Transcripts For CSPAN3 Boeing CEO Others Testifies On 737 MAX - Part 1 20240713

Will come to order. I ask unanimous consent that the chair be authorized to declare recess recesses in todays hearing. And i also ask that the ranking chair member be recognized for a minute each during first round of questions. Without objection, so ordered. Before i begin, i want to expla explain an administrative matter regarding some of the documents we may use in todays hearing and may be entered into the record. Ill be making two unanimous consent requests in reference to two document lists, list a and list b. First, the documents contained on list b are marked export control. Weve been advised by the house General Council that the constitution provides ample authority for us to release these documents and the documents from boeing, boeings attorneys agreed to the release of these documents. I see nothing that is export sensitive in these documents. The faa stamped every document and they sent us as export control. However, to prevent confusion with regard to documents with markings on them, i will be making a unanimous consent request regarding to the export control act and second, ill be making a unanimous consent request to enter the documents on list a into the hearing record. This list includes the export control documents on list b as well as additional documents. The Ranking Members staff is aware and has reviewed all these documents and theyre on both lists and with that, i ask unanimous consent that the documents on list b be disclosed pursuant to 50 u. S. Code section mr. Chairman . Yes . I want to reserve my right to object at this point. The gentleman is recognized. The reason for doing that is weve had two at least two, two that i can remember, hearings noting chinas infiltration of american industries, and that includes rail, maritime, transit, you name it and the most and they would love to have the opportunity to get their hands on technology from the aviation industry, as well and it concerns me in a big deal. We have talked about this does gone over this. In making these documents, these documents have all been made available to everyone in the committee and putting them out there in the public domain, i think is its a real problem. I do, and i think were cutting ourselves off at the legs when it comes to that technology. It concerns me in a big way and i really want us to think about that moving forward. Having said that, i will withdraw i will withdraw my right to object and allow this to move forward. Do i want to go forward and i do want to get the answers so ill remove that request. I thank the gentleman, and i didnt take a backseat to anybody in the issues regarding china. I voted against most favorite nation status and opposed them going into the wto. Ive raised concerns for decades about their theft of u. S. Technology and their unfair trade practices, so i certainly share the gentlemans concerns. I have reviewed these documents and i dont think theres anything in there that will be of any utility to the chinese, but in any case, i recognize your concerns. So i just have to finish reading this. List b will be pursuant to section 20h2b2. Without objection, so ordered and i enter all of the documents into the hearing record. Without objection, so ordered. Lets proceed now to the hearing. I first want to recognize the families who are here today. Ive met twice with families and i dont know if im met with all of you here today, and i want to convey my utmost condolences. Its one year and one day after the lion air crash. A very somber day. We shouldnt have to be here, but we are and were going to get to the bottom of this and were going to mix it and were going to see that it never happens again. With that, i would thank the witnesses for being here. Mr. Mullenburg, and mr. Hamilton. This fourth hearing, the committee has held for the First Full Committee Hearing and given the extraordinary interest i felt it best to do it in full committee. I know that boeing told us that they wanted to wait until the airplane was ungrounded, but i felt it was very important for them to testify before that happened. We are here today because 346 people, sons, fathers, daughter, mothers died on two max aircraft within a fivemonth period. Something went drastically wrong. As you know, our committee has been conducting a very robust investigation and been on this committee a long tile. Weve never undertaken an investigation of this magnitude to the best of my knowledge in the hifty roo of this committee which is the second oldest committee in the u. S. Kong, and we have received hundreds of thousands of pages of documents from boeing. They have been cooperative in providing those documents and agreeing that we could use those documents in the public hearing and we have received tens of thousands of pages from the faa. We have conducted some hearings with faa employees. We have others we wish to interview, and we are we have requested to interview boeing employees and we are told that we have to be in line behind the justice department. So those are still forthcoming. There are a lot of Unanswered Questions that we need to get to the bottom of. You know, we know that a novel system, a new and novel system called mcas took these two planes into an uncontrollable altitude after it repeatedly triggered, having to do with a faulty or missing sensor. These were wired to one, in the it was wired to one sensor and in may, and then acting administrator elwell was there and i asked him was mcass a safety critical system . He said yes. Then how could it be approved to trigger with a single point of failure . He had no answer to that. Highway could the faa approve it . How could the manufacturer do that . He had no good answer and that will be, we will continue to pursue the roots of this problem. We do know that at one point, boeing had planned to inform pilots about mcas and it was in the first version of the flight manual and when it became a radical system which could trigger the catastrophic failure, it came out. Some of that was discussed in the senate yesterday and it will be discussed here today, particularly quoting from boeings chief test pilot and his instant messages seems inexplicable. Secondly, we do know that boeing engineers actually proposed placing a an mcas enunciator in the cockpit. But again, that came out. In later versions or in the actual production version and then it wasnt until after lion air that boeing informed anyone and still at that point i think soft peddling mcas that was on the planes. Ive talked to pissed off pilots. We were back up . How can we be backup if we dont know if something will take over our plane. There is quite a bit of discontent in the Aviation Community about that. We now know that boeing and the faa assume pilots would appropriately react in four seconds. Four seconds. But boeing had information which well get to a little later in this hearing that some pilots might react in ten seconds or longer, and if that happens, the results would be catastrophic and result in the loss of the aircraft as happened twice. We now know that the planes development and boeing was they had a phone call. The phone call was, hey, major customer. Were going to buy airbus. They have a better fuel economy and the pilots dont need retraining which is very expensive and disruptive of our schedules. So bowing from day one had to meet that instead of a clean sheet airplane. They got the 12th or 13th iteration of the 737 amendedtype certificate. That meant big engines mounted forward and flies differently and they had to develop a system to make it fly like the others so it wouldnt go through Pilot Training or recertification and that drove the whole process. We do know that boeing offered Southwest Airlines 1 million per plane rebate. If the pilots had to be retrained. Imagine what the pressures were from the top on down to mid level and lowlevel engineers and youre saying, what . No. Cant have that. It cost us a million bucks a plane and maybe the other contracts had the same provision and it cost us the markets advantage and slows things down. And then, you know, theres been a lack of candor all through this. Boeing learned that the aoa angle of attack disagreed light which was a standard feature on all boeing 737s did not work on this plane unless someone bought the upgraded package. We are told that was inadvertent Software Error in the upgraded package. But that may be so. But boeing decided to delay the fix for three years until 2020. They didnt tell the faa. They didnt tell the kiscustome and they didnt tell the pilots about this until after the lion air crash. Thats inexplicable. You know . They say well, its not necessary for safe operation of the max, but keeping everybody in the dark and having that there it is. Its there, right in front of the pilot and its not lighting up. Well, it cant light up. And it was included in the flight manual unlike mmcass. You include something in the manual that is going to work and something was not in the manual. What is that about . We know there was tremendous pressure production and boeing whistleblowers have contacted us regarding features, engineers wanted to put on the max, but were denied because of the rush to get this plane out the door and compete. We have from internal whistleblower a survey conducted november 16 that 39 of boeing employees surveyed had experienced undue pressure and 29 said they were concerned about consequences, you might lose your job, i guess. If they reported these. We now know at least one case where a boeing manager implored the Vice President general manager of the 737 program to shut down the 737 max production line because of safety concerns several months before the first tragic lion air crash. Theres a lot we dont know. We dont know what would happen if a different path had been followed here exactly. We dont know if these pilot his had the system what would happen. We dont know why boeing designed a plane where a critical, safety critical system assigned to a single point of failure, inexplicable and inexcusable and as far as i know, in the passenger aviation product and we have seen pressures from wall street, Market Forces have a way of influencing the decisions of the best companies in the worst way, endangering the public, jeopardizing the good work of countless, countless hardworking employees on the factory lines and i hope thats not the story that is ultimately going to be written about this longadmired company. So we need today, mr. Mullenburg, and mr. Hampton. We need answers, but we also know that we need reforms on how commercial aircraft are certified and how manufacturers, not just boeing and all are watched and overseen by the regulators. This hearing today, an investigation is not just about getting answers to our questions, but how to make the systems safer and prevent future tragedies. With that, i yield time to the Ranking Member. Thank you, mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. I do want to extend my condolences to the families, and friends of the accident victims, i cant imagine how hard it is to just sit and go through this process. Im going to divert from my statement for just a minute and associate myself with a couple of comments that he made, and i too, being a pilot and having an equipment in the cockpit that enabout is something that concerns me in a big way and that comment that pilots, were the backup system, it does concern me, but i do want to point out, though, as well that when it comes to airbus because it was mentioned, too, that airbus, you know, there were customers that wanted to look at airbus as opposed to the boeing product, but the pilot is the backup system. You cant shut it off ask the sa similar system thats in a boeing max mcas. You cant shut it off. It overrides the pilot. Overrides the pilot. Whereas mcas can be shut off, you want to be able to shut a system off which has failed and be able to fly the airplane and thats what ive harped on over and over and over again and it is my hope that mr. Mullenburgs testimony today will help us understand the decisions that boeing made between 2009, 2017 regarding the design and certification of the 737 max. Some of those decisions were reviewed and approved by the boeing organization and the Designation Authority of the ada and we keep using that term, obviously. Its on behalf of the faa ask while the boeing oda was authorized to act for the faa as a regulator of the faa, they retain the ultimate responsibility for overseeing the compliance of all safety regulations. I know the term edz we have a lot of other people to hear from and were sear are here in front of the boeing Leadership Today and to gets complete ebb picture, i would like to be with the faa officials at the time between 12 and 20 fen with these did get a commitment and i hope you dont have a problem. We have to hear from everybody. Thats the bottom line. Ive read before, the many times. If these reinvest gaegs reveal problems with certification then i think congress should act to fix those specific and identifiable problems and thats going to be the issue is identifying what those problems are, but in the aftermath of these accidents we cant address the safety by focusing on one single factor that contributes to an accident. Ive heard Safety Experts refer to, you know, the swiss cheese model of accident causation. In this model, ifio you use this model, we have layers. Many layers of accident protection that are visual. If you visualize them as slices of cheese, with holes it represents the weaknesses and others are due to active fail urs, but when an accident occurs, when all of those holes and weaknesses, when they line up. When they line up thats when you have a catastrophic failure and in the context of the 737 max, we have to consider all of those layers, all of them when it comes to the protection and safety and you know, we try to determine what weaknesses are out there and try to figure out what those weaknesses are. As an investigator, the indonesian government said about the lion air accident and i quote, if one of those nine contributing factors did not happen the crash would not have happened. One particular layer that designed the certification of the 737 max, thats the focus of a number of investigations. Earlier this year, boeing took responsibility for the mcas design weaknesses and theyve been working on a software fix which we were waiting to hear about that, but other weaknesses, boeing with the faas oversight, you know, that were going to address include pilot displays and operation manuals and crew training and today well hear about the status of all of those efforts, but i want to hear about how these efforts line up with the recommendations of the joint authoritys technical review and the first completed review of the max certification by individuals with fast aviation and technical, per tees thats due out and is obviously due soon. While the jtar didnt call for an end to the faas delegation programs and they did highlight some bureaucratic efficiencies between boeing and the faa and we have to address those and i know we will. And the faa, theyre concerned the faa concurred with the jtars report and is committed to working on these recommendations which is good. We obviously have to make oversight to make sure that happens and lastly, i want to hear about recently shared documents with the chief technical pilot with the 737 and im sure youre going to do that, but other investigations are moving forward as well, and last month, the National Transportation safety board issued a recommendation report which largely focused on the assumptions that were made during the design and certification process related to human factors. Designed and certification cannot be the soul focus of our efforts and ive said this before. Thats only one layer of that choose model that i talked about. In the last few months, other weaknesses that appeared to have played a role in these accidents have surfaced. Reports called into question evidence submitted to the lion air investigation which related to the installation, calibration and testing of the faulty angle of attack sensor and theres also been whistleblower statements and other reports raising significant concerns with lion air and Ethiopian Airlines operation and maintenance programs. The former chief engineer for Ethiopian Airlines filed a whistleblower complaint alleging significant problems with the maintenance, training and recordkeeping. He also alleges that the air carrier went into the maintenance records of the 737 and went into the maintenance records a day after the accident. And unfortunately, operational pressures and the lack of robust Safety Culture negatively impacted aviation safety and thats another layer of that model that i talked about. The ntsb has confirmed that along with certification, operational factors will be the focus of its accident investigations and in addition, along with its own max certification review, the department of transportation and their ig and their Inspector General at the request of their committees leadership will begin a review of the International Training standards with the impact of automation which is another thing that ive talked about as a potential problem, but i want to be Crystal Clear in reviewing these areas that this is not an effort to blame the pilots and i dont absolve boeing of its responsibility and it described the changing nature of the Airline Industry and the impact its having on airmanship. The article refers to a decadelong transformation of business of flying where airplanes became so automated and accidents so rare that a cheap, air travel boom was able to take route, and this booming air traft resulted in the need for more and more pilots and the pool of experienced pilots and i remember getting letters from airlines all over the world just simply because i had atp on my license and getting letters offering me jobs to get what i was doing and come fly for them, but ill continue to repeat this. Pilots can master Cockpit Technology and when the technology fails, they have to be able to fly the plane and want just fly the computer and to be clear, none of this is a reflection on lion air or ethiopias pilots professionalism or character. Theyre flying for their lives and thats the bottom line. Instead, its a reflection in the broader pressures thats present today and its incumbent on the airline whose name is on the side of that airplane to ensure that their pilots are properly trained to the level that they need to be and not rushed in the cockpits to meet those demands and thats where some of this blame lies. In ethiopia in particular. The government owns the airline. And they put pilots in there that something above their head. Its not the pilots fault. You have to look at who put them in that position to be responsible for hundreds of lives. So in line with the swiss cheese model and other layers of protection such pilot actions and Airline Operations and maintenance and training program, they must also be explored in all of those weaknesses have to be addressed and i still believe that the faa remains the Gold Standard in aviation safety and once the agency certifies the fixes to the max i will gladly volunteer to be the very first person right alongside administrator dixon in the very first flight of the max 8. In regard to the two 737 max accidents. I think all of those earns need to be addressed and only after the benefit of investigate of works, and jumping to conclusions for that work only risks more harm than good. The bottom line is the Safety Record speaks for itself and ill stand up to anybody who tries to question that. The faas proven system has made air travel the safest mode of transportation in history. And with that i appreciate the opportunity, mr. Chairman and i yield back anything i have left. I thank the gentleman. I would now turn to the chair chairman of the subcommittee, mr. Larsen. Thank you, chair defazio. Ill be brief because i want to get to the reason that were here today and thats for questions two and clearing direct answers from boeing. Yesterday, i did release a video opening statement. In summary, i want to say this, that the 246 lives lost in lion air 610 and Ethiopian Air crashes are constant reminders of the importance of this committees work and what is at stake if we do not address systemic safety issues in u. S. Aviation today. Some of the victims family members are here with us today. Others are watching on a live stream and your presence and tireless advocacy are critical to what we are doing today. I want to thank you for that. You deserve answers and you rightfully expect congress to act. And following the recommendations of the ntsb i do want to say i see one undeniable conclusion. The process by which the federal Aviation Administration evaluates and certifies aircraft is itself in need of repair it is no accident that there are few airplane accidents and makes it all the more tragic when there is one. It makes it even worse when there are two. We should maintain safety as the guiding principle and use the tools to the ensure the safety of the traveling public. With that, i yield back. I thank the gentleman. I now turn to the Ranking Member on the subcommittee aviation and mr. Gray from louisiana . Thank you, mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this hearing today. Yesterday was the yesterday wassed lion air tragedy, and i too want to join everyone sitting up here and offering our condolences to all of the ethiopian family victims and the indonesian family victims. Here we are in washington and everybody in this town, everybody nearly in this town, you sit up here and youre dealing with billions and trillions of dollars and all these crazy acronyms and processes and none of it often makes sense or fitteds the common sense test and oftentimes you see people that just forget about objectives and why are we actually doing this . What is the purpose of this whole process that we go through, the regulations, the procedures. Why . And at the end, its always about people. Thats what were here for. We are here for people. For fellow americans and fellow citizens. And it is amazing to me, just being here, how often that is forgotten. Im sorry to every one of you and your pictures are incredibly powerful. You know, i used to be a rock climbing instructor and we would go out there and we would have somebodys son or daughter, someones brother or sister and when youre out there rock climbing, look, there is no room for error. None. You lose somebody on the rock, theres no room for error. Air travel is the same thing. You cant oh, well pull over to the side of the road and hear whats going on. Thats not an option. This roes is has got to stay focused on the risk that air travel poses. The fact that you cant pull over to the side of the road, that youve got to have redundancies. And look, theres an awful lot going on right now with all of the different reports and investigations that are going on and im going to run through those in a minute, but theres an awful lot going on, but for example, if there truly was one aoa sensor that could potentially engage mcas, thats not the proper redundancieses, and if you look at the risk thats posed in this case, its unacceptable. Its unacceptable. A while back i had to represent the deepwater horizon disaster and i spent days in court listening to testimony and i do believe and the judge found that there was an inappropriate culture of focus on the wrong objectives and untime people can be looking at stock pricers on economics and how fast can this jet travel and what have you. Im going to say it again. This is 100 about people and ive heard people talk about this whole process and say the process was short circuited. Well, you know, you can look back and look at the 737, 6, 7, 8, and a319 and the e190 and the e195 and the c919 and many versions of those aircraft and you know what . Every single one of those was certifiedor approved in a shorter period of time than the max. So its not just about how long. Its what we actually do during that process. What are we doing during the process to make sure that this is a safe aircraft, to make sure that were not putting folks at undue risk. Ive heard a lot of people talk about a lot of different ideas and solutions and things that they want to do as we move forward and people posing solutions right now, and certainly, we need to extract every single Lesson Learned that we can, but right now, and i somehow ditched my list. Right now, we have investigations, the indonesian authorities and the ntsb. We have the jetter and the technical Advisory Board and the tab, we have the office of special counsel that is working with the whistleblower complaint. We have the secretary of transportation that set up a special committee. Boeing is doing an internal investigation. We have so many different investigations that are going on. One thing that weve got to make sure that we do is focus on facts. One thing that ive seen in this body in the four and a half years ive been here is responding emotionally to things and not responding to facts and it may make us feel good, but does not actually respond to the facts, so as we move forward and im sure we left out the investigations that are ongoing, but as we move forward, we have got to make sure that we are acting on the facts and every single outcome and every single problem that we have identified, we have to make sure that we truly base our solutions on those facts that that doesnt happen again. Lastly, mr. Chairman, the families shared a be in of concerns that i think are right on, and i do want to ask that boeing get back to us on these, and it was things like fully disclosing the mcas fix before the plane is allowed to fly if its allowed to fly again and fully define the role of the mcas system. Ill i would suggest that you can submit those for the record or you can ask during the question period. I thank the gentleman. With that, well turn to the witness for an opening statement. Chairman defazio . Ranking member graves, congressman larson, congressman graves, thank you and to the whole committee. We appreciate the opportunity to be here today and well do our best to answer all of your questions. Before we get started, i too, would like to acknowledge the families that are here with us today. And again, wanted to tell you im sorry. And ive had the opportunity to talk with some of you and hear your stories, and we are deeply, deeply sorry, and well never forget. And i want you to know that and were committed to making any improve ams that we need to make. Were committed. And i had the chance to see some of the stories and hear the photos and listen to personal stories and it does get to a business thats about people. I think congressman graves said it well. Thats where our hearts will always be, and i know all of boeing and are 150,000 people feel the same way and they think about this every day. We will carry the memories. Can you speak a little closer into your microphone . Thank you. Just pull it toward you. Is that better . Yeah. Thank you. Sorry. Please note that we care the memories these yets, anies and their memories will bring us every day to make our industry safer and we are committed to doing that. I am grateful to have the opportunity top here, and i want to let you all know that we are dedicated to learning. We are learning. We still have more to learn. We have work to do to restore the Publics Trust and we will do Everything Possible to prevent accidents like this from ever happening again. Mr. Chairman, i know and while investigations are still under way, we know both accidents involve the repeated activation of a Flight Control system called mcas which weve already talked about. That system responded to erroneous signals from angle of attack. Bizzed on that weve enhanced mcas in three ways and first, it will compare from both sensors before activating. Second, mcas will only activate a single time and third, mcas will never provide more input than the pilot can counteract using the control column alone. Pilots will continue to override mcas at any time. We brought the best of bowing to this exfort and weve flown more than 800 hour test flights with 545 participants from the 99 customers and 41 global regulators. Ive flown on a couple of flights myself. This is taking longer than expected, but we are committed to getting it right. During this process we worked closely with the faa and other regulators. We provided them with documentation and answered their questions and regulators around the world should scrutinize the max only when completely satisfied with the safety and the public deserves nothing less. Mr. Chairman, today and every day over 5 Million People will board a boeing airplane and fly safely to their destination. Decades of cooperation by industry and regulators and the rigorous oversight of this committee have reduced accidents by more than 35 over the last 20 years, but no number other than zero accidents is ever acceptable. We can and must do better. Weve been challenged and changed by these accidents. Weve made mistakes and weve learned and we are still learning. And were improving we established a permanent Aerospace Safety committee for our board and we strengthened our Engineering Organization so all 50,000 engineers now report up to boeings chief engineer. Were helping to rebuild the communities and the families impacted by these accidents. We pledged 100 million to this effort and hired Renowned Experts to ensure families can access these funds as quickly as possible. No amount of money can bring back what was lost. But we can at least help the families meet their financial needs. Mr. Chairman, i started at boeing more than 30 years ago as a summer intern in seattle. I was a junior at Iowa State University studying engineering and ive grown up on a farm in iowa. My parents taught me the value of hard work and integrity. I was awe struck to work at the company that brought the jet age to the world and helped land a person on the moon. Today, im still inspired by what boeing does and by the remarkable men and women who are committed to continuing its legacy and these heartbreaking accidents and the memories of the 346 lives lost are now a part of that legacy. Its our solemn duty to learn from them and we will. Recently, theres been much criticism of boeing and our culture. We understand and deserve this scrutiny, but i know the people of boeing. Theyre more than 150,000, most dedicated, honest people you will ever meet and their commitment to safety, quality and integrity is unparalleled and resolute. We will stay true to those values because we know our work demands it and it demands the utmo utmost excellence. So thank you to making sure that accidents like these never happen again. Mr. Chairman, thank you for listening, and i look forward to your questions. I thank the gentleman as i stated at the outset with consultation, with minority of both myself and mr. Graves will open with ten minutes and then well move to other members for five minutes in the usual order. You know, its clear, obviously from everything we know in the lion air report now that mcas was a major factor that contributed, but boeings position, at least prior to these crashes was an autonomous system, and it operated in the background. Is that correct . Mr. Chairman, that was the design approach. Yes. So but, the question is how do we get to that . And we have a slide and youll be able to see it right in front of you. Staff . Yes. This was a Concept Design for the flight deck in 2012 and as you can see, in the bottom righthand corner there was an mcas alert indicator. So at least at some point some on the engineering and design staff felt it would be important to make the pilots aware of this system and to have an indicator light. So is that do you agree that thats that that was originally proposed . Congressman, understand that was part of an early trade study at that point and very common that early in the design stage we would evaluate different systems. Thank you. But obviously, the final version did not have that. That was there was no indication either in the manual or on the flight deck of the presence of mcas . Congressman, john can answer that question. Chairman, the mcas light, as you pointed out, the intent of it was to signal an mcas failure. Its important to note that in these accidents the mcas system did not fail. But the functionality of the mcas light and the reason it was deleted was because the functionality was incorporated into the speed trim light which you can see just adjacent to that. Thank you. Thank you for that, but when it was a relatively benign system,. 6 degrees and when it was repeated it came out of the manual. Is that correct . I have seen early versions of the manual that you had mcas of the manual and it was asked to taken out and it came out. Congressman, if i can try to clarify because youre asking questions that expand into a couple of years just so i can clarify. The mcas inclusion and the training manual, that was a process that was occurring in parallel to the lowspeed operation, so the extension to air raft to low speed round middle of 2016. Yeah understand the prk lemms, with the fact that was tested and thats got for now. Akai key arc sumption was reaction time and with the aoa failure, and the mcas activates and its two and a half degrees every ten seconds and pretty rad cat and boeing assumed it would take pilots four minutes to react to runaway stabilizers, sthashth . Mr. Chairman, we do hazard analysis of the airplane design. Four seconds was the assumption. Thats a longstanding industry assumption for systems like this. Lion air reports as it took pilots eight seconds to react and thb we have informatien we provided by boeing which is the second slide ask it says there a slow reaction time scenario ten seconds found the failure to be catastrophic. Was this document ever clearly communicated to the regulators and ten seconds which isnt a lot of time to me and when you look at the ntsb report when they didnt know the system existed. Was the faa aware of this document . Chairman, i cant speak to this specific document. John may be able to, but i do think its important to note that as part of the design process we use a set of Industry Standard practices on these timeliness and this is a part of our hazard. That you shared right. I understand what the Industry Standard was, but i mean, it does cause a little concern. Ten seconds and you can see, gee, really good pilots can do it in less than ten seconds. Pilots arent at the top of their game every day and particularly if the first iteration, at least when they werent even aware of the system. You know, i think that assumption should have run alarm bells. So do you think in retrospect it was a mistake to not inform pilots of the existence of the mcas system . Congressman, a few things on that, and agreed, we make some mistakes mcas and, providing additional training information and the feedback weve pilots and rehave saiding these decades long end and of course, the question would it be why io why one set sensor and the admin they are the ask in may and the safety critical system that was not done and as the ntsb said multiple alerts can increase the pilots workload and the combination of alerts and indications did not trigger the accident pilots to immediately perform the runaway stabilizer of, you know, functions. Okay. Again, mr. Hamilton, are you aware of any other aircraft out there that has a safety critical system that is dependent upon a single point of failure . Chairman, single point of failures are allowed in airplane design. Regulation 25. 1309 actually discusses that and talks about different hazard categories, and and this one was deemed to be catastrophic. I know there are three categories. You dont deep it to be catastrophic. It was classified as major, as i recall. Catastrophic is one category, so when we test out systems we do look at their impact on the airplane when theres failures and we did look for ten seconds and then took over the simulator with pilots and then the typical reaction time is for seconds. Are i put up intorth document if front of you there, 1217 and 1215 shlg but this was raised to an engineer and who do have a fall you are or it, and did ye ever aware and i am aware of the communication as it surfaced in talking with the engineer, i think it highlights that our engineers do raise questions and in open but it also follows our thorough the single sensor from a reliability and availability standpoint in the hazard category of course, we dont know what happened in ethiopia, but there is some speculation. There are delicate Little Things out there, ive seen them. And now, of course, final flight here is now, as you emphasized, the Flight Control will now compare imports from both aoa sensors, and i guess the question is, why wasnt it that way from day one . Why wasnt it that way from day one . If you could do it now with an expert wire or a software fix or whatever, why didnt you do it from day one . Why not have that redundancy . Mister chairman, weve asked ourselves that same question, over and over. And if we knew everything then that we know now the concept from a safety standpoint was to build the mcas, extent the Current System on to the previous generation of 7 30 sevens, thats a system that had 200 million flights on it and incrementally extend them, that was the safety concept behind the original decision. My time. My time has expired. And i want to turn to the Ranking Member. Ranking member, mr. Graves, is recognized. Its hard to know where to. I want to go back to clarification to that, that first flight with mcas, can we bring that up . Can you bring it back up, please . The one that shows the flight deck with the mcas. The mcas warning light, to me, this is more of an editorial comment. Have you read in your car and the check engine light comes on, and what is . It is it oil pressure . Oil temperature . The vacuum . I didnt know what it was. Its just a general check engine, and the stuff thats more important to me, is the stuff thats on the left. Because mcas manifests itself as a trim issue, and i go back to training, you have memory items, every pilot, i shouldnt say that, in the United States, pilots are taught, to have memory items. You instantly go through those, when you have a failure. You start to do that in your mind. And some of them are even goofy little rhymes or whatever, to help you remember. And you go through each one of these processes. And in the case of if european air, they never did i still come back to this as well, they never retarded the throttles. They set the throttles for take off and they never pulled them back. They went right through the maximum certified speed of a 737 max eight, right up to 500 miles an hour, way beyond the maximum certified speed. Thats a reason that it cant manually trim the airplane, because its going so fast. Ive used that analogy as well. Try going down the road at 70 miles an hour, try opening the door, see if you can, and see what the pressure is against the door. The more pressure there is, the faster you are going, the more pressure there is, and the more that the harder it is to try and reverse those pressures. But you go through those memory items, and you immediately start taking down, and the trim is right. As far as what it is, whats the average, for seconds to react, ten seconds to react, and thats one of the flaws we need to be thinking about, is i guess we will have to Start Building airplanes to the least common denominator in terms of thats a poor choice of words, you might say. But the least common denominator in terms of international we have to start thinking about, it we will have to export and start thinking about International Training standards. Thats one of the things thats been looked at, how they train, did they have those memory items . Could they take them off . Most piles will sit there and they will do it in the shower. You go through your memory items. I do it all the time you just sit there and take through your memory items on engine failure, trim failure, whatever those might be. I guess we are making assumptions, and the faa is making assumptions and manufacturers are making assumptions about Pilot Training experience, and in the aftermath of these two accidents, and this question is for mr. Muilenburg, do you believe these assumptions, particularly for air traffic, are they going to be operate outside the United States, do we need to revisit those assumptions . We believe congressman, we believe we need to take a look at those longstanding industry assumptions and as you well pointed out, those are used to cross manufacturers and not just boeing. These are things that are produce airplanes for decades but we believe that its appropriate to take a hard look at those and we may need to make some revisions. We had the report that identified the same thing and we think that would be a good area up for this all to look at on this tissue specifically. We are committed to doing that and supporting that study and one of the areas that were addressing when we think about machine interface and how to do that most effectively as you pointed out earlier, a large generation are going to be needed over the next 20 years and we need to think about designing airplanes and for the next generation. With the benefit i guess is always dangerous and hindsight is always 2020. Knowing what you know now with the Polling Company and have you what you have done things differently with the certification of the 737 max . Congressman, yes we wouldve. We wouldve learned as i mentioned earlier, we made some mistakes and we discovered some things that we didnt get right and we on that and were responsible for any accident at any accident is unacceptable. That is our responsibility and were going to fix it and we know it needs to be done and thats what were focused go i are going for. Im going to make a comment here, as a result of this is the fact that we lost life and we lost loved ones, friends and life was lost as a result of these accidents and you hope there is never going to happen again only four unfortunate reality is it will happen again. I hopped on this and this is something that concerns me and i talked about the United States and Pilot Training and Pilot Training in other countries but something that concerns me and i want everyone to hear this it at the United States were going down the same direction our seeing in other countries when it comes to bring pilots to the point where they can fly. No matter what, we can build a perfect airplane at all never cause a problem or get into a bad situation any year later, you will get into a bad situation that were going to require a pirate to know its going on but here in the United States i think we are dumbing down and this is a criticism of ours. Because this is what im afraid of him i want to think about this as we move forward because i begins to be addressed. The United States topspin training, style training and basic in your basic piloting skills for your pilot license or before you get your airline transform running and youre you were tight peace external characteristics and today, you cannot do that. The instructor is not allowed to let a stall fully develop. At the first warning do look at the first warning of the stall and they have to recover and they fall this obediently. That means of the light comes on or the buzzer goes off you have to recover immediately and they cant let that stop develop. We are teaching them how to this is happening in other countries because many countries do booster system off of our system as well. You are going to have an airplane stopper youre not gonna teach anyone how to get out of that stall and recognize. But thats never going to happen and sooner or later you will run into problems and this concerns me. We have rewritten our ive got a problem with the faa allowing this. Weve ridden rewritten are instruction manuals to not allow this to happen and not allow these items that will ultimately happen and arent teaching pilots how to fix them and how to crack them on how to get out of them. How did shape the people that are in the plane with them and having forbid that should happen and that i can its me harping because it concerns me concerns me in a big way and the United States is behind other countries and ultimately going down that road and i think that we have to keep that two basic ways and theres nothing wrong with the Technology Ethical technology is great. But the most important safety component in any airplane is a pilot that can fly the dam plane, and not just slide the computer. Ive got a minute left. Actually, ill just yield back. I think the gentleman. We recognize. I dont know if we do this in order of. We do this in order of seniority and parents, and so first would be miss norton. Thank you chairman, i cant say enough about the importance of this hearing. I appreciate you, mister muilenburg, being here. Ranking member graves, i think you havent said in your testimony that you had flown on the 737 max since the fixes and corrections have been made, that is your testimony. Yes, ive flown on a couple of test flights as part of the i understood those to be test flights. But the chairman mentioned that we are trying to get the roots of the problem, so that it doesnt happen again, so that the faa, airlines like boeing, so my question is going to be heavily, whether they have made any difference, penalties, paid our outstanding, essentially to compliance, so that congress can decide what, if anything, it can do, everyone has an obligation here. Boeing, for sure, but so does congress. So the record i have, i asked you, mr. , did boeing enter into settlements with the faa in an effort to resolve what were then multiple and against boeing that were either pending or under investigation. That was in 2015. Congresswoman, im not familiar with the details of that, although i am aware did you enter into settler you know whether you entered into Settlement Agreements. I didnt ask you about the details. Congresswoman, that is correct, we did enter a Settlement Agreement in 2015. Thank you. Is it also true that boeing had to immediately pay 12 Million Dollars and that to the u. S. Treasury as a result. That is correct. Continuing, is it true that boeing faced up to 24 million in additional penalties through 2020, if certain conditions were not met . Yes, congresswoman. In working with the faa, they were really looking for creating a longstanding agreement with us to build a good foundation, and elevating compliance. Im just asking about the 24 million. My time is limited. An additional penalties in 2020 if the conditions were not met. There was, yes, there was a different penalty. Now im just going to just quickly, the obligations, improved management, accountability, interim auditing, supplier management, more stringent quality and timeliness of regulatory submissions, simplified specifications, i could go on. Im sure you understood that that was the agreement, those were the agreements. Yet in designing and developing and manufacturing the 737 max, boeing has run into issues, problems, characterize them as you will, in meeting the obligations in most of these categories. Would you agree, mister muilenburg . Congresswoman, we have identified many of those challenges through to Development Program and some of those youve had issues in meeting them . This has resulted in the problems they bring us here today. Congresswoman, i cant give you any specific examples and john do you have any . Some of these agreements we work to make over the course of the five years and we provide a Progress Report on our progress. Im not saying youre not making progress im saying the issue is black and white. There still time remaining for a legal obligation. Within the last decade, boy has had to worldwide grounded of relatively new airplanes. Seven 87 airliner and 737 max. Encountered many compliance issues in the times where point paid that 12 Million Dollar settlement which was paid and has the faa and its financial penalties in released on boeing . In the 2015 agreement. Were not aware of any additional penalties. The time has expired. We are now going to mr. Crawford. Mr. Muilenburg, are you aware of any aviation accidents can be attributed to a single factor . Congressman, no. I think the history of aviation shows that accidents are very unfortunate but its multiple factors. Mr. Hamilton, you agree with that . As Ranking Member groups pointed out in this model all accidents are contributed to a number of causes. The indonesian National Transportation Safety Committee issued a final report into the lion air light and had 99 contributors to the crash. Other than the design of the aircraft its the sensors during the lack of documentation and failure by the flight crew to respond to the emergency situation. One of the indonesian flights in ivanka investigators denied the factors and had one of these not contributing factors did not happen the, crash with them not happened. Mister chairman i, have a copy of the report and i ask that it be included in the record. Without objection. Thank you mister chairman i yield back. Thank you gentlemen. The next would be representative would be bernies johnson. I like to have an opening statement. Mr. Muilenburg, de mr. Mueller could as the ice pilot on the 737 max which was in place at the time of the accident. What do you report to . Congresswoman, he was engineering our commercial airplanes but recorded up to our engineering team. He is in the training to parliament. There was a chain of command. In march of 2016, he asked the faa what he was okay to remove all efforts of the mcas and in training material when he made this request he acted on his own and outside the school but he was supposed to be doing to be a technical pilot. Congresswoman, part of his responsibility included discussions on trains with the faa but that is more than a single individual that does not Work Together with the faa and other stakeholders and typically they will discuss the contents of the training manual and iterations on that overtime to try to optimize the pilots. Was there some way to call attention of this request and what was the inside discussion . Congresswoman, i apologize i cannot hear the question. The first question youve responded to was in a second one and that is, when he made the request to move to the mcas and the flight crew Operations Manual and training material. When he made a request, he acted on his own and said that it was a number of people. I have said, was he. Did he have any reprimand in any way for this request he made, or was it a Group Request . Congresswoman, part of that discussion on whether to include mcas in the training manual, that was an idiot of process over several years, and it included people beyond mr. Forkner, and typically what we do is we want to include them in the training manual, items pie lets need to fly the, plane and we dont want to put more we want to focus on the data or the information relevant to find airplane, so over a multi year timeframe, we will make decisions not depending on had boeing were boarded in any Financial Way for removing this requirement and making it simpler for you . Congresswoman, no, part of our obligation, our responsibility is to provide the best training manuals we can, i know the discussions around mcas have included whether or not to include it, but our focus has been providing information the pilot needs to fly the airplane, rather than the information that would be used to diagnose a failure. And that difference between flying the airplane and diagnosing a failure is really important in our training manual. Do you recall any discussion that was made around anybody except objecting to this Pilot Training materials . I cant point you to a specific document, but i know there were discussions, debates on whether to include mcas or not. Thats part of our healthy engineering culture. We bring up ideas, we debate, we encourage that open discussion, thats how we ultimately optimize the content of the training manual. Have you reconsidered the removal the of this material . Have you had any discussions to reconsider removal of this material . There were discussions and debates among the team, that was happening during that multi year timeframe that was being developed. I agree. But i would, say we understand that pilots to want more information, and we are going to incorporate that in our flight Operations Manual. The time has expired for the gentle lady. A quick interjection, in reference to the single point of failure. There was turkish 987 where it dc10 went down because the rear cargo door blew out. There was u. S. Air 427, the rudder problem we had, which was the subject of hearings in this committee, ultimately determined that we had to single points of failure. And then we have the jack screw on the alaska flight, so there have been a number, in this case, mcas was a major factor, it wasnt the only factor. Representative gibson. Thank you chairman. My condolences to the family as well, and prayers, as they struggle through this difficult time. On the mcas, the sensor, my understanding is, on the angle of attack sensors, theres actually two sensors, but only one was tied to the mcas system, is that correct . Congressman, thats correct. Depending on sequencing of the Flight Control computers, one sensor would feed mcas, but on different flights, it could be either sensor. But one sensor at a time. Because im not a pilot, i fly frequently, but my friend down here talks about how important it is, you cant just pull off the side of the road as redundancy. I dont know what you guys were thinking, the sensors i know from my background in agriculture, a lot of times when we have problems, its usually a sensor failure, it shuts the system down because the sensor is failing, its just an analogy, and the airplane redundancy is really key itself. I think we all learned a lesson there, that we are going to not just depend on one sensor, correct . The congressman thats, one of the Lessons Learned here. Well a previous architecture and learn how are moving to it to censor architecture. He mcas just when you know, im old so i guess my kids my grandkids my feet difference but every once in a while stop that i operate with my phone or whatever it needs to reboot so i have to agree with the chairman and Ranking Member to make sure we have to pause second flight a plan because i know these systems are about safety overall and there have been issues and tragedies but we have to make sure that we have to be able to override it and make sure that airbus doesnt have the ability that just raises the question with me. Pilot training and testing i know we talked about those two catastrophic accidents happening with with lion air and indonesia. My understanding is, nothing against the pilots i know theyre trying to save the lives of the people who died but the training wasnt what it should have been from the reports i read. If i was blowing, the largest manufacturer of the most sophisticated pieces of equipment and sharp in their craft. What is blowing looking to do in a future with the sophisticated aircrafts around the world to make sure that who are not just relying on a couple of regulators to make sure that people are maintaining them and that they have the training in and the continuing training moving forward that we can make sure we can prevent this and not rely on a infrastructure and the technology itself with the human technology. I guess i want to hear your comments on what we do bring forward when they make those sales and youre confident the people making the aircraft that have the trading and ability and what with the role will be moving forward . Congressman, its a very good point and it brought an area with the global aviation safety and the additional investment Going Forward and the element of that to within our pipeline. The world will need about 44,000 commercial airplanes in the next couple of years and one half million pilots he aviation technician. We have a responsibility to hold that chant at that point i will take a look at the pilots interface and mining that for the next generation and technology is radically evolving and we are investing heavily in the future of flight deck designs. Were also investing in additional infrastructure around the world with additional training that works with as Airline Customers around the world. We have a few examples of what we are doing. Im just curious in the case of the two case here with ethiopia and lion air. Did you have the simulators training or that just in the past with boeing . Are you aware of what training there is . Not specifically what ethiopia has with that plane. We can take that question and follow up with the details and engage with both airlines and will follow up with the details in relation. I appreciate it. Moving forward, we have our computers and all of that and machines break two though i yield back and thank you mister chairman. We now go to the chair committee mr. Larsen. Mr. Muilenburg, as we move forward in brussels retrospectively to understand and be focused on this committee with a longterm term investigation you said today and in the hearing that when you think of boeing, we have made mistakes and we got something wrong. Can you name some specific mistakes boeing made in the process . Congressman, i would point out implementation of the angle of alert, we got that wrong. Upfront implementation was wrong, and we subsequently fix it up. Second . Secondly, we learned about the mcas architecture, the changes that weve already talked about. Clearly we have areas to improve their. Third . Thirdly, i would say, in the broader area of communication, documentation, across all of the stakeholders, doing that in a efficient and comprehensive manner. Weve identified improvements that we need to make. Can you identify individuals who made these mistakes . Within boeing . Congressman, across all three of those areas, these are large teams that worked together across our company, are supply chain, weve got 900 Supplier Companies that work in our 7 37 supply chain alone. Our other global so each one area is broad, there are no one individual that makes decision within these. They are engineering teams that built consensus with all of the stakeholders. Does that make this an organizational or cultural problem, as opposed to an individual problem that led to these mistakes . Congressman, i think its important from an accountability standpoint, my company and i are accountable, that accountability starts with me. And our board recently took actions regarding my position. I was going to ask. How if youve been held accountable . Congressman, to your question, our board recently had taken actions on my position, and i fully support that. That will allow me to focus even more on safety at our internal operations have also taken some management action, we know that there are a number of other reviews underway, and those reviews are completed, if we need to take additional actions, we will, and those will be firm. And in some cases they are not individual actions but as you pointed out, they are organizational or structural actions. And these are equally important, and weve recently announced changes to our safety review board structures to elevate them and make them transparent, i now receive weekly data reports, very detailed, on our safety review boards. We stood up a new Safety Organization under beth pastor. She now reports directly to our chief engineer, who reports to me. Instead of being down in the businesses. Our board has set up a new committee, which is chaired by admiral bonnie. We added admiral richardson, who has a deep background and safety. He will be a member of that committee, and weve also realign our Engineering Organization, 50, 000, roughly 50,000 engineers, now all report directly to the chief engineer, who reports to me. And this will create additional transparency, visibility, and independents, all with a focus on safety. I cant help but think, when i hear that, and when i read the report, and read the recommendations in september, and read the investigation report, that there are changes in that we need in how we certify aircraft components in the process. What we have now went too far, and we dont have a handle, we hold the faa accountable, the faa is supposed to then hold the original equipment manufacturers responsible. Im not convinced, reading these reports and looking at boeings own actions, that thats being done adequately. And id like to hear your view on do you agree with me or not . Congressman, we believe there are also improvements we can make to that process, and as you are familiar with the delegated authority process. That process, we do think is very important to fundamental safety, and broadly it contributes to 95 improvement city that weve seen over the last two decades, but we need to make sure we have the balance right, and we need to support the reviews that have been announced on that. If i could just, and i will finish here, the bookends on this are what acting minister thats one bookend, and the other book and is what we have today. I think that we ought to be pulling out somewhere between those two bookends, but right now, weve got too far. With that i yield back. Now we go to representative davis. I want to add to what my colleague in washington was asking about any certification process. As he just passed, theres one bookend what the faa actually believes what can be done with the dollars for inspectors and the certification process. I dont want to see in the jerk reaction. Look, it breaks my heart and everyones heart to see those pictures and i know it does to yours too. These are real people who were affected by tragedy that and were here to get answers. I also want to make sure that we dont see any more. I have many of my constituents who work at your facilities in moscow to illinois and i know every one of those constituents go in uniform and breaks their horror theyre hard to have these tragedies being witnessed. They do the best job they can and they want to make sure that no one cuts corners so the certification process, what do you think will see from what mr. Larcenous talking about . I applaud the focus and safety and people and as you point out what we remember what we are doing here is for people around the globe so we have to get certification that we have today which is a solid system and we have seen very significant improvements and travel over the last few decades and about a 95 improvement and the current certification system which we need to maintain and their nerves is clearly a lot of goodness with a couple of areas we can look at them and one of the areas we talk about as these longstanding Industry Standards of pilot machine interface. I think were all eager to look at that in a potential area and i think, as john has pointed out, there are regulations that could be updated up to that current technology. That would also be beneficial. Thats good to hear. From all of us here with these policy makers we will ensure that we know not had that knee jerk reaction and nobody in this room not many more in the country will understand the in Safety Industry but this is where safety might have been compromised and i appreciate boeing i, appreciate you and talking about the administrative decisions with the team in boeing to ensure that those mistakes are made in the future. Weve seen some disturbing whistleblower complaint from former boeing executives and workers in the culture that may exist. What are you doing to address the culture of all of their facilities and i know my constituents will look at also . Congressman, he raised a very good point. We want our employees when they have concerns, issues we want a culture and we encourage those reports. And we conduct surveys and we provide if employees want to bring it up they certainly can. They can follow us in action and we think its important when we look at those whistleblower complaints and i brought up, this is part of our culture and thats how we get better and as you know, i know the hundred 50,000 people of boeing, we were here and mascoutah as you do and we are honest, hardworking, dedicated people who know the work that they do that affects lives. They want to do it right they, want to do it with excellence and i wanna cultural people will bring up concerns and in my commitment, the culture of our company i know john shares this in the rest of my team to be responsive and to hear our employees to take action and to do that with our values. I hope thats what you take with todays hearing and thank you and thank you for what youre employees doing a daily basis but we also expect results and we want to see those results in all of your facilities and my time is up and i yield back and i thank you for both being here. I now recognize mucarselpowell. Becky mister chairman. My partner with the prayers of the families here. My question regarding the delegation known as olivier, allows your family and these facilities and the faa Oversight Office well received the boeing 37th or three some problems including the 77 there are 40 5 am ploys 15 her buoying employs in the o. J. And boeing employees have a dual role and common interest through the. Faa, mr. Muilenburg do you think having a pay employees overseeing all of the safety decisions with every day is adequate, yes or no . Congresswoman up, i can the exact number and you respect the faa oversight authority. Do you believe thats an adequate way of your duties . Mister chairman, i cant answer that specifically. All i want to say we fully support in the strong oversight in the system. As they max highlights the problem and buying more guarding boeings commitment but we also hope by the faa and inappropriate oversight in Critical Issues and ultimately they both lie on air. The current oversight structure is critical and will have to evaluate and thank you mister chairman i yield my back my time back to you. Thank you miss napolitano. I wanna go back to the market and it would require Pilot Training and during an executive word unfortunately with the ethiopian planes and was just relentless pressure for the next flight which is no plight simulator required. Had questions about the communication but you have the polling and the pressures in the fragmented manner with information to the regulators and are also going to pursue what their understanding was. Just a quick question. And why theyre here today and why people died when two planes were down in five months and or tried to dive into and taking full accountability for the death of 346 innocent people on to 737 max flights. This is a simple one and i hope you can give me a direct response. Who bears the principal responsibility at boeing for the cascading event that resulted in the crash of lion air and Ethiopian Airlines by three or six . I know that youve lost your report chair and you still seal in serving on the board. I happen to look at your conversation after that crash with the Million Dollar bonus. What are the consequences . Who is taking responsibility . Who is being held accountable . I know you fire one person. Mister chairman, my company and i are responsible, were responsible for our airplanes and we know there are things you need to improve and we are not summerlike to fix it and we are responsible, i am responsible. Im also accountable. I described the actions that we had from earlier and the additional reviews are completed and will take additional action and i am accountable to, my family my company is accountable and the fine public deserves are safe planes. Thank you. Mr. Woodall. Thank you mister chairman. I want to pick up where the german left off. Im a lawyer, im not an engineer but i dont have the regulatory distinction between this type and a new type and that is debris quadrant of a new Flight Simulator which is a qualifier to be under a derivative . Let me explain, the 7 37 is a family of airplanes and its a family of airplanes flying and many pilots will fly an empty first flight in the morning and the second flight of the day and then ngo the third flight of the day and one of the markers that they want is a seamless transition to the max. Lets go back because 9 11 is a crew with airbus and the derivative type and its the design that customers wanted and its the presumption at that time and a brandnew design was a brandnew type and had no Flight Simulator. Congressman, i was the chair of the 7 37 and the product studies we are looking at this since 2007. We also had the new airplane like any good company, we were looking at both options and seeking them internally about what is with the market. What they wanted was you have an airplane which transitioned in the seven three seven to a future airplane. When we talk about who takes responsibility, im sure we may have created a Regulatory Environment which makes it difficult to give certificate to try to stump all of these changes that should never be stumped. Why are telling me is it your customers who demand the derivative and we from a regulatory perspective are not complicit to declare that last. Id say the derivative is not necessarily the future and i think someone alluded to and we took over five years to do the derivative types on what we do for new types and theyre actually very complimentary and if you look at the maxes certification. When we go back to the igs report and the faa official saying climaxes nice simple derivative and its a very complex modification and has many novel features and they are exempt from the certification of the aircraft and from the same time minimal training which has nothing to do but the process has everything to do to make customer demands of pilot similarity in these viewing models. With instant technology, we have the same amount of fuel efficient Carbon Dioxide and the same noise reduction and with the new airplanes and i was it is dire for customers and informed but it wasnt about approaching the certification in the Design Choices we made. Lets go back to the faa partnership and i appreciate your testimony mr. Muilenburg about taking the World Aviation safer and i believe we murray with every tragedy that will swing the pendulum back in the other direction and one faa official says that max is not a derivative, it is a very complex modification within the novel feature but ruled as boeing has inquiring the faa to sign off on that derivative instead of saying no, this is not a derivative type and we want to go back and begin this process. Especially in a face decision. Congressman, we were leading the idea at the time and has not been a o. J. Function at all and we go with the faa certification base in the airplane and its the faas decision on this basis and we as a company of applicants will follow that. Its not an audit function at all. I hope will bring those officials in so we can ask that question as there is a point of failure in that process and i yield back. Thank you and mr. Wolf malinowski is next. Daniel lipinski his next. This is boeing 737 max plane but should not comply by the faa. I sit at a hearing earlier this year of what went wrong and the certification process of the plane. Did the faa certification process help in this fall . Boeing is at fault in the role and after i made this statement i was upbraid by some of the industry who questioned the process. But this committee has a responsibility to see what went wrong in the certification process of the 737 max. We can make changes to that process and ensure the public what we know in this audience and everyone has loved ones to ensure they will not fly and safely again. Now, were sitting here and were talking about accountability and if accountability means mr. Muilenburg you received a bonus after the plane crash amateur whos been held accountable. Two planes crashed and even after the first plane crash i dont understand and im an engineer but im asking as there are more experts than me how we test on that failure but it was raised and theres also another case of internal ethics complaint that alleged that an engineer said that the synthetic or speed that was in the 7 37 was rebuffed because of cost and potential Pilot Training impact. Mistakes being made is not the reason mistakes are made. The bigger problem mistakes were made more financial reasons and was a point to that in the whole process and that is what is so concerning. How does it happen boeing . And how to this certification process allow that to happen. In order to get a new type certificates, it takes a general amount of time and i think most people in take a longer amount of time which will most likely have the Pilot Training. All these point back to ways of saving money and that is i really thought that . The team found that mcas was not evaluating and this is Something Else listening to from mr. Muilenburg and you didnt seem to agree with this and im gonna get what you said here. This was not a value added and the function and the certification documents of the faa. It is a true . Congressman, the emphasis them was certified with the faa. Was it evaluated or was it stepbystep . Without ever having the faa look at it, that is the important piece of this. I think they report quite it out and gave further looks as well is what we call the cross system and how we lose certification and for example, multiple failure moen analysis with pilot workload conditions and thats an area we want to look more deeply and the mcas is them was certified to our standards to how we do those analysis. Its a very different system. I think its important that something the faa should have and should require. In the last few seconds here, the 737 max where boeing will require similar training and mcas for a pilot . Congressman, those positions are the purview of the Public Authority authorities. Will boeing have to give money back and if that the case . Congressman, money doesnt factor into this decision. If it in the contract thats a question. Now we go to representative katko. In my previous life, i was an organized crime prosecutor we had victims and families and the pain i see on your face is what i see in those victims faces and i want to recognize that and help you understand that we take this very seriously. I understand mr. Muilenburg you, had an opportunity to meet with the family and i know it i huge impact and it motivated me to get to the bottom of this problem and we want to know what was discussed . Congressman, i want to respect the privacy of the family and perhaps of your allow me to describe our discussion. We wanted to listen and each of the families told the stories about the lives of our lost and those were heartbreaking. Ill never forget that. We talked about their stories and further into the conversation we talked about safety and changes and talked about what the company has learned and what i learned and we talk about our commitment up of never letting this happen again and preventing any future accidents like this. One thing i wanted to convey to the family was that these stories theyre always going to be with us and i wish we can change that but we have to remember these people brought me back to remembering that it depends on what we do at the boeing company and thats why i wanted to work on the boeing kids from iowa up. Were never going to forget that in the moment we share with the family Going Forward as very important to us and we will followup. Ive never got any of those conversations with the families and i remember i hope you remember that and i hope this goes with your company Going Forward. Mr. Hamilton, from an engineering standpoint. My colleagues have done a terrific job asking about this particular issue. Im concerned about all the things with my work on Homeland Security and my chairman ship of the committee and its very concerned about the supply chain in Public Transit and made a lot of noise in this community with our subway system and noise with the metro here as well. Im concerned that what youre doing to consider the supply chain is good and they are not getting it from bad actors and theyre ever spreading in metastasizing the valves. We do have a Global Supply chain and we carefully bought it from our suppliers and get something from that supplier or not and in the followup process were looking at the Quality Control and the oversight of our supply chain. This is what of the things that the faa is doing. We take some actions on that as well. Up every day we get reports in on how they are doing and how they will invest and put more actions into operations. You are talking cybersecurity overall . We have about 12,000 companies in small sized businesses and we insist them with their cybersecurity structure and thats a very important in this enterprise and the ceo who reports will know that and was separate on the cybersecurity so cyber hardening is in our future. Ensuring that nobody could gain access to those airplanes is very important and will be a side principle for us and will work on that every day. Thank you very much amount of time in a yield back. With that i recognize representative cohen. On the 30th of march on 2016, the faa said it was okay to remove all mcas the operation training material and that was part of boeings reputation and only operates was outside of the operating ways. I believe it is true. I cant verify the day but i think its true. Let me suggest this to you. On march 30th, the same day, boeing pilot at the time email the faa with the following request. Were you okay with us removing all mcas from the operating manual and the training as we discussed. You add to the flight crew and only the outside operating which was to determine the commercial Airline Passenger is that correct . As mr. Muilenburg has discussed, the process that we go back and forth of what needs to be in the training manual and collectively the reason that that the mcas was not in a training manual. Yeah correct . His role as a technical pilot will be on that. He said it was well outside the operating roles but where are the maneuvers that what we would normally experience . Thats right mr. Out in. Said mark forkner it was outside the procedures man. Referring to the mcas envelope. Mcas was transparent to the pilots and when we heard this condition. Am casten activate from lion air. It was activated within the flight. That correct . Mcas reaction operated as it was designed. It repeated this representation in january of 2017 after boeing impacted on lower speeds before the faa finally down the plane. They were discussing changes for Pilot Training would to lead mcas who are going to cut it in the operating manual which was way outside. We have the flight crew operation in hindsight, we do not agree that they did not understand, and too downplayed or concealed the fact that there was a zone to boeing and the angle of attack sensors within the normal operating maneuvers. I was not part of those conversations and i think that was part leading up to the Board Meeting in saying what needs to be presented. You are an engineer heart. Would you not agree that they did not understand or the facts under a scenario where talk to mcas talk about what they want . Mr. Hamilton, would you answer my question . Congressman, i dont know what was going through mark forkner and what he knew and didnt know. Mr. Muilenburg . Congressman, the only point i would add is that the mcas which originally designed outside the normal envelope and i think you are referring to i was something that was certified with the faa and from 2060 to 2070. You said you are accountable. What does accountability mean . Are you working for free for now on . These peoples relatives are not coming back, theyre gone. Its anybody i thawing working for free to try to rectify the problem the way needs to . Congressman, its not about the money for me. Are you giving up any money . My board will conduct a way to do that. Youre not losing any compensation at all . The 30 Million Dollars you make a year with two accidents that caused all these people family to disappear and i. You are taking a pay cut it all . Congressman, again, on board to make a determination the board is accountable. Im accountable sir. The time is expired. We now go to representative graves. Mr. Muilenburg, did you fly on a maps 37 prior to these disasters . Congressman, i dont recall flying on a max before. You have an idea how many times . I dont recall the exact number. All part . I flew one i dont know how many times maybe once before. My point is, there all sorts of things in some folks have said this is a smoking gun i will soon that you are would not have an airplane if you would believe that something was wrong . Is that a safe assumption . Yes. Heres what i want to transition to. I talked earlier about all the reports up and when i left out was the Inspector General report. Weve got outcomes of a number of reports but legion air and weve got the Bulletin Board that have come out. How do we know that this new process is actually going to have the integrity or you dont feel its right and its actually right and he totally got a new process before you flew and we all believed it was right and now were going to underground this craft. How do we know the new process its going to work and yield the right outcome. I would say the Software Changes will forever get change pilots being in this position. Its a thorough documentation of our testing that partially white taking as long and i know constantly the faa will clearly say that the airplane is safe. As i mentioned, youve got preliminary preliminary outcomes from boeing board and others based on what youve seen so far, are there any of these expert recommendations that you disagree with . I think, the recommendation is all even the indonesians recommendation are still reviewing but i think my initial look i think there are some very good recommendations and the faa and the industry. Are you implementing those recommendations now on your efforts for the triple seven if it does go through . I would say based on what we had coming out of the max we are absolutely applying those and some of the recommendations where you work on how they will respond. I would appreciate if you can go back to the committee after looking through some of the recommendations and advise us on any recommendations you do not concur with and secondly, if you could provide the committee and followed by up with helping us better understand what changes boeing has made. You are part of the system and play a role and you play a role with others to where he felt it was right before and making sure and i was going through five recommendations from some of families and i want we have the mcas thats fixed and the utility for mcas which will address the concerns of the culture within boeing which will prioritize all things and ensuring in our efforts to reveal the mcas and also ensuring that the entire plane in an integrated system or components which is recognized as the role. We will follow up on all of those. Thank you very much neal back. Were going to recognize one more member and then the panel has requested a break which is quite reasonable. We will recognize one more a lot of 15minute break in return. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. Mr. Muilenburg, in the spring and summer of 2018, the former general manager of the 7 37 ever raised safety concerns with you about the bulldogs employees or that were involved in the final assembly of the 737 max in these facilities, yes or no . Congressman, yes im aware some of the concerns. Id like to read from an email that was said from the general manager in june of 2018. Four months before the crash and months before the plane was delivered from lion air. Even from a senior manager and the final Assembly Team of the 737 max, i have some safety concerns they need to share with you. As the leader of the 7 37, he wrote, today, we have 30 what planes located and the following concern is based on my own observation and 30 years 30 years of aviation safety experience. My first concern is that our workforce and employees will happen to work at a very high pace or a sensitive period of time when these employees make mistakes. My second concern, is scheduled pressure in its creation from creating a culture where employees are deliverable earlier consciously in the established process. It process comes in a variety of forms of equality. Frankly, right now, all my internal warning bells are going off because for the first time in my life im sorry to say that i am hesitant about putting my family on a boeing airplane. The employee was so concerned that he recommended to shut down and said i dont make this commutation lightly wrote. I know this would take a lot of planning but the alternative is far riskier. Nothing we do it so important that its worth hurting someone. Mr. Muilenburg, i know this employee wrote to you personally in december of 2018 after the air crash. With boeings general manager, the question is, what have you done to ensure the safety issue of boeing employees rays are addressed . We went through what you do and it seems like this one will be there somewhere . Congressman, im familiar with that and what you referenced of what the employee sent or a retired employee. He will have to retire after 30 years. Up i recall his email and we did have several followup questions. I told him i appreciate the fact that he brought up the future we know our team at that point was operating at 52 737s a month at that point. We have been wrapping up production. What did you do about it . We put took a number of actions and each of the work and location and the production staff. We have committed some way took a look at the concerns which was not in the factory at that point and we went back and took a look and in some cases we found areas where the issues are already been addressed and we got that information back to him. Its part of our continuous process and its very important that we set up a culture where that comes with quality as he pointed out. Safe work is also work thats done and that is one of the focus areas. In high rate factories like ours, its work to get behind and not out of position and thats were injuries happen and tried to make sure work and have been and a safer Work Environment and are very focused and our safety and will continue to be. We evaluate them my time is up and i thank you. Quick followup. We reduce the rate of what is concerned from 52. Congressman, at that time, it concerns expressed . We do not change the production its very important when you change production in a way like ours we change up or down. I understand the supply chain, thats good. If you are 50 minutes for enough to break now. We will reassess the committee for 15 minutes. Okay, everyone. My name is glen howard. I am the president of the Jamestown Foundation and we are delighted to have today at our ninth annual China Defense and security conference the honorable Randall Schriver whos the assistant secretary of defense for indopacific security affairs. Mr. Schriver