An excellent panel of experts are here as well. Reintegration in afghanistan. Id also like to we will all of you know joining us online. In the webcast and would note that you can also follow the conversation on twitter that u. S. Ip, hashtag cr. Sid ar. I would also like to encourage you to check out the podcast network. It will include this if it and many other compelling programs featuring leading voices on violent prevention and national security. Was founded five years ago by members of congress as an independent nonpartisan National Institute charged is vitally important litigating and resolving violent conflict. Since 2002 are Afghanistan Program has worked closely with the governments, Civil Society organizations of how others to prevent litigate violent conflict and more recently, to support the afghanistan Peace Process. It goes that went out staying, that there is considerable uncertainty during the last two weeks in terms of the Peace Process but while that remains true, what is certain is that the topic of todays conversation on the integration is going to be made and remain highly relevant if and when we get a Peace Process and we certainly that will be sooner rather than later. The report we are launching today the seventh report of the Lessons Learned program. Please with having the opportunity of some of the earlier versions here as well. The report is the first and only u. S. Government setting to comprehensively examine all approach of 2001 Integration Programs and assess their effectiveness. We have an excellent panel line of today. We have distinguished people afghanistan, moderated by scott our director of her Afghanistan Programs. But first i have the pleasure of introducing the inspector journal, to drive the keynote address. John was sworn in as the special Inspector General of the reconstruction by president obama on july 2nd, 2012. He has over Years Experience in oversight and investigations as a prosecutor congressional counsel, and senior federal government advisor. In addition to working for International Law firm he has worked on capitol hill for over 20 years with key positions in the senate and house of representatives. Please join me now and walking into the stage. [applause] thank you very much for that kind introduction and good morning to all of you. And a special thanks obviously to the institute of peace. We have worked with them for years that ive been at the cigar and i hope that relationship continues. I stand here today, and an interesting time in the current chapter of our nations longest work. Which in a few weeks, will be marking the 18th anniversary of it. In my seven years at the cigar, i have learned at least one thing, and that is never underestimate the utterly unpredictable nature of Matters Regarding afghanistan. I think you will agree with me the past few weeks only have underscored the point. But the subject today, is the reintegration of combatants in afghanistan. And that will and is relevant to afghans future in American National security interests. Not what happens in afghanistan and the United States over the time to come. So if there is ever to be a true sustainable peace in afghanistan, reintegration of the taliban and other combatants, will be a necessary component of that process. Again, both of that occurs in days or years from now. That is why todays report by cigar, we believe is so important. It is the First Independent public official u. S. Government report on the trials and tribulations of integrating the taliban another combatants into the afghans society. Todays publication as was mentioned is our seventh Lessons Learned report and i believe we have a document that we have handed out which thank you to all seven reports. We began this Lessons Learned program and should say to scott, for a while, until he came back to the institute of peace. But we can begin the program at the urging of then general john allen and former u. S. Ambassador ryan parker. As well as other senior government officials who reminded us that our agency was the only u. S. Government agency with the mandate to look at the whole of government and the whole of governments efforts in afghanistan. Like our prior to our six prior reports, todays report is available both in traditional and interactive format. Its on our website w ww. Cigar. Milk. I believe of the 70s Inspector General who operate in the United States government, we are the only one that actually puts our reports out in interactive format. Now cigar undertook this specific investigation or this project i should say, in part because and then the spring of 2018 when i was traveling to kabul, senior u. S. Military and diplomatic leaders, and cabo expressed an interest in knowing more about what worked and what didnt work and integrating combatants. We also recognize that the body of literature on what practitioners call ddr, disarmament demobilization integration. Deals more with them to ds in the art. Reintegration. We also viewed reintegration is an appropriate topic because large scales disarmament in afghanistan its not seen as foreseeable in the future. The goal of todays report is to help u. S. Afghan and other coalition policymakers and agencies as they prepare for that daunting task of assisting with the reintegration of approximately 60000 fulltime taliban fighters. As well as numerous other non taliban combatants. In the if it, the Afghan Government of taliban enter negotiations to reach a peace deal. The report, which ironically, actually started 14 months ago today. It relies on 51 interviews of current and former u. S. Afghan and other government officials and academics, a review of thousands of pages of public documents and academic material as well as a rigorous peer review. Now regard i am grateful to former u. S. Special representatives were afghanistan and pakistan, james dobbin, as well as doctor dirksen, a scholar in afghanistan and it ddr as well as others who Peer Reviewed this report. We do appreciate the work. We also appreciate the many officials at the department of state and treasury and others. He provided valuable insight and feedback. While this report is a cigar product. It is really a collaborative effort of all of them. In that report we outlined 14 findings and ten lessons and made 15 recommendations for policymakers but in an effort to keep my remarks a little shorter than the peace negotiations, i am going to just highlight a flue of the major takeaways from that report. First of all as we all know, the state of u. S. Goal in afghanistan is a sustainable political settlement. Between the Afghan Government the taliban. They bring lasting peace and stability to that country. There has been hope that the u. S. Taliban deal would open the door to an intra afghan Peace Process. It could eventually lead to Peace Agreement. No other is no u. S. Taliban deal at this time, let alone an intra afghan political settlement, the ongoing fighting hasnt stopped the u. S. And other donors from supporting reintegration efforts over time. Our teams close examination of those efforts, led to our first recommendation. That is as long as the taliban insurgency continues, the u. S. Should not in a repeat should not support a comprehensive program to reintegrate former fighters. Because of the difficulty inventing protecting and tracking former fighters. This report as i mentioned examines the five main post 2001 reintegration efforts in afghanistan. And assesses their effectiveness. Or lack thereof. Further it examines several past local security arrangements and both of they provided an opening for real reintegration. The report also examines opportunities and constraints for reintegration efforts now and in the future including case studies reintegration the columbia and somalia. As well as reviewing the broader literature on reintegration. Our review of all of these efforts, found how ever been any major reintegration effort is very likely to fail in the absence of an agreement between the Afghan Taliban in terms of how to reintegrate those taliban fighters. Now why is that. Its quite obvious. I reviewed that art reintegration effort is more likely to have greater chance of success in the formally hostile parties demonstrate a high loophole commitment and a mutual trust that they will allow the fighters to peacefully participate in the program. That went out this, if fighters join a Reintegration Program, they and their families face enormous risks of retribution. And during the war, it is very difficult if not impossible in times to provide protection for them. That risk of retribution, and insecurity more generally, was a key reason while fast reIntegration Programs did not succeed in afghanistan. Other factors, were very weak economy offering few legal livelihood opportunities, the former fighters, unlimited afghan capacity to implement those programs. Additionally early efforts to demobilize it in reintegrate state militias, failed in part because u. S. Forces were at the same time, partnered with those malicious for security and other sources. Services. U. S. Forces dependence on militias and power commanders and groups were supposed to be disbanded. Based upon our review Afghan Government documents Program Evaluations interviews and independent studies. We had a pass programs did not lead to any significant number of former fighters reintegrating into society. Did not weaken the insurgency and did not reduce violence. If they had, they would not be reading a lot about whats going on in afghanistan today. Our report also highlights that especially from 2009 onward, the u. S. You viewed reintegration primarily as a tool the fracture and weaken the taliban. Note that approach, while we understand that approach, and unintended and damaging consequences. It is basically the potential for reintegration efforts to promote actual reconciliation. As we report, there is no evidence that the Reintegration Program served the weaken or splinter the televangelist resolved. Nothing about the current environment unfortunately suggests that every new program would have any chance of success, than the past ones. Moreover, given the legacy of prior programs, renewed program we hear that in fact there is a trust need it to establish a truly lasting Peace Process. Because the past is often prolonged, one goal of evaluating previous reintegration efforts was to drive lessons and recommendations for future efforts. Should a more conducive environment presents itself. As weve seen in recent weeks, development in afghanistan move quite rapidly and quite unexpectedly. The loophole of tip Committee Engagement by the United States with the taliban and Afghan Government, in recent months, suggest that it would be prudent for all of us particularly u. S. Policymakers to consider now what reintegration may look like following a Peace Agreement between the afghan and government and taliban. Rather than waiting to date after an agreement is signed. In our report, we recommend that the u. S. Only consider supporting reintegration effort if first, the Afghan Government and taliban sign a piece agree integration, sign a Peace Agreement that provides a framework for reintegration, single if it significant reduction in overall violence, and thirdly if there is a strong Monitoring Evaluation system in place. I think i only need to highlight the letter they came out the department of state today by secretary of state, from raising his serious concerns about corruption in afghanistan as the reason for why you need strong monitoring and evaluation of any program on reintegration. Our report is very clear that any Reintegration Program even on the political settlement, with still face significant challenges. One of the biggest, problems that we highlight is the poor state of the afghan economy. Joblessness for example with present a major hurdle. To the six sacks full reintegration. But if im at now 23 percent overall. With a 30 percent Unemployment Rate for the one fifth, of the afghan population. Tween the ages of 15 and 24. An estimated 400,000 afghan youth, and of the market every year. For a fighters, to come in from the cold and rejoin society, they will need access to a stable job. Or, they may return fighting orator one of afghan many more profitable but illicit, economic sectors such as organized crime kidnapping and narcotics. Additionally should a Peace Agreement be reached, some portion of the over 2. 7 million afghan refugees, can be expected to return the best of majority of them out being in iran. And pakistan. In 2019 from the world bank is already sent over 800,000 afghans returned to pakistan from pakistan and iran and more than 700,000 afghans were internally displaced but rather conflict. These vulnerable groups will increase the pressure on an already anemic economy and labor market in afghanistan. As well as on the capacity of the Afghan Government and donors to provide social services create jobs, and deliver humanitarian aid. Adding tens of thousands of armed Afghan Taliban soldiers, as well as their families, and supporters in the mix, will only exacerbate this challenge. It will also be critical of relitigation be directed at not only the taliban combatants but also members of state alondra militias. In other armed groups that have been fighting the taliban. Failing to do so would give a taliban rationale for not participating as they would most likely seek to protect themselves against their former rivals. Call accordingly successful reintegration from the u. S. In the rest of the donor community. Now we note approvingly, and a number of donors right now, including the United States, are working with the world bank. Our plans for enhanced financial and Technical Support to afghanistan. With the goal of improving afghans economy and its capacity to deliver Services Host a Peace Agreement. In a post settlement scenario, this would support reintegration and the youth population. Other nevertheless, and let me emphasize this, secretary, mayos emphasizing, it in his letter today. Pervasive corruption in the Afghan Government institutions, paired with limited capacity would undermine attempts to deliver tangible benefits and resources the former fighters. As cigars prior work seven years of work that i have looked for cr, as shown that went out adequate oversight and conditionality by the donor community, resources intended for foot soldiers face the real risk of being stolen by corrupt government officials our senior commanders. Benefits are provided to former fighters but do not also reach the communities they live in the resentment that fall is may also enter undermine reintegration efforts. In addition, we have to face reality of the future of the Afghan Security forces. Over 300,000. That provides a further complication. The taliban have shown interest in integrating their fighters into the Afghan Security forces. Im not taking sides on that desire. But this would be one of the most contentious issues in any negotiation between the Afghan Government and the taliban as well as with the u. S. Government. Failure to adequately resolve that issue could threaten again, the implementation of any successful Peace Agreement between both sides. Again, the u. S. Funds will continue no likelihood. To support Afghan Security forces robust oversight would be paramount to ensure the successful integration of those adversaries and successful and safe use of those funds. Now some reintegration, primarily for taliban fighters who fight seasonally, and are already part of the social fabric of afghanistan, may occur naturally. It will continue as just as it did after 2001. But for some research, also indicates that many taliban struggle beyond the insurgency and they want to retain a moment military power. The potentially tens of thousands of taliban who do wish to re integrate will the obstacles of a weak economy ongoing insecurity, and local conflicts driven by tribal disputes and unresolved grievances. Its k could also attempt to recruit disgruntled taliban fighters who find fault with the terms of any peace deal. So in a piece post settlement scenario, u. S. Policymakers must consider the conditions in which they would support and fund reintegration efforts. Including weather, they should be targeted programs for ex combatants, or both of Wider Development programs is more appropriate to address the issues they confront. In addition, u. S. And un sanctions that prohibit thanks assistance to going to certain members of the taliban may need to be revised in those individual scenarios are not excluded from any Economic Development or aid. If a peace settlement opens the door for Development Assistance to reach previously inaccessible populations, the donor community, will also face hard questions about how and where to direct that assistance most efficiently. The logic justified reIntegration Programs, assumes the next combatant compose greater Security Risk than the other vulnerable populations. Such as jobless youth. But it is reasonable to assume that unemployed young, afghans will remain at rest for recruitment by groups and terrorist organizations. Such as isis. So investment and reinvest Integration Program should be appropriately balanced against other development priorities. Finally, as sagar has pointed out before particularly in our high risk list to congress that we released earlier this year, and afghan political settlement would not in the plague of insecurity corruption or weak government capacity. Something that u. S. Agencies need to take into account in advance of the successful Peace Agreement. In conclusion, its often been said that is far easier to start a war, and to anyone. A sentiment that i think the success of u. S. And Afghan Governments would all agree with. But even if an intra political settlement is reached, afghanistan his problems will not magically disappear. The moment the ink dries on an agreement. We have to be realistic. And as of this report is staying. Lets be realistic. A failure to reintegrate combatants of all stripes will only lead to the continuation of this 48 year cycle that we have witnessed that is led to generations of afghans growing up knowing only death and destruction. And likewise which is led to many of the afghan supporters around the world continuing to sacrifice blood and treasure in this distant land. Should a sustainable political settlement be reached, something we all hope for. The success of that agreement will depend in large part on the successful reintegration of the taliban and another combatants. Annas hard reports review the integration identify, this its not an easy process. But should the United States support such an endeavor, we must learn from past mistakes. We must set reasonable expectations. We must identify and implement best practices and all of this i hope, is assisted by the report that we believed and released today. The man by just staying this, i would be remiss as a sagar, not to identify the great team which has given you, this report. This is an outstanding team. First of all im not going to thanks them to rise. Kate, the senate. She led the team that produced this report. And her key colleagues was miriam, i always mispronounced her last name but i hope her parents forgive me for my ignorance. Matthew ribbon, where is matt . Jordan, are you here . In kabul okay. Good place. So long with nikolai, tracy, and a few more people. Joe is in charge of a program. These people will be here today some will be at the Panel Discussion others will be arou around. Please buttonhole them and if you have any questions, thanks them. Images say, i worked in the government for nearly 40 years. I worked on the hill, the department of justice and the department of congress, please call the department of comedy. As well as the sam nunn, john dingell. Its people like that team, that makes me proud to be the sigar and puts the special in the special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction so thank you very much. [applause]. Over the past 18 years we see that work so what should be done quick. Thats a very good question. Not just Lessons Learned but if we try to get congress to focus on this issue they go out and many are here today to greet members to incorporate these lessons into practice but what if they are adopted . My team has gone to many agencies in Us Government even myself on one of the reports for almost two hours. We tried to get incorporated into best practices for the future for thats what were trying to do. The Afghanistan Peace Campaign unfamiliar with the process in el salvador which the human implemented. For that was defeated. Thats not the case in afghanistan with the taliban and. With another agency how would this work because the taliban and thinks they are winning rather than defeated so what role do they play that you mentioned quick. For Us Government funding the other igs can do the monitoring all that that first line should be the us agency. By the time we come in we are like that document and we rarely recover. And then we have concerns of how they do their job we have had concerns talking to the world bank how they monitor nation say that i recommend you read the secretarys letter because not only is he concerned about corruption, something that we raised but pulling back money from usaid with a public utility in afghanistan. And also to highlight with those reconstructions. Here is a role for everybody. Is not just afghanistans job. Now in his letter he also raises concerns with the Evaluation Committee there needs to be the role for the afghans. But they definitely need a role. Im an old Trial Attorney and get paid by the word. I can talk for hours. Thank you. Did they have the opportunity as we all know and does have linkage, so how do you see that without losing . So do you have any use on that quick. I will defer to the panel who is our team lead. With a Peace Agreement or the Peace Process youre getting in that area. We look prior for those best practices from that. But let me just add the last question from somebody on the side over here. In the absence of a Reintegration Program supported by the west where there still remain a path . There should be and we talk about that. We expect there to be some coming in but what we say is dont develop a Major Program if you dont have that piece grant. We identify where they tried to get back into the community but a fullblown program, without that modicum of security will not work. Thank you very much for those questions. I will be around afterwards and my staff will be around but thank you very much for allowing us here to see her friends at the institute of business. Thank you. [applause] [inaudible conversations] good morning. I am the director of afghanistan and central asia program. It is my pleasure to introduce the panel to moderate discussion between now and 1230 to talk about more specific findings and recommendations of the report. So with two points of observation on my own is the value that was said earlier, the only independent government report and the value of documenting that now over the 18 year engagement products they are talking about or 15 years old it was first i was in afghanistan but most of the current policymakers have not experienced that or remember that with the full chronicle of this engagement in one spot. The only thing i hope the panelist will talk about today and the way we structure the panel is to illustrate the contrast between those objectives with those reIntegration Programs for better or worse in the ground reality of the calculations that afghans make on the ground with Community Members to see what the reintegration is worth and worth supporting. When there was the policy objective in the ground reality. Those have ground experience as well as policy experience and those issues. Kate is director of this report from the Lessons Learned program and has also read reports on anticorruption narcotics and worked previously at the council of Foreign Relations to the state department in kabul and washington. Cap next the deputy minister for policy and Technical Affairs of local governance. Good evening. Glad you could join us. Senior policy analyst with the crisis group in the asia foundation. And also the academic doing research of the phd of local governance. Next to nonresident fellow from the new America Foundation as well the Public Policy institute in her research focuses she has published on local substate and hybrid Security Forces. In iraq and afghanistan in syria. Previously leading the afghanistan and yemen of rolloff programs. And spending ten years from the state department from afghanistan for the state department in new york and is focusing on that Peace Process. So without further ado lets hear from kate. Thank you scott. We are so grateful to take the time to bring your expertise. I would like to pick up on a few points and also to save more of our key recommendations. And answers to main questions, first, how do us policymakers think of the combatants in afghanistan in the current environment of the ongoing insurgency and how do they think about reintegration in a future hypothetical scenario where it is a Peace Agreement between the Afghan Government and the taliban and. So with the current environment you can look at the track record of those programs that were implemented from 2003 through 2016. During that time there was continuously some program in place. Two of those were targeting states and illegal armed groups but that was somewhat of a different context because those were implemented in 2001. But the second two programs for those who know they were targeting insurgents. Those were undertaken during the insurgency. We found none of these programs work to successfully reintegrate any significant number. Surely there are anecdotes and cases of people or fighters returning to civilian life that we found no evidence that the programs had a significant role in the outcome of that they successfully reintegrated large numbers. In particular for the two programs that did target taliban and insurgents, one was betting how do you determine someone is an actual fighter in this environment they are genuine in their desire . So the problem of protecting Program Participants if you are a fighter the basic thing you will need is a security guarantee for you and your family patella band fighters are facing threats if you did want to reintegrate used to get threats from your former comrades from coalition and Afghan Forces who may not know or care that you have reintegrated or other members of the community who may be seeking revenge against you for abuse committed by you or your unit so coalition and Afghan Forces did try to take steps to protect caliban who were reintegrating but it was not enough over 200 were killed during the program during the Second Program and it was very difficult to think targeting among actors us military and us and afghan intelligence. A third problem was with tracking and monitoring insurgents its very hard to know if they ever left the fight. There were other implementations as well including dispersing and spending money to develop that capacity that was needed to manage the program. Ultimately we wanted them to be afghan bed programs. This is more reasoning behind the recommendation to not support a renewed program in the current insurgency. On the other hand we do recommend that if and when the Afghan Government the state department should encourage both sides to negotiate or figure out how former fighters would be integrated. Afghan including the television will have a very big vote and ultimately design the framework for reintegration. If the details are not worked out during integration that would be even more difficult. And a broader recommendation that state usaid and dod should designate an existing office and that sometimes we have the inhouse expertise. With that afghan political settlement such a settlement in place to open the door for reintegration it doesnt make it any less urgent to the numbers of people dying and that level is still better today than it has been in 18 years and last but not least no one would argue the Us Government is not planned and prepared too much how to sustain a Peace Agreement. Admitted the there is a lot we dont know about a future Peace Agreement we dont know the power structure the degree of which the afghan and Security Forces are cohesive. Or if all ethnic groups will come back in an agreement with the scale of the international presence. All of those factors and more shape the prospects for reintegration. Despite those uncertainties we have parameters how the us and Afghan Governments could approach reintegration while planning looking at those challenges that they will face. So that can help ask combatants through the process of reintegration to not entirely depend if there is a target Reintegration Program in place its important to distinguish between the process and some of which can happen naturally and reaching those in the communities with us sanctions us assistance can reach these people that the taliban and now controls. And with that Reintegration Program all of those are in place first Peace Agreement sets the framework for reintegration and with a large environment to enable assistance to reach former fighters in these communities strong monitoring and Evaluation System in place so we know the program is working and we can make adjustments finally report several actions the Afghan Government could consider for future reintegration effort. For instance the need to include not only tell a band fighters because there is a proliferation of armed groups in society, but those that are in the reintegration effort not doing this would give a rationale for participating and would like to protect themselves and any future effort must ensure communities receiving these be part of the decisionmaking process around reintegration. As the communities themselves to not be angry or resentful and we also suggest experts could advise on reintegration coming from both sides of past conflicts unlike colombia and Northern Ireland to give those negotiators a sense of whats happening in their countries as well. I will stop there and i look forward to my fellow panelist comments for reactions on this issue. Think is a much. Thank you again for joining us from kabul and me look forward to your reactions on the report. Thank you with this report on the integration of the taliban with those key lessons and financially we emphasize a number from the local governments of those politics in afghanistan but it is important to ensure that it hasnt become a process of distribution so secondly of the powerbrokers early on with that peace negotiation. We must pursue that mechanism at the local level and its important with those levels of the state. And with those political aspects and is given attention to the immediate program. And through the shortterm benefit to be about numbers. And that is crucial for the Integration Program. So to give an example we found out he was formerly was with the taliban and. For 23 years was eiji heidi. With that level of dynamics. With the senate individually and through the extended family as a whole. But then they will have full control and with the government compound and with those key questions and to have that village support and then to be in that office and then to campaign for candidate and then the next day over lunch to incorporate with that tribal support. And without honor and dignity that brings me to the fourth point with the Community Based approach. [silence] you cut out but please continue. So when you have that approach with those existing state structures and the structure with the Development Councils to trust the cdc to be very influential entry point and with that social dialogue and that is something that is important but fifth with that representation, what needs to be included among the afghans is the importance like with the elections for example because elections have not happened we have to be insured that they could be complete. So that provides an excellent representation and prevented through the council and 49 percent of those leadership positions that is the missing link. And my expertise that it can be adopted at the district level. In my six. I cannot emphasize the importance and right now with that responsibility and what we are trying to do. This is the important resolution. And next justice has to go together including entry points for the taliban and that the injustice with the establishment of the lower courts of a have shown interest that they are willing to engage but with this economic integration, with that week acting economy so in kabul with sad initiative through integration and through the shortterm to maintain those infrastructures and then we propose as a district for Infrastructure Development and then those with those governance that they are trying to establish. But over the last 18 years our Economic Strategy has been encouraged so we need to shift and then the steps that they are taking which i would be happy to discuss. Thank you very much. Lets turn to erica. I will pick up on a couple of things and talk a little bit some of the issues of Power Dynamics and briefly on what reintegration might do in terms of groups that are currently online with progovernment sources and the Peace Process. First what this report lays out are the pitfalls that happen with the process. More often instead of reducing the advisors are drawing down conflict it is just another source of aid for those that were appointed into positions to oversee these initiatives reduce patronage and funds were diverted to prop up existing networks so there were a lot of loopholes for the fighters through those progovernment forces and on the taliban inside pro fighters were coming in that were farmers aligned with the progovernment factions that caliban who did enjoying were disgruntled by those incentives offered and many of them were attacked and there is lack of protection. But then denison is a fighting picked up they went back in so this is the litany of the past problems and this is why the report really draws out its hard to find anyone who has good things to say about the whole record of disarmament and reintegration of afghanistan. Just one quote that i thought was a good summary even the own assessment of its program is that its overly ambitious producing no satisfactory results. The world bank has specifically earmarked funds for this in the next Economic Program because it found the evidence is setting aside economic incentives for fighters against opportunities for corruption and to fuel further violence. This is the shadow about the reintegration of course there is a narrative that should be pursued but if you have peace happening in the us is more supportive than it was of the past there were more prospects so what the report highlights is the same conditions of the past disarmament is still very much in play so nobody thinks the estimated 40000 and tell a band fighters that all take part in that disarmament process a lot of them will still continue fighting and in addition there are any number of armed groups that are not part of that. Is not the peace dividend everybody hopes for that will result in a smoother disarmament process with opt outs and re mobilization from before better. With the steam same security pressures. More importantly is stretching back to the original negotiations major blockage to taliban and reintegration isnt coming from the taliban or other groups but those aligned in the Afghan Government. So you hear what does the taliban want to get out of the Peace Process or negotiations what do fighters look for in the reintegration package cracks what with that package look like clicks but equally important is not with the taliban fighters would want but the progovernment factions and fighters would want most in the process within the Afghan Security force as a resource patronage and power for the local fighters and they are unwilling or unlikely to give that up to give a greater share to the taliban and so thats a Greater ProspectGoing Forward as soon as the disarmament reintegration plan is on the table it creates spoilers for the ongoing Peace Process and then there are broader discussions that ratchet up a notch. There was one major risk putting this package on the table could affect the prospect for peace negotiations and misaligned incentives of the afghan Peace Process. Also to the extent there is some talk of reintegration proposal looks like, one of the most common ideas is not to put out for their economic incentives but that the taliban and will want Afghan Security forces. Most say we dont want them in the army we want to maintain a strong coherent army, at least publicly that dont support the afghan constitution. So third and left over option seems to be maybe we can get in a position with the local forces like the local police or another quasi state force. This is problematic because these forces have been able to respond but they have a mixed record so the best Case Scenario at most has a lot of areas of what they have done is the enabling force to get on payroll or other economic groups to take further control of power in a local area and then fight with other groups so they are a source of conflict so the idea to bring the taliban and through this is not clear they would want that as opposed to a force that would be synced in with the estate of power but what is likely to happen is a scenario. With those communities leading to more conflict and another areas those that already were under taliban control that is not a lot like integration but those provinces through that caliban. And then looping toward the conclusion, the quote that i took away that programs done poorly in adverse conditions are worse than not at all in this case its worse than nothing so if you are all conditioned otherwise but the rebuttal you get what you want to do cracks i say focus on all the other fighters that are currently out there not under government control creating violence and instability at a local level and then to be part of a disarmament and Reintegration Program. The current Afghan Security force numbers are 300,000 its not sustainable. Everybody thinks you have to reduce by at least 50 or 100,000 then what happens to those fighters quick the local force units many with unsustainable sources of fighting so if you need to find new 30000 local police that is a real important integration priority not to mention the report talking about those who are waiting for the deal to come through. A lot is already on the plate that needs to be sorted out without waving future peace talks with this. I will try to be very quick so we can include some questions first my congratulations on that was a cathartic report to identify the real problems that frustrated many of us a government over the years. My own journey with reintegration i started in afghanistan serving there in 2010 at the height of the troop surge resources to throw it every problem and during that time there was a guy named john who said he wanted to integrate and was a significant commander it was very hard to prove or disprove that claim. That he probably was not one of the most important people we were looking for in the short version is we did reintegrate him, he came with 25 or 30 people on his tail but it did start a Small Movement of imitators may be more legitimate than fake, but it was virtually impossible to provide cover even with the limited resources even being housed in the governors compound or other existing facilities and even though there was the stirring momentum that was visible it died within a few months because you could not provide for more than that tiny Critical Mass to ensure their safety. So to me it was representative but i just want to make three quick points on the past and present and future but on the past it proved basically impossible to split or two weekend caliban through reintegration through a defective strategy. Not that we didnt try but the effort to do so undercut the larger efforts to reach pat peace in afghanistan the same person who integrates several times in the first place we can seriously provide for any number against the movement and the fact that caliban is an extremely cohesive movement existing 25 years without anything on the battlefield and the fact our very plain efforts to split the group to know if it made it harder we wanted the top down piece thats a different discussion but a much more viable way to get to peace in afghanistan. Now the point on the present with the domestic battlefield to speculate one of the reasons they asked the guard to take on this problem. So we could talk with her the best way forward is to revise that topdown process we should not be tempted to revisit the idea that some will Level Campaign of attrition will wear them down because it wont. Finally for the future if that process does get back on track basically the first item of every list of recommendations of conflict reintegration could be hopeless as far as the taliban and is concerned but that is crucial. I would go a step beyond to say this is one issue with negotiations as an International Community we need to want it more than the parties do. Weve done a fair amount of research of the afghan parties including the taliban would like to see in a final agreement is often a minimalist view of what is necessary i think people on the government side will look at it more from the lens of how can Development Programs integrate people and that television doesnt want to believe or acknowledge that fighters want a handout from the government. But this is a huge employment crisis was sobering numbers of people of the taliban and ecosystem with as many as 200,000 if you look at every category. Feeling too seriously provide for these people even if they are willing to go minimalist is a formula by which isis where the future functional equivalent can recruit a lot. Or get left behind. So the recommendations for making this work will have their most important moment if and when there is a serious deal. And i thank you all. A rich discussion and a lot to talk about we have ten minutes for questions. Moving directly to the audienc audience, starting with the woman in the back. I was part of the team that developed that program. And in addition to what you said, one is the mismatch between the training and the actual job. And second this was actually supported but the donors went against it so they stopped funding it so the people that have integrated were expecting money then they were left out in the taliban came and said now fight with us and those that were on the list were killed. But this is the past so for the future is about the community. Do we securitize aid and then for those that integrate do we give them more money or assume that communities are behind them but this is interesting to say that they had the support of their community. Said we look at the community as a support system for the taliban and cracks and very quickly can we envision a Paramilitary Organization to fight the Islamic State in the future alas the panelist to keep in mind the questions it will take a few questions at once. Thank you so much. I tend to agree there are different categories of fighter fighters. Some are not ideological motivated others by a desire for those that are committed to them or the word by many others join because of the fear factor. Does it suggest that same recipe to integrate those factors besides justice besides justice the chamber of commerce if that caliban is on board coming with a Peace Agreement one of the biggest manpower is security because youre still doing the deep security to protect any sort of investment in afghanistan so its easy to take soldiers and taliban and retrain them take away the labels and give them shotguns and pistols and give them private security of many other reasons you need security. So it seems there is a huge opportunity with afghanistan to reemploy these people and retrain them fairly quickly. Just a comment. Which points would you like to address quick. Thank you so much one of the key things i have learned is how important it is with protection and support but also through which a lot of these disputes are resolved. And looking at those two categories of fighters and then to be based on land but with that structure is the sense with that status and administration. So we did a survey a few months ago and there were a lot of these disputes but a lot of these are not contained at the local level which also means the national level. So than with the almost collapse of the state because we are trained to understand conflict at the institutional level so its important that we support and empower these responsibilities. And with that reintegration effort and to be successful at integrating. And second of justice and government and that means to give a form of justice and find ways to combine and more on emerge these existing mechanisms and then in resolving some of these issues i am personally relieved that after this level of Political Representation we have an organized District Council elections because it will take a lot of effort but through indirectly but that means we are privileged elders. We can only bring them every three years to the district for one week so we havent been checking on what we can do with the communities to effectively overcome some of these challenges. Thank you very much. Each panelist a chance to respond to those questions before we close. I can take a shot. In response to the rhetoric of military force against isis and in response to the question about you looking at private Security Companies with the taliban and i think its hard to know in advance exactly what role will be the right one in a fund to limit one fundamentally changed afghanistan in the post conflict moment that my personal view it will be virtually impossible to provide for what i think is the largest insurgency in the World Without significant use of the tool of Security Forces of some kind. Erica has been as articulate and forceful as anyone out there on the dangers of doing that and shes right on every point that she makes. Nonetheless given the absence of other alternatives and the apparel to those agreement if there isnt quick employment. And i would add to that the nonexistent chance they will actually turn in their weapons. I dont see that as an outcome in the Peace Process. Some form of responsible programs to integrate into the armed forces although im not sure how thats done with the isis component is inevitable to make the process work and i hope in the make those choices they heed the warnings to the greatest extent possible for those critics of the past programs have put out into public debate. Very briefly certainly there could be those as joining as security guards and there is an important distinction between those that are selling security roles or feeding into other trends within afghanistan. But be careful because the issue is the revolving door between folks that were taking out other folks through the ddr Program Given another job through Security Companies thats why the progovernment forces programs failed for go thats worth not repeating that mistaking giving more thought to that while recognize thats an industry that will likely continue in afghanistan. On a quick followup with paramilitary groups, yes, that is possible and its already happening now. In the last year and a half now not only with the paramilitary forces, the alp has already existed and they been making the Cottage Industry of uprising forces with evidence there is a quid pro quo to allow the taliban to take on. So far i would try to play an optimist integrating tele band for the local forces it might be a common enemy at the time they were fighting although im not prepared to be that being a sustainable solution for the future. I will give you the last word but also would like to direct the comments your way so what does your research and report say about who should be leading this effort cracks i have heard this is a political and governance problem but yet so many programs treated as military and you have reactions to that as well as final thoughts. First, to continue briefly the conversation on what is security form look like, we are not taking sides of me understood the sensitivities to predict what that might look like but we also wanted to underscore we need to be realistic that it is in cases where that Insurgent Force integrates into state Security Forces that is the case where the government has been victorious then there is a military stalemate for a decade then in likelihood look at former fighters from many different factions that may not be called reintegration but in columbia the farc said we will not use the government Reintegration Agency to become a ministry after the 2016 peace deal we will rename it and call it reincorporation to establish provincial a couple layers of subnational committees with government representatives to jointly work on reintegration issues. May be that pace the peace deal is framed maybe there is some instruction for afghanistan but to your question who might be in charge . The mantra in this post Peace Agreement with that broad reintegration effort if there is one that is distinguished from the general Development Assistance package, then it must be hosted in government led and probably would be for it should be this is their effort and afghans need to be in charge but at the same time we have to be realistic about their capacity and corruption challenges and ultimately it would be International Money so we have that prerogative to put in place some conditionality and measures of oversight to mitigate the risks. This is a conversation we could continue but we have come to the end of our time. Thank you for attending and those who are watching thank you for joining us and enjoying me with a round of applause for our panel. [applause] [inaudible conversations]. Now, on the tvs after words, ben howe asks whether evangelicals are choosing political power over christian values. Hes interviewed by author and history professor, john fea. After words his weekly Interview Program with relevant guest host interviewing top nonfiction authors about their latest work. Congratulations on this book. It sounds like its out there now and making a statement about things we need to think about especially about evangelicals and trump congratulations. Lets try to situate and i know we dont like labels and so forth but its clear from the book you do write this book as both an evangelical christian who self identifies and a conservative. Right . What are those two terms mean to you or how do you define those two terms