Transcripts For CSPAN Hudson Institute Discussion On Nuclear Security Policy 20240714

Congressional oversight of Nuclear Security and arms control. Speakers included representatives from the Arms Control Association. The Hudson Institute in washington posted this two our event. Two hour event. Thank you. Lets begin. Toant to welcome everyone hudson. My name is richard price. Talk, we are honored to about an important report and an important subject, that is congressional efforts to oversee the u. S. Nuclear security efforts. We are specifically going to talk about a report, copies of which are outside, by the partnerships to secure america and the Arms Control Association , blueprints for a new generation. I want to particularly welcome the cspan audience for joining us. To make everything easier, if people could silence any cell phones you have now, that would be helpful. The report and other work we have been doing with partnerships to secure america and the Arms Control Association has been continuing over years. It is an independent project, but we collaborated with these two organizations, doing two events on the hill, congressional briefings, the Nuclear Threat and tools of the trade, how do we encounter the threat, and Global Security architects . And the report presentations we gave in congress were supportive of the Macarthur Foundation. The agenda today, we will have three presentations that will discuss the importance of congressional Nuclear Oversight in general, the key findings and recommendations summarizing and , and morethem on what needs to be done, what initiatives we could pursue as we go further. Thefirst speaker will be chairman of the board of directors at partnership for secure america, which is a nonprofit founded by former representative lee hamilton. For policy challenges since january 2008. He has also been a private consultant at aks consulting. Before that, he was the assistant secretary of state for nuclear operations, and has had a lot of impressive positions before that. Kingston reef, the director of disarmament and Threat Reduction policy at the arms control organization. His work focuses on nuclear preventsnt, which Nuclear Terrorism and other issues. S is theis expertise legislator progress and congressional actions on this issue. He is very smart, a former marshall scholar, and. Independent of the two aganizations, we have had guest with an extensive career on energy policy. She is currently the member of the board of the Defense Nuclear facility safety board, and this is an independent organization in the executive branch that is publicsible for health and safety issues in the departments and Nuclear Facilities. Before that, she worked in various national labs, in the department of energy, and served on the National Security council. No views are solely her own, endorsement by the border the u. S. Government, and in fact, all of us as independent think tanks, we are not taking an institutional position on these issues. A just want to contribute to discussion today on what we consider to be a really important topic. Do you want to go ahead . I am a little out of breath because we hustled down here, sorry. I apologize for being late. Two things before i Start Talking about the report. I want to introduce, we have two other fellow members of the partnership for america, rachel and jack brought rachel price and jack osman. I want to point about for the work that they have done. The second thing i want to mention, in supremely great as some of morning, us know that congressman panetta and choice in introduced a piece of legislation that is study, it is our enacted, past and enacted, would ask and require the gao to give the congressman and and report on budget and spending and in both nationalized domestic Nuclear Security programs, for greater security. This is one of the recommendations in the report, of those members are of the nuclear Scrutiny Working Group on a bipartisan piece of legislation. About thel do is talk study that we did, why we did what sort did it, and of generalization, what principle findings we derive from it. When i say we, i mean the actual survey that we did excuse me among Congressional Staff. Way we started on this issue, we wanted to get some greater clarity about what is Nuclear Security . What is the Nuclear Security issue area . Whole ofsee with the congress thinks about this issue, what its Knowledge Base is, how it feels about it, what its priorities are and so forth. Congress has a bit of history, bipartisan history in some cases , other actually coming up with good, interesting initiatives that have not only moved this otheration, but legislation. The cooperative reduction act Bipartisan Legislation that was passed in the early 1990s. So congress is an important player in the government and more. What we did was set out to focus our attention on Congressional Staff. Congressional staff in part, because Congressional Staff are accessible, they are willing to produce a paper this the members are, and Congressional Staff plane Important Role in the entire legislative process. In terms of writing legislation, oning up with ideas, being top of legislation and so forth. I think no other country in the world rivals the role, as far as i know, that staff play in our legislative process. Know that legislators play a large role with the Congressional Staff in our legislative process. Haveership for america, we sort of a running start on some of this. How did we do this . Our database composed of three different components, and i will give you the numbers on the first part of the database. We actually did facetoface, personal interviews with about 20 Congressional Staffers. Most of whom are what we call a involved or heavily involved on this issue in Nuclear Security. These were personal interviews in their offices, personal interviews have the advantage of being able to get clarity on some of the responses, a followup or things like that. Datawas one subset of the that we were able to gather on it. One, we sent out a survey to Congressional Staff and received 107 responses on that. It is not exactly what we call a random sample, but a large sample, giving us some credibility in making inferences from those data. These were directed from staffers who have some broad engagement on Foreign Policy, National Security, homeland security, intelligence. That sort of thing. We had two groups of individuals , which is about 127 samples, if you want to call it, 127 data sources. The third part of this methodology was to have a small focus group. Kingston and i were there. We invited another 10 or so staffers who were in it, and to simply sort of go over them, go over with them what we thought our findings were. And have a discussion with these staffers. Most of whom had not participated in the survey itself. Some of them did, some of them didnt. This was a way to enrich our understanding of the data we were able to collect and to give us some more texture, i think. Arehose three components kind of the core methodology. The data was collected some time ago. I think it was the fall and 20172018, so it was obviously before last years midterm elections, which changed the composition of congress in a remarkable way. It was before the Nuclear Posture review was released, so anyway, before that was released. There are a number of findings let we have in the report, me talk about four or five of them that were the most interesting to us and hopefully to you. What did we learn . The first thing we learn is probably the most important thing we learned, and the least surprising to those of us who have either been on the hill for ago, backor some time before this thinking of the battles this sinking of the battleship maine. So this is the first important thing i think we learned. We asked the question to elicit some responses. Question, when someone raises the issue of Nuclear Security in congress or talks about the threat of Nuclear Security, what comes to mind . Our findings provoked a variable scattergram of responses. The single largest response we developed a word cloud for the report. Words in thehe responses elicited, according to their frequency, the words would appear larger and so forth. , what we saw,d basically, in response to this, there was no consensus on what this issue area of Nuclear Security is or was at that point. No disagreement, there was no understanding i might point out what this term, what this area was. Any of the responses, i should say, pointed out that Nuclear Security was statebased threats. That is to say, many staffers pointed to north korea, the nuclear program. Russia, china, some sprinkling of pakistan and other countries. Nd their countries in there nuclear responses, and so forth. Congressional staffers viewed nurse in a security viewed Nuclear Security as threats enacted by other states. And the interviews and in the digital questionnaire that we sent out, we had this definition of Nuclear Security, securing Nuclear Materials and the facilities that house them, basically. The generic definition. Responsesnow if those go back to that time, but the of time in that period was around the north Korean Nuclear program and offers. So this was more statebased threats. This was a very important finding. The second major finding was derived from the first, and that that staffers that we to view thetended issue of Nuclear Security according to their work requirements. End up depends upon where you sit, that phrase we use in academic literature. Efforts work on defense or defenserelated issues, on services, defense appropriations were some of the examples that onhad, they focus more command and control, Weapons Development and the like. Those of the staff who worked on energy or energyrelated issues, the Energy Committees and appropriations, etc. , tended to see the solution along energy terms. Storage, waste management, sabotage. Those that focused on the more traditional Foreign Policy areas , the Senate Foreign relations committee, tended to see it more in traditional terms of proliferation, new start, the iaea, things like that. The responses to this question tended to break down along internal institutional lines, depending on what the work individuals of these sessions are. They cut across all of the work requirement issue areas. Had more years of experience, and people we describe our as more directly engaged on the issue tended to make this area a higher priority in the realm of our Foreign Policy and National Security, and those with less experience on the hill. , butarticularly surprising now we have an empirical base to say that is true. Our findings, as we come back to this, there needs to be more crosscutting contact and communication, working together these areas,across cross committees, caucuses, and so on. Fastt to get through this and other finding pertains to the sources of information thats half utilized that staff utilize on understanding the Nuclear Security issue. Who do you look to when you want to more fully understand Nuclear Security issues . And nongovernment organizational think tanks were cited as the most reliable sources for most of the staff. Those staffers who we called engaged more directly on the issue on a much more frequent basis, tending to lean towards think tanks and ngos for insights, while those we described were much less directly engage, looking at the crs congressional resource service, and personal staff, and the like. Skepticism about reliance on the executive branch and on the media. Another interesting finding was how staff assessed the role of congress as a whole. The Work Environment in which they were, for dealing with Nuclear Security issues. We asked two questions. The first one was, how much of an impact do you think congress can have on this issue area . Nuclear security . The followup question, how much impact do you think congress should have on improving u. S. And global Nuclear Security programs . And the issue of Nuclear Security . The results were somewhat intriguing, having worked on the hill. The staff tended to say that congress should have mor more staff said congress should have a greater impact and influence on policy and programs on nuclear sit purity Nuclear Security then they said congress can have. There is some disappointment over what congress can do and there is hope over what congress should be doing. This might suggest that congress is underperforming on this issue, at least in the sample that we took. Staffers doubted that congress could take a larger role, [inaudible] we interpret this to the fact that there was a loss of expertise, there has been a loss of expertise among members and staff on the hill, and at the time that we interviewed, there was no Major Nuclear terrorist incident that galvanized interests and attention. And there was very little constituent interest among the constituents of congress. By the way, on these issues, we found, much to our interest, that there were very little differences between democrats and republicans. No big significant difference between the house and the senate. Perhaps the size of the sample might be a reason for that. Staffers about constituents very quickly, and we found very quickly that among mostonstituents, constituents, this is not a high , notity, not a big concern of interest to members. There are some exceptions for members who had a car plant in their district or state, or a Nuclear Facility of some sort that might engender greater interest. But not much constituent concern. And this issue gets lost in the flood of so many other things, there is not something to catalyze and draw interest. Asked deciding standpoints for congressional leadership, we wanted to know what knowledge they had about the facts as past as predictors of the present and future, and what they might do legislatively. Mentioned a few members that were part of a Nuclear Security working group that has been created in congress in the recent few years. A concurrent response among those with longer tenures, more than eight years in service, was the reduction program, which is a bipartisan piece of those two guys [no audio] cooperation with other Nuclear Risks had remain limited. HasTrump Administration prevented any National Security priority at least, it is rhetoric. 2018, it isruary of one of the most mexican threats and the United States. However, the attention is far less and it did not propose any new Nuclear Material. To reduceproposed and nonproliferation programs for the administration which comprises a leading edge of Nuclear Security work. I should note that this trend [no audio] request for these programs during the last year of the Obama Administration. The proposal is more than 200 million less than projected. In addition, a recent story in the Los Angeles Times found that the administration has scaled tok and edit programs denied combat radiological and Nuclear Threats. In our view, the work that merits to be done increased funding, not less for the vital programs and an absence of highlevel programs and welldefined vision, funding will continue to undermine, critical expertise will address the revolving threat. Even Lisa Gordon Hagerty suggested the Budget Commission a insufficient, telling Congressional Committee that she would gladly take additional funds of the budget quest to secure materials from the world because those are materials that are less likely to all in the hands of terrorists or adversaries. Asking what they could do with an additional 80 million, the administrator said the agency would require additional training around the world and help other countries. Over the years, but us and support has been a critical feature of u. S. Leadership and continuously improving Global Security. Ofres a long legacy bipartisan action to reduce the. Isk in recent years, bipartisan leaders like senator dianne find championar alexander sizable funding increases for the nuclear program. Congress provided almost 300 million more than what the administration requested. 2020, the year chairwoman who oversees the programs propose an additional 113 million above the agencys budget request. Becoming more complex and a need for congress to play and more active role. The nuclear tariffs remain a vertical concern and the new ideas have been put forward to advance the mission. Has beenoversight constrained in recent years by several challenges at our study documents. Newco security is not a priority for most members of congress and second, skepticism. In recent years, some members have characterized u. S. Financial to secure and eliminate Nuclear Materials, particularly in russia. They say the country should pay for Nuclear Security on their own. The difficulty of engaging other countries have reduced cooperation and raise doubts on what can the done and a columnist after two decades of intense effort. Prioritiesrepeating and funding constraints. Less funding has been available for the nsa and Nuclear Security programs. Bers of congress focus focus on Nuclear Threats and these challenges are reflected in a request that lawmakers make to the Appropriations Committee every year related to Nuclear Security. Despite these challenges, the goal of present preventing Nuclear Terrorism enjoys bipartisan support. To augmente sought congressional engagement. For instance, the working group focused on improving awareness and engagement on the threat engagement. Lear beginning in 2017, the working group harder with the university and foundation to establish a Nuclear Security fellowship program. The mission is to extend the resources and expertise available for Congress Pursuant to the gold of the working group. Following the release of our report described last july, the Arms Control Association and the [inaudible]tute addressed global Nuclear Security architecture and included a kind of technology and response team. We averaged about 80 attendees per event. Im sure the chickfila we offered at lunch had nothing to do with that attendant spirit the task now is to augment leadership and cooperation with russia. Offer several lessons to build on past examples offer several lessons to build on. Of manuals the office and budget [inaudible] the consolidated summary, we recommend should include all funding by departments to prevent Nuclear Radiological terrorism. We also recommend a report. Blueribbon toa recommend a conference of strategy to prevent, counter and respond to radiological challenges. Fiscal year 2018, the act mandated that the group conducted similar review, but it do not focus on a comprehensive strategy of preventing Nuclear Terrorism. A Congressional Commission would carry a higher profile. Third, we recommend congress hold more hearings on the go security which have been few and far between and in addition to some of the oversight steps, we urge congress to pursue several such asc initiatives securing the most vulnerable radiological material around the even establishing a program of activities as part of verifiable phase and support of infrastructure. These recommendations were by 32ed earlier this year highranking government officials representing both lyrical parties. I believe there was an oped published this afternoon by a former representatives and former secretary of state George Shultz who sign on the bipartisan policy statement. In addition to the funding increases i mentioned that were proposed, other members have set forth this year with new initiatives. For example, senator joe manchin established a Congressional Commission [inaudible]. And today, representatives introduce an act that requires the Government Accountability office to provide any reports to congress on international and domestic insecurity programs for the United States. It allows for better understanding between program goals, budget estimates and makes it easier to better identify program gaps from yeartoyear and examine the extent from which budget estimates line with plans for nuclear efforts. Let me stop there. I would be happy to answer any questions you might have your thank you. Let me remind viewers that nsa remains National Security agency. Thank you for inviting me here to review this report and provide comments on it. I like to thank the partnership and the work youve done for youing today and inviting to the crowd. A female voice on the panel. Hopefully, there was a reason as well. At any rate, what i wanted to do topicsess some of the raised with regards to the report on the survey because i thought some of those things were quite interesting and begged for more conversation later on. I was going to walk through some of the recommendations of lee hamilton. In both the Bush Administration and Obama Administration on issues specifically like Nuclear Security. To senatorseer lugar. Her senator i concur with the overall conclusion of the report. More needs to be done to educate congress on Nuclear Security. If you put fellows on the hill that are interested and passionate, they will come up with russian and convinced their congressmen and congresswomen to put forward these bills. Not the folks who bought it was a good idea to put folks on the hill and the physicians who have the background. For the purpose of my commentary, i want to use the narrow definition of Nuclear Security which is the security. F Nuclear Facilities that is a lot closer to the core issues of Nuclear Security as we andk about it here statebased Nuclear Threat. A lot and congress did not necessarily make that distinction and some of the recommendations are not specific. There are nuances. One of the things we talked they secure did Nuclear Material . [inaudible] traditional security, as well as the control and accounting which took control of keeping track of material. When the cooperation programs were expanding, we moved to looking at issues of Insider Threat war it became much more important in talking about issues in very recent years of cybersecurity which were not part of the Traditional Program that we initiated. As you started looking at the programming and digging into the , you have toms have that broader view of what Nuclear Security is. Additionally, converting material to less desirable form or removing it from threats entirely. We have a saying that if youve got it, protected, if you dont. Eed it, get rid of it that was kind of our concept but went to the Nuclear Summit when we thought about how we would address Nuclear Security. Im pointing this out because the nature of options for directing the variety of threats is understood. It allows for analysis, considering the options for Nuclear Security. I forgot to put my disclaimer that it was stated at the beginning that my remarks are my viewsd do not reflect the of the safety board. Board where i work oversees the department of energy and facilities of Nuclear Safety and not security. While i spent much of my career working on Nuclear Security, i have been focusing on the Safety Commission board since 2015, so my comments are initially based on the work of my colleagues. Bile to have the pleasure of being part of the Security Working Group which is responsible for putting the staffers on the hill. I can say with confidence there are individuals in the Administration Link hard and work hard and as mentioned in on report, little daylight security. How it gets done, who does it with what funding, that is the essence of the debate, not whether it is important. Before i get to the individual recommendations, the point that struck me as i was reading the survey, im not an expert on service, but i know that how you frame the question matters, so it wasnt a surprise that the respondent that more money must be spent and more must be done. It day did not say that, i would be shocked. That is the nature of the question. I know it is telling that the definition of Nuclear Security berries and that is because i think it is much easier for the public to have their heads around a Nuclear North Korea or potentially nuclear iran. It isnt all that hard to figure out that there are policy discussions to be had. Should i engage in sanctions or connecticut options . The Nuclear Material in question is already in the hands of what we would consider an adversary. Bit harderurity is a to capture because you cannot really sanction nonstate actors and material is not yet in the hands of adversaries. The result our mock much less for lack of a better term. I would say that with the exception of the summit, the summits are pretty sexy. Statesu have 47 heads of sitting around the table talking about Nuclear Terrorism, that is pretty interesting and noteworthy event that captures the imagination. Im not saying the policy options are the right one, they just a necessarily capture headlines. You struggle with that in this ,olicy space and consequently whether or not you will spend your energy doing that which will not get the same headlines, that is the trick space in which you work. I thought it was interesting, but not surprising that those were more likely involved in the blue Security Issues and i would say we did not do a great job, speaking specifically of 2010. I think we may have had to rememberut i dont having that much contact prior to the summit. Toarly, if we had done more engage, i think the results would have been better, but we were trying to figure out how to throw a Nuclear Security summit. The discussion about the federal andrnment was familiar rather sad. You look at the report, i dont know if anyone mentioned it specifically. There was a constant mistrust and there were comments that it was difficult because of the desire to control the message by the administration and the need to keep people informed and understand on the hillside who was speaking and with what authority. We need to be able to figure out a balance. Congressional fair offices are for to medication between congress and the executive branch and the relationship is bad anyway, that could actually destroyed that relationship and that is not a good thing. One of the areas ripe for work is how do we make that Communications Better . How do we bring them into spaces where they can be to each other and not worry about what is being said . The hill can receive that information without a hearing to cameras and subsequent death subsequently their constituents. Is to logical alternative present information on the hill on what the executive branch is doing. I have the utmost respect for the community who has done the homework and think about the issues everyday, but they dont always have all of the information that is the executive branch has provided it for what other whatever reason. While i know my colleagues are objective, the question posed might not be that objective and whoever is funding the work frames the question. Have the luxury of focusing on one policy priority dont face the challenges than those making a decision with multitude of actions to consider. We need more policy ideas, critical analysis. What im saying is i cannot make up for it having full and i thed information and 80 challenges they are facing would be important. Limitation that the of the knowledge for a small group difficult and the key finding of the report. I also agreed that the members personal interest can yield itself. An example is a young congressman who went on a code l gar workum of the nonlu and that influence how he thought about Nuclear Security. The more we take people to the facilities with which we are working overseas, the more impact it can have. As far as recommendations go, i will put them into three buckets. The persons education and indication. As the survey indicates, it is necessary. Would say recommendation to, three and five. The recommendation to is to hold hearings and recommendation three is the call for Security Issues and recommendation five is investing in Educational Programs on capitol hill. Say they areould the more important and effective of the three initiatives. Im not opposed to hearing my question to what end. It can be enlightening, but it , will besociety ideas the benefit of a hearing versus presenting those ideas directly that it can be ascertained. The importance of the issue would be to invite them to a doubletalk, a National Level exercise as you point out in your paper. Members reacting to an question mayers for Civil Society actually entrench them in a position rather than persuade them. More discussions should take place between the administration and congress, staff delegations are very important and not just for insights, but domestic sites as well. Omestic sites additionally, members should be intelligenceof assessments as well as Nuclear Security. I think this is the cap that cap not talked about in the public face. Equally, Training Programs expose both Staff Members to abroad list of ideas. The second is reports and initiatives and the for the recommendations under this category. When i reviewed this, i did not know there was a proposal to this. This. Do [inaudible] the office ofhink management and budget would be the place to do this. I have seen a number of attempts to map out all programs and none of the maps were pretty. To see it would be great where all the work is being performed and all the funding is going. I say that i dont think the office of management and Budget Agency is a right office to do it. The first report will be the most important because that is where you will catalog all these activities taking place and it will be difficult to replicate on a yearly basis. The first one is going to take a lot of work and i think you have to define the question very carefully. 9 11 and the National Terrorism center was set up mother was an effort to create a. Lan for the run terror all of the agencies across the government that had a piece of the terrorism portfolio were hugensible to populate a spreadsheet with all of their activities and coordinate activities across the government. I was in government for the whole time and im not sure that document was ever useful, but i will say it a lot of time and outgy and effort to fill this very detailed report where you only had a small line to explain what you were doing. I fear that if taken to the kindme, a report of this could be rendered useless, so definitions are important to i think it is useful to separate the activities undertaken by the United States and taken on internationally. If there is cross pollination between those two, i think you can identify them. We should have an understanding of what is being counted and also, are we only counting the security dollars . Directincluding bilateral spending, International Commitments such andhe Global Partnership the committee at United Nations . Then again, what about the funds we spend either in the military or the department of energy to protect our facilities . Is that being included as well . That breaks if down. I think it is a very good project. I think the defining scope will be the challenge and i think it is worth the effort to try to figure out how to do that as well. The second recommendation is a blueribbon Bipartisan Commission to recommend a conference of strategy. I know im going to sound like a cynic, but in washington, blueribbon commissions are basically where top issues go to die. That is the nature of them in usually, it is after an incident happens to determine what happened, or you have an issue that is overlap for the two sides. In this case, i dont see the need because both sides understand this is a priority. It is a matter of what is the funding allocation, how do we go about doing it. Again, i dont mean to be too cynical. The Nuclear Security cross cut initiative is not new and it is not a bad idea. It can be revitalized. As we have turnover and staff, some good things happen and that you have fresh ideas and the bad thing is we keep making the same mistake again and we should not we should be making doing. We should recognize what has been done in the past and improve upon it because sometimes we get into a rut of doing the same thing over and over, but it is important to understand what capabilities we have and i would also say given the attrition rates in the federal government at this time and in the Technology Sector in , we should understand were those capabilities are as well. In terms of a crosscutting initiative to implement activities, we normally use the National Security council for that and i think youll find that if you scratch the surface of that poor little bit, there are crosscutting plans in place. The thing that would be interesting to me, because i dont see a lot of it, it is having a dialogue between the Nuclear Security people and the nonproliferation folks, the Nuclear Waste folks, Nuclear Energy folks. That crosscutting conversation rarely and i think that when youre talking about engaging with international partners, it can be hard to crack. When you have an inch away, you can start the relationships and the move on to Nuclear Security. We do a very bad job of having cross conversations interdisciplinary amongst those groups. Finally, the last category was action oriented. One was to expand the research and development efforts. 100 agree with that. Im not going to go down your wish list, but i would say knowing what the research and Development Area looks like within the National Security administration, within the Defense Department and how those can be applied to the security would be vitally important and i think more should be done in this area. I think as we talk about new , fiber security, issues, artificial intelligence, all of those things will take cuttingedge research and development to understand and additionally, in the event of a denuclearize north korea, we will need new technology. There was a call to support global strategies, stronger regulations and increase funding in order to secure the most high risk radiological materials in the world. [inaudible] the hierarchy of needs, i think radiological security is important. Nuclearlump it into security as tightly as others do. Some are conscious not to include it because of the different nature of the material and because we have limited time. Theas later added as Nuclear Security summit and if it was important, but i think we recognize the sources used the commercial industry comes to having that and not involving the resources, i think it is probably not the best strategy for protecting those resources. Support thecall to inversion of metal reactors low enriched fuel. There are some that believe we should explore switching to lowend rich and ready in full uranium fuel. My guess is it wont get funded. We usere reasons why highly enriched uranium in our submarine force. I dont think the demonizing it is a conversation we need to be having at the moment. I know that is controversial phase oft is part of a north koreas arsenal. Again, yes, i believe these conversations are taking part in the government, and think tanks. What i would love to see it and organization that convenes under Chatham House rule or Something Like that. Set members from the hill and people from the government and people from think tanks to noodle through what it would look like to dismantle north koreas arsenal and what the followup program look like. Not sure that is necessarily the model we should look for because , we were on the brink four nwq for new nuclearstatius new states. Were going to have to understand what those assurances are on both sides are. What we do need of the colleagues that worked on the program in past, former iraq weapons inspectors, folks in the administration, and gave out some of the scenarios, understand where the pitfalls are, where we should be putting research and development dollars. That come i think would be to catholic and if the community focuses on the issues could pull that together, i think that would be a tremendous asset for future generations. Thank you. Very comprehensive and very concrete. That you may want to give your response and if you could also, the question i was asked, update what has happened . Think about what else. I think i saw that in the context and part of the report focused on a terms of the not exactly what you were referencing, but the same date pertains to compartmentalization that takes place on the hill. Among those, focusing on issues that are defenserelated spirit that is not take place very often. I suspect that is still pretty much the case. Theres a tendency for communities to look at the responsibilities and i know when i was up there, i tried to set effort to have an Informal Group in the Armed Services committee. That bothas issues are interested in like to handle issues in war zones. Bothems to me something minis would have interest in. That is an example of the difficulty of the crosshatching of the responsibilities. It is very difficult. I draw from my own experience of congress is structured congresses structure is not always help and that is the one example i always like to cite. Process. Ery difficult the russians came said we have a problem and that helped us. Example i often dont use is free event did primitive preempitive. To a longing definition, that piece of listless and leftists in it, at up among sevend different committees. Seven different committees took a slice and it was only because of the willingness and to be able to take those opponents, stitch them together into a final piece of legislation that made it possible. If you dont have that leadership from the top, he cannot get it done. Itrybody wants a slice and was a metaphor in some way about how difficult it is to do complex legislation of cross across committees. Thingd mention the one that we know is true in the executive branch in communication not only across agencies, but we also know from Prior Experience it is difficult. Commodity, some of this can be toolved by strong leadership pull the pieces together. In the executive branch, it is not always done. Thank you for those thoughtprovoking comments. Really great and useful. When a respond. With respect to hearings, tabletop exercises, public forms can be tricky. I think one of the benefits that evenmetimes lost is that if it is not well attended, the hearing on the schedule forces a particular staff to engage on the issue. Withnk that is important respect to addressing some of what we found on the survey in engagementlack of and a lack of knowledge with respect most Congressional Staff. In that respect, i think hearings can be an important tool to enhance understanding and to enhance engagement. Whereibbon commissions is they go to die. In hear that often washington. I think there is some truth to that. However, the model we had in mind respect to the Commission Congress at the end of the george w. Bush thenistration, i believe in was timeframe which Bipartisan Commission passed u. S. Ally identifying Nuclear Weapons policy. Event on that commission, but i dont think there could be any doubt that the commission heavily informed the Obama Administration. Had a Significant Impact on that process them at least that is my view. When there is a controversial they put itgress, to the commission. I think in this case, there could be real value in particular because this is an area where there is more bipartisan they put it to the or in bipartisan support and overlap. We spend money, what is the funding allocation . Questionsose are the the commission should be tasked with taking on. Hierarchy of the areas, clearly an incident of Nuclear Terrorism and Nuclear Explosive device going off the far nonetheless itt would be detonated and have massive repercussions, perhaps less in terms of the number of people were killed and injured, but certainly economically would have tremendous implications with respect to the national what kind who knows of steps our government would ake in an effort to combat future attack. The material is prevalent and use more widely for domestic use which creates challenges, but also opportunities. Koreae taking on north and i totally agree with that. They are doing some interesting work. Richard just released a report on the subject which i would recommend. Dont want to get too much detail on this, but let me give three reasons why i think this is an area where focusing on. That issee the amount available. It is a good thing some of the also reduces the risk of Nuclear Terrorism. Two, for the united effort, isued this think would give incentive for other countries who have not gone down this road to do so. Finally, if you believe that the national Nuclear Security administration plans to sustain , already,t warheads an executable, just wait until an Actual Program to develop u. S. Domestic enrichment programs starts to come on the budget books and i think to the extent we reduce our reliance on anh, i think that opens up andresting alternative possibly come to this is controversial, looking to the international market. I want to give you guys an opportunity to ask questions and comments. Hand, whyld raise her dont we start over here . Please identify yourself. Go ahead and move backwards. For bridging the gap in the conversation. I wanted to bring in an idea that might and administration that my mistress lead in the past. It is a pencil best potential idea to bring in current members of congress, they are Staff Members and in our case, we brought in international. Artners into the conversation i had a question about the report which im looking forward to leading. You mentioned all the staff normally put would in proliferation issues. The income the conversation we back the, which brings role of an increased u. S. [inaudible] in the area. Parts one to wantst its a part to break that into parts. [inaudible] theres a history of some of that already. I remember when i was on the hill. Which the Observer Group the staff for staffing that and it was a group that was andefore the leadership provided some resources for that and this was a group that was focusing mostly on arms control issues during that time. It was not exactly a discussion that, it was something ought to be revived. Something along that line were members can get together, focusing on a given issue for area or so forth. Group that [inaudible] during negotiations for it had individuals invested. If i recall, there was a staff or two. Most had gone to members only. Members getting in on the dynamic issue as it was evolving over time rather than just coming in late. I remember writing paper on one of these for senator lugar before he went into the discussion. Something to do with funding issues. Anytime i think you have this can broadenand you the number of diversity people in that group, i think it is a good thing. I think it is a very good idea theone of the locations of study is that some of the best ideas are not in the executive branch, the best ideas are in includingety and longer legislation. Crossfertilization, the extremely enriched question is can somebody pick up the ball and run with it. Yes, and maybe you could take the second question . Do you recall it there was a distinction between statebased threats and Nuclear Newcomers . I dont thing that popped out that we were able to collect. Sensewas newcomers in the that it was high on the agenda. , if on the priorities thats what you mean by newcomers. Because that was dominant in the ,ews and headlines administration and so forth. Beyond that, im not sure there was much. Daca i must im a scholar at Columbia University and i wanted to ask in did and mightve growing interests of middle Eastern Countries producing nuclear programs, how would you expect congress to keep nonstate actors from using and obtaining Nuclear Materials. Thats a very topical question. Goal in is already a that, because in order for the u. S. To trade in Nuclear Deals we have to have an agreement with another country which goes through congressional scrutiny before it is enacted. , that agreement sits in front of congress for a certain number of days. If they dont act, it is not enacted. Its a passive agreement at that point. One of the ways that congress can be helpful is to Pay Attention when one of these agreements comes in front of them. Hold hearings. And ask the administration if they have done Due Diligence with the credentials of the country that is seeking to have Nuclear Cooperation with the u. S. Thats one way congress can get involved. To Nuclear Energy ambitions and other countries with regards to Nuclear Energy ambitions and other countries, its hard for us in the u. S. To have influence over that unless we are competitive in that market in terms of having our Nuclear Companies competing to sell nuclear technologies. To do that we need the agreement. That is how i believe that plays out. He mentioned the middle east. You mentioned the middle east. Its been a topic of conversation in congress. Particularly the issue of u. S. , and ision with saudis there a safety component to this . There is a nonproliferation component with this, with respect to what the United States should ask or demand saudis to do on the nonproliferation front. Its part of any civilian Nuclear Cooperation deal. What kind of leverage do we have two insist on those tough conditions. And this is a controversial issue, but the saudis also engage in into richmond then nuclear fuel making. Said, this is a controversial issue. Security,f nuclear those challenges become more difficult if the country is engaged in making its own nuclear fuel and separating plutonium. From my perspective, and i think the United States has a significant amount of leverage. And i give the Trump Administration credit in this lined, they are holding a at least in terms of insisting. N Additional Protocol onand another key figure there areity new Nuclear Security programs and they are engaging with new entrants, those who want Nuclear Energy, to educate them on Nuclear Security. That is something that administrations in the past and the Current Administration continues to support, is education for a country entering the Nuclear Energy field. Two questions here. First in the back, then the center. Im an attorney in d. C. Discussionted is the into yourcurity discussion of Nuclear Security . Great question. Not nearly enough. I think it needs to be integrated more. There are people who look at private security from a Nuclear Security standpoint who are engaging in International Conversations and its challenging. When you talk about cybersecurity you dont want to give away your vulnerabilities. Thats always a challenge talking about Nuclear Security. But even the government, on the whole, does not have a good handle on cybersecurity for its and israstructure working hard to do that, but it is siloed at this point. But i am not in this on a daytoday basis. I think theres more awareness. Certainly more awareness, there has been several workshops on this particular issue. Congress is certainly interested in it. The executive branch is looking nsass, if part of research and development efforts. And i would say the obvious, when everyone assesses what needs to be done, and what are the emerging problems, cyber is one of those and its a high priority. Always at the top of the list. How to address it is the next question. Somewhatof those intractable but high priority issues. Risk ofe is the revealing information that might otherwise you would want to protect it. It creates a new set of s. Nundrum the Nuclear Threat initiative did a report on this, as well as the harvard center. Everyone is working on this issue. But i would recommend those resources to you if you are interested. Thank you. Thank you. I am with the Nuclear Threat initiative. Thank you for the kind call out. If you have any questions about the products mentioned im happy to talk more about that. I was curious about the outcomes of the survey you conducted with hill staffers. I was wondering if there was a generational component to your results . I think one of the challenges to your field is raising awareness of nuclear policy. I was wondering if you thought about the need to raise more inreness for policy issues addition to Nuclear Security and if anything came out of the survey in those regards. I did mention my initial remarks that those staffers who have around i dont know what the average age of the staffers of congress on the whole. I could probably figure out the average age of those we surveyed. Young. S Congressional Staff work is often a springboard to Something Else. Throughputit of a and a great launching pad for career development. That thesaying is longevity of members is short of staffers on the hill. The memory is based on other things. Report thatn in the those who have been on the hill longer, those were more experienced, had developed perhaps some expertise on this , elevating Nuclear Security to a higher priority, because they may have had recollections of what happened in the past. And may be sensitive to the Nuclear Summit process. So they might be more sensitive to that because of recent history. , for those of us who were in the heydays of this and theion in 1990s decomposition of the soviet union, these were highpriority issues. Imminentts seems to be. But many of the staffers, including myself, are gone on the hill. So the expertise, not among members but staff, has dissipated over time. Have people who have to start all over in a postcold war environment. But there is not the sense of legacy that i mentioned before. The generational problems exist, the constant turnover and members after election, new staff comes in starting staff, coming from late and dashed and local districts. State and local districts. That is why the program we , yousted terms of hearings are right. Senator lugar encouraged senator the stick take a trip to the states of the former soviet union. He understood what those problems were and it was a educational an educational experience. He was a new generation coming in at that point. These kinds of suggestions we and Civil Societies playing an i should haverole put a plug in here at the beginning. Note that ifing to the interestrace not just among us, but among ,unders to think tanks and ngos you will find the interesting Nuclear Security is going down, and shifting as a reality onto control issues of u. S. China and u. S. Russia relations. But several years ago, the Macarthur Foundation and Carnegie Corporation of new york put together this extraordinary map, a Great Initiative in which announced that they were going to put aside hundreds of millions of dollars to encourage groups like ours to Work Together in a collaborative way funding,e research, and projects on Nuclear Security. , becausey has dried up the issue is not as salient as it used to be. Them, and hopefully we do not get to a situation where it is such a prominent issue where we have to find funding. There is also a generational thing among funders. Side. s go to the next starting in the front and moving backwards. Dcbased security analyst. My question is, does your study group think that the gravity and urgency of present Nuclear Security risks calls for the establishment of new subcommittees in the house and senate dedicated specifically to Nuclear Security issues. It seems like the specializations of Congressional Staff are determined by the existence of the committees and subcommittees. Wondering about the urgency if this calls for new subcommittees that would address the issue of specialization . I think it would be a good that goes back to a problem that i mentioned when we were trying to meaning there are informal ways of doing this but they are not as effective and its difficult to have followthrough other than going back to existing institutional structures. If you had some sort of institutional change or innovation in terms of subcommittees. Is rightf the issue for crossfertilization, i think the three sets from defense, Foreign Affairs, bringingnd informally them together would be a good thing. In trying to formalize that creating taskforces but creating taskforces are not easy. Do i think its a good idea . Yes. It could be helpful. People are asking why this issue, why not Something Else . Wordont use the proliferation, because the committees are very protective of their terror than they dont want to give it up their turf , and they dont want to give it up. But i think yes, its a good idea. I think you were starting to address the question i had, you mentioned concerns about , and joycealization mentioned the need for interdisciplinary crosscutting conversations. During my time on the Senate Intelligence committee, i was struck by the barriers to ,ealing with Foreign Affairs and on issues that intimately involved all three committees. I would be interested in hearing about anyone elses ideas on how to achieve that, and giving a , we were ideas responsible for monitoring the state departments Intelligence Bureau along with 16 other Intelligence Bureaus. Nothing to do with the authorization of that entity. Likewise, we could do evaluations, but the authorization was handled completely separately. There was no way to rationally use tradeoffs, and it seems like a structural problem in congress. And you talked about the value of Senior Leadership in congress. I think you are saying an informal arrangement would be an alternative way to break down some of these barriers between the committees that deal with nuclear issues. My experiences that when we have these kinds of problems of coordination and information , many would just get. Ogether trying to share some of this information. This does not formalize, and it was mostly staff, but often the authorizing committees, for example, working with the Appropriations Committees. The authorization committees certainly have trouble getting legislation passed, but thats not true of the National Defense authorization act. Because the leadership would not for takingocate time a Foreign Relations the lasttion authorizations bill, when it was separate, the last foreign assistance authorization bill, which is focused on policy and authorizes funding, was passed was enacted in 1986. I was sitting on the floor next to senator lugar. We have not passed one since. That example does not rely on the appropriators, which you need at some point. They can sit down and talk asking if we can get this or that done. The good relations between the two chairman in the four members is essential to move that kind of legislation where there is blockage in one place but avenues in another. There are lots of examples like that. In the process should be a review and the process should be review of committee jurisdiction. Each committee has its own some of them, as you suggested, ought to be someplace else. That would be an interesting , to look at some commission or group to take a look at that. Theres a lot of resistance to human as e human nature i guess, they do not want to give up what they already have. I think there are probably legions of examples you could cite on this, but its a problem. Compartmentalization that makes the legislative process more difficult. There are ways of doing it informally, and there have been many efforts in the past, to walk up the hill and walked back down. Since we are running out of two. s take the next arms control and nonproliferation. When you talk about congressional hearings, i think Pete Zimmerman and i staffed the first hearings on nuclear 1990s. In the we also had a series of classified briefings that led into those hearings. The briefings featured the national laboratories. Suffice to say, when the labs came up and explain to us in great detail what an improvised Nuclear Device would look like, thatw it could be done briefing was so impressive to the members who attended that we had to do it again a couple of years later by popular demand those helped focus the members in hearings, were able to sign on learning more about the problems. A technologyon fair, there was one the deal we it mustve been around 1989. It was really what senator joe biden was really what school senator joe biden on the importance of the issue. He took it on as a personal mission to make sure those programs were funded. He would go to the floor each with amendments to the National Defense authorization. Ct i take it back, it was the appropriations bill, he would withwith senator de medici a very nondescript amendment. Merely say fix this. And he would use that to fix this and get more money with the programs. Although this is to say it can be done if you get even a small number of members to be committed to the success of the funding efforts. You talk about fellows, and im glad to see theres another fellowship program. Keep in mind there are also important fellowship programs as, the stateaa department, and the energy department. Said very them have useful sent useful scientists to the hill who had major influence on the content and funding of federal programs. All of those are important to keep up, and between the law, you probably have, in any year, a dozen or more fellows available to members if they would take advantage of it. When you talk about gao reports, understand that the gao traditionally has had a hard time covering the Intelligence Community. So to the extent that that is relevant to what you want people to look at, you really have to perhaps look to organizations him up withao took all of the things you want. The National Academies have also done useful reports in that regard. Staff, ing members and would say my organization has with eveningess briefings for members, where the whorstanding is that attended and what they said would be kept secret. That gives the members the opportunity to ask dumb questions as well as smart ones. To educate themselves without worrying that it will show up in politico a week later. And finally to joyces point about how big the data set gets on programs. Tried to do that myself one time and took all the to thes, and i set them periodic table of the elements. I only sang it once at los was unanimously decided i would not sing it again. Im a washingtonbased scholar within nash with National Security and law. I was wondering about the importance of congressional leadership, do you intend to target congressional leaders and members . Or do you prefer to take a more objective approach . Do you think collective action will result . Does anyone else have a question or a comment . Im rich from George Washington university. Question, first, and your personal interviews, on surveys, and small focus groups, was there any discussion about efforts to improve social resilience and governmental of aience in the wake Nuclear Event . Question,k second with a formal withdrawal from the imf treaty, and the joint comprehensive plan of understant your report was issued in july 2018, has there been any shift in emphasis as a result of that, perhaps with respect to thirdparty transfer or related issues . I am a graduate student here at the Hudson Institute. My question is on Security Issues, policymakers sometimes view it through the lens of probability versus consequences. If the consequences are high but probability is low they are not as inclined to act on it. My question is of your proposals , which of them do you think best addresses the issue when advocating to policymakers . [speaking simultaneously] anyone else . . Rst order, joyce joyce the closing comment, i think a lot of the questions addressed the survey. They are all good questions. I wanted to go back to a point. It came to this point about radiological security. In general, but i was addressing was showed it raised to the four yearaving a effort, and i have a lot of remarks on what is being done at the iea is what is being done historically. I didnt want to leave the impression i dont think it is a serious problem and serious consequences, but it goes to your question about sequence and risk. I think as a policymaker aside , whenhe executive branch folks come to us with proposals, for us to look at, there are a lot of things we take into consideration, cost benefits, what are the ways we can address the issue that will be most successful, how do we manage risk, not necessarily eliminate, and that is kind of the key verse is the consequence piece of it. Obviously the consequence is extraordinary. , but the frequency of the radiological will probably be more likely would have been more likely than Nuclear Detonation. The consequences of Nuclear Detonation are unacceptable. That is why policymakers have chosen to act on those things. There are two ways we can secure , prevent terrorism, go after the terrorists they move around a lot. We dont know where they are. Up in different places. The material is easy to understand where it is and how it is secured for the most part. But to his point about the intelligence communities, and the committees, that is one piece we have not addressed which i think is fundamental to our understanding of where the vulnerabilities are. If it is true we have hit all of , it is theging fruit material we knew where it was and where people were willing to work with us to address it. The nuggets we have not gotten to yet are the material we dont know where it is, and we have less partners cooperating with it. That is the bigger challenge. I dontessarily know necessarily you get to that without the Intelligence Community understanding what the material is an using the tools of government to put pressure on those individuals and using the tools of government to put pressure on those individuals. That is why it is important to get rid of the stovepipes, to work across disciplines and work at a diplomatic solution without being with the individual country or entity that has control, to try to figure out how to address it rather than, you know, put money to programs that are helpful but not necessarily impactful and getting at that material which atic. St problem with request to the implications of the jcpoa treaty,al and the imf the bigger implications with respect to the withdrawal from jcpoa is there were provisions in that with respect to obviously cooperating with iran pursuant to the steps iran was taking to address concerns about its nuclear programs, breakout time and there were references Nuclear Security cooperation. There have been proposals in a nongovernmental space to build and two deal the dl2 enhanced conversations with the iranians. With the United States, not a party to that agreement anymore, the future of the agreement certainly is in doubt. The opportunity for that is much view,ith, in my potentially negative consequences. Sort of a scattergram of responses, you mentioned about joe biden, Vice President biden, candidate biden. Of techintroduction fares and so forth. There was one run several months ago where there was the opportunity for staff to come in, to see, touch, feel actual equipment being used for detection purposes, monitoring those whoand having know how the equipment is being and demonstrations took place. We served a room in the capital someplace and it was well attended. For myself, i didnt know much of this equipment other than by name. That kind of education is important, and you can up your expertise very fast if you know these things. Another thing i will just mention is going back to the when i was in the hill, we used to say, who owns this issue . Who owns this issue, whether it owns arms control, who Environmental Issues and so forth . There was always somebody. Today i dont know who owns Nuclear Security. I dont know who owns arms control. Someone who puts himself or herself members i am talking about, him or herself in a position to take some risks by getting out in front of an issue that perhaps constituents are not very concerned about, someone who is did,ng to, as biden educate his colleagues through Dear Colleague letters. I dont know who owns these issues on the hill. Perhaps i am not wellinformed but i dont think anybody stands out. Ofre is some scatter gram numbers that share the working group and social security. This gets back to the issue of leadership. Step forward and do things, sending out letters, having informal meetings, elevating the priority of Nuclear Security or some aspect of it. There is many. I know there was another question i think about what ought to be the priority. I dont know. I have worked in the international field. We have international nti. Uclear strategists laura whole gate did this marvelous matrix Laura Holgate did this marvelous matrix of Nuclear Security architecture. There must have been boxes, 25 different elements. We have a patchwork of the International System of sometimes disconnected needs some agreements and treaties, initiatives, but it doesnt always work in the same direction, in harmony with one another. Someone who focuses on the International Side. There is a lot of things that could be done to fix up the patchwork and try to move this issue on an International Side mandatory requirements. Iea, their set is as good a set of standards, International Standards for member countries how to secure them. Materials and house there is also something called the code of conduct. All of that is voluntary. Countries are not mandated to follow those rules which means you are going to have huge diversity. Fixing up the International System of controls, strengthening the Nuclear Suppliers group, theres a lot of things that can be done and as someone interested in this, we try to fix up that and move, convince as it may be, the world that some of these standards ought to be mandatory. There ought to be in limitation of these standards, enforcement and consequences for noncompliance with them. That is a huge jump. Not sure this administration would be in the right position, but someone should be pushing. Ok, so for now i have thank yous to give first to our speakers. They did a good job of explaining the complicated issue and helping us through the implications of this, and beyond it. I want to thank the hudson team, sean and fail and the cspan team. They have been here and phil and the cspan team. They have been here a long time. We all owe each other a round of thanks. [applause] [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2019] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] announcer 1 weeknights this month we are featuring book tv programs showcasing what is available every weekend on cspan 2. The theme is politics tonight. Feature journalists report on the rise in millennial activism. Watch that tonight at 8 00 p. M. Eastern on cspan 2. Also this month we are showing you American History tv programs as a preview of what is available every weekend on cspan3. Tonight a recent Purdue University conference called American History. That begins 8 00 eastern cspan3. President trump holds a Campaign Rally in manchester, New Hampshire thursday. Live coverage 7 00 eastern tomorrow here on cspan, online. C spun at cspan. Org listen live on the radio app. Sunday on q and a, doug mills talks about photos covering president trump. He enjoys having us around. His constantpite comments about fake news in the i feel he enjoys having us around because it drives his message, the news of the day every day ando does every day. Constantly driving the message and therefore having us around really allows him to do that. Announcer 2 sunday night at 8 00 eastern on cspan. Now michael griffin, defense undersecretary for research and engineering, talks about concerns with countries using Hypersonic Weapons technology. His comments came during a discussion on American Defense technology and capabilities at the Hudson Institute. This is just under one hour. And welcome to Hudson Institute. My name is rebecca heinrich. Rebeccah heinrichs. It is my privilege to host dr. Mike griffin again. A little over a year since we last had a conversation about his priorities as the head of research and engineering at dod. I will not give him the long, full introduction because you know who he is. The most qualified