Transcripts For CSPAN Nuclear Posture Review Part 2 20180217

I will post some questions to the group. We will say the last part of our we will save the last part of our time in the session for questions from the audience save the last part of our time in the session for questions from the audience. Let me quickly introduce our group. We have the Principal Assistant deputy administrator at nsa, where he runs the defense program. Anita is the acting system secretary of state from the bureau arms and control. I am very pleased that we could gather this group here and we are looking forward to this discussion. We will start with entered option and go with the following order we are going to start with greg, then we will go to phil, anita. Greg, over to you. Greg what i thought i would do in my brief remarks is give you a little more insight into the approach that 3 departments took in conducting the Nuclear Posture review over the last year. It will emphasize what general hyten said. Which is consistent with the National Defense strategy. This is a threatbased and strategy based review. I will talk more about the approach that we took and how we did that. Van i want to focus my brief then time on giving you a then i want to focus my brief time on giving you a little more understanding of the rationale behind what i guess is the most controversial recommendation of the Nuclear Posture review, which is our recommendation to acquire 2 additional capabilities that expand the range of low yield Nuclear Options in the u. S. Arsenal. Let me start by walking you through how we did this review. When we were tasked by the president , the department was tasked with doing this review, it said nothing about what the answer should be come other than to ensure that the United States would end up having a Nuclear Deterrent that was effective in the 21st century, and against 21st century threats. We started out by doing a very extensive intelligence deep dive. Band reaching out to other experts. What does the 21st century security environment look like from the perspective of Nuclear Issues . I would argue that this Nuclear Posture review took a longerterm view of the International Security environment than any previous one. That is because this is the first posture review that has ever been contacted right at the front end of a comprehensive modernization of the entire u. S. Nuclear force. That force and that infrastructure has to be able to last and be effective for decades into the future. We cannot afford to modernize the entire force every 10 years. We needed to understand what the security environment looked like that far out. In this review we start by saying what has changed in the security environment since the 2010 Nuclear Posture review . General hyten gave a very good explanation of the obverse observations that we made. We then asked the Intelligence Community how far into the future do you have some confidence and been able to in being able to project the environment . Im not going to tell you what they said but i will tell you it was not far enough for our purpose. We had to look beyond that time frame. What is the nature of the and of the uncertainty . How can we hedge that . As we develop strategy and capability. Once we did that deep dive of the environment, we then did a comprehensive review of the roles of Nuclear Weapons in our National Security strategy now and into the future. I think you will notice that they are very explicitly laid out in a list in the Nuclear Posture review. I wont go into what they are, you have already come but we were determined to be explicit already, but we were determined to be explicit about the roles. The next step in the review was once we determined what the , roles of Nuclear Weapons needed to be, we needed to decide what our strategy was to enable Nuclear Weapons to fulfill those roles. We did a comprehensive strategy review. We looked both sort of across the entire world, and out into the future, but we also took a very tailored approach when looking at strategy. We looked at each adversary including iran as a future nuclear adversary. We developed a very tailored strategies. Only then, which was around three quarters of the way through the review, did we turn to capabilities. We literally did not want to look at what capabilities we would require until we got through those three steps. We were pretty disciplined about that. One we got into the capabilities, we turned back when we got into the capabilities we turned back and said ok, is the program of record for modernization that is on the books sufficient to support the strategies that we have laid out to fulfill the roles . We concluded for the most part that it was. That a comprehensive modernization of our existing force was sufficient to address to fill that strategy and address those roles. One area where we were not confident that the program of record was sufficient was as a result of our deep dive look into russian strategy, russian doctrine, and russian Nonstrategic Nuclear capabilities. Let me tell you why we made the recommendations to add a low yield capability to a limited, small number of warheads as a nearterm solution, and then a recommendation to once again field nuclear arms sealaunch missiles in the future. It is a growing disparity in Nonstrategic Nuclear capabilities between russia, the United States, and nato. Russia is not only replacing its capabilities, it is expanding them. In both numbers and types. We concluded that there are that there were row indications there were real indications that our current strategy was inadequate. The first is initiating limited nuclear strikes and the second is to make wider use of Nuclear Weapons to defeat nato conventional forces if there ever to coerce us through limited use. In looking at this we also , concluded that given the stresses on russias National Defense investment, they would not be expending their limited resources to modernize and expand their Nonstrategic Nuclear forces in in support of their strategy and doctrine if they had little or no confidence in that strategy or doctrine. We saw no reason why they would throw good money after bad. Why invest in a strategy they have no confidence in . Let me say before i talk about why we recommended what we did that nobody can objectively determine precisely what capabilities are required. Anybody that tells you they can do that through some model or quantitatively is an amateur. That is just not the nature of deterrence. Theres too much uncertainty associated with it, because it is ultimately about adversary perceptions. It does not really matter whether we think our current capabilities should be sufficient to deter that the series that adversary. We need to look for indications that that is not the case. We were uncomfortable with our look at that question, that that was the answer the russians were coming to. Given the difference between what they say and what they are doing. We also think that it has proven to air on the side of having more rather than less capability if you have a significant amount of uncertainty, as long as we do not create new counterproductive to perceptions in the discounter perceptive threat perceptions in the adversaries. We do not believe that the 2 capabilities that we recommended do that. They do not increase u. S. For strike capabilities beyond first what it is today. They do not threaten the Russian Strategic Nuclear Deterrent in some way that it is not already threatened. We concluded that the recommendation that we made was a sound and a prudent one. Let me go a little farther into that rationale. What we were trying to do with these capabilities is to reduce russian confidence in the course of escalation strategy in their coercive escalation strategy. We needed to take additional action. The low range the low yield involving russian modernization and expansion of their Nonstrategic Nuclear forces is increasing that disparity, and thus potentially increasing the risk of deterrence failure. Let me make this really clear. Reducing russian confidence in their strategy does not require that nato match russian Nonstrategic Nuclear capabilities either in quantity or diversity. Nato no longer compensates for conventional or perceived conventional inferiority by reliance on Nuclear Weapons to deter. And so nato requires a wider range of credible low yield Nuclear Response options to convince the russians that this that if they in initiate limited nuclear use our , objectives will deny what they seek. Additional low yield capabilities recommended in the npr paired with the rest of the Modernization Program are designed to do just that. The are designed to reduce confidence in moscow in this strategy and doctrine. That we do emphasize not see these additional capabilities as lowering the u. S. Nuclear threshold. That has been out there in the media. These capabilities will make a u. S. Nuclear response to russian limited use more credible. And raise the Russian Nuclear threshold and not lower the hours. Purpose of these capabilities is to make a u. S. Response more credible. It is for a response to russian first use. That does not lower our threshold for first use, it raises theres, at least that is our intent. Let me talk very briefly about the specific capabilities we recommended, and why. General heighten touched on some of this. The recommendation to rapidly field a number of low yield submarine warheads is to provide an inexpensive augmentation of our ability to credibly strike any target. Thats in response to russian limited nuclear use. These would be survivable, prompt, and is able to strike targets that are heavily defended against air delivery. All of our current low yield capability is aging. Its air delivered. Again, fielding this capability will not increase the number of Nuclear Weapons deployed on our Ballistic Missile submarines. It wont take us over the start limits. In essence it is actually , reducing the aggregate mega tonnage that is on the submarine. Our recommendation to pursue a nuclear arms sealaunch missile is designed to provide a response to russias increased expansion of Nuclear Forces. It will further enhance deterrence in the future. It is also inherently survivable. It would provide a future u. S. President with options to respond to russian first use. The npr makes very clear that if fresh a were to agree to address that if russia were to agree to address return to arms measures, the u. S. Might be able to agree to limit or four grow forgo the nuclear sealaunch missile capability. We can talk more about that. Finally, a nuclear sea launch Cruise Missile, depending on its concept of operation, could provide a regional presence with out requiring allies to supply further Nuclear Weapons on enhancing assurance of the allies in europe and asia. That is kind of a summary of the rationale that we had, and how we got to that conclusion. I will turn it over to anita. Actually we will have phil next. Just hold it and talk into it. Phil thanks. Good morning, everyone. I am pleased to be here and please to have the opportunity to talk about the npr from the perspective of the department of Energy Nuclear administration. Nuclear security administration. The main point i wonder i want to underscore is that the 2018 npr does not represent a significant departure from the work that we were doing. You have heard that from greg, i think you will hear from rob. It really is a document that reflects a lot of continuity with their work over the past three to five years with a couple of adjustments in capabilities in response to threat environment. That continuity applies to the Weapons Program but also Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Terrorism. Before i speak about the npr, i wanted to highlight a little bit about nsas role in the National Security architecture. I want to provide context for my subsequent remarks. For those that are not familiar, there are three main missions. The largest one is the weapons activities. The nonproliferation Nuclear Counterterrorism mission, and the role there is to prevent terror and to respond to terror. The third is to provide the u. S. Navy with nuclear propulsion. The weapons piece of the nsa budget is about 40 of the department of energys budget. Thatll give it an idea of the size of it. As paul said i am part of the organization that is responsible for the safety, security of the stockpile. I have been there in three separate areas. First we maintain the current stockpile through routine maintenance. The second one is that we prepare for the future deterrence through lifetime Extension Programs of the stockpile. The third area is that we ensure that we possess the capability, i mean strategic material, infrastructure, science tools, and perhaps most importantly people so that we are prepared , to support future stock pile requirements and needs, including those we dont envision right now all of this is. All this is meant to highlight the critical part that we play as part of the deterrent. And why we are part of the npr process. What does the npr mean for us . It reinforces the need for the current work. That is in terms of lifetime Extension Programs and in terms of infrastructure. The general mentioned that infrastructure piece. Ill talk more about that in a minute. First, on the weapons inside. It will not alter the efforts already underway. That workload is significant. It is our largest workload we have had on her plate on our plate. Since the cold war and the npr does nothing to change that. Over the next 10 years, will be looking we will be working on several programs. I will get you some other air force systems in just a second. It will also supplement the workload in response to the everchanging environment. There are four areas i will mention. The first is to replace the w78 icbm warhead. We had a program on the books , it was in started it was intended to start in fy 20 them removed it up next year to reduce the risk and make sure we intend alignment with the air force programs. The second item is we will retain the be 63 gravity bomb b63 gravity bomb longer. Then we previously planned. The u. S. Will modify a number of existing warheads to provide a low yield option. Finally, nsa will work with dod to pursue a nuclear sealaunch Cruise Missile. There has been a lot of focus on the last 2. I want to emphasize that a lot of the npr reinforces the need that we need to get the Current Program of record right. The other side of the coin it is coin is the infrastructure. The npr realize the need to capitalize and to modernize infrastructure. This is not a 510 year undertaking, these are programs that will be around for many years capabilities that will be around for many years. Much of the infrastructure and capability that was the best in the world and its time, has in its time has atrophied since the cold war. A large portion of our facilities date back to the manhattan project. Greg mentioned that this npr was done at a time where we are taking a fresh look at not only the nnsa piece, but the Delivery Systems and other things. Its critical we get these programs started and completed because they will be with us for decades. There is no margin for further delay. We need to get it right and we need to get it done quickly. There has been some items in the media about Nuclear Explosive testing. I want to be clear about the u. S. Policy on Nuclear Explosive testing. Despite some of that media coverage, there is no change to the policy. Although the u. S. Will not seek to ratify the conference of comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban treaty, we will continue to observe the Nuclear Test Moratorium that began in 1992. The annual assessment of the stockpile provided to the present by the Laboratory Directors certifies the safety and liability of the u. S. Stockpile and that effort will continue. Taken it a step further, there has been some other media commentary about the nuclear test rate and its posture. There is also no change to the test rate and its posture. It remains as it was largely since 1992, with some mike judge minor changes. This npr does not reflect any change from that posture. The continuity is also evident in the nprs strong support for nnsa counter proliferation programs. These are not mutually exclusive with the weapon sight of an nsa side of nnsa. They are complementary. Much of the expertise we took to use in those areas is linked directly to the capability we have that was originally established. An effective deterrent that assures allies, reduces the likelihood that others will seek weapons. A robust nonproliferation effort will. Restrict the flow of capability. A strong counter risen Counterterrorism Program is essential. It is integral to protect the homeland. As you heard several times today, the previous three nprs were drafted in the context of a very different threat environment, a very different security environment. There was a declining influence which meantrent there was a declining emphasis on infrastructure. We started the process to climb out of that hole that we are in. It is absolutely critical that nnsa continues to be part of the response. We recognize the need to invest in the enterprise. As others have said, this is the bedrock of the nation security. Part of that bedrock is the nnsa infrastructure, and that is why we need to get it right. Thank you. Thank you, phil. Anita, over to you. Just start talking. Anita thank you so much for hosting us today. The dod, this interagency review led by the dod has received a lot of attention, and deservedly so. It is especially important that we continue this discussion here today. We need to better understand the underpinning and analysis and strategy that went into the npr. I want to interject about where general hyten ended. On the importance of education, the fact that we are here today and we have such a rich group of interagency participants, experts, this is a phenomenal opportunity for us to all benefit from this. I want to put in a plug for interns. I am very pleased to say that we have as many other agencies and departments do, we have a very rich in turn Program Internship program. We are pleased to have some of them from our bureau here today. I will emphasize many of the points that the distinguished speakers before me have made, but they certainly bear to be repeated. First and foremost, the fact that while there are certainly changes in the Nuclear Posture review, there is much continuity. I want to emphasize 5 points with you today. I will go through them. First, the 2018 Nuclear Posture review is fully consistent with several decades of u. S. And allied thinking regarding Nuclear Weapons policy impostures. Policy and postures. Must also prepare for an uncertain future, certainly a point that has been stressed today. While there is continuity in our strategy, each mpr is really a product of its time each npr is a product of its time. For decades the u. S. Took the lead in Nuclear Disarmament and arms control, hoping to set an example the others would follow. We have seen a return to the Great Power Competition and a degradation of the overall security environment. These changes have specifically been in the area of Nuclear Capabilities, were fighting doctrines, war fighting doctrines, and the actions and behavior of russia, china, and the dprk. We have not abandoned arms control. That does not mean that we have abandoned any of our commitments to Nuclear Disarmament. It just means that the reality is we are in a different environment right now. So, i would also like to pull in our allies are. The u. S. Government view on the security situation is not exclusive here. We had more than 30 governments that we consulted throughout the npr process that have agreed that the security environment has worsened. Second, this environment calls for strengthening deterrence and assurance. Our capabilities need to remain effective against evolving threats. It declares our recognition and willingness to collaborate with allies and partners. The United States extends deterrence to over 30 allies. That is really an impressive number if you think about it. Each has individual views and different assurances assurance needs. Our assurance strategies must be built to deal with different security environments, potential adversary capabilities, and bearing alliance and varying alliance structures. It includes ongoing allied dialogue to understand each others threat perceptions, and to arrive at a shared understanding of how to best align our collective capabilities. I have to say that it has been one of the great pleasures and honors of my job in the last five years to work on these issues with allies. One such ally that i would like to highlight is the u. S. Japan extended deterrence dialogue. My bureau is also the state department league for organizing under secretary level u. S. Republic of korea extended deterrence strategy and Consultation Group. I will try not to use too many acronyms here. Our bureau has a lead role in the state department, and that Defense Department Deterrence Strategy Committee with the republic of korea. The u. S. Japan extended deterrence dialogue and that u. S. Republic of korea Deterrence Strategy Committee evolved from alliance consultations that informed the 2010 npr. This was one of the important outcomes of the 2010 npr. It was the first time we brought in allies to ask what they would like to see in the npr. We have done this again in the 2018 npr, and quite successfully so. So, since 2010 we have been we established the undersecretary let extended deterrence consultation strategy and Consultation Group with the republic of korea. That was informed just last year that was formed just last year. United states effectively extended deterrence to allies during the most challenging periods of the cold war and we continued to do so now. It is a great history and we will continue to do so on the future. Changes to our posture are designed to ensure that the United States Nuclear Threshold remains high. The United States will only consider the use of Nuclear Weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States, its allies, and its partners. Our aim is to clarify the extreme circumstances that could lead the United States to consider a Nuclear Response. To increase what we are doing is to increase stability but decreasing the likelihood of miscalculations and risktaking by a potential adversary. We further note that the United States will not use or threaten to use Nuclear Weapons against nonNuclear Weapon states that are part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation treaty. This is the very same negative security assurances that was in the 2010 npr. We are not by any means lowering the u. S. Threshold, we are seeking to raise the threshold for others. As the president said in his february 2 statement, the strategy developed capabilities aimed at making use of Nuclear Weapons less likely. The United States is not pursuing a new arms race. What we are doing, given that deteriorating given that deteriorating threat environment, is to indicate that the u. S. Can credibly deter. Fourth, United States remains strongly committed to nonproliferation armscontrol. We will continue to use arms control, nonproliferation, and counter Nuclear Terrorism measures to advance the security of the United States, its allies, and its partners. The npr makes clear that the United States will continue to abide by by its Nuclear Testing moratorium. Although the United States will not seek ratification of a comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban treaty, we will continue to support the comprehensive Test Ban Organization preparatory committee. The United States is committed to all of its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation treaty. That includes undertaking its article six obligations to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures towards Nuclear Disarmament. The u. S. Commitment to the npt article six is a longstanding, and very clear. We discussed earlier, the u. S. Stockpile is now down nearly 87 since the cold war peak in the 1980s. We must take into account further addressed security challenges that make Nuclear Weapons and deterrence necessary in order to create the conditions to enable for the negotiations on Nuclear Weapons. Here is another point that is very important. I want to bring in the treaty on the prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. This is why the United States opposes the ban treaty, which conveniently ignores, from our perspective, the stark realities, including the importance of extended Nuclear Deterrence in favor of attempting to apply political pressure on responsible democracies with Nuclear Weapons. The real problem here is that the ban treaty is not changing the calculus of autocratic states that are engaging in provocative behavior, or are modernizing and increasing their nuclear arsenals, and actively seeking to undermine international order. The ban treaty does not address these are important points. No state with Nuclear Weapons will find the treaty, so it will not result in the elimination of it single Nuclear Weapon stash single Nuclear Weapon or enhance a single Nuclear Weapon, or enhance the security of any state. It has the potential to further pull the global disarmament debate, making future progress less likely, not more likely. We will continue to up laments to implement the new treaty. The nuclear Modernization Program in the npr is consistent with the stark treaty. We remain committed to the Nuclear Forces treaty and are seeking russias return to full and verifiable compliance. Here we continue to work to continue we continue to work to engage russia diplomatically. We want to bring russia back into compliance with the inf treaty. We are also seeking to encourage russia to engage and negotiate seriously on reducing Nuclear Weapons. We have talked about the upswing in russias nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons. United states has actively worked to engage russia to address this issue. We have not done so successfully, but we continue to try. It is a priority. Fifth and finally. Were not resigned to an adversarial relationship with either country. We do not seek adversarial relationships. We will respond to the evolving environment and continue to seek positive change when we can. We do not regard russia and china as adversaries, and seek stable relations. We seek dialogue as we both address the security challenges that are posed. We want to deter aggression, preserve peace, and we reduce and reduce nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Until that day comes, we will protect the security of United States, our allies, and our partners. Let me just finish by saying that i believe this npr is a very strong statement of our commitment to do just that by maintaining an effective and credible Nuclear Deterrent. Thank you. Thank you, anita. Rob, over to you. Thank you, paul. I said i would love to do this panel as long as i dont have to talk about what is in the npr. This npr rollout has been the longest in history. You see versions of this in the huffington post. Versions a few other floating out there right now i thought it would be useful if i could explain the view from the trenches. We have a lot of policy veterans here that know that the strategy phase is important, but it is not sufficient. You have to build consensus and what that strategy is, and you have to in what that strategy is, and you have to be able to implement it. Let me just pretty face this by saying that these are my own views preface this by saying that these are my own views. From my perspective, i thought that there were three dimensions to this Nuclear Deterrence problem. One dimension is do we have enough to deter our adversaries . Russia, china, and north korea in the most plausible scenarios . Do we have enough . Is what we are doing assuring our allies . The third is how do we maintain support in the congress, as well as our ally part of its our allied parliaments for what we are doing . It is deterrence, assurance, and maintaining support. When we look at the deterrence component of this, we came to a conclusion that the program of record was not sufficient. It was mostly due to the growth in russian Nonstrategic Nuclear capabilities, as well as their nuclear doctrine. There was Something Else going on. This is not unique to our analysis. We have been worried about russian tactical Nuclear Weapons for at least 10 years, probably longer. The imbalance in nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons was a rising concern. Congress gave advice to ratify. It said that the u. S. Will seek to initiate not later than one year after entry into force negotiations with the Russian Federation to distrust address the disparity in the national stockpile. So that nonstrategic capability was one of the biggest drivers. You combine that with their nuclear doctrine, their exercises, right, and the expansion of these capabilities, and you under like that with russias geopolitical ambitions, and it led us to conclude that we had to do something more than the program of record. Let me just remind people that is not just the numbers of weapons. The russians have about 2000 tactical Nuclear Weapons. It is not just the numbers, it is the types of capabilities. Why do you need it death charge a depth charge death charge . These are all nuclear capable. Antiaircraft missiles, submarines. Why in the world would you build a transcontinental, underwater Nuclear Drone that could obliterate a city when you can already do that with a submarinelaunched missile and an icbm . There is something going on here, why russians were doing it and that led to a great deal of analysis. We thought we had to do more to assure our allies. We may not say this publicly, but they were concerned about what north korea was doing. They are concerned about russia and china. You see it in their press, you see it in statement by parliamentarians. You see Public Opinion polling. Bringing back Nuclear Weapons to south korea, the u. S. To deploy Nuclear Weapons. We had to do something to bolster the terms. If we did it bolster the terms, we would not assure the allies and there is a very sure possibility they would go nuclear themselves. Deterrence, assurance and now maintaining support on capitol hill. As you are well aware, over the last few years, it has been very difficult for republicans and democrats, for congress and the president to achieve consensus in just about anything. Over the last two to three years, thanks to former Obama Administration officials and members of congress, we do have consensus to modernize the nuclear triad. The Obama Administration proposed that and congress will ratify that. It is important. What we did was not disrupt this consensus. I want you to understand very carefully, these supplemental capabilities dont break any treaties. They dont expand a nuclear stockpile. It does not cost a lot of money. These were deliberate choices that we thought would do enough to bolster deterrence of our adversaries, assure our allies and maintain consensus in capitol hill. We will go to some questions. Thank you all. Very illuminating and a lot to chew on. I will take a few minutes to pose some questions to the group before turning it over to you folks. As i said earlier, do be preparing your questions. At the right point, you can start moving towards the microphones. Rob, let me start with you. I want to key on what you said about maintaining support. Youve got support in congress that the critical parts of the npr, especially in terms of new capabilities, will not disrupt the consensus. What do you see is the biggest challenge is on keeping the congress on board in your program . With allies as well, you were in europe this week, give us a sense of what you heard from the nato allies, at least, and the asian allies as well. Anita, if you could give us your state department perspective. The secretary just attended a Group Planning at nato. There was support from the members of the alliance for the Nuclear Posture review. When they talk about this, what they appreciate most about the review is that in integrates both Nuclear Deterrence as well as producing Nuclear Dangers as well as reducing Nuclear Dangers through nonproliferation and arms control. That is a key theme in the npr and for the secretary of defense. With respect to capitol hill, clearly, the supplemental capabilities, that will be our biggest challenge. We have already heard from 16 senators who are opposed to it and they issued their opposition even before the npr came out. It was based on the huffington post, i think. We will, we will engage congress. We will make our argument. There is something unique about this approach. Very often, the administration will go to the congress and say we are doing this. We are doing that, but respect to the sea launch Cruise Missile, this is a process. We deliberately said we are going to begin a capabilities study that will lead to analysis of alternatives. Based on that, we will come back to Congress Next year with the acquisition approach. In the meantime, we will have a discussion with that, a strategic discussion. Lets talk about the strategic imperatives. We will make the argument and come back next year. They will understand how much it will cost and we will have a decision on that. I think it is going to be a challenge, but its those 16 senators who are opposed to it, i think i understood that they would be opposed to it regardless. What im concerned about are those 16 senators in the middle who are ready to be persuaded if we have the right arguments. You ok, thanks. I certainly echo robs point. No question, as i mentioned, there is wide consensus among allies and partners in the security environment that has definitely changed since 2010 and much so for the worse. The threats are quite obvious. Let me point out, again, maybe expand a little bit on what rob pointed out, the importance to allies to continuing to pursue arms control, nonproliferation. Here again, we have reassured them that these issues are addressed in the npr. Are they addressed as they were in 2010 . No, obviously, not in the same way. But even in 2010, during the Previous Administration when president obama spoke about a World Without Nuclear Weapons, he made clear that as long as there are Nuclear Weapons, the United States will have a safe and secure, reliable deterrent. That has not changed. That has also not changed that we continue to look for opportunities for arms control, but the reality is it is quite difficult. Given my long discussions and history here working in the area of arms control and security issues, especially the former soviet union and russia, im confident we will come to a point where interests will intersect and we will look at another agreement of some sort. It is too early to forecast, but right now were looking at the most important way forward to have strategic stability discussions, to actually discuss what is in the npr, and to discuss, have an exchange of ideas and how we can move forward. Let me also, in terms of the nonproliferation, disarmament disarmament, in order to move forward to low numbers and reduce the disarmament threat, we need effective verification. One of the great things, one of the things i am most proud of and we have worked on since 2014 is a small International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament verification. This is a lowkey partnership with the Nuclear Threat initiative, where we work with some 25 countries on Verification Technology that we need for future arms control verification. This is one of the many things we are doing in terms of moving towards disarmament. Disarmament does not mean you have to have flashy headlines every day with new arms control proposals. That is hard work. Let me put a plug for that. I think you mentioned on february 2, that your department had briefed the russians and the chinese on the npr. Can you shed any light on those conversations, those interactions and what our approach should be Going Forward in dialogue and with the russians and chinese . Absolutely. We certainly had no secrets. We wanted the allies but also russia and china to know we were looking forward. We did brief them. We had a very good discussion in both cases. We talked about opportunities for the future, for future engagement. Specifically, a number of dialogues we are pursuing with china, with russia, the most important immediate one three things i will say. Implementation, the successful implementation of the new treaty cannot be over emphasized. We are successfully implementing the treaty and both sides are doing so without any problems. On february 5, three days after the npr was announced, both russia and the United States made public statements that we will have each met our respective limits, which we were required to do so by february 5. The inf violation is another important point for russia. We have engaged russia since 2014, actually before that, to try to resolve or address the violation and that is an important step forward to address the violation before we could move forward in other areas, especially in terms of new agreements. Then finally, strategic stability discussions. We launched the first strategic stability discussion in this administration. As many of you know. We have had long and very fruitful history of strategic stability discussions with the russians. We had a dialogue in september of 2017 and we are looking forward to the next dialogue, hopefully in the next month. Again, npr, the National Security strategy and the Defense Strategy will be topics of discussion and exchange. Thank you. I want to come over to you and dig deeper on the warhead and complex side. How comfortable are you with the ability to fund the necessary work . Is the 2019 budget request adequate . Where do you see the biggest risks on the funding side . And i have a couple of followups. Always a good question, but a difficult one to answer. A lot of people say are you funded for your program . These are eight, 10year undertakings, if not longer in some cases. Am i comfortable with the budget . Yes. If you look back over the last couple of years, we have gotten consistent support from both the white house in terms of putting what we need into the budget and from the appropriators in terms of appropriate. That doesnt mean they have appropriated everything we have asked for, but largely, there has been an acknowledgment that these programs need to be supported. The fy19 budget is no different. It is about 10 higher than it was in the previous year. That trickles down to the weapons and activities portion of it. The thing that concerns me the most is that we get stable, predictable funding. We are good now. We are ok. We have gotten strong support, but if you look at the National Level fiscal picture, the 2013 sequestration, that wreaks havoc on our programs and drives costs up and drives schedules to the right. It makes it that much more challenging to execute on a given schedule. As i said earlier, we are at a margin. We dont have a lot of time to slip programs, delay programs. We need stable, consistent funding Going Forward and that is perhaps one of the biggest risks, if not the biggest risk. You also mentioned b83 in your opening remarks. I think the npr says we will retain it until a suitable replacement is identified. Is there an approach to identifying the replacement and what is the vision Going Forward with that process . So, the b83 retirement was, i think, set in about 2014 or so. It was related to other initiatives that were ongoing. One of the things that we do as part of our sciences to surveil the systems. We decided we were going to retire it on a certain date. At some point, we cut back on the surveillance. We surveil it for safety reasons. By retaining in the inventory longer than originally planned, we will continue surveilling a little longer. As far as identifying the appropriate replacement, im going to refer to dod for the actual requirements. Rob . I want to play the thinking behind this. We have a deterrence approach. We realize if you want to deter north korea, you have to threaten what they value the most which is the regime. How do they protect their regime . Buried, hardened bunkers. We realized we needed a capability to go after that kind of target, the b83 provides that. We have decided not to retire it prematurely. We have to evaluate how else we can achieve that objective. We have a tough decision to make by the time the b83 needs to be life extended, that is where the true cost of that endeavor takes place. We have a few years now to figure out how to achieve that mission with having to do a costly program on the b83. Ultimately, we may end up retiring the b83. I have a question for you about integration. A word in our community is used pretty promiscuously. It means a lot of Different Things to different people. The u. S. Special forces can ensure nuclear and nonnuclear planning and operations and will have exercises to operate in the force of adversary Nuclear Threats and attacks. Further elaboration on this can you maybe deconstruct the meaning of these words for us and help us understand in practical terms what this kind of integration actually is . I dont want to be promiscuous in doing it. [laughter] so, the point of that direction in the posture review is also to enhance the terms. When you face an adversary that does integrate nuclear conventional operations and does envision warfighting that involves proliferation, to be able to convince them that they will not gain what they seek and they will not incur costs that exceed what they can get, you need to be able to convince them that our conventional forces are not so vulnerable to nuclear operations. That they cannot fight in a Nuclear Environment. They need to be sufficiently robust in a limited Nuclear Environment to be able to conduct operations effectively. If the adversaries perceived benefit is to defeat their conventional forces through limited nuclear force, you have to convince them they cannot do that. By doing that, a combination of Response Options in kind that can deny them that objective and also conventional forces that are better capable of fighting in a Nuclear Environment then ours are today. Did you want to come at it . Comment on that . Just stepping back a little bit, the npr puts its context of great power rivalry. That is a dominant theme of the National Security strategy and the National Defense strategy as well. From a joint staff perspective, do you see the npr nested . What should that mean to those of us in the Nuclear Business . The corollary should be what should mean to the Combatant Commander who thinks mostly about conventional warfare . Let me start by saying that the npr and nss all talk to each other during the course of the process. Of course, it is nested because it is a subset of our overarching National Security strategy. The nds, i think you will see has sections and it that are almost, if not exactly quoted from the npr. The nds is a much higher level description for the National Defense strategy. It talks about the role in effective Nuclear Deterrent plays in our broader strategy. Obviously, all three of these documents reflect the return of Great Power Competition. I would argue they do that not because that is a policy. They do that because it is a fact, right . I think that is an important point to make. This is not just a shift in policy. Some of this shift happened in the Previous Administration, and it is because the facts have changed. What was your second question after nesting . Yeah, so the question was, there was a lot of talk in the past about mainstream nuclear mission. So, we have work to do this goes to general hytens education point. It is not just education about deterrence. Im not sure he left it out, but there is also education across the force about nuclear operations, adversary capabilities, what they intend to do to you, how you can counter that. As we work on that integration problem, there are patrol aspects, training aspects to that. I think it will naturally come up. I dont think it will become the highest focus of geographic commands but i think it will become a renewed focus. I want to say another thing about that that is completely consistent and an element of the chairmans effort to globally integrate the joint force and conduct globally integrated operations where we arent constrained in either our thinking or capability by artificial geographic barriers between combatant commands. We need to fight as a nation, not as a combatant command. The chairman has done a lot to change this, not just involving nuclear but the whole joint force. The other thing i would say about the chairman he said this in public so i am comfortable saying it if you are going to project power in defense of an american ally against a Nuclear Armed adversary, you have to be able to deter nuclear use. There is no way to successfully project power with confidence against a Nuclear Armed adversary if you cannot deter them from using Nuclear Weapons. So, i want to turn to the audience now. Those of you who have questions but remained seated, now is your opportunity to move to a microphone. I will take what time we have left to field your questions. I think we have our first question over here on my right. Thank you. I have a followup question on the low yield trident concept. For questioners, please direct your question to an individual or a couple of individuals on the panel. Thank you. I will address this one to rob. General hyten, this morning, admitted the obvious that there was no way to distinguish a low yield warhead from a high yield warhead on a trident. He did not seem to really care or seem that was a problem. My question is if you are the russians and looking at a trident missile coming to you, which could have up to eight 450kiloton warheads on it, what are you going to think is coming at you, even if we know it has a low yield warhead on it, the russians are going to do the worstcase analysis as we would if we were in their shoes . Reassure me, how does this keep the low threshold how does this not promote a fullscale retaliation by russia . How much is in the fy19 budget for the full yield trident . For the low yield trident . We have had debates about the trident modification as you have mentioned. It seems like we are recycling the same arguments over and over again. Let me try it this way. By the time we have used a low yield Ballistic Missile warhead, russia has already used a Nuclear Weapon. Their forces are on a high state of alert, as are ours. They see one warhead flying at them. They know there is no way we can eliminate their retell a tory capability. There is absolutely, positively no incentive for them to launch an allout Nuclear Attack against the United States. Their forces on alert, and the only see one warhead. With respect to the funding, let me look at my cheat sheet. I believe there is 22. 6 million in fy19 for the dod portion of the low yield Ballistic Missile. It will run under 50 million across the fiveyear defense plan. I think rob captured it pretty well. Why would anyone commit suicide and guarantee there would be hundreds, well over thousands of warheads in response to being struck with one . It is just not a rational response when you are struck with one, especially when they started the nuclear war in some way, they should be expecting some response. This is designed to convince them that a response in kind is credible. Thank you, guys. Amanda . Im amanda moody. Questions for anyone who wants to answer, but it might be best for you. On cdtv and how consistent the current condition is with the npr. The Previous Administrations efforts to talk about it 20 years on and what it looks like, are those kinds of education efforts likely to continue . If not, is there a change in the strategic environment that might make those less useful at this point . What does all this mean for u. S. Contributions to the International Monitoring system . Excellent question. As you may recall, the Previous Administration put a big emphasis on the ratification of the cdtb. That was one of the key goals. In fact, immediately that and the new start treaty. The reality is we worked and obviously negotiated, successfully negotiated the new start treaty and have a challenging time ratifying it. It was quite simply, as much as we tried, the political situation was not in the cards for ratification. That said, the administration, consistent over all administrations, we have not tested since 1992 and we continue to emphasize the importance of all countries to maintain their testing moratorium. And those that are testing, there is one in particular, that is the focus that should be on. The dprk, the only country that is testing Nuclear Weapons. That would be a great help if dprk could come on board or somehow change its posture. Who knows where that would lead . In terms of education, there is no question, i think, education on testing, the history of testing is a winwin. It is not an emphasis right now, but i fully support that. Very important. We have learned a lot and that is why we have phil can talk about this more eloquently the Stewardship Program and how effective that has been. We dont need to test right now. We dont have a need for it. Support for the cdtb and comprehensive test organization, the precursor to the test ban coming into effect. Weve made huge progress. The organization has made huge progress since, in the last decade, last 20 years in building up this network of International Monitoring stations to monitor Nuclear Testing. This is something we have supported across administrations. The state department is fully funding the ims stations. We have the funding for it in 2018 and we look forward to working with the organization and emphasizing that. Thank you. Question . Hello, im an independent consultant. My question could go to dr. Soofer or mr. Weaver. This morning, general john hyten made a narrative about russias exercises, insinuating since 1999, every exercise has integrated a nuclear and conventional elements, one against one ribbon of highway. Every single exercise has the same nature. I wanted your analysis on the evolution of russias strategic doctorate and how it is reflected in these exercises. I have noticed that russia has Strategic Missile groups exercises, silobased icbms every fall. Every four years, it has an exercise. The conventional exercise overlaps with the Strategic Missiles exercise, making it look like there is a Nuclear Component to conventional exercise. I wanted your perspective as to how you evaluate russias strategy and policy. Thank you. That is a really good question. My ability to answer that it am unclassified level is limited. There has been an evolution in russias publicly stated doctrine overtime. There has been an evolution of what we see them doing. They do not always mast. Match. Let me read you a historic series of quotes from russians about their exercises. It starts in 1999. My russian is 37 years out of being fluid. Fluent. Forgive my pronunciation. [speaking russian] in july 1999, the Russian Media said, if the aforementioned measures do not make nato abandon its aspirations, the strategic troops and aviation will deliver a number of Preventive Nuclear strikes as envisioned by existing guidelines against concentration areas of Forward Alliance air and ground groupings in order to demonstrate moscows ability to take tough action against the aggressor. The enemy was forced to enter negotiations. In 2001, and moscow. [speaking russian] the scenarios for a number of exercises in recent years have stipulated that after nuclear strikes like reversals, the conflict would begin to subside. In 2003, the defense minister said that russia is prepared to use appropriate amounts of its individual components of strategic Nuclear Weapons to do you still a aggression and to force an enemy to cease military action. Two more 40. In 2006, first Deputy Defense minister said, in order to terminate military actions on terms acceptable to russia, it is possible to inflict damage on the enemy to an extent that cast doubt on his ability today in his objectives. I have one more. Hold on. Yeah. In 2012, the secretary of the Russian National council, who is in putins inner circle. He said, the procedure for the use of Nuclear Weapons is indicated in russias military doctrine. It provides for the possibility of the use in repelling aggression, not only in a largescale water war but other intensive four. There is provision for the possibility of use of Nuclear Weapons depending on the intentions of the adversary. In situations critical to National Security, the delivery of a Preemptive Nuclear strike is not ruled out. There is a series of statements in the unclassified literature with the russians have stated where the russians have stated this. These are either reports on at their exercises from government friendly media sources or from government officials themselves, three of them highly place. Highlyplaced. That doctrine evolved as they improve their position strike capabilities. We see them incorporating that into this doctrine. The fact that they continue to say that they might be willing to use Nuclear Weapons to try to course the alliance into capitulating is a fact. All the nato nations agree that this is the threat that the russians pose. If i could just add to that. It is not just the doctrine that concerns us. It is a combination of the doctrine and the capabilities that they are acquiring. There are many people out there dont buy that the doctrine is not indicative of their capabilities. They are building their capabilities. They can be as for conventional they can be used for conventional strike as well as for nuclear strike. They are blurring the lines between the two. Think about this. They are building air defense capabilities, massive air defense capabilities, in the border area between russia and nato. Their assumption may be, i have these low yield capabilities. I can strike in a limited fashion. I have air defenses. Theyre able to defend against natos air deliveries. You put together those two assumptions and they might think they have an advantage. That is what we are concerned about. I forgot one of the more important ones. In 2017, last july, the president president putin said, in the circumstances of an escalating military conflict demonstrating the readiness and resolved to employ force involving the use of nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons is an effective deterrent factor. Were going to move on. We have beat that course to death. That horse to death. You questioners. Let us go to you. We will get both questions on the table. Go ahead. Another russia focus question. This may be for rob or greg. In 2010, after the new start treaty, the Obama Administration extended multiple sincere invitations to the russians to continue this Nuclear Disarmament dialogue. In response, it was something of a firm if. He did not go along with that. In 2014, the chief of staff of putin said, every time the americans come to me wanting to negotiate, i say we have new missiles and you still have old missiles, why would we want to negotiate . Is this your sense . That they still have that why have they not reciprocated are our multiple offers for disarmament talks . Did they just have a completely different view of the value of Nuclear Weapons . Do they have a different view of the value of negotiation . Give us some insight into what you believe their objectives are. Let us get on your question on the table. One more question on the table. My question has to do with the nsas capacity given the program of record and reviewing the stockpiles studentship and mental Ship Management plans. They are very high already. My question is, does it added current level of funding and manpower have the capability to take these on . Have these projects sort of been scoped out in a speculative way or perhaps has this been done in an exploratory fashion . Is there already a start on some of these projects . Part of the question. How much does the plutonium standstill affect any of these projects . As well as the way the strength of our deterrent is perceived by adversaries. What if you start that why dont you start with that . As i said, there is more flowing through the enterprise now than there has been since 1990. That is something we have been working very hard on. Can we continue . Absolutely. There were folks five years ago that said we cannot do what we were doing today. We have four major weapon programs underway right now. The new initiatives, the you wield weapon low yield weapon is not a technical challenge. It is relatively lower cost. We do not believe that presents any challenge that we cannot address. The sea launch Cruise Missile, will flesh that out. We will flesh that out. That is a little farther to the right. We have some time. With respect to the plutonium piece, you are correct that operations were caused for three years. They are now operating again. That said, we have a whole lot of work we need to do to get to a position where we can actually can produce pits again in quantity. The last time was 1989. That is something that the npr just as well. It emphasized the need to get to a pit quantity and capability by 2030 as required and programs of the department of defense. Did i miss any . How doesnt project to our adversaries are Nuclear Capabilities . How can it affect how we are perceived when were struggling with production of pits but the surveillance of pits . Theres not cracked open during that standstill. When they did that test was not even usable. The extremity fail. That experiment failed. All this stuff has been out there. It has been reported. How does that affect the perceptions of our adversaries . Feel free to jump in. I can only imagine that im sure theyre watching that. It is not lost on anyone. There are nations out there that produce more pits than we do. Including the north koreans. That is one of the reasons we need to get moving on our capability. In terms of the effort you mentioned about the 76, a lot of this is shaking out the cobwebs. We need to get to a point where we can execute faster, do more, even if we fail, even if we identify problems. Learn from them and continue moving forward. I would put that in that category. Could you quickly address the problem about the question about the russians . Your question cuts to the heart of the 2018 security situation. In 2010, our emphasis was we look very closely at disarmament. It was a totally different security environment. We had a reset with russia. We were on a high. We had negotiated the new start treaty. Immediately after that, the president said this is a good treaty but we need another round. In 2013, in his speech in berlin, he came up with a proposal that included nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons. Russians were not interested. The russians are on a different track. They are modernizing, they are looking at new capabilities, nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons. I am confident that in a in the future of our interest will coincide. Until he gets that point, were not just there. We continue to look for that. We continue to emphasize the importance of engagement with russia. If i can follow up. This is not something unique to the 2018 npr. Frank rose has been quoted numerous times on this. Let me quote the president of the United States. The former president. Obama said, my preference would be to bring down further our nuclear arsenal. I approached the russians in terms of looking at the next to next phase for arms reduction. President came into power. President putin came into power. We have not seen the kind of progress i wouldve hoped for from russia. Russia has been an uninterested partner in this. It goes well beyond our assessment 2018. Can i add my personal opinion to that . Given the perception of the balance of conventional military capability between nato and russia, i think the russians may well proceed further reductions is a trap that is designed to get them into a position where they are really disadvantaged and they cannot counter nato we have two more questions left. My let me ask my question. I have a question for anita about arms proliferation and it is out of my box. That is why i am doing it as a question. You said several times and the npr says the nonproliferation treaty it remains committed to it as the cornerstone of the International Nonproliferation regime. Npt hasderstanding, the three legs, one of which is disarmament. The disarmament leg is undersold across the International Community as calling for stepbystep reductions. Role. G to the ultimate i think that is how it was characterized. Later in the npr, the long line the last line on page 70 says the cornerstone of u. S. Nonproliferation policy is deterrence and assurance to our allies because it keeps them from creating their own weapons. To bolster assurance and deterrence, we must increase our Nuclear Capabilities with the ofplement and the retention the. How is that not a contradiction . Of oure cornerstone concept policy is a that seems to acquire require increases in proliferation . Thank concept that seems to acquire you, amy. That is a good observation and a good question. There is no question that we are committed to the ntp and it is the cornerstone. That said, in order to make progress, in terms of disarmament. Six, the disarmament portion of the npr, is not the only part. Many in the ngo community. But the npt is about much more than just disarmament. As we do during each review conference and cycle we try to ever size the other pillars. Overshadowed by article six. In order to make progress on disarmament, you need a security environment conducive to this. We do not have an environment conducive to this. And we need deterrence is a big part of that. I will say that i do not think the approaches are inconsistent. We are not planning to expand our nuclear stockpile. The low yield Ballistic Missile will be swapped out with the warhead in the warhead that will be used for the sea launch Cruise Missile will also come out of the stockpile. We will not be expanding our capabilities. An opportunity to pursue arms control and arms weuction with the russians will followup with that. I do not think it is inconsistent. The International Tweeted he does not view the numerical count of the stockpile as representative of the u. S. Commitment. That is why we continue to do the work on verification and implement the new start treaty. And countless other things. As i said, the big headline every day saying we are going to lower numbers. That is quite frankly unrealistic. The International Community has to give us some credit for reducing our stockpile by 85 . That was not the point of my question. This is not the end of the discussion. But this is. Last question. Alex bell. A quick question. No change ine was test readiness. Perhaps you can talk why thessnp posited we should reduce the readiness timely for a simple nuclear test from 24 months36 months to 610 months. Done an adequate amount of direct discussions with the russians, both military, political, diplomatic, and whether or not they are indeed intending to escalate the escalate strategy . Let us give some twopart question twopart answers. We should not posit that we should reduce the readiness to 610 months. It simply said that if it was a simple test, we thought the approximate test would take us 610 months. There are some press reports that say we were direct you to do that and those are not true. Have we talked to the russians about their concerns . And we have not done nearly enough. We continue to try to engage. In terms of going to future arms control initiatives, we need a willing partner. And we also need a more willing partner to engage in doctrine discussions. I mentioned strategic ability talks with the russians we are having. This is a wonderful opportunity first ofnpr the three major documents from this administration. A perfect opportunity to have a substantive exchange on doctrine when we next meet with the russians. This is this has been a fantastic discussion. Thank you to the folks on this stage for lending us their prestige. We need to take a break. Be back in your seats at 11 30 a. M. On the nose. Join me in thanking the panel, please. [applause] theur live coverage of savannah book festival starts this morning at 9 00 eastern and include the author of, future war. Author Scott Schapiro with the internationalist. With herte headley book, we need to talk. Watch live coverage of the savanna book festival this morning beginning at 9 00 eastern on cspan twos book tv. Series,ns history landmark cases, season two, begins february 26 with a look at the significant to cream Court Discussion heard in 1819. Exploring the case with us will be sarah peters, associate law office professor at the university of virginia. Cases, live on monday, february 26 at 9 00 p. M. Eastern on cspan, cspan. Org, or listen with the free radio app, cspan. Org. Availableion book is at cspan. Org landmark cases. For an additional resource, there is a link on our website to the internet interactive constitution. Yesterday, mitt romney announced he was running for utahs open senate seat. He made his First Campaign appearance at a fundraiser for the utah party utah republican party. It became an open senate seat when orrin hatch decided not to run. This is 40 minutes