Transcripts For CSPAN2 Hearing On U.S. Military Mission In Afghanistan 20240711

[inaudible conversations] call the committee to we call the committeeal to order the full Committee Hearing a Us Military Mission in afghanistan and the implications for the Peace Process with us involvement. We are doing this hearing was some members present in some members remote also to witnesses are remote so this is the first time we have been back for a full Committee Meeting since the covid outbreak i urge all of you participating and watching to make sure we work out the bug before we start our read the basic rules and outlines how we do this hearing i welcome the members joining us today to establish and maintain a quorum to participate and vote. Experience connectivity problem. If a person remotely have issues, the staff will help you get recorrected. Video of remotely, will be visible on television and the video feed. Members remotely will be asked to mute when not speaki. If they want to speak recognize verbally. Unmu their microphone pyre to speaking. Members should aware theres a slight lag of a few seconds between the time you start speaki and the camera shot switching to youment members o are participating remotely are reminded to keep the Software Platform video function on for the entirety of the time ty are in th proceeding. If he they leave, leave the video function on. If they going to be absent for a long time, they should leave it entirely and join when they return. And a designated, mute unmembers microphones to ccel inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the proceeding. And they may use the shout feature to alert the staff for chnical remote issues only and see a five minute countdown clock on the software, if necessary i will remind members when time is up. I joked with staff,oing the heings is like launching the space shuttle, not quite a technical, but a lot. Thiss incredibly timely and were lucky to have three outstanding witnesse with us today the honorable ryan crocker who wl be appearing remotely. Career ambassador retired u. S. Foreign service nonresident senior flow at Carnegie Endowment for iernational peace and a former ambassador to afghanistan. And dr. Steven bitle, professor of aairs in Columbia University and advocate for foreign relations. Here in person dr. Seth jones, the harold brown chair, director transnational threats project and Senior Advisor for the International Security program at center for strategic and international studies. Now, as mentione this is an incredibly and importantimely topic, just out 19 years ago we went into afghanistannd at the time we had a very clear mission, having just been attacked on 9 11, by usama bin lan and al qaeda out of afghanistan the we went in there and made sure that it never happened again, to sto the threat and to contain it and i think that continues to be the top mission, we faced a threat from transnational terrorist groups. We can debate how large that threat is, where exactly it comes from and how best to contain it, but it not debatable that the threat is there. Its worth noting for all the problems and troubles and difficulties that had that mission has been successful in one nse, we have not h a transnational terrorist attack on the u. S. And when we think abt all the men and women who served in the military, those who lt their lives, those who were injured,hose who have suffered because of this, also all of the stateepartment personl and all the aid workers who ha been there and allies and rtners. Keep in mind this is not just e United States of america. Nato ap a number of couries have participated in this mission. And in that oneey point, it has been successful and it shld not be taken for granted, but the question is, where do we go from here . Ile that has been succsful, there has also been a great cost as was mentioned inerms of the lives lost, people injure and the sheer cost to the nation in money as well. So where do we go from here and howo we move forward . I think its important tha we continue to maintain the mission to stop transnational rrorist threats and some of the other costs associated with this is the fact that iis disruptive to have foreign troops in a country. And as we look to contain the terrorist threat and stop the spread of th toxic ideology that fuels it, the presence of u. S. Troops in Foreign Countries is one of those things that we cannot deny fuels it. And you can think of your if you were in you own town wherever you live in america and a foreign troop cam rolling through town telling you what you had to do, it would not makeou feel good about that foreign untry. We would be in a better place if we did not have to have our troopsn Foreign Countries and i dont think we should ever forget that. The other aspect of ts mission ths made it difficult is in aition to preventing transnational terrorist threats that mission has morphed a littl into trying to bring peace and stability t afghanistan. Notheres a clear reason for inonnection to the basic principle of stopping transnational terrorist threats. Weve learned that ungorned spes, failed governments make it easier forhe terrorist groupso show up and take route and south asia is where there are a lot of that cld take advange of that, and that we could b right back where we were on 9 11. I dont think thats as quick a guarantee. And i think wve learned in 19 years were not going to impose peace onafghanistan. How were going to bri a coalition together and reduce corruption and build confidence, outside forces are not going to bring peace to afghanistan. One way or th other, the people of afghanistan are going to have to mak that choice. And when we look a ghanistan, i think we need to be very hule about imagining theres something we can do to make that different. We can help, certainly, we cannot ultimatelyolve the problem and we have to balance that again all of the costs i just laid out and seemso me this point the common sense thing to do is to have the absolute minimum presence that we require to meet our goal of stopping that transnational terroris threat. I happeno believe that we need to draw down there because of the cost, because of the impact, and because of e fact that its become clear that were not going to be able to imse peace upon afghanistan. There are a lot of diffent ways to contain troublesome gions that could potentially pose transnational terrorist threats. We have an enormous experience with doi just that, libya, yemen, somali or several Different Countries in west africament the disruptions there, the instability ap presence of violence groups in some cas with transnational ambitions shows us whave to work hard withocal partners in a variety of different ways to contain that threat. It doesnt require thousands of u. S. Troops. My hope todays to give us guidance how best to contain the thrts coming out of afghanistan and south asia more broadly while minimizing the risk, cost expense a crucially minimizing that disruptive effect that the presence of u. S. Troops on foreign sl has, that the propaganda, that it hands to our enemies, to argue about what the u. S. Is doing that requires this ideolog extremism. How do we balance that . This is timely because the president just made his announcement hes drawing dow to 2500 troops in afghanistan. Its absolutely crucial tt we work with our partners on whatever our plans are, but i think its a crucial moment as we decide what our future is in afghanistan. Nobody wants to be there forever. Now people said weant have rever wars and i personally never liked tt phrase because a war that lasts kone day done for the wro reaps and wasnt necessary is completely and totally wrong. On the other hand,f youre going to war, if youre fighting becse you need to protect a core interest and it lasts as long as it lasts. I never imagined myself wanting to quote lindsey graham, but when heaid you maybe tired of fighting isis, but isis is not tired much fighting you, i think thats an important thing to think about as we try to ntain the threats and minimizing the threat and impact and costs of doing that. I look forward to the witnesss testimony. And withhat ill turn it over to Ranking Member thornberry for his Opening Statement. Thank you, mr. Chairman and i have to say it is good to be back in our Armed Services committee home. And because this may well be the last hearing of this session of congress, i want to take a moment and just express appreciation to you and to the staff for the way you have dealt with incredibly channinging circumstancchannin anning challenging circumstances in covid and weve pressed ahead with hearings, pressed ahead with having our bill passed overwhelmingly on the floor. House in conference now with the senate. So our business has continued in spite of the challenges and that is in no small measure attributed to you and the staff dealing with all the technical challenges that we face and i appreciate it. I agree with you that this is an incredibly important topic. Rightfully, our National Security our military and National Security apparatus is more focused on Great Power Competition, but the terrorist threat has not gone away. And so it is one of the challenges of our time that wed have to worry about this wide range of threats. The other thing i just want to emphasize, which you mentioned and i think we maybe dont say it enough, is that when it comes to National Security, its really hard to prove what did not happen. And in the case of americans who have fought and some died, to prevent a repeat or worse of 9 11, i think it is very important for those who participated and family members who lost loved ones to know that it has been the last 19 years has seemed far greater success than i ever expected on september 11th, 2001. The idea that we would be this far removed there have been terrorist attacks against our homeland, but nothing on the scale of 9 11 and we know from our classified briefings that they were planned, attempted and some far worse even than that day. So appropriate appreciation as you say to the military, but also intelligence community, Law Enforcement who have helped prevent that is probably something we need to say and recognize more often. I think it is very important to have this hearing today. I should say, by the way, that a hearing on afghanistan has been on our agenda for months, but it turns out, that this is a very timely hearing today. The goal all of us have is for the afghans to be able to handle their Security Issues on their own so that no transnational threat emerges from that territory, but i do not believe that they are there yet. I have tremendous respect for each of our Witnesses Today and look forward to hearing from them. What they see is the state of the conflict today. What effect our unilateral withdrawal in the midst of negotiations may have and any advice they have for the Incoming Biden Administration on how to deal with the afghan and broader situation in south asia. So i look forward to hearing from nem and appreciate their participation today. I yield back. Thank you, our first witness will be the honorable ryan crocker wh is parcipating remotely. Bassador crocker, you are recognized. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Ranking member thornberry. Are you able to hea me . Yes, we got you loud and clear. Go ahead. Excellent. I would note that i come to you this morning from the great state of washington. Its about zero dark thirty out here, but im honored to be here. I approve of that and wish i were there as well. Mr. Chairman, you and the Ranking Member have summarized, i think, very, very well the central question that we as a nation are dealing with. Why are we in afghanistan . After 19 years . Its pretty simple, pretty basic and pretty crucial, to ensure that nothing again ever comes out of afghanistan that strike us in our homeland. After two decades its again, very important reminder, so that and a reminder of who we fa out there. An of 9 11 the taliban was given a choice, it could give up the al qaeda terrorists that were enjoying safe haven in afghanistan and we would not take military action or they could stand pat and suffer the consequences. They chose the latter, mr. Chairman and have been in exile now for almost two decades. Unfortunately we are at a moment when the taliban sees the end of its exile and the opportunity to return to control. Mr. Chrman, i have the privilege of opening our embassy in afghanistan in the beginning of january, 2002. What i saw there was a scene of utter devastation. A shattered city, a destroyed country. And as bad as the physical damage was, was immediately aware of the profound damage two decades of conflict had gone done to the Afghan People, especially during the period of taliban rule to women and girls in afghanistan. I thought it important to move swiftly to try to repair the damage to the human capital, as well as the physical. So we opened girls schools right away. Still, in january of 2002, i had the privilege of hosting the then chairman of the Senate Foreign relations committee, senator joe biden. I took him to visit a girls school. We sat in on a First Grade Class that had girls ranking from age six it age 12 and the 12yearold came of age when the taliban took over the country. So i saw a unique opportunity here. As this commitment knows so well, we often find tension between our Cory National gals and our National Security agenda. In afghanistan, the two came together. Our values and our interests dictated that we be present, and that the al qaeda did not return with allies and the best way to do that was developing the human capital. So when i arrived in 2002, there were about 900,000 students, all of them boys in ghan schools. I returned as ambassador a deca later and when i ended that ambassadorial post, there were eight million students. And around 35 of them were girls. Over the long run, mr. Chairman, it is the Afghan People, as you rightly note, who have to make peace, certainly an educated population and with girls and women playing the role they deserve in these momentous decision is the best way to ensure our own longterm security. It will take strategic patience and tend u. S. Engagement. The Peace Process, socalled, was launched now almost two years ago, represented a very bad u. S. Concession. We agreed to longstanding taliban demand that we talk to them, but not with the Afghan Government in the room. They considered it a puppet regime. So we gave in and it underscored, i think, that this again, socalled Peace Process, thats not whathis is about. These are surrender talks. Were watching the white flag, basically saying to the taliban, you win, we lose, lets dress this up as best we can. And an eerie reminder othe paris peace talks on vietnam. But i wouldnt push that parallel too hard and too far. In vietnam neither the viet cong nor the north vietnamese had attacked the homeland or ever considered such a step. Al qaeda did attack the homeland from afghanistan, posted by the taliban. They have not become kinder and gentler in the intervening years. Itis, im afraid to say, folly to think that a full u. S. Troop withdrawal is somehow gng to make us safer or uphold our core values. We have, as you point out, nato in the mix. I think thats very importan weve heard from the cretarygeneral of nato, expressing his concern over the president s decision this week to cut in half the already small number of troops we have in afghanistan. So again, i commend you for holding this hearing. I do believehere is a way forward in afghanistan that will minimizeur costs andur human losses,hich have to be an imperative. Ill be part of a wking group put together by the Rockefeller Fund and the Atlantic Council to do just that, but we have to show the strategic patience we need to face dow a determined enemy. Id like to teust a moment on another special groupf kids that have sacriced a great deal for u and those are our intpreters and other afghan individls who have helped our mission in that country. Mr. Chairman, youve recently received a letter from senators shaheen andwicker asking that the necessary steps be taken to grant 4,000 visa for these individuals and their families. Theres a backlog oflmost 18,000 cases and, hey, tse are individuals thatre at enormously serious risk. No one lt behind a group dedicated to bringing our interpreters and oths here to fety calculates about 300 individuals, interpreters and their family members have been killed while waiting for the visas weve promise them and have delivered slowly and in disappointingly small numbers. So i would urge this committee as it moves ahead to do the right thing, the thing we promised. Bring these brave people re. Bring them home, their new home. We will never regret having done so. If we fail in this endeavor, we have have introduced, i think, our own core values, the nature of w has changed. There is no more total war, we can be grateful. And in the future goingo require interpreters and the world is watchings to see how we handle this case. Again, i commend ts smythe for the visa program and irge to take necessary steps to see that these people are able to leave danger behind and come here to us. They earned it, they paid for it. Thank yo mr. Chairman. Thankou very much. Next, we have dr. Steven bitle coming to us remotely. Dr. Biddle, you are recognized for your opening remarks. Thank you,r. Chairman. Id le to thank the committee for this opportunity to speak with you today about afghanistan and the important choices that face us there. Id also like to say that its a horn to be part of such an august panel, with two colleagues ive long respected and admired. Normally i would use my opening remarks for the key points for the submission, but that submission was written prior to tuesdays announcement of the 50 reduction of troop strength. In light of this development i thought id take my Opening Statement time to offer on the chief announcement. And where the u. S. Policy should go here in light of it. Of course, i would be happy to answer questions about my submission or any other aspect of the issue as members would wish. In my view the drawdown policy on tuesday was a mistake. I suspect like all of us here, i would like to see u. S. Troops come home. The question is when and how. And it seems to me that a progressive incremental withdrawal, in my view, is the worst of three possible options before us. Total withdrawal, no withdrawal without a negotiated settlement to end the war, and the announcement announced policy of unilateral drawdowns. As i argued in my submission, i believe our without a settlement to end the war. And chiefly political value as bargaining leverage in ongoing talks between the Afghan Government and the taliban, but we should be prepared to withdraw those troops entirely in exchange for negotiated concessions from the taliban precisely in order to increase our ability to get such concessions from the negotiations. This view is premised on my hope that a settlement, although difficult, is achievable if we husband our remaining leverage carefully. And the troop as an element of the major leverage. In my own view we should not give in away unrequieted. A reasonable case can be made for a negotiation is so poor its fruitless. I disagree, but this is a reasonable position. If so, however, the logical implication would be total withdrawal. Our current posture is that the most expensive than it was in 2009 to 2011 surge, but it involved sacrifice all the time. As i argue, our afghan allies can mott maintain the military stalemate indefinitely even if we maintain the small u. S. Presence indefinitely. The battlefield situation on the ground in afghanistan is a slowly decaying military stalemate that the Afghan Government will eventually lose unless todays battle field trends reverse and [inaudible] dr. Biddle, you went silent on us. I apologize for that. Im sorry. Youre back, its not your fault. Some argue im better when silent, but i suspect the committees purposes are better served. Youre back, so go ahead. Very well the point i was ming when i assume i went sent was that in a slowly decaying military stalemate, if nothing changes, we will eventually lose the war. This decay will eventually produce the collapse of the allied position in the country and what that implies then, if you accept that assessment,s that in the long run, the plausible all theiff are either eventually defeat or some kind of negotiated settlement before that happens. If a settlement really is impossible then defeat is the likely outcome and we would then be better served to lose cheaply via immediate total withdrawal than toose more expensively via a series of slower a partial withdrawals that prolong the chaps of failure and increased costs. What the administration announce is the slower whatever one thinks for negotiation, it goes dow everyone time we announce partial withdrawals. We have chief sources in the talks, the promise of aidnd troop presence. The taliban wants us out. In a negotiation where were radicay leverage poor, troop withdrawal is a crucial bargaining hchip. And this bargain for negotiation is now in my view, the most contribution that the u. S. Forces make to thewar. Of course, this is not their only role. The u. S. Air strikes in particular are also important for ebling our afghan allies for the stalemate. But the political function in bargaining in the negotiation is, in my view, the most important contribution they make when we gradually draw down that troop esence, we have yous reduce the leverage availablerom a now smaller troop presence, diminishing our ability to negotiate relatively favorable terms with the talks and perhaps more importantly, marble marble rtial incremental drawdowns, why should they keep giving concessions wh the u. S. Gives what they want for free, step by step, congratulate gradually over time. And we have a chanc that the securi forces might break under the strain of reduced support which gives the taliban a furth incentive to wait and see wther their oppition on the battlefield might just melt away this time. And even if the Afghan Security forces dont break altogether. They will surely be weaker wh less u. S. Support enaing a faster expansion in territory and populationontrol and moving the bargaining face further inhe talibans direction and reducing the tail that we could reasonable checked. And all of this while the taliban await fuher, potentially favorab developments by our progressive incremental withdrawal. Again, reasonable peopl can differ on the prognosis of the talks. I still believe thiis a potential bargaining space for an assocted settlement much better for us, and for our afghan allies whoacrificed so much than outright defeat. But i believe we reduced that bargaining space via our announcement, but if weuspend furthe drawdowns and retain the remaining troops pending a successful settlement. Perhaps we can still get out of this with somethi better than sile failure. If one disagrees on this, the logical policy would be total withdraw, n different splitting rtial drawdowns that make defeat more expensive. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you very much. Dr. Nes, youre recognized. Thank you, chairman smith, Ranking Member thornberry and distinguished members of the committee both in person and virtually for the opportunity to testify before the house Armed Services committee on an important, actually a critically important subject, the u. S. Military mission in afghanistan and implications of the Peace Process. Im going break my introductory remarks into sections. First is how they involved. The peace settlements right now. Third is the war and taliban itself and fourth, ill summarize with some brief conclusions. But let me just begin by noting as others have noted, including dr. Individualle that u. S. Policy options, at this point, are not optimal, they are suboptimal. We do not have a range of good options and i think its worth noting that. My corner is absent a peace deal, the further withdrawal of u. S. Sources will likely continue to shift the balance of power on the ground in the military campaign in favor of the taliban. Other militant groups, including al qaeda and the talibans outside supporters which include pakistan, iran, russia, and other countries and outside actors. The drawdown will have an impact on the u. S. s ability to train, advise and assist Afghan National defense and Security Forces in the middle of the war against the taliban, a group which we should all remember is an Extremist Organization committed to establishing an Islamic Emirates in the country and something that i think weve got to grapple with, is that what we want in the end . Is that what we want to leave behind in afghanistan . Let me begin with my first section on u. S. Interest. I think theres no question as weve heard both from chairman smith and Ranking Member thornberry, the u. S. Is in a different position than it was in 2001. There are other important objectives oversees, including china with a rising china and aggressive russia. Theyre also indicate of and a roux region that has three of the u. S. Competitors, chinese on the border, iranians on the border and has the russians very close by and as weve, i think, seen with news reports this year, they have they continue to have a relationship with the taliban including a lethal relationship. Al qaeda continues to be active in afghanistan. The numbers are relatively small, but i would urge anybody thats not seen it there, there are a series of u. N. Assessment, United Nations assessments, including this summer which continued to note that the taliban retains close links with senior and lower level Al Qaeda Leaders. Particularly ones associated with the al qaeda and the subcontinent, local affiliates, as the report concluded relations between the taliban, im quoting here, especially the Haqqani Network and al qaeda remain close based on friendship, a history of shared struggles. Ideological sympathy and intermarriage. They also have weve seen attacks and continue to see activity from the Islamic States local affiliate. And what the u. S. Has to be aware of, regional balance of competition between india and pakistan both of which are Nuclear Armed and i think we have to be mindful of a potentially worsening humanitarian crisis if we were to leave. Afghanistan has the second largest refugee population in the world at the moment. At 2. 5 million. A withdrawal at this point would significantly likely worsen that prospect. Let me just move very briefly to the peace talks, weve already heard her witnesses remark along these lines. On february 29th, 2020. The u. S. And the taliban, the taliban and the afghan governme government the u. S. And the taliban on september 15th this year, but the Peace Process has stalled. In fact, i would argue its never really begun meaningfully. What we have right now is taliban advances data right now suggests that the taliban attacks are at the highest levels, some of the highest in 2002. And they continue to fight. So let me just briefly conclude by noting that and this really goes back to the announcement this week. The u. S. Decision to go down to 2500 troops did not occur because of successful peace talks. In fact, it occurred in spite of them. The u. S. Did not coordinate and i think this was a mistake, meaningfully with nato forces operating in the country. They were alerted just before the announcement and i think its worth noting, they stood with us, article 5 and sent nato forces after that. We have other country that shed their blood in afghanistan, sent advisors, diplomates and Intelligence Officers and i think a withdrawal has the capabilities, and particularly in the cia and National Security, as we withdraw forces, we would be increasingly blind. Moving forward i think the u. S. Goal should be to build political concensus in afghanistan to support peace talks and at least to prevent the overthrow of the Afghan Government by the taliban. Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions. Thank you. A coue of housekeeping items. Were going to have votes here shortly. Now, one of the advantages of the covid voting thing is its spread out ove an eended period of time. Its my intention, wit the Ranking Members concensus that we tip ctinue the hearing and staggering when we go. Illeed someone to sit in to are me. And with q a as we covered with remote people, direc your question towards one specific witness. Youllave a diffilt time getting rough five minute window bouncing around remotely. Towards that en let me start wi you, dr. Jones. You know, the general theme here seems to be, y know, we cant get out because of e bad things that would happe which raises thequestion, why is there so much pressure for us to want toet out. I think its rlly important to understand that. Numb one, there is a strong feeling amongst a lot of people, and i included, no matter the scenario, were not going to deft the taliban and its not going be a successful Peace Process. The tng it doesnt get much worse. E idea that were going to defeat the taliban, we are going to have a stable govement there, most people think is i would thinkf youre telling me, im betting confidely that the chaos is going to continue. Wooe an in the middle of the chaos. Not as in the middle, but liv are being lost d our tops and others are forced to be sent over there. I think the American People are saying for what . Ok . And if the answer is because, gosh, if we hang in f another year or two. We send another 5,00 troops well get to a peace deal. I dont know that anybody believes that. Okay. Not in any serio way so were not going to get there. That peace is not going to be achieves. So wt happens if we pull out. Well, imean, slightly different flavor of chaos in the mind of most people. So weve protect lives and saved money and just trad one type of chaos for another. And thats a win. Now, the rea threat is what weve talked abo, what if we have another al edalike situation. And as awful as it is there are an awful lot ofeople and thre fighting isis, those two dont get aloaning. Not snug and secure in a peeful situation. Do you tnk well face anything anywhere near the pes of transnationalist threat that we mistakenly didnt see before 11. I dont think the same threat will be there and the final cost. And i get our partners and i was all offense the trump situation for what happened in syria, they did not consult. They pulled the rug out from our allies in the bnk of an eye. That did know the happen this time. Discussion for going down to 2500 has been going on for months. At some pointe had a disagreement wh our allies and the predent said or,s this is whatere going to do. And i get it, but again shall the question is, can someone tell me that were hanginout and less chaos is going to resolve, number one. Number two, can yourgue that we face lets say thatverything fell apart. Do we really face a significant transnational threat at that point . Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much for the questions. Youve actually hit, i think, on one of the most important questions that the u. S. And the American Population need to think through. My response is several fold. One is when i look at since world war ii there have been insurgency. And the government won on the battlefield and 35 of the cases insurgent won and 27 these of my numbers. There was a peace settlement or some kind of draw. So just to be clear, that means about twothirds of the cases weve had either a government win or a peace settlement and i think, as i look at the odds. Thats the kind of those are the adds that i would look for in afghanistan. I dont know whether a peace sorry interest intrupt on this point. Thats like the guy who drown lking across are the rer a an averageepth of three feet. But this is afghanistan and this is now, and you dont sort of get t average. I think you can look at afghanistan and see where were going to fall on tt ledge. The average, thats nice out of 132 things, bu this is a very specific case with very specific facts that ought to inform that opinion as well, dont you think . Absolutely. Ive spent much of the last 20 years in afghanistan and i would say if im a betting person right now. Thosare the adds that i odds i would look for in the foreseeable futu. The u. S. Has been successful with force presence there in severely weakening al qaeda, including Osama Bin Laden and other Senior Leaders and the recent killing of Al Qaeda Leaders have actually been afghanorces supported by u. S. Forces and i think what were seeing some successes ki especiallyround Afghan Forces. And what concerns me is in 2011 the u. S. Pulled out of iraq and e situation deteriorated significantly now the upsiden iraq we had an apply where we could push pourses bac in. If we would leave we would have an enemy in kabal. What worries me is the number of groups, the kazmiri groups and like attacks in mumbai like the one involving david hedley, still exist. And things arent going to get as bad as 9 11, but the trajectory is wha id be ncerned about. And one more question, id have to take this for t record because i want others to get in here. Dr. Biddle you made the point of basically a or nothing and i dohink iwe go the nothing route, you still have to draw down you cant just pull i out tomorrow you have to do it and be safe. The other point id like if you could give me a writte you used to be on the screen and now im looking at myself. Not doing any good. But the question is, ive heard the groups, and heard it from nior leaders, that in fact the 2500 number performs extly the mission that dr. Jones alluded to, which is to be ae to, you know, keep the terrorist groups at bay. So if you give me a written respon whyou dont think that 2500 makes sense from a ct standpoint tha would be helpful. And with that ill turn it over to m thornbry for his questions. Let me ask each of you to address this question and well go, ambassador crooker and then dr. Biddle and then dr. Jones. The question is, if you had one minute to speak with the president elect on what he should do in afghanistan, what would you tell him . So so [inaudible] again, ambassador crocker, well start with you. One minute to speak with the president elect on what he should do in afghanistan. What would your message to himm himmen be . Show support. My colleagues pointed out the worst thing we could do is what were doing. [inaudible] i would just tell the vicepresident to hold where we are prior to president trumps announcement and then reassess. Most important thing to reassess. We should not fw forward with them any further without meaningful concessions from the blab and we need to show that is through remembering this is our security as a nation and our values as a nation. Okay. We had some connection issues there that made it hard for me to understand everything you were saying. Maybe well either work on the connection or you could help provide that to the committee in writing when were done because it was hard to we didnt get all the words. Well try, dr. Biddle, can you address that . Yeah, my advice would be the plausible longterm outcomes at this point are either outright deceit or a negotiated compromise settlement. And our goal should be a compromised settlement and maximize the leverage as a bargaining chip. Which means dont partially withdraw without some sort of calm sa compensating compromise from them. And the strategy cut our losses. And would you go back up to 4500 because you believe theres a chance of negotiations . That would be my preference. Whether thats politically sustainable is an area beyond my expertise, of course. But i think the chance of a compromised settlement is not zero. I think the cost by comparison what we were paying in 2009 to 2011 is extremely small. And given the costs of continuing to pursue a settlement which i think are fairly modest, i think its in the u. S. Interest to do our best, to try and get out of this with a deal we can live with, rather tn simply failure. Thank you. Dr. Jones . I think to follow on what my two colleagues noted. I would say three things, one is, i wouldnt go down any further. I think i would ask nong other issues, i would ask the commanding general. U. S. General in afghanistan and xarm of the joint chiefs of staff for their advice on what the 4500 or the 2500 gives us. Do we need more than just a Counterterrorism Force . Do we need to continue to provide training advice and assistance . And i think thats going to be an analytical judgment from our Senior Military Leadership is where to go. The second is, i think we do need to show commitment to the Afghan Government. Some of this will be financial, some of this is just a political commitment that we will remain an ally against an extreme Islamic Emirates. And third, i think we have got to be able to tell the taliban, one of our majoring bargaining chips, forces, theyre not going to come down with without a peace settlement. He think weve got to example up pressure along those lines. Thank you, ill yield back. Thank you, ive got to continue. Susan davis with the questions and then well try and grab our colleagues as we come in the room. You know, this is always difficult for me because i spent the last 15 years travelling to afghanistan, visiting our troops, our female troops particularly and our deployed moms and over the course of that time we witnessed the progress of women who have started businesses, have served in parliament, and certainly as ambassador crocker said, we shared with them that we have their back. It didnt feel like we have their back anymore and i wanted to get a sense. Ambassador crocker, i probably know your response, but from dr. Jones and biddle, where that value analysis falls in this and whats the role of congress in that . You know, should can that be helpful or no longer helpful . My other concern is really about, you know, talking about the challenges of integrating the taliban into society. I mean, is there any hope for that . Is there any reason anybody should trust that thats possible, and given that where do we go . Is there any kind of a plan b that actually incorporates that concern . We havent really spoken much about isis and i think we know that former taliban fighters are going to be looking for another group to pick up arms with. And despite the fact that they dont have any great feelings for one another, nevertheless it can be attractive. So, i wonder, first, let me go to dr. Biddle, if i may, and then to mr. Or dr. Jones, why dont youstart . Thank you very much. All of theseere important issues. Let me start with the women issu i have an article out in west point, the u. S. Military economys journal that comes outoday from the ctc sentinel. Among other things, it notes that it looks at the taliban and who they are and i think one of the things it votes, the talibans continuing persecution of women is deep mri deeply troubling, and women living in the areas have little justice in the taliban courts. The talib continues to discouge women from working, prohibits women from being in politics, look at the taliban makeup. And support punishment against women such as stoning and public shing. I think that congress has a very important krull keeng this now, afghanistan does have conservative elements of society and i think theres a broader debate among that we want to put our afghanistan, but weve seen progressn the last 20 years, the taliban takeover would eliminate that virtually immediately. I think w weve had some examples of Senior Leaders into the government or at least on the governmentside, they have generally behaved when they have integrated back to the government, so i think we have some cases where we n trust them and i would justinally highlight your concerns about the islic state. It has shrunk in size as its been targeted, but i think a growing civil war in the country does provide an opportunity for them to regenerate. Thank you. Dr. Biddle. Did you want to comment . Id love to hear from ambassador crocker quickly, too. Certainly. We have many important values at stake in afghanistan. The rights of women are an important value. The rights of ethic minorities are an important value. The rights of an entire generation of afghans who put their trust in us and tried hard to rebuild the country and significant change in the country since the taliban was in control. If we want to realize the values we have to make amendments commensurate to those. Its going to require a military investment on our part sufficient to prevent the taliban from taking control of the country. The dilemma we face, of course, is that we have interests that we care about, but Many Americans worry that those interests arent commensurate with the scale of military effort with the United States required to secure that. So were stuck in this unfortunate situation where we have to look at a potential compromise to values that we care about and should care about to some degree. Given the limits and scale of the military investments were willing to make and given that, the only way to square that circle at the moment is through the negotiating process. Now, with respect to the taliban and whether we can trust them and what their behavior is likely to be . Obviously the taliban are not an ideal negotiating partner. Thank you, doctor. Its my responsibility to keep this going, as much as i would love to have you continue to speak. Mr. Conway, yourenext. Thank you, madam chairman, i think both dr. Jones and dr. Biddle helped to answer part of the question. The only queson, the taliban distinctly different than the taliban of today and what i heardr. Jones say is not really, that wha we saw happen in afghanistan to women, leaders, teachers, all forms of folks who disagreedith the taliban, they were eliminated and killed and persecuted. To do that in afghanistan, its e right thing for us to do. Its a real conflict within ourselves as to what we do next in that country but i thinke bear responsibility for having led the reforms here they are there. The expectations particularly of folk who have grown up posttaliban era. Ey may know the history much but he didnt live under the taliban rule in the mid90s, late 90s and so their expectations are different. Are those expectations, either dr. Jos o ambassador crocker, are those expectatis stron enough to lead the nation out of the wreck a taliban takeover again, iny view, would happen if can delete themselves out . Are the Strong Enough to take those risks to move forwa . I would say without u. S. And broader International Systems they are n. Its an unfair fight bause a taliban continue to sanctuary in neighboring pakista iran and russia. With support so military even small little military and financial support, europeans have provided a fair amount of assistance. I do thinkhe Afghan Government and the populatio is able to do what you are outlining it will take time but i think publicpinion polls conducted by the asia foundatio that populations support that kind of the vision and does not joseph votel mans extremist vision. Does not support the taliban extremist vision. They appear t be allowing some girls to go to schl. There are a lot more chnologically savvy. They were not in the 1990s but in terms of ideology, same kind of organization, then kind of Islamic Emirate they are trying to establish. Ambassador crocker, do you have thoughts . Yes, i hop you can at least ar me now. I would associate myself with the remarks of my two colleagues. I do not see this as impossible. In the experience weve had with onetenth of what they were when i was a bastion of afghanistan, indicate that is the case. We are not facing on the battlefield so it is ironic we seem to be trying to defeat ourselves. It is true that all wars must and, and return to the political process. Its true in this one but not on the terms that this administration has set for these talks. These are surrender negotiations. Negotiations. I would hope the president elect when he becomes president will simply freeze them. Not cancel them out but as my colleague suggested, to tell the taliban until you live up to your side of the deal, we are not going anywhere. Dr. Biddle, is a fair to say the taliban is getting significant outside help and that an Afghan Government with the outside help, that would be an unfair fight . Yes, absolutely. The taliban have been getting substantial support from the pakistanis and from others, and from illicit Economic Activity like the drug trade in afghanistan for a very long time. I think theres very good reason to believe it outside assistance to the Afghan Government seized, the Afghan Security forces would break up. The taliban would quickly march in to kabul and we get a chance to find out what chaos presents in afghanistan. Thats not a social science experiment i would personally like to run. Its important to note the great majority of money required to keep the afghan National Security forces and food comes from outside. They are operating budget and is more than twice the entire domestic revenue of the Afghan Government. If that outside support to the afghan secret he forces were to stop their ability to sustain a stalemate much less to better would go awayuickly. Thank you, gentlemen. Eld back. Mr. Lynch event, you are next. Ms. Link of mr. Lang giv. Can you . Yes. Dr. Jones, i want to thank all of our panel circus like today. Dr. Jones i want to go back to a question, if i understood it right, you seem, if we stay std could be chaos, if we withdraw that could be chaos. Its one kind of chaos or another. We were not anticipating the prodding and planning that was going on before 9 11 and that you really think [inaudible] my question, if we got there and do [inaudible] how would we know whether alqaeda or any other is plotting or playing against us . How can we respond effectively and know exactly where i know we are jointly in intelligence gathering with our partner agencies, but would we know enough how and where to adequately respond should there be a threat to america or our allies . Thank you very very good question, questions. On the chairman enzi, on the discussion with the chairman, my response was essentially that i wouldnt characterize nesser the situation as chaos now. There is a war but i think were the u. S. To withdraw it would significantly worsen. It is worth pointing out that the taliban controls not a single major city right now, and compare that, say 2014, 2015, 2016 to iraq and syria where the Islamic State controlled raqqa and fallujah and mahdi and mosul. The taliban controls zero, zero cities right now. I think its worth noting that we change i think that my assessment is that we change with the u. S. With the draw. How would we know, you as . Who would become a lot more difficult obviously as you noted the u. S. With some intelligence collection capability but it would be much more difficult to understand what alqaeda was doing, what the taliban, what other militant groups were doing in afghanistan without a military cia, nsa meaningful presence in the country. Ambassador crocker, the u. S. Talibangreement commits the taliban including alqaeda from using afghan soil to threaten the security of the United States or its allies. What would the verificatio mechanism be to eure the taliban are compliant . Would a troop reduction in fact, our ability to ensure the taliban are compliant . Thank you for the excellent question. The taliban has no intention and no need their commitments. They will say what we want to hear, but they know that were going home as these negotiations are currently structured. Again, the president made the decision to cut by half or more, maybe a fourth, tells the taliban all we need know about are staying power and to continue our support and our presence. So unless or until socalled Peace Process effort is restructured, to show that we are serious about this, that if they do not live up to the basic commitment, we are not going away. If there is a single phrase i would come into this committee on what we need, we need patience. The taliban and alqaeda have that strategic patience. They believe they can outlast us and we are proving them right. Weve got to state and weve got to show that we do have the will to stay the course until we see circumstances in afghanistan that more for the withdrawal. Very good. Thank you very much to all of our panelists. I yield back. Thank you. Mr. Byrne, you are recognized for five minut. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Its been gat morning. So im not an expertn this issue like the three of you a, and im an expert of wha the people i my district think that we all are. Thats have got it. And i dont think with the people in my district think often disagree with the people of america think on this issue. The people of m district are tired of nation blding in afghanistan think making years, thousands of lives, american lives lost, all these injuries, all these hundreds of thousands of Service Members lives disrted. Obviously billions and billions and billions of dollars. You know, enough. So i thi they are not for nationilding immigrant weve done a great thing. Ambassador crocker made a great point about all that but my folks thinks weve done enough. I think they probably would support a continued counterterrorism effort, okay . Be1 alqaeda to get back in control there. When you talk about the drawdown, the questn in my mind is, whats the right number . Can we have a successful counterterrori effort with 2500 versus 5000 troops in their quest dr. Ones, i will start with you and a you that question. Thats really the 64,000 question. And question. And let me say its a lot more than that. That is probably te. 64 billion queion may be. Im tired of nationbuilding. We are well beyond that and i dont think anybody as you know is ttlet anything close to the 100,000 forces we had in afghanistan in 2009. What i would say is the question think that we need to ask our military leadership is 2500 enough to prevent a taliban erthrow of the government . For me its not just i counterterrorism issue. It is also a prevention of the ovthrow of the government. So what is 2500 give usersus something closer to 4500 or 5000 . Hundred or 5000 . Thats the question for general miller, a a question for the chairman o the joint cefs, and i think thats what i would come back to. Agai i i would say its more tn just killing or capturing alqaeda leaders. It is also do we want to prevent the overthrow of the government, and how can we continue to sustain and support the Afghan Government to do the fighting and dying . I think i know the answer below and ask you because its a familiar question. Is it a given the taliban take back over again that they will allow the country to be harbor for alqaeda . How much they hate isis, i think they still like alqaeda. Will they allow alqaeda be harbor against . I will answer that in two ways. One is the assessments have been unambiguous on this that they continue to Strategic Operational and tactical level, the taliban a Strategic Operational and tactical of the relations with alqaeda. Alqaeda senior and alqaeda in the indian subcontinent and i think weve also seen global taliban commanders have been willing to give st. George alqaeda leaders in areas they control. The answer is a yes, we will see contind as he taliban qaeda relations in t future. That last question, dr. Biddle, what is your opinion . I would agree with my colleague dr. Jones. Its a mistake to separate counterterrorism in the survival of the Afghan Government. If the government falls and the taliban takeover organization chaotic war the terrorist threat will go up and the ability of a handful of america troops operating from a handful of bases that will look like seized for disaster the middle of a catastrophe will be very limited. Worse still, the security afghanistan to neighbors will be a poorly implicated and especially the security of a Nuclear Armed pakistan. The event chaos in afghanistan flows across the board in aftermath of the government collapse we didnt have the potential for militant groups in pakistan if that government falls getting their hands an actual usable nuclear weapons. The tendency to say what we want is can address them. Lets forget all of his counterinsurgency to protect the government, is a false dichotomy and very important ways. Veryuickly, ambassador crocker, on that last question. I share the view, congressman. Congressman. We have seen this movie before. We were heavily engaged with the pakistanis and afghan fighters throughout the decade of the 1980s to expel the soviets. We succeeded and then we walked out. What did we g . The afghan civil war, the rise of t taliban and the road to 9 11. It would be appalling to think it is some equity magically different this time if we walk out. As my colleagues have said, theres no doubt about the link between alqaeda and the taliban. Again the taliban gave up the country for alqaeda. I apologize, ambassador at the time has expired. We have to move on. Mr. Garre mindy, you are recognized for five minutes. Thank you, mr. Chairman into the witnesses thank very much. To m colleagues for the estions, youre providing some really good qstions and good insight into theituation. Hopefully i can do the same. Im looking at all ofou argued for the presence of american troops, somewhat higher than 2500. For the purposes of securing a negotiated settlemt between the taliban and the Afghan Government. Cod you please dcribe what that some would look like . What exactly do we wt to see . Ho will the taliban and the Afghan Government merge into some sort of recciliation . That start with mr. Jonesnd then we will go crocker and dr. Biddle. Thank you very much for the question. I think this is, it is important to ask for a specifically what a settlement might look like. Obviously at this point with negotiations just starting in september, its difficult to predict where they might go. But i think what we have seen in the taliban who had defected and come to the Afghan Government side is a willingness to participate in the political process. I think what we probably have to see it some compromise on both sides, on issues including powersharing arrangements, ministry, key ministries including security services. I think one would ideally want to see the taliban allowed as a have been in some other wars, think of el salvador or even columbia, whether was a peace deal, demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of fighters. In some cases potential into the Government Security services. There also has to be some discussion on the afghan constitution, the role of islam in the constitution. I think the issue is can we get to a place where the Afghan Government and the taliban can compromise on a range of these type of issues and get support from their constituencies . Which will be hard. There is room im going to interrupt you. I have just a f moments so a short answer would be necessary here. Lets go on, dr. Biddle. I think the nature of the bargaining space is the taliban would have to give up several things. They would have to break with alqaeda, renounce violence, disarm and except some variation of todays afghan constitution. Thats a lot but it is plausible. We would have to give up a lot. We would have to legalize the taliban as a politic actor in afghanistan. We have to withdraw all foreign troops including o characters and present uess the Afghan Government asked us to stay and we would have to provide the taliban was some sort of set aside of guaranteed offices in the Afghan Government, guarteed seats in the afghan parliament. They know they are unpopular. If all were doing i to let them to elections in ways they know they will does come it wil not be a deal. Where turkey hasalked of what kind of oversight, how big . What version of the afghan constitution when we get . Thatshat the journal of marking space within which that you would be cast looks ke. Thank you. Ambassador ccker . Ambassador, yourhoughts on this. Whats a negotiated settlement . Apparent ambassador crocker is not available. I think we lost them for one reason or another. Go ahead,ohn. The next question really is one that we nee to consider comp has been said a couple times and also neibor dissolvable fall. Havent talkeduch about the neighborhood. Could you do so and i dont know, 152nd spots your starting with dr. Iddle . Fifteen sonds on the neighborhood . The most important neighbor is pakistan. They are Nuclear Armed country isighting a civil war at the moment. That civil war to go bly for them. It does and prospects and i would go up a lot if the government in total collapse. Then you have failed state with clear weapons running around and lots of militants that dont like us in more than they like them. I should have asked for 15 seconds. I could go on longer if you wish. Thats up to you. Lets go to jones. Agree with dr. Biddle. Pakistan is a primary supporter of the taliban. Its where its leadership structures located. Taliban taliban does receive some assistance from iran and russia, among others. Final five seconds time as expired. John thank you very much. Thank you. Ms. Hartzler is recognized for five minutes. Thank you, mr. Chairman. I appreciate the question of my colleagues about the status of the women in afghanistan. I had the privile of traveling with mr. Davis. We will miss you but on one of those trips and met with many of the women who are nown parliament and hurt some the stories ofhat life is like when taliban was in charge. I am very concerned about that. Since thereseen some questions asked about that i i waed to move on, start with. Biddle. Talk about the status of the Afghan National defense and securityorces. We hav invesd in them for years and i would like you and the other witnesses toind of summarize in your mind the progress that has been made in their abilities, and do you envision a future with the Afghan Security forces are selfsustainin . And what level of support or Time Commitment should the United States prode to ensure afghanistan has adequate Defense Forces . Along with that goes along with our assistance. Should the United States and International Community ctinue to provide military and economic assistance specifically economic assistance to afghanistan into the future . I know there are several questions there but mr. Biddle you could start that would be great. Time permitting. Im on theessimistic and of the sperum of opinion on the prognosis for the afghan natial Security Forces. I think what we see with a lot of forces of this kind in the developing world not just in afanistan is weekly visitation was political settingse dont have a judiciary or court or police neckesolve conflicts between armed elites. The government is required to maintain an internal balance of power in whicht cannot allow its own military t get too strong. It threatens other wlords and armed actors within the elite broadly defined and thas a bigger threat to the government usually in an insurgency is. What tt means is you end up with corruption and cronyis as tools to control the threat the National Military poses to armed elites within the regime wanted to find and that is a profound systatic dply rooted limiter on the kind that potential of the afgha Security Forces and forces in some countries elsewhere. And thirdly to defeat an insurgency. I think there are Strong Enough to mntain a slowly decaying stalemate. Theyre almost 3,000 of them in the country after all at the moment. I dont think there are plausible capability for defeating the urgency regardless of possible levels of u. S. Support. In terms of u. S. Aid moving forward i think the primary role for u. S. Aid moving f once we get a settled before y get a sobieski to Afghan Forces in the field and maintain a stalemate. Without our without our support they cant do that. After settlement, it would be acquired o enforcing the terms of settlement. The presence or aence of outside aid i a critical tool to get a power shad government of which taliban will play a role to behave itself and its of the terms of the agreement, therefore, some kds of International Aid will be necessary in the longterm. Nothing likehe current scale but a complete shutdown of u. S. Aid even if we get a settlement will lead to a colpse of the settlement we will lose our leverage to enforce its terms. Let me follow up quickly before go to dr. Jones. He mentioned the courts. When i i was there in 2011 we visited with our department of justice and officials from the state department, help them set up the court system and it was progreing. What would you say is the status of the court you indicatedou think the reasonability of the course to maintain justice. Could you expand on that . The court are better than they were but they had the fundamental limit, their inabity to enforce adjudication of disputes on armed memrs of the elite. We have seen or and over again that kind of corruion that is used to maintain this internal balance of power within afghan elite broadly defined is largely gone the building of the course and t dishes the system to solve your when afghan porbrokers are accused of corruptionnd evidence is presented, the judiciary system as a generalule has been unable to enforce its will on them. Tha you. I dont think that a surprising. Thirty seconds, dr. Jones. Can you expound on it is topics . Starting wit women, i thi weve also seen the taliban in areashey control today, not just in the990s, oppressive of women. Their tck what today is not very good. I think the area where we have seenhe most successful Afghan National defensets good forces has been the commanders, roughly 20,000 commanders. The important lesson is thats been sustained u. S. Training from special operation forces. Those of the best, the best trained, the most consistently train and thats why think weve had the most succe. Thank you very much. Yield back. Mr. Norcross is recognized for five minutes, a i believe we do have mr. Crocker back so if you wish to ask questions of mr. Crocker you could do that as well. Mr. Norcross. Thank you, chairman. This is directed to the ambassador. The 15th of january withawal of the troops. What strategic aantage, if any, did we achieve or what our beginning and response for the drawdown, in your opinion . We are getting nothing in response to that drawdown. That is been the problem with these talks from the beginning. I sitting, the taliban without the Afghan Government in the room, they knew from the start that the negotiation on the terms of our surrender and everything that is happened since i think has validated that you in eyes of the taliban. So they will continue to press their offensive and will continue to withdraw. That is not a staged reason step. Step. It is frankly cuttingur force in half and two months, that is a route. Next question for dr. Biddle. One of the four pillars, in my opinion, is harboring terrorists. We are seeing so manyimes throughout our history the plausible deniability, i hado idea they were there. In you opinion,ow does one enforce or retain true information that is verifiable whether the are harboring terrorists . Thats a relative question. There are two pieces to that. Theres intelligence probably a figure out whether they are behaving themselves, whether theyre complying with the terms of whatever a great weekend to reach and then theres the issue of leverage. If we decide they are not complying to force them back into compliance. On the intelligence side of this its partly function of intelligence mechanisms of the u. S. Government. But its also in part a function of intelligence mechanisms of afghans who oppose the taliban within a powersharing regime. If we get some sort of settlement and will involve a taliban takeover. If what we end up with is a surrender instrument for us, then of course we will offer no aid to support that kind of a deal. If we are talking about a a del that in our interest and were willing to support, it will involve powersharing in which we retain allies within Afghan Government would have an incentive to report to us violations of the agreement either taliban. That coupled with her own intelligence is necessary for us to know whether the agreement is being violated. If it is violated our leverage bring them back into compliance is eight. Thats one of the reasons why continued aid is essential if any agreement we reach is going to be stable. Thank you. Dr. Jones, lets bring this back. Does taliban control automatically equal a terrorist and existential threat of some sort to the United States . Either directly or through them allowing of the groups to come back in . Does that automatically mean they will look at the United States for some sort of additional attack . I think its important to differentiate types o terrorist organizations. The taliban has bee committed to conducting attacks against the Islamic State, khorasan province in afghan provinces such as so i think we could expect the company to fight this kind of organizations but those are a minority. On the relationship tay between the taliban and alqaeda at the strategic operationa and tactical levels, i think we could expect, over time, that the u. S. National security interes are threatened based on international and regiona terrorist groups operating in afghanistan, including alqaeda. So assuming that maybe not immediately that were going to be back in the same situation, what does that new afghanistan look like in terf troops . Obviously after the Second World War we are not looking at germany but certainly we have been there for [inaudible] i was looking at are we lookin at longterm present in order to keep in check [inaudible] might answer to that is, until there is a Peace Agreement or Something Else that weakens the taliban, yes, i think my judgment would be continuing u. S. Military presence, a small presence, that is able to fight against and we can these organizations. Thank you. The time of the gentleman has expired. I yield back. Thank you. Ms. Stefanik is recognized for five minutes thank you, mr. Chairman. Dr. Jones, i represent fort drum which is home of the tenth Mountain Division which you know is the most diploid division and u. S. Army since 9 11 to afghanistan. Currently theivision headquters and members ofhe First Brigade Combat Team are operating in afghanist with the second brigade comba team at seduled to deploy to the regi throughout this fall. I want to wish our tenth mountain solers are very happy thanksgiving. I know this is not the first thanksgiving for many of them or away from theriends and family at home. Given yr experience advising military commanders, how can we balance the production of forces infghanistan with the nessary force Protection Measures to ensure that our remaing troops that are in country are protected and able to safely conduct their daily operations and mission . I want to ensure we are keeping force to the absolute highest level. Force protection is obviously essential. Our logistics and other components of that. I think the question we talked about numbe is, as you are implying think, its not just a number ofharacters and forces that are striking targets or arsting or even Training Afghan terrorists or Training Afghan commandos to target terroris organizations like alqaeda but its also the force protection that is necessary. That may be military police and others to secure bases on any her basis i ever served on. Weve also hired local ahan to provide basic protection and in some cases contracrs as well. That does need to be added to e mix of the force posture were talking about. In your written statement you meioned a troop tried an impact on our ability to conduct the train, aise, and assist mission and Contact Missions in opations and click intelligence. At over all does this mean for th resurgence and strengthening of terror groups in afghanistan, particularly in reference to potential difficulties we may have when it comes to conducting ct . Does this put us in a similar tuation that we face i iraq in 20112014 in which we will be back in afghanistan down the road to combat stronger, more organized terrorist groups that threaten us . I dont think it entirely puts us back to 2011 will be pulled all forces out but we are taking a risk by going down to 2500. What it means i think is that that force posture may be enough to contact strikes against terrorist but we are going to have to move our range of our train, advise, and assist trainers from the canned that clerval to the Afghan Air Force up to the ministry of defense and ministry of the interior level so what will is is a busy to train afghans at the operational and tactical level. Actually where the fight is happening. So that means its a risk to the state of the war and i think thats where were at right now and thats where were going to accept some risk. Thank you. Yield back. Thank you. Mr. Gallego is recognized for five minutes. Thank you, mr. Chairman. I defer to my colleague, representative crow. Thank you, mr. Gallego, for yielding a time to meet. Everyone here today has spoken about the need to address the threat and is universal agreement that there is indeed a threat in afghanistan but the fact of the met is we face a lot of threats. We have a lot of adversaries and we do so with limited resources. Because went to take a holistic view and make decision about those limited resources there are ultimate tradeoffs and opportunity costs to that. I went to war after 9 11 three times, twice in afghanistan upon the taliban because it to take seriously our charge to keep our country safe and are responsible to respond to those threats that i also know we face domestic terror threats that we havent adequately address over 1000 americans that they are dying of covid19 because were not adequately addressing that. Over 50,000 americans are dying by opeds because for not adequately dressing that and over 20 veterans of a are dying because we are not addressing that threat and that need as well. But this isnt an a so fosco discussion of the value we place on different threats a philosophical i believe we do have to draw down for the reasons many of my colleagues have taken it before but there is a right way to do it and there is wrong way to do it. From my perspective the administrations process of been largely a black box. Its changed we dont have sufficient information in but cant have a discussion as upon here and in the American Public about the process and the relative risk. From your perspective briefly starting with dr. Jones since you are here going to ambassador crocker, and the new mr. Biddle, do you believe america would benefit from a more transparent process like the one we outlined in the National Defense authorization act provision that would require our engagement with congress and our partners to better understand those threats and the proper way to draw down . Yes. Very breezy ihink it is always better to have a transparent press where we have any administraon outlined what its objectives are in places like afghanistan and what is the force posture necessary to meet those objectives as well as a diplomatic presence, intelligence and others, yes. Thank you. Ambassador crocker . Thank you. We are a great democracy, and the greatness of our democracy depends on the transparency of the administration. The American People sacrifice a lot and deal with a lot of hardship. If they understand why theyre being asked to make a a sacrif. So i would hope that the will be an effort in the coming months for the new administration to articulate precisely that. What are the stakes in afghanistan . Why are we there . I think those are questions we can answer and f answered in this committee. But the case needs to be made and made repeatedly. Ery briefly, mr. Biddle, because io have one more question but would love your thoughts on that question. Transparent is key. Democracy waging a war is engaging policy of the take lives in the neck of the state and spend billions of dollars of public treasury. We owe it to the public to debate this publicly, t build consensus behind whatever poly we adopt, and commend the committee for each role in further debate with todays hearings. Thank you. My last question is just not because of our power and a military but the because were friends, friends and allies that hasnt outsized impact notches in afghanistan but in every way [inaudible] im extremely concerned the house and the consultation with our nato partners, 30 partners and allies have committed to the u. S. Led coalition. They have not been given adequate information about what were trying to do. In fact, as you mentioned, dr. Jones, article v has only been about after 9 11 and was always an estimation that would go in together and come up together. Very briefly, each of you, 15 seconds on the impact of the Nato Alliance have not adequately consulting wit them. I think it makes it hard not consult with allies makes it harder for them to make a case to the own populations to keep a presence in afghanistan that we need because i provides additional value to us. Thank you. Ambassador crocker. Clearly, weve got to do a better job of communicating with our Strategic Partners in nato. We have seen the statement of the secretarygeneral of nato this past week after the president s announcement expressing his distress over where we were going and how we doing it. So yes, nato has did a force in afghanistan. They are with us there now. They need to hear from us that will stay the crse. Thank you. Mr. Biddle,ery briefly. Our allianceince of one of the great grand strategic advantages of the United States relative to our primary competitors in china and russia, neither of them enjoys the alliance light system the United States and joystick respect for allies enables us to take advantage of the things that this might system rings to the table. We should further that critical grand strategic advantage by taking our allies seriously and consulting them to the greatest degree possible. Thank you. Thank you again to mr. Gallego forielding me his time. I yield back. Mr. Gaetz is next for five minutes. Thank you, madam chair here not only a my minorityember of th committee. I hope i minority deal on the war in afghanistan on the committee. Im against it. Based on even the word of her own Witnesses Today, the corruption in afghanistan is unsolvable. The war is unwinnable as a strategy is indecipherable. Its not a criticism of the current administration. These are conditions that have been present for the last 19 years as weve traded the same villages back and forth with the taliban. I was listening as dr. Biddle said we are leaving and getting nothing what were getting is out. He made the biggest loser in afghanistan is the nation that stays the longest. As i read some of the prepared testimony of our witnesses, particularly dr. Biddle, heres how the argument seems to go. 2500 troops really has no military value. There is no Technical Capability with 2500 troops that we have that will fundamentally win this war. We have had 100,000 troops there and we could win it. And now we think with 2500 thats its going to like preserving these alliances and ensure our allies that we are really there was sufficient grid. At the purpose of the 2500 troops is politics, that it is a political future of the war in afghanistan that if we leave 2500 troops, we will get more leverage. And if we engage in accelerated drawdowns, with the taliban, the taliban will see this sort of a war of attrition that the United States is going to lose. They are just going to stick their and maintain aevel of violence that allows them to potentially recapture their political power. The obvious question is, if we know the 2500 troops we are leaving dont have military value and are there as a statement, probably the enemy knows that, too. Probably they understand the dynamics that are witnesses have laid out in the testimony today that this only ends one way, with us leaving, with the taliban getting more power, and with conditions in afghanistan in pretty rough shape going forward. As they have been for the last two decades, as they were for substantial period of time before that. I am grateful in the Trump Administration we have highlighted our near. Adversaries as the requisite focus for our work. Im glad we dont believe we have to chase every potential terrorists into other potential cave where ever so we can help our chests and say were being tough with the global counterterrorism mission. It is my sincere hope that we not only reduce our troop levels of 2500 but we reduce them to zero, that we leave afghanistan if this is been the longest war in our nations history. Our country is weary of it even if the Armed Services committee is not, and i yield back. Mr. Moulton, you are recognized for five mines. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Having served four tours and novak theres no one who wants to bring the troops home more, but if theres one lesson we learned over the last 20 years, its hard to get out of these wars than to get in. And we leave willynilly without any plan, without any leverage is clearly the wrong thing to do according to every witness, republican and democrat, before this committee. I want to end the war in afghanistan but i want to end it responsibly. And more importantly i want to bring the troops home for good. I do not want to repeat the mistake we made in iraq where we withdrew so quickly without sufficient plans that we had to turn around and go back in. And although i think all of our witnesses also agree that we are not going to quote when the war in afghanistan, wrinkly thats not on the table and hasnt been for a long time now. There are very devastating ways that we could lose. Most of all, of course, repeat 9 11. Ambassador crocker, i would like to ask you a question about another way that we could lose, which is that there are two black americans that we suspect are being held hostage in afghanistan and pakistan by groups with close ties to the taliban, paul overby and mark, the navy veteran contractor. As this administration proceeds with plans to withdraw troops early and without any concession from the taliban there is no indication those two men release and safe return are being considered in diplomatic negotiations or required as a precondition for an accelerated drawdown. In your experience and opinion, what are important factors to consider in securing the release of these two americans asked if we withdraw troops earlier than anticipated, what other potential leverage to have you ensure that they are return safely to their families . Thank you, congressman. As with this said, these sad cases, we i think see another illustration of what we are giving up. By giving up our leverage and were certainly doi tt by unilateral troop withdrawals requiring nothing of the taliban. They have no incentive to cooperate at any scale or on any level. That would impact both from the top strategic level of support for the government and its survivability in afghanistan, and it goes down to this level as well. It is pretty hard to get something if you have given up your leverage. There is no incentive for the taliban who we presume are holding these two americans to take any steps to release the so again if you are programmed for defeat, which we seem to be, you have no leverage and no expectation we will gain anything including the release of these two americans. Certainly a principle i was in the marine corps is we dont leave americans behind. I hope that the purported a of the delisting but these two americans oppose our troops as if you get the best way forward. Mr. Ambasdor, i would also like to ask you about the importance of speal immigrant visa program that you stressed in your Opening Statement. [inaudible] and the house version of t fy 21 ndaa. We recognize the critical portance of the program for s. Government operations in afghanistan and also for fure operations whereoung troops like i was i going to have to convince allies overseas to trust us enough to put the lights on the line to support us. So can you just tell us why the ogram is so critical in your eyes and the effect that the success ofhe program in afghanistan will have on future National Security operations overseas . I think that is exactly right, congressman. As i noted there is a backlog of some 18,00 cases in afghanistan. The sad reality is probably today more interprets and their family members are getting killed in afghanistan because of their service to us that are getting special immigrant visas to make good on our pledge to them that we would take care of them. You are quite right to assess implications far beyond the borders of afghanistan. The world is watching. The nature of war has changed. The wars of the future going to look like we haveot to have peoplerom the community, from the nation, working with us, otherwise we are blind out there and you know what that is like from your extraordinary svice in iraq. Thank you, mr. Ambassador. Madam chairman, i yield back. Thank you very much. Mr. Keating, you have five minutes. Sorry, couldnt hear that, madam chair. Madam chairman, who did you call on . Mr. Keating. Are you ready . Yes, i am. I couldnt couldnt hear my name. Sorry. Thank you. Very briefly, theres not a broad consensus that on what exact we should do in terms of our troop withdrawal in afghanistan [inaudible] the fact the week Administration Proposes this drawdown is precipitous and it is discrt with i think by virtually everyone that is spoken today. Its pretty clear one of the reasons is tt it undercuts the socalled peace plan, you know, where theres a political Inauguration Day for the drawdown. And ao it is one more example, a large one, of o inability to coordinate and respect our allies who have troops on the ground. Thisalls on the heels of dealing wh the pull out after discussion with president erdogan i syria, without notice, adequate notice certainly. Hours i i heard, question, to r allies. About tt decision. Pullouts from germany of the troops there. Other political decision on the heels of the g7 pullout by the chaellor of germany. And also the political switching of fundsrom this like the European Defense initiativ. These abound b about our inability to consult with himn our allies on the inf taty or the jcpoa decisions. Th is a critical problem. I havent seen private discussions and their concern for the way this haseen decided, the lack of consultation is profound. But i want to just quicklyo on a couple of other issues that we havent dealt with directly, i dont think. The danger of this pullout in the timing, the ctracted nature of it, with troop safety. This is no longer the term of force protection but actually moving our troops safely out in such a tight timefme. Also the protection of our military assetsillions of dollars of assets that cou fall into terrorist hands as a result of this artificial timeframe. Also the thirdhing, justification because of our situation with pakistan, a very complicated issue. How exactly can Troop Deployment help us with pakistan as opposed to our increing inability to deal with them directly . The troop trip safety, shorttm Asset Protection shortterm and exactly how this is going t benefit our position stragically with prophet from pakistan . I will throw it over probably first two dr. Jones. Thank you very much for the questions. On the danger of pullout and the safety issue, you do rates very important questions. I think the taliban has shown over the last couple of months since the february deal that it has decreased, in fact, generally stop targeting u. S. Forces in afghanistan. It is targeting Afghan Forces but not u. S. So i would not expect the taliban to take advantage of this opportunity but as weve noted during this committee with other groups including the Islamic State khorasan province that continue to conduct attacks. There are issues related with the safe withdrawal in spite or in the face of groups like the Islamic State that may conduct attack. I do think there also has to be very serious questions about what are we doing with American Assets infrastructure in the country, u. S. Has poured large amounts of money, what is going have come whos going to get including who is going to be in the basis of the u. S. Is also downsizing . On pakistan, just very briefly. I think pakistan almost certainly believes this is a win for it, its ally, the taliban is likely to advance with the continuing u. S. Drawdown. I see this is largely viewed positively by islamabad. Thank you. I have 30 seconds left here i yield back so my colleagues can ask questions. Thank you. Thank you very much. Mr. Carbajal. Mr. Carbajal, you have five minutes. Thank you. Thank you, madam chair. Ambassador crocker, we have been in afghanistan for almost two decades. While im concerned with administrations recent unilateral announcement to draw down u. S. Troops to 2500 in january, we cannot be an openended war. How can the u. S. Better assist diplomatically and militarily in addressing the main barriers that are inhibiting an intraafghanistan agreement . I know you hav if you could elaborate i would greatly appreciate it. Thank you, congressman. Your question was broken up due to technical problems but i thk i have the gist of it. Again, it is an issue of strategic patience of a longterm view. The taliban certaly has it. They spent all those years in exile rather than give up to their alqaeda colleagues. They know, they believe they can out weight us in the course of the socalled peace talks would vindicate that. I know about bng tired, congressman. I spent seven out of first 11 years after 9 11 in pakistan, afghanistan and iraq as ambassador to all three so i get that. Getting tired in giving up need to be two different things. I just pray that it is not too late to reverse the disastrous course were on right now. That is simy running up a white flag a will pay for it downhe line, not just in afghanistan. Ambassador, if you could touch on what concrete steps we could do to create that intraagreement . [inaudible] well, first, we needo make it clear we are not neutral in this matr, that the Afghan Government has our sol backing. That we are not going to abandon an ally to the taliban. What woulde first in critical i thi concrete thing we can do, and from that making it clear that anything we do further is going to be strictly based on conditions. We want to retain our presenc as long a the government wants us and as long as we need to to defend our own National Security interests. We need to demonstrate some strategic patience and we need to do it now. Thank you, ambassador. Dr. Jones, as is well known part of the negotiation by the compensation the taliban commit to prevent alqaeda and other terrorist groups and using afghan soil to threaten the u. S. Or its allies, including by preventing recruiting, training and fundraising. The taliban are not and will not uphold that commitment. Looking forward how do we measure the extent to which a taliban will fulfill this part of the agreement . Its a very good question, congressman. I think the answer in part hinges on our intelligence collection and analysis capabilities. To what degree do we continue to see meetings . Thats from human intelligence and meetings between the taliban and alqaeda. To what degree do we see alqaeda continue to operate in areas where there are taliban commanders . To what degree do we see alqaeda and other camps operating in afghanistan or along the afghanistanpakistan border . That are obviously a range of ways including through Geospatial Intelligence that we can monitor that it does become harder, the more we drop in forces though it makes it more difficult for nsa and cia to put their important units and Collection Sites because these military for that. Dr. Biddle, in your testimony youold us how the Afghan National the Security Forces need to be professnalize to root out corruption. What can the United States do and our allies to suprt these efforts . Theres a limited amount we can do actually because the corrupon and cronyism we see so deeply rooted in fundamental political features o the afghan governing system. What we can do is reach a low and the key is conditionalit and the eight we provide. We need to tell the afghans what we expect an exchangeor our support. That can move their incentives beit gradually in the direction professionalization. We should do that but we should also be reastic about how much we can accomplis on that score. Thank you very much. I am out of time. I yield back. Thank you. Mr. Kim, you have fiv minutes. Thank you. Dr. Jones, i am gng to start with you. Thank you for taking time to come here. I was reading through an october interviewhat you concted with now acting secretary of defense chris miller just i guess in october. Let me begin with the importance of maintaining pressure. I think the 2500 does allow us to continue to pressure al qaeda in some terrorist gros including Islamic State in afghanistan. But i do think a complete withdrawal would have eliminated our ability to maintain pressure against terrorist organizations having some special Operations Forces and some aircraft does allow us to keep pressure. But i do think going down to the levels that we are, does cause us to risk the broader Counterinsurgency Campaign so i thk were taking risk im not sure i would have recommended that to go down to 2500. But i do think we still can maintain some pressure with the size force we have. I dont think we want to let afghanistan fail and again, part of the issue is not just the military footprint, part of it is also the aid that we need to provide and one of the things that i recommended mr. Kim in my testimony and my written testimony, was also to make it very clear to Afghan Government that were going to provide sustain assistance to that government like we do in other countries. And that we would be a supporting partner in the next several years. So i think thessue is not to focus just on military forces but what are we doing in terms of state department and u. S. Agcy for international devepment assistance . What are we doing on the intelligence aid side . That stuff has not been clear so i actually like hear more clarity on what nonmilitary types of assistance are happening. Absolutely. As would i as former state Department Official that worked in afghanistan about ten years ago, and then also i visited afghanistan with a number of my colleagues and a Bipartisan Group a year ago. These are the exact same questions that were heard which is what is that comprehensive strategy actual way in which we work in this way and this fashion here. And i want to turn to ambassador crocker, ambassador you are ambassador in afghanistan when i was there in 2011. And always appreciated your leadership out there, and i wanted to focus on what you said about nato. You were talking about it how nato is coming up with a different approach and they have different opinions there i wanted to ask you if you could give us a little bit more detail into any reflection you have any communication youve had with nato partners or other countries seeing this situation and why is it that they seem to have a longer horizon and approach this and also just conclude what is your assessment of the state of the Nato Alliance, and thoughts there in materials of how we need to prepare. Thank you. Thank you congressman. Nato made it clear during the time i was there and i do remember your visit. Thank you for making that effort it is so important to come out and see things on the ground for yourself. As you did. Our nato allies as you know stood up for us. On article 5, i have been pleasantly surprised their willingness to make the longterm commitment they have in afghanistan. They are ready to stay but as long as were staying. But we would dilute ourselves utterly to think theyre going stay if were going and that i think is the hinge point were at right now after the president drawdown decision that did not involve consultationings with nato. I believe very strongly that the Nato Alliance is critical or mobile security as well as america security. We have all have frustrations with nato both in terms of financial commitments and capabilities. Here is one arena where they are ready and they understand fortunately my time expired so i hav to yield back to chairman but thank you for your assessments there. Thank you very much. Ms. Horn is recognized for five minutes. I yield back my time. I just walked in. Thank you, chairman. Okay. At this point i dont think we have anyone else seeking time. I have one last question for ambassador crocker and i think sort of the crux of the problem and certainly we understand the risks and theyve been very well explained of whack happen in afghanistan. You know those risks go up to some extent if we arent present trying to contain them. But when you talked about and this is, you know, a very long held belief by many people that after the soviets were driven out of afghanistan our decision to not stay engaged in the impact of that you know a lot more about afghanistan than i do. Ive been there eight or nine times but not for any length and certainly not in the depth that you have. But if you were to take me, you know, back to that moment, and then, you know, knowing what we know now i just dont think it would have solved the problem and i think thats what a lot of people are, you know, wrestling with connectivity. Im sorry ambassador crocker are you hearing me okay . Yeah ill take that as a no. So i guess weve got dr. Jones and little here. If you could answer this question, my point is and weve heard it described. Now i forget i think it was dr. Jones making points about all of the war lords and that government gets too powerful war lords get upset and you have to appease them. You certainly got the drug trade. Youve got extremists. Everyone in afghanistan owns ten guns. And after the soviets came in, it really blew up the existing government. You had the funding that came out of saudi arabia into pakistan which radicalized a large portion of the population. Can we honestly say that there was something we could have done in 1989 that would have changed that . I think thats what concerns a lot of people is here we are theres a huge problem here. And if we show up, well solve it. That just doesnt seem to play out, there are certain things that u. S. Military and foreign country the just cant come in and solve. And the idea that, you know, gosh if we leave everything is beginning to go to hell. It is an enormous cost certainly, you know, in lives, in the risk of lives and disruption of lives, of american Service Members and others who serve there. But it is also a global cost in terms of our credibility and other what were doing that what else cant with be doing and again, you know we have u. S. Troops killing afghans. All right. Going to be a certain amount of resentment to most of the Afghan People for that. So i guess how can you answer the question of are we as americans in the merle really able to solve these incredibly complex problems that exist in afghanistan . Because i think most peoples impression is that is the folly is thinking that somehow oh if we were just there and greater numbers and we would just there a little bit smarter we could achieve some sort of peace deal. So i dont know what the connectivity stuff going on dr. Jones youre in front of me ill let you take a stab at that. Very good questions i think it is important to look at the history of the country including the 10s. I would say the u. S. Position today is very different than what it was in the 1980s where were actuall in pakistan. We were not in afghanistan. Where we were providing assistance to the aden. I garble that because i got confused with connectivity there i was talking what about it was done and thats, you know, thats the war. That was the great lament o that. Gosh we pulled out and evything went to hell. You know i only we had ge in it would have beenixed and thats what i dont believe to be honest. Well i would take the one lesson that we did not do that we could have done is kept a close intelligence and probably a special operations presence embedded with Northern Alliance forces which were still surviving at the end of the 1990s, and we could have i think the 9 11 Commission Report highlights this we could have conducted a tax against glad at that point we did not we did not pull trigger Clinton Administration had bin laden within its sights so having a presence there, would have allowed us to conduct some action. Based on that one quick point, though there are risks in doing what you just described. Okay . Because that is the risk of inaction, okay . Weve taken actions before, you know, we bombed that, you know, pharmaceutical plant in sudan which, you know, blew up in our face. You know, we launched we did launch bunch of cruise missiles tay take out bin laden i think theres a tendency to say inaction good or action bad youve got more of a balance depending on the circumstances and those risks either way. Yes. I think there are risks either way i think thats where were at today. Is do question take the risk of leaving and seeing what happens afterqardz . Or can we accept some small military presence, some aid and keep the Afghan Government and taliban talking and prevent overthrow at least for the next couple of years and see where this goes . And thats what thats what my advice is to consider. Understood just to conclude i believe theres still a transnational terrorist threat and when we talk about the shift to Great Power Competition we t out of this stuff and everything. I know that challenges that are presented by russia and china. But i think it is important that we all keep in mind that theres still only one group of people that gets up ery morning hoping to kill as Many Americans in westerners as they psibly can. And only thing thats toking them is the ability to do itt is not a lack of will. And that is al qaeda and is and various affiliate groups all over the world. We will have to do something i my view to contain tha threat. And i think those who wish it away and say gosh if we just werent fightings them they would just stop hating u thats not going t work. Something needs to be done to contain that threat i think with American People trying to figure out is how can we do that in wayhat is less costlynd places troops at risk i thi thats what we have to work towards. This is horribly unfair. T believe it or not mack were wrappingp, and mr. Chairman i did have a thorn bury walked into the room by the way. But [silen] im sorry mr. Thornebury you have the floor. Brief question based on earlier conversation mist was asking you about force protection, and i know that doctor bitle talked about two sources of lerchl once was presence of our troops other is our financial commitment. The concern about that expressed to me if we unilaterally make cuts to commitment it could endanger our forces who were there in some way because that leverage, that incentive would be reduced. Do you have an opinion about that . Yeah. I think the answer to that depends mr. Thornebury on what time of assistance were cut by i certainly think training to local forces particularly if it starts to trigger some animosity weve seen attacks against u. S. Forces from afghans as the situation deteriorates that would be a concern. But i also think are we cutting Key Resources that protect our forces on the basis where we operate. And i think that, that needs to be looked at very closely. Well, whatever the number 25, 45 it is not many folks and we depend upon afgha to protect our folks by and lar, and it just seems to me to be a key consideration. Nally mr. Chairman i say i really appreciate all three witnesses and their testimony and their bearing with us today. I think it has been very helpful i yield back. Thank you we did have a couple of more members who came back in. Since we concluded this, so well go with ms. Sphere and small and adjourn ms. Sphere youre up next for five minutes. Thank your. Chairman. Than you especially for the hearing it has bee very insightful. To all of the witnees extraordinary testimony to ambassador crocker what a lifetime of contributionsouve made to our country. Im not se if it was you ambassador or someone else tt someone said are going to pay for it if we leave abruptly, and i would like for someone whoever said that to define what is paying for it mean. Ms. Spear yep. Im sorry ambassador crocker are you still with us . It sounds like weve lost our conntion to ambassador crocker. So maybe to dr. Bitle and dr. Jones abrupt withdrawal, i mean, weve seen what has happened certainly in iraq. I worry about the reenstatement of sheree law and impacts on women and children, and i worry that we have to calibrate what a presence, what a presence that will be relevant is. Is 2500 enough . Or do we need 4,000 . Can we reinstate over 2,000 after the Biden Administration comes in to operation if that is where hes inclined to go . You can just kind of in your own words kind of answer those two or three questions and lets start with you dr. Bitle i would personally like to see the withdrawal order remanded and i would like our current troop level to remain at least through the beginning of Biden Administration. In part for the political issue of the talks, but in part because afghan ally it is do depend on air strookings that u. S. Presence provides we were to totally withdraw sing is defensive view if it was useless but i think it is likely that afghan National Security forces would break. Theyre taking heavy casualties in combat already. There are serious strains on organization if we were to leave that would signal them that the future is very negative. And that combat motivation that remaining troops effected in a very dangerous way by a perception that this is now a hopeless enterprise and that sooner or later theyre looking at failure and defeat in absence of u. S. Support i think the signal that would send to Afghan Security forces is likely to cause them to be unable to sustain the stalemate that we now see. Thank your. Jones. I did not u the words hate r it but what i would say is that that if at the moment we have something close to a military stalemate in afghanistan, and a rough balance of power, the afghan on the one side with support from the u. S. And other nato countries on other we have the taliban with some support from pakistan from iran, from russia other outside donors you break that balance but a withdrawal so shift balance in favor of the taliban i think all of us have noted during this hearing that the taliban continues to have relations with al qaeda i think it becomes only a matter of time before taliban starts to overrun major cities in kandahar, farah other provinces i think then the concern is you start to see [inaudible conversations] thats my concern. I apologize for that ms. Sphere you still have time. Ahead. Was that dr. Jones speaking or ambassador dr. Jones speaking. Okay. And iuess ambassador crocker cannot connect. All right i guess my final question if i still have time mr. Chairman is there anything that has not been asked this morning that any of you would like to inform us about that we should be looking at that maybe has not been discussed. Im getting a hea shake. I going to have to be apologize almost out of time. Gohead. Ill take the opportunity then what i would suggest is this whole exercise tells us that it is very important to think of the determination of a war when you begin a war. If we engage in any of these kinds of interventions in the future we need from the beginning to assume not that the war just whengdz you concur the capitol but that theres going to be some subsequent process that we need to think through in advance if we understood that in 2001 to 2002 and negotiated taliban when we have opportunity and advantage rather than assuming that we won the war because capitol had fallen i dont think we would now be in this situation easiest way to prengt dilemmas we face now is to solve them at the beginning. When question get involved, and we understand what our war aims are and when we accept idea that negotiation is a way to realize our war aims at the beginning, is a better solution in waging a 20year war and finding yourself with no good options in the end. Thank you. I yield back j recognized for five minutes. Thank you chairman, smith. I wanted to followup on congressman kims question regarding the impact that our, this scaled withdraw was impact on our allies you dr. Jones i would love toear your sense about how our aies what position our allie have put in both nato and nonnato given this reduction in forces. Well ihink two challenges we saw it with secretary general they were not given sufficient advance warning. So that what it didnt include was a broader u. S. Nato and other forces one of their objective combine objective force postures collectively they need and how does this affect all of that so i did n see Strategic Planning with our allies. Seco issue is rember, there is pressure andhere should be pressure in all of our allies capital and amo their populations with people that are asking why do we still why do germans have forces italian where shall british and other why is do they have forces in afghanistan . So i think that the recognition here is if we want those countries to continue to train and to continue to engage in combat operations we have to treat them as allies, plan with them as allies, and thats the only way i think were able to keep it because i think they actually provide advantages they have forces on the ground they can train afghan fces and i think that, is thend of the day this shows that it is not just us. Earlier in discussions we taed about the potential impact that the removal of troops or the draw down o troops would have on negotiations for peace. And i wante to link those two discussions together. The need for us to strategically plan with our allies and potential domino eect that our reduction of troops could have on other presence allies presence on the ground. And how that might impact negotiions especially given changes changing relationships perhaps height tensions with our allies. That drengted drengted at me . Yeah. Sorry. A very good question. Qhing you look at this from the taliban perspective, they agreed to negotiations in september and they have dragged their feet, and now they have, perceive theyve been rewarded for drag their feet by further u. S. Drawdown that was not connected in any way to progress font peace settlement. So ting that issue here is if we want an actual Peace Agreement, then no one can be rerairded rewarded. Specifically on relatiohip with nato and nnato allies is there anything more youould say on terms of the impact on potential collaboration for the peace negotiations . I think, i think the addition of International Forces is also an important bargaining tip in negotiations not just u. S. Forces leaving as weve talked about it is also other International Forces leaving thats an Important Note here. Thank you i dont know if we still have ambassador crocker but if he wanted to qaig in on this i would appreciate it. Thank you i think im reconnected. If you are ultimately this is not about force levels. It is about american resolve. And that resolve has been very sadly wanting, going all the way back to the inception of these including Afghan Government. That is the decision we need to make as a country. I all of us in different ways all three of us have said we are in a very dangerous situation right right now and that further link will make it worse and great strength of a nation has been based on many things. One of them are our alliances. Nato is crucial we have an opportunity here. We immediate to cease it. But first question need to stop the move literally, and second, we have to have a conversation among ourselves and with our allies. This is not a lost cause. If we demonstrate that resolve thank you i yield remnder of my time. Thank you. We do have one more member who is returned andhen that is it. No matter who comes back ms. Youll have the last minute of your time. I hope that you all can hear me. My question is for dr. Bitle United States committed to a draw down which we heard people asking questions in your written testimony says that expectation on part of the afghani offer central to ability to acceptable settlement i was just wondering if your view what would be moving away from our publicly touted condition based approach especially on the eve of a transition of government here in the United States signal to the Afghan People and what does it mean for our ability to creditly facilitate and enter afghan negotiations in the future . I think during the Trump Administration as you view heading out regardless of what happened conditions wasnt to be taken seriously or to be trusted and that in turn made it very, very difficult for Afghan Government to persuade members of its own Political Coalition. That they should accept compromise in order to get a deal because it looked like the halflife of the entire Afghan Government was going to be very, very limited and hence asking power brokers within the afghan at large, to make near term sacrifice when total cut and run looked like it was going to create a longterm in afghanistan measured in minutes . Months, years at most. Didnt look like a good bargain that it turn made it very, very difficult for them to organize any kind of consistent position the taliban. Now, in Incoming Biden Administration is beginning to have an opportunity to make its own decisions. About how seriously it takes these talks to what degree theyre prepared to use the leverage we have remaining to bring about successful talks, among the many difficulties in this talks is that theres so many parties. We tend to think of it as the taliban and the u. S. It is actually the taliban in Afghan Government but the Afghan Government is not a unified actor. And in terms of the Afghan Governments ability to get a consistent position among all of the Different Actors internally to its side of these talks some degree of understood consistency in u. S. Support for the Afghan Government is critical for enabling afghan leadership to persuade elements of its own Political Coalition that it makes sense for them to be in this for the long haul. If we signal to them that were not in it for long haul stability of their government goes way down and ability of instable government to command enough loyalty and corporation from its own power brokers to make confessions in a compromise talks goes way down. These are issues that the Biden Administration now has an opportunity to recast. I hope they will attack take that opportunity. Next question is somewhat related to that assuming that Biden Administration gets that opportunity what kind of conditions if any do you think need to be met before the u. S. Would consider reducing withdrawing troops further assuming that aroach for Biden Administration or what we remanes of this administration . Further withdraws conditi on end to war. If thats our strategy for geing out of this with an acceptable outcome, way we use our resources needs to be td to that outcome if a end of the war is what we want and what we should wt we should be prepared to lested small number of troops that are there now this isnt the almost 100,000 soldier prence of 21 anymore this is rather small footprint to begin with. I think we should be prepared to say were going leave it there until we get what we want which is an end to war to negotiate a settlement. That is you must be alluding to my mind my next question is what troop should remain and what kind of troop would you recommend in terms of personnel i have a minute left. I would recommend leaving every single american soldier who is there now there, and until the war ends. Now in terms of the configuration of what is there, i suspect it is pretty close to optimize now because i have confidence in general miller and his ability to design his fore structure to be optimal with respect to the cap hes given in terms of the military capabilities to go along with the political role driving us towards a settlement, the Critical Military capability at the moment is air strikes. Our ability to do air strikes effectively in turn on how many basis to maintain on country and how much cooperation we can get with afghan core headquarters to enable us to know where Afghan Forces are what theyre doing, what theyre seeing, and thus how we can support them with our air power. That the way i would evaluate in military terms, that the size and configuration of a posture in my view primarily valued for political purposes would be centrally how does it affect our ability to deliver air power to keep our ally, afghan allies militarily effective in the field to the extent that we can do it . Thats the criterion in the makeup of that posture. Specific. I appreciate your time and i yield back. Thank you very much. I want to join Ranking Member and thanking our witnesses for this discussion. Appreciate you being here. Appreciate you sharing your knowledge with us, with that we are adjourned. [inaudible conversations]