Welcome assistant secretary of defense from Homeland Defense and Global Security that is a very long title in Lieutenant GeneralDeputy Commander of United States special Operations Command thank you for appearing before us today the hearing comes at an important time or we are witnessing a craze in the proliferation of wmds and terrorist organizations that present a growing threat to National Security. While we are familiar with and concerned by those capabilities of the program we should be mindful of the efforts to expand the chemical and biological weapons capabilities the Washington Post reported that north korea is moving steadily to acquire the machinery that could potentially be used for an advanced bio Weapons Program from factories by the time by laboratory specializing in genetic modification. Similarly isis has demonstrated its ability to develop to use chemical weapons in iraq and syria as spiders flee the region we must be aware of the potential for Technical Knowledge to spread additionally new reports of syrian dictator continued use of chemical agents like serotonin with attacks against his own people all of these developments show the Global Nature of the wmd threat to underscore the need for a global strategy to combat the threat the most recent dod strategy was released june of 2014. As i have just laid out the scope and complexity of the problem has only increased this requires the dod to reassess its strategy to ensure we are postured appropriately with organization and authority in capabilities to most effectively confront this threat to mitigate existing ones to responding in the event of an incident and then to provide the subcommittee with their candid assessment as well as provide recommendations on any changes to the current approach that may be warranted. Additionally the preferences to deal with the threat before reaches the shores we must be prepared to respond quickly and effectively to the wmd event in the homeland. While dod is not the lead organization in particular the National Guard plays a key role to civil authorities like the fema or department of Homeland Security and local authorities. We would appreciate an update on planning and efforts in the event of a wmd attack on the homeland and lastly it has been over one year since the Campaign Plan was updated with the responsibility to synchronize the mission which entails drafting a new global Campaign Plan establishing intelligence priorities and monitoring Global Operations generally look to you to provide an update how so, is managing the new responsibilities to date and the description of any issues that could challenge the ability of socalled to successfully execute this Important Mission. Thanks for being here this afternoon we look forward to your testimony on this topic i will call on my Ranking Member to make his opening statement. When all else fails, improvise. [laughter]. Ranging from nonproliferation programs that help set International Norm and export controls to other efforts designed to stop the development of wmd by noncooperative nations. Assistant secretary, your portfolio includes response abilities for these efforts, and i look forward to better understanding how they are achieving their objectives and also what challenges they may be encountering. U. S. Special operation commanders played a key role in supporting the dod role in countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction for more than 25 years now. As a force provider, to educate, train and equip special operators tasked with interdicting and rendering safe wmd, should they fall into the wrong hands. As a combatant command, theyve also been tasked with synchronizing dod global plan in operation or in countering wmd. Today i hope the witnesses will share their views on how they are fulfilling these critical responsibilities, while also retaining its focus on countering violent extremist groups. As we all know, special Operation Forces are a finite resource, and it is important that we maintain sufficient readiness to address any contingencies and bees do fail counter wmd missionaries. I look forward to the testimony. We will go ahead and start over with this testimony. Why dont we start with you. The regime has increased a behavior and continued to Test Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missiles in violation of multiple Un Security Council resolutions. With the chemical weapons by both the regime and the islamic state. Further eroding o the International Norms against the use. With expertise in material that can be used for both peacefully and military purposes to heighten the risk that adversaries to acquire wmd. Its never been more difficult to prevent adversaries from acquiring the materials or expertise necessary to develop wmd. The speed, the unit coverage means the naturally occurring pathogens. Itits what they delivered a biological attack. They keep up with and adapt to the current threats. The department of state and department of justice play a Critical Role in detecting threats. Both domestic and overseas activities and works closely with allies and partners to the wide range of threats that exist today. Close cooperation with the other departments and agencies and allies and partners are crucial for the efforts to encounter operationally significant risks and activities for mitigating the threats of the source preventing them from reaching the homeland and when necessary responding militarily. The Department Strategic approach to the mission focuses on three lines of effort. The dual use materials to and from the Department Works closely with interagency partners to encourage states to impede and stop the shipments including through efforts to build capacities and International Norms and obligations to the Proliferation Security Initiative. Despite the best efforts at prevention, we must be prepared to reduce threats once they develop. The posture to isolate and identify and neutralize and dispose once we reached the borders. They do not use them against the United States or allies and partners. To work with International Allies and partners to hold the regime accountable for using chemical weapons we remain concerned about the reports of ongoing use and will continue to ensure the president has all the options available to respond if necessary. In addition to contain and reduce th the threat from isis,e u. S. And our Coalition Partners continue to exploit opportunities on the ground to better understand and to disrupt the networks. Ultimately should be efforts to contain and reduce threats fail and an adversary attack against the United States or our allies the department of defense top military priority is to respond and to prevent future attacks. This may require forces to operate in a contaminated environment which makes it critical that we safeguard ports and insured u. S. Personnel to sustain effective operations in the event of the war or other contingencies. In asia for example the dod is working with key regional allies the republic of korea and japan to ensure our forces remain prepared to respond to the cbo contention is on or emanating from the korean peninsula. Elsewhere, complementing those engagements, they prepared the program to equip the partner nations to enhance the capabilities to respond to and mitigate the effect of the cern incident. For the domestic incident at home while most incidents begin and end locally, significant events such as a wmd attack would require the jurisdiction from the state governments and if necessary the federal government. The response elements continuously train and exercise. While the largescale attack is something we hope will never occur we cannot be complacent or wait until a threat is imminent to act. The complexity of this area requires a whole government approach and strong unity of effort. I work closely with the joint staff and Combatant Commanders and other components to ensure the department prioritizes the efforts for the unique authorities, resources and capabilities to protect the nation. Theyve brought a renewed focus and sense of enthusiasm to this mission is. The plans to the operational efforts. In closing we must anticipate our adversaries will continue to evolve and develop increasingly sophisticated methods. If they would be rigorous and prioritize its efforts and work closely with other departments and agencies and International Partners to continue to confront the threat posed at home and abroad. The related challenges continue to emerge and continued support for the departments efforts described for the ability to understand, anticipate and mitigate the threats thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and i look forward to your questions. It is an honor to testify with the policy of strategic guidance for the department of defense to support the countering weapons of mass destruction or wmd. During the testimony to the full Senate Armed ServicesCommittee Last february, general thomas outlined the u. S. Special Operations Command with the initial goal for the new role following the change of january, 2017. With other u. S. Government agencies as well as allies and partners working in this space. For the u. S. Special Operations Forces to execute counter wmd tasks. To broaden the scope of responsibility for the Operation Forces specific roles for the planning of the department of defense counter wmd efforts and support of other combatant commands, department of priority is and as directed other u. S. Government agencies. Other coordinating authorities that have been established this enables a more strategic approach to enhanced integration of department of defense plans and intelligence priorities. The establishment of the coordinating authority we focus on three major areas of effort. First, we are developing a Campaign Plan in coordination with the geographic combatant commands you to the plan takes a trans regional perspective and the sizes of the new development and existing programs. Second, weve conducted a Baseline Assessment to determine geographical combatant command counter wmd capabilities and capacities. The intelligence planning and assessments to this end weve established a counter wmd Fusion Center dedicated to the planning and using intelligence operations providing the community. While much progress has been made in the past year, a tremendous amount of work remains to finalize and implement these efforts. Other Combatant Commanders and the rest of the counter wmd community. They are opened with questions and even if we are giving those in fiveminute iterations shall we be joined by other members of the subcommittee we will remind their questions as well. I would like to start with you. Which wmd threat concerns you most at this stage based on your work within the department and your insight across the inner agencies . Thank you, senator. I think it depends on th filter that you look through. North korea is a primary concern in the department and the combination of destabilizing behaviors and very aggressive Testing Programs and statements about the nuclear Weapons Program and capabilities give cause for great concern, an ande have a lot of efforts focused on that. I think we also put a lot of concerted in terms of that evolving capability beyond the focus that you are familiar with on the National Defense strategy as they are developing missiles and capabilities of un security resolutions and are a threat we are monitoring closely. Then finally in terms of development that creates growing concern over time. Its ubiquitous availability of biotechnology today. You can do a paint by numbers instruction in the province of the nobel prizewinning scientists only decades ago. Its for those that can present a real threat. You mentioned the nuclear test and we followed that with great interest, but something we just dont talk about a loss that was pointed out in the Washington Post ive mentioned in my remarks is north korea acquiring different mechanical pieces that potentially could allow them to develop chemical or biological weapons. We are focused on developing weapons sierra trekking that very closely and there are a variety of export controls to which we look to limit the export and further proliferation of agents of particular concern we do have concerns about the biotechnology and the ability to innovate the agency to develop an without that kind of stock. Secretary or general, what we talked about in the nationstates, we know they have a capability out there. What are some of these assessments when it comes to the various terrorist organizations in order reporting isis do they have the ability to deliver this type of weapons . We understand that both al qaeda and isis are interested in Chemical Biological. Nuclear, they certainly would be if they had an opportunity to acquire the material and the knowhow. Part is to allow a model made the state on state actors to look at the threats if yo you wl in the vertical column columns n the functional Campaign Plan crosscuts those so we can observe where the Technology Transfer may occur between state and nonstate actors and working in a geographical location or functional capacity. So we try to weave that into the translation of the strategy and policy to the tactical application of introduction in order to basically reinforce the larger efforts that are in place. Thank you very much, senator heinrich. I want to go back to the issue that you were talking about and rapid innovation with respect to biological resources. Its never occur to the field before. Are there things we should be thinking about now that can create some level of obstruction or raised their ear race. As to the entry to make sure that we are doing an adequate job of what we apply with respect to export controls and other tools and other fields. How can we make sure we are not just missing some very big developments that could be happening under our nose with offtheshelf internet purchase items . That is something we are very focused on what our interagency partners and in turn, there are a number of forms in terms of internationally, nationally with regards to research being done in the area. Where you look to not do certain things but wellestablished norms that works great for the folks that follow the norms. We showed sort of track and Trace Technology to make sure people are following the standards. I didnt come prepared to speak in details about that today. The research is going on all over the world and its not like more select research is only being done in highly developed nations. Its proliferated to where it is being done at places that would have been unimaginable decades ago. I think we need to put some thought into this because this is a situation that feels like it could get ahead of all of us very quickly. I want to shift gears for a minute and ask you, general, with respect to special forces and how theyve led the effort in places like syria and iraq and raining and development of chemical or biological weapons from groups like isis, these are specialized missions tailored for the stock opportunities that i wanted to ask how would they prefer this sort of mission in a more conventional force environment where you have a different battle space then you would in iraq were serious and ialot of heavily secured wmd sites, just trying to get without a specific understanding i want to know how you apply the missions in a more traditional battle space environment. I think i would answer that from the standpoint of reactive or proactive approach. When you look at the proactive ways of being able to interdict things like that it is associated with a pathway approach ambiguity alluded to that in one of your Opening Statements of the components of different types that are required as a precursor to with missile or other type of activities. So, understanding pathways is important and i guess when i would look at that from what weve done in iraq and syria for state actor. We could easily translate the Human Capital associated with these things and that becomes an opportunity for targeting would be genetically or non kinetically, so i think there are a lot of similar things in that way that can be done. When it comes to secure facilities if it have to get back with you on that. But the approach is very similar in the sense that there are ways the Human Capital resourcing and Technology Associated in these type of things. The fusion to understand what is the indication of the warning that things may be coming along and have you matrixed up with the different threats that are out there versus the viability of the threat. Thank you for your testimony. How do we describe the weapons of mass destruction . Splenic that is the great question. When you look at the domestic law of thlaw of the department e defines the weapon of mass destruction from a firecracker to a thermonuclear bomb. We have a much higher threshold, so it is a weapon that causes significant effects, but you still see a wide range should which is an Industrial Chemical that can be used and has been used as a chemical weapon and it doesnt have near the level of effect of nerve gas and other agents, so it is a pretty wide spectrum but essentially, a Chemical Biological agent or a Nuclear Device that creates significant consequence. Do we consider Cyber Attacks as the weapon of mass destruction . Who we have not defined to date how to use the term wmd. We havent defined that include cyber. I know it is the Nuclear Posture review that contemplated there might be situations in which the massive use of Cyber Attacks could result in a Nuclear Response to. Should we be thinking of those as hypertext . By reading doesnt include tv could defy cyber use. If its any use of any technique that would be extreme and disastrous for the nation. Anything that might produce that sort of bee them has to be prety disruptive so should we be thinking of cyber in the way that we are thinking about these other weapons of mass destruction because they have the potential to create the same amount of chaos and brutality fatalities. The challenge with that is a cyber domain for which there are zero negative effects all the way that could be high potenti potential. We dont have a welldefined body of law and response practically, response is the wrong term, but we dont have a proactive way to address the potential of Cyber Attacks and that that is part of what makes it difficult for us to figure out how to categorize. I believe the challenge, whether it is for cyber or other avenues of attack is what is a threshold that will pour into the response and the consequence that i believe is the deciding factor to determine the level of significance that would be. I dont think that that respono the question im raising. I want to get to another issue around cyber because i appreciated the response to my inquiry regarding the work the department does with it companies into the issue around sharing sensitive source code data with russia and other governments. I wonder if you can tell me why they dont require companies to disclose information about whether they have released their source code information and whether we should be doing that. I dont come here to todays hearing with details on that, but i can get those answers for you. I would appreciate that, thank you. We will start the second round of questioning. Can you in an open setting can you describe what those are and what are those differences . Theres a range of defenses on the weapons used in but the consequences of the effects starting with the inclusive resilience to deny the adversaries and intended benefit of the u. S. Use, so the better defended or the more resilient less inclination. Active military operations or a range of other activities that are not necessarily connecticut military operations from the whole of government perspective sanctions or diplomatic actions and there are financial penalties getting into the military space and a whole range of force brings to the capabilities for response. As does secretary o the secrd defense and Homeland Security, do you coordinate a how is the dod posture to respond to an incident in the homeland . And can you give us an example and walk us through that we have a response enterprise that is almost 19,000 combinations of National Guard and title x military who are formed into a variety of teams we have the civil support teams and the enhanced Response Teams with a different mix of capabilities that go from contamination detection, but medical effects and ground transportation, the whole package that can be integrated into either command by the state National Guard and at least one theme in every state where they can be authorized in the title of number ten in the command. I appreciate, and thank you for the shout out. I am familiar with cfp existing in the iowa National Guard as well. We have the army National Guard combine forces and they work very proactively, but just for the public information, can you describe the proactive stance on where they might be stationed in these large events perhaps they were around the super bowl this past weekend just so people understand how to utilize the teams. We use them on a routine basis, starting with the National Special security event and the super bowl. These will be pre deployed in the activities for which there may be some concern which they will be the target of a the attk that may include wmd and they are prepared to respond. I appreciate that and just to make it clear to the public, we are not just reactive but we are also very proactive in making sure the republic is safe here on the homeland, so things you very much for that. We will go on to senator sullivan if you would like the opportunity to ask some questions. I dont know if the chair already asked it, so if she did i apologize for the repetition. The. I think for an a Broad NationalSecurity Mission we might be going after isis for a couple of more years or al qaeda but as long as we are republic, the counter wmd mission might be the most Important Mission in the u. S. Military and we want to make sure that its resource and made sense to transfer but im sure the transition has been flawless. The transition and assumption is a very close and Good Relationship with u. S. Strength, and was well coordinated and defined and frankly everyone came to the table with an understanding, a basic understanding of what the requirements were, so before the assumption in the mission we worked through all that and we are at a point right now where the way the plan was to set up was at the oneyear mark we are at right now we would reevaluate how things were over the last year do we have the right people and the right places and resources aligned to the mission. We are close to what we need to. We probably need to tweak it internally to optimize it, but everyone was very supportive of that so any Additional Resources weve put into the budgeting cycle we are confident in as well as the authorities right now everything is moving along well, so no problems with the geographical combatant commands and hoping to work with them. If i could just add having been someone in my career, they bring a unique blend of experience, skills, capabilities and relationships that make it uniquely well equipped in terms of the relationship with the operational equipage of the capabilities necessary. They have a visceral appreciation from the experience and then working the entire threat to the consequence management and focusing the department on those areas that we have the most impact on getting that wmd. Those in my capacity here and then as you know in my reserve we spent a lot of time focused on this issue and just recently within the last six months theyve both been exercised at the very largescale the confidencconference and more tan nature. They have those that are classified or unclassified but you could share with the committee having good visibility on how things are developing at what you see as strengths and weaknesses. We definitely have the after action seemed we use those to feed the successive iterations in the case of field exercises we are just those in stride based on the emerging threats that are out there so in a closed session where we get the classified information. Adam chair, on the network that they have developed a there are a lot of us who are very curious on how much, an and divt him of the Intel Community on this issue, but how much the north korean proliferation network has helped with regards to know what they are looking at in terms of precipitation. Particularly with regards to the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile testing. Its hard to believe that that is all organic investments because they made a lot of advancements of only on the nuclear side of the missile site. Do we have the sense that its better for a classified session are they getting help on the outside with regards to how quickly they are advancing a. I would say in the open session this is something that we and the rest of the Intelligence Community are intensely focused upon a. Thank you senator heinrich. Would you still consider them a threat even in that scenario because obviously this is about talent is not just yours and intellectual capacity. What is your analysis of that at this point . My analysis is just that they are still a threat to put it simply. We are looking at intense infrastructure. Weaponization, delivery systems. Theyve demonstrated not only that capability over time, but even as they lose, those individuals that have the Technical Knowledge and frankly it is not one that would undermine the ability to continue to pursue weapons of mass destruction. One of our greatest challenges in the biological wmd is being able to develop vaccines and other potential specialized medicines and pharmaceuticals for the troops or for populations that are impacted by those and when they begin to emerge, there is a dod that have gone through the full process. There is not an obvious way to scale them in many ways and we have found partners to do that. Have you thought about how to address this so that we dont get caught behind in the way that we do with the ebola crisis . We worked over at dhs to help the threats from occurring and to sink the research with them to make sure we are covering the full landscape on what is naturally occurring and what could perhaps be justified or developed from belittlement use. That is difficult because you need a databas that base in tere manufacturing base. We have done that in certain areas and it if its been more challenging but that is a priority that is reflected in the still drafts complete National Bio Defense strategy. It seems to be setting these aside for a moment even with these outbreaks but we typically havent had the capacity to be able to manufacture things and we may know through the research was made or may not work but getting that back to scale in any meaningful way we just dont have a mechanism to do that right now. I have a few seconds left and then i will turn over to my colleagues. Can you talk just a little bit, from either of you talking about how the communities collaborate across their wmd mission in terms of how do you bring all the different talents agencies together, you mentioned the Fusion Center. Center. But what has worked when it comes to effectively leveraging international in place. I will take a start about and then handed over to the general. When you look at the spectrum of activities all the way from intent and desire through the usage response it is a very wide spectrum and when we look at any one agency including the department of defense and the roles and responsibilities and authorities and capacity to scope there is no one that can do it all and if you start to specialize and say what tools and techniques and weapons can be applied to getting boost return on investment with denying responded so if you start all the way from the left of the pathways, that is primarily export control driven into understanding what the pathways are so that is the department of commerce and parts of the state but there are still opportunities so for example, they are operating with partner nation and they think very differently than they do here. Some of them manage export controls and developing an understanding of the individuals characters, leaders and what their level of interest is. In aland all forms of composited understanding so for example what they are doing in the Fusion Center is just improving that integration of intelligence but from a national and military intelligence perspective. As you go from the right from the frigid use to respond the activities to get touch more connecticut both in terms of military and as well as the dynamics of the response which need to be an integrated whole of government response, we are very focused in the past several years the National Scale events and nuclear so that is a major challenge and the probably achieved that effort in crisis from realtime but we are making progress in that area as well. Senator sullivan. Thank you, madam chair. I want to get back to come and again we touched on this i apologize. In terms of countries whose governments that you see as the biggest threat from the perspective of the counter wmd threats, which ones would you put in the top category . From a strategic perspective. A country that has the capability of the history of proliferation. We need to start with the countries that have existential wmd capabilities and that is russia and china. With regards to proliferation too bad actors or russia for example north korea clearly helped to build a nuclear reactor. Have we seen s for the proliferation concern, depending if you are talking about the dual use commodities i it is more mixed but its not always clear where those items are going, whether they were going to the wmd program or a conventional program, but iran and syria as are two very significant actors in terms of proliferating technologies and iran has done it if ther if theres a number r countries that have consumed if she was issues. On the plaintiff north korea, i wouldnt say in the context that proliferating wmd per se a dual use peace is a lot more gray. It is a concern, but depending how you want to draw a threshold are they knowingly and deliberately looking to provide the capability to another actor again that is better left to the closed session. The Iran Nuclear Deal in the United States has enabled us to take our eye off the proliferation threat because of the fact of the agreement. That is not the current view of the military or others. It was a shocking statement. I actually couldnt believe where somebody had mentioned because the agreement now that i was very opposed to, we dont have to look at them with regards to so much of a proliferation, Nuclear Development problem. To me that has been corrected by just want to get that out there. That is not the view of this administration or the u. S. Military. Let me ask one final question. We have the secretary testified in front of the full committee and the National Defense strategy which i think he got a lot of bipartisan compliments on it for the thoughtfulness of the document for what its focus is, but in particular one of the areas of focus in the document is the emphasis on our allies with regards to our National Security strategy and in this effort, the ally participation with regards to the wmd seemed really important. Are we getting cooperation and then do we have regular consultations with our allies or other bilateral allies that have similar capabilities that we have in terms of the counter wmd or is there more we can help to encourage these countries to coordinate more with our efforts . We have a variety of programs. Ive mentioned the a number of proliferation programs that were developing capacity on the part of allies to operate in the environment were in terms of understanding the dual use commodities and potential risks we are working with them for example of the National Pressure campaign with regards to the ship heads to korea so we are very active. The secretary is very serious about partnerships being a critical element. From the secretary you heard it from him and that Partnership Component is a mainstay. Thank you madam chair. I want t to followup on thaa little bit because i understand that we are participating under the Proliferation Security Initiative and that works with our International Partners for the wmd related items. Can you talk about that a little more than you just did with senator sullivan and also talk about its importance in addressing situations like north korea in terms of the potential to interdict shipments of Nuclear Related materials . Dot Proliferation Security Initiative is not an operational coordination process. Its about developing a common understanding in the prioritization of proliferation consequences and impacts and working together. What flows from that often times are operational coordination for example the ships at sea, but that isnt done per se. Its not about having that worldwide cooperation. And it happens bilaterally into small groups had another topic that would be best addressed in a closed hearing. With respect to its importance in addressing the situation in north korea, can you speak to that in this open session . We have a growing number of part tears and allies who are looking to cooperate with us on addressing illicit shipments including ship to ship. Does that include states like russia and china . I wouldnt go into detail in the session talking about individual relationships and agreements at this point. As you have both pointed out, we have a multitude of threat around the world. Kim you talk about how the military assesses the threat and the resources tha it would reque to respond . Yes, senator. This describes the framework. Most of the suspects are addressed in the functional Campaign Planning so we look at it in a wide variety of criteria from what is the tent to what is the ability all the way through that and from the trans regional perspective, some of the threat is how are they looking to the fashion and is it a singular mode or the viability of chemicals that may be capable of producing or as was mentioned earlier, the biological agent aspect of things etc. So that is basically how we get into the assessment of that risk is really what we do is define that prioritization if you will of threat and then as i mentioned, naturist up with the actors that are out there to kind of come up with recommendations through the department about how do we prioritize. But that is about it. In the force capability within the ability to operate in that environment. You were talking earlier about the question of isis and whether they continue to have that capacity to inflict major damage through the wmd. You talked about that and we have all read the reduction of their caliphate if they are on the run. Thereve been several news reports recently that talked about the fact there are significant numbers who gone underground and are reappearing in other places an it has the potential to organize. Since we found about and that is how isis reconstituted itself what are we doing about that and how much of a concern about th that. Even though atlarge there are a number of people basically moving to the counterinsurgency the actual number of individuals that are associated with the wmd production, and this goes back to your additional question about what is wmd. The ability is that really wmd, so it is a very finite Technical Capability issue and they are generally not frontline fighters. These are folks that were not necessarily easy to track but once weve been working on for a number of years. That is where my concern is that where we watch closely to make sure they are not leaving that area of operation perhaps becoming an export threat to the United States. Thank you madame chair. I believe we have time for one more round of questions, so if we can maybe just ask one final question in the last round and then wrap up the subcommittee hearing. I appreciate the discussion about the different agencies you interact with whether it is the department of energydepartment d security, other entities being the junior senator from the great state of iowa, one might t didnt hear was the usda and one thing we do not often discuss is the fact that we want to protect the Human Capital that part of that is also protecting our stocks here in the United States. We have had an active discussion in the committee about offshore vaccine banks for things like foot and mouth disease that butt impact agriculture at large with livestock and other diseases that could be introduced into the play of the varieties of agriculture. What are the discussions when it comes to working with the usda and protecting agriculture . That was a major omission on my part for the lead federal agencies and threats to agriculture livestock and they play a very preventable because that is a critical commodity in terms of the commodity in the populations needs. So they are a part of that team and a core member of the team helping to evaluate the threats to agriculture and developing approaches either to forestall or respond to events that threaten u. S. Ag. To my understanding, it is just about there but i dont have the latest. The reason being we are hoping to use that with the 2019 budget. Thank you madam chair one final . The interagency cooperation which i am sure we all would agree is essential to defeating the networks those proliferation networks. In terms of this mission, is there sufficient cooperation between the Intel Community department of energy and department of agriculture with statutory improvements we could help you with to make sure the mission . I dont see any statutory obstacle and in my experience the Interagency Community is very collaborative and works very well together we are constantly looking for ways to improve the process to focus and prioritize those threats and also looking ahead involving technology and actors to understand or those threats will come from so i would say from my perspective to say we are on the right road but we have to improve. If i can add on to that with the functional areas with the military to be honest i have never found a community that works more closely together literally an open door everywhere you go not only interagency but also from the allied perspective. Some of those tangible examples were routinely meeting with the organizations collaborative collaborative working on tools with tangible technical means that from the allied perspective we actually bring in allied partners that come to participate so in my view it is a Tremendous Community and frankly to bring them together that is a big responsibility to coordinate that authority to bring everyone together with a concerted effort in a particular direction but that hasnt been the problem everybody is willing to help her just to get it moving in the same direction with positive responses so far. Things to my colleagues for coordinating this meeting for us today as well as secretary and general for your wonderful expertise and commitment to the men and women of the uniform service we look forward to see how it progresses during this transition and we look forward to working with you on any initiatives you deem necessary and we will conclude the subcommittee meeting and we will conclude the subcommittee meeting. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] committee memos and Robert Mueller investigation. Be 535. [inaudible conversations] good morning everybody. Our guest ifo