We want to flag everyone. We are more than 300 people registered. We will do our best to get in as many questions as possible. It is my great pleasure before joining the council. The special assistant to the president in north africa in the gulf region. Responsible for relations. In the organization for security. In europe. Having written numerous books on u. S. Foreign policy. They recognize the release of the newest book. They hail it as the examination of u. S. Regime change efforts. For everyone interested in americas foreign policy. Let me vote for all of the members on todays call. You will have the opportunity to receive a copy of as well as two other csr books published this month. Let me welcome phil gordon. We have a great group. Let me say congratulations on the plication of the book. Why ts book at this time. This is aistory of u. S. Regime change. In tryg to learn from our hiory less we rept it. Half of the people on this call have been thinking about regime change around the world. I felt thi as i watched in particular. They formulate the policy on iran. That was not the stated goal. But we d a lot of proponents pointing in that direction. This road that we go down. Maybe it wou be useful to ask this question. How had we done it before. Thats what i did in the book. It tns out this is unusual. The average o about once per decade for the last seven years. Then you get afghanistan twice. Obviously the iraq war. And then interventions by obama. It is something we regularly had done in every case no matter how we did it or why. The costs turned out greater than we thought. It was harder to deliver the objectives. Why is the book called losing the long game. Can you clarify for me whether you are making a broader argument. Or it specifically doesnt work in the middl east. The book focuses on t middle east. For the most part to the extent that there is a foardlooking contemporary debate. People talk about it all the time. The gime in saudi arabia. That felt to me like the most cuent policy. Its where i have the most personal experience. This is not just aistorical exercise. But a reflection on the their own experience. Thats what i thihink the middle east is most relevant. More than latin americand asia and elsewhere. Its a where i hav to direct experience. Its even harder to pull this sort of thing off in the midd seat east than elsewhere there areot long spmac coherent nationstates. Other than turkey and iran. They cross religions. Even more than elsewhere. When you were removed regime. There are other relevant cases as well. Most people will grant you that. Lets talk about another case that we discussed in the book. That was praised as a low caution initiative. Why is a conventional wisdom wrong. I think people who havent really focused on this would say obviously the iraq war was a disaster. The cost off the charts. There were other cases where it was successful. The first intervention. Its like the poster child. Its not like the iraq war. For a relatively small amount of money. It is nothing as far as these things go. We have achieved the objectives. At first of course. It was another lesson in all of this. Under carter. The objective was to push to the government. Bob gates at that time. Over time after that. We are can change the regime. The mission and escalation. It was an obvious success. It didnt cost much. We got rid of the communist back ever met. What could be better. How could you argue against that. When you put in full project it was a nobrainer that this was a great idea. It is true that we have achieved those objectives. We also led to by pursuing the support of the opposition a savage civil war that lasted for more than ten years. And killed over a million afghans which was like a tenth of the population at the time. Fueled this movement in notion that their supporters who included a summa been a lot in. Could take down a superpower by fighting against it. You get this vacuum afghanistan, savage civil war with lots of casualties in consequences and that even after the regime goes we go away. But they keep fighting until the taliban finally comes back. Four years after the regime falls and institute this dystopia of chop enough limbs in destroying the statute. Repressing the society. After which we responded again by doing another regime change in afghanistan. At the costs of a trillion dollars and so on. The longterm costs and consequences are much greater. Then looking at that immediate results. The other historical case you could do. And iran in 1953. And also the invasion of afghanistan in 2001. You were in the obama administration. In egypt. When they were launched against libya. And when president obama first raised the redline in syria can you tak us quickly through those cases. Is really interesting as well when answer the question about what led me to this. The oth reason i wanted to give this a hard think and d some research about it is my own personal experience. Ama who as much as anything has the principal opposition to regimehange. He opposed the iraq war. He was will placed against john mccain. They supported the surge and obama early on and raised estions about just the sort of things im talki up. Then when they were the unknown state sator. When he says, im not against war im just against those wars that will empower a qaeda. And lead to all in sorts of unintended consequences. That was ironing thathey were opposed to this and finds hielf pursuingimilar objectives. All of these regim changes are different. They have difrent motivations. What is similar i the notion that the United States can decide that a particular regime is so proematic. That never get to remove it and put Something Better in place. The two cases that i write about. Are all hugely different. We did not intervene aall. I can explain why thattill changes the regime. It started with a different mission. It wasaving lives. We decided to achieve that objective. We support an opposition with the view of getting rid of a side. Very different cases. Nearly each one even barack obama. Getting back to the notion that they want to pivot to asia. And certainly not go toar in the middle east. Find themselves pulled into thisotion that we can use this in oneay or another. To bring about positive transformation. We certainly failed to achve that goal. Lets begin with egypt. Ma people might say wait a second. When they alluded to the question of whethert fits your set of cases. Walk me through how you now understand our decision to drawupport and why tha counts. It is definitely fair to ask. You could make a case that it is not there. The reason i keep it in this category ishat once the revolution was underway we did ultimately get to a point where it became u. S. Pocy. And as my definition of regime change. When they have a policy matter and i sets out to get r of a government and transform the political system. Within a system. An attempt to transport that system. We try to do that in egypt. Once they decided that the couldnt survive anymore once they decided that. We dided to not only urged him and push h out with diplomacy but support elections that we knew were likely to lead to a very different political approh which they did which is changing the regime. In that sense it did become u. S. Polic ofourse it didnt happen initially as a deliberate. Either way it was the opposite it was ironic that you have the Bush Administration determined to spread democra and freedom and use all of his Power Transport the region even bush by the second term have more or less moved o in American Public an american publ was just not into it, it was when we decided tha the regime change was our thing. Ouide of our control you get the arab spring. D the people in these countries start to demand change. He did not initiate this but you get the developments in indosia. And then people start to think maybe this is possible. And then it starts topread to other countries in the region. And that presented the United States with a policy choice. In the spectrum wasnt massive but within the spectrum there was a way to stick with robotics for a wle. Or just decide look, hes on s way out. We should be on the right side of this. And i want to go too much in e weeds here. I think its interesting and relevant that this generational divide that you head at the top of the national secity team of obama between those more senior cabin officials and secretary gates. Vice president biden. They were mo cautious in skeptical in the nt generation there say no, this is why he was elected. He tried to promote change. Therwas a policy choice. And it came to a head when it watime for obama to address at he wanted to do. One wasore in the orderly transition side. He ended up going int the latter direction. Lets talk a bit now. It was about the responsibility to protect. And thoseho face vlent ppression by the government. At that time. It was a nato operation. A t of pressure calls from some of our closest allies in europe to join in this effort. You come away saying bad idea we should have done this. Walk me rough thinking about that case. I was doing middle east for the whiteouse. As you say. Because this was acrs the mediterranean from europe. They we deeply involved and it became a nato operati. One of thehings thats interesting about it. Asn this case it was the europeans pushing us to tervene. A classic thing and i said it was some irony. It was wrd for me to watch in one case t secretary of state be lecturedy the french and the italians. Do not really believe in this litary force. Thats what happened whe i went to the g7 material. This is a tough call. I think anyone has to acknowledge damned if you do damned if you dont difficult policy call. And massacring a bunch of civilians. Or provoking even further divisis. The europeans felt like this was producing refugees. They felthe same way. We need to act in the u. S. Needs to bhere. They were pressing us and urng us so those of us that lived through that 2003 iraq war. Even being berated by s. If the shoe on the other foot experience. That was back into the decisionmaking. It was an important factor. Apparently helps explain why the nonierventionist ended up intervening. The domestic media butlso allies. You haveour allies urging us to act. In this case i think it helps to take out his judgment. And secretary clinton was sort of in the middl saying both. As secretary of state hearing this constant pressure the u. S. Has to be a team player youave to leave that pushed her to go to the side of intervening and help shave at decision. What is interesting and underscores why this is always so hard is that t lesson of the iraq war was tried to occupy after you intervene. We try to do it thepposite ways. The unique capabilities in. And then the europeans who were s set on doing this. We are to do it without peacekeepers. If they showed theost of heavy forces in occupation. They showed the risk of dng the opposite. Lets talk about the third case. You are at the white house. You prepare pair this as a failed case. It comes to no surprise to you. The real problem in syria was in regime change tt we didnt fully commit to a policy regime change and if we have we wouldv gotten a much better telecom. Why do you see that as misguided presentation of the case. A lot of this happened while i was doing middle eastern things at the white house. People start to rise up against asad. As they have done against others. It was a little bit of a time lag. They were watching what was happening and the other cases. Wait a couple of years before i started dealing with this issue directly in 2013 or by u. S. Policy it was not to intervene i think obama was keen on avoiding the middle east conflict. They have unintended consequences. Early on, when others worst turning to push the United States in the been more. They have said publicly. They commissioned the study of where we have done that before and how that worked out. The same sort of angle in my book. The response is not very encouraging. They were determined to avoid being pulled in to the intervention or regime change in syria but over time just like i described in libya the pressures group. There and is humanitarian situation. With allies in the region who want to want to do more and more. And ultimately that did lead the United States to increase its support for the opposition. But what it showed. And this is what i want against from all of these cases. Certainly in the case of syria it showed that modest increases in military forces doesnt necessarily lead to a quick transition. And the empowerment of pro American Partners or democrats for stability. It escalates. And especially in the case of syria. The Syrian Regime have backers in place. They were even more determined to counter escalate. I think it really underscores and rebuts the notion that for modest resources or intervention or use of force you can change the regime this way. Once we started to do more in support of the opposition is the regimes backers started to do more. I think in the history of all of these cases shows there is not an example where sanctions lead it to led to regime change. Nor modest amounts of military force. Of course it wouldve been possible to do whatever it took to overthrow the regime but that would not had been possible with the weekends weekends worth of airstrikes. Or more aid or opposition. It would have been required. An understanding that the escalation that wouldve been required wouldve been much greater than people imagined and then a willingness and an answer for what you do once you get rid of that regime because just like in every other proceeding case you create a vacuum that would lead to a composition among Different Actors in syria in the region and youd had to you have to be able to insert what you were going to do in that case. By the middle of the conflict it was clear to me as we were still trying to get rid of the asad regime. I did not know who would come to power in the wake. But i did know it was not going to be the democratic opposition that we were most in favor of. You could add to namic like this that was based on arming people and who is able to see has power especially with the support of the allies abroad at that even gets consolidated its most likely unfortunate. Before i bring the rest of the group into the conversation. Theres always a question about First Principles are basic analysis. I will take your point that none of these operations achieve all of their objectives. Some of them fail. But to try to develop what sense of what could happen if we have not enacted. I and others are always challenging. And it can happen anyway that you want. Why are you sure that it will be better off if they have different strategies in the middle east and cut it we had ended up with an equally miserable track record. We would have a meeting about how we did too little and set up too much. The other thing i described in all of these cases. Whatever approach we tried. The critics afterwards said the opposite occurred. If you go to the big occupation force. The critics say you should have done light footprint. That is certainly a fair. Let me also acknowledge from the start. They were all superhard calls. All of the options were bad. They were always very sound reasons whether it was geopolitical competition. That is not my argument at all. It comes down to whether you are able to achieve your objectives. I want against in this context. This is a very american thing. There is always a solution. Dont just stand there and do something. It is partly derived from the history of great accomplishments. Its been so powerful for so long. Does that said that we so that we could see the tremendous power. Get those things done. Its a very american thing. If it has a problem and a solution the problem is its not always the case. In many ways its honorable. Its also a potentially dangerous one. In a number of these cases. Thats what we try to show. Since the situation is bad it cant get much worse. Lets fix it. We just dont have the confidence in power and leadership that we should. I think the same is true in syria. I cant get much worse because its a terrible dictator. So do something. If what you do rather than the conclusion. Makes things worse than it really is the worst of all of it. Thats why i think it is dangerous to think that if youre not happy with the situation change and see what happens. In the book i try to be honest in each case when i show the cost of consequences of what we do. And talk about what they alternative to it is. We are better off in situations like this when we use some combination of containment with engagement and arms control and development than we are when we decide we are just cannot transport when you look around the world. Either successfully as opposed to places where we had decided to manage and engage i think it strongly suggests as a genera rule better approach. I want to pull on the thread that you jus laid out. Whether we can break our regime change. We do had one more question. I would like to invite members to join the conrsation with questions they might haves meeting is on the record. Thanks very much. You made a really interesting point. Having just a couple of real states. Do you think regime change is easier or makes more sense or had better longterm possibilities of good consequences in these real states i run as a real state. We got 25 years after that coup and 53. During the cold war. Many people might say not so bad. Ups and downs. Not a failed state. Do you think it makes sense to think about yes, those are two really interesting questions. The short answer is yes i do. Dont misunderstand. In terms of easier yes in the sense that youve a greater chance of some form of institutional cohesion. Some national every say is fractured. The ones that are completely artificial. Once you remove the regime you are creating that area for power. And not only that. Particularly in the middle east. You get the Competition AmongDifferent Actors within the state and something you know greg all too well. Is not just the one that most people think about. You have a divide in the country is lining up. You have a give a similar sort of thing going on in yemen or frankly any country in syria as well. They are largely lighting up on one side. Underestimated in all of this. Even if you have a great and if it im not having a split you get a split among the countries. The emirates in saudi arabia and the egyptian government. If you say it is in the category artificial and not longstanding nation state. I think it is that much harder. When they have cited while before the iraq war. They have all of these arguments. And worked while it worked well in germany and japan and other cases like panama and grenada. Part of the problem is that states like some of those longstanding institutions in democratic precedents have a much greater chance of surviving the regime change. Its also a fair point. I mentioned the chapter of original sins. We did regime change in the region. Twentyfive years and that cold war. Just like ive made i made the case about the first afghanistan. We got rid of a prickly nationalist. We start to spin the analysis around what we want to see. They were going to take them into the communist camp. It was vastly overstated. By getting rid of that. Weve a pro american regime. We also destroyed any prospect of democratization in iran. And put in place the rep press of dictator. It fueled the anti americanism. Even in that case i would never say this. But the longterm consequences are pretty extreme there. Will take the next question from george. Thank you very much for a very interesting talk about the trump tragedy. It is geared towards policy change. With the economic strangulation. But others who find it not likely that the regime is going to back off on either its Nuclear Development or its adventures within the middle middle east. Argue that the real strategy is regime regime change. Other than the fact that it really works whether there is anything about the contemporary iranian situation that would lead one to either be pessimistic or optimistic about the feasibility of this strategy of economic strangulation military threat leading to regime change i am prepared to accept that. In backed away from any nuclear ambitions. On the face of it. Fair enough. But realistically i think it is the only real goal. The stated demands for that behavior change almost seem designed to be rejected. Left a get rid of everything that theyve learned and done over the past 20 years. Inspections whenever we want. When you follow the policy and listen to the way they talk about it. And pompeo himself. You dont really think this regime can change. The people can change the regime. I think that is clearly what the strategy is. Lets be clear. Maximum pressure has definitely increased and imposed that tremendous pain. It hasnt really brought us closer to that deal. In it is expanding the nuclear program. The strategy really seems to be implicit about it. The support for protest. So finally because you ask if theres any reason to believe that maybe something is different. I am skeptical for all of the reasons that i had been talking about in these other cases. As just not the case that there are precedents for tough sanctions what the lead regimes. They just dont. And they have it in the middle east. Nofly zones. And squeeze the country. The nuclear capabilities. They did not leave power until we sent in the big guns to get them. It was affected with the nuclear m ambitions. We pursued that right away. The efforts to per se dash might persuade them to go. Aside, crippling sanctions. Just devastating. I think it is a fantasy to believe that sanctions will be the regime. To be overthrown by the population or to bring it back. Lets take the next question please. Thank you very much for a terrific conversation. I am curious about the consequences. In the inverse. It has taken actions both overt and covert to preserve elected regime stability in the middle east. Im curious if you see a similar consequences happening over time or in regimes like that. Deeming places like egypt and saudi arabia. Look, the same consequences of that also. When you compare them to the alternative they dont look so bad. Thats what we mean about managing problems. Those who said that the regimes we placed. Were usually right. People should not misunderstand my argument. I think the current regime. As all sort of horrible things. To the region and the world. In the policy question here is not whether we should wish for a different regime its weather actions that we might take like crippling sanctions. Are likely to lead to Something Better. You could probably list a number of regimes or elsewhere in the world where we would wish them to be otherwise. But unless we have a realistic plan to bring that about and not only bring about but then follow it up with something that is going to be more stable, peaceful and had better relations with the United States for more consistent interest. Then we need to think about it. Whenever you find yourself criticizing certain regimes in the regent or the world even though it is problematic. Ask yourself about the alternative. I think it helps understand while living with doesnt mean we should use the tools available. Or not to develop weapons of mass destruction were threatened that. I think a lot of things that we can and need to do with our power however frustrated we might be with some of these regimes that we support they contemplate the alternative reminding that strong statements from the white house or the weekend where the bombing. They are not going to bring about that goal. If you are not happy with that regime. You have to do a lot more than that. And then what comes in its way. He has some regrets about the operation. He have more in the category of its the right thing to do. I challenge that argument. I think its the easy way to look at those things after the fact where you dont question the operation. But we couldve followed it up better. I think they greatly said that. You need to be able to answer the question about the day after. Next question please. We take the next question from mark hanna. I want to thank you for writing this book. I want to ask a question about the International Precedent that is set. The United States is the ultimate roll maker. When it comes to the rules. And the international order. Do you worry that other governments might look to regime change. For the tool or tactic in their region now that we have done so. The king about china and neighbors and their neighborhood that they might want. Do you get into that in this book. A little bit. And i do point out that you could write an entire book about the costs and consequences of other books. And following into some of the similar traps as us. The saudis. In the regime change. But then the response is also an attempt to change the regime in yemen. With not wanting the regime to be in power. But you could question the effectiveness of that approach that has led to what is now close to six years of a horrific war. With this horrific consequences. I do a talk about talk about some non u. S. Cases there are non u. S. Cases that has backfired as well. There will be other countries that will pursued the regime change. In many cases other countries strategies. It entails getting the United States to execute this. Most countries dont have the capacity to do this. If the United States says were putting on massive sanctions. Your neck and it trades at all. We cannot allow ourselves to think about we can say here is the redline. And we are going change the regime if you dont do what we want. Its not an option for most countries. You mentioned a few there are some countries who might be able to pursue the regime change on their own but there is nowhere near what we can do if you look at it. When they set about to try to get rid of their neighboring rivals. It is through american power. Turkey and syria once turkey had decided that it was the sermon determined to see them go. Then i have the capacity for that. It did occur to them to try to set up the dynamic that would lead the United States to be in a more direct conflict. I think if they make clear what at second to do. You are less likely to get other countries doing it. Sir, we can take another question. We will take the next question from john sullivan. Thank you very much for your presentation. I used to be ascendant. You wont be surprised by my question. Have you looked at Ronald Reagans westminster speech. He sets out and unfortunately i dont think his predecessors have followed. We cannot impose our system of government but what we must do is work with democrats to help develop the country. I will just make a comment on the change of regime he must have looked at the work of richard. With that ran landmark book. Actually a cia officer. In 1953. Who opposed the overthrow. Laid out pretty much the consequences to that. In terms of the longlasting areas. Thank you for your time. Broke up a little bit. Im glad you brought this forth. It is important in the sense that i think they invoke Ronald Reagan as a proponent of regime change. And the president has shown how they can do it successfully. And invoke the policies. We can do the same thing through a sanctions and military activities i think the history of the cold war is not the time to get into the cold war. But the lesson i think is not how the United States can pursue the regime change but in some ways the opposite. The United States did not pursue the regime change. With the committee on the present danger. And overthrow the soviet government. They pursued containment. There are certain problems that you cant fix at a reasonable cost. So you contain them. You use arm control containment. And sometimes they can have a better outcome than trying to transform the situation directly and especially through the regime change. Ronald reagan wrote letters to the general secretaries of the communist party that were not that different from the obamas letters. About the desire to move forward and had pragmatic relations. I think its a myth to think that we won the cold war by trying to do the regime change in the soviet union. It came about let me remind you. Not because we armed the opposition or fermented rebellion. And people got that regime. They came out the opposite way. They realize they have a terrible system. I was losing economically. And it decided it have to try a different approach. Reg and i reagan i think is interesting because he misused the speech at the Reagan Library in california not coincidentally. To evoke the notion that it was a regime change. If you actually look at the history of our cold war policies and makes a strong case for containment and deterrence. Thank you very much. We have come to the end of our time. I want to thank you for that taking us through some seven decades of history in the middle east. I want to remind the beverage the members on the call this will give you the opportunity to give you a copy of the book. One note that the audio and transfer will be posted on the website. And we want to thank everyone for joining us today. Here is a look at some books being published this week. They reflect on the life and political career in a promised land. Attorney and legal installer. Offers his thoughts on free speech. And i was at the schoolhouse door. They argue that republicans are trying to dismantle public education. Also being published this week in big white ghetto. And looks at poverty in america. Brian hug suggests that topdown solutions are preventing people from succeeding. And believe in people. And that feuds in diamonds. Paul farmer provides a firsthand account of the ebola epidemic. Find these titles this coming week wherever books are sold. In watch for many of the authors and the near future book tv on cspan two. Much indepth with the author and chair of princeton university. Live sunday december 6. The most recent books include again. James Baldwin America and that urgent lessons for our own. Democracy and black in an uncommon faith. Watch indepth on sunday december 6 at noon eastern on book tv. Book tv Us Television for serious readers. All weekend every weekend. Join us again next saturday at beginning at 8 00 a. M. Eastern for the best and nonfiction books. Trent lott this week on the communicators its a reporters roundtable and a discussion of Incoming Biden Administration and some of the communication and tech issues that it may face. Joining us cat zakrzewski of the washington post, john hendel of politico, and kyle daly of axios. Da