Plausible construction is one in which the guilt or innocence hinges on how the ordinary defendant might act but a very unusual way for criminal conduct in the context of a jury trial but section 924 c were the only or the first to present the categorical approach and categorically specific. What do you think congress intended in 1986 . They did not think of the question. I dont say had because that is rewriting their intent to. Given the circumstances of 1986 that it was red in the categorical approach they adopted it through the bail reform act that for decades you have said 16 b is better than categorical . A couple of points. Without reference. First of all with the bail reform act we dont agree necessarily that with that categorical approach was not well established to identify a single decision from the Second Circuit with the form of a categorical approach that they were not covered by the existing version congress clearly repudiated that. You say the language was best defined as categorical. There are a few fits and starts with briefs to be filed i would also note the Commission Read the language 1987 to 89 through those fits and starts heading into the approach because that is where the courts seem to be going and because it appeared to be workable and constitutional i know you dont want me to reference these decisions but it is clear it is workable not constitutional so we have gone back to take a fresh look. I think if you take a fresh look at the statute it is reasonably red as where demand to have that circumstance specific approach. This was not adjudicated on a specific approach. That is correct your honor. We think it is harmless but if the court does not agree with us they would go back to the court of appeals there could be a retrial but the operative turn is any context specific way to prohibit the defendant from using or carrying a firearm in relation to the crime of violence. The subsection specific definite definition of crime of violence is best understood and reasonably understood to have that same circumstance specific meaning it is very logical to do because it captures those who are committing crimes and violent ways. So with your theory you say it would have to be a jury finding and what do they have to find with respect to this offense . Do they take account there was a use of firearms. It could be a factor but the only factor that is one of the things that it does in the statute. So for example if a crime he simply has a gun in his jacket doing criminal Business Unit would necessarily have a crime of violence but a violation because he carries it further but if all he is doing is selling counterfeit handbags in a nonviolent way that would not be 924 c violation. This is the inquiry the court made clear as the juries can figure out they are well acquainted to figure out degrees of risk courses of conduct and of 924 c the jury is already finding the underlying offense conduct issued. So that categorical approach gets away from the whole idea to send things to juries to substitute the categorical judgment of the ordinary case of a crime the fact that the jury has right in front of it to easily apply standards of the angloamerican system has entrusted to juries two centuries. Looking at the language of c3 the word offense is a clause for anb and is as i understand the governments position to mean defense charged on the proximate the elements. With respect what did the defendant actually do . We dont read that preparatory language to mean two Different Things of two clauses that follow in fact the government earlier this year argue precisely this point no single word is given a single construction so what do we do about that problem . I think we are giving it a single construction let me explain why because the term offense is always been understood particularly looking at double jeopardy jurisprudence the way the framers used it to mean transgression of the law that is the act the defendant committed in the elements of what they violated to see if there has been a double jeopardy violation to understand the way we are urging here i think hayes is particularly instructive if you look at what was construed there it was even more difficult for the reasons i will get to in a second but the court they are interpreted. Im sorry we are running a little far afield for me but if we just returned to this language, as i understand that you would have offense to be offense as charged on the books but when we get to be look at the facts is that right . Can we agree on that much quick. Yes your honor. You can qualify another minute that we qualify on that. To make just one thing clear on the jury findings to incorporate an element with a use of force so that they find something in both cases. I am not tracking you add all. Does the offense have an element of force . A classic categorical approach analysis and what actually happened . And again i would like you to address that and not run too far afield of other cases or statutes and explain how we give that word to different construction. My answer to you is i dont think we are giving them two different constructions and the reason is another example. Help me where i am. I am on the statute. Offense means a transgression of the law. That has multiple components and an act is the legal prohibition so the court has said that double jeopardy. I will let you go in a second i promise you can go on to other stuff that is fine but we look at the elements so when you keep saying double jeopardy is what you want us to do for a but not be so how does that help me because that needs me to focus on the statute. Obviously committing two different murders look at the specific act he committed each time. But these are not two different crimes being charged. With transgression of the law it is natural to talk about both the elements. I dont think anybody would look askew if somebody would say a youthful gun crime is defined as defense with an element with the use of a gun committed by the age of under 21. In that sense we understand to encompass the statutory prohibition in the manner in which it is committed. So exactly how the court interpreted the phrase in the context of hayes. I am happy to take further questions. Can i ask further questions about the language of the statute . I want to do that by comparing it to the bill thats currently pending in congress in order to make it fact specific. So rather than saying in offense that by its nature involves substantial risk of physical force may be used instead says based on the fact underlying the offense by its nature and then they change that tends to say involve the substantial risk that may have been used. So by its nature based on the facts to make it clear what we are looking at is something that has occurred to make a fact specific determination about that. That is the way you would write a provision of the kind that you want this is not the way you would write a provision of the kind by its nature clearly what is this that offense ordinarily about . It is inconsistent with the notion that the jury in this case has to look back to determine the particular facts of a particular crime. As a preparatory matter if that language is clear the other answer to the Justice Gorsuch question that would be considering to have that elements clause. In a particular portion in which it tries to solve, yes. Let me just say that is not where the defense could be used in both ways. You have to answer his question anymore. Fair enough. I think that language is clearer and there are a couple of issues for that language as well. First of all i wouldnt put any weight on that tense because section 924 c with those other crimes that speak in the present tense for those who use or carry a firearm but this is the language congress constructed because of this court to render this constitutionally invalid. I dont think that is a fair representation in 1986 and in reference by its nature i do think that term could be used and was use 924 c three b if i were to tell someone dont bring your gun to a situation i think that would be understood without limiting feature. But with the word situation but this is not prefaced with that word as Justice Gorsuch said it is prefaced with the word offense that we know from section a is the statutory context and the crime by its nature, tell me how that is fact specific. By its nature. Burglary. By its nature. I would like to get back that by its nature as a circumstance specific and focuses on the offense conduct rather than the intended if tony soprano is prone to murderous rages at the drop of a hat but that doesnt mean its always a crime of violence. Murder by its nature . What does that phrase mean murder by its nature quick. Then i would want to know if youre talking in the abstract or a particular murder. I am just repeating this language. That is not how we interpret the offense it is the conduct and whether that conduct by its nature through this goes back to the Justice Gorsuch example you dont mean it that way because then section a is incoherent spirit that is the exact interpretation the court gave if i could explain that they were faced with a statute of misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. Im paraphrasing only slightly but it was in offense that is a misdemeanor that has an element committed by a domestic companion the court interpreted even though the offense misdemeanor applied to the whole thing and they took a categorical approach to have a circumstance specific approach i dont think the fact it is a felony. But there was Something Else in addition to the language in this provision but that was true and also with hayes what the court pointed to with Something Else in addition committed by specified persons or defrauded by over 10000 to say that particular language made it clear that somebody knew what had happened. But there was no such language in the statute. If that is a question you are now raising then we can all agree the offense that is a felony could have that categorical approach. It could. But then we are on the question of section 934 cb can reasonably be read to invoke a specific approach and by its nature both what i said of the offender and also to capture the idea of the word otherwise. This court said in rosemont what the statute is going after is trying to prevent a defendant from upping the ante to bring a firearm to a situation that will otherwise present risk. Im just a little concerned during your presentation. As i said earlier it cannot just be the firearm itself but it is already a hazard by its nature i dont think that is clear. Sorry justice alito. No. Im interested in the Practical Implications in this case how many contemporaneous crime statutes put in jeopardy if we affirm . Very few have subsections specific of crime of violence. The courts decision here will would be held of that categorical approach but would invalidate 924 c3 b and also the bail reform act but then there would be other consequences. Number one if the court does so based on the arguments that the juries cannot possibly figure this out because its too complicated for them that we call into question the hosts of other statutes that call into questions matters of that degree. We know from johnson exactly the fallout to invalidate a provision like this and what it will be. Hundreds of thousands of very violent offenders in the system challenging their convictions if they are under direct review and challenging their prison term this will also increase the amount of litigation under 924 c3 a calling into question if very Violent Crime that congress would undeniably i think wanted to include. That the government and all of these cases keeps upping the ante. But if you rule this way they will fall then we do then you have to come back you have 40 given up all of those others. Case after case i thought you would be more interested to say there are plausible distinctions so you dont automatically stack the odds against you when the next case comes up. The only federal statute i think we would see next if it came up was the bail reform act there may be some discussion of that. But the main concern we have here will be the practical concern that i was just mentioning with the defendants seeking release and not to be dramatic they are violent offenders. This is a case of tremendous importance to the community. While re sentencing could be required for a large number of persons and significant changes in prison sentences is low that this is usually an Additional Charge thrown in stacked on top of others. I dont think thats correct. Although a core is entitled to consider the fact if there is 924 c3 sentence added on, a court will lower a sentence of the 924 c3 excuse me if that conviction is vacated. We didnt see every defendant get that and some were released. With this impressionistic argument maybe its not as close as we thought . Will your friends argue it wont change much at all . But we dont seem to have a lot more than these rhetorical arguments are a lot of facts before us. Fortunately we havent faced this collateral litigation but numerous defendants are filing for release and we do expect quite a few of them notwithstanding are urging the courts to impose the same sentence that they cannot in every case that we do think some will be let out this will also increase litigation in the lower courts under that categorical approach 94 c3 aletter if a rule against us in this case. One of your points this would significantly lower the sentences of many violent criminals. There will be cases we cannot get and for those defendants those convictions will be wiped out and probably lower sentence sentences. And this is one of the concerns you have to confront squarely dealing with 924 c. Your response to that and what congress was thinking about in 1986 with respect to why congress wanted long sentences for these types of Violent Crimes. I think that is Crystal Clear that congress wanted the text of the statute they wanted the additional term of sentences they would receive for any underlying crime of violence also charged for the 924 co fence what the respondents approach would do here is essentially radical eradicate that judgment the only defendants who will have that judgment anyone falling under 924 c3 b thats not the right approach to take when it could plausibly be read with that circumstance specific approach with that the only defendants have relief are the ones that actually committed their crime nonviolently. That is exactly the result congress wanted had understood what this presumes that the categorical approach of it even imagined one would be held unconstitutional if i can reserve the balance of my time. Thank you counsel. Mister chief justice may it please the court. This case is about following the text of a statute that when necessary requiring congress to speak more clearly on what is prohibited. There are three reasons why the 924 residual clause should suffer the same fate as 16 be. First, it contains the language giving rise to an ordinary case of a categorical approach and second they share a common history suggesting similar treatment under the law and third the approach lies beyond the reach of constitutional avoidance. So this is a concern about the jury protecting the right of the jury to find the facts that concern undergirded all of those cases that fifth amendment concern as well as a practical concern to relitigate what happened many years ago that is totally absent in this case. Right . Your honor the constitutional concern is absent in this case. s you agree with me that under greater one undergirded johnson and taylor quick. I disagree that play the integral role taylor versus United States. It specifically identifies taylor as a concern on page 601 of the opinion where it talks about the right to a jury trial. My reading of that portion of taylor it is raising a question of judicial economy dealing with the paragraph of concerns is simply raises the question now are we faced with the problem of every defendant appealing to say they were denied a jury trial quick. I think the prior cases interpreted language in a way to avoid the constitutional problem with those convictions and that reason to stretch the language in one direction is not here as i see it. The case was about the jury than they could apply it here. I want to be able to answer your question clearly. In taylor when the court first raised the question to apply a categorical approach the very first statement was we are persuaded by all the circuits below that reach the categorical approach. Are not one of those is there a mention of a constitutional or the application of constitutional avoidance. So what are the other interests . Taylor began and then went to the history the noted workability concerns. But then did not discuss those concerns at all but rely solely of section 16 to reach a singular conclusion that the language by its nature with the absence of conduct requires a categorical approach. But say that statutory provision comes before us and its possible to read the language of this provision in two different ways to argue which is more strongly supported a couple and would we not think that congress is likely to have chosen the interpretation or have meant that is workable as opposed to unworkable . I am aware of the presumption of constitutionality im not talking about that. Im talking about the rationality. I think that is relevant when construing the statute. I would agree with that but ultimately the way it is read in the workable way. As opposed the unworkable . We would choose that is what congress meant not something that was dead on arrival. We must agree with the text workability has to be a secondary or tertiary consideration the government has proposed a new reading conflict based approach that cannot be reached simply because it is not broad. Let me ask you this question. Subsection buppercaseletter so when the Court Determines an offense by its nature is the requisite risk, is it not askin asking, do the elements involved that risk . Isnt that what it boils down to quick. I disagree under this language. So then what is it besides the elements of a typical case quick. This has been construed it is imagined an ordinary case and we get from this courts opinion to note the dual inherent language that is present. Lets take burglary a classical definition unlawful entry with a commit a felony. So now the ordinary case of burglary, what do i think of beyond that quick. You think how it is typically committed and you are asking the question what is the risk associated with that. What is typically done in a burglary quick. We cannot answer that question so to explain as many times as we try with a common offense. I understand that but. Justice breyer, please. If you cannot tell me what beyond these elements of burglary that i take into account with the typical burglary than under your categorical approach is the risk and if that is the case then why is there reference to elements . Or not saying anything other than those offense i would agree but not conduct. Coming back to the question of the government how do we construe this with the phrase for subsection a and subsection b . The core answer that question that it cannot be treated as a chameleon one thing for one purpose and one for another. A statute that said in defining the relevant crime, burglary which is sometimes violent, or send, extortion, hardly ever violent, explosives and often violent or otherwise involves conduct that present a serious risk potential of physical injury and its that last phrase that the court to sort of Justice Scalia writing throughout their hands. And both judge pozen or the lower court opinion, and i think i said the same thing there is no problem here, what the government at the presentence report and let them discover how often these crimes do involve violence and then categorize. Its tough to do with the johnson case because with the johnson case, you were talking about the state crimes that are phrased in the 4,000 different ways but its sure not tough to do here. This is a federal crimebased statute. The government has all of the presentence reports at once, and it can go through and categorize which are violent in which crimes are not. And if that is so, i dont see why it couldnt come if that is so, this wouldnt be a difficult statute to interpret. It wouldnt be very ambiguous and therefore, you win you lose because in fact it isnt unconstitutional. If i think that, which i do, is there some argument against it which there very well may be, which would tell me im either alone or out of my mind. I understand, your honor. One of the reasons we have the doctrine is to support the separation of powers by not delegating to judges and prosecutors of the authority to define the contours of a criminal statute particularly a criminal statute that takes sentencing discretion away from judges and imposes harsh mandatory minimums in the case 25 years. I want to tell you why this is like johnson, and of course we shouldnt forget about the sessions which looks at the same language. Language. The same two features that conspired to render the residual vagueness is also present here. A lack of violin somehow to a recognize threcognized the casea threshold and they find that the greatest strength let me follow up for the second because the words are substantial risk. Substantial risk of physical force. But the court writes, and im not saying we should come it is in part a is an offense that is a felony with the direct use of physical force so we get the presentence reports and we see that the average risk of those crimes is in terms of physical force and then we say it means the same. The crimes that have the same risk of physical force as the crimes in respect to a ar par wh this language is referring to. That would be clear. Nobodys tried at that. Ive suggested it, so what do i do . I guess you would like me just say the government is conceded as unconstitutional and that is the end of it. To address your proposed solution, your honor, at that point we would be delegating to the United States probation the authority to define this you looking at who writes the presentence report. Its according to the fact anfactsand anyone that wants a l with respect to a presentence report has the jury to find a tory judge if it is appropriate. Then we run into the same problem with statistics do we use. But other sources and this court has never been able to answer that question and i think appropriately it is unanswerable. In johnson we distinguished cases of prior convictions at one point they require the riskiness of conduct in which an individual defendant engages on a particular occasion so that was to say then as a general matter we do not doubt the constitutionality of the law so why would the wall that refers to substantial risk be unconstitutional in the court in johnson said thats not an issue tax itissue its certainly not always the case, your honor. With the quirks that do not doubt the constitutionality. I would agree with you that most of the time a jury is capable of making a risk assessment. The question here isnt whether the jury is capable, but if that is what congress intended. It is in a conception of fair notice he woul you would agree h that. A combination of the fair fae and separation of powers. Hasnt congress in 1986 was concerned about the enormous problem of gun violence, Violent Crimes committed with guns which was as bad as it is now extremely bad, worse, much worse in the 1980s and put everyone on notice. If you commit a crime with a gun, you are going away for a long time. That was the obvious intent, overwhelming because of the problem and the idea i guess im not seeing the notice problem given that that has been Crystal Clear since 1986 for everyone in the country. If that is what the statute said, i would certainly agree that if we look at how the congress was being ended up the things that passed a comprehensive crime control act in 1984 which created section 16 as well as the first definition of the crime and violence congress was thinking about the predicate offenses categorically as categories have traditionally Violent Crimes. On the question of what the congress was thinking maybe we could take a glimpse at what actually happened in this case which is that the defendants conspired to commit and then committed a series of robberies of Convenience Stores where they put a sold off shotgun to the head of a clerk and then rob cigarettes. You really think congress would say that isnt really a crime of violence . The defendants are guilty of every offense described and we are not challenging any of those. The difference here today if we were to win in one of the six countcounts they were convictedr is either they would die in prison or be released as very old man. At this and my question after congress had in mind a t. Have any doubt what they would say . s i do have doubts whether congress included, intended to include conspiracy when it was thinking about Violent Crime simply because conspiracy is an offense. Looking at what the Congress Actually wrote a, one weve heard about so far and we can talk a little bit about his the constitutional avoidance to avoid a construction that were renders the congresss work. We also have the rule we dont typically construe statutes to be as grievous as they can possibly be read and for the notice problems you talk about the separation of powers problems if Congress Wants to act more grievously and needs to speak more clearly usually they played in the same direction. This is an unusual case. Have you examined how they are reconciled . s we know for example in quark versus martinez we resolve them before reaching avoidance. In dealing with another normative its not clear. I couldnt cite a case for example it certainly makes sense constitutional avoidance of s before you do what makes sense, we hear about what makes sense. Im curious about what the law is. Have you done any examining of historical sources, joseph story, a good source, commentary of the constitution, something you can pu put into law in the w they get reconciled . If the answer is no that is perfectly finaperfectly fine i k myself i just thought it might save a little time. I will start with no but i would like another attempt to answer the question. Going to other questions. The rule only kicks in after youve done all of the other tools of statutory interpretation which would include constitutional avoidance. Weve said that many times. I have read it inconsistently and applications. Certainly they exist in the same sphere over the ambiguity they are used with a possibility standard but the reason the government proposed to conductbased approach is not plausible comes down to the rule of one of the bus in addition to that more importantly its irreconcilable with the plain text of the statute and it conflicts with how the court has identified the language and the separation of powers. Can i come back with a question about the meaning of the word offends which you addressed extensively earlier. Does that same problem exist under aca him and if it doesnt s it does . In the sands of the crime meaning the same thing for the purpose above the subsection because it has the same subject that is consistent with our argument the government intact is trying to change that, so the government of would be asking a different way do you think the residual clause in aca can be objected to on the same grounds you were using to object to the use of the case specific approach to, e fact specific approach to the residual clause . I think so, your honor, absolutely. Can you explain how that is . s if i can refer to the president while doing so but without mentioning for example s i would prefer if you could put the language but if you dont have the language in mind, i will just leave. The lack of guidance on imagining ordinary cases of the crime and the indeterminate risk threshold, those are present here as well as there and you also have the dual probabilistic language. Im getting at you is your argument that the provision under the governments reading interprets the word to mean two Different Things, element at one point and facts at the other. The way aca is worded, that problem doesnt arise. It talks about crim the crime ad then in subsection five if this is a serious potential risk so you dont have up there, do you . s we have the same problem but what is modified in the crime isnt presented that involves conduct. Its a parallel reading and of course if you look at sessions it is the same language. You dont think there is an n important distinction with respect to the language and provision . s certainly not and i think the plurality answered the question. If i dont think there is the problem i shouldnt think there is the problem under this provision. I would agree with that, your honor. If we go back to 1984 when congress created the section 16 and for the first time narrowed the application of 924 from all felonieoldfella needs to just cf violence, they were joined with a cross reference and at that time even if we didnt know what they meant we knew congress intended them to send s they changed it and 86. They removed the cross reference. Doesnt that defeat your whole point . s it does not because they used the same language. Neither the government or respondents know exactly why congress chose to copy and paste the language from 16 into 924 but we know they used the same language so it makes better sense that they were doing so for convenience because it was at that time they were also adding a definition of Drug Trafficking crime. In 2007 the court dealt with a similar situation where two provisions used the same language on inception and the way congress intended a different meaning there is a changed the language and one that kept the language and the other at the same, yet here we are faced with 30 years of a categorical interpretation from the circuit courts and we have three different instances where congress changed the language of 92924 c. And thats time and not once has it changed the language that gives rise to this categorical approach, so i think that gives us some insight into the congressional intent to this amendment history. The court stated in jennings versus rodriguez spotting a constitutional issue doesnt give the court the authority to rewrite the text of the statute. In the proposed conductbased approach it would effectively be asking the court to do just that. One of the limitations on the application of the constitutional avoidance is the separation of powers. Congress alone is the lawmaking authority, and a conductbased approach would to send that in the truest sense. The question of whether it is vague that is my dilemma and the conductbased approach. So what do i do if i think theres a substantial risk and what they mean is the same risk of physical force . Maybe theres an obvious answer to this but if you were to do that it would be very specific and it wouldnt be like johnson because johnson put a lot of weight on the fact they have three examples in Different Directions in the state crimes. Suppose i just wrote that and wd that hasnt been argued. What would you do unless you see something obvious clarks is asking the question does it have an element of force and subsection b. Is asking a different question what is the risk of force posed by the nature of the office those are two different questions though i would agree its sweeps more broadly. Id like to address the governments use the court identified a statue that is a hybrid statute that involves both a categorical inquiry as well as a factbased inquiry but what was present there is a clear indication from the congress that we were to look at the fact specific conduct using the language committed by and its important to note one of the reasons the court ruled in the way that it is because the division right above is clearly called for a conductbased approach and it had identical structure. If we were to apply the same reasoning to this case it would require a categorical approach because Drug Trafficking crime is categorical and the elements clause is categorical effectively conceded by the government and why did congress intend to treat the subset shouldnt be any differently without clear intent based on the language of the shows . To other professions that are categorical in nature that apply to the president often says that are cited by the government to section 929 and 931, one dealing with body armor in connection with crimes of violence and one with armor piercing bullets if the government is correct here today those would be treated differently than 924 c. Use of a gun and i think that really calls into question the internal coherence of the body of law. I think the court does have some obligation to seek a harmonious interpretation of the body of wall in as many of the points raised by the government today would destroy not only the internal coherence, but also its external coherence with the way the court has interpreted section 16. So it is for these reasons we ask the court to affirm the judgment of the court of appeals for the fifth circuit and hold a combined 24 residual point for vagueness. You have four minutes remaining. Thank you, mr. Chief justice. I have four points. One is i think that my friend there is a plausible interpretation if it were to come to the court you should apply the rule of quantity for me because i want a circumstance specific approach. I understand that an ordinary defendandefendant whodefendantde commercial trafficking with a minor does so by threatening a minor with force, but that is in the way my crime was committed and i want to prove that to a jury and i would argue on the other side that didnt matter. It just matters what an ordinary defendant does you have no right to show the jury what you did. I dont think anyone would think that its a slamdunk case to the government that they should apply ordinary case category approach. Third, the shows why it shouldnt have any application here because it cuts both directions. A defendant who committed his actual crime in a manner that is nonviolent would invoke the rule in favor of the very circumstance specific approach we are urging. There is no reason to apply the rule to favor the defendants s the reason you seem to be touting this reasoning is that its going to expand it over the categorical approach a number of the statute now well apply to. Otherwise he wouldnt be fighting so hard. There was a ball on your brief that walks the line saying there is no empirical evidence to support how large the difference is. But logically speaking, the use of a gun in the vast majority of cases theres a few where this wouldnt happen. I am not buying this because for a very large number of people under your reading they are going to have t the statute now apply to them. The first thing i dont think this will dramatically expand the scope of crimes. There would be very few o we wod think about it for really nonviolent but just because theres a gun i want to give a specific set of crimes that are now at the very least questions under our approach which come up in some of the amicus briefs where they enter into conspiracy within agent that doesnt really exist. Those cases get to the tree because the defendant can claim the situation was so under control there was no risk and we might lose a lot of those cases and in some cases judges might defend them from coming to the jury that the other thing i would say this is going to be mike fourpoint. Its going to of course limit it to only a subset. Theres a lot of offenses we are going to lose. Kidnapping, conspiracies to commit murder, rape, these are the kind of Things Congress would certainly have wanted to categorize as the kind of violence and there is a member of others that are going to be called into question because it is unclear we are going to be able to get hi in and under secn 924 c. Three a. Which will have a whole new industry of litigation on this issue. Im not making this up. They include manslaughter, support of tourissupportive tour defendants who gone and trained with all of those cases, nothing about the ruling that affect the District Court judges if they choose to get the same sentence and even more because once they open up the sentence the judge has the discretion to go up, down or stay the same. It isnt always going to be possible to impose the same sentence and congress clearly made the judgment that it wanted additional sentences for people to use firearms for the disabled in the furtherance of civil rights crimes that cause physical injury. This has come up for example in the prosecution in charleston. I dont think that its correct to say that they are going to get the same sentence no matter what. Thank you counsel, the case is headed. The story of different ideologies and so forth and friends of mine emailed me and said why do you want to tackle this issue, marriage and family you are jumping into the culture war. I am a white male and i am prejudice into the reason is something i wasnt taught that its kind of something ive learned. I dont want to be forced to like people. I want to be learned to like people for example what can i do to change should. That was a remarkable moment i didnt realize until i stepped off the set because there were more calls after that. It is so authentic as he searches for the words to Say Something to a National Audience most of us wont admit in our homes. Part of the reason for that you have to remember this is all just. We had the same kind of racially charged campaign wit with a blacklight is matter and the Police Shootings and tragic events. It was a time people felt like all they were seeing was bad news and here was first a white man admitting that he loves prejudice, which for people of color the kin we kind of just sd finally. Next, a look at u. S. South korea relations in this activity on the korean peninsula. This event from the center for strategic and International Studies started with a discussion with representatives of the cochair of the Congressional Study group on korea. Good morning. I think we have some fun planned for you today. Im a trustee here standing and for this mornings festivities. We have a big day ahead of you this is the fourth strategic form and we are delighted to be with the foundation and delighted to have been sailing along side of us for this. One of the commemoration of