Transcripts For CSPAN Special Inspector General For Afghanistan Reconstruction On Afghanistan 20240714

Look at the election in greece and other parts of europe. Inthere are 30 minutes left this discussion and you can find it online in the cspan video library, cspan. Org. We take you live now to the center for strategic and International Studies in washington, d. C. For an update on security in afghanistan. Introductions are underway. Finally, please take a moment to familiarize yourself with the emergency exit pathways for this room directly behind you and down the stairs. If there is an incident behind you, we will go out these doors, follow me and i will take you to a safe location. Today we are delighted to be hosting two angus king individuals from the special Inspector General for afghanistan reconstruction. Himself,ive director john sopko, sworn in in july of 2012. He has more than 30 years of experience in oversight and investigation as a prosecutor. He has served as congressional counsel and senior government advisor and prior to his partner at he was a a law firm. His previous experience includes over 20 years on capitol hill. We are also delighted to be joined by james cunningham, the anduct project leader afghanistan, he has supported there in his current role as a lead analyst for Lessons Learned and best practices for the u. S. Security sector assistance in afghanistan and was the project lead for the report we are going to be discussing here today, sector from Security Defense in afghanistan. Serving as a proverbial long pole in the tent for u. S. Strategy in afghanistan over the last 18 years. So certainly many lessons in best practices to be unpacked not only here today, but anchorage youtube dig into the report as it pertains to afghanistan and also the broader u. S. Security sector enterprise. Without further ado, im delighted to introduce mr. John sopko. John thank you very much. For that kind introduction. It is a pleasure to be here. I want to thank my good friend, jon hamm rate, as well as melissa for todays invitation to discuss our sixth Lessons Learned report that looks at the divided responsibility for Security Sector assistance in afghanistan. I have been privileged to enjoy a long and strong relationship with csi s. Going back to its finding. Thate continued relationship since i have been here. This is my sixth time to come here and discuss the important issue of afghanistan and some of the work that our Little Agency with that tobacco sounding acronym, sigar, has produced. I look forward to our continued collaboration for years to come. Sigar began our Lessons Learned program at the urging, actually, of the first staff commander i work with, general john allen, as well as the first ambassador i worked with. Other officials also suggested were qualified to look at the whole of government and governments approach to reconstruction. The first was reconstruction and the private sector initiatives. One of the brochures if i have the right one in front of me, its out there in the atrium, we linked to all six reports. The prior report released here at csi s look at u. S. Efforts to rebuild the Afghan Security forces. This was, the title of that report, its again available on the internet. Of general joeon when we wereothers briefing them on the first report, they suggested that we examine the patchwork of Security Sector assistance programs undertaken by dozens of entities, dozens of International Partners to develop the Afghan Security forces. Todays report identifies the areas where this amalgamation worked well and fell short. Interviewed over 100 current and former government officials. The report was reviewed by department of defense and state and various military services. It was independently peerreviewed by 13 experts, including among others Melissa Dalton and tommy ross. Like the five other Lessons Learned reports, todays report is available both in traditional on oureractive formats website, which is the view is www. Sigar. Mu. Were the only ones that actually issue interactive reports. Makes us a little unique and i think more user friendly to a lot of people. Todays report is organized into five discrete chapters. Focused on field advising, ministerial advising, equipping the Afghan Security forces and u. S. Based training of afghan natos role in Security Sector assistance efforts. While these chapters can be read as standalone products, taken together they illustrate the this jointed and complex matrix of activities the United States undertook to develop the Afghan Security forces and related ministries. Report is,ce of this i think, highlighted or reflected in the fact that just last month nato deputy secretary rose got a meal or gotteml uler gave a private briefing to nato in which hundreds of officials were in attendance. Since then we have also briefed the hill and senior officials in the state department and the joint staff. Now overall in total the report , identifiedfindings 10 lessons, and made 32 recommendations. The findings highlight the difficulty of conducting Security Sector assistance in the midst of active combat and the challenges of coordinating the efforts of an international coalition. We found that there was no single person, agency, military service, or country responsible for overseeing all of the u. S. And International Activities to develop the Afghan Security forces. Even within the u. S. Government no organization or military service was assigned ownership of developing key components of the mission. For example, no one the u. S. Army with the responsibility fell. Executive Branch Agencies were instructed to deploy personnel to assume responsibility of Security Sector assistance activities for duration of individual appointment that only lasted a year or less. And in doing multiyear plan for sector activity, these divisions often created strains on unity of command and unity of effort and i believe that led to that that we diduote fight 118 your war in afghanistan but weve thought 18 one year wars and i would say manybefore 36 wars when served only six months. While the dual head of u. S. Nato commander in afghanistan is largely responsible for reconstructing Afghan Security forces, as with all nato operations, the commander lacks absolute authority to dictate the exact methods and activities each nato country must use when training, advising, and assisting Afghan Forces. These issues impeded standardization of Security Assistance programs with the International Communities significant contributions. Additionally no direct authority civilian actors operating within embassies, the european union, and other international organizations, all of whom are a part of the effort. Due to the breadth of this , and the00 some pages limitation of time this morning, i will focus my remarks specifically on two areas that i think are extremely important as we go forward. That is field advising and equipping efforts. I would say that these are probably the two most Critical Issues that must be addressed to create a viable Afghan Security presence. A goal necessary to achievea goh afghan and u. S. Security objectives, whether there is a Peace Agreement or not. That aftery a secret nearly 18 years, the American Public and its elected leaders are weary of the war in. Fghanistan when we released our high risk report that i highly recommend you all read, here in march, afghans are the forces cannot vive without external door external donor support, financial and technical. Of the conflict about 63 of the 133 billion reconstruction effort has gone to support the Afghan Security forces. Without continued support, senior u. S. Officials have learned warned sigar as well as the public that they would not be themselves. They have found the while improvements havent made, many of the same challenges that the army a the early years continue to date. Theexample, we note that most recent advising approach unveiled by the army in february of 2017 was the creation of the Security Force system gates. In afghanistan they were to get belowigned the core level and accompany those units on operations and ordinate access the coalition enablers such as Close Air Support and medical evacuation staffing based on recruiting active army duty volunteers. Of the first had never previously been deployed. And even though the army offered a number of incentives for volunteers, the first was filling billets until the day they departed. Advisor roles continued to be seen as not career enhancing in the military, which contributes to high attrition rates, up to 70 for the first, limiting continuity and institutional memory. On a positive note, as there after action review showed, the first sfabs leadership noted their presence had provided a rare window into how well the afghans were performing on the battlefield. They also noted a two full threefold increase in National Army led offensive operations in teams were sfab advising. However, our report also notes that that review, done by the many unit, also identified of the same challenges identified by advisors who had served in afghanistan years delayed teamas formations, the assignment of nonadvisement tasks and meet deployment changes. But they did note riskaverse leadership as factors that inhibited. Drive to advise and fly to advise missions as short as five minutes away from their base were often often required lengthy and difficult approval processes. Now, while we found predeployment training for sfab units had improved, it still failed to provide instruction tailored specifically to the sfab mission in afghanistan. For example, many advisers were unaware that the Afghan Security forces prioritize the evacuation overceased personnel critically wounded personnel based on religious customs. Its interesting, we briefed a senior u. S. General who said we knew that in 2001 and they still arent training that to our staff. It makes it difficult for the advisors who dont quite understand where the afghan priorities are coming from. Additionally, u. S. Army advisors were not exposed to u. S. Imposed flight hour restrictions on u. S. Provided aircraft that were being managed by the u. S. Air force. This issue is critical, since air assets fall under the command of Afghan Army Officers during cooperation within the advisoryf the sfab commission at the tactical level. Knowledge of these critical command and control relationships and important aspects of Afghan Military culture are important for u. S. Advisors to be successful from day one of their assignment. Despite the 2015 transition that prioritized the train advise and s dot mission, the sfab not operate under the combined security transition command in afghanistan otherwise known as stick command, but rather under the u. S. Commander in the field for operations. As a result, many of the advisors were tasked with nonadvisory missions. One sfab battalion was tasked with running an airfield and another was tasked with helping to coordinate air attacks. Theyadvisors noticed received a little direction from the u. S. Advisory mission in kabul. It is also difficult to judge the true impact of the sfab deployment because the unit lacked a monitoring and Assessment Tool to assess the afghan counterparts in middeployment reassessments reassignments, excuse me, such as having to switch from advising an Afghan Army Unit to advising an Afghan Police unit, limiting assessment capabilities. Now, if advising is one side of the coin, equipping is the other. The United States taxpayer has expended more than 18 billion to equip the Afghan Security forces. Providing over 600,000 weapons, 70,000 vehicles, and more than 200 aircraft. Now, the United States typically provides defense articles and assistance the partner nations through either the Foreign Military sales fms program or former military Financing Program that usually is run by the department of state. The Defense Department began using what is known as pseudofms mechanisms. It was to define your own requirements. Without a formal request from the participated country. In addition, frequent personnel rotations and the lack of comprehensive plan mentor that equipping decisions were often ad hoc and inconsistent from yeartoyear. Each of whom will need to be taking the program in a different direction. Lieutenant general david bolger told us that he compared looking at the Afghan Security forces to the crosssection of a sedimentary rock each years u. S. Budget priorities and good ideas layered across the older ones. Under pressure to turn the corner now, commanders equipped Afghan Forces with little regard for past decisions or future expenses. Negative battlefield implications of course resulted. For example, the u. S. Military did not begin transitioning the Afghan National police to nato standard weapons until 2016. Eight years after it did so with the afghan National Army. As a result, during a Taliban Attack on the ghazni province last year the afghan army were unable to resupply their besieged Police Colleagues because the ammunition was not compatible. Also found conflicting reports concerning the extent of afghan involvement in equipping decisions. The Security Assistance office in afghanistan repeatedly told input had beenan and is currently considered at multiple levels. Those who worked in the area that we interviewed for this report, many of whom had a longwith stick for time questioned of the extent to which afghan input was considered at all. Retired officer who spent four years in afghanistan told us that afghan involvement and input simply meant acquiring a signature and a former commander told sigar that afghan work informed and directed, not asked or consulted. And that leaders afghan leaders made reasonable requests and were told that it is not part of our plan, basically forget it. Because of this, the u. S. Had lost critical by am from our the valuable stakeholder, afghan army and police. Defense Department Officials that the rapid turnover of personnel resulted thingsrts to include such as the Security Assistance office, which were discontinued whenever personnel related rotations occurred. U. S. Militarye transitioned to a more traditional afghan mission, they would need to be able to play a larger role in the direction execution and tracking of their own equipment, procurement, training, and sustainment. The Senate Appropriations Committee Found similar problems. Its exceeding afghan needs and not meeting other requirements identified by the afghans. Sigar found that the Defense Department missed opportunities to do provide Defense Department with costeffective equipment. For example, the u. S. Continues to up provide humvees to the afghans without upgrades to protect a primary gutter that has been available to u. S. Forces in afghanistan for over a decade. Without these they have been forced to improvise with scrap parts from destroyed humvees that have likely suffered a necessary unintentional casualties. While routinely used by u. S. Forces, those Security Forces have a force of 352,000 authorized personnel. The ministry has repeatedly requested that the u. S. Provide additional armored ambulances. Congress has supported the , the u. S. Requisition army has sent 287 surplus armored ambulances to be destroyed in 2017 alone rather than provide them to the Afghan Military. Sigar found that personnel at various organizations locked lacked acquisition will experience and training. At one point that three executive directors in afghanistan had no prior fms experience. These staffing concerns were highlighted in our 2017 audit that was used for this report. Personnel didhat understand best practices for acquisition. Despite this advisors failed to. Everage the expertise a classic example we have highlighted in the past is the 468 million purchase of 20 g222 for theift airplanes air force and that exemplifies we think this lack of coordination. The Program Ended in march of 2013 because critical parts were too expensive and too difficult to obtain. Ironically the u. S. Air force has identified the same problems when they were operating the aircraft from 1990 to 1999. They decided to retire the aircraft because parts were, you guessed it, too expensive and too difficult to obtain. So let me conclude by saying this. The recommendations that you will find in the report are intended by sigar to improve Personnel Selection and training. They are intended to improve longterm training to align efforts and intended to increase and involvement in key decisions to increase awareness of complementary activities. Improving coordination to optimize security incentives in the future. But we are not naive. This longn doing enough and my colleagues have, too. We know that there is no Silver Bullet for the problems that we identify. There is no Silver Bullet that will fix all of these challenges. After 17ecognize that years of u. S. Security sector assistance, transformative changes are highly unlikely. We hope that the commonsense reforms can make a difference in what we propose will lead to improvements in afghanistan and elsewhere in the world where reuse Security Sector assistance. Let me conclude by saying i would be remiss if i did not thank the Lessons Learned program director, who is sitting. Ere in the audience project lead james cunningham, who is here today to help answer the questions and who really took the bulk of the work, and his team, zachary martin, rick ,ates, samantha, ashley, brian vaughn foracy, and their excellent work on this report. While it is a sigar report, it is really theirs. They have spent years working on it and i look forward to your questions and hope you have an opportunity to read it. Thank you. [applause] melissa great. Well, thank you so much, john, for the sober reflections on the state of the u. S. Security sector in afghanistan. A lot to take forward and they just, not only in the afghan context, but for how the United States and its allies might approach center prime in other situations. I have read the report, of course, but hearing it in your own words, talking about the fact that there was no single entity assigned for the responsibility and oversight of the u. S. Security sector in afghanistan is pretty remarkable , 17 years in. Pinning arose on someone for multifaceted enterprises that involve not only the united oftes and the array coalition efforts. Couldwondering if you invite james as well to talk a intle more to contribute terms of how central and building the capacity has been to the u. S. Strategy for the last 17 years instead of being the long pole in the tent, proverbially. Single entity driving it to the policy outcome in afghanistan, how does that impact our ability to know if we are on track to achieving our overall outcomes and objectives for afghanistan . Let me respond briefly and i will turn it over to james. This is the long pole. Get out ofwant to objective wasur to create a centralized government to keep the bad guys attack the let them United States or our allies. Whether we can afford and honest or fair p afghans deserve it. , afghans deserve it, but you will need a Security Force. Isis. Ve at you have got warlords, gangs, and other threats. You need a functioning police in a functioning of a terry and therefore you need assistance. As i look at it again i highly suggest you read this report. Its online and on the high risk list. They say you got a plan for that . If these comes, all of these problems that my agency and other agencies have identified for the last 17 years dont miraculously disappear. We signed peas and all of the sudden you think the narcotics problem and corruption problem disappears . The economic problem in afghanistan disappears . No. Failure to plan now is planning to fail once its declared. And we do hope for that. I think this is the key. Again, the long pole is that you have got to have a viable, effective military police force that is functioning and functioning in a way that we think is best. Meaning no violations of human rights. James . James thank you. A lot of times the Security Force is viewed as our exit strategy to get out of afghanistan and have them take over the counterterrorism mission, but the problem is we often find that our vision is looked at through the lens of combat. We have to move the Security Assistance at the pace of security operations. Thats a big problem because it is tied to our policy for combat , not necessarily our longterm policy. 2004,ample back in 2003, there was one central core and then leaving. The army planned possible expansions at a later date and were told to stop it because we would not expand beyond one core and we know today that that would have been a good plan to have. The other problem is that a lot of the advisors are told to operate on the speed of. Dvisories they are assessed as needing some help but by the time they leave they show progress, so the mechanism that they use, go green, showing complete. The next unit that comes into partner says that they regress. We see it in the Assessment Tool, and some was like a shark based on the powered cycle and we really cannot assess it longterm because we are reviewing it through longterm policy. Melissa right. That point, tracking the metrics, it seems we have been u. S. Rily got through the plan, referring back to the speech for lack of definition or a engagement definitionary u. Plan, referring back to the outcomes and objectives and what the outcomes might be for their own Security Force develop an. Wherehere been instances we have gotten that right . Maybe at the tactical level that your report and illuminated . Or was a complete across the board . Have gotten itwe correctly uncertain capabilities. Air capability that we were able to assess overtime. Worst of looking at the right metrics for some of those things. One, we did not include the afghans in deciding what to look worst of lookingat. But the second thing is that the advisor himself is grading himself and there is not an independent Assessment Team that we recommended that the port , i judge myself and dont judge the activities overtime. In your prior comment in terms of the tension between shortterm operational, battle driven metrics and the promises we are making versus the , theterm policy goals current u. S. Administration has emphasized a desire to see better return on investment for sigar writ large, but often times these returns take time to manifest. Can the how best United States strike a balance in afghanistan with shortterm gains necessary for political and fiscal cover on capitol hill, simultaneously retaining that on capitol hill with , rather more broadly than investing in more Sustainable Solutions . I think some of that comes down to being realistic about what we are trying to implement in afghanistan. A lot of the things that they can self sustainer not u. S. Based. Perfect example, the air force. The m i17 Program Ability to self sustain over the decision to take away that program and bring in the uh 60 black hawk , thats not a negative result for the afghans but a decision that we made that we need to be transparent about in terms of giving them political will and a longterm commitment, to understand our decisions. I think that to show them progress over time, we need to talk about how in the u. S. Military you wont have a Lieutenant Colonel or colonel inside of 10 years so in afghanistan youre starting to see now this next generation of u. S. Trained nato advised forces coming into the fold. General miller will often highlight those as good news stories. We are starting to have some highlights that can show that this is the outcome of longterm Security Assistance, but i would argue that the new generation has done it completely as far as their ability to go overboard. I think that if you read our reports over the last seven years, the common refrain of our agency and most of these honest to the be taxpayer and to be more honest to congress as to the limitations of what were doing. Tendency is what is required by the appropriations cycle, but to claim success within six months. James talked about the sharpness and that is in one of our assessment. They match perfectly with peoples rotations, you know . We also actually looked at different Assessment Tools that they had on assessing the Afghan Military. Independente an Inspector General. We dont have a dog in the fight. We are not related to any of the contractors trying to argue for a program. Every time we looked at the Assessment Tool, the military would abolish the tool and say no, dont waste your time. Kept moving the goalposts and it eventually disappeared. Thats important. Lets be honest to the american people, we should have been more honest years ago, telling them it was going to take a long time. Like james said. Do we think we will turn round the Afghan Military in six months . With these new officers that we have brought in or the afghans have brought in, these new and younger officers, 20 take time. I think thats just right. I believe in the report, speaking of the training element , only 13 of the larger number of officers trained in the United States under the International Military Education Training programs and are now in prominent government positions. Acknowledging that this is of course a generational effort, what are some of the specific problems are related to afghanistan with maybe the efficacy and what steps can the United States take to mitigate these issues . The first problem i would raise is that i dont know if tool is a good tool in afghanistan, its basically a rating success on how many pilots or soldiers that go to train end up in parliament or as general officers. I dont know if that is the right tool to use in afghanistan. The second problem that you have is that we dont have good visibility on the afghan personnel system. We dont know, even that number, im not certain its accurate. We dont know where they end up. The third problem that we have noticed, and unfortunately i think that this is where we have gone backwards, not forwards. There is a big problem with a wall. Itsns come over here and the highest percentage, correct me if im wrong, of any country that sends people over here, afghans have the highest percentage of going awol. Part of that is a problem that the Afghan Government, when somebody comes over here for training, they go on with like retired or semiemployed status, so they lose their pay. They may not want to come back. Theres also corruption. Many of the people that we train, we bring them over here, they have to pay a bribe to get their job back in afghanistan, so they decide to stay. We have also heard that there is a network of afghans here who try to get these soldiers who come over here to leave in the and up in canada or elsewhere. Thats a problem. A bigat i think we made mistake with this year is we decided we are not going to train any afghans in the United States. I think that we were talking about this before. We highlighted the air force Training Program as a success story. It was the gold standard. Where the u. S. Air force at campo muti, for duty down in georgia, bringing air afghan pilots over to work closely with american pilots and american trainers for four years. They went back and forth. Its a Great Success story. Well, that program no longer exists because we decided that because of the fear of john awol fear of a wall , proverbial proverbial you cut f your nose to spite your face. The air force and muti had a clever program and how to keep people. Basically you came as a Group Training you would get additional money if you all left is a group. If anyone left it was like your trainingpressure. No one got a bonus when they left. It was a great thing that the air force was doing. Yes. Sa you raise an interesting issue in terms of taking the less is example andhanistan extrapolating them to the broader Security Assistance world. T might not beime the best training tool for afghanistan. There is this question that in a fragile, contested state with an theve war happening where forces engaged, what is the toolset that we bring to bear to work with our partners in those contexts . Are there other tools that need to be sharpened, refined, or created with the relevant authorities and funding to be able to provide the type of training and advising in context support that actual, you know, training objective as it connects to the context and goals for the partner in the United States . You know, i think we have some relevant authorities that can be used in places outside of afghanistan. But you know perhaps that is a broader conversation that needs to be had. And your recommendations are also coming at a time when there is an ongoing active conversation in washington following in 2017 in the National Defense authorization act when there were fairly sweeping reforms to the security fact Security Sector enterprise as implemented by the department of defense. So if you are putting these recommendations out there, what have you heards so far from the Broader Community in terms of the lessons that should inform how we do this in other countries. James there has been good reception 12 reports of how to do things better and improve security efforts over time. The problem with afghanistan related to 2017 is that its often excluded. If you look at the mandated security preparation budget that was mandated by the reform, there are a lot of instances in which afghan is excluded from the effort. I think they view it as a cut of lost cause, something beyond the purview of traditional Security Cooperation and its often meeting those reforms later. Programs areol supposed to be for all programs. I know that they are trying to formulate a team now to start that for afghanistan, but again, you are multiyears late, we have been there for 17 years doing this. How do we get those reforms targeting the future effort to look at the current efforts to include that Workforce Development where i dont believe that many advisors out there are getting that certification training and they are still loves making the key decisions on a daily basis. And to break down the barrier of thinking about afghanistan has apples and oranges versus Everything Else the United States is taking, all the parts in the ark of the experience is we are shifting to a different type of mission with Resolute Support for the last couple of years and looking out regardless of the policy that this administration or future administration chooses to take, this mission will likely be sustained and, perhaps as john was speaking about earlier, familiarn into a more model. So for the community to break down the communication and start sharing those lessons, on the question of Workforce Development i wanted to follow up on some of the comments and findings on the Security Force assistance brigade. Could you just speak a little bit more about the role of the Afghanistan Context in which you spoke about the differences between the first that had deployed being active at multiple levels down the organization of the Afghan National defense and Security Forces. But then the second of client being a bit more removed from some of the lower echelons. Are there other findings that you think will be important . In thinking about that model Going Forward, as i understand, this was very much a priority for general millie and given his ascension in the joint staff, this operating model might be applied or thought about more broadly in a global context. With james, james had a great opportunity with his team to grow and brief the interview believe, so sfab, i i will defer to him, but i thought one of the best successes around Lessons Learned was when the first sfab redeployed, they created a Training Program for the second sfab. And i thought that was fantastic. That was actually taking some people who have had on the ground experience and you didnt lose it. But james, i know you might want to add something else. James sure. I think with the sfabs, there was a lot of growing pains. The initial Training Program would be at the administering a level and shortly beforehand we are choi and daschle by chairman millie and general mattis at the time that there would be this revamping in realtime to try to get them should ready for their deployment. I think they have become a bit more steady state and what they are planning to do and implementing whats Going Forward, but the big thing for everyone to consider in the brigade was that they were institutionalizing the formation without institutionalizing the expertise. With 60 to 70 attrition yearoveryear, even as they came back it was a new advisor learning again from the ground and repartnering without the report established. Youre not really institutionalizing the roof there is critical for them to move. One thing that we recognize is that they really strain u. S. Military ability to leverage niche capabilities. There are only so many military intelligence captains and the army, so have you balance that into the combat teams and the near fight for the brigade that believe partnering with units . Ultimately the service is going to look at how you both with these select lowlevel people that we have. Right. speaking of the broader context of competition, how might a unit like this be deployed in the context to work with allies and partners . Thats also an interesting prospect. It will be interesting to see where the Army Services take that Going Forward. Ask our panelists one more question and then we will turn to the audience in just a moment. You mentioned the Institution Building role. There was the program earlier in the u. S. And their experience in afghanistan and now we have Defense Management and Institution Building or defense Institution Building. Has evolved over time, but it is a key function and the connective tissue between the top political level in afghanistan down to the level of being such a critical part of building a professionalized force. John also mentioned some of the issues or questions surrounding the personnel system. Going forward, how do you see the question of defense Institution Building . What we found in the report is that its one of the best trained and selected individuals Going Forward but at most we had 12 to 15 actually doing a mission comparatively. The u. S. Military does not have the program institutionalized yet for them to go through this kind of Institutional Development or training advisers have it is that. I know that they are looking at it at the Training Center but not looking forward. They are not getting it Going Forward but they are making up a large part of the advisory core responsible for the missions. The one thing that we call it is Security Sector governance. A ginning and things of that nature, what we dont understand a lot of times is that we think the things that are hardest to do come the latest. We dont focus on the systems as much operational capabilities and then Human Resources and things that nature, you are 10 years to 15 years in. We need to start implementing them early and i think the biggest challenge we will have with this is that it requires a proper turnover. You wont be able to complete all the tasks to create a Human Resource system and 12 months. What are your tasks for the first 12 and what you need to transition to . But we lack that kind of mental mindset of this. Changes were i dont do everything in my tour. If we can start getting our advisors to understand how to build these institutional capabilities and how to work with the next one to make it sure its streamlined going caserd, thats their best we have for creating these things in afghanistan. Melissa also engaging with afghans and how they frame their Enduring Solutions for them after we depart. John just to add, melissa, this goes back to the longterm landing and looking at the long haul on this. At the six months to one year rotation. Melissa great. At this point we will transition to questions and answers from the audience that i am happy to moderate. We have severalmoderate. We have several staff on hand that dont have microwaves. Microphones. Please wait for the staff member to bring it to you and then please introduce yourself with name and affiliation and state your questions in the form of a question. We will star with this woman right here. Thank you. [inaudible] for leaving i, i, i dont know of any tension. I would have to talk to general miller about that. The information being alluded to is information that the afghan rs to provide. D we highlighted that. I dont think that this is general miller or his team particularly. And then a decision was made i think at the beginning of last not mistaken, about actually not collecting certain data. Which was i think the decision that was made not by general miller, but gave it back here in washington that they were no longer collecting it. I dont think of it is a tension much as we highlighted the fact that without this a that its hard for the average taxpayer to know again, it goes back to a monitoring tool. We are not collecting the data on the number of districts and trolled by the Afghan Government or the districts controlled by the taliban. Its hard to rate whether we are winning or losing. Thats essentially the tension that we have, the amount of information. But there is no tension per se with general miller and his team. Where they can. I defer to you because you were talking about some of the things they were implementing. But again, general miller is not in charge. A lot of these changes have to be made back here at the pentagon or made elsewhere, or congress has to weigh in on some of them. During the research phase, the general provided me great access into what they were doing. It was a great full day trip. Our Agency Review process we had close discussions about things they thought were valid in our report and things they challenged in our report. I do think we have a Good Relationship with them. Continue to will engage in this ongoing dialogue to hopefully implement some of these Lessons Learned for future operations. Melissa gentle man here in the here in thetleman front. Am a journalist in washington covering the white house and state department. This war has been going on for a long time, not just for 20 years, since the 70s. People in afghanistan are still living in dark, and still hoping there will someday be light in the dark tunnel. This report may be timely or not , but the rest of us are still going on. Pakistando you think relied on doing this work billions of dollars in the name of at the same time they were denied for the last 20 years Osama Bin Laden was in pakistan. Than 40 terrorist groups were operating inside pakistan. I was there. Time terrorist groups are still there. Including four of most terrorist wanted including by india, america, but they are saying they are not there. How much do you think they are still relies on pakistan . Pakistan does not want india presence inside of afghanistan. Thank you very much. This report has nothing to do with any of those issues you raised. Im an Inspector General. My office looks at reconstruction. I think the question you are raising is more of a policy political issue. I really cant address your questions. Melissa lets go to the gentle man in the back. Thank you. Gentlemen in the back. Thank you. Just want to get back to the information that had been withheld. The military says they always got the information from the Intelligence Community. Even the vital role in determining whether the u. S. Is winning or losing or being successful, have you been able to reach out to the Intelligence Community and has there been willingness on their part to declassify and share that information with you . We have john complete access of information from the Intelligence Community, but i dont want to comment on what they do or dont do. What we specifically were addressing at that time was an unclassified collection of information that military had been doing, based on data from the afghans. Highlight thes fact that they were no longer being collected. Discuss what the Intel Community is or is not doing. All of our staff has clearances. We get the declassified briefings. We produce a classified annex for those members of staff on the hill who want to read the reports. Fronta gentle man in the gentleman in the front. Director for you mention one of your recommendations is that the Afghan Air Force training should not be cut off as it is, since it is crucial. These provinces are covered by mountains and air force continued operation is needed. Atmosphere, it is election time, probably that would be something to consider. Would you advise any alternative such as Training Afghan air forces with u. S. Military advisers . It was because they worked closely with the afghan pilots. They assigned people for four years the same advisor for four years with those pilots. You develop a really great rapport. I dont want to imply that training wont be done. I forget which country it is going to be assigned to do. It is a shame, because it was the gold standard. It is not being done because of the fear of a wall. It is not just that program, it is all the programs. They are being done in other countries. I dont know where the programs are going to be done, is that india . We had a great audit we published last year that highlighted the different Areas Program the problem is we can train them to combat standards. In slovenia they are training them to civilian standards, then they would have to go through a. Ourse to reprofessionalize we call it dependency analysis. If the u. S. Is going to reduce its footprint, Security Sectors or combat footprint, how does that impact our Security Sectors programming . We argue there needs to be some dependency analysis done so we can measure where the Training Needs to occur and to make sure the Afghan Air Forces capabilities are sustained. Melissa why in the back there. Way in the back there. Thank you. [indiscernible] do you think your concerns have been addressed . . Nd what is your main concern referencing some of the comments made earlier about the peace negotiations with the taliban and what you think about the prospects for that, and whether some of the concerns he heard you express have been taken into consideration. John i have no input on the peace process, other than i follow it in the news and we support a fair and lasting peace in afghanistan. The point we make with this ,eport and what i was saying is despite peace, problems dont miraculously disappear. We wish they would, but you have to plan for the day after. An Inspector General on reconstruction, im not an Inspector General on peace, negotiations, foreign policy. We and other oversight bodies have identified problems that have affected reconstruction. Some of these problems could affect lasting peace. We aretelling congress, telling the executive branch, here are the problems, plan now, not until the day after do not wait until the day after. I am not privy to that, it is not my job to do that. We support these, i think everyone supports a lasting and fair piece. Fair peace. Melissa lets go over here. Thank you. Retired navy captain, with a grandkid who is a First Lieutenant in afghanistan. To go further on what you mentioned about predeployment it couldand where obviously be improved, how do you assess a daytoday nectivity between act have between afghanistan and the states . If i am a commander in learnedtan and i something say i am leaving in four months, and i know something my relief needs to these people talking generally back to their relief, or do they even know who he is or what unit he is coming from . James the problem is you are right, knowing who your relief is. Historically over time we have not had that in place. In afghanistan today there is a huge effort to get this advising Network Database to be able to work at the combat, operational and tactical level, where you can input things you have seen, observed, issues you are engaging with, and that will be in place for the next unit to come on board and learn from. They are trying to fix the way in which their units can communicate to each other and bring that capability back to the United States and provide advisers access to it prior to Going Forward, so they are able to see some of the things going on. Really upon the unit commander of the team going out there to know about the database and leverage it to get his team Going Forward, that is not standardized or institutionalized. Thing we have seen over time is there has been an overlap between some of the units that went out. I remember james and i, we attack atthe tac, and some of the Senior Officers who came in overlap for a few months. They shared information that way. I dont know how much of that was organized or was a oneoff. We are not just critical of the military. This is a problem throughout the u. S. Government. Have hundreds of advisors from the department of justice that came over and did rule of law. I remember talking to one of them who said he begged the department of justice to let them stay over or at least to write out they are notes of who they saw of what they saw, who they dealt with for at least three weeks before they left. Never done. We had thousands of people come through on that program. No one has captured any of the information. Waste, a total waste. Its not just the military. Melissa its a problem not too unique to afghanistan either. The agency is undertaking a huge. Efense work Program Initiative part of that is to connect members of the Security Sector as well as mentoring the next generation. Also to enable this transition of personnel as they are coming and going from different locations. This, iwe started remember general had breakfast , he said the marines will do after action reports. Will there be purple, you know what purple means. Learnedre be lessons reports done . Bel the state department to doing Lessons Learned reports . Will the u. S. Id be doing Lessons Learned reports . Usaid be doing Lessons Learned reports . We went around, we went to the state department. They decide to one person who did a tour, and that was it. There. I went over not the current regime. Over to the nsc and the nsc said great idea, but we are not doing it. It falls to an Inspector General foro the Lessons Learned the longest u. S. War. I think its great what we are doing. It is kind of odd in this u. S. Government, there is not an agency that regularly collect information like this and does best practices in Lessons Learned. Maybe thats why we tend to repeat the same mistakes. Proselytize the importance of Lessons Learned. I was on the hill for 25 years. How do we handle issues dealing with opiates . Has anyone done a Lessons Learned report on how we handle a narcotics issue . No one has put that together and tried to analyze what are the best practices . Thesea to you as you read reports and think about it is you have an Inspector Generals office and reconstruction writing the history of afghanistan. Its part of my charter. It seems like an art an odd charter. The woman here in the front. We keep hearing that taliban control over 40 of afghanistan. My colleague just recently did a howof afghanistan to see much is true. And she did it based on population. She looked at each district and and where theon taliban had control. Of thend only 3 population is under the taliban finds, because research taliban control where the taliban control, people leave. Over oneave no control city. Wouldnt it be unfair to keep taliban controls 40 instead of looking at the population. Responsible for what people say in the press. Got fromed the data we the Afghan Government and u. S. Government. We stand by whatever that information was. These reports in the media are summer are some other sources. I cant comment on whether they are accurate or not. [inaudible] consider your sources. Melissa here in the blue shirt. Hello. I work with the International Foundation here in d. C. Given the president ial election ,hat was scheduled in september you assess the capability of Afghan Forces that they will be able to protect provide security . John are you saying after a peace negotiation . During the election. I really cant answer that question. I know it is going to be i know they will get support from the coalition. I cant comment. Do you have any thoughts . I know they are doing Election Security planning. Abouts where we talk security for system brigades and others. A better idea on what the afghans can and cant do. Since we moved it up to the brigade level, to the core level it is hard to assess. Front. over here in the one of the question was, corruption is a major problem in afghanistan. Does it contribute to prolonged the war . If there is any progress made so far, this is one part. The second, based on experiences and Lessons Learned, can you name a few more major continuethat can around this . I do remember that interview. Corruption does impact on the security situation in afghanistan. Corruption and Human Rights Violations by the Afghan Government are utilized by the insurgency other forces for recruiting. Everyone is aware of that. Corruption is still a problem. And it will continue to be a until the Afghan Government becomes more aggressive. Has the Afghan Government made progress in that area . We are currently doing a second , and they are asked by congress. Those reports should be coming out sometime in the fall where they are giving a more detailed assessment. We will be taking a look at the Afghan Governments capabilities to address the corruption issue. Corruption is a problem in afghanistan. Its one of these problems that doesnt disappear overnight. We have been critical of the Afghan Government, where they deserve criticism, and where they deserve praise. Mixed bag. The other question, are there other problems . One of the ones that i think is important to keep in mind is the narcotics problem. That is going to have an impact on successful peace and incessful security afghanistan. Narconnot have a existence, which has close ties groups, andcs expect you are going to have lasting peace. Narcotics traffickers do not like strong Central Government by definition. It is not just in afghanistan. You can see it in other countries around the world. Many of the narco traffickers in work withtries terrorist groups to provide protection. We would be so naive if we signed a Peace Agreement. And miraculously those terrorists who had been collecting money and developing the relationship with narcotics traffickers will all of a sudden say, i dont have to do that anymore. We dealto make certain with that problem and more importantly the afghans have to deal with that narcotics problem. That could be a real stumbling block, unless the Afghan Government can handle that narcotics problem. I think human rights is a big issue. Not just human rights dealing with gender, but human rights in general. Taliban havethe used two recruiting purposes. One writes the illegality and the bad governments. A those things are going to be there with our help in the coalition. To recruit going more people who are upset with the government. They turned to weapons and destruction. That is something we have to address and the Afghan People have to address it. One more question, go to the gentleman in the front. Do you mind introducing yourself . I did not invite to particular issues. And the lack of the agency to coordinate all of the military support efforts. Why do you think it took so long for all agencies involved in the military support mission to not identify this particular issue . Take six years for sigar to come to this conclusion . To thet is the solution frequent personnel rotation . Assignedncy should be to coordinate all of this . Very good question. These problems people have identified many people who served another half served in afghanistan came back and commented on these problems. Voa,ad great reporting by Washington Post and many other journalists who came back and commented about these problems. Sigar was created 10 years ago. Icame seven years ago, and think our earliest reports, we did look at individual programs, identify the problem of training asast two frequent rotations problems. What we did here was try to collect as much data as we had to understand the problems. This isnt a problem we just discovered now and no one has ever heard of. We serve a different role. I made a comment to somebody about what is your source . Sources a contractor, your sources a reporter. A report, it has to go through due process. Documented. Lly it is 200 some pages. Bluebook or silver book are standards that all ags follow. When you read our quarterly reports, you can trust we are independent. We dont have a dog in the fight. The Afghan Government has their own political value system and what they want to accomplish. We are independent. General, by law have to be independent. You can trust the report coming out from the dod, state ig or aig on issues like this. We tried to get to the truth. In newsthe difference reports and what you may read somewhere else. To that extent, it is not a new issue but i think we finally have documented this. We have many others we are still working on. Do we take one particular agency that should be running the show . Not really. Policy. Really do do a problem and make certain recommendations. Whether they want to continue whether they want to buy a certain weapon system, they do it and we will say, this is your objective and either you meet it or dont meet it and why. It is not our job to pick an agency. If you are doing a train, advise and assist, it makes sense that all the traders and advisors report to the same agent. The combined Security Training command, it sounds like a logical place for it. Thats off and saying the way it should be done. You understand the difference. Dont feel bad if you dont know what an ig is. I dont know if people in the u. S. Government know what an independent igs. I went overseas and somebody in the state department says, you didnt ask us to write a report. I said that violates the independence clause. We take umbrage when people who criticize our reports, who we know who have connections to contractors, who we know have connections to procurements out there. To be a right contractor, to be involved with procurement, but dont try to hold yourself as an independent judge of the press. We all have to sign, every time we do an audit, that we are independent. Thats the difference between an independent Inspector General in the United States and even an auditing function in some agencies. Here and giveback a briefing on ig. I dont think enough people the 1978ow significant ig act was. Im a big proponent. A brilliant piece of legislation. Melissa thank you so much for your important insights today on the future of Security Sectors in afghanistan, and john reminding us of the importance the ig play in the american constitutional system. Please join me in thanking our two speakers today. [applause] much. Thank you very [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2019] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] starting shortly a discussion about the 2020 senses and trump plus decision to count citizens and noncitizens in the u. S. Trumps friend decision to count citizens and noncitizens in the u. S. Tonight, vaping and the youth nicotine epidemic. Congress is investigating the issues. We start at 8 p. M. With the opponents of vaping. Associating there have been articles and studies written about this. Juuling, they are they dont think they are vaping or using ecigarettes. At 9 50, the ceo of juul labs. Agee dont want any under consumers using this product. We need to Work Together to make sure no under age consumers use this product. It is terrible for public health, terrible for our reputation. None of this is good stuff. Watch tonight on cspan, online on cspan. Org, or on the free cspan radio