Our final panel today will examine how China Growing military presence and influence in south or Southeast Asia and africa Furthers Development of expeditionary abilities. We will start with greg pulley, he is the rector of Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative and at the center of Strategic International studies. He oversees research on u. S. Foreign policy in the asiapacific with a particular focus on the maritime domain and the countries of Southeast Asia. He is the author of the South China Seas and focus clarifying the limits of maritime dispute. Coauthor of multiple other works. He will focus on chinas activities in south, Southeast Asia. Next we hear from [inaudible], am i pronouncing it [inaudible] Research Associated at the African Center for strategic studies at the National Defense university. He is an expert on china africa relationships partnerships between the africa and east asia and the African Security issues. His forthcoming book, manuscript examines the influence of traditional chinese strategic culture on chinas military strategy in the western pacific. He also has a forthcoming book chapter on chinas expanding influence in africa. He will testify to chinas military activities. Thank you, thank you to the commission. Its a real pleasure to be here but i was asked to speak about their projections specifically in south, Southeast Asia. To do that i think its useful to break chinese capabilities and chinas efforts into different categories because the more we talk about chinese petitioner capabilities were not talking about the same things. Within Southeast Asia the most important way china projects power right now is from their own military facilities built at the heart of Southeast Asia which is the South China Sea. Over the last five years chinas ability to project power has moved south by about 1000 nautical miles and that is a big deal. It is radically altered the status quo in Southeast Asia. It has certainly sounds altered the balance of power with u. S. And gunpowders and allies in ways they did not a few years ago. The second is that chinas overseas facilities and other countries and i think were only talking about two for the time being. Were talking about the Chinese Naval base in djibouti and talking about an unspecified amount of chinese access to cambodians naval and air facilities. It bears watching but is not entirely transparent at the moment. We have a much bigger, more of its category, i think it was discussed a bit the last panel which is chinas civilian court and Airport Infrastructure in southeast, Southeast Asia where there is no direct of a Chinese Military presence but one must assume that china can leverage those facilities for Logistic Support as facilities in future conflicts. All of these bear watching but we have to be clear its the first in particular that immediate military concern and the last are tied up very closely with salt chinas economic and political strategy in the region in ways we cant disentangle. It is not purely military problems. When it comes to category one, the South China Sea, the way i think we should be thinking about this is beijing has moved through its military process quite quickly and in a very clear order manner through a series of phases. The first was the building of artificial islands. Apologies, in 18 months china constructed 3200 acres of new land starting at the end of 2013. It added hundreds of more acres to its existing basis in the [inaudible] and by the middle of 2016 that was largely dunford island building was over and there has been no new landfill work we judging in the South China Sea since the middle of 2017. China then moved into phase two and i was the construction of military infrastructure and if you look at 2017 alone time. With a world largely stopped watching the South China Sea closely china constructed 120 acres of purely military facility and were talking about 72 fighter jet hangers and a dozen hardened shelter for military bombers, transport aircraft, varied facilities to how weapons, ammunition and fuel and large signals intelligence and radar facilities and all the ports and harbor facilities and needed to enable a pla and costarred presence throughout the entire South China Sea. It then moved into phase three around pretty 17 which was deployment of highend military forms. At the end of 2017 we saw the first deployment of military control aircraft to [inaudible] so by the end of 2017 all three of chinas airbases were operational. We saw a series of increase in the number of size of pla navy and coast guard as well as Maritime Militia deployment in the islands. We saw highend jamming platforms deployed [inaudible] and anti ship cruise missiles and service to air missiles in china landed the first bomber in the para sales and increased the rate of rotation of their aircraft and the suggest ties had prepared the ground for a Rapid Deployment of say, broadbased aircraft if it decided to encase of the conflict with this is radically altered the status quo and the most visible part of this is what we are seeing out the current phase is persistent continuous deployment of chinese multi force short of actual kinetic capability. What we are seeing is the number of Maritime Militia vessels china has deployed has increased to about 300 on any given day, three fold increase in the course of year. China is preventing any new oil and gas work by the Southeast Asian states and china is able to see and monitor anything that moves on and above the most think blue the South China Sea. China is deploying its own to fish and their neighbors waters and prevent them from doing the same print this all undermines the american claim to be the defender of regional order because for Southeast Asian parties they look at us and say how did this help my fishermen and how did this help my oil and gas operators and that is the primary way for china right now is projecting power in Southeast Asia by undermining the credit ability of the u. S. As the supporter of regional order. Beyond the first island chain in the South China Sea are looking at the other two categories i mentioned. Chinese access to military base, right now starts and ends with djibouti and cambodia. Im not going to state a lot about djibouti and i think everyone on the pollution is familiar with the facilities, harassment of the nearby u. S. Facilities but in cambodia i get increasingly worried because we know to his on what the pla is doing. We had reports from u. S. Officials to the wall street journal last summer, more or less confirming that they have secured access to the naval base on the cambodian coast we have lungs expected the airbase province is been built by the Chinese Foreign military purposes and far too long for a civilian air force and that navy area and the turnabouts are four fighter jets. This has real indications but i worry less about the naval base in airbase but if you imagine chinese fighter jets flying out of cambodia suddenly china is able to contest or control the air over the streets of and into the indian ocean. That is a radical change. Beyond those two we move move into this amorphous, dual use facility discussion where we are talking about sri lanka and pakistan and all these could turn into Chinese Naval facilities at some point in the future and if because of the overlying ends on the chinese that they feel they have no choice more likely though they will see the pla navy use them for rest and replenishment. A lot of these facilities if you look at have no commercial rationale and they will never turn a profit and if the pla is the only one offering to pay for rights they will take the money. We have to accept pla will develop a water navy and will have Logistic Facilities around the world and we have to make sure that states arent armed with it against their will because of an overreliance of capital and i will and might segment their. Thank you. Commissioner. Commissioner, commissioners of the u. S. China review commission thank you for this honor. I will talk about the peoples republic of China Military protection and influence in africa. Our conference of report is contained in my written submission paid every january the highranking chinese official no lower than the state consulate visits no less than six african countries to mark chinas first overseas visit, a tradition that started in 2000. A state ranks above a cabinet minister and is one level lower than the vice premier. Africa is of paramount importance to chinas global ambitions, 60000 africans studied annually in china surpassing the u. S. And the uk are the most popular destinations for englishspeaking african students. African professionals and students receive 100,000 scholarships, 50000 academic and 50000 Skills Development each year. 2000 additional training thoughts go to emerging political leaders under 55 years, 302 media professionals, 202 local government personnel and around 2000 Security Professionals each year set to increase. Meeting every three years the forum for china africa cooperation gathers more African Leaders than the un general assembly. In between summits secretary stopped by officials across 33 chinese agencies oversees the daytoday invitation of programs. In africa cabinet level officials under the presidency caught in implementation on the ground occluding security and defense. 2019 a china African Institute was launched to facilitate positive energy and develop new models and learning between china and the african partners. Africa is fully integrated into the community of common destiny and the one belt, one wrote strategy both written into the state constitutions at Strategic Priorities for the new era. The community of common destiny is framed as a critique of western models. It is a vision of a world order reflect the chinese norms and models of security, governments and regional connectivity. While it provides broad theoretical guidance one belt, one road chinas Ambitious Program to connect two thirds of the World Population including one point to billion africans is the means by which china hopes to make it a practical reality. China wants to shape tomorrows geopolitical landscape. Africas strategic blueprints on governments incorporate several different aspects of chinas governance models, cementing the final Africa Community of common destiny that china and its african parts pledged to build a 2018. The examples include kenyas vision 2013, row wandas vision 2015, ugandas vision 2014, south africas National Development plan 2030. All of these align with chinas white papers on development, foreign aid, human rights and chinas role in the world. China has signed an agreement with the African Union to align one belt, one road with the African Union agenda 2063 Minutes Program for the develop meant strategic and per structure. This final Africa Partnership means that sufficient political will on the ground if china chooses to establish a military presence or Additional Base options beyond djibouti. My testimony explains that chinas patterns of behavior, doctrine and ideological orientation predisposed beijing to replicate the dual use model in djibouti. Future basing partners will ideally meet three chinese criteria. The level of importance in chinas partnership rankings, their ideological affinity and their ability to mobilize regional and continental support behind chinese positions. Thirteen african countries fit these criteria and all but two are maritime states and all 13 had Major Chinese civilian tool use of military acts. Nine have robust Space Programs with china, for had been the largest destinations of chinese fbi into africa and additional 46 nations host a range of planned or existing Chinese Investments in ports from saddam to south africa and from kenya tucson ago. The employee an indirect approach, multilaterally, bilaterally, unilaterally. Mandated operations top the list in their international and therefore less politically sensitive for beijing and also project china as a responsible big power, and image that china is keen to dash through peacekeeping operations they learn to operate in hostile environments and improve intelligence and surveillance for chinas counts of piracy develop its maritime production and support several tasks from evacuation to military diplomacy. China invests heavily in the African Standby force in the Regional Standby brigade hoping they will provide force projection once fully operational. Beijing meanwhile has placed its own 8000 strong Standby Force of the un disposal for crisis situations. Bilaterally china worked with partners to develop intelligence, surveillance, lawn force meant capacity and indeed african countries have borrowed about 2. 5 billion for these efforts between 2003, 2017. China uses China Companies in a bit to increase its security mix. Over 3000 mainly ex pla and expat personnel are to play globally protecting belt and Road Initiative and in africa. We do face legal constraints as they are not allowed under the law but they do. This highlighted recently is about weight when a chinese guard was jailed for shooting and wounding a son of a high level official. This is the ruling party in zimbabwe. In conclusion, i argue we should wreck a nice china advocacy strategy as part of a broader effort to realign global detriments and implement alternative Political Economic screen models that challenge western monarchs and therefore we should pursue identifying needs american competencies, and with partners and responding to african challenges as defined by them. This should account for the multifaceted comprehensive and multilayer nature of any security engagement in africa recognizing that they reinforce other tools of statecraft. Finally, we should develop contingencies for assured [inaudible] i thank you. Thank you. Now we will hear from doctor Cynthia Watson who is the dean of faculty and Academic Work college of the National Defense university. She has been studying latin america for almost two decades and we will ask her to focus on what she thanks about china and latin america today. Thank you. Thank you very much for this opportunity. I appreciate the interest that is been shown today in latin america. I appreciate each of the commissioners taking time and i think we will find latin america is a considerably less important position for the pla then my colleagues have described so far. I have to start by saying these are my personal remarks and should not be construed as any form of u. S. Government policy. The policy of the National War College or any part of the defense department. Chinas engagement and latin america dates back roughly 20 years and its height, certainly the transfer of diplomatic relations from taiwan to the mainland began in 1970 but the real emphasis for china and its role in latin america begins after the new millennium starts. Having said that chinas interests are primarily in, i would argue, rank order Natural Resources energy and food which latin america is providing and secondarily providing an area where greater emphasis on the same type of approach to the International System and an approach that respects the role of sovereignty is very important in latin america and offers china an opening to this region as the idea of shared partnerships. Third this is a part of the world where taiwan is still does have a small number of states, a decreasing number of states that respect taipei as the capital of china and beijing would like to reverse that and finally, this is yet another part of the world that has been discussed already considering the belt and Road Initiative where china is simply wants to play if not the dominant role as an external partner certainly a dominant role. What i did not say in that list of four things is i do not see at present latin america as a place where china intends to have a very large pla presence. I think there are two primary reasons for that and neither of those should be particularly surprising to anyone. First this is still the region and the chinese do read history even though im not sure we read history sometimes but the goal of the moron doctrine and the declared policy of the United States that this is a region where they will have a predominant is something i think beijing is still acutely aware of and that has led them to be considerably more cautious in terms of using the pla in a very overt or very aggressive way for fear of alienating the United States and creating potential problems and other aspects of the bilateral u. S. Chinese relations. Secondly, geography matters. The United States is simply much, much closer to latin america then is china and historically before the mid 20th century there had really been any ties between china and latin america with the notable exception of immigrants who came to build the rat roads in latin america as was true in the United States but that geographic imperative makes it such that gives beijing pause in considering whether possible pain of exciting thought United States for creating tension is worth the benefits that they will get out of pla involvement. That is not to say the pla is not involved but i would reiterate that they are not as heavily involved as they certainly are in the South China Sea or as we have seen in other areas of the periphery around china and increasingly we are seen the potential for in africa. Instead i would argue that what we see with the pla is it is a means to advance chinese interests but is not currently an end in and of itself. With that let me stop and isolate my remarks for your record and i look forward to your questions. Thank you. Thank you very much. We will start with the commissioner. I have two questions the first four mr. I noticed in your testimony i know china is managing ground satellite tracking stations in kenya and namibia and that the person that in doing that are from the satellite control center. Turns out the control center is pla, Peoples Liberation army support force Strategic Support force base 26. Do you know whether these are actually pla personnel . And then i am assuming they are and for mr. Polian, you talk about illegal maritime and a campaign to detect and report on them, wouldnt it take some kind of a un sanction before those activities could be designated and be acted on . Thank you, commissioner. Yes, from what is available in the namibian press one of those very active and robust professional presses media on the content and according to those press reports these are pla affiliated and that makes sense. It makes sense in the sense that namibia and china have a close relationship and the ruling partnership was trained by the share doctrine and traditions but i would also say that it might reflect a larger pattern because if we look at the organizations that provide support for the political schools around the continent those associations are closely affiliated with the pla and i discussed one of them in my testimony. Yes, it might also be a pattern. Thank you, sir but we already have enough standing off to say that the actions are illegal and legal in the eyes of most governments around the world and any number of issues in the customary maritime law. The sanctions we dont have a un mandate that ask Eastern Ukraine but we do still have it. At the very least we should be arguing that Chinese Companies who are supporting the paramilitary and sporting illegal construction in the south seas or supporting any number in the South China Sea should not be free to invest in u. S. Infra structure project which at the moment they are. Commissioner louis. As long as i have some time, i know that in latin america there are satellite tracking and do you know if they are also supported by the pla strategic. I do not know that britt i know the satellite tracking opened in the press is primarily in brazil where there has long been interest in space ties and between the prc and brazil and there are increasing that argentina which is beijing has been showing considerably more interest in the last couple of years and argentina has been rumored to be one of the other places that is appearing. I would make the observation to your question that beijings primary interest in this region is in brazil for a range of reasons. But what we increasingly see as we see states wheres democracy has failed or is failing bolivia, argentina, ecuador those are the same places that we see more pla involvement in latin america and i would caution all of us that there may be a step further that we need to be aware of and that is as we see democracy under greater threat in latin america, which is a phenomenon that arguably we are seen to include in brazil, those seem to be the places that beijing most readily targets with pla connections as a way to build literary to military ties. In those middle to middle ties but a the militaries are rising as institutions win the states of latin america that seem to have credibility that had been lost after the poor governments in the 70s and 8 side. Dont see much writing on that in the u. S. National security space right now. Secondly, as we think about our middle to middle ties with the region or actually our ties in general with this region, the importance of Southern Command as a symbol of the u. S. Government is one that is hard to overestimate. Will we see the pla attempt in its own way to model on that . There is some evidence for that if we see militaries rise again in latin america, again, as credible institutions. But we are not there right now, and i dont mean to imply we are. It simply strikes me, as i see what is becoming less and less comfort with democracy, or better said, as we see more and more possible failures of democracy in latin america, it is worrisome to wonder if they will then turn to some of the tried and true methods that have failed, frankly in the past to rely on the military, and i think that would open the doctor potentially to more pla involvement. Thank you. Im positive head nods out of dr. Mulvaney when i asked the question but who is operating the satellite tracking stations. So if you have published on it, well get a copy, and if you havent, i wonder if we could invite you in to just talk about it. Thank you very much. Commissioner louis. Mr. Poling. As far as the South China Seas go, what was chinas seeing as it began to build in the islands . What was the justification for doing what they were doing, and what did the u. S. Do at that time . Is it too late now for the u. S. To do anything . Early on we heard silence from the chinese and the region. Took over six months before anything knew what was happening. The chinese justification was a mixture of, these are necessary for the livelihoods of those stationed aboard it and then it was, well, theyre for civilian benefits in the region. Were using search and rescue, for weather forecasting, storm warnings, for hadr. The same excuses made when the chinese first occupied the spratlys in 1998. And i they were not compelling to anybody in the region or the u. S. At the time. What we did, i think, was spend a year or so trying to figure out what the end game was, and by the time the u. S. Realized how large and scaled this project was going to be, was too late to stop it. You can look at statement from pla officials saying they were surprised by how little pushback they got from the americans. Beijing was prepared for more of an International Outcry and felt they didnt receive it so it was full steam ahead. Now, we did eventually wake up to the threats and started tightening relations with the filipinos, with others in the region, negotiating the enhanced defendant Cooperation Agreement under the obama administration. Product product had a Nuclear Security summit in 2015 and said the building was a redline and the chinese turned the barges around and chose not to build on scarborough. So we took steps to prevent things from being worse but didnt do enough. There is still more think be done . Of course, we have to be ravings, i what china has built is built and what china has put on it. And theres nothing we can do to reverse that now. Our goal that be to convince the chinese not to use those facilities to kick around their neighbors and theyre not putting the sand back in the ocean but we can dissuades the chinese from using. The to attack partners. The land where those bases have been built, is that land claimed by any other country . Yes. So, six of chinas seven island nets spratlys, six of them are claimed very clearly by vietnam, the philippines. The seventh, is not an island. Its a peace of the sea bed that belongs to the philippines and all of them are in one form or another claimed by another country. The u. S. Position on six of the seven is that we take no position. We have not taken a position since 190 and not going to now. What would suggest the occasion for doing that. The justification is nobody has an airtight case. If you go back and look in separateleys its not clear that any chinese official stepped food on the spratleys until 1946 but no philippine official claimed them until the 1950s. The vietnamese are the inheritors of a dubious french claim. Theyre no been fit to the u. S. To wade into the messy historical arguments and nobody is a winner. He want to make sure they are resolved peacefully. Take them to arbitration, find. Negotiate, fine, but we cant accept the chinese using force against our allies to resolve the issues themselves. Also true that china is trying to keep indonesian and other countries Fishing Vessels away from certain of the lands, fishing grounds in the South China Seas, and theyre being contested by the indonesians . Certainly. The chinese claim vague historic rights that have no place in International Law out there the entirety of the South China Search. Their fishermen in their minds are allowed to operate in the Coastal Waters of the neighbors. The neighbors are not allowed to operate in chinas Coastal Water order the waters around the contested islands and reefs. And the recent stand knopf with snows is the chinese sent a half dozen coast guard adviceles to escort dozens of fishing boats, who spent well over a month operating in he waters of of indonesia and brunei to prove they can and they do that regularly now. Thank you very much. Thank you. Commissioner cleveland. Thank you all. Really, interesting testimony, especially because its late in the day so i commend you for keeping us all rivetted. Were going to have a hearing in i think april on africa and china, so i dont want to overly focus on this, but mr. Nantuyla. Your testimony was compelling and there is a risk of rep police indication of djibouti, and im interested in your sort of case studies of the 13 countries where theres partnerships, and most are maritime states. There are also countries that enjoy the benefit of debt relief, and so im curious butter staysment of which came first. Were these countries positioned where their credit and their economic position improved substantially with debt relief and then the chins moved in and took advantage of that . Or were this longer standing relationships and that debt relief dynamic facilitated an acceleration of Chinese Investment . I guess what im curious about is how you see that intertwining of the position that seven of the 13 countries were put in by very tour of debt relief, and i guess my real question is, an assessment on your part of chinese free riding when it comes to taking advantage of the debt relief which has now created an economic and a security risk. Thank you. Thank you, commissioner. I think its a combination. Think its a combination. The relationship, the relationships that its kind of difficult. When looking at all these Different Countries and how they interact with china, its kind of theres a lot of gray area. One might be tempted to thing that it could be an outcome of a very deliberate, systemic thinking on the part of the chinese or just coincidencal. But i try to go to the foundations. And china started engaging these Political Parties long before they governed countries, and for many of them, it was never really dish it was never a forgone conclusion that there would be an office. The Zimbabwean Liberation movement is a good example. A fierce struggle, and it wasnt clear right up to the elections, right up to the last minute, nobody really knew which of these two movements would end up controlling the government in zimbabwe. China has similar relationships in these seven countries i talk about. Man of them which now organize under the socalled former lesch racing movement of Southern Africa which chinese has strong relationships with them. Always a case where even in one particular country, china was associated with more than one movement. So thats where i take it to. In terms of the Ideological Foundation of these relations, what has happened is that on these these are escort of sort of like layers. You have the ideological element and then the political element and then the economic dimension. The fact that so hasnt of them are maritime states as well with Major Chinese dual assets and dual use assets and civilian assets. So it is essentially just in terms of what the research is showing, the ideological almost is a foundation and its true the colder war has been over for a very long time but the fact its colonys closest partnerships on the continent are with those countries it mentored right from the time they established liberation movement. So the debt, the economic dimension, the debt relief, has been an its been a rider, and its been something that the chinese have its been an addon to the chinese engagement but we need to pay close attention to the ideological partnerships and the partner ships the partytoparty relations that china enjoys with many of these countries because we shouldnt forget in the chinese system, the society, the party, the state, and the military are one. And the party is above all these four. So, that impact on the type of military relationships they have with these countries and it is a shared heritage. Without exception, all these countries also have this very, very close relationship between the military and the party, and i think that is where the foundation is, and theres not a whole lot of research being done into how china uses these ideological political relationships to build distributionicly focused. So this is an area for further research. Thats fascinating. If i have another round id like to talk but cambodia. Let me ask a quick question on the South China Sea. Perceive this has a fait accompli. You said so without saying fait accompli. I dont know that youre the person to ask the question, but two points. How does that how does the caught china see militarization affect our strategic forces, and how vulnerable are they to being neutralized quickly . Because these are not particularly large land masses. Shy be clear i think were losing but i dont think we have lost. We have to be clear what our goals are. If our goal is saving some form of the rules based order in asia, making clear the chinese dont get to just set their own rules bass they want to nobody has accepted chinas claims. Even the weakest neighbor says the claim is illegal. And we also have so pfaff dissuadessed from from using force against the philippines, and if you were to look at the u. S. Ty cal interest here, i think we are holding the line, albeit being pushed back bit by bit. The island does a few things. I talk how how to hey undermine the credibility of the United States as a provider of public goods. These state support or forward presence. Ought the forward presence we are pushed back to guam and hawaii and if they come to believe our forward presence only benefits us and doesnt help them that, no longer have any reason to support it. So if we cant sea same time we defend our freedom of navigation, defend their free. Of the seas, right to drill for oil and gas and right to fish, then we are going to lose the place in asia we have maintained since world war ii, which has kept us safe. When it comes to direct military power, the islands turn the South China Sea interest a chinese lake in the early stage of any hypothetical conflict. A conflict in asia, for instance, that involved taiwan or japan would require the u. S. These island cannot be neutralized without cost. Theyre rather large. The largest is the size of the i495 beltway, hundreds of pieces of ordinance to drop. If youre going to use long range munitions we dont have that much magazine capacity in asia. You have to empty thanages of u. S. Forces to neutralize what is ultimately a secondary target. When it comes to a war plan if a congratulations bros out we cede everything south to the chinese. Thats different from the posture we have green used to. That was my point of asking the equipment have a quick question on south africa. Lots of people are concerned but the chinasouth african relationship, and sees until a your analysis going back to chinese existence in the mao era has paid off and we must be frank that the United States government wasnt supporting the Antiapartheid Movement at the time, so, im wondering what your view of the historic relationship and the sort of today the contemporary impact of the historic relationship on south africa. Thank you. Thank you very much, commissioner. I certainly agree with you that is very important. South africa is special in the sense that, unlike the other these countries mentioned in my testimony, south africa developed a fairly robust democratic constitutional state in which theres a very, very clear separation between the state, the government, the army, the military, should i say, and the ruling party. Very, very clear, very clear lines. That shows in terms of the defense budget, discussions of National Security matters and so on. So, its a very special case, namely that the relationship is very tight, the anc and the communist party of china relationship is very tight, but south africa has not replicated the model, the party army model at all, in any way, shape ore form. However, for ideological reasons and for reasons of the strategic narrative and Strategic Communication and messaging, that relationship is really key. Especially under the zoom ma administration. We have seen it has extended into intelligence training and more senior anc personnel training at the Central Party school, and at the different academies. So the relationship has definitely deepened. So i think it does play a role. Certainly the two sides do invoke that. If we look at the statements that the president made at the where he was talking about the model, the chinese model as being viable and it is a model that african countries are going to work with and that those sort of unnamed countries that think that china is a negative presence, are only doing so for their own reasons. That, again, that rhetoric feeds into that the maoist traditions because the anc does have maoist traditions. So i think that definitely plays a role in south africa. The military exercises doesnt recently with thiemia as well. So i agree. It does play a role but i should also mention that the Antiapartheid Movement had very, very strong connections to the United States. Nelson mandela talked about american democracy, talked about his admiration for Thomas Jefferson and others, the federalist papers, and the anc has a strong relation ship with the Congressional Black Caucus and so on. So its a complex relationship but i think all these elements might factor in terms of smoothening that transition with south africa. Thank you. Commissioner bartholomew. Thank you very much. Thank you to the witnessed for very interesting testimony. I have dr. Watson, does your portfolio of latin america include the caribbean . We have not mentioned that at all but theres growing arm saleses saleses and Security Operations between the chinese and caribbean and mr. Nantuyla. You talk about the private security contractors who are primarily demobilized pla and pap. Are these contractors establishing themselves in the communities where theyre protecting the projects are they more sort of a migrant contractor presence . Theyve been demobilize. From the pla. Could they be remobilized in the event of needing to be used . Dr. Watson . Yes, maam. Yes, there are growing arms sales, but when one talks about arms sales to the island nations of the caribbean, one must think but what were talking about in relatively and absolute small terms. What is much more interesting about pla involvement in the caribbean is this is a region that is almost entirely excluded in anybodys analysis, apropos your question to me, and this is a case where the pla has seen a vacuum and has moved in and in particular we have long seen we have seen a very tortured relationship between china and cuba. I was very struck as mr. Nantuyla was discussing the ideological links between states in africa and china, because theres always been a great deal of tension, frankly, even between cuba and china because each aspired to be the dominant remaining state in the post soviet world for a communist regime. I remind everyone that the only ideological tie really in latin america between the pla and a Maoist Movement was the peru which has been quite a while ago and is dead. Theres not anything that anybody takes seriously about the rise again as there was even 20 years ago. But what we see is that cuba has proven extremely reluctant to commit to longterm ties with china that will, again, bind them to a regime that they then feel may discount them in a bilateral relationship. I would also just add this is in my committed remarks this is a part of the world where sovereignty matters a great deal, as it does in china, and that leads to one of the ropes that states outside of the caribbean are reluctant to completely embrace china, and certainly embrace the pla, for fear of a repetition of what they see as a longterm relationship with the United States that was not positive. And even in a case such as venezuela, youre talking about a regime driven by antiamerican and antiwhat they consider to be imperialist sentiment rather than a pro chinese view, and i think that is an important distinction. You see the same thing to a letters extent in cube bark although there are ties in cuba according to public press reports in intelligence and there certainly have been attempts since fidel castro passed away to move back to the possibility of stronger ties between cuba and china. In the remainder of the caribbean you see bits and pieces of pla interests but tens to be relatively sporeadic and the arm sales are more to build trust than to have any sort of military effect and that simply comes down to the fact that the island of the caribbean are basically using on Police Activities some theres no compelling reason for something beyond that. That doesnt mean police ties dont build into other ties, but as we talk about arms sales, we generally are talking about something more substantial than what we have seen in this region. Would also say the other thing that is important is the role of International Banking in the caribbean, where we have seen a great deal of chinese interests and we have seen a willingness on the part of these regimes, often without a great deal of transparency. Thank you, vicechairman, bartholomew. Its a fascinating and very confusing and very gray area topic, the Chinese Private military companies. Its evolving. I dont think the chinese have a clear idea about where theyre going, about use. I think its really this is one of those moving targets, yes, they have a law, they have a National Security law that allows them to deploy overseas into pla units overseas and had 300,000 pla units demobilized, what to do with them. They could easily feed into the domestic dynamic and theyve been problems with veterans on the ground. But i think we can look at it from a five point framework. The first is in some situations where we have seen evacuations, the mountains, south sudan, these were highly trained demobilized united that were able to evacuate chinese and situations of distress so thats really the first category, the first order of things and thats is what the Chinese Government would really like to see happen. The problem is that on the ground, the situation can become extremely messy very, very quickly. It doesnt always play out in the way it played out in south sudan and the mountains. They did evacuation in darfur. So that brings us to the second layer. So, with the ex pla theres a level of control. Then you have the Companies Like the Frontier Services group and so they get short, medium to longterm contracts deployed in maces like ghana, nigeria, and other places with belt and road companies. The problem is that they cannot even under chinese law they cannot bear arms but they do. So, what china has been doing its a very, very tricky situation. We have seen all kinds of permutations on the ground. In places like zimbabwe the contractors have tried to form local chinese Neighborhood Watch type situations, really gray area, really weird. But its done. In other situations, they have tried to work with local partners in the private sector, to form private security companies, and then they operate within that framework, which, again,er is also very tricky from a legal standpoint. In other situations, which this is basically the fourth level were starting to see we have seen this in south africa where the chinese communities is in n those countries get together and for purposes of safety, security and so on, will form sort of associatings with security with a security element to it. But its very tricky from a legal standpoint. And then the fifth level is basically direct operations that are done by the Frontier Services group. So, for instance, got an office in nairobi. Got assets they protect in places like somaliland and somalia as well so these are the five levels. I think its a work in progress. Chinese has a very, very, very robust Legal Assistance program in place for africa. Its been around since 20052006. Over 40,000 lawyers, paralegals. Theres a training executive Training Program in the ministry of commerce that do legal training, to harmonize african law with chinese law. Its dispute resolution at the moment, and investments. But we need to look at that and see whether these this machinery that china has developed will be used to push for legislation and laws that create a Legal Framework for the operation of Chinese Private military companies. So this is something the commission needs to look at because china does have the Legal Assistance machinery in place to do that. Sorry. When you say theyre doing this Legal Assistance training, its not as though china has a rule of law itself. So, what kind of norms and legal interpreter tryings are the training different african lawyers. Its been on investment three things investment, its been on property law, because the chinese are investing heavily and some of that gets into the area of Property Rights and compensation. So in kenya, during the building of the railway, there were issues around that, around community compensation. The are places in africa where land is owned by the community and cannot be privately owned and thats right sort of thing. Thats the second arena. The third arena is in dispute resolution, and under the belt and road that has been beefed up. These are the three areas, and its Legal Assistance. I use that for want of a better word but its really harmonization of law and of juris prudence. Thank you. Commissioner. Thank you. Mr. Nantuyla. Thank you for your the level of details, specificity and nuance in your testimony. Reminds me of when i was a military attache in beijing and had a number of interactions on topics you touched on today. The first south African Defense at day at attache, and so your testimony really brought back those memories and i appreciate the specifity but i dont have a question for you. Mr. Poling. We typically start our thinking about the South China Sea with 2013, maybe 2012. I argue it begin monday hanoi in 2010 when secretary clinton enunciated the principles of the South China Sea. I think the chinese went to school and did the pla did a strategic estimate of the situation and judged that the kinds of actions that they later undertook would be those that the United States would not defend with use of force, and we made public statements to that effect along the way as you well know. Were left with a circumstance now you said our policy is failing if not failed yet, you followed this more than probably almost any other human over the last six years and yet i find myself left wanting with your principle policy recommendation that the United States should reininvestigate rate its diplomacy on this issue. We heard testimony that perhaps the u. S. Should reconsider the two negatives. Our policy of two negatives. Were against we dont recognize, we dont take a position and were against the use of force, the argument earlier today is we ought to decide as a nation what our policy is and then we can proceed in a more proactive base thereafter. Id invite your comment. Where do you come out on this issue and related points . I think we have failed over successive administrations to adequately state what our policy is. I agree with that. Dont, however, think well gain much by trying to decide who gets to ownneath k and who gets to have southwest k. What we should stand on the principle that International Law is International Law, and chinas claims are illegal because they are made outside of that framework. If the other claimans want to bicker over rocks and reefs within the framework so be it. We dont particularly care that the japanese and the koreans bicker as long as they dont come to blows and remains win the framework of the International System. Our problem with the South China Sea is not the disputes over territory. Thats not a vital u. S. National interest. The maritime disputes that surround it, that touch upon the territorial disputes but can be separated from it, and so our goal should be to help push the region toward a Longterm Management regime for disputes so they can freeze the disputes for the next hundred years. The same way every a territorial dispute in asia has been frozen for the last century, but that fish riz, sea bed resources, free of navigation of air and sea are not impeded and we dont have to worry about our ally in the philippines getting kicked around and thats our policy since at least 1946, and really since the 1920s. Our position was always we werent going to pick whether or not the french or chinese were making making the claims of the spratleys and theres not a compelling reason to change that now. We have any other questions from the commissioners . Second round. Im sorry. I cant count. Id like to build on that and ask you, mr. Poling, about cambodia. And it seems to me its a lost cause in terms of the governments relationship with beijing, and im curious how you would characterize what u. S. Interests are in attempting to correct, change, reverse, alter the game on the ground in terms of either the port or the air field . What would you argue our interests are . Im eager to hear because id like to make that case. At this point i tend to agree with you. I think that our interest at this point are limited to dissuading the cambodians from allowing the forward deployment of Chinese Military aircraft are the air base. That is the thing that will then our larger interests, then our ally in thailand and singapore. Short of that i dont know we want to bend over backwards in appeasement of the regime, and we invested an enormous amount of effort and an enormous amount of money i mean the international community, not just the out and that experiment has failed. Cambodia is in freefall, an authoritarian kleptocracy. We cannot come wheat perspective the chinese in purchasing influence in phnom penh. We can try to support pro democratic voices and hope that at some point we see a change in governments in cambodia but we cannot debase ourselves because we worry about the Chinese Naval presence at the naval base. It undermines our larger effort in the region to support good governans and rule of law. I might suggest its about to become intergenerational kleptocracy. You mentioned thailand. How to do other countries in the reregion view it . I view it as the full collinization of cambodia. Thats not just a question for us. Its for our partners and allies in the region. How are they viewing the challenges as you described it, jets leaving from Cambodian Air fields and threatening the straits. I preface with everybody is going to keep quiet because you cant criticize a fellow member too loudly but the vietnamese and the thais are worried about the idea of a Chinese Military footprint on the are door step and are quietly encouraging the cambodians to find a way out of whatever deal they sign. And we can differentiate. Some logistical aspects they can hold their noses and live with. J11s flight out of the base is a whole different matter. You have seen a reinvestment from the vietnamese in their diplomacy toward cambodia. Theres only so much they can do. Its certainly serving as a lesson for the rest of the region, and you watch even laos the way they negotiated hard and for years of the railway, recognizing that they dont exactly want to be a client state. I caution i think the he reason that cambodia has been so effectively captured by the chinese is the circle of rent seekers they had to capture was so mall and does not reflect an actual capture of the hearts and minds of the country. Whether or not that leads to in the next generation certainly not the net but we could certainly see this come back to bite the cbp. The one that we do have to accept as long as cambodia is a chinese client it and is a chinese client than the ability to be the Regional Center we hoped for, that cannot happen on any sensitive issue and especially the South China Sea. If you want effective negotiating mechanismsed has to be out anything else is a pipe dream. Thank you. Mr. Unanimous to all la unanimous too la. One final question. Has anybody done a map as it were of the kind of ideological party state relationships and training on the continent . Understanding we have very, very diverse country. Has anybody done just a starting in 1960, this relationship with the anc and we saw cadres going to china . Has anybody done that kind of historical napping. Thank you, chairman cleveland. To my knowledge, no. No. So we do have bits and pieces of analysis that have come out over the years on this issue but we dont have anything comprehensive as yet, and i think its necessary. Its necessary because this is really the foundation. Now, theyre not that many of them but this is really the foundation, and seems these countries wield tremendous clout of the level of the African Union and even the united nations. Where china has increased its engagement with african support in shaping the way u. N. Agencies work at that level so much these countries have been very, very key. So its i agree, its a critical area, and it also shows a level of flexibility, namely that china also has very tight relationships with countries with which it doesnt have ties but the foundation comes from those countries it works with the moment. I really think its an area that we need to look at quite systemically going forward. Thank you. Thank you. And that is a your last statement is a segway to the next hearing that i would remind folks that the china model, beijings promotion of alternative global norms norms d standards which happens on march 13th. Id like to thank everyone and the staff for this here and the preparation and hard work you have all done and your testimony today. With that we will adjourn for the day. Thank you very much. Very interesting hearing. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] this week were featuring booktv programs featuring what is vandal every weekend. Tonight at 8 00 p. M. American Enterprise Institute director offers his thoughts on how americans can rebuild their communities. Thenes a cline looks into the american political divide and then michael behind argues that democracies are being unraveled by a new class war. This weekend and every week own once cspan2. Campaign 2020 is in the nevada on friday, live at 3 00 p. M. Eastern. At President Trump speaks in las vegas ahead of the states caucus. Live coverage on cspan. Watch at cspan. Org and listen on the go with the free cspan2 radio app. This weekend on booktv, africanamerican history, the likelihood of secession and challenges for the working class, sat at 6 20 p. M. Eastern. Karen on their latest book on africanamerican history. The fierce 44. We dont say this is the greatest black achievers ever. We dont try to put that on these are just 44 that we looked at that fit the sensibility of the first africanamerican president , in the sense that heres something that they did something pioneering, something disrupting, they were some cases i say noisy geniuses or quiet innovators. At 9 00 p. M. , George Mason University professor buckley examines the possibility of states exiting the union in his book american secession. Every morning the Washington Post arriveses on my door step and seems a fresh argument for secession. Just drips with contempt on the other side. Theres a lot of that. I think what is missing is a tolerance an understanding of people with very different points of view. Sunday at 9 00 p. M. Eastern on after words, a report on the issues facing the working class in Rural America in the book tightrope, i theyre interviewed by Oregon Senate democratic jeff merkley. In she small towns around america, people are walking on a tightrope and one miss and they fall. Theres no safety net. Over the last 50 years we have vastly over kind of obsessed with this personal responsibility narrative. Blaming the people who fall off the tightrope for the cat catastrophes that follow. This weekend on booktv on cspan2. Today u. S. Special representative for iran, brian hook, made an announcement outlining new sanctions against five iranian election officials. Good morning. Good morning. Tomorrow the Iranian Regime will stage an event called elections. Unfortunately for the iranian people, the real