Transcripts For CSPAN2 Nuclear Posture Review Part 2 20180220

From. [inaudible] its my pleasure to moderate this discussion with a group of folks who are prime movers in the development of the nature posture review. I will introduce them in a moment. We are not calling this a panel. Each group will give us five or ten minutes. We will get some conversation for the group going. Most of you know the group and let me introduce rob the Deputy Assistant secretary for defense for Nuclear Defense policy. Greg weaver is strategic director for staff j5. He runs the Defense Program shop and anita is the acting assistant secretary from the bureau of arms control. Im very pleased we can gather this group and we are looking forward to the discussion. As i said we will start with introductory remarks from each of our guests and then we will go in the following order. Well start with greg and go to phil, anita and rob has asked to clean up today. Thats what well do. Greg over to you. Thank you. When i thought i would do in my brief remarks is give you all a little more insight into the approach that three departments took in conducting the Nuclear Posture review over the past year. It will emphasize what general height and said which is consistent with the National Defense strategy which is that this was a threat based and i would add strategy based review and ill talk a little bit about those. Ill talk about the approach we took and how we did that and then what i want to focus my brief time having the floor is giving you a little more understanding of the rationale behind what i guess is the most controversial recommendation of the Nuclear Posture review which is our recommendation to present, to acquire two additional capabilities that expand the range of low yield nuclear options. Let me start by walking you through how we did this review. When we were tasked by the president , the secretary was tasked with doing this review of the tasking we got said nothing about what the answer should be other than the purpose of the review was to ensure that the United States would end up having a Nuclear Deterrent that was effective in the 21st century and against 21st century threats. We started out by basically doing a very extensive intelligence deep dive and reaching out to other experts on what the 21st century environment looks like from the perspective of nuclear issues. that infrastructure has to be able to last and be effective for decades into the future. We cannot afford to modernize the force every ten years. We need to understand what the security environment look like that far out. In the review we started by say what has changed since 2010. They give a very good explanation of the observations were made about whats changed. We then asked the Intelligence Committee how far into the future to have confidence to project the environment. It wasnt far enough for our purposes. Then we had to look at the on the timeframe was the nature of the uncertainty associated with the future security and how can we hedge against that as we develop strategy and capability. Once we get the deep dive that we did a comprehensive review given what we learned led to the Nuclear Weapons need to be in our Nuclear Strategy now and in the future. They are very explicitly laid out not to go into it they are you have read it but we were determined to be explicit about the role speak is the next step was once we have determined what the roles need to be we needed to decide what the strategy was to enable Nuclear Weapons to fulfill those roles. We then did a comprehensive strategy review i looked across the entire world and took a tailored approach of looking at strategy adversary including iran as a potential nuclear adversary. We develop tailored strategies but unclassified and classified. Only then which was about three quarters of the way through the review to return to capabilities. We literally did not look at what capabilities we would require until we got through the steps. Got into those capabilities we said given the strategies the roles they supported an environment, first we looked at is the program of record is on the books sufficient to support the strategies weve laid out we have concluded for the most part it was. But the comprehensive modernization of the force was sufficient to fulfill that strategy. One area we were not confident the program of record was sufficient was as a result of the russian Strategy Nuclear capability. So let me turn to the explanation of why we made the explanation to add a low euro capability to a small limited of warheads. And then a recommendation to field nuclear arms Cruise Missile in the future. We express implications and the growing disparity in Nonstrategic Nuclear capabilities between russia, the United States and nato. Its not only replacing but expanding them in numbers and types. We concluded there are real indication our current strategy capability are perceived as potentially inadequate to from deterring them from doing two things, initiating Nuclear Strikes to curse nato in a nuclear war and the second to make wider use of weapons to defeat conventional forces that their efforts to course fails. We also concluded given the stresses on russias National Defense and investment they would not be expanding their limited resources to modernize and expand their forces if they had little or no confidence in that, the reason why the russians were rational actors why invest in the strategy they had no confidence in. Was to the people know that nobody can objectively determine precisely what capabilities are required to deter potential adversary. Anyone that tells you they can do that is an amateur, thats not the nature of deterrence. Ultimately its not adversary perceptions. It doesnt really matter if we think our capabilities should be sufficient, we need to look for indications that is not the case. We were on comfortable that question that was the answer the russians were coming to giving the difference between what they say what they are doing. We also think its prudent to air on the side of having more rather than less capability. As long as we dont create new counterproductive threats. We do not believe the two capabilities. Reporter and added to the portfolio does that. They do not threaten the Russian Strategic Nuclear Deterrent in some way that it is not already threatened. We concluded the recommendation we made was sound imprudent. Let me go further, what were trying to do is redo reduce russian confidence the current display or dn range of low yield options in the two sides increases the risk of deterrence failure to appoint we needed additional action. Russian modernization is increasing that disparity in increasing that risk of deterrence failure. Let me make it clear. Reducing their confidence does not mean they match their capabilities and quantity or diversity. Natos strategy doesnt have the same role. Nato will no longer compass site for conventional inferiority by reliance on Nuclear Weapons nato does require a wider range of credible low yield Response Options to convince the russians but our response would tonight the objectives they seek and oppose cause that outweigh those benefits they could achieve. Additional those paired with the rest of the Modernization Program are designed to do that to reduce confidence in moscow in the strategy. The man emphasized that we do not see these capabilities is lowering them in the threshold. I will make a u. S. Response to russia more credible and raise the Russian Nuclear threshold the purpose of these capabilities is to make a u. S. Response more credible. Its a response. That doesnt lower our threshold for first use, it raises theirs. When attack briefly about specific capabilities we recommended and why. Recommendation to rapidly fill the low range missile is to provide a nearterm and inexpensive augmentation of our ability to credibly strike anything with russia. The your low yield launch would be survivable, prompt and strike targets heavily defended against their delivery. Were moving to modernize ours but the existing technology is aging. Fielding the capability want to increase the number of weapons or take us over the new start limits. Nsfs its reducing the make it tonnage a recommendation to pursue this to provide a longerterm response to the continuing expansion of the Nuclear Forces to enhance deterrence in the future. We provide a. Caller u. S. President with a wider range of credible options to respond to russian first use. If they were to agree to arms control measure u. S. Might be willing to agree or to limit or forgo the nuclear launch. Finally a nuclear see launch missile would provide a regional presence without requiring alice to field u. S. Nuclear weapons on their territory. Thats a summary of the rationale we had and how we got to that conclusion. Morning pleased to be here with my colleagues and im pleased to have the opportunity to talk about the npr the main point i want to underscore is the 2018 npr does not represent a significant departure from the work we are doing. Youve heard that from others to document that reflects continuity with their work over the past 3 5 years. With a couple of adjustments that greg mentioned response to the threat environment. It also applies to Nuclear Nonproliferation and counterterrorism before speak about the apia on highlight about the role of the National Security architecture to provide context for my remarks. There are three main missionaries. The largest is the Nuclear Activities in the role is to prevent in the third is to provide the navy with nuclear proportion. The weapons piece is about 40 of the department of energy budget. All of it is roughly 50 of doe. From the organization that is responsible for the safety, security and reliability, the stockpile. First we maintain the stockpile to routine maintenance and science based stewardship. We prepare for the future deterrent on the third we ensure we possess the capability the strategic material, infrastructure and people so were prepared to have future requirements and the including those we dont even envision right now this is meant to highlight what an essay plays a part of the deterrence all talk more about that in a minute is the largest that the enterprise had on its plate since the cold war and the npr did nothing to change that. [inaudible] is also going to supplement that workload in response to the changing threat environment. First to replace the w78 icbm warhead. We had a program on the books im about to the left, start a 19 to maintain alignment with the air force programs. The second item is to retain the gravity bob for longer than previously planned. The threat environment has changed. The u. S. Will modify a small number of existing warheads to provide a low yield option. Finally theyll work to pursue a nuclear see launch crews michelle. Theres been a lot of focus on the last two on that the other side of the coin is infrastructure the need to re all caps allies remind nice infrastructure clinton available through the mission. This is not a fiber tenure undertaking, the programs that will be around for many years. Much of the infrastructure and capability that was the best in the world and its time has atrophied since the cold war. A large portion day back to the manhattan project. As greg mentioned this npr was done were taken of fresh look at Delivery Systems when its critical we get the program started and completed because they will be with us for decades. There is no margin for further delay. There is been some items in the media about nuclear testing. Be clear about the policy, despite the Media Coverage there is no change to the policy. Although the u. S. Will not seek to ratify the comprehensive Nuclear Treaty we will continue to test that began in 1992. The effort will continue. Taking a step further there is but another media commentary about the Nuclear Test Readiness posture. Theres also no change it remains as it was largely since 1992 with minor changes. The cemetery does not reflect any change from that. Continuity is evident a secretary mentioned these are not mutually exclusive what the weapon side they are complementary, much of the expertise we put to use this link to the capability we have in the labs originally established for the weapons mission an effective deterrent there is a declining emphasis on the deterrent that minute declining emphasis on infrastructure. For the last five years you started the process to climb out of the hole were in. As he continued to respond to this its critical the nsa as part of that response this is the bedrock of the nations security. Part of that is the nsa infrastructure. Thank you. Thank you to the center for hosting us today. This dod led interagency review for Nuclear Policy has received a lot of attention and deservedly so. Its important to determine this discussion today and here at mdu to better understand the underpinning of the strategy that went into the npr. I want to interject some notes on the importance of education the fact that we are here today and that we have such a rich group of participants this is a phenomenal opportunity for a stub benefit. I also want to put in a plug for interns. And many other agencies and departments that ever rich interim program so, i will emphasize many of the opponents the speakers before me have made. They dared to be repeated. First and foremost just said the fact that while there certainly changes in the review theres much continuity. So i want to emphasize five points today. First, the 2018 Nuclear Posture review consisted of several decades of u. S. And now i think it friday Nuclear Weapons. At the same time any policy must take into account the real World Security environment i prepare for certain future. Certainly a point thats been said here today. Other has been cut annuity in our strategy each npr is a product of our time. Changes from 2018 to may 2010 as discussed on the security environment for decades the u. S. Took the lead and arms control hoping to set an example that others would follow since 2010 lucina return in a degradation of the overall security environment. These notable exchanges have been in the area of Nuclear Capabilities, were fighting doctrines on the actions and behaviors of three countries, russia, china, m. D. Dprk. Just because theres a different focus does not mean we have abandoned our control or abandon any of our commitments to the npt. I just means the reality is were in a different environment. Id also like to pull in our allies here. The u. S. Government view of the security situation is nonexclusive. We had more than 30 governments we consulted the grade the security environment since 2102nd it clearly calls for deterrence and assurance. They determined that they will keep up and remain effective will also tailor our response to those in respective regions. The United States extends deterrence over 30 allies. Each individual view therefore, our strategy must be built to deal with different security environments capabilities and alliance structures. As the npr emphasizes its based on collaboration with allies and partners to deter or defeat common threats. It includes ongoing allied dialogues to understand threats to perfection and to arrive at shared understanding to best align our capabilities. These are critically important. I would have to say its one of my great pleasures in honors that my job to work on these issues with allies. One thing i would like to highlight is the u. S. And japan my bureau is the state department lead for organizing undersecretary level u. S. Republic of korea deterrence strategy ill try not to use too many acronyms because i can keep track. Our beer pace pace to lead in the Defense Department would be the republic of korea. So the deterrence dialogue and the u. S. Republic of korea Deterrence Strategy Committee evolved from alliance consultations that informed the 2010 npr. This is the first time we brought in allison partners to ask what kinds of things they expected to see would like to see in the npr. Weve done this again and 2018 npr and quite successfully so. Since 2010 we have established the eds cg, the undersecretary deterrence with the republic of korea. And that was formed just last year to better coordinate and employ all of our elements of National Power visavis the north korean threat. The United States extended deterrence to ella during the most challenging part of the cold war and continue to do so now i will continue to do so in the future. Next, changes to our posture designed to ensure the United States Nuclear Threshold remains high. Only consider this an extreme circumstances with its allies and partners. Our aim is to clarify the circumstances to consider Nuclear Response to increase the ability we further note that the United States will not use or threaten to use Nuclear Weapons against nonnuclear states that are party to the pts and in compliance with the air obligation. The very same negative assurance in the 2010 npr. We are not lowering the u. S. Threshold, here seeking to raise the threshold for others. The president said in his february 2 statement this strategy develops capabilities aimed at making use of making Nuclear Weapons less likely the United States is not pursuing a new arms race. What were doing is to indicate the u. S. Can credibly deter and if necessary respond to threats of limited use by potential adversaries. The United States remain strongly committed to arms control. We will continue to use these Counterterrorism Measures to advance the security of the United States its allies and partners. The npr makes clear that theyll have a nuclear test in moratoria. Although the United States will not seek ratification we will continue to support the comprehensive test Preparatory Committee and specifically the International Monitoring system and the International Data system. Its a complex network to monitor nuclear test. The United States is committed to all of this and that includes undertaking article six obligation to pursue negotiation in good faith on effective measures towards nuclear disarmament. The u. S. Commitment to the article six and is also very clear the u. S. Stockpile is now down nearly 87 since the cold war peak that said you must take into account further security cap challenges that make Nuclear Weapons and deterrence necessary that enables further negotiations on Nuclear Weapons that the socalled ban treaty. This is why the United States opposes the ban treaty which conveniently has a stark reality including the importance of nuclear did attendance to provide political potential with democracies through a problem here is not changing the calculus so or modernizing or increasing their Nuclear Arsenals. Then actively seeking to under my national order. They do not address these very important points. No state with Nuclear Weapons will find the treaty it will not enhance the security of any state that does have the potential to further polarize the debate making future progress less likely, not more likely. We will continue to implement the new start treaty, the Modernization Program in the npr is consistent with the application we dont plan on with the forces. We remain committed to the intermediate forces treaty and are seeking russias return to verify compliance. We continue to engage russia diplomatically while also seeking to achieve this goal, to bring russia back with the inf treaty were seeking to encourage russia to engage and negotiate seriously but here we need willing partner we talked about the upswing in the nine strategic weapons. We work to address this issue but have not done so successfully it is a priority. Although this review addresses the challenges posed by russian child should not be meant that we are with napa serial relationship. We do not seek adversarial relationship we will continue to seek positive change when we can. We do not regard they says and we seek dialogue. These are challenges. As we address the challenges posed we want to deter aggression preserve peace and we support the goal but until that day comes and we can actually be there, we will protect the security of the United States, our allies and partners. This npr is a strong statement of our commitment to do that. Finding credible Nuclear Deterrence. I said i would like to do this panel as long as i didnt have to talk about whats in the npr. It has been the longest in history. You see versions of this in the Washington Post i thought i would be useful if i could explain the view from the trenches. Another policy veterans here and knows that its important but not sufficient. It makes no sense to come up with a beautiful strategy that cannot be implemented. I can give another perspective of how this is making this to take place. From my perspective there are three dimensions to this Nuclear Deterrence problem. One thing is to have enough to deter our adversaries. The most plausible scenarios. Second, is what were doing assuring our allies . In the third and often forgotten is how to remains teen support with our ally parliaments so its deterrence, assurance maintaining support. Look at the deterrence component we came to a conclusion that the program of record was not sufficient. Was mostly due to the growth in Nuclear Capabilities there Something Else going on, its nothing new tar analysis. We been worried about this for ten years probably longer. You may recall the treaty when Congress Gave its advice to ratify is said in its evolution that we would look to reinitiate. We digest the disparity between the russian the u. S. Large disparities et cetera. Then nonstrategic capability was for me a big driver. These are exercises in the expansion and you underlie that with geopolitical ambitions that led us to conclude that we had to do something more going to remind people that its not just a number of weapons. So we say that they have about 2000 tactical weapons is the type of capabilities. Gravity bonds why in the two and under water drawn that could blow away the system. We had to figure out why the russians are doing it. With respect to assurance, we thought we had to do more to assure our allies. We are concerned about when north korea was doing in russia and china. You see it as statements by parliamentarians. You see Public Opinions so we had to do something. So if we didnt we went assure our allies and there is a real concern and that would be good. Deterrence, assurance, and now maintaining support on capitol hill. As you are aware over the last two years it has been difficult for republicans and democrats to achieve consensus on anything. Thanks to the former Obama Administration officials we do have consensus to modernize they propose that congress has ratified that. So its important and what we did not want you to work carefully and understand whats here. The supplemental capabilities dont break any treaties are explained nuclear stockpile. And if youre one of them it doesnt cost a lot of money. These were choices that would do enough to bolster deterrence, assure our allies to maintain consensus on capitol hill. Thank you all. The minute take a few minutes to pose questions before turning it over to you with an important question. So please prepare your questions i want to key in what you said about maintaining support. What you see as the biggest challenge in with allies as well, can you give a sense of what youve heard from our nato allies and what you might hear the perspective there was support from the members of the alliance for review and they talk about this and what they appreciate most of the review it integrates deterrence the key thing in the npr and the key thing in the secretary of defense with respect to capitol hill, the supplemental capabilities will be our greatest challenge weve heard from senators who are opposed to no space on the huffington post. We will engage congress with their arguments. Theres something unique about this. Very often the administration will go to congress with respect to the sea launch missile weve been talking about a capability study that will lead to an analysis of alternatives. Will come back to Congress Next year with what the acquisition approaches. In the meantime will have a discussion with them. Will come back next year to see how much it will cost. It will be a challenge but those senators are posted understood they would be opposed to it regardless. Im looking at the 16 senators in the middle who are ready to be persuaded if we have the right arguments no questions as i mentioned theres wide consensus among allies and partners that things have definitely changed since 2010 and the threats are obvious let me expand a little bed the importance to allies to continuing to pursue control and nonproliferation we have reassured them that if they are addressed are they addressed as they were in 2010 . Not in the same way. Even in 2010 when president obama spoke to make their that as long as there are Nuclear Weapons the United States will have a safe and secure reliable a term. We continue to look for opportunities of arms control but the reality is, its quite difficult. Given my discussion in history working in the area of arms control and security issues, and confident will come to a point where we will intersect and look at another agreement is too early to forecast. The right now the most important way forward is to have strategic meetings to discuss whats in the npr and have an exchange of ideas and how to move forward. Especially disarmament, in order to move forward to load numbers to reduce the threat you need effective verification. One of the things im most proud of that i worked on since 2014 is a small international fair. We worked with 25 countries on verification technologies this is one of the many things were working to move towards disarmament. It doesnt mean you have to have flashy headlines every day. So let me put in a plug for that. The department had brief the russians and chinese on this condition by most conversations in it interactions a water approach should be Going Forward in dialogue . We certainly had no secrets only one of the allies but also wanted russian china turnover moving forward with the npr. We had a good discussion. We talked about opportunities for the future and specifically a number of dialogues were pursuing the china, with russia the most important one is implementation of the new start treaty cannot be more overemphasize. We are successfully implementing the treater and both sides are doing so without problem. On february 53 days after the npr was announced both russia and the United States made public statements we had met our respective force limits which we were required to do so the inf violation is another important point for russia. We have engaged russia since 2014 to resolve her resolve this violation and thats an important step forward especially in terms of new agreements, whatever they may be. Strategic stability discussions we launch the first ones in this administration as many of you know clearly weve had long and fruitful histories discussions with the russians. We had a dialogue in 2017 and are looking forward to the next dialogue in the next months. The National Security strategy and Defense Strategy would all be topics of discussion and exchange. You have programmatic responsibilities on that side, how comfortable are you with our ability to fund the necessary work . Is i the budget request adequat . Its always a good but difficult question. People ask if your funder for your program, these are eight or ten yearend are takings mia comfortable with the budget . Yes, if you look back over the last two years we have consistent support from the white house in terms of putting what we needed to the budget and the appropriators. It doesnt mean weve gotten everything weve asked for but theres been an acknowledgment of these programs need to be supported. This budget is no different. The budget is about 10 higher than it was in the Previous Year and that chuckles down to the weapons activities portion of it the thing that concerns me the most is we have stable, predictable funding. Were good now, were okay and we have strong support but as you look at the fiscal picture of the 2013 sequester that wreaks havoc. Drives cost up and schedules to the right. Makes it more challenging to execute on a given schedule. We dont have a lot of time. We need Stable Funding Going Forward its one of the biggest risks. You also mention the b83 can you give us insight i think it says bell retain that until something has been identified. Was the vision Going Forward. The retirement was set in 2014 related to several other initiatives that are ongoing. One thing we do is surveilled the systems we continue to surreal the system but decide we will retire in a given day at some point you look back on the surveillance by retaining an inventory longer than planned we will continue surveilling longer. To identify appropriate replacement i will refer to dod for the requirements. We have a taylor deterrence approach. If you want to Deter North Korea you have to which they value the most is the regime. How do they protect the regime . Its an deeply hardened bunkers. So we need the capability to go after that target. Eightythree does that. Now we have to evaluate how else we can achieve that objective and we have a tough decision to make by the time it has to be life extended thats where the true cost of that endeavor take place. We have a few years to see how we reset ambition without doing a costly program. We ultimately we manned up retiring. Have a question about integration. The empiricists u. S. Forces will ensure their ability to assure nuclear nonnuclear planning and operations will operate in the face of adversary nuclear attacks. Can you deconstruct the meaning of these words and understand what this actually is . The point of that direction in the review is also to enhance deterrence. When you face an adversary that does integrate nuclear and conventional operations doesnt vision fighting that involves integration of their Nuclear Operations, to convince them they will not gain what they seek and will incur costs that exceed what they can get you need to convince them are conventional forces are not so vulnerable to Nuclear Operations that they cant fight a Nuclear Environment. They need to be robust in a Nuclear Environment to conduct operations effectively. If the adversaries proceed benefit is to defeat your conventional forces need to convince them you cannot do that. That requires a combination of Response Options and kind. They could deny that and impose costs. Stepping back a little bit, the npr places is geopolitical context of great power rivalry the dominance see in the National Defense strategy from a joint Staff Perspective to see it as being effective under the the nss and what should it mean to those of us in the Nuclear Business . What should it mean to the combat commander who thinks mostly about conventional warfare. Miraculously the people who did the npr and dsl talk to each other so courses rested because its a subset of overarching National Defense strategy. I think youll see sections that are almost quotes from the mdr. Its a much higher level description of our Defense Strategy. It talks about the role and effective Nuclear Deterrent place all through these documents return of great power and competition. Not because its a policy but its a fact. Thats important point to make. Its not just a shift in policy. It happened because the facts change. We talk in the past about mainstream in the nuclear mission. We have work to do in this goes to generals education point, its not just education about deterrence theres also education across the joint force about Nuclear Operations, adversary capabilities and what they intend to do and how you can counter that. As we work on the integration problem their control aspects and training aspects of that. I dont think it will become the highest focus of geographic commands but renewed focus thats completely Consistent Development of the chairmans effort to globally integrate joint force and conduct integrated operations were not constrained to our thinking our capability by artificial geographic barriers. We have to find destination so the chairman has done a lot to change this for the whole joint force. The other thing is if youre going to project power in defense of an american now against an armed adversary after deter nuclear use. Theres no way to project power with confidence if you cant determine using their weapons. Will take questions now. Our first question is over here to my right. Thank you. Of a followup question on the low yield chiding concept. Make sure address your question to an individual or couple of individuals on the panel. Thank you. Will direct this one at rob. The general this morning for those who werent there admitted the obvious switches theres no way to distinguish a low yield to a highyield and he didnt care think that was a problem. If you the russians looking at a missile coming at you which could have up to a 450 tongue warheads on what are you going to think is coming at you even if we know, the russians would do the worst Case Scenario as we went. So reassure me how to assist lower not promote a fullscale retaliation is second how much is in the budget for the low yield . Weve had these debates seems like were recycling the same arguments over and over again. By the time we have use of low yield Ballistic Missile warhead russia is already used in Nuclear Weapon. Their forces on high state of alert. There is no way to eliminate the capability. Theres no incentive for them to launch an attack, we cannot catch them napping and they only see one more had coming at them with respect to the funding and delicately cheat sheet here will is 26 million in the budget will probably run us just under 50 million across the fiveyear defense plan. I think rob catch captured it well. Why would anyone commit suicide and guarantee they would be hit with hundreds to well over a thousand warheads in response to being struck with one . Its not a rational response especially when they initiated the nuclear war in a limited way, they should be expecting some kind of boring spot mrs. Designed to convince them that a response and kind is credible. I have a question to anyone. On how consistent the current position as with the previous npr specifically previous education efforts what it looks like those education efforts something likely to continue that would be useful, if not is there a change in the strategic environment, make it useful at this point . What is the me for u. S. Contributions . The previous administratio pe ratification of it. That in the new start treaty. The reality is, they worked to successfully negotiate the new start treaty and then had a challenging time ratifying it. Something the congress was not in the cards for ratification. The administration this is consistent overall administrations, we have not attempted we continue to emphasize the portable country to maintain the testing and our focus should be on dprk. The only country now testing Nuclear Weapons. That would be great help if they would somehow change its stance. Theres no question that i think education on the testing and consequences of testing and its a winwin. We continue to do it. Is very important and we have learned a lot. The stockpile Stewardship Program and how effective it has been. Quite simply we dont need to test right now have a need for it. In terms of support for tests band organization which is the precursor to test them coming into effect weve made huge progress in the last decade or 20 years. The building out this that network of monitoring stations. Something we have supported across administrations. The state department is fully funding the ims stations there. We continue to look for to working with the organization and emphasizing the. My name is alecia them an independent consultant. My question could go to doctor this morning there is a seamless narrative about the nature of the exercises, insinuating that since 1989 every exercise has integrated nuclear and conventional elements just one i wanted your analysis on the evolution of the strategic doctrine its reflected russia has strategic troop exercises and silo based icbms every fall. Every four years and has other exercises. It overlaps with others making it look like nuclear component. I want your perspective as to how you evaluated through its exercise is not just a statement. Thats a good question. My ability to answer that at an unclassified level is difficult. There has been an evolution in russians publicly stated doctrine over time. Theres also revolution and what we see them doing and we dont always match. Let me redo some historical quotes from russians about their exercises. It starts 99 so my russian is 37 years out of being fluent. Forgive my prince nation. In july 1999 about this 99 exercise the Russian Media said if the affirmation measures dont make nato abandon its original aspirations the strategic muscle troops will deliver preventive strikes as envisioned by existing guidelines against concentration areas of Forward Alliance ground groupings to demonstrate moscows ability to take action. Fearing this would escalate the enemy was forced to enter negotiation. In 2001 in moscow the paper reported on an exercise the scenarios for a number of exercises has stipulated after Nuclear Strike against military targets or against an ftc area the conflict could subside. In 2003 the defense minister was quoted as saying rush is prepared to use appropriate amounts of strategic Nuclear Weapons to force an enemy to seize military actions. In 2006 the first Deputy Defense minister said to terminate military actions its possible to inflict damage on the enemy to an extent to cast out. And then one more in 2012 the secretary of the russian National Security council said in answer to a question in an interview if a military threat arises under what conditions for these nuclear conditions. The answer was a procedures indicated in our military doctrine. It provides for the possibility of these not only in largescale for other types of four. In addition theres provision for the possibility of these have Nuclear Weapons depending on the conditions of the situation that situations critical to National Security the delivery of a preemptive strike is not ruled out. Theres a series of statements where russians have stated this. The reports on their exercises from government officials pretty highly place. That evolves says they look at their provisions. The fact that will be able to use Nuclear Weapons to curse them into capitulating it is a fact. All the nato nations agree this is the threat the russians post. Its not just the doctrine, its a combination of the doctrine the type of capabilities they have. Many people dont buy that the the building the capabilities but all the systems are capable. The blurring the lines between the two. Think about this, there also building air defense capabilities in the border area between russia and nato. The assumption might be they could be low yield capabilities and i have air defenses to defend against c put together those two assumptions and they might think they have an advantage. If i forgot one in 2017, last july president putin said in the nonclassified tractor to the navy said that in the circumstance of an escalating military conflict demonstrating the readiness resolve involving these of nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons as a deterrent factor. We have to move on. To maximize her time the man two things. Well get both questions and both on the table. Another russia focus question. They didnt go along with that. Every time the americans come to me wanting to negotiate, i say we have new missiles and you still have old missiles, why would we want to negotiate . Is this your sense that they still have that why have not reciprocated our multiple officers for disarmament talks, do they just have a completely different view of the value of Nuclear Weapons, do they have a different view of the value of negotiations, give us insight into what you believe their objectives are . Lets get one more question on the table. The senate of public intriguery, my question with nsas capacity Given Program of record and reviewing, stockpile and management plans, the workload projections are literally off the charts, very high already and thats before the introduction of two significant new projects, so my question for mr. Calbos, does it have the capability to take these on or have the projects sort of been scoped out in a speculative way or done exploratory fashion, is there a start on some of the projects thats been going on over time with the work at National Labs . Part two of that question, is how much does plutonium at los alamos affect any of the project as the way our strength is perceived by adversaries . Thank you. In terms of capacity, as i said theres more flowing through the enterprise since 1990. That is something that weve been working very hard on for the last five years, can we continue, absolutely. You know, there were folks five years that said we couldnt do what we are doing today. We have four my juror weapon programs right now. The new ishtives in the npr relatively speaking. Its not a technical challenge, from a cost standpoint, it is relatively lower cost, so that we dont believe presents any challenge that we cant address. The sea launch Cruise Missile, we will flesh out that out and that is a little further to the right than we have some time. With respect to the plutonium piece, correct, that operations in the los almos facility that does plutonium work was paused for a few years. They are now operating again. That said, we have a whole lot of work we need to do to get to a position where we can actually produce pits in quantity. The last time we produced pits in any quantity was 1989, i think. And thats something that the npr addressed as well. It emphasized the need to get to a pit quantity and capability by 2030 as required and programs for the department of defense. Did i miss any . Howhow does it project to adversaries and how we are perceived when los alamos struggled with surveillance of pits and when they finally did, according to the nsa east own review of performance, the test was not even usable. The experiment failed. We werent able to judge w76 pit, had aged in the last years and all the stuff has been out there, its been reported. Its been in the Washington Post, how does that sort of affect the perceptions of advisor adversaries . Feel free to jump in, rob, greg, in terms of the intelligence piece of that. I can only imagine, im sure that they are watching that. Its not lost on anyone that there are nations out there that produce more pits than we to including the north koreans. Thats, you know, one of the reasons why we need to get moving in our capability. And in terms of the effort you mentioned about the 76, a lot of this, again, is i will say shaking out the cow webs to generals point that we need to get to a point where we can execute faster, do more even if we fail, even if we identify problems, learn from them and continue moving forward and i would put that in that category. Could you quickly address the question about the russians . I had not heard that specifically. The russian quote, very specifically, your question cuts to the heart of the 2018npr, the security situation. In 2010, the npr, our emphasis was as the 2018npr points out we looked at closely disarmament and totally different security and, in fact, recall we had, quote, unquote reset with russia, we were on a high. We negotiated the new start treaty and immediately the new start treaty was signed, the president said this is a great trety but we need another round, we need to go further to reduce further and in berlin he came up with the proposal that included nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, russians were not interested. Why because as we pointed out the russians are on a different track. They are modernizing. As i said, im confident that in the future our interests will coincide but until we get to that point and the security situation changes, we are just not there, but we continue to look for that and we continue to emphasize the importance of engagement with russia. If i could follow up, this is not something unique to 2018 npr, former assistant secretary has been quoted numerous times. Let me quote the president of the United States, former president about two years ago, president obama said my preference would be to bring down further our Nuclear Arsenal and after we complete a new start, i approached the russians, our Team Approached the russians to look at arms reduction because mr. Putin came into power, returned to office as president and because of his vision pursuing of emphasizing military might over Development Inside russia and diversifying the economy, we have not seen the kind of progress that i would have hoped for with russia. So the bottom line is that russia has been has been uninteresting partner and well beyond our assessment in 2018 review. Could i just add one thing to that . Its my personal opinion. I think the russians given the role of Nuclear Weapons in their strategy and their perception of the balance of conventional military capability between nato and russia, i think the russians may well proceed further reductions as a trap thats designed to get them to a position where they are really disadvantaged and they cant counter nato conventional capability. Two more questions left, amy, if you would go first. Wait a minute, arent you a panelist let me ask my question. I have a question for anita and its about nonproliferation and its out of my box and thats why im doing it as a question because i dont cover nonproliferation. You said several times and npr say that is the treaty we remain commit today it, the npr says its the cornerstone of nonproliferation regime. To my understanding, the npt, the nonproliferation treaty has three legs, one is disarmament and the disarmament leg is generally understood across the International Community as calling for step by step reductions in Nuclear Weapons leading to the eventual goal. If i mischaracterized it, im sorry. Later in npr, i believe its last line on page 70, the corner stone of u. S. Nonproliferation policy is assurance and deterrence to our allies because it keeps them from acquiring their own weapons. Throughout npr it argues that to bolster we must increase Nuclear Capabilities with the supplements, retention of the b83, how is that not a contradiction that the cornerstone of the International Nonproliferation regime is a step by step process to reduce Nuclear Weapons and the cornerstone of National Policy for nonproliferation is a concept that requires increases in Nuclear Weapon . Thank you, amy, thats good observation and good question, here, there is no question that we are committed to the npt and it is the cornerstone of nonproliferation. That said, i mean, in order to make progress, we need to have in terms of disarmament and very thank you also for pointing out that article six, disarmament portion of npr is not the only part. We sometimes forget this. I know its a focus of certainly many in the Ngo Community but the npt is about much more than just disarmament. And if we always have if we do need to review conference and review cycle, we try to emphasize the other pillars but always gets overshadowed by article six. But in order to make progress on disarmament you need security environment thats conducive to this and we dont have an environment that is conducive to this and we deterrence is a big part of that. Rob. Ly just say that i dont think the two approaches are inconsistent. We are not climb to go expand nuclear stockpile. The lowyield Ballistic Missile will swap out with existing w70 war heads and the war head for sea line Cruise Missile will come out of stockpile. We will not be expanding capability. If theres an opportunity to pursue arms control with russians to move toward disarmament, we will follow up with that, i dont think its inconsistent. That the International Community doesnt view the numerical count as stockpile as representatives of u. S. Commitments. Right, thats why we continue to do the work on verification and we continue to implement the new start treaty and countless other things. So there is it is not just its not as i said, a big headline every day saying, we are going to lower numbers, new proposal, great new proposal, we just dont have the quite frankly unrealistic. Okay. Im sorry, just you have to give us some credit for reducing stockpile by 85 , all right. That was not the point of my question. My question is moving forward and not Going Forward. This is not the end of the discussion, but this is the end of the discussion, last question, please. Hi, alex bell from the center of arms control and nonproliferation. Quick question for mr. Calbos, im please that you said theres no changes, why snp to reduce readiness timeline for a simple nuclear test from 24 to 36 months to six to ten months and thats why people are confused about this and for anita and rob and greg, if hes interested, in yalls opinion, have we done an adequate amount of direct discussion, direct discussion cueses with discussions diplomatic on whether or not they are employing to escalate or deescalate strategy . Quick answer, we should reduce the test readiness to ten months. If it was a simple test, proximate estimate it would take us six to ten months. There are report that is were directed to do that, not true. The second question was have we have we talked directly to the russians about our concerns . We have and no we have not done nearly enough. And we continue to try to engage, but i mean, as we said in terms of going to future arms control or initiatives, we need a willing partner and we need a more willing partner to engage and thats something that we are working on right now. I mentioned the strategic stability talk that is we are having with the russians that is the focus. We look forward and a wonderful opportunity with the npr and the major the first major three documents by the administration, the National Security strategy, the defense doctrine and npr, this is a perfect opportunity to have a really substantive exchange on doctrine with russians when we next meet. Great, this has been a fantastic discussion. I want to personally thank the folks on the stage for participating and lending their time and expertise, we are going to take a break, please be back in your seats at 11 30 on the nose, thats when we are going to start. And join me in thanking the panel, please. 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