I dont believe that. From a 44 year career in public history, most notably as a former and founding executive of some place. Previously served as historian and manager of a National Park service, before becoming the first president of the association of preservation of civil war studies. Hes currently on work on the last two volumes of his trilogy, which we desperately waiting for. Whats going on . Theyre coming . Great. Im very happy to introduce a. Wilson green. Why is it good to look out on these faces. Ive gotta say. Its just wonderful to be with you all. Especially to be with such great colleagues. We are really fortunate that ryan was able to make it because he has a twoweek engagement at the boom boom room at the holiday inn and you took time off to join us, so thank you for that brian. I hope your flight is and you can get back to the show at the holiday. And pete carmichael, what a great [inaudible] im a little supplies that he would take a shot at my sartorial habits because, this is a fellow who wears scarves in the middle of july. New york and shows up at symposiums without socks on, wearing a sport coat. But be that as it may, thank you for those kind words and thanks for coming out. I must have not gotten the memo about the way talks are supposed to go. Weve had these thought pieces and all this great humor, im just gonna do like a straight battle talk. So i hope that you still have some energy and some brain cells left because this talk on the first petersburg offensive is pretty complicated. Everyones been to penal petersburg battlefield, and you think you understand the first petersburg offensive, but it involves four armies, it involves four days of combat plus a major Logistical Movement in order to get there. Well try to go through this, and hopefully youll have a better understanding of what i think is a very complex is my microphone cutting in and out . And i doing something wrong . Okay. Well Edward Porter alexander, the fa famous artillery thought that this was the most interesting point in the whole history of the confederacy. You may not agree with him, but the event between an 1864, if they had gone differently at petersburg would have altered the trajectory of the civil war tremendously. Perhaps shortening it by months. So my talk is going to address the movements to petersburg at that time, the conduct of combat not in a micro tech [inaudible] now the Petersburg Campaign was [inaudible] appointment of ulysses s grant, the chief of all union armies. Grant brought to strategic [inaudible] first, to apply [inaudible] across the various theaters of the war. It looks like were gonna get some technical help here. You dont want to miss any of my words, im sure. Well if i was brian wills, and telegenic right now. Ill just keep going. The second thing of course is that he decided not to make his headquarters in washington [inaudible] , instead i dont think this [inaudible] to make his headquarters with the army [inaudible] and pursue relentless operations against the confederate opponents. Grant would of course would implement his plan in early may, sending his protegee, William T Sherman on a campaign in georgia to concentrate on his opponent, Joseph Johnston and the railroad atlanta. In virginia, meade would focus laser like on the army of robert e. Lee. To subordinate offenses with towards the south side of failed in me. France segel being defeated in the valley in newmarket, and Benjamin Butler being halted at Bermuda Hundred, south of richmond. The army of the tournament, across the river at the same time, a series of costly ingredients at the wilderness. At the north end of the river, and coal harbor. Losing some 60,000 men in the process. Inflicting sufficient number of casualties on leads army, to eliminated at as an offensive weapon. It was primarily now only potent on the defense. A new threat in the valley posed by david hunter compelled general [inaudible] to release about [inaudible] under double early, to deal with that threat as well. But with butlers access to richmond blocked by confederate forces, under pierre goo staff beauregard, and lee seemingly if movable, in front of the confederate capital enrichment, grant made a bold decision. He would shift his entire army south of the james river, capture petersburg, 23 miles below the confederate paddle, which was logistics apply nexus. Now petersburg, as many of you know, was a much more relatively important city then that it is today. It was the seventh largest city in the confederacy, the second largest city in the commonwealth of virginia. No fewer than five railroads led into what was known as the cockade city at that time. Three of them, the richmond and petersburg railroad, the Southside Railroad at pete petersburg, its real name was the petersburg real road thats where it ended in wilbur, North Carolina. All of it remained crucial, to the confederate supply situation. In fact with the [inaudible] richmond petersburg, the richmond, fredericksburg potomac railroad, and the Virginia Central railroad all being interdicted by union forces, the capture of petersburg and those railroads would have entered richmond more abundant. So oh i dont think the [inaudible] in saying that the capture of petersburg would have been tantamount to the capture of richmond. Theres an awful lot of at stake in this campaign. Grant was only too aware of the risks involved in this maneuver. He has to disengage from his opponents around harbor. Without lee knowing it in order to gain a head start on a much longer route to petersburg than lee [inaudible] diab. Once li realized that grant had departed, he would need to persuade the [inaudible] that he was going to be approaching richmond in the same way that George Mcclelland had ten, two years earlier in 1862. Even if all of this went according to plan, [inaudible] ask negotiating swapping [inaudible] river. And [inaudible] river, which was as much as 80 feet deep, and as wide as 4000 feet in some places. And [inaudible] in this journey, the army of the potomac would be spread out and vulnerable. Never more so than in the process of crossing the james river. The movement also put the army in jeopardy, as grant would be much further away from the army of the james than would be the army of north virginia. Lastly, [inaudible] was contrary about the administration expected grant [inaudible] and [inaudible] change of microphones. [inaudible] and beyond that, the fear of losing washington. Exposing washingtons forces. Now lets face it [inaudible] aya, had not exactly beeny [inaudible] even [inaudible] would have been compromised. I dont know that lincoln [inaudible] idiot now thats a very complicated map, and probably more complicated than you need to try to inculcate from your seats out there. But it shows you the planning the grant went into in order to get this movement to the james. The first thing he did had nothing to do with going south. The first thing he did was to attack sheridan, and two thirds of the cavalry to make a raid north against the Virginia Central railroad. Ultimately he hoped that sheridan would link up with the coming east from the valley, but more imports from our purposes, the raid would naturally compel lee to detach some of his own cavalry in order to counter sheridans movement. And absent, a lot of cavalry, that would make the opportunity for grant to make a Stealthy Movement to the james much more easy. He also arranged for a motley fleet of ferryboats to be assembled at fort minh row, and move up the james river to provide transportation for his army. He then authorized butler to destroy the railroad bridge connecting petersburg with Chester Field County on the north side of the river. In order to prevent lee from detaching troops to the north and coming to petersburgs rescue. That operation did not succeed, on june 9th, the so called battle of old men and young boys prevented that railroad bridge from being destroyed. Now grant began his movement to the james on june the 12th. There were 12 army corps involved in this movement. The four in the army of the potomac, and balmy smiths 18 corps, which had joined meads army prior to cold harbor. He each core disengaged from north to south, following carefully selected routes in order to expedite the movement to the james river, while the 18th corps would march to White House Landing on the Potomac River and take water transportation to get back to the area north of the appomattox river. Now the Chickahominy River, for the other four corps, would pose the first obstacle to this movement. Describe it when you officer of a wide ditch partly choked by web logs and full of brown, tepid, sickly water, whose slow current would scarcely carry a straw along. The plan called for the army to move across the chickahominy in three different places, by building pontoon bridges there. Either south or poised to cross it. Now, in order to follow that other precept of convincingly lee he was moving towards richmond, north of the james river the way mcallen had approached it in 1862, meade said two divisions of the core and number grade of cavalry toward an important crossroads known as glendale, or on this map, riddles shop. You can see it better than i can. There it is, right there. That is glendale. Its where the big battle took place on june 30th of 1862. A sharp fight on june 13th left modest casualties and glendale and confederate hands. But reinforce the notion and leaves mind that this thrust might actually represent grants next attempt to capture richmond. This is not to say that lee was insensible to the possibility of grant going across the james. The confederate commanders primary responsibility was what . Richmond. To protect richmond. Unless he could be sure that grant would not threaten the confederate capital, lee would maintain his position on the north side. Counting on the army of beauregard to provide intelligence regarding any operations on the south side. Because all of beads pontoons in his terrain were required to cross the Chickahominy River, he put general butler in charge of the pontoon bridge across the james river. Butler would turn to his chief engineer, brigadier white sought to select a crossing points and attempt a construction. He would recommend a position on the peninsula where the river measured a little less than 2000 feet across. The banks on both sides required significant modifications. 150 man immediately went into the force, cut down giant cypress trees and created avenues of approaches, especially on the north bank of the river was very swampy and then built better approaches on the south side of the river as well. By working around the clock, by the night of june 14th and 15th, they had built a pontoon bridge consisting of 101 boats and 2000 feet across. As one confederate said, the greatest bridge which the world has seen since the days of xerxes. In the meantime, the Union Infantry began gathering on the north bank of the james. On june 14th, they got hancock a second corps, her ratios and most of warrens fifth core were on the north bank of the river in position to cross having negotiated the remaining ground without any problems. Meanwhile, smic 18th corps moved up the james river and prepared to disembark at Bermuda Hundred. Only the supply wagons that were guarded by the black division of the ninth corps and problems discovering their designated crossing point down there on the chickahominy at kohls ferry was impractical. They had to move back up to a place called windsor shaves in order to try to get across. They would be delayed, everybody else had achieved a spectacular logistical achievement. Grant had no doubt. Stolen a march on robert e. Lee. He simply had to approach petersburg, overwhelm a line of thin defenders that were supposed to be around the city and then reap the benefits. Forcing lee to fight for his communications, accept a siege of richmond, or abandon the confederate capital. There is the union set up for this. What about the confederate perspective . As i mentioned, he was perfectly cognizant of the potential of grant crossing sooner or later and getting to the south side of the james. But lee was uncertain of grant s intentions. He declined to consider butler s june 9th effort as anything more than a reconnaissance. No troops have left general grants army. Lee assured a nervous beauregard. Not have crossed james river without being perceived. Now, these competence and this was derived from his own intelligence gathering abilities and on beauregards line of scouts that were allegedly arrayed down the banks of the james river for many miles. But still, lee would order robert hokes division, which had been loaned to the army of Northern Virginia by beauregards army prior to cole harbor, to move to the pontoon bridge of the confederates at chapmans blacks. Just in case those federals appeared on the south side of the river. By june 14th, as grant arranged his petersburg offensive, beauregard speculated about the location and intentions of their enemy. Lee responded to an inquiry from president davis early that afternoon by speculating, quote, i think the enemy must be preparing to move south of the james. Of course, lead news that some federals had moved self, and another large body had boarded boats at the landing. This could mean that grant was changing his base to harrisons landing, just like mcclellan did two years earlier. He could be resupplied for another movement against Richmond South of the river, north of the river, rather. All of those federals boarding boats might be some of these regiments that had their terms of enlistment expire and were heading home thousands were doing that. We have to be extremely watchful and guarded, lee advised. A witness did not equate changing focus yet from richmond to petersburg. Beauregard was less ambivalent about grants intentions. He beseeched the War Department to return the division immediately, warning if some combination of the armies attacked him, i cannot be responsible for consequences. When this appeal elicited no response, beauregard took matters into his own hands and at tempt him on june 14th sent orders to hoke who was part of his army to move across the james. He also sent Staff Officers to lee to justify the shift. The absence of any hard evidence, and beauregards penchant for the fantastic, convinced almost no one in richmond and certainly generally of any imminent disaster. So, while beauregard fretted and lee remained cautious, grant and meade proceeded on june 14th with there are fence of plans. Smiths 18 corps had boarded the transports on june 13th. By the next day, had begun a staggered arrival at various points, at Bermuda Hundred, and up the river at point of rocks and broadway landing. This disembarkation began in the middle of the afternoon of the 14th and would continue until after dark. Meanwhile, Winfield Scott hancocks second corps at 8 30 am. Received orders from meade to cross the river, utilizing that makeshift fleet that grant had assembled. While the engineers were putting the final touches on the pontoon bridge. Before noon, the first of hancocks corps boarded their boats and by 1 pm on the 14th, they were on the shore of the right bank. Delighting the veterans, such as this new jersey shoulder, who had grown disenchanted with the virginia landscape. As we steamed across the beautiful river, he said are were filled with hope. We had bid farewell to the swamp and muslim of the chickahominy. The long live of graves that stretched not only across the peninsula, but across the hills and valleys and streams and fertile fields. And tangled swamps of virginia up to the rapid end. We were bidding farewell, he said, to the old battlefields and entering upon a new field of operations. It would take hancock until about dawn on the morning of june 15th to ferry his three divisions across the river. By 5 am, the second corps was comfortably encamped on the south side. Many of the men cleansing the grime of 40 days of constant campaigning by taking swims in the james. Hancock remained on the north side, communicating by signal flight to the far bank. This is an important point. In most military operations that dont succeed, there are a series of mistakes. This is an important one that i dont think too many people have called attention to. It was critical. Hancock confirmed to meade that his corps, contrary to earlier reports, had three days of rations on hands. And would not be out of food that night. So, while the engineers finished their bridge and hancocks men ferried across the river, grant boarded a steamer and met with butler at Bermuda Hundred to outline the plans for the attack. Grant told butler that he would be solely responsible for the attack. Hancock would require reprovisioning before marching towards petersburg. With meades wagons, as i, said stalled on the north side of the Chickahominy River rating to get and find a different way to get across, butler will be responsible for providing the rations. 60,000 of them. Grant says to butler, without this precaution, the services of this corps, meaning hancock, cannot be had for and emergency tomorrow. This message not only implied that grant considered hancocks participation in the june 15th offensive as necessary only in and emergency, he was unaware of hancocks actual supply situation. Grant returned to the north side at about sunset on the 14th and informed meade of butlers supply mission. Meade dutifully provided those orders to hancock at 10 00 that night telling him not to advance until butlers supply ships had arrived to give him the 60,000 rations. Hancock would obey those orders, of course. A decision that he was very unlikely to have made had he known that his presence at petersburg was expected. Ultimately, the supply ships failed to arrive. At 10 30 in the morning on june 15th, mead released hancock to begin his trek towards petersburg. Thats nearly six hours were wasted between the time of the second corps arrived on the south bank and their departure for the front. Six hours and they mightve changed history. As for the 18th corps, grants orders to butler were to begin smiths march towards petersb