I dont believe that. From a 44 year career in public history, most notably as a former and founding executive of some place. Previously served as historian and manager of a National Park service, before becoming the first president of the association of preservation of civil war studies. Hes currently on work on the last two volumes of his trilogy, which we desperately waiting for. Whats going on . Theyre coming . Great. Im very happy to introduce a. Wilson green. Why is it good to look out on these faces. Ive gotta say. Its just wonderful to be with you all. Especially to be with such great colleagues. We are really fortunate that ryan was able to make it because he has a twoweek engagement at the boom boom room at the holiday inn and you took time off to join us, so thank you for that brian. I hope your flight is and you can get back to the show at the holiday. And pete carmichael, what a great [inaudible] im a little supplies that he would take a shot at my sartorial habits because, this is a fellow who wears scarves in the middle of july. New york and shows up at symposiums without socks on, wearing a sport coat. But be that as it may, thank you for those kind words and thanks for coming out. I must have not gotten the memo about the way talks are supposed to go. Weve had these thought pieces and all this great humor, im just gonna do like a straight battle talk. So i hope that you still have some energy and some brain cells left because this talk on the first petersburg offensive is pretty complicated. Everyones been to penal petersburg battlefield, and you think you understand the first petersburg offensive, but it involves four armies, it involves four days of combat plus a major Logistical Movement in order to get there. Well try to go through this, and hopefully youll have a better understanding of what i think is a very complex is my microphone cutting in and out . And i doing something wrong . Okay. Well Edward Porter alexander, the fa famous artillery thought that this was the most interesting point in the whole history of the confederacy. You may not agree with him, but the event between an 1864, if they had gone differently at petersburg would have altered the trajectory of the civil war tremendously. Perhaps shortening it by months. So my talk is going to address the movements to petersburg at that time, the conduct of combat not in a micro tech [inaudible] now the Petersburg Campaign was [inaudible] appointment of ulysses s grant, the chief of all union armies. Grant brought to strategic [inaudible] first, to apply [inaudible] across the various theaters of the war. It looks like were gonna get some technical help here. You dont want to miss any of my words, im sure. Well if i was brian wills, and telegenic right now. Ill just keep going. The second thing of course is that he decided not to make his headquarters in washington [inaudible] , instead i dont think this [inaudible] to make his headquarters with the army [inaudible] and pursue relentless operations against the confederate opponents. Grant would of course would implement his plan in early may, sending his protegee, William T Sherman on a campaign in georgia to concentrate on his opponent, Joseph Johnston and the railroad atlanta. In virginia, meade would focus laser like on the army of robert e. Lee. To subordinate offenses with towards the south side of failed in me. France segel being defeated in the valley in newmarket, and Benjamin Butler being halted at Bermuda Hundred, south of richmond. The army of the tournament, across the river at the same time, a series of costly ingredients at the wilderness. At the north end of the river, and coal harbor. Losing some 60,000 men in the process. Inflicting sufficient number of casualties on leads army, to eliminated at as an offensive weapon. It was primarily now only potent on the defense. A new threat in the valley posed by david hunter compelled general [inaudible] to release about [inaudible] under double early, to deal with that threat as well. But with butlers access to richmond blocked by confederate forces, under pierre goo staff beauregard, and lee seemingly if movable, in front of the confederate capital enrichment, grant made a bold decision. He would shift his entire army south of the james river, capture petersburg, 23 miles below the confederate paddle, which was logistics apply nexus. Now petersburg, as many of you know, was a much more relatively important city then that it is today. It was the seventh largest city in the confederacy, the second largest city in the commonwealth of virginia. No fewer than five railroads led into what was known as the cockade city at that time. Three of them, the richmond and petersburg railroad, the Southside Railroad at pete petersburg, its real name was the petersburg real road thats where it ended in wilbur, North Carolina. All of it remained crucial, to the confederate supply situation. In fact with the [inaudible] richmond petersburg, the richmond, fredericksburg potomac railroad, and the Virginia Central railroad all being interdicted by union forces, the capture of petersburg and those railroads would have entered richmond more abundant. So oh i dont think the [inaudible] in saying that the capture of petersburg would have been tantamount to the capture of richmond. Theres an awful lot of at stake in this campaign. Grant was only too aware of the risks involved in this maneuver. He has to disengage from his opponents around harbor. Without lee knowing it in order to gain a head start on a much longer route to petersburg than lee [inaudible] diab. Once li realized that grant had departed, he would need to persuade the [inaudible] that he was going to be approaching richmond in the same way that George Mcclelland had ten, two years earlier in 1862. Even if all of this went according to plan, [inaudible] ask negotiating swapping [inaudible] river. And [inaudible] river, which was as much as 80 feet deep, and as wide as 4000 feet in some places. And [inaudible] in this journey, the army of the potomac would be spread out and vulnerable. Never more so than in the process of crossing the james river. The movement also put the army in jeopardy, as grant would be much further away from the army of the james than would be the army of north virginia. Lastly, [inaudible] was contrary about the administration expected grant [inaudible] and [inaudible] change of microphones. [inaudible] and beyond that, the fear of losing washington. Exposing washingtons forces. Now lets face it [inaudible] aya, had not exactly beeny [inaudible] even [inaudible] would have been compromised. I dont know that lincoln [inaudible] idiot now thats a very complicated map, and probably more complicated than you need to try to inculcate from your seats out there. But it shows you the planning the grant went into in order to get this movement to the james. The first thing he did had nothing to do with going south. The first thing he did was to attack sheridan, and two thirds of the cavalry to make a raid north against the Virginia Central railroad. Ultimately he hoped that sheridan would link up with the coming east from the valley, but more imports from our purposes, the raid would naturally compel lee to detach some of his own cavalry in order to counter sheridans movement. And absent, a lot of cavalry, that would make the opportunity for grant to make a Stealthy Movement to the james much more easy. He also arranged for a motley fleet of ferryboats to be assembled at fort minh row, and move up the james river to provide transportation for his army. He then authorized butler to destroy the railroad bridge connecting petersburg with Chester Field County on the north side of the river. In order to prevent lee from detaching troops to the north and coming to petersburgs rescue. That operation did not succeed, on june 9th, the so called battle of old men and young boys prevented that railroad bridge from being destroyed. Now grant began his movement to the james on june the 12th. There were 12 army corps involved in this movement. The four in the army of the potomac, and balmy smiths 18 corps, which had joined meads army prior to cold harbor. He each core disengaged from north to south, following carefully selected routes in order to expedite the movement to the james river, while the 18th corps would march to White House Landing on the Potomac River and take water transportation to get back to the area north of the appomattox river. Now the Chickahominy River, for the other four corps, would pose the first obstacle to this movement. Describe it when you officer of a wide ditch partly choked by web logs and full of brown, tepid, sickly water, whose slow current would scarcely carry a straw along. The plan called for the army to move across the chickahominy in three different places, by building pontoon bridges there. Either south or poised to cross it. Now, in order to follow that other precept of convincingly lee he was moving towards richmond, north of the james river the way mcallen had approached it in 1862, meade said two divisions of the core and number grade of cavalry toward an important crossroads known as glendale, or on this map, riddles shop. You can see it better than i can. There it is, right there. That is glendale. Its where the big battle took place on june 30th of 1862. A sharp fight on june 13th left modest casualties and glendale and confederate hands. But reinforce the notion and leaves mind that this thrust might actually represent grants next attempt to capture richmond. This is not to say that lee was insensible to the possibility of grant going across the james. The confederate commanders primary responsibility was what . Richmond. To protect richmond. Unless he could be sure that grant would not threaten the confederate capital, lee would maintain his position on the north side. Counting on the army of beauregard to provide intelligence regarding any operations on the south side. Because all of beads pontoons in his terrain were required to cross the Chickahominy River, he put general butler in charge of the pontoon bridge across the james river. Butler would turn to his chief engineer, brigadier white sought to select a crossing points and attempt a construction. He would recommend a position on the peninsula where the river measured a little less than 2000 feet across. The banks on both sides required significant modifications. 150 man immediately went into the force, cut down giant cypress trees and created avenues of approaches, especially on the north bank of the river was very swampy and then built better approaches on the south side of the river as well. By working around the clock, by the night of june 14th and 15th, they had built a pontoon bridge consisting of 101 boats and 2000 feet across. As one confederate said, the greatest bridge which the world has seen since the days of xerxes. In the meantime, the Union Infantry began gathering on the north bank of the james. On june 14th, they got hancock a second corps, her ratios and most of warrens fifth core were on the north bank of the river in position to cross having negotiated the remaining ground without any problems. Meanwhile, smic 18th corps moved up the james river and prepared to disembark at Bermuda Hundred. Only the supply wagons that were guarded by the black division of the ninth corps and problems discovering their designated crossing point down there on the chickahominy at kohls ferry was impractical. They had to move back up to a place called windsor shaves in order to try to get across. They would be delayed, everybody else had achieved a spectacular logistical achievement. Grant had no doubt. Stolen a march on robert e. Lee. He simply had to approach petersburg, overwhelm a line of thin defenders that were supposed to be around the city and then reap the benefits. Forcing lee to fight for his communications, accept a siege of richmond, or abandon the confederate capital. There is the union set up for this. What about the confederate perspective . As i mentioned, he was perfectly cognizant of the potential of grant crossing sooner or later and getting to the south side of the james. But lee was uncertain of grant s intentions. He declined to consider butler s june 9th effort as anything more than a reconnaissance. No troops have left general grants army. Lee assured a nervous beauregard. Not have crossed james river without being perceived. Now, these competence and this was derived from his own intelligence gathering abilities and on beauregards line of scouts that were allegedly arrayed down the banks of the james river for many miles. But still, lee would order robert hokes division, which had been loaned to the army of Northern Virginia by beauregards army prior to cole harbor, to move to the pontoon bridge of the confederates at chapmans blacks. Just in case those federals appeared on the south side of the river. By june 14th, as grant arranged his petersburg offensive, beauregard speculated about the location and intentions of their enemy. Lee responded to an inquiry from president davis early that afternoon by speculating, quote, i think the enemy must be preparing to move south of the james. Of course, lead news that some federals had moved self, and another large body had boarded boats at the landing. This could mean that grant was changing his base to harrisons landing, just like mcclellan did two years earlier. He could be resupplied for another movement against Richmond South of the river, north of the river, rather. All of those federals boarding boats might be some of these regiments that had their terms of enlistment expire and were heading home thousands were doing that. We have to be extremely watchful and guarded, lee advised. A witness did not equate changing focus yet from richmond to petersburg. Beauregard was less ambivalent about grants intentions. He beseeched the War Department to return the division immediately, warning if some combination of the armies attacked him, i cannot be responsible for consequences. When this appeal elicited no response, beauregard took matters into his own hands and at tempt him on june 14th sent orders to hoke who was part of his army to move across the james. He also sent Staff Officers to lee to justify the shift. The absence of any hard evidence, and beauregards penchant for the fantastic, convinced almost no one in richmond and certainly generally of any imminent disaster. So, while beauregard fretted and lee remained cautious, grant and meade proceeded on june 14th with there are fence of plans. Smiths 18 corps had boarded the transports on june 13th. By the next day, had begun a staggered arrival at various points, at Bermuda Hundred, and up the river at point of rocks and broadway landing. This disembarkation began in the middle of the afternoon of the 14th and would continue until after dark. Meanwhile, Winfield Scott hancocks second corps at 8 30 am. Received orders from meade to cross the river, utilizing that makeshift fleet that grant had assembled. While the engineers were putting the final touches on the pontoon bridge. Before noon, the first of hancocks corps boarded their boats and by 1 pm on the 14th, they were on the shore of the right bank. Delighting the veterans, such as this new jersey shoulder, who had grown disenchanted with the virginia landscape. As we steamed across the beautiful river, he said are were filled with hope. We had bid farewell to the swamp and muslim of the chickahominy. The long live of graves that stretched not only across the peninsula, but across the hills and valleys and streams and fertile fields. And tangled swamps of virginia up to the rapid end. We were bidding farewell, he said, to the old battlefields and entering upon a new field of operations. It would take hancock until about dawn on the morning of june 15th to ferry his three divisions across the river. By 5 am, the second corps was comfortably encamped on the south side. Many of the men cleansing the grime of 40 days of constant campaigning by taking swims in the james. Hancock remained on the north side, communicating by signal flight to the far bank. This is an important point. In most military operations that dont succeed, there are a series of mistakes. This is an important one that i dont think too many people have called attention to. It was critical. Hancock confirmed to meade that his corps, contrary to earlier reports, had three days of rations on hands. And would not be out of food that night. So, while the engineers finished their bridge and hancocks men ferried across the river, grant boarded a steamer and met with butler at Bermuda Hundred to outline the plans for the attack. Grant told butler that he would be solely responsible for the attack. Hancock would require reprovisioning before marching towards petersburg. With meades wagons, as i, said stalled on the north side of the Chickahominy River rating to get and find a different way to get across, butler will be responsible for providing the rations. 60,000 of them. Grant says to butler, without this precaution, the services of this corps, meaning hancock, cannot be had for and emergency tomorrow. This message not only implied that grant considered hancocks participation in the june 15th offensive as necessary only in and emergency, he was unaware of hancocks actual supply situation. Grant returned to the north side at about sunset on the 14th and informed meade of butlers supply mission. Meade dutifully provided those orders to hancock at 10 00 that night telling him not to advance until butlers supply ships had arrived to give him the 60,000 rations. Hancock would obey those orders, of course. A decision that he was very unlikely to have made had he known that his presence at petersburg was expected. Ultimately, the supply ships failed to arrive. At 10 30 in the morning on june 15th, mead released hancock to begin his trek towards petersburg. Thats nearly six hours were wasted between the time of the second corps arrived on the south bank and their departure for the front. Six hours and they mightve changed history. As for the 18th corps, grants orders to butler were to begin smiths march towards petersburg that night and to launch his attack, quote, as soon as he could after daylight. Grant assumed that butler would capture petersburg that morning and that hancock would then be available later in the day to help smith hold the city should lee try to redeem the situation. Smith would have the two white divisions that arrived in cold harbor, two brigades taken from his Bermuda Hundred line, 2500 calgary under august, and 37 African American soldiers from city point under edward hanks. A total of about 14,000 men. Smith would claim, i think justifiably, that he had learned nothing of these plans until late on the 14th. His troops are beginning to disembark from their ships from a cold harbor. Obviously, it would take time to organize his men. They had landed in three different points. Without any divisional integrity. So they had to get everybody together, get them all in their proper brigades and divisions. Smith would then have to cross the appomattox river in the dark and march five miles towards petersburg before deploying for his attack. In short, in short, grants expectation of the dawn offensive was fantasy. An echo of the poor planning that had plagued hancocks departure. Five men, grant, butler, meade, smith, and hancock. They all needed to be on the same page in order for this plan to work. Subordinates but grant failed to communicate his battle plans to all the subordinates. And thus, like the university of georgia which drives down the field to the three yard line, and then fumbles [laughs] , the generalinchief jeopardized the potential payoff of his brilliant march to the. James would about the confederates . What are they up to . Of course this fellow, beauregard, was in command of something called the department of North Carolina since april 23rd. This was a Huge Department that extended from the south, the mouth of the Cape Fear River all the way up to the south bank of the james river. The virginia portion of his domain was called the First Military district. It was under the command of henry wise, the former governor of virginia. He had authority over the garrison troops in his district, well bush ron johnsons division for containing butler at Bermuda Hundred, behind a compact defensive position known as the it line. A four mile defensive line, anchored on the left by the james, and the appomattox rivers. A portion of johnsons division was on detached duty. Beauregard deployed about 3300 men, on the howlett line. At petersburg, an elaborate defensive position known as the dematha line, featuring 55 artillery batteries connected by an infantry curtain that extended by ten miles, anchored by both flanks on the appomattox river, was defended by about 4000 men. Including a large contingent of local militia, which of course would be less than one third of smiths troops approaching petersburg. No wonder beauregard was very anxious to return hokes 6600 men to his army. But despite the louisianans orders, the previous night, hoke would not start to cross the james until nearly noon on the 15th. Leaving beauregard on his own for this impending clash. Now, once informed of his assignment, but the smith quickly organized his advance about as well as he could, many of whom had enjoyed little or no arrest after getting off of their boats. And starting their march across the pontoon bridges of the appomattox river. His plan called for the cavalry to lead the way, dispersing any resistance between their approach and the dimmock line, and allowing the infantry to march directly against according to butler, defended only by a skeleton force. Now the federals began their march between 2 and 3 am, on the 15th, but coates was delayed in crossing the bridges. Not until about 5 00, half an hour after, would smiths two white divisions joining the black troops of edward hicks on the south side of the appomattox river. Now the Union Cavalry rode ahead and encountered a stubborn confederate resistance at a place called baylors farm. Several miles east, of the demonic line. This is just east of the interchange with highway 36 and itwo 95 today. Its pretty much a lost battlefield. Declaring the resistance too powerful for cavalry, smith called on hanks to shove the rebels aside. The black troops lurched forward in their fourth combat absorbing significant casualties from a single cavalry regiment, supported by one battery of artillery. Eventually the four or 500 gray coats fell back, giving the black troops a hardearned victory, accompanied by a sinister byproduct the intimidation of baldy smith. A most unexpected place i had been called upon to develop my force and make an assault against this fact cost me, at once, to cease taking anything for granted that had been asserted. Grants don attack already a moot point would now face further delay. Now smooth resumed his approach with extreme caution. Advanced align, and halting it every intervening ridge between and the not until the afternoon to the federals approach the confederate division. Smith would deploy his three divisions from the appomattox river on his right, southward with tanks on the left, and the cavalry even further to the left. Along the line, rebel cannon belched forth at their new targets, inflicting minor casualties but further persuading smith that contrary to butlers sister, beauregards defenses were substantial. Smith opted to conduct a thorough reconnaissance, to identify the targets for his assault, taking almost all afternoon to decide on focusing on a place called battery five. A salient near the city point railroad. So while this is all going on on the 15th, whats our friend general hancock doing . He had left the south bank of the james, remember, about 10 30 that morning. He was traveling in an ambulance. He was not mobile. His gettysburg wound was festering. He was unable to mount a horse. His men were marching under unrelenting heat. It was over 95 degrees that day. They were traversing poor roads and they had such faulty maps that one of his divisions, francis barlows, which you see wandering off in the wrong direction, got completely last, and would be out of action. Not until about 5 30 in the afternoon, 10 30 they started, at 5 30 in the afternoon, did they did david brunis division begin to approach the confederate position. At that point, breathless couriers arrived from grant and smith, urging hancock to support smiths impending attack. Hancock is so by the urgency of the orders, hes under no illusion at this point that he is expected to participate in the fight. And it was almost impossible to find out where the smith wanted him to go. It was poor staff work, there was no maps. More time is elapsed for this. Smith will finally be successful. He identified a ravine that provided some between batteries six and seven, thats for you people who are local, thats where a highway 36 goes under the park tour road, and his plan was to send a reinforced skirmish line, really, in order to make the attack. He said my best chances of success was to trust a very heavy skirmish line that would not in itself attract much artillery fire, and which would get be sufficient to do the work that the enemy was not strong in infantry. Troops from william brookss division would initiate the attack, triggering responses by john martin dales division on his right, and hence his black division on his left. Smith further thought that it would be best to degrade the defensive confederate defenses he gave orders to his artillery commander to bring up the guns and began firing immediately. Unbeknownst to him, the artillery commander took all the horses out to be watered. It took time to get back, bringing the guns into position, the artillery opens up, does a 20 minute bombardment. Then smith launches his attack. About 20 7 00 at night to make a long story short, they penetrated between that ravine, between batteries six and seven, and the entire compliment of confederate artillery in those batteries and the adjacent batteries on either side surrendered. On brooks is right, martin dale scattered the defenders of batteries three and four, while the black troops accomplished even more. Capturing batteries six, seven, eight, nine, and finally ten. By the time the darkness enveloped the bloodstained landscape, smith had conquered two miles of the confederate line and captured at least 13 guns and inflicted hundreds of casualties. Now the question remained, what would the federals do with this tardy but decisive victory . Now with barlows division lost, only bernese and gibbons divisions of the second corps were available to respond to those early urgent messages to assist smith. As i said, poor communications, confusing geography conspired to delay their arrival until well after dark, after most of the fighting had already been concluded. Hancock met with smith about 9 00 who had explained to hancock what had transpired and pointed out the extent of his achievement. Hancock confirmed that bernie and gibbon were available to continue the offensive, although it hancock outranked smith, he deferred to history news judgment. Saying, i desire not to interfere with his honor, as he was directed to take the place. Smith declined to continue the attack, requesting only that hancocks two divisions relieve brooks and hinks at the front and prepare to meet any confederate counterattacks. A second core unit stumbled forward in the dark, and between 11 and three in the morning, occupied the captured line. Now, one of the enduring questions of the petersburg story is the wisdom of smiths and hancocks decision that night. There were certainly bitter voices who decried the failure to press ahead and try to capture petersburg. A private in the fourth u. S. Artillery, for example, remembered that, gradually the fact that we were not to fight that night impressed itself upon us. The rage of the intelligent enlisted men was devilish. The most blood curdling blasphemy i ever listen to i heard that night. Uttered by men who knew they were to be sacrificed in the morning. Many blamed smith, such as the staff officer that believe that petersburg wouldve gone like a rotten branch, had smith exercise sufficient courage. Other critics cited the bright moonlight that would have guided the federalists into what was presumed to be in defenseless city. Now, its easy to condemn baldy smith who is a rather unlikable character and whose postwar appalachia wreaked of to do so is too simplistic. Although hancock is certainly blameless for his corps slow approach from the james on june 15th, he certainly could have insisted on a coordinated advance after 9 00, if in his judgment, such an attack was warranted. He did not. Neither of the army commanders, butler, or meade, set foot anywhere near the scene of action, nor did grant, who said quarters at city point were barely an hours ride from the front. All three of these men could have ordered an assault and had the authority to do so if they wished. Now smith would cite a plethora of reasons why he didnt continue the assault. Chief among them the darkness and the disorganization of his troops, particularly the blacks, smith also believed that by capturing batteries three through ten he could mountain artillery but martin meant close enough to petersburg to render it indefensible. Perhaps most of all, smith expressed concern that the confederates had been reinforced, and to plunge troops into the darkness against a enemy of unknown strength would have been, as he said, simple madness, and would have inevitably resulted in disaster and the loss of all that we had gained. Although in hindsight, we should conclude that hancock and smith should have pressed on that night, i think they acted reasonably, and the confederates were in fact gathering strength. Now general beauregard had arrived in petersburg about 6 pm that night, traveling from his headquarters north of town. The attack that quickly followed didnt particularly surprise him. Hed been predicting this disaster for days. But now the question for him was simple. Should he defend petersburg by stripping the defenses of Bermuda Hundred, or forsake the kirk a city and hold the howlett line . He had appealed to the War Department and successfully all throughout the day for instructions as to which of those options he should exercise, but never received an answer. He was on his own. And not long after that federal breakthrough, the leading elements of hokes division begin to arrive in petersburg in the form of johnson 1400 confederate south carolinians, much to the delight of the panic stricken citizens. Hagan initially received instructions to extend the right flank, but when the news of the collapse of the eastern portion of the line reached petersburg it sent him to establish a defensive perimeter behind the broken batteries. Hagan almost stumbled into the federal lines, that occurred near at harrisons creek. But with the aid of Border Guards very competent chief engineer, a man whose unfamiliar to most of you, but shouldnt be, one of the best engineers in the confederate army, if a fellow named david b. Harris, hagood helped draw a new line of defense, connecting the intact dimmock line between batteries two and 15. During the night, georgians, and then the north carolinians james martin, and thomas brigades, extended the line, digging furiously to create a barrier. In the meantime, beauregard made the decision to abandon the howlett line and bring johnsons division to petersburg, giving him a 11,000 men to meet the combined forces of smith and hancock, whos still outnumbered the confederates 3 to 1. Beauregard informed lee of his decision, and big time to replace johnsons troops before butler discovered that the halep line was evacuated, and moved west to sever the road and railroad connections between richmond and petersburg. In the predawn hours of june 16th, lee ordered george picketts division, the first core of the army of Northern Virginia, about 4500 men, to cross the james for this purpose. So how would the federal high command react on june 16th to this developing operational situation . Lee put picketts men on the road to the river crossings at three in the morning, and a few hours later [inaudible] they quickly scattered them, although there is only a fraction of butlers men involved in this, they quickly began ripping up the tracks of the richmond and petersburg railroad. Meanwhile, two Additional Union corps, burnsides ninth, and mormons fifth, began using the completed, pontoon bridge and the ferry boats to cross the james with orders to extend hancocks at the same time johnsons gray coats across the atlantic, and extended the new confederate defensive perimeter to hancocks deployment. Throughout the day, the second and 18th corps crept forward slowly and cautiously and discovered the new rebel defenses. Grant nearly ordered burnside and warren to provide flank protection, while the second and 18th corps spent the day identifying points for a proposed evening attack. As the federalists probe the confederates dug. Late on the afternoon of june 16th, beauregard had fashioned the hay would line into a defensive position. Meanwhile up at Bermuda Hundred, butler only committed a relative handful of history ups to the occupation of destruction of the vital length that connected richmond and petersburg. As a result, when pickets leading brigade arrived on the scene, the federals quickly withdrew. I think butlers failure to hold the position on the r b railroad was an even more egregious mistake than the overcaution of hancock and smith the previous night. When Fields Division arrive later on the day on the 16th, any opportunity to block additional confederate troops coming from richmond to petersburg had evaporated. Meanwhile, south of the appomattox, mead launched his attack on june 16th about 6 pm. All three careers then president , the 18th, second, and now the ninth, on the left advanced. Smith and bernstein demonstrated never seriously challenged the confederates in their. Front hancocks attack was a bit more spirited, resulted in the captures of batteries 13 and 14, but ran out of steam without seriously damaging beauregards new perimeter. The current confederate commander recognize that the haygood line was vulnerable, and ordered colonel harris to lay out new defenses even closer to petersburg. During the day on june 16th, lee continued to press beauregard, no fewer than four times, to find out information on meades whereabouts. And at 9 30 that morning, beauregard had notified lee of hancocks presence. But heres another communications problem. He sent that message to these headquarters north of the james. By then, lee had moved his headquarters south of the river, and that message never caught up with generally. Not until 7 pm woods beauregard again mention the presence of the second quarter. News natalie, after two days that a portion of the army of the potomac was at petersburg. Heres something i just dont understand. First of all, beauregard never recognize the presence of the ninth corps, or the fifth tour, despite the fact that he had skirmished with them. And how in the world did those scouts along the james river miss a 2000 foot long pontoon bridge, varying thousands of troops up the james river. I dont have an answer for that. But they didnt. Solely contented himself with shifting the last of the First Quarter divisions, closer to the pontoon bridge, but keeping ap hills core north of the james in position to defend richmond against what was now [inaudible] after the fighting had dined [inaudible] grant however admitted that, quote, not knowing appearances in front of you, i cannot give positive directions how far or how hard you should push in the morning. I believe this two year judgment knowing that you will push any advantage that may be gained. Thats the generalinchief can cindy to delegate operational decisions to me the first offensive with George Meades game completely not grants pennsylvania didnt hesitate he passed the information on to hancock encouraging those officers to make the attack to exploit the huge if possible leading numerical advantage over the beleaguered beauregard. Hancocks corps had somewhat been bloodied on the 16th, so the events was the responsibility that belong to burnside. Burnsides black division had not yet across the river. He would have the services of his three white divisions. During the course of the day, each of those divisions would venture separate assaults, never achieving coordination with each other, or with the second and fifth corps on their flanks. The morning assault, conducting by robert putters division, targeted a southern flank of Border Guards defenses, centered on the heinel occupied by something called the shand house. Those who are familiar with this area. The shand house null is just to the right side of the back gate to fort lee along route 109. The Civil War Trust is in process of acquiring some of that land, now. Granted knitted that he wasnt sure what was going to happen, but potter had moved his men up to the base of the hill during the night and head up the slope, sending virginians, and ransoms north carolinians fleeing, and decimating fultons tennessee brigade, capturing some 600 men, and all four of the guns on chance. Hill putter expected his victory would be exploited by the second corps on his right, and reinforcements from james latelys division on his left and rear, but neither of those units advanced. Lately citing terrain too difficult to navigate. Hancocks men claiming with dubious for a city that they try to attack. It was the same old story again. The most spirited and gallant attack without adequate support, said a match institutions veteran. Had a single corps been on the ground, or had the divisions that were ordered to support us be ready to advance, the fearful carnage of the two succeeding days with atlas have been prevented. Orlando wilcoxs division had spent the night behind the second corps, but by about 10 am on the 17th, they moved into the deep ravines behind the shand house ridge. Burnside assigned his eccentric chief engineer, james st. Claire morton, to add them to find the most likely ground for wilcoxs attack. He selected the terrain north of the shand house ridge, where the confederates who had been defeated that morning were desperately preparing a new line that were of yet of limited utility. Wilcoxs men came out of their protective ravine, hampered by a faulty tactical alignment, and greeted by waves of confederate canister. Nevertheless the federals approach this makeshift line and almost were in position to capture the works, when major morton directed the men to execute a half wheel to the right. You see this represented on the map. Morton paid for this illconceived tactic with his life, as all that confederate fire hit their left flank, and wilcoxs men fled for safety behind hancocks line. It seems that her blue coats a bountiful harvest field, wrote a wisconsin shoulder. Barely, it was a harvest of death. Now the final attack of the day came from a division commanded by james ledley. Lately, of course, i hear some chuckles, would become infamous six weeks later for his role of the battle of the crater. But his flaws were already evident to any observer. His previous combat experience in may featured it drunken an unauthorized attack. By the time his division was ready to execute their assault on the 17th, ledley was to inebriated to assume command. A supply of artificial courage which he had taken carried him beyond the proper counter, ploys and rendered him in which condition he remained in the movie, explained a massachusetts captain. One of latelys commanders had to lead the assault. The federals they are where he rebels and what was left of the evening seriously digging the earth works along the line that harris had laid out. Meanwhile in bermuda pick it restored all that even lost the day before and stained content to spam the is the frustrating as the federal performance on june 17 must have been to grant robert e. Lee severed his own anxiety that day. At daybreak he pressed beauregard to clarify the identity of his opponents predict real commander replied that he faced to korsak federalists presumably the 18th and second taint course still failing to acknowledge burnside and warren. At 11 15 or inside compounded the confusion by informing lee that warren has likely abandon the petersburg area and is headed for the piedmont to confront early only suggesting that we send them reinforcements so he could crush the yankee line but not long after beauregard changed his tune telling lee a local citizen had reported a 30,000 have crossed the river former guard changed the tune, tellingly that a local citizen reported 30,000 federals across the james river and appealed to lead to help him hold the position. One can only imagine these reaction to this conflicting intelligence. At 4 30 that afternoon, at least told beauregard, have no information about grant crossing the james river. But ordered hail and kershaw to approach the pontoon bridges at the bluff. Then it last, beauregard provided lee with an ambiguous confirmation that the ninth corps was on the ground in front of him and that the fifth and six court were either there or in route to petersburg. Li finally had the information he needed to shift the rest of his army south he ordered kershaw to cross the river immediately and told hill to march to the pontoon bridges and be prepared to cross to the set aside at dawn. It was now a race with meat and grant exceed an overwhelming beauregards exhausted man before the army of Northern Virginia could arrive and save the city. Kershaws division began as the march to petersburg at three in the morning. If you mourn started trapping across the pontoon bridges well fields brigade left their trenches up married 100 and followed in kershaws footsteps. Union forces were also on the move that morning, reacting to meads nighttime orders to commence a coordinated advance of daylight. For course, the 18th, ninth, fifth, lurch forward and prepared to engage the confederates. In some places they met resistance. Most of the wouldbe attackers encountered the abandoned lives of the hagood loan. Surprise but undeterred, he told the commanders to prepare a new attack focused on the new completed harris line. The 18th and second corps press forward but soon discovered that the rebel works in their front were well prepared and adequately manned in their efforts came to not. Further south, the ninth and fifth corps never advanced at all, claiming to be or professing that they had never received the mandatory orders to assault. These failures infuriated meade hooper once lost his poise and snapped in an order. I find it useless to appoint an hour to affect cooperation demanding that all four of his corps advanced without reference to the disposition of any of the other corps. By this time, they are going to church, god love you. By this time, kershaw had extended the confederate right and field was moving into position law hill is laying it south to get to petersburg. The federals responded to meades frustration and preemptive attack orders and an uneven and universally unsuccessful fashion. On the far left of the, line warns the merging 200 yards of the rebel line can do that. For unexplained reasons they have never directed people to do this but you can walk with your footsteps on the first main artillery. That field became a seething. They came in from the front the right and the left and as many of you know in less than 10 minutes, 632 of the 900 men who began the charge were killed or wounded the largest loss suffered in one battle by any regimen during the war. The final union of the day came from burnsides elements of whom managed north of the petersburg award in front of it considers strong point known as elliott and mike them in on the other side failed to penetrate the confederate works. These men dug and exploited the cover provided by the valiant creek setting the stage vi weeks later for the battle. Lee had a right to petersburg shortly before noon and that was beauregard at the Customs House downtown and observed the situation was beauregard near the high ground. Mercurial creole urged him to take an offensive against expose federal left flank and lee declined and remained on the defensive in that decision of course led to the successful repulse of the many uncoordinated union attacks and ended the first petersburg offensive. The tramp that last holding the invaders at bay and saving the city of the rule of the beast. The yankees have a large force but if they keep on charging we will have them all killed in a few days. Ulysses s. Grant for the time being had seen enough killing although estimates vary provide best guess is 13,000 federal soldiers became casualties between june 15 and 18th. Confederate casualty figures are even more murky but my guess is about 2500 to 3000 became casualties as well. About 10 00 that evening george meade sent a summary of todays actions to grant including expressing great or get im not able to report adding i believe every effort in my command has been made. Grant immediately replied with condemnation im perfectly satisfied he wrote that all that has been done could be done. Of course that was far from the truth. Until the rival the first troops from lees army in the morning of june 18 grants army grew as much as 51 despite confederate earthworks. A few weeks later so they confessed to his trusted staff officer that i should have taken petersburg that had reason to calculate the success but he didnt, but he didnt. Why . I think the primary cause was a federal failure and the condition of the troops particularly needs army on the potomac. The 49 days of contingent marching and firing absolutely requires rest. He added he cannot replace officers with experience men because theres no time for rear cassation or careful selection. There could be no doubt that horrendous casualties and consequential attrition at the line and fill command level reduce the efficiency and the esprit de corps of the army potomac. With many of the best leaders and brave as fighting men lying in shallow graves are languishing in with many of his best tactical victories, and fighting man, languishing in hospitals, these offensive capabilities were greatly diminished. Thats not to say that the soldiers were to demoralize to fight. The long line of killed and wounded during the first offensive stance as a new testimony. But their willingness and ability to press an attack vanished. There were also mistakes made at the higher command levels. Grants failure to communicate his battle plan to all the principles involved seriously compromised his success for june 15th. Smiths timidity in executing his assault that day allowed reinforcements to bolster beauregards shattered ranks that evening, and the tardy attack meant that a push into petersburg must occur in the dark, the risk either smith or hancock was willing to take. That hesitation and conservative mind set infected the other core commanders who only rarely felt sufficiently comfortable about their flanks to advance in concert with one another, leading to the piecemeal assaults that characterized the federal operations during the succeeding three days. Benjamin butler as i said fumbled a major opportunity to sever the road and railroad connections between richmond and petersburg when he so easily surrendered his position between the two cities, allowing lead to funnel troops into petersburg without interference. And at least part of the overall explanation lies with the generalinchief whose fingerprints were all but invisible during these four days. Although, delegating operational decisions to his subordinates was fairly typical of grants generalship. Of course the confederates had a great deal to do with the outcome. Borg ordered and his little army performed about as well as any force during the entire world. As one observer put it, with them such fearful and incredible as against him, beauregard maintained a successful barrier against the advance, a feat of war almost without precedent. That might be overstating the case just a tad, beauregard does deserve high praise for selecting his two new lines of defense, timing the evacuation of the old lines follow scene and allocating hoax and johnsons brigades properly. But theres frankly little evidence that beauregard had any influence on the combat the thwarted the attacks, to the limited degree of tactical improvisation when fighting on the offensive is relevant. On the negative side of beauregards ledger is remarkably poor intelligence that is inconsistent of the situation in the front contributed to the indecision and hesitation to reinforce his friendly, historians often cite his failure to reinforce petersburg more quickly as one of the worst blemishes on his record. There can be no question that grant stole the march on the great commander, and that his deception kept the uncertain of his enemies whereabouts, i think lee acted reasonably given the Information Available to him between june 13th and 17th. As we said, these first responsibility with the protection of richmond. Without some assurance that the federal army was not lurking on the north side of the james, his decision to send incremental reinforcement south was reasonable and prudent. Once he had definitive information of the federal presence at petersburg, he acted swiftly. I think the first petersburg offensive should be ranked among the major battles of the civil war. More than 125,000 soldiers battled for three days resulting in casualties approaching 16, 000, numbers that correlate with the largest and bloody sunday agents of the war. Grants failure to capture petersburg would lead to during the next 288 days, before he achieved the victory that might have been his that might have been his earlier. Thank you very much. My mission on these talks is always too exhausting to the point where you have no embarrassing questions, and expose my superficial knowledge of the subject. Thank you very much. Is there anything out there that anybody has . Petes gonna attack me about robert pete is going to attack me about e. Lee. Robert e. Lee. A few quick questions. The first question is, you think about these opening assaults. I imagine that the casualties were extraordinarily hard. They are not at all. Youre talking 3 to 4 days. Of course, its required of me to always mentioned gettysburg. Three days of gettysburg, lets do a little comparison. Even todays. Take your two i would like for you to explain to us, is this all the hesitancy of these union attacks . I would say theyre fairly light. A second quick question. You think about world war i and the song which dominates our thinking in terms of how we imagined tactics on the western front. When, in fact, the first days of the psalm did not infect characterize what followed. Soldiers adjusted on the side. Could you help us understand, did in the siege of petersburg, not when theyre doing union armies during the flanking maneuvers to the south, the sleeves lines themselves, where the raids from more for a change on the front . Two questions. First of all, were comparing the first petersburg offensive with the largest battle in the north american continent. I guess most bottles would fail by comparison to that. I dont think 16,000 casualties is insignificant. My point is, if you had asked people in this room to list the ten most important battles, the bloodiest battles, the major battles, none would mentioned june 15th 18th. My point is, this was a much more sanguinary and consequential civil war battle then its given credit for. Relative numbers can be argued all day. Secondly, i take exception to your characterization of the Petersburg Campaign. It was not a siege. To me, a siege operation implies two things. One, an encirclement of one army by another where there is no escape. Of course, that was never true, even as lays up a third of 1865. That was not true. Secondly, according to military protocol, a siege involves standard approaches. Mike you had import hudson. Those are sieges. General mead after the second petersburg offensive which occurred between june 21st and 24th, less than a week all that was happening during the first offensive actually went to grant and said, look, at least these things arent working. We should exercise official siege operations. Grant said, okay, it lasted for about 36 hours. Grant said no more digging in the trenches. We are going to continue the operations. In that regard, i think petersburg is always understood as a siege. That has deprive petersburg of a lot of the interest that civil war students have, what is more boring than a status siege . It is just depressing, there is no real attacks to understand. Who cares, lets move on to the appomattox and well be done with it. You said, we are dismissing these. There are nine federal offenses. There was an awful lot of maneuver at petersburg. Where there slack times in between . There are various trench raids. There were various collaborates north and south of the james river. One thing you have to understand, the Petersburg Campaign involves directly all the actions up in the county. These mysterious battles that no one knows, second the bottom, first the bottoms, williamsburg road, second derby town roads, all these things that only dick summers has ever understood. It is all part of the petersburg story. There is lots of action going on north of the james. You certainly argue, without much of a stretch, that the 1864 Shenandoah Valley campaign was also part of the petersburg story. That is a direct relation to what is going on in petersburg. If i understand your question, was there a combination of world war i tactics and civil war tactics . To some degree. I have thats really a stretch. I dont think petersburg is a precursor to world war i tactics. Thank you for chiming in, it is always good to hear from you. I will go a little easier on you. You mentioned in your talk about the list expiring. Do you have a rough number of how many troops that was that actually walked away from the fight . God last them. They did their service. I dont have it off the top of my head. There were dozens of regiments, dozens, not scores, not hundreds, but dozens of regiments whose enlistments were expiring. They were going north. They would be thousands of men, not tens of thousands, but thousands of men. Enough to make an observe or wonder if those shifts that are leaving White House Landing are heading their way eventually up the chesapeake bay, up the potomac to go back north. There were a lot. Someone earlier mentioned, i guess it was andy, someone mentioned, i must of been andy, about how many of the, no, it was pete. Talking about the greatness of the union army at that time. Hes exactly right. There were lots and lots of new soldiers whose motivation for joining the army was sometimes not as pure as the early volunteers were concerned. I dont think thats the explanation for the first offensive. I think it kicks in later in the Petersburg Campaign when these attacks just dont seem to really accomplish mosh. Youre dealing with guys who are inexperienced. And maybe not as motivated to get their life for the cause as the fellas in 1862 in 1863 were. Could you share some of your thoughts on the condition of leaves army at the beginning of this time period . Around the 13th of june. Specifically, even if he had had perfect intelligence, which is impossible, even if the scouts had been observing the james better, what options did he really have in your opinion. Just some of your thoughts. As i mentioned really briefly, although the Overland Campaign is almost always described as a failure on grants part, because of all the losses that he made, the fact that lees Army Continues to defend richmond, which was allegedly grand subjective, grant had degraded, grant and meade had degraded the army of Northern Virginia significantly that it was not an offensive army anymore. And then you subtract a third of the infantry going to the Shenandoah Valley. The army of Northern Virginia is reduced to maybe 30, 000, 35,000 infantry. Consequently, lee is a potent defensive force. He is not an offensive force. He is a counter puncher he is not going to be able to exercise any offensive movements on his own. He cannot change the calculus of the war in virginia like he had done earlier in the campaign. If the morale of the confederate soldier seems very high, i have not seen any evidence for deteriorating morale any kind of a significant percentage in the common soldier of the army of Northern Virginia. They still believed in lay. As far as they are concerned, they had kick some yankee but between the james river. They were doing pretty well. Richmond was still in their hands. You read all types of quotes, keep them coming. We are going to kill them all. I will be home by the fall. Their morale was still very high at this point. To your point about the elon of the army of the potomac. A lot of those veteran regiments were replaced by agreeing units from the defenses of washington who had spent their military experiences sitting in a lot of forts, practicing artillery but nothing else. Grant stripped them. Thats one of the reasons why the raid was ian setup set off a lot of alarm bells in washington. They realize their defenses had been stripped of regiment south of petersburg. I agree, gordon, i agree with you. The one thing that im a big blast over. I want to emphasize, whenever you try to dig down a little bit deeper in the story of the civil war campaign, you start encountering conventional wisdom is that may not be all that lies. I think most of you who have read about this have probably read that the first main heavy artillery, one of those units that gordon referenced, went into the attack on june 18th, against not realizing that they were going into a meat grinder. They were so naive and inexperience that they would charge, where the old veterans knew better than to do that. The evidence for that is nonexistent. My conclusion is that the first main guys knew darn well that they were going into a very tough assignment. They did it anyway. Ian so by petersburg, some of those heavy artillery units had been bloodied pretty badly at places like spots of india, maybe maybe the degree of naivete, and lack of experience they still lacked combat experience, but they werent naive about it. They were pretty brave guys, in other words. All right, i dont want to stand between you and dinner. Thanks very much. Its great to see well. Rogram guide for cspan. Org history. Welcome to the virtual series, im the Vice President of programs and public relations, it is m
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