Transcripts For CSPAN Special IG For Afghanistan Reconstruction Testifies Before House Foreign... 20240713

Efforts in afghanistan. We will come to order. All members will have five days to submit statements to the record. Notice, we are here today to examine the lessons from americas war in afghanistan. , welcome general sopko to the Foreign Affairs committee. I look forward to learning the lessons of afghanistan, but also getting some input to what we should do in the future. Learning the lessons of afghanistan, but also getting some input to what we should do in the future. Afghanistanes in over the last six years have 10. Aged roughly we mourn those deaths and take them seriously. Compared to the other ,onflicts we are engaged in compared to the training deaths we suffer in our military, we cannot have the exhaustion of 10 years ago blind us to what is the operation now, and what is its cost. I know the chairman has an opening statement, but i will ,ecognize the Ranking Member then i will recognize our witness for his opening statement, and hopefully by then we will hear the chairmans statement. Thank you mr. Chairman pro tem, United States has been in afghanistan for almost 19 years, the longest war in the history of the United States. We sacrificed much on the battlefield, but we achieved a great deal. We decimated al qaeda and greatly weakened their global network. As a result, afghanistan has not been a staging ground for another successful attack against our homeland. After the 9 11 terror attacks, it is clear our approach to foreign threats needed to change. We cannot sit back and wait plot thousandses of miles away. We need to go on the offense, and we did. Our presence in the region thewed us to catch mastermind of 9 11, kill Osama Bin Laden, and more recently removed his son from the battlefield. I visited ambassador crocker many times and saw firsthand the challenges we faced and opportunities we had to succeed. We have led the charge on important issues as well, beyond those on the battlefield that includes supporting democracy and womens rights, countering the drug trade, developing the private sector, promoting economic growth, fighting corruption, and this type of work does not always make the news, but it is vital to our future and security. Unfortunately there have been costly missteps. We know about these missteps because the important work performed by the special Inspector General for. Fghanistan reconstruction since 2001, the United States has spent an estimated 132 billion on development 132 billion. Has found much of this money was wasted or stolen, or failed to address problems it was meant to fix. This is not the best use of american tax dollars. We spent 9 billion on counter narcotics programs, yet today afghanistan is the largest producer of opium which finances our enemies. How is it possible that after two decades, billions of dollars spent, thousands of lives lost, we still cannot slow drug production . Our efforts in counter narcotics have clearly failed. We have also learned our strategy to build an afghan army and police force has not made the security situation any better. The lack of coordination, misuse of funds, and insufficient training for afghans have failed to reduce violence across the country. This is completely unacceptable. The publication of the afghanistan papers, in the Washington Post last month serves as a sober reminder of our past mistakes, and underscores the importance of the Trump Administrations efforts to end this war. The American People have been very patient with our involvement. We have sacrificed greatly. Lost theirn soldiers lives in an attack this weekend. Well it to them and others to get this right. We owe it to them and others to get this right. In 2014 anditiated offers key insights into the complex challenges we face. These evaluations provide opportunities for congress and the executive branch prevent the from happening again in afghanistan or other operations around the world. I would like to thank mr. Sopko for his work on this important report, and appearing here today before this committee. With that, i yield back. We will now hear from john sopko, the special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction for five minutes. Thank you very much mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, and other members of the committee. Congress created sigar in 2008 to combat waste, fraud, and the reconstruction efforts in afghanistan. We have published over 600 audits, inspections, and other reports that have saved the american taxpayer over 3 billion while convicting over 130 individuals for misconduct related to that reconstruction effort. The 22nd time i have presented testimony to my appointment, today is the first time i have been asked to address sigars unique Lessons Learned program, and what we have learned from it. I think you for that opportunity. In light of the recent attention that our report has gotten, i am pleased to have the opportunity to clear up any misconceptions about what that program does or does not do. As with everything produced high , this produced by sigar programs mandate is limited to just reconstruction, not the war fighting. We do not assess u. S. Diplomatic and military strategies, nor our war fighting capabilities. Likewise, we are not producing an oral history of our involvement in afghanistan, nor opining on whether we should or should not be there. Rather, we are the only u. S. Onernment agency focused conducting research and analysis, which meets strict professional standards aimed at providing an independent and objective examination of u. S. Reconstruction efforts there, and to make practical recommendations to you the congress, and executive Branch Agencies for improving our efforts there and elsewhere. I would like to mention six overarching lessons that you can draw from these thousands of pages of reports we had issued. First, the successful reconstruction is incompatible with continuing insecurity. Secondly, unchecked corruption in afghanistan has undermined our goals there, and we helped foster that corruption. Third, after the talibans initial defeat, there was no clear reconstruction strategy, and no single military service, agency, or country in charge of afghanistan. N in fourth, politically driven timelines undermined our reconstruction efforts. Fifth, the constant turnover of u. S. Personnel, or what we have called the annual lobotomy negatively impacted all of our reconstruction efforts there. Sixth, to be effective, reconstruction efforts must be based on a better understanding of the historical, legal, and political traditions of the host nation. In addition to these key lessons, your staff has asked us to give you certain recommendations that you can focus on now. Here are six. First, in light of the ongoing peace negotiations, congress should ensure that the Current Administration has an actionable plan for what happens the day. Fter peace is declared second, to ensure that congress is made aware of problems in a timely manner it should require agencies to provide regular reports to congress disclosing risks to major reconstruction projects and programs as they occur. This would be analogous to the requirement we have imposed upon publicly traded corporations for the sec. Congress should condition future on budget assistance on a rigorous assessment of the afghan ministries and International Trust funds to ensure they have strong Accountability Measures in place. Fourth, oversight is still missioncritical in afghanistan. This must require administration continues to ensure adequate oversight monitoring and evaluation capabilities continue. Fifth, congress should require agencies to rack and stacked their programs and projects on at least an annual basis to identify their best and worst performing programs. , congress should required to submit for reconstruction efforts that june 2018,dated by and still has not been filed. That was mandated by the National Defense authorization act. In conclusion, our work at sigar is far from done. For all the lives and treasure the United States and its Coalition Partners have expended in afghanistan, the very least we can do is learn from our successes and failures there, to improve future operations. Thank you for the opportunity to appear today, and i look forward to your questions. Good morning. Nation has been at war in afghanistan for more than 18 years. Sink in, and let that more than 2000 american lives lost, thousands more wounded. More than 60,000 afghan deaths, and more than 900 billion spent on a war that has dragged on for almost two decades, and is not include what it will take to take care of our veterans and years to come. After all that time, we are in a military stalemate. In 2001, the United States invaded afghanistan with a clear objective to defeat al qaeda and its taliban hosts, and prevent a repeat of 9 11. Our Coalition Partners and many were deadior leaders or fled into hiding. In 2002, president george w. Bush said, and i quote, the history of military conflict in afghanistan has been one of initial success followed by long years of floundering and ultimate failure, we are not going to repeat that mistake. Yet here we are today 18 years later having made precisely that mistake. What happened . There is a lot to unpack when we look at what went wrong. Some things are clear. We got distracted by the war in , notby an administration an endgame in afghanistan. We entered into a questionable alliance with pakistan which continued to support and arm the telegram, provide them safe haven, and allow them to strengthen its hand in afghanistan. We changed missions, change priorities, and lost sight of what was considered a just war. Our role in afghanistan constantly evolved as we plodded along year after year to what now feels like a neverending war. In 2008, congress established the special general for reconstruction in afghanistan, which we call sigar, to conduct oversight in the war in afghanistan. In 2014, we called on sigar to do something that had not been done, conduct original research into the war, look at its failures, and Lessons Learned. Today we focus on those Lessons Learned. This past december, the Washington Post published hundreds of interviews and documents sigar collected, but the Lessons Learned program, m. These documents helped fill in significant gaps in our understanding of the u. S. War in afghanistan. They show a years Long Campaign of misrepresentation by our military officials. Youre after year we heard, we are making progress. Year after year we are turning a corner. Administrations of both parties promised we would avoid falling into a trap of nationbuilding in afghanistan. And military officials were painting a rosy picture, the reality was a deepening quagmire with no end in sight. It is a damming record. It underscores the lack of honest conversation between the American People and their leaders about what we are doing in afghanistan, and why we are doing it. Even in the light of this new information, the Trump Administration is not righting the ship on our afghanistan policy. Lessons learned reports have confirmed the longstanding view that there is no military solution to the conflict in afghanistan. Nevertheless, the Trump Administration in 2017 announced it would send more troops to afghanistan and waited 18 months before naming an envoy to focus on afghanistan conciliation. That is a long time when we have troops in the field under fire. Just this past december, this Committee Held a hearing after President Trump derailed peace talks with the telegram over twitter, as we have come to expect from the president. The announcement came after a year of the administration blocking Key Information from congress and the American People about the status of the war. Secretary pompeo has still to this day refused to let the Top State Department negotiator in testify in an open hearing about the status of peace talks. There is so much more for us to understand about how we wound up here, and how we move forward in afghanistan. Inspector general sopko, i am pleased to discuss your findings and show your perspective. I recognize your opening. Tatement that you already gave i will call my friend the Ranking Member. Any further statements . No, ok. This morning, special inspector , i now, john sopko recognize you for five minutes. You have done that. Now it is time for questions. Despite sigars welldocumented account, the Trump Administration made no real change in strategy. 2017 south asia strategy suggested the war would battlefield and force the taliban to the negotiating table under favorable terms. He even dropped the mother of them tos to shock bending to our will, and it did not work. Did you make your reports available to the white house and other parts of the Trump Administration . When presented with evidence this war would not be won militarily, why do you think the president sent more troops to afghanistan . Mr. Chairman, thank you for that question. It is not my jurisdiction to ,valuate strategic level policy so i cannot comment directly why the president did or did not do. We did brief senior staff. I spent over two hours briefing with my staff the chairman of the joint chief of staff on our Lessons Learned reports. We briefed senior officials of the state department as well as those at the nsc, and elsewhere. We advise them on what has worked or what has not worked on military policy, and our report has highlighted a number of things that have worked. I leave it up to them to make the decision as to how to proceed on that. I cannot not really think i can comment further on that. 2002, president thee w. Bush said, history of military conflict in afghanistan has been one of success followed by years of floundering and ultimate failure. We are not going to repeat that mistake. Looking back at that statement, president bush was right, and subsequent administrations did repeat that mistake after the initial military victory over the telegram, there were long years of floundering and failure. Officeere many your interviewed that felt we lost focus in afghanistan because of the bush administrations focus on iraq. Do you agree with that, and to what would you attribute this failure . I am sorry, mr. Chairman. I did not quite hear your full question. Do i agree with what president bush his statement . President bush said, the history of military conflict in afghanistan is one of success flounderingyears of and ultimate failure. We are not going to repeat that mistake. That is the end of the quote. Looking back at this statement, right,sident was president bush, except his administration and subsequent administrations did repeat that mistake. After the initial military victory over the taliban, there have been long years of floundering and failure, and there are many including those in your office interviewed that felt we lost focus in afghanistan because of the bush administrations focus on iraq. I am asking if you agree with any of those, and what you would attribute this failure. Reported ine have our Lessons Learned programs that we did lose focus on afghanistan. We allowed the telegram to basically come back, there was a resurgence of the taliban. We have noted that was a mistake. We have noted as a result, there was a surge under the Obama Administration of troops, as well as a surge on reconstruction and development aid. To nots in response focusing on afghanistan issues. Let me ask you a final question. I understand from your letter to the editor of the washington the that you feel newspaper mischaracterized your efforts. How would you respond to some of the observations of the interviewees . For example, this quote from bob crowley, an army colonel who served as a counterinsurgency adviser to u. S. Military commanders in 20132014 . This is a quote. Day it was altered to present the best picture possible. It totally unreliable but reinforced everything we were doing was right, and we became a self licking ice cream cone. Could you comment on that please. Mr. Sopko i am happy to do that. That quote is similar to what we have been reporting almost since i have become an Inspector General. I noticed, and it is not just on the military side, but on the develop inside and again, i do not focus on the war fighting. Ime Inspector General for reconstruction, not how well of inspector foran reconstruction. Whatrst trip over there, dod was saying was going on and what i saw in my staff was seeing on the ground is one of the reasons we performed or came about to do the Lessons Learned report. The problem is there is a disincentive to tell the truth. , and it is incentive for many reasons i know my time is up, but there are many reasons we can discuss that we have created an incentive to almost require people to live. Lie. Ople to i do not want to sound like fromhing from bul irl ives thaton a hot tin roof, there is an odor of audacity. Mendacity and hubris. You create from the bottom up an incentive because of short time frames, you are there for six months, nine months, or a year to show success. That gets reported up the chain, and before you know it the president is talking about a success that does not exist. At, is a good issue to look the does that tell us about way we do business, whether in afghanistan or maybe here in the United States. Thank you. Thank you mr. Chairman, i remember visiting with the general who led our forces in tora bora. He said if i had a few more men, we could have taken them out. I think about that because had we taken out bin laden in the early days, who knows . It would have changed history. We would not be talking about later, 130ades billion later. Who knows if we had not gone out theq, had we taken perpetrator of 9 11, and i thought that was our number one mission, to stop terror threats from attacking the homeland. Ande we got mission creep, got into things we should not have. The days of occupying nations and reconstruction with the hope that jeffersonian democracy will plant its seed and roots, in retrospect it may have been a little naive. It is a primitive country, afghanistan. I have been there many times. , as i advise the president on syria, a residual force to protect the homeland, i do not think we can afford to stay in these countries forever and occupy them forever. The most important thing we can do is have a residual force of some sort to take out terrorist threats to the homeland and a counterterrorism mission. Maybe we lost sight of what our mission was in the first place. I know you are not here to report on policy, but i would like your comments on that, and to that end, what programs have been most effective at counterterrorism in that mission . Congressman, that is an excellent question. I can bring you up to the line on policy, and i leave the policy for you. Going back to that time, the reason we went in there were to find the people who killed our people. Find them and punish them. The second point was to make certain that country, afghanistan, was not a place where terrorists could breed and attack us again. We were trying to create or help create a government that could manage their country. It could not. That is where we call it nationbuilding that is a word that is abused more than actually defined. It is always defined in the negative. We were trying to make certain that an Afghan Government could keep terrorists out, that is why we did build roads and do training. We are doing train, advise, and assist right now. Those are two points of our goal. Taking it to what has and has not worked, we identify this is one of the things we were briefing joe dunford and his on this Lessons Learned report which may have helped the president in his decision on what to do in afghanistan. Where we have consistency in our peopleg, and we bring over there for more than six months, and you see that particularly with special forces training, excellent training. If you look at the Afghan Military now, the best units that are fighting are the special forces that are teams are connected with them, they live with them and work with them. The other area where we have success is with the afghan. Irports the u. S. Air force have done a wonderful job with a couple of the platforms, the 839 is the best one. Our air force mentors work for with thes working afghan air force. That is tremendous, one of the best programs we have. We were advising the president and his team, that is what you should do. It goes back to we should have done a more racking and stacking of what worked and what did not. The Afghan Military and Afghan Police has been a hopeless nightmare and disaster, and part of it is because we rotate units through who are not trained to do the work, and they are gone in six to nine months. I do not blame the military, but you cannot bring in a black hawk. Ilot to train for police work that is what we are still doing. Been verys insightful. It will help us make our recommendations to the administration. It seems in conclusion, turning their special forces and Security Forces and air force, with the appropriate people, may be the best strategy. I know the president hopes he can negotiate with the taliban, i am a bit skeptical. Can never negotiate with the taliban. I know a complete withdraw would involve an overrun by the telegram for sure. They would probably take the country over and we would have a real mess. This is really complicated. Something needs to change. The status quo is not acceptable here. ,r. Sopko in response to that i agree totally, but the important thing is you have to be given the facts to make that decision. And one of the concerns i have 47 or eight or nine years that i have been doing this they merge after a while is a lot of facts that you need, you are not being given. They are over classified or are ignored. Collected or not have you do unless you go into the classified briefing you know how difficult it is to use that, but you are not told some of the basic facts that you need to make your decision of whether you should Fund Programs are not. I can go through those lists at some time, that is still a problem. When we talk about mendacity, lying, not just lying about a particular program but lying by omissions, i cannot tell you about casualties or weapons or this and that. It turns out everything that is bad news has been classified over the last few years. We appreciate your hard work on this. Thank you. We cannot deny terrorists a few acres here or there, after all they plotted against us in an apartment building. We need to prevent terrorists from getting a whole state or Training Facility as large as tora bora was in early 2001. In evaluating our afghan policy, i think we have to get away from looking at the sunk costs, the exhaustion of the last 18 years, and look only at the future and see what are the future costs of being involved, and what benefits are there is available. Learned asson i have we are good at breaking things. We broke the telegram and entered kabul. We broke Saddam Husseins army and entered act that. We are not very good at fixing things. And at nationbuilding. We should restrict our future military involvements to those where our keys for involvement are so strong that we are not morally obligated to go in and fix it. The pottery barn rule should not apply. The worst example of our behavior was iraq. We invaded even a few days after Saddam Hussein said he would allow all international inspections. No weapons of mass destruction, and then to justify our behavior we had to announce we were going to turn iraq into a democracy with rule of law. I wonder how well that is working out. Us sopko, you have shown that our afghan nationbuilding was not done well. Foreign policy, Foreign Affairs magazine gives our efforts there a d. Going forward we are going to be confronted with similar situations. Lets say we had done a b job. We did a b job. One view is we can do nationbuilding at reasonable cost if we learn from the lessons of afghanistan and do it about as right as the government can do it. Another lesson is, we cannot do nationbuilding. Job from the federal government had done the job in afghanistan . Mr. Sopko i used to teach in college, and i think if you can get a d job, it would have been ok in afghanistan. And it would have worked a lot better. What we did was an f you showed up for class, that is it. Mr. Sopko you should upper class, that is it. We can do nationbuilding if we do the good job that the federal government is capable of doing . Mr. Sopko absolutely, and what we tried to do is get the afghans and i think one of your staff asked about misassumptions that we identified. There is a list of them. One was trying to give the whatns what we had, when they only wanted was a little bit of peace and justice. If you look at our report on stabilization, we talk about that. The Stabilization Program was coming in after our military to bring instrict, Government Services so the locals would go back and support the central government. They wanted a little justice. We built courthouses. They were not looking for courthouses. They were looking for something they were looking for just simple justice. As much as you hate the telegram, and i do, and i hate their brand of justice, for the average afghan it is better justice than that provided by the National Unity. That was one of my most shocking they can and i believe repeat the story, but i came back so depressed because i met three separately afghans who i had been working with, smart to my young, brave afghans who risk their lives every day, and for some reason we started talking about their families. Their families lived in the countryside in afghanistan, and every one of those young, smart, bright afghans told me a story where they recommended their mothers and fathers, if they had a justice problem, go to the telegram. Do not go to the local government. Instead of creating a government similar to what afghanistan had in the last 50 years, we tried to create the government we have in the United States . We tried to create a little america, we tried to create norway. What they wanted was fair justice, and what has happened, and he went to the National Unity government justice, the judges were not there because they were afraid to go there, you had to pay bribes, and the bribes determined whether you got the land or if the dowry was recognized. In, it was came rough justice, and i am not advocating taliban justice. Is there a period of time and afghanistans history that you had what those villages would have wanted . Mr. Sopko it would have been before the soviet invasion, and it goes back to that. And before the communist regime . Thank you mr. Chairman. Thank you mr. Chairman, and thank you mr. Sopko for your tenacity and frustration level must be that thing. And your frustration level must be vexxing. In another part of the world, i shear, and i was there to talk about darfur, and he was almost mocking. One of his people mocking that they offered us Osama Bin Laden before he went to afghanistan in Clinton Administration would not take him. Let me issue a couple of aestions, 130 convictions, thousand investigations, maybe you could break down for us, who are these people . Americans, people from afghanistan . Where did they go to jail when they were convicted . Examples to some and i think your testimony is amazing you talk about how in dr. Shock, and honorable an honorablehaw, man, he said you pointed out his information was from the government and contradicted by other government people. There was no attempt to verify the accuracy. That is troubling. You point out on the rule of law , the strategy013 had no performance measures. That is appalling. Finally, you point out in interviews for this Lessons Learned program, 80 of the people interviewed wanted their names removed, to be anonymous. Was there retaliation against anyone . Fear of a wellfounded retribution. Maybe you can speak to that. Mr. Sopko those are all good questions. Let me start at the end. Of retaliation, we know of no retaliation, but we are concerned. One of the concerns i have is that there is a lawsuit pending in the Washington Post of all of our people who asked for anonymity. If i ig, i cannot work cannot offer anonymity and protection to a witness or whistleblower. Whistleblowers are the lifeblood as an Inspector General or any Law Enforcement agency. I have Law Enforcement credentials. Them. Ve to have i find it ironic, this is the same Washington Post who had an informant for 30 years, they ept the identity of the throat from the American People, but now we have a washington our with they want to know informants. These people who spoke to us risked a lot, and you know what this town is like, you know what badmouths if somebody their old boss. They had realistic fear. We do not give them a litmus test if your fear is reasonable not. That is so important. There is no retaliation that we know of. Differencesan, the these people would be killed, simple. Once theirgton post names for some reason. Why . They have the information, why do they need the names . I do not want to go there. The rule of law, the safety of children. Mr. Sopko that is fact versus fantasy. This problem we identified early on, this odor of mendacity. There was an exaggeration of what we accomplished. And theres another example we give about the Life Expectancy shaw u. S. Administrator went up to the president , and said we had doubled the Life Expectancy. We talked to experts in the health field and at the cia who said that was statistically statistically impossible to double the Life Expectancy of any country over that time frame. Some president and some aid administrator the current aid administrator is totally different, and he sticks to the records and the facts. One of your former colleagues, a tremendous person to work with. I think the problem is, we did not send liars and thieves and troublemakers to afghanistan to or department of defense. We sent the bravest, the will not say always the smartest but the best we had, but we gave them a box of broken tools. If you are a contracting oned not if are rat any of the contracts were. On outcomes but output. Officers with nine months or less of duty, and they had to show success. I have been briefed on the shark tooth of assessments. You would be assigned to an afghan unit, you would say the afghan unit cannot walk and chew gum at the same time. Later, success, they are getting better. By the end of your tour, they are meeting all objectives. Captaine, the next comes in and these people cannot chew gum and walk at the same time. It is not because that officer is a liar, that officer wants to get promoted and show success over his tour of duty. This is the problem we have, our hr system is broken, our procurement system is broken,. Ur rotation system is broken the problems in afghanistan are the problems the way the government operates here. That is the one thing i can say looking at Government Operations first for senator sam nunn, then john dingell in the house. , andank you mr. Sopko thank you for your work and your teams work conducting oversight. The publication of the afghanistan papers by the post has elevated an important discussion, but it is not the first attempt to highlight problems of the u. S. Role in afghanistan. Congress established sigar, and they have written seven reports that touch on many of the issues covering the afghanistan papers. The major concern is the u. S. Was dragged into a conflict in a country it did not fully understand. According to the afghanistan papers, in 2014, an official said if i were to write a book, its cover would be america goes to war without knowing why it does. We went and reflexively after 9 11 about knowing what we were trying to achieve. I would like to write a book about having a plan and end game for going in. An anonymous u. S. Official said, we rarely tried to understand what the disease was. A career foreign officer who was told government interviewers, in 2015 if there was ever a notion of mission creep, it is afghanistan. We have to say good enough is why we are there 15 years later. We are trying to achieve the unachievable. These quotes help demonstrate the lack of strategy and policy goals undermined our efforts in afghanistan. We do not fully understand our adversary or the environment we are operating. Despite the assistance that flowed into the country since 2001, it still remains fragile. , congress is culpable for many of these problems. You are here today and you have told us that part of the problem is that we do not have the facts. The basic facts we need are not being given. Can you elaborate on that . What are the basic facts that all these years later, that we have been at this that we are still missing . Mr. Sopko lets start with strategy. There is a strategy for afghanistan, it is classified. You do not have clearances, you cannot get it. There is no strategy for narcotics. Let me stop you there. When you are referring to the strategy, what are you referring to question mark a document . Mr. Sopko usually there are strategic documents. You have to have a strategy and lay out the programs. Know where the programs are going, that is the problem we have had for 18 years. You have to have metrics are ways to measure success. When you talk about new people coming in and starting over, they are operating pursuant to that strategy . They get a job assignment and go there to run a program. That is the problem, they are sent without knowing what the strategy is or what the objective is of the overall strategy in afghanistan, but the individual program strategy. Keeper in that strategy . You make it sound as if there is a document that we could see, everything would be clear if we share it with military officials. Mr. Sopko i do not mean to imply this is the Silver Bullet answer. You start with the strategy, and you look at how do the programs meet that strategy. Then you look at metrics for success. Then you look at the facts. When i talk about classification, i can go through the list of what is classified if it may help you. The way to determine whether we are doing a good job on training, advising, and assisting the afghan Security Forces, you would want to know about the Afghan National Security Forces operation data. That is classified. Casualties. Obviously our training has not been helpful if they are getting killed. You want to know about the commanders assessment of the security environment. That is now classified. Is attrition metrics, that pacified. Equipment readiness, classified. In the seven documents you produced so far, and all the times we have had this conversation before i am not being flip. Were is this notion that if had this information for all the years we have been at this, have you been screaming from the mountain tops about this . I have been raising the issue about classification going back at least five years. And repeatedly. In every quarterly report, we raised it. I raised it just last year. The last metrics we had for success, and general nicholson said these of the metrics you have to focus on, the amount of territory the Afghan Government controls, and the percentage of the population they control, they classified that and then stopped collecting data. He said that is no longer so you have no metrics. You as members of congress have no public metrics to rate the billions of dollars we are spending in afghanistan. Thank you for holding this hearing. Over 2400 american lives lost and 20,000 wounded, we certainly owe it to every one of them to make sure we get this right. I appreciate this. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you mr. Sopko for your candor. Here from thejob perspective of some of my colleagues is to make sure you do a good job bashing or affirming President Trump is pathetic and does not have a strategy and this is his fault. I applaud your efforts to stay out of the fray. I do not think any of us are perfect and the president wants to get out of afghanistan. It is hard to determine the facts. Out posts article laid that we do not know the information, and you have reaffirmed that. Defense,he president s when he wanted to declassified information, that would buttress his innocence in claims against him, he cannot get that done. This town has a way of sequestering information most important and damming to it and the people in it. I would like to get some of the you highlighted challenges regarding coordination of reconstruction in afghanistan and the fact that there is no one in charge, whether it is on the afghan side or the american side or some ngo, etc. If everyonee that is in charge know no one is in charge. Have there been improvements on this since you have to continue d to decry that. Any improvements regarding culpability and assignment from responsibility in afghan reconstruction projects . Have one if i can moment. Sure. Mr. Sopko well, its unanimous. No. Anywe havent seen improvements. I do not want to turn this into routine. The problem is this is a very complicated. This is a nato operation. We have multiple donors. Multiple donors just doing reconstruction. Some are providing military. Its a problem. And i really think it is something that Congress Needs to focus on, because we will do this again. There are going to be multiple people wearing multiple hats. We actually have an entire report looking on, i forget the title of it, it is divided responsibility. And that report goes into unfortunately gory detail of whhow convoluted the process is. This isnt meant as a criticism of any administration. 900 footnotesver highlighting, maybe this is the difference between us and the Washington Post. We go into a lot of detail on this. No, there is a problem. And it is not just in the military field. This report focuses on that. But it also does the reconstruction field. This is a worl worthwhile area for you and congress to focus on. Divided responsibility in afghanistan, in these postconflict environments. With a little time i have, let meek where he further on that. It is your studied opinion that, that should be the purview of congress to assign those responsibilities. Look, im a black hawk pilot. And they do not want to teach Law Enforcement. I would not be any good at it. Surrounded by a lot of really well intended people that are smart, im not sure congress is the best answer, either. It seems to me that somebody that can act somewhat autonomously to determine the problem and see the solution set, somebody like mark green or anybody in that capacity, should be able to say, look, here is the project, here is where the funding is. Youre in charge. Knock yourself out. If you cannot get the job done, then in six months were going to look for a replacement. Be do you think it should congress . Im concerned about that. Mr. Sopko no, no. I think part of the reason is some of these authorities and responsibilities are established by law, first of all. What were dealing with in afghanistan is a whole of governments approach, and a lot of this is going to have to be done statutorily. Im not saying that one committee up here is the best one to decide. It should be recognize we have a problem. My time is expired, sir. Could you do this with the chairmans indulges. Could you give us one example regarding a statute where we think we can make a difference so i can conceptualize contextualize this . Mr. Sopko i will ask my staff. Thank you, mr. Keating. Lets be clear on one thing off the bat. Our greatest responsibility to get things right. We will be talking about billions and billions of dollars, but our great responsibility to get things right rests with those families that lost sons and daughters and loved ones to this war and to the People Living with devastating injuries that they suffered in this war that forever will challenge them both physically and mentally. Not let me zero in on one area of concern that we raised. My colleagues and i raised it. I authored a piece of the dissuasion ensuring that women are part of the Peace Process in afghanistan, and they are engaged in the activity, being Meaningful Partners in creating a lasting peace. Something i hope will advance well advance out of this committee shortly. You mentioned in your report the you expect, in new york testimony, you expect to issue a report on womens empowerment in afghanistan this year or early next year. And in a recently released 20 list, there is a section focus on despite the fact 1 billion has been spent, gains by women in afghanistan remain fragile. How would you characterize the current state of meaningful for women, and what is a Clear Strategy in your mind Going Forward to deal effectively with will gains that not only help women but i think will help the country achieve any semblance of a lasting peace Going Forward . Mr. Sopko congressman, that is a very good question. Im glad you highlighted our high risk list, because this report talks about the importance of a number of issues. This is one are referred to Congress Needs to do something about ensuring that this is one i referred to Congress Needs to do something about ensuring that these risks are dealt with if we want lasting peace. I cant tell you specifically what is the answer. I can tell you that although we have made advances helping women in afghanistan, life for a woman in afghanistan is horrible. Outside of the cities where, major cities, where majority of the afghan women live, it hasnt improved much. And i have not met an afghan woman yet who trusts the taliban. So, that is something. I know youre concerned that they have a seat at the table, or somebody represents them at the table, so they dont get lost in this shuffle, declaring victory and leaving. Thats my concern. Rep. Keating we have been assured that time and time again. Mr. Sopko by the afghans . Rep. Keating [laughs] no. By the afghan leaders. Yes, youre right. There is no place at the table. You characterize it as fragile right now. Could you talk to us about right now, and what we should have done, to make it less fragile, and what we can do Going Forward . Mr. Sopko you know, i dont have specific answers to that ill get back to you, but i think one of the critical things about that issue, and it is a delicate issue, because you are talking about cultures, but one of those things is we have to focus that the problem of womens rights is men. And all of our programs have been focusing on giving certificates and things to women. The problem is, and this is ghani the president s wife. Rep. Keating ive spoken with her. Mr. Sopko ive spoken to her, too. She says the womens issue is a mens issue. So the program should be focused on men. But one of the things is if you are going to design a womens program, talk to afghan women. And mrs. Ghani was one of the first people who highlighted the problem with the promote program, which was one of those programs that was oversold as the greatest program on earth for women. 250 million and there was going to be 250 million of donations from the European Union and the european allies. Add i remember meeting with the european allies in afghanistan, and none of them had heard about the program. But we had already, this odor of mendacity. Havekeating all right, i got 20 seconds left. A recurrent theme talking about the judiciary system, the rule of law, the Current System or what were talking about with advancing womens place in society. Were not tailoring our programs around the traditions of the host country. And i think, probably with later testimony, thats going to be an area you are going to highlight. That is a huge oversight on our part. I have to yield back. My time is up. Mr. Sopko we have to talk to the afghans, sir. Thank you. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Mr. Sopko, thank you for being here. I apologize. I feel like it is welcome back to groundhog day. We have heard this over and over again. I remember when ryan shaw was here with usaid. I think afghanistan got 1 billion through usaid, and they could not account for 300 million. I think what you pointed out was a grand plan. And i think congress should be the one that does that. And it should be the appropriate committees. The Foreign Affairs committee working with dod or one of the other committee should be able to create a policy that lives beyond a presidency, so that it is something that our allies and countries we work with can count on this policy will not change. Yes, the president can tweak it as needed, but it has to survive and administration. That is something that if we vote on it in the house and senate, will be hard to change. That all goes back to making sure we have the correct policies. I lost my train of thought. The one thing you picked up, and you said this in the very beginning, and this is so important. Your reports come out every year, and i think they are spot on. Its this body that doesnt act. We are the ones in charge of the money. I thought what you said in the very beginning, successful reconstruction is incompatible with continuing insecurity. Until we have a stable government, we can throw all the money want. But until there is a stable government, and it doesnt mean to be a democracy. They are not ready for it. That is something that has to come from the top down. It has to be a stable government that we can work with. And the women programs, those are all great. And i agree with you. When you look at that culture, if you do not understand that culture, the culture is you walk behind me 8 or 10 feet. They are not going to have them at the dais. Unfortunately as that is, weve been to countries where they have done that because of our policies in the women are there, but when you go to ask a question, the men answer. Ive interrupted the men and said, i do not want to hear from you. I want to hear from the women here. We need to understand that culture and give them time to change and adapt. I think we need to focus on stability. When we have stability, then our Infrastructure Projects can start creating the economy that we need so that trade can come. The taliban, we ran them out, and the women went to school, but when the taliban comes back , they will be out of school. We know thats going to happen. I think we need to be smarter in how we do this, and this is a Lesson Learned that we should never repeat again. I want to get your sense. Do you feel the militaryindustrial complex that president eisenhower forewarned is about, are they playing a hand in this or impeding a success in this, or is it more our policies, where it changes the mental lobotomy. What happens with talent we send over there . Mr. Sopko i cant really comment on that. I think the problems we have youve identified. The other problem is theres a tendency, and i talk about it in the statement of we think that just throwing money at it will answer it. And more money is a problem. We spend too much money too fast in too small a country with too little oversight. Rep. Yoho right. Mr. Sopko and that created the corruption problem. That distorted the economy and distorted the culture. So, smaller sometimes is better. I dont know if that has anything to do with the militaryindustrial complex. I think it more has to do with maybe it is a tendency of american culture. We will get to where we are the firstest with the mostest, going back to general sherman. And we had the same thing about development aid. We will get there with the firstest and the mostest and assume that is good. Rep. Yoho what we need to do is focus on what you need, what do you want . Mr. Sopko and what you can use. Sir, i would hearken back to the seven questions, which we posed within a year of me coming on board, i was trying to, what are the lessons we learned . And one of the questions we asked is do the afghans know about the program, will they use the program . If you answered that in the affirmative, that program will succeed more than it will fail. If you answered in the negative, why are you doing it . Mr. Yoho your six recommendations is what this body needs to do. I thank you. Welcome, sir. The gentlemans time is cicilline. Rep. Cicilline thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you, mr. Sopko, for your service. I want to understand a little bit about the afghanistan papers. What was the document that was being prepared . Was that going to be this report you provided to the committee, or is it an internal document . Is there some failure in our model of the Inspector General in terms of getting this information to congress in a way that will require action, because i do think some is really important. Can you tell us a little bit what the purpose . Were you preparing a report that was shared publicly or shared with congress . Mr. Sopko that is a good question. It is one of the misconceptions. We werent preparing a report. We interviewed peoplein preparation for these seven reports, as well as we are interviewing for the next series of reports. You know, we, these were raw interview notes rep. Cicilline ok. Mr. Sopko that we had done for those reports. Rep. Cicilline for the reports you previously prepared. I want to get, i appreciate that. Because i do think getting this information is valuable. I want to focus my question very much on corruption. , because i think certainly the absence of a clear set of objectives, developing the objective for our mission in afghanistan, followed by a strategy and even than metrics to measure. I think that has been a challenge. I am particularly disturbed about what i am learning in this report with respect to corruption. The department of defense says that corruption remains the top strategic threat to the success of the Afghan Government. Your report in 2016 reported on corruption and criticized the governments failure to recognize corruption, which was bad enough. But the american activities contributed to the corruption. Would you speak a little bit about that and also about this notion that we prioritize security over anticorruption efforts, and whether that was the right judgment and how we might measure metrics in both of those areas . Mr. Sopko well, that is i think youve focused on what some military officers told us is really the major threat to reconstruction and to the war effort. And that is corruption. It is not the taliban. It is corruption. If you talk to general miller, who is head of all of our troops right now, he will answer that is still a problem. It not only saps the money we give to the Afghan Government, but it also is used as a recruiting tool by the taliban, because they can point to the corrupt officers, they can point to the corrupt warlords who are getting all of the government contracts. They say, see . Thats what the u. S. Government does. So, i think you have honed in on a serious issue. It still is. Mel, i will say in defense of congress, congress has recognized that, and they have done legislation on that. They have actually asked us to assess the corruption situation three times. So, you are aware of it. And we are in currently assessing the condition there. It is still a serious problem. Rep. Cicilline so one of the most mismanaged pots of money was the commanders Emergency Response program, or cerp. This was a slush fund reminiscent of the war in iraq. Allowing military commanders in the field to bypass normal contracting rules and spend up to 1 million on Infrastructure Projects. What role did that cerp money in enabling corruption and was it ever conflicted with other foreign Assistance Programs to make sure that funding streams were not working at cross purposes . That seems to be a very serious, contribute factor to the corruption we saw in iran. Mr. Sopko you have highlighted a good point. Cerp money was not deconflicted. Like a lot of the military programs that were not deconflicted. I would not say that cerp is the worst. There were a couple other programs i could discuss that are worse. We have not actually done an audit on that funded to the granularity that you are asking, but it was deconflicted. Good intentions, but what a waste. Question,line final a retired Brigadier General said, Congress Gave us money to spend and expects us to spend all of it. Became, we do not care what you do with the money so long as you spent it. This sentiment is reflected throughout the report. What can congress due to review among military personnel in the field that you should spend money no matter what . Mr. Sopko i think the best answer is for the appropriators to put language or dont hold the agencies vulnerable or attack them for not spending the money. I know a lot of agencies were attacked for not putting money on contract or not spending or losing it. So multiyour money may be an answer to that. But there is an incentive to spend the money. And we saw an absurd situation down in at camp leatherneck, where we rebuilt a building that we called the 64k, a 64,000foot headquarters for the surge. They started construction as the surge was ending. Our marine corps general said, i dont want it, i dont need it, i wont use it. His superior above him, general alan said, we dont want it, we wont use it. It went up the chain, but there was a general back in kuwait who said, Congress Gave it to us so spend it. There is a beautiful building. You cannot get to camp leatherneck. When i got there, it was the most best built building i saw in afghanistan. It was 36 million. As far as i know, it is empty still. Thank you. Mr. Wright. Rep. Wright thank you, mr chairman. Mr. Sopko, thank you for what you do. It is pretty clear our experience and afghanistan is a case of winning the war but not winning the peace or we would not still be there. But i have a couple of questions with specifics. The process of doing employment. There is a significant downside to long deployments in terms of the effect on our men and women in the military and their families, but, as you pointed out, there is also a significant downside to short deployments. Not from a military perspective but from our reconstruction perspective. How do you reconcile it . How do we know when we have got it right . Mr. Sopko that is a very good question. I think that we can do is, again, look to where there have been successes. And what the air force has done is they have assigned the same people for four years. They do not spend the whole four years in afghanistan. They basically work with the afghan pilots. They bring them back. You are assigned to a similar task. Special forces has the same thing. You are assigned, but then when you have been there for a certain amount of time, you come back to a pool. It is the same pool that works very closely with the same units. So there is a connectivity. So, those are two examples. We are actually going to be doing a Lessons Learned report on what are the best practices for doing that with aid or state or dod. How you how you able you dont want to send somebody over there for 18 years. My dad was drafted for world war ii. He was there for the length of the war, however long it lasted. But that is different. There is a way to do that. You do not lose that conductivity. We do not lose that connection with this afghan unit. And you work together, and that afghan feels closer to you, the american advisor, than he does to the taliban. Rep. Wright i want to pick up on something that mr. Yoho talked about earlier, and that is changes in administration. I am not asking you to judge the administrations policies, but we have had three president s during this time, both parties. To what extent does a change in administration hamper our ability to, in terms of the reconstruction efforts . Mr. Sopko i havent really seen that as a problem. When the new administration, the Trump Administration came in, they did a policy review. We participated and they actually were very responsive to our bringing the information to their attention. A lot of the career people dont change. Obviously were dealing with them. The ambassadors dont change. So i dont see that as a problem. We do not see much of a difference between the bush administration, the Obama Administration. That we have not seen as a problem. Rep. Wright ok. My last question has to do with iraq. In your, based on your experience, to what extent did the war in iraq prevent us from completing what we needed to complete in afghanistan . Mr. Sopko again, i havent looked at the war fighting side. Remember, we spent 132 billion on reconstruction. We spent close to 700 billion on the war fighting in afghanistan. All i can tell you is, when we did an analysis on the train and advise, assist, and on the reconstruction, everybody told us when the focus turned on iraq we lost interest in a lot of the , key issues in afghanistan. That is all i can tell you. Other than that would that include the establishment of civil government . Mr. Sopko yes, to some extent. Rep. Wright ok, great. Thank you. And i yield back. You, representative right. Wright. Ami bera. Rep. Bera thank you, mr. Chairman. 132 billion on reconstruction. We have spent more in afghanistan than we spent on the whole Marshall Plan rebuilding after world war ii. Pretty amazing. And when i think about that, i think some of it is when we approached europe we had similar cultures, similar, an understanding of europe, similar forms of government, etc. That probably contributed to some of that success. It does seem evident from your answers and from what ive looked at we do not have that same understanding of the values, culture in afghanistan , and that probably foundationally is one of the things that has led us to be not so efficient. I think you stated, or mr. Yoho stated, you know, our goal is to find lasting peace. But the problem is how we define lasting peace may not be how the afghans define lasting peace. How would you say they describe, define lasting peace . Mr. Sopko i think i would use probably the websters. Its its will the gains that the afghans have made continue in the future . So, the womens rights. The rule of law. Some of the gains they have made on corruption. I mean, the question is is will , is will a peace treaty just end up into civil war again . So, its sustainability of any of the gains. And we had made some gains over the 18 years. The afghans have made improvements. Will those continue . Onbera so it behooves us the committee, and the subcommittee i chair has jurisdiction over afghanistan. It is an area we are going to look at. We should define those parameters that we should also mr. Perry isnt here, but none of us is bashing President Trump here or any particular administration. Each administration got some things right, but they also got a lot wrong. The Current Administration wants to consider a drawdown in afghanistan. It probably will perceive in that direction. Congress should insert itself into this process. It does not have to be adversarial. The message of the administration is work with us on this. If we were to do that, there probably is no Peace Process that doesnt involve the taliban , if we accept that as a reality, then we have to think about the gains within that context. And, you know, it would be my sense that, you know, some of our interests are certainly the counterterrorism space. We do not want to see a resurgence of al qaeda. Am i thinking about this correctly in terms of, well, what would that remaining force be on the counterterrorism side . And then, you know, the last thing that i would think about, and id love for you to comment on, is it is my sense we created a dependency afghanistan on u. S. Dollars. There is going to be a big hole that is left in the afghan economy as we exit. How do we fill that hole . Theres regional dynamics as well. Obviously the afghans have a relationship with the indians. The indians have an economy that could step there. The pakistanis do not like the indians. Much so the whole regional dynamics are challenging as well. How do we create that conversation, as were drying down, to create some regional leadership . I guess, am i thinking about this correctly . Mr. Sopko absolutely. Congressman, again, i would ask you to go back to our highrisk list that we issued. These are the risks to that stable lasting peace. And one of them definitely is finances. The afghan economy is abysmal. It is reality. 70 of their budget for their government comes from the United States taxpayer and the european taxpayers and whatever. And that is not going to change once you find peace. Now, maybe the cost of the war fighting may change, but just because you find peace with the taliban does not mean you will have peace with isis and other warlords and gangs who are operating. You are going to have a cost. We have to face the reality and try to work with them. But that is one of the biggest concerns we have in here, because you also have to reintegrate. Lets assume it is a successful peace. You have 60,000 taliban. , plus their families, who have to be reintegrated. That cost money. Can the afghans do that . No. We just had a major surrender of isis troops. I have seen no evidence that the Afghan Government has done anything to reintegrate those isis troops. And actually, if you talk to general miller [inaudible] mr. Sopko im sorry. Im terribly sorry. I didnt hear you. I apologize. Thank you, mr. Chairman, for that recognition. I am probably not as intellectual, but i am probably more entertaining. How important, we usually, we have their whole line of people , and they get their five minutes, and they tweet about it and they go home. You are by yourself and you turn around to the group behind you , and they, they take note of whatever you say and make notes of it. They are doing an excellent job behind you. I had a couple of questions. Your father was a world war ii veteran. My dad enlisted shortly after december 7. My mom flew an airplane during the war. I appreciate you, brother. I have been listening. Have you seen any evidence that foreign state actors have or are currently undermining u. S. Reconstruction efforts, and can you expand specifically on the role pakistan is playing . Mr. Sopko i have not seen any evidence of that, of foreign state actions on reconstruction. And, as for pakistans role, obviously, there is a lot of reporting about their involvement supporting various terrorist groups, but that is not within my jurisdiction. So i am not the best person. I would just be reporting on what i read in the newspaper, too. Thats all right. And that is probably wrong. So i appreciate you saying that, brother. Should the u. S continue to fund counternarcotic programs, even though we have thrown 9 billion at the problem with little success . I say that to you as a state legislator for 16 years, the county mayor. I remember when our attorney general Randy Nichols talked about the price of brown tar heroin. When it became too high, the Opioid Epidemic would explode. He was a prophet on that. Overseas, the market is flowing in and out. Mr. Sopko counter narcotics is the 800pound gorilla in the room. It dwarfs the licit, the legal economy. It employs more people than the afghan army. So if you ignore it, you ignore it at your peril, particularly if we are talking about developing lasting peace. You have peace of with the taliban, but what about the drug warlords, who are probably more powerful than the taliban . They corrupt the institutions. They are recognized by the Afghan People as that. And if we tolerate them, or if we allow the Afghan Government to tolerate them, you can kick the can down the street just so far. And that is a problem. I do not know if that answers the question, sir. Do you ever see it seems know, wee folks, you get a new regime in or whatever, and the drug warlords just seem to transcend to the next one. Is that because of their immense power, their cash flow, or is it a combination thereof . Mr. Sopko i think it is a combination. I do not want to downplay how difficult it is to fight drugs. Yes. Mr. Sopko we have a problem in the United States. A huge problem. Mr. Sopko you look at mexico, you look at colombia. You look at developed countries. You put it into a country like afghanistan, it dwarfs a lot of the other problems. The sad side thing is that over the last 18 years, drug usage in afghanistan has skyrocketed. And i cant remember, and i can get back to you on the data on the u. N. , i think afghanistan may have the highest addiction rate of any developing country now. But i can double check that. If you can get back to me, that would be great. No big deal. Thank you so much for being here. I yield back the remainder of my time. Thank you, representative. I call on myself now. Im next in the lineup. First of all, thank you, mr. Sopko, for your testimony. I want to ask you about our diplomatic corps and the state department and the efficacy of our diplomatic efforts. While the United States is continue to spend billions of dollars annually, we did not invest enough in our Foreign Service officers and diplomacy to train and retain experts. Given we sought to achieve peace and develop it in afghanistan, more military is not the right answer. Whether rebuilding of negotiating with the taliban, personnel within the state department is, of course, of the utmost importance. Here are my questions for you. What can be done to empower and strengthen the diplomatic corps . Mr. Sopko i think, first of all, i think you hit a right point on empowering and strengthening them. The problem in afghanistan is the ambassador has been sort of de facto, his role as the senior u. S. Government official has been downplayed by the fact that there is a military officer sitting across the street. I was going to ask you about the interplay between our military folks who are there and the diplomatic folks that are there. Mr. Sopko the problem is that the state department, i think you hit it on the head, is underfunded. Usaid is underfunded in comparison to the military. We are fighting a war in afghanistan. And i am not saying we shouldny we are doing it. But im just saying you cant ignore the diplomats, you cant ignore usaid. Prts andis at the regional groups. Weirs was to be aid and state in the military in the region. The military all showed up, they had money and the manpower, they had the funds, where were the state and aid people . There werent enough to go around. That is a problem. Im old school. Development should be done by development experts. Those are diplomats and aid officials. They should not be done by the u. S. Military and we highlight when we give that task to the u. S. Military, it almost automatically fails. Rep. Castro why does the military appear to be the nation in the middle of nation building instead of the state department or usaid especially since this is been going on for 18 years so theres been plenty of opportunity to make course corrections. Thesopko weve emphasized war fighting and given short shrift to development and reconstruction. The military has the weapons and they have the manpower and they have the money. Rep. Castro what is that portend for when our military presence is no longer there at some point . Mr. Sopko its a big issue. Its one of the risks you face. Military Assistance Program has been run by the military, we trained the afghans to deal with the military, they havent been trained to deal through the normal embassy function. Castro i will go now to mr. Levin from michigan. You for yourhank public service, i really appreciate it. Indicating paul even as money from prior years was left unspent and officials made clear that afghanistan didnt have the capacity to put so much money to proper use. Apparently policymakers claimed the political signal by a Budget Reduction at a turning point in the war effort would adversely affect overall messaging and indirectly reconstruction efforts on the ground. The articulating of gold was like to theas likely budget. It seems political expediency was prioritized over longterm effective policy. No one want to support budget cuts and risked being blamed if things went badly. To what extent were budgeting decisions in afghanistan made due to political expediency . We have not looked at have, becausewe it goes beyond my mandate, but that issue has come up of just too much money sloshing around in the motivation of was to spend it. We never looked at it. Levin here you are testifying for congress and i really want to get your advice about what we can do here to insulate the budgeting and policymaking processes from political pressures when it comes to matters of war and in afghanistan. Maybe to put another way, how do we keep this from happening that we are spending much more sending much more money than people in the ground think is appropriate. Problem when we have domestic priorities here and peaceful priorities, we need to take care of our prek kids. We need to educate them, to be able to afford our infrastructure. Mr. Sopko the best answer i can have for that is having more hearings like this. Where you bring not just me, you bring someone in from aid, state, and dod to explain and justify their budget. And explain not just the talk about the influence and outputs, but whats the outcome. I go back to why some of you may have wondered why did i attach all of those letters when i death, secondnd sec state what were the best successes and failures and why. I firmly believed that they had honestly answered those questions we wouldnt be here today. Because what they would have done is it would force them to answer the question why are we spending 9 billion on narcotics if its a failure. They would answer the question why are we spending 90 million bringing in rare italian goats the aly to develop they wouldve been forced to look, that is why we talk about stacking. Take a look at the letters we sent. Many of those are the same you should be asking. I cant answer those but if you want to stop the hemorrhage of money to a place like afghanistan, it has to start by asking people not to talk about inputs, do not bring someone in who talks about how much money hes gotten or outputs, how many kids he says they are training in afghanistan. But whats the outcome. Any of those rep. Levin you had multiple Lessons Learned reports where you identified the approach and programs the u. S. Used to achieve stated goals were not properly dictated tailored to the afghan context. Contributed to this gap. What lesson do you take from reading all these letters the gap between what the u. S. Is supporting and what the afghans needed on the ground . I think i go back to the institutional movers and mendacity i talked about. We have incentivized lying to congress. And by that i mean the whole incentive is to show success and to ignore the failure. ,hen there is too much failure clients dont report it. Congress has to weigh in and say we want to know the truth. , reconstruction takes a long time. You cant do it in six months. You cant do it in nine months, you probably cant do it in one administration. If you want to help the afghans, it is the long haul. Rep. Connolly i want to go back and thank you for your work, frankly that table ought to be filled to overflowing. The story about afghanistan and the United States military and economic assistance to the country really deserves a kind of scrutiny you have been trying to provide and get attention to. It is shocking in some ways the story you are telling has so little interest by the media, the public, congress itself. We have provided at least 130 2 billion of Development Assistance that is of dubious value. Mr. Sopko correct. Imagine, 132 billion dollars. Almost all the systems put in place were designed to avoid measuring progress, failure and success and for that matter even accountability so for example, you earlier testified there are almost no metrics for how are we doing, did it work, if that didnt work lets try something else. Theyhen we have metrics classified them so the public and congress and others cant access them. Is that true . Mr. Sopko basically i was talking about the military where the bulk of the 132 billion has been spent. Rep. Connolly in the report, you talked about the fact that in a sense the military stifled, suppressed usaid by bulldozing holdgency into a clear build strategy and demanded a id , despite misgivings, implement despiteeward program protest as well as misgivings. Mr. Sopko that is correct. Rep. Connolly how do such a thing happen . How does a id lose its independence of judgment. With all it is the agency the main expertise and development systems, not the pentagon. Mr. Sopko i cant fully answer that other than to say who you give the money to and i suppose the guns to really call the shots. Persones only one aid at the table and theres 23 guys and gals wearing green suits, i think you know whos going to win. Connolly you talk passionately about the problems with the longest war in american intory and our engagement reconstruction and you use two words that struck me, hubris and mendacity. Almost sounds like potential title for a novel. Thead advice and consent, modern version will be hubris and audacity. Example thate an affected directly our efforts in afghanistan. , wer all, the stakes invaded afghanistan after 9 11. We worked with local militias to overthrow the taliban and to try and expel and eliminate the presence of al qaeda. Decisiona momentous with very high stakes for america directly and here we are well over a decade later and we dont seem to have done a very good job at a meeting any kind of objective including a stable government accepted by the people. Can you give us some examples of hubris and especially mendacity. Mr. Sopko i think we refer to it in my statement, i talk about some of the statements made by aid about the Great Success on Life Expectancy. It was statistically impossible to double Life Expectancy over the time given. Know is weing you are going to be walking on the water from an aide program. The education, we claimed millions of children were in school and aid new the data was bad. But they still reported it. As if those millions of children. Its that hubris and mendacity. I actually think the people on the ground thought they were doing a great job. They just never looked at all the data. They werent going to explain that the data was faulty. You look at some of the successes we claimed about the power grid. Those are some of the examples. Im happy to give you more. I would just say shades of vietnam. Allred i was in afghanistan over the thanksgiving holiday and while we were there we had a chance to meet with our military and state Department Leaders and i met a young army captain who was a west point grad and a football player. He was tasked with training the next generation of Afghan Military leaders and he was tired when we met because he had been out the night before leading a raid which we are doing every single night degrading the talibans ability and ive often thought about that captain especially as we heard the news of the two servicemembers killed this weekend and wondered if we are serving him as well as he is serving us as well as many of and i want to thank you for your work, i think this is one of the best parts of our democracy is we can be critical of ourselves and that we can take a critical eye to our commitments and say what are we doing wrong and what can we do better. Fingers,ere to point there are multiple administrations involved. We all know how long and how much money we put in to this. One of my questions for you is over the years youve released a number of overarching recommendations for various parts of government, i want to know how receptive you found agencies involved to your recommendations, i think i read that 13 of them have been adopted and maybe tell us what you think is standing in the way. Mr. Sopko that is in regard to i believe we had 170 recommendations from the first seven lessons. Overall from our inspection its about 86 , 90 of our recommendations are adopted. The smalleror number i believe is because many of our recommendations are conditional on events occurring such as peace or the next many of our recommendations or if you do this again you should do the following burden so it is hard following. So it is hard to say they have complied because it hasnt happened. The Lessons Learned program has been well received by the military, state department and usaid. Particularly the military under general dunford when he was the chairman of the joint chiefs, he was very receptive and we are using it, weve been asked to do it for training for them as well as the Foreign Service institute. Rep. Allred . While i was there we were told a new generation of Afghan Military leaders were emerging, particularly in special forces and they were leading most of the connecticut fighting and doing a decent job. I was wondering if you could provide you and your Agency Opinion on the generation of leadership thats coming through the Afghan Military, whether or not they will be able to stand up when we stand down and i know thats some of this is a military consideration itself. But from the reviews youve done and over the years of your experience, how you believe its progressing. Mr. Sopko it is in our purview because its part of the train, advise, and assist. I think special forces is a success story. Our training and advising and assisting the Afghan Special forces is a success. We highlight it and continue to highlight it. I can give you more details if i had the time and i will be happy to brief you on it. We are all hoping for a new generation of officers, Senior Officers in the Afghan Military. I know general nicholson spoke that this is what we were hoping for, a lot of those officers were also viewed trained officers and they finally got rid of them. They pensioned them off. But it is too early to tell, we are talking about the law that pensioned all these older officers off which is less than a year old or maybe older. We dont know but the problem is that below that, below that lot of level you have a corruption, a lot of seriouslycy and it is hurting the Afghan Military. The biggest problem is not casualties, it is desertions. Katie is people disappearing or it is people who never existed and we are paying their salaries. So i got we all have to respect the afghans for doing what they are doing with the current situation. Its a difficult situation. They have to buy their own food from their officers who steal it from them. Rep. Spanberger thank you for being here. I like many of my colleagues previously visited our armed forces in afghanistan and had the opportunity to meet with many of our men and women who are working on Training Special forces in so it is good as we are discussing whats working and whats not with some of your discussion related to those success stories. And youve talked a lot today about the fact that we are theding too much money and abuse of u. S. Taxpayer dollars that we have seen in afghanistan. Theas we are moving towards congressional appropriations process i was wondering if you might dive into that question more of where are we spending too much money, where are there places where we are witnessing these abuses and are there things that we as members of congress could prioritize or should consider as we move towards appropriations to ensure we are not seeing the continued abuse in the way we have witnessed over the past decade. Mr. Sopko i cant give you specific recommendations, but looki would go back to is at the justification for some of these programs. Outcome, ask the the agencies. What has been the outcome of funding counter narcotics. What has been the outcome of funding rule of law. So i think thats probably the only way i can help you on that. I cant tell you for sure. This is what we did when we briefed general dunford, lets look at the successes and see if we cant duplicate that in the rest of the Afghan Military and we were very hopeful that we were going to do that and they proposed i think they still have these brigades, excuse me. Assistancerces brigades where they were trying to do that but im not actually certain if the latest brigade has gone out. That may be an area you want to look at. Im happy to give you and any member we can brief you on more particular specific issues. Im sorry i cant answer in more details. Reppo spanberger rep. Spanberger i appreciate that. Is one of the Main Findings of the Lessons Learned studies is the war we were conducting in iraq did hamper some efforts in afghanistan. A fromn is from the experiences we have examining what happens in afghanistan and looking at the range of National Security challenges we see today, do you have concerns about escalating tensions in the region, particularly with iran and how that may impact our efforts in afghanistan moving forward . I think any security region causes concern and its concern not only for the security of our people there, afghanistan has a border with iran, theres a lot of connections with iran. We have to be cautious about that, its even difficult to get people in and out of afghanistan. Its a landlocked country now and i have to deal with that because i have people over there. I dont know if i could have made that trip now that i did back then. But i cant really speak because is a broader issue of whats going on with us in iran and i really dont know. But obviously that region is something we have to focus on and ultimately the success of peace there is going to have to involve the region. The great the book game, which is a fascinating book by a british historian on it. What he says about afghanistan is nobody wants to be there but nobody wants anybody else there and i think thats the same thing going on now. Every one of those countries doesnt want anyone else there, but we are there now. Mentionederger you corruption into competency at Different Levels of the military, are you saying seeing that in particular facets of where we are spending money in particular places where we are working with afghanistan that there is a greater level of corruption in one place or another and would you point us in a particular place to have concerns or see improvement . Mr. Sopko fuel and payroll. We dont have a good way to protect fuel. One of the former commanders said over 50 of the fuel we buy never reaches its ultimate destination. That is something that we are working very closely with them. The other one is payroll. Even after 18 years, we dont have the payroll system right. We dont even know how many afghans we detained. Rep. Houlahan . You for want to commend being so frank, this is only my first year here, but you are literally the first person who i have seen in front of us and any of my committees that i felt was being honest and fully honest and not just waiting for the right question to not answer. Thank you for that. So given you effectively have testified and talked about for the last couple of hours the fact that weve basically failed all of our objectives in afghanistan over the last 17 years or so, can you reflect on what the implications are for efforts we have in other unstable countries and whether there are any lessons to be learned or Cautionary Tales we should be aware of . Mr. Sopko i want to qualify, not everything has failed. There have been some successes. There are more women in the economy, theyre more women going to school. There are more kids going to school. It is hard to summarize 130 recommendations in all the separate reports but i think small may be better than large. Definitely deal with corruption early on before you go in, also know where youre going in. People were designing and working programs in afghanistan like they were walking into norway. This is not norway, this is not kansas. Sometimes i sound like i was out of out of a movie. Some of the people and unfortunately a lot with aid, it was unbelievable where they thought they were. So train our people before we send them in. They are honest people they just dont know where they are and develop an understanding of that community. Know who the warlords are and who their brother into their second cousin days because you may not want to give the contract to him but you gave it to his cousin. We had that capability, our intelligence people know how to do that but if they are not told to do that and we dont follow them and follow their advice, we are going to fail. Allowing tendency of counterterrorism to trump counter corruption and when you do that, you still have a security problem. Houlahan i have one more question. You spoke a little bit about the importance of calendar versus conditionbased timelines. Can you give us more detail about why you thought that our strategy afghanistan was not successful because of improper selection of those timelines. Mr. Sopko it basically goes back to the decision should be made on the reality, on the facts and on the ground, not an election cycle over here or a number poll data here. We make ahan how do difference in that . We are driven by calendars and election cycles. A change in funding or sources are timelines that we can be helpful with . Mr. Sopko i think it is having an educated electorate and in educated congress to say we are not going to put a timeline because we know it didnt work in afghanistan or it didnt work in this other. I think its being honest to ourselves that Development Takes a long time. Hopefully that is one lesson weve learned from afghanistan is it takes a long time to try and build a government that is not corrupt or can keep the bad guys out and if we think we can do it in one year or nine months or two years, we are smoking something. We e asking me how do this is common sense. So i dont know if that answers the question, im i only have about a half a minute left, but i want to conclude with appreciation, particularly with your emphasis on the fact that a lot of information is not available to us in the congress. We cannot provide oversight. It may be available to you but it is that a closed environment. It will be difficult for your staff to work with it. More importantly, it will be difficult for the American People to know what is going on. They are the ones paying for this. They have a right to know. Agreed thank you, sir. I yield back. Thank you. Great to see you. We thank you for your work and your honesty. We have been focused over the last minutes or hours on what has gone wrong afghanistan. My view, there are several fundamental mistakes, many of which youve touched upon, first of all the decision to try to do this on the cheap. The diversion of the war in iraq which then required our people in afghanistan to rely on the powerbrokers who were already there, who happened to be violent, brutal, corrupt warlords, and under those circumstances, building the basic system of justice that was always the Afghan Peoples number one demand proved impossible. As you just put it, very clearly, even after that, even after we recommitted, we consistently prioritized counterterrorism over counter corruption. The result of that was that terrorism flourished. Terrorism is in many ways a response in afghanistan. A response to anger about corruption. And the consistent promising of the American People that this could be done in a one or two year time frame and not being honest about what it would take. That is where we have been. There have also been gains. Your job is to look at the problems. Afghanistan today is a different country from the failed state that it was in 2001. People do not want to go back. Anyone who has been to afghanistan knows that. Let me ask you looking forward, what happens to his this work that you are evaluating and urging us to improve if we precipitously withdraw . If our military were to perhaps, in response to a tweet from somebody, just get up and leave . Mr. Sopko we have not done an exact study on it. Based on all of our work and what people are telling me, i was just there over christmas, ive gone four times a year since i started this job. If the military, if our military precipitously leaves, the Afghan Military is going to have a hard own fighting on their without our support. We dont do the bulk of the fighting. They do it. We do a lot of support. Particularly in the air. We do a lot of support for that and with the special forces. You would have a very bloody stalemate continuing but probably declining. Cut funding,tously my prediction, and it is just my prediction, we have not done a study on it, the government would fall. Do you see that the perception that this might happen is having an impact on choices that afghans are making . Have we seen capital flight . People deciding, i will take my money, sell my property and my business, move my money to send my kids to another country, because i dont have confidence that the support is going to continue over the longterm. Mr. Sopko we have not done a study on it. From the afghans we have talked to, i have people who have been there for years. People are moving their families out of the country. I assume money is going with it. Weve seen a bit of an uptick in theft of fuel and all of that. Thats what happened the last time when we thought there was a draw down. Everybody is stealing what they can before we leave. That, we have seen. That is a problem. Do you have any confidence that there can be a Peace Agreement or a powersharing with the taliban that would enable us to continue honest, corruption Free Development work in afghanistan . Mr. Sopko it would be difficult but it is something you are hoping the taliban cares about. That is the difficulty of this negotiation. The taliban are involved in a of illegality beyond killing us. They are involved in the drug trade. What happens after that . They are involved in extortions, kidnapping, stuff like that. Its a fullservice criminal organization. On top of being a terrorist. I dont know how that will work. I would conclude by saying, this is obviously difficult and complicated. In all these years, there is one thing that we have not tried in afghanistan. We have tried everything else. The one thing we have not tried is to simply say, we are committed. Were not leaving. I wonder what impact it would have if we were to simply say to the Afghan People what we have said to the south korean people, to the german people, to the others, that whatever the nature of our presence, we will not pack up and leave. I think im out of time. Mr. Sopko thank you. Thank you. Representative titus . Rep. Titus as ive listened and read through some of the testimony, it seems to me a couple of things stand out in addition to that excellent summary that was just given. One thing, to use some of the jargon, instead of ordering the green spots, we seem to keep rewarding bad behavior. Instead of helping those that are more secure, we keep investing those that are insecure. Why is that the case . How do we change that . Our whole pattern seems to be buying results. We will give you some money if you will do this. I think you noted some religious leaders who adopted some attitudes towards women if we gave them a nice financial package. Once we have established that as our pattern, how do we break it . Are there any other kinds of incentives that are noncash that we can be using so that the commitment to the kind of things we are trying to encourage is not just shortterm or superficial, but is really more ingrained . Mr. Sopko answering your first question about this timeline, i get how you phrased it rep. Titus water in the green spot. Mr. Sopko yes. A lot of that comes from our stabilization report. This was driven by the timeline of the troop withdrawal. That our troops there wanted to try to get as much of the territory free of taliban before we knew they were leaving. That was shortsighted. They did clear a lot of places. But there was nothing to come in behind it. That is what was driving that train. That is having timelines issued from here, not based on the reality on the ground. As for the second question, i dont know what you are referring to on the specifics of that. What it is is conditionality. We are Firm Believers in conditionality. One is a carrot, the other is a stick. We call it smart conditionality. The one thing is to say if you do this, i will give you more money. The other thing is, once you do it, i will take something away from you. That is who you are dealing with. If you know that the people on the other side want their kids to go to school at nyu, they have to get a visa. They have to get into the United States. That is the conditionality you can give that is not exactly monetary. I will give you a classic example. We rebuilt the office of the minister of defense, the minister of interior. He wanted an office as big as the minister of interior. We went in and build him an office. He did not like it. He totally ripped it out and rebuilt another one. It was comparable. They feel happy, they look the same and all that. We spent hundreds of thousands of dollars. I remember asking a commander after we had done that. We built an office, ripped everything out, sent u. S. Taxpayer dollars to make it look pretty again. What did you get for that . He had no idea what i was talking about. I said you just did a favor for him. What did you get . Did you get him, maybe he will fight corruption in some area . That is smart conditionality. That is knowing who you are dealing with. That is a way we can proceed. We have not done that too much. We are right now asking for what type of conditions were imposed on the funds to the Afghan Military. If im not mistaken, theyre refusing to give us their current conditions. By they i mean the u. S. Government officials. Rep. Titus i serve on the house of democracy partnership. Afghanistan has been a partner since 2016. We have very difficult time engaging with them. I think it goes back to the point that you made, early on you said, successful reconstruction is incompatible with continuing insecurity. That is just one example of how true that is. Mr. Sopko correct. Rep. Titus thank you for your testimony. I yield back. Thank you mr. Sopko. That concludes our witnesses. You have any closing comments you want to make . Mr. Sopko thank you very much for giving us this time. This is very helpful for you and also the American People. Thank you to our members of congress and also to our witness. Thank you for your candor and hard work on these issues. The hearing is concluded. The committee stands adjourned. [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2020] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2020] cspans washington journal, live every day with news and policy issues that impact you. , nebraskang republican congressman Jeff Fortenberry joins us to discuss border wall funding and trade policy. Then Wisconsin Democratic congresswoman glenmore will be with us to talk about wisconsin as a campaign 2020 state. Be sure to watch washington journal live at 7 00 eastern this morning. Join the discussion. Live thursday on the cspan networks, at 9 00, the u. S. House returns to debate a measure that would overturn an Education Department rule on student loan forgiveness. Cspan2, at 9 45, the senate takes up the u. S. Canada mexico trade agreement. A vote is expected at 11 00. The impeachment trial president begins at noon. Now house3, Speaker Nancy Pelosi holds her weekly briefing. Tuesday, tate reeves was sworn in as mississippis 65th governor and delivered his inaugural ads