Transcripts For CSPAN3 Boeing CEO Others Testifies On 737 MAX - Part 2 20240713

So representative babbin. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Id like to join the others in acknowledging those in attendance here today who lost loved ones in the accidents and our sincerest condolences to you and thank you for being here today. In the interest of time, id like to get right to it. Instead of directing my questions to one of you specifically. Id like to address these to both of you and let you decide who is best fit to answer. I think there is a feeling out there that after the lion air crash in indonesia boeing sat back and did nothing in terms of addressing the causes of the accident and since the second crash in ethiopia, weve heard a lot from boeing and the rest of the industry about how the information gleaned from these tragic accidents helped to ensure that they are not repeated. With that in mind, what did boeing do after the lion air crash to ensure that those circumstances were not repeated and do you have any specific examples of Lessons Learned that you can share with all of us that have positively impacted the entire commercial aviation arena, beyond just boeing. If you can give that to me as quickly as possible. Ill ask mr. Hamill to answer that and he referenced a concern that had been brought up by an employee. I responded to a question about whether the Vice President of the gm of the program had contacted me and i said yes and that was incorrect. My initial reception was direct from the employee, and i just wanted to clarify that to make sure it was right. We did follow up and i referenced several actions that were ongoing in our factory concurrently, and the letter from the employee addressed several of those topic areas and i just wanted to clarify that was separate from the actions that we were taking. Thank you. Just very, very quickly, mr. Hamilton because i have other things i want to say. Certainly, in the so in my previous role i led our Investigation Team including one that the chairman announced earlier and ive had corrective actions and we convened a group of experts from around the company and started postulating on what possibly could have happened given the limited data that was available. We quickly identified that this mcass activation could have been a scenario and we started running that through our labs and running scenario planning and once the flight data recorder came up later in the week and then verified what we had, we started working on the software change immediately to work on that. We separately convened the safety board and determined that was not enough, just the software change to mitigate the risk and we determined that while the crew and the captain of lion air was trimming out the airplane as it was getting mcass when he was handing out the control and it didnt quite follow the assumptions that they would base the design on, so we need to put an operation manual out to remind crews. Let me interrupt you because i have other things that i want to have, but i think ill just submit those for the record, but i do want to use the remaining time to be perfectly clear about something. As unfortunate as these tragedies are the systems will sometimes fail and well continue to learn from them until they dont fail. In the meantime, we need highly trained humans in the loop to make judgment calls until things go awry and that means ensuring that the operators of the systems know how to triage problems in order to put a plane safely on the ground in the case of an emergency. The day before the lion air crash when the identical problem occurred an offduty pilot riding in the cockpit guided the crew to disable the mcass and save the airplane. Let me be clear. This plane absolutely should not have been in the air on october the 29th in 2018, another human error, but this is an indicator that a welltrained crew potentially could have averted this disaster an all of that to say that athere are plenty of things that boeing should have done better and sorry to say that there are those who claim that boeings decisions are made only with the almighty dollar in mind. Are we under the illusion that boeing makes money when tragedies like these occur and hard to imagine that boeing would suppress information that would make the public safer and their product ultimately better. We should be using these opportunities to seek out solutions and not trying to hang blame on a country that has as much desire to keep the passengers safe as we do. Lets not forget that 5 Million People fly on boeing planes every single day and we must be careful not to erode leadership when it comes to aviation. America is unquestionably the Gold Standard when it comes to commercial aviation and boeing has played a major role in getting us to that point. And just for the record, i served no parochial interest in my district, 36 in the state of texas, so i willyearold back and i would submit further questions then. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Since you just made a clarification about your response to the representative, i just want to get this separate. You heard directly from this individual. The individual who four months before lion air said that he was hesitant about putting his family on the plane after he was complaining about the schedule and he corresponded before correctly. It was via a letter that i received and im not sure, that it was physical. You said you didnt ruse protection and despite what he raised, youre concerned about your supply chain. Just reflect on this for a second. You talked about your upbringing, modest upbring, but now youre a highly paid ceo of an instushgsz the boeing company. As mr. Cohen pointed out and i pointed out in the beginning and after lion air you got a 16 million bonus and people are being held accountable. This gentleman quit the company after 30 years in the industry because his concerns werent being addressed, but youre leading us to believe that they were significantly addressed. Im sorry, i just dont buy that and with that i recognize mr. Mitchell. [ inaudible ] sorry. No need. You were carrying on a line of questions that id like it on pursue. Mr. Mullenberg, youre the chief executive officer, do you set the standards and do you set the purpose and goal for the company . Congressman, thats part of my responsibility . The answer is y you do those things . Yes, sir. Good. As the chairman just said did you receive a 30 million ren remuneration from the company in 2013. Stock . Congressman, i recall my salary was roughly 23 million that year. Then i suppose this is incorrect. It came from the seattle times. It says 30 million. You have at least three employees that have left the company and Adam Dickinson and also a whistleblower in charlotte. All of which said the companys goal is profit over quality. Are they correct . Those comments are not accurate. And what is the companys standard for quality . Over profit . Our core values at the company and the top of the list is safety, quality and integrity. I see. So in 2016 when boeing started asking for time and cost reductions as part of the managers performance evaluation, and the manager who said that, mr. Dickinson, is that correct . That is not what happened in 2016 . Congressman, im not familiar with the specific communication, but it is true that we insensitivize our team to perform from a cost and schedule standpoint, as well. Is that contrary to quality and safety . Congressman, no, its not. So which is most important . Most important, clearly safety comes first. And we have the the 737 max to prove that that is incorrect. Congressman, i disagree with that premise respectfully. Its very true that we operate in a competitive environment around the world. Were the last remaining big commercial airplane builder in the u. S. And it is a competitive environment. And you were the first to lose two airplanes as a result of a problem with your quality and airplane. Is that correct . As i said, safety and quality are Top Priorities and safety and quality go hand in hand with operational excellence. Would you like to talk to me about the quality of the kc46 . Would you like to go into detail about the abject lack of quality of an airplane that the government wants to purchase for you the kc46 . You of twant to talk about the . You want to talk about the inability to keep cargo in place . Shall we talk about the quality there . Or would you like to talk about the quality of the dream liner . Congressman. Youve got a problem. We have improvements to maka quality. You have a systemic problem in your company. You are reaching for profit which, incidentally, was very, very significant in 2018, was it not . 15 billion in cash plus a Significant Impact on the profit. Youre not driving quality and youre sure as heck not driving safety. I just gave you three examples. Congressman, i disagree with your premise. Our Business Model is safe airplanes and thats the only sustainable Business Model for boeing. We work in a longcycle business. It takes five to ten years to bring a new product to the market. When those products come to market theyre typically used by our customers for decades, both military and commercial customers. The only sustainable Business Model for our company is safety. Thats what were built on. Thats why weve lasted 103 years, and thats why were the only u. S. Builder of big commercial u. S. Airplanes remaining today. Three of your principal product lines, the 737 max, the kc46, and the dreamliner all have quality issues. They certainly the case of the max they have a serious safety issue, and i would pause at the reality that you are pushing profits over quality and safety and those three examples of three of your main product lines and i see im out of time so i have to yield back. I thank the gentleman, and now i would turn to mr. Mitchell. Thank you, mr. Chair. Were talking about 346 lives here and we refer to it as an accident its not an accident. It reflects a failure. It reflects multiple failures. I think we need to stop talking about accidents. Its a tragedy. Accidents are mistakes that people make as a bad choice and its a fender bender. This is far from that. Safety begins with design. Thats where it starts. I met with the faa and the safety people there, and ive met with your folks as youre aware. The word assume was used way too often for my comfort level. I was ceo of a business much smaller than yours. We didnt build aircraft. Were makeriing assumptions and wont use it here in the public venue. You talk about changing your culture and they manipulate a sumpses. The worst thing in the world are assumptions. You talked about restructuring your team and who will test assumptions in your organization given that assumptions kill people . Congressman, thats a responsibility that i count on with what i call our engineering function. As weve recently announced, weve realigned all of our engineers to report to the chief engineer. Let me stop you because time is limited, unless you have a separate group doing that independently outside of the other decision making, literally theres pollution there and impact on that. Theyve got to do it totally independently. How are you doing that . Internally, typically in all of our design programs, we bring in external experts and well bring in senior advisory groups and sometimes well tap a team from boeing to call a nonadvocate review to get crosschecked so we use resources from a number of different areas. I would ask, if you would, that for the sake of the committee here that you explain how it is that youre going to go forward with testing your assumptions, in light of where we are at now, but we have to look forward based upon the experience that you have, and i would say that the mcass will operate in the background. Well, it certainly didnt when things went awry and then the circumstance we had it wasnt in the background and it was pretty much in the foreground. The 2014 slid, common the commonality between max and the x. The m cass wasnt in theed training model so it doesnt matter. The focus was trying to call it a stable irer and how the pilot will repovrnd spond. Wasnt in the manual and was it covered prayer to the lion air crash in they didnt know it was there, how do you train on something that you dont know its there that hasnt said up front heres whats going to happen under these circumstances. How do you train that . You dont. One of the thing weise learn side zee to provide more m cass documentation which were doing and the intend was that the training for m cass was to train on the runaway stabilizer as opposed to training on diagnosing the system itself, but we have learned that we need to provide more information on m cass and thats what were doing going forward. Let me in the last 50 seconds or so, im not operating on the basis and im not that profit is somehow evil and i was the ceo of a not for Profit Company and yebl that incentivized boeing on pressures and i dont care about your or any of your management teams bonuses. What you caompensate is up to your board and it was a much Smaller Company that i was a ceo of, but if i was ceo of a company that i led into, that i was responsible for that was mine, and in this set of circumstances, and i owned 38 of the company, i would be submitting my resignation to the board of directors because im responsible for it ultimately. I have one more question and its a simple yesterday or no. Have you submitted your resignation to your board of directors . Congressman, i have not. Im responsible. These two accidents happened on my watch. I feel responsible to see this through. As i mentioned earlier, i grew up on a farm in iowa. My dad taught me that you dont run away from challenges and this is a challenging situation. My responsibility is to stick to it and to help my team work through and to get boeing in the future and i feel a keen sense of responsibility to do that, and i am confident that thats what well do as a company. Thank you. Mr. Johnson would be next. Thank you, mr. Chairman. I would like to extend my heartfelt condolences to the families a effected by these tw tragedies. Looking at the faces of the deceased, their lively, smiling faces, im deeply saddened that they are no longer with you, but my sadness can in no way match the grief that you feel. Thank you all for being here. You would say the crews of lion air 610 and Ethiopian Airlines 302 were faced with multiple alerts during the accident sequences, correct . Congressman, my understanding of the accidents is thats correct. And you would agree that they received airspeed disagree indicator, correct . Congressman, i believe from what we understand they had airspeed disagree as well as other flight deck alerts occurring. Altitude disagree indications . Correct . That and also, i believe i believe stick shaker alerts, as well. Uhhuh. And you would agree that they had received various other cautions and warnings during that period, correct . Congressman, thats my understanding, yes. The National Transportation safety board reported in october in reference to these tragedies that, quote, multiple alerts and indications can increase pilots workload, end quote. Do you agree with that statement . Congressman, yes. That statement makes sense, yes. And the ntsb further observed that, quote, industry, perts generally recognize that an aircraft system should be designed such that the consequences of any human error are limited, end quote. Do you agree with that statement, as well . Congressman, i believe thats consistent with our design approaches. Yeah. And the ntsb went on to note is to develop airplanes and procedures that are less likely to result in operator error and are more tolerant of operator errors when they do occur, end quote. Do you agree with that statement . Thats one area that we learned in both of these accidents is that is an area that we need to review the longstanding principles and guidelines. I believe thats an important area for us to address. So you would agree that in terms of the design of the 737 max and the 730 maxs mcass and sensing systems were not designed such that the consequences of human error were limited. You would agree with that, correct . Congressman, on the mcass, as we said, weve identified areas where we need to improve and its related to pilot workload. Thats one of them, correct . The sequence that was not designed to accommodate. Let me put it like this. In other words, you would agree that the 737 maxs mcass and angle of attack sensing systems were not designed such that the c consequences of any human error were limited. You would have to agree with that statement. Congressman, again, from that standpoint, we designed the system to a longstanding Industry Standards but it was this one was not designed so as to accommodate the possibility of human error in terms of dealing with the mcass system, but let me move on. You in court filings, you intend to stop all litigation in the United States and ensure that as far as the indonesian crash and confined in indonesia and not in the court system of the United States, correct . Congressman, i cant comment on that. Im just not familiar with the details of that. So are you here to say that your company would not take efforts to protect itself from the u. S. Court system in so far as the victims of these air crashes are concerned . Congressman, if i could take that question ill get back to you. I dont know the answer. Well, you are attempting to settle things out of court with a 100 million Fund Available for claimants, correct . Congressman, i believe the 100 million fund that youre referring to is one that we recently set up thats completely separate from any Legal Proceedings and is being administered by mr. Feinberg. That is intended to be completely separate from any legal proceed little with the idea that we can more quickly assist the families and communities. Participation in that system cause the agrieved individuals familys next of kin to waive their ability to go to court later . Congressman, the 100 million fund that youre referring to if im understanding that youre referring to is completely separate. The one participating and the 100 million fund would not bar them from litigation thereafter . That is correct. They are completely separate. Thank you. I will say, mr. Nuremberg, im incredulous that you dont know whether or not your company is attempting to avoid the u. S. Courts for liability regarding lion air. Seriously . You know nothing if thats a fact . That would be a darn big thing. U. S. Court, we go through this with the maritime industry where mariners on these foreign flag ships arent allowed access to u. S. Courts and youre telling me that youre not aware of your legal strategy regarding indonesia . You really arent . Congressman, im not familiar with that strategy. I have a legal team. My focus has been on safety. Yeah, well, well get back to that. With that, mr. Palmer. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Mr. Nuremberg, you may want to comment on this, but the indonesian governments final action report identified nine contributing factors that resulted in the crash of lion air flight 610. One of those factors was the absence and the flight crew training to properly respond to the uncommanded mcass, and i bring this up in the context that it was reported that after the initial certification, and i guess this was discovered after the plane was certified that the adjustment on the horizontal was great are by a factor of four than what was certified. Can either of you address that . I think referring to the mcass authority with low speed versus the high speed. Originally, we did wind tunnel testing back in 2011 and determined we would have to do something for the characteristics for the highspeed windup terms and thats where we developed the original mcass and during testing of 2016, was there additional work we had to do to satisfy for low speed and thats where we used the mcass to address that. There is a difference in the authority and thats partially because youre going low speed and you need to move the stabilizer more to get the pitching moment you need to address the handling quality, but that was my training, according to what the indonesian government found was the training based on the original certification or did it take into account both certifications with the flight manuals or the crew training adequate to address both situations . Yes, sir. We were open and trance parensp with the faa with the authority between the high speed and the low speed with the certification and development and they understood that prior to certification and the decision thats not the question. The question is did you provide adequate, detailed instructions for both situations . We were having conversations with the faa of what was in the training manual and we were accounting for high speed and low speed. Yes. Was it adequate . We believed it was sufficient as mr. Nuremberg said because we wanted to train pilots on how to react to behavior and regarding whats causing it and the runaway stabilizer and that the crews would be able to react to and take action. Weve learned since these accidents that we need to take further action. Theres also criticism thats been reported about the fact that boeing tends to use the same design for planes rather than build a new plane and in the case of the 737 max youre basically using an old design that required the mcass system because you use larger engines and move forward on the plane. Is that accurate impeach. We involved the 737 over the years and we have the safety thats certified through the years and its not uncommon as youre developing a new type and design airplane that you have to make an offer change or some other control change to address that. Yeah, but more specifically, you were in the process of a totally new design and they were an unparalleled pass, werent they for the 737 max . Thats whats been reported, i believe. John, you referenced the early trade studies . We were looking back in 2007 and also looking at a brandnew airplane and those were both being developed and looked at ask we made a decision back in 20 tloech from seed forward with the okay. So was the decision based on what is the best, safest design or based on what you could get to market in a timely manner . Safety guided the decision and pilots fly a family of airplanes and its from the safety standpoint, its important that crews were able to transition without having to think about the max or an ng. They wanted them to feel and operate the same way. Thats a matter of time. And training. Thats a matter of time and training. Im going to say this, hearing the questions that were directed through today. I do not think that boeing if any way tends to produce an unsafe product. I do think, though, having worked in engineering, mistakes are made and i think sometimes people make decisions that have very bad outcomes, and i think that might be an issue here. I have children who fly. I fly every week, and i think everybody in this room probably flies on a boeing product and when they put on that seat belt they want to know that the plane will take off safely, fly safely and land safely and that ought to be the sole point of this hearing. Retribution and anything that comes after that will be handied in the courts of law from the perspective of transportation safety. We wont save planes. I yield back. I thank the gentleman. This took me 30 seconds with a google search. June 13th, business insider. The company is arguing for the cases to be moved from the u. S. To indonesia and you would have us believe that you are not aware that your legal team. Theyre so far distant from you, you dont talk to them and this hasnt been discussed in the board . My wife was the manager for the city of eugene, oregon, for a long time. She had to pay the claims. When the claim came with a couple of million bucks against the city. She was involved, the city manager was involved and the city manager was involved and everybody was involved. Youre looking at hundreds and millions and billions of claims and youre trying to move to the country and this expert says having a trial with a different legal culture and less scope for close scrutiny of boeing would render the cases worthless and you dont know that thats happening that youre making that pleading . Congressman, im aware of those articles, but as i stated earlier. Im not would you please tell us would you please respond to the committee after you consult with your lawyers, have they filed to move these cases to indonesia in any court of the United States or do they intend to . Mr. Chairman, well follow up with that information. Thank you. Ms. Titus. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Like my colleague, ive been concerned about some of the Text Messages and emails that have come out in the documents with this case especially by your chief technical pilot who palmas, and he sefrnnt this whee was discussing the concerns about the mcass system. He talks about flying around the world in this Jedi Mind Tricking foreign customers into purchasing your aircraft. Im not quite sure what Jedi Mind Tricking is, but he uses it frequently. He is jed Jedi Mind Tricking these people into buying airplanes. Heres another one. Ive been working to certify e 7378 max all over the world. It was a huge deal and i got what i wanted. As usual, i usually get what i want. Later, things are calming down a bit from my airplane cert expect im doing simulator valuations and Jedi Mind Tricking into accepting the training that i got accepted by faa. So i would ask you what Jedi Mind Tricking is, and if given these comments, would it be fair to state that your company misled foreign regulators to get your aircraft certified . Congresswoman, im not quite sure what mr. Forkner meant in those emails. We havent been able to talk to him given hes departed the company and has legal representation. But any thought that we would try to trick customers or deceive customers is just not consistent with our values and that would not be tolerated. So im not sure what he meant and thats not our approach. Well, what is your approach when it comes to International Customers . What do you think is your responsibility especially those that have less stringent Pilot Training requirements when you sell a new aircraft abroad . Congresswoman, we work with regulatory authorities around the world so those decisions are made in that jurisdiction and we with the faa support that ask we work with the airlines in those other countries and together we work on training standards of ultimately those are decisions that are made by the Regulatory Authority in that jurisdiction. So since that captain is no longer with you, have you kind of changed or modified if any way your engagement with foreign regulators or are you still just using the Jedi Mind Tricking approach . Congresswoman, i appreciate your question. I can tell you again, im not quite sure what mr. Forkner meant, but that does not represent the people of boeing. It does not represent the people that work with our international regulators. Youre not trying to Jedi Mind Trick us in this committee . Congresswoman, im telling you the truth. Thank you. I yield back my time to the chairman . I thank the gentle ladys little time remaining. Im a star wars man so i what Jedi Mind Tricking means and you perhaps have watched star wars, too. And heres another observation and we brought up your 15 million bonus after the lion air tragedy and boeing has established a fund of 100 million, and i just did the math. That means that each of the 436 families would receive 1 of your compensation that you got last year. That does not seem to me but youre telling us there have been consequences, youre responsible, and yet these families will get 1 of what you get paid and you talk about your upbringing as a farm boy. I grew up a little different as a teacher. He ran a camp forrener city kids in the summer. I carried golf clubs for rich people. You are no longer an iowa farm boy. You are the ceo of the largest aircraft manufacturer in the world. You are earning a heck of a lot of money, and so far the consequence to you has been oh, youre not chairman of the board anymore. I dont know what extra bonus the chairman gets and i know the members of the board get a quarter million bucks every year. So i havent seen convincingly that there have been consequences except one guy got fired and the chief leader of the 737 program retired in disgust because he wouldnt want to put his family on the airplane. With that, who am i recognizing . Ms. Miller. Thank you, chairman defazio. To all of you, my heart absolutely goes out to you. Having lost a Family Member in a horrible crash. While it was not an airplane, i do know the consequences to children who dont have a parent and spouses that are missing their loved ones, and it is so hard, and my heart does go out to you. Also, i think its very important that safety and quality should always be the highest priority for Airline Manufacturers. We need to be prepared if Technology Fails us. With the new Technological Advancements its a possibility that one day there might be a time when we have to decide whether to put our faith in our training and our intuition or on a machine. Millions of people fly every day and while theres new technology in the aviation industry, it is critical that pilots be prepared if a mechanical problem occurs. With that being said, if we move forward into the future, it is of the utmost importance that we continue to advance or Perfect Technology before introducing new equipment into the market. We can support innovative and new technology as an added benefit, but we cannot also overlook safety, efficiency or quality in the aviation industry. Restoring confidence in air travel is not a political issue. Its a societal issue. Our world has become so much smaller once we were able to fly and its imperative that the Airline Manufacturers perfect new technology and guarantee safe, flawless and exceptional airplanes. Mr. Mule emberg, can you quickly walk us through the Safety Assessment evaluation boeing conducted for the heirmcass. I would be more than happy to do that. Well do it together. We conducted the review boards and the Safety System analysis as part of that development. So safety is one of the core parameters that we look at throughout the design test and certification process, and that ultimately leads to the certification of the faa and consistent with our normal procedures. John, if you want to add detail to that. Every tomb we bring forward a new system we do a failure affects analysis of when somethings going fail and what is the effect of that. We do a hazard assessment where we look at all of the different faults and we make an assessment based on whats the hazard category for regulations. Then we look we build a fault tree which is a top down look of whats the probability of these events happening and this is all built to meet regulations and then we put together a system Safety Assessment which culminates all of the information from these different actions and thats deliverable to the faa. Did boeing have response to the erroneous mcass activation . Yes. We evaluated if the mcass operated what the response would be. Did it also show if it could trigger other alarms . We considered that in the analysis. In your testimony, mr. Mulenberg, you mentioned your dedication to safety and culture and the time you spent traveling to different boeing teams. How can we restore confidence in our air travel and guarantee industry transparency and communication from top to bottom. Congresswoman, i believe those changes start with us, my company and our structure. I mentioned a number of changes weve made internally with the new Safety Organization and a new board, Safety Committee and realigning our engineering workforce and those are all actions were taking to increase the focus on safety and increase transparency, and i believe thats part of rebuilding confiden confidence were also paying attention to the reviews being done and the government reviews and any actions we might take together to have the certification process and those are actions that might help, as well, and we have a lot of work to do to rebuild the publics trust, and well make sure what happens today well prevent this from ever happening again and that is our focus and it will take time to rebuild the publics confidence once we get the airplane back up for the fleet, and were going to be working side by side with the customer and side by side to help rebuild that confidence. Thank you. I yield back my time. I thank the gentle lady and mr. Loewenthal. Thank you, mr. Chairman. I, too, join with my colleagues in offering our sympathy and our concern and as mr. Graves said in the beginning of the hearing. This is all about you, the people. I cant imagine what youre going through and i am so glad youre here to keep us focused and it is all about the people who have been impacted and my questions and concerns mr. Mullenberg really have to do with the certification process. You know, the jatr, that report, the technical review found that despite significant advances being made since the max was originallier is thei originally certificated theyve led to improvements in the air transportation and the max failed to incorporate many of these designs and Technology Advance ams as they were deemed impractical. What is the reason boeing failed to include the real safety features in the become, like the 737 dreamleaner. Congressman, let an attempt here, as we are developing a product and i dont want to go back to one of the biggest ways we can have safety for the pilots to be able to transition from one airplane to the next not have to have a big difference, whether it is the crew alerting system or how the systems operate. Excuse me, so what youre saying is that you did not include these improvements because it was difficult for the pilots to transition . Its not a question if its difficult, we want the crews to not have to think about which model theyre in so that the training that theyve gone to applies to either model and they handle each airplane because when you walk on an airplane you want the pilots to be comfortable flying that. So the question is as you point out this is an aircraft that was originally certification did, certified in 1967, has not have a full certification sins and the reason had to do with the ease in which pilots could move between different aircrafts of the same family, i want to go on, jay to your report found that there is no criteria for determining when the core attributes for an existing design make it fundamentally incapable of supporting the safety advancements introduced by the latest advancements in standards, so if the faa dont have a federal criteria when you have to go to a full assessment of nurses that is, what criteria does boeing use when deciding to use the original design and have a recertification . So congressman there is actually regulations and power to 21 that defines when you need to do a new type served, we follow that process. The faa has no specific standard, you are seeing boeing follows what the faa, there is no specific criteria that use independent of the lack of standards that the faa actually specifies. We follow the faa regulations. On the standards you just mentioned. Yeah. So last question, im very unclear about what that answer means, the jatr also found that the requirement of an amended Type Certificate certification process, like the max went through, focuses only on change in areas affected by the change which may feel to recognize the whole aircraft system that could be affected by seemingly small changes, do you agree with the assessment by the jatr report . Congressman were taking a look at all the recommendations from that report, i believe there are 12 recommendations that are being considered, one of those areas is this systemwide analysis and we have identified that as a potential area for improvement going forward, so that is an action we look forward to supporting and making appropriate changes, i think it is an area worth looking at. So you have not or are you are looking at the report deciding how in the future aircraft is signs that seek to fall under an amendment Type Certificate rather than new Type Certification, you are discussing you will be looking at when and did type or full certification will be needed. We look forward to working with the faa and the rest of the industry and make changes that may be required when you apply for one versus the other but the amended type, you still upgrade to leader safety requirements, so i just want to say that the requirements at the max is certified to, even though it is amended it meets some lawyer safety requires that the earlier version 737. Thank you and i yield back. Thanks sir. Mr. Brown. Thank you mister chairman. My condolences to friends and communities and families of the men and children and women who lost their, lives i believe that you are sincerely sorry as well, i also know that you wake up every day with the responsibility and accountability for a Large Organization while you were values maybe on safety often in a Large Organization there are interests, profits and production rates, promoting the product and also personal incompetence along the 150,000 people, not all of them are the most proficient and competent, those factors can ability to achieve that most important value of safety, and mr. Dennis muilenburg according to the report, during discussions and communications weakening in march 2016, and boeing proposed removal of the am cast from the flight crew and differences table and it has been brought to you, i too am a pilot, what i valued was information, the operator manual, the quick reference hand out so all important information, sometimes i look and i see theres a lot of information but i knew its my responsibility to prioritize that information and my concern here is that boeing to not give the pilots the information that they needed and what makes a particularly troubling is the environment this is happening in, a lot of this has been raised in brought to your attention, an environment in which you were chief technical pilot talks about Jedi Mind Tricks to convince regulators to accept a lower level of training, i dont know what a Jedi Mind Trick is but i know when its particularly boggling when boeing has the data far superior than what the regulators have but the chief guy on your team is interfacing with the regulator is playing tricks to down training levels, coupled with the fact that as the chairman bridge on the screen youre promotional material as you build your 737 max fleet, many dollars will be saved and the combination with rebates and contracts and if you dont have to use a simulator which is much more expensive to trade of pilot, if you have to use a simulator 1 Million Dollar rebate on the air from. So this is the environment that we are observing in boeing and in questions whether that profit and promotion is undermining safety, i want to ask you this question, mr. Cohen was asking you from the same line indonesia your report, boeing consider that the procedure required was no different in the existing procedures and they crews were not expected to have normal operation, but existing procedures thats the runaway stave but later, but thats not the same procedure . Its the eighth common procedure. When you have on mcas, when it is defective, its not the same emergency procedure as a runaway stabilizer trim. Actually when an mcas to fail there are various stabilizers, stabilizer trim fails, i can use emmanuel trim but in or i can control the column, if its a true runaway stabilizer trim i will be able to disrupt that failure, is that correct . No with a runaway stabilizer you can counter it with. If i countered and i dont get the result i want, i go to the cut off correct . You go to the cut off. However, with the mcas failure i can actually interrupt the stabilizer trim failure, isnt that correct . That is true. Because it happened 15 plus times in Indonesia Air the net . Yes. Right, so, you are saying that you dont put it in the documentation because emergency procedure is the same but in fact it is not. And what i am wondering is, when you look, particularly at the Indonesia Air, the very first time that the mcas fails is when the flaps go to zero. For attraction. And you provided no information in any of these manuals. That said when you go to fall flap retraction you are activating this new system, isnt that right . That there is nothing in the manuals that tells the pilot when they have activated the system, isnt that right . That was correct and we are making changes now to have that material in the manual and the training. The mcas was probably the first Computer Software system that manipulated a primary Flight Control in the 7 37, isnt that right . The first, not a pilot induced Flight Control changing Flight Control, the first Computer Software system that actually manipulated a primary Flight Control, that is mcas isnt it . Well actually the autopilot that is on the airplane. Okay well everyone knows autopilot, aside from the autopilot, isnt that right . Mcas was the very first Computer Software to actually manipulate a primary Flight Control . Yes or no. Or you dont know. Chief engineer. I guess the words you are using i would say the autopilot does satisfy that. Okay with the mcas be the second one . There is a damper function on the butter that moves with the pilot. In the quick reference handbook do you have a procedure for the failure on that . I probably do. You probably do. But you dont have it for the mcas, you didnt give them the information that they need. Congressman as we said that is one area where we have learned and we are coming back an out in that information to the manual. Thank you mister chairman. Mr. Mitchell. Thank you mister. Chairman boeing is an iconic brand in this country. Ive asked have you flown the 737 max . Ill say publicly in undergoing the scrutiny i will flight as soon as its a lot to go back in the air. It is one of the most scrutinized in this country. I do want to talk about some of the continuing questions that mr. Garamendi had. The boeing supplying to the military. There are some significant issues, however, when the system was put to the mcas, the pentagon required that it fire only once. Only once. Why on the 737 max was another approach taken where it could and did fire repeatedly, as my colleague says, significantly, why the difference in approach given a similar issue with the aircraft . So, the mcas, again it was just signed as you approach, when pilots to fly and stall, they can correct and fly back into a stall, but it was intended that if you are in a stall condition. Let me stop you, i understand stall. But you have an answer my question. Why the difference between the tanker, where the pentagon required it only fire once, that was a criteria put forth as they were taking that aircraft, and the commercial aircraft had a repeated and in fact accentuated, you change the standard of, it went to a more powerful motion ultimately, why the difference . What motivated that . The air force, some of the requirements for the tanker. Congressman, if i could just out a bit to that. John is correct, the concept behind mcas on the tanker was for a different purpose, a different part of the flight envelope as i understand it, we can find Additional Details on that but the reason the design requirements are different is because it was a design for a different part of the flight envelope and a different purpose. If we can follow up the details we. Well i appreciate that but i think we need to be honest, that boeing made an error and where to apply the flight envelope in terms of the mcas because it clearly occurred within the flight envelope and it occurred catastrophic lee so i go back to my early your question about assumptions, because they failed. Question to for you, when doing similar testing, i saw some documentation that it wasnt possible to simulate no angular tack data or flawed detail to test response and in fact it wasnt included as part of the simulator and so therefore there is no way to figure out whether four seconds would work or ten seconds, never mind all the other things that may happen. Can you shed some light on that . That is when we evaluate the mcas failure, waited not actually put a faulty a way accessory input, we couldnt simulate that, but we simulate the actual mcas failure. Let me answer your question. You have how many other sensors on the aircraft . Are there any others that you didnt simulate in order to test the aircraft performance or pilot response . I can answer that question off the top, i can follow up with that. I would like you to answer the committee, im astonished not only by the information which ive raised as well, the pilots training requirement regarding mcas, and it appears to me in your Testing Process that you didnt test whether or not flawed data from a Single Source would cause catastrophic problems which in fact it dead. They couldnt test in a simulator, they didnt see it because they didnt have, it they had other problems but they didnt see that. You are pilots, which are more experienced than some that are flying this aircraft, so i would appreciate that information. I yield back, thank you mister chair. Thank you gentlemen. Just one point that mr. Hamilton responded to about why the repeated actually shown how to very radical angle. He said sometimes pilots tend to overcorrect and they can fall back into a stall again. That kind of contradicts your whole reasoning that they are going to figure this out in four seconds and fly perfectly. I think you have just created something that goes back to your other study which side if it takes as long as ten seconds, the plane is going in. With that i recognize mr. Tom malinowski. Okay adriano d. Espaillat, and then tom malinowski. Think you mister chairman, i first want to extend my condolences to the families that are here today, my district suffered similar tragedy with 587, back in 2001. It went down in the roadways in new york city and i know the kind of hurt that many of you are going through so my heart goes out to you, my condolences and sympathies to you all. Mister muilenburg, the National Transportation safety board recommended that the federal Aviation Administration develop standards for improved aircraft system diagnostic tools that help the pilot better identify and respond to the kind of failures they make. Will you provide this committee with your absolute assurance that any future boeing airplane will include such a system . Congressman, im not exactly sure what system you are from mueller with . I know about the recommendation and thats one we are taking a look at. Are you committed to following those recommendations provided by the ntsb to upgrade and improve improve youre plane so it will not happen in the future . We are currently evaluating those recommendations, we think that topic areas when that we want to look at, we will get into the details. You cannot give us any assurance whatsoever that any of those recommendations that are given by ntsb, as of today, you are completely sure that you will include them in any future boeing production . Congressman, our intent here is to evaluate all of those recommendations, we simply havent completed those recommendation evaluations yet, any opportunity that we have to improve safety is certainly what is the timeline for the evaluation . When do you think you will be completed . Congressman those recommendations are made to the faa, so we will have to work with the faa on how they want to move forward with adopting those recommendations. For this entire horrible experience there is not one modification, there is not one single meritorious change that you will make in production that you will make as of today right now . As a result of all of these accidents we are making changes to the software, were making changes to training, the procedures. What kind of changes have you made for the airplanes . For the airplanes . Yes. So we are making three changes to the software that address the mcas issue, we are making additional changes for the pilots flying towards stall, and addressing some of those issues as well. Are any of those changes included in these recommendations by the National Transportation safety board . I think when you look at the first recommendation that talks about the max i think it does address that first one. Thank you, my next question really quickly, mr. Muilenburg, the joint authorities technical review reports, the report states that the mcas used to stabilize trim, to change the column force field, not trim the aircraft, and this is a case of using the Control Surface in a new way that the regulations never accounted for. I understand that you personally maintain that the max was designed and certified to the company standards. Would you agree that this is an example of where the regulations have not kept pace with changes in the industry . Congressman, i dont know if i would characterize it is not keeping pace, it is true that the mcas implementation is new and different and we are evaluating what lessons we have from that, so again, all of the recommendations are currently being evaluated and we will take a hard look at all of them. Just let me conclude by saying, i know that all of this has to be assessed, i remember when we had flight 587, but there are particular changes that could be adopted immediately that are no brainer, that these families i think deserve to hear from you with regards to what kind of improvements you will make as passengers may consider getting on a boeing in the future. I think its incumbent upon you to give responses to these families in this kind. So we are making a number of Software Changes as i mentioned that will prevent the pilots from ever getting in the situation ever again, but also i would tell you that as the faa is diligently going through all of the documentation, they are taking Lessons Learned from these accurate students and applying criteria to us that goes above and beyond what the guidance and regulatory current standards are. So i would say that we are working to a higher level standard already with that. Thank you. Thank you mister chairman i yield. Gentlemen, mr. Bolder is recognized. Thank you mister chairman. First i want to thank the families and loved ones of the victims that are in attendance today. Your strength does not go unnoticed by anyone in this room, and who is watching on tv so my thoughts and prayers are with all of you and thank you so much for being here. Mr. Muilenburg, thank you for being here. Following the grounding of 737 max, boeing stated in a cbs news report, safety and quality are absolutely out the core of boeings values. Speaking of, there is a culture we look into all issues that are raised. When the 737 max was being certified, when procedures were in place that there are safety concerns from designers, engineers, or mechanics were properly investigated and addressed by boeing. Congressman, in addition to the specific updates that john will described on software and training which were an important part of that answer, we are also making significant restructuring of how we do our work. We have set up a new Safety Organization that will report to the new Vice President , reporting to our chief engineer, creating a direct line of communication back to me. We have restructured all of our safety review boards within the company, so that they are elevated and again, provide more ready access, detailed access to safety data. And his safety concerns that our employees might raise will also come through this new organization. That includes setting up an updated anonymous reporting system, so if we have any employees that have a safety concern, if they wish to remain anonymous they can reported up through that system. That will come directly to me and it will also independently go to our aerospace Safety Committee inside of our board of directors to make sure that those all get the right response. Thank you, my followup would be would, does process is there a process that boeing has that will be made to the faa during the certification of the client . Congressman, yes. Our intent is to share this information again, as we gather data, safety concerns are raised, our intent is always to try to share information with the faa. So thank you, you have discussed recent actions for vowing to enhance safety. These include having all boeing engineers report to chief engineers with the new reporting system that you just talked about, can you provide more information on how those novice reporting system will work . Congressman i will be happy to follow up with the information and, it will be modeled after our existing ethics hotline destruction which has proven to be very effective and our intent is to have a similar model here and if helpful we can provide Additional Details on how it structured and how it works . Yes please, thank you very much. Do you believe it should be mandatory to immediately provide the faa with safety concerns and reports that have been filed through the companies internal channels . John you can comment on that. So we actually have a electronic Bulletin Board will we take an all the data, anything that meets the criteria, posts that they have total visibility of that, so if we have potential safety issues that we can post to the board as well, so the faa can then do an independent review of that. Okay thank you mr. Hamilton, mister chairman i yield back my time. Thanks gentlemen, thank you mister chairman, mr. Dennis muilenburg weve been over a lot of this but to be clear its fair to say that boeing push the faa and regulatory agencies to not require Simulator Training to fly the max. Congressman our design objective was training understood and of course weve been over the issues with the he manual, not including information on the mcas system, with all of that in mind, let me ask you very simply, was boeing aware that mcas could pose under realistic world circumstances a catastrophic risk . Congressman as part of that broader hazard analysis that john described earlier we evaluate a broad set of scenarios and that is included in that systems and Safety Assessment document, we have another slide that i think may be worth looking at if you could put it up. Thank you. This is from a presentation that boeing developed for the faa december of 2018, after the accident before the Ethiopian Airlines crash and as you see the slide states that there were the loss of one attack sensor and the other received a bad reading, the situation was potentially catastrophic before crew recognition of the issue and underneath it states crew training supports, supports recognition and appropriate flight crew action, so it does appear from this and other evidence we have seen that boeing understood how important crew training would be to prevent these kinds of crashes within a month of the first crash and given how quickly boeing came to that answer and before many details of the first crash were available i have to assume that you were aware before the first crash as well and yet do you actively worked against Simulator Training, do you have an explanation for this . Congressman ill try to Andrew Service and john i dont know if you want to jump in. The training that they recognized in the original training, that same basic training would apply, here if youre new to the max there would be similar training that would be required as part of that so that is how i got addressed. Let me also ask you this going back a little bit in time, did boeing lobby for the provisions in the 2003 aviation below that established this oda program that is delegated all these decisions, did boeing lobby for those provisions . Congressman im not familiar with the details back and that timeframe, boeing has been engaged in the oda process and discussions over that time period. And is it fair to say that since that time period boeing has vigorously lobbied the faa and lobbied congress to lobby the faa to speed up the certification process . Congressman we have advocated efficiency and certification and trying to do things officially across all the stakeholders where we can provide better interfaces and exchange in data, so efficiency in the process has been very bureaucratic language but i think it means yes, i think its worth reflecting on because there is a larger story here, there is a reflective tendency among corporate lobbyists to own louise lobby for less regulation and here we have a case because they see it within the companies interest, here we have a case where 346 people died, number one, most important and in terms of the companys interest how much money did boeing lose in the Second Quarter of 2019 . Congressman we rode off millions of dollars. Can you reflect a little bit on this, is this one of the lessons you have learned that perhaps this reflective pattern of lobbying for faster and faster procedures to make it easier for you to get planes to market is not necessarily in the companys best interest. I have to disagree with the question, we never lobby for something thats going to harm safety, if there is a place where we can gain efficiency the idea is always to enhance the safety of the regulatory system, that is our intent, we have no desire to reduce safety, our Business Model is about safe airplanes and that is the only sustainable approach, so i understand the point you are making but our intent is to try to be part of the regulatory system that drives safety. I yield back. Gentlemen we are now going to representative stand. Its clear that during bowing, too often puts shareholders but or shifty and profit before peoples lives, as a result the singular focus to get them acts up ex quickly as possible and the actions that were taken in many that were not taken, 346 innocent peoples lost their lives, and it says a lot about the roads in the strategies, the evidence that were outlining today and in the months that word leading show is that boeing did not follow its own design requirements, here is what deeply troubles me, not only did you fail to follow your own design requirements but you also went the great lakes to hide the existence of mcas from our customers and even from pilots that are actually violent vital to the safety of the max. It is your job to make sure that mcas works properly, i want to ask you a few questions about boeings internal mcas requirements. They were described in detail in boeings own coronation seats and these coronation sheets were updated as mcas moved in the desired process, but two sheets, juan from june 2018 did not change, even after we started using a newer more powerful version of mcas they were not changed. Even after a year of the 737 max entered service there is still no changes, first slide please. Id like to focus on their side, and to specific design requirements of mcas, design requirement number four, you see it highlighted on the screen estates quote, mcas shell not have any objective will interaction with the piloting of the airplane, unquote, so my time is short i need yes or no answers, so mr. Hamilton did mcas flecked the piloting . They always had the ability to override mcas. Let me ask it in another way, did the pilots of the lion air flight struggle. As the captain was flying the airplane, they continually trimmed out the mcas and putts multiple times. Did mcas affect the flight of ethiopian flight. That is still under investigation, i think we need to mr. Muilenburg, you are the ceo, you are ultimately responsible for making sure that you would hear to you or design requirements, that didnt happen here, did it . Congressman again we have learned some things from these accidents, we are coming up and updating the design and the training materials, every, as we went through our process at each stepped trying to make the decisions that are consistent with the data we had and clearly we didnt get it all right. Are you willing to give a yes or no answer to that direct question . That didnt happen here, its a yes or no question, a tough question but it deserves a fair and direct response. Congressman ill try to give you my direct response, its a complicated question with an answer thank you, i reclaim my time. Mr. Hamilton design requirement number 70, you can see it on the side, mcas should not interfere with dive recovery, unquote, did mcas affect the dive recovery of lion aircraft . Ultimately after multiple in pucks. Thats intended as a yes or no, its tough but it deserves a yes or no. Did mcas effect lion air number seven 6 10. We assumed it would be, it caused the airplane to go into a dive and the crews were not able to recover from. Was mcas a contributing factor as known by the reports release by investigators. Did mcas affect the dive recovery of ethiopian flight number three or two. Yes. As ceo, mr. Muilenburg, i want to ask you the same question, did mcas affect the dive recovery of lion air number 6 10 and ethiopian flight number 3 02 . Congressman we know mcas was a factor in both accidents and there were a number of things occurring in both and we know that mcas was a contributing factor and we know we need to make some updates and that is what we are doing. Mr. Hamilton i appreciate your direct answer to that question, this is back to mr. Muilenburg, did boeing failed to meet your own design requirements as it relates to mcas . Congressman we are still evaluating everything we learn from those accidents, what you see here is there are cases where we implemented requirements where we need to make some improvements and that is what we are doing with the updates. Its clear that the design was fundamentally and tragically fatally flawed, the lion air tragedies show that the system did not even meet boeings own design criteria, its Crystal Clear to me through the course of this investigation that relinquishing approval of mcas by the faa was a grave mistake with severe consequences, safety must be our top priority and Congress Must act, we owe nothing less to the victims and their families, i yield back. We will now move on to powell, thank you chairman ive been sitting here listening to the testimony and i think that its clear to me that so much of what we have heard today and also on the testimony from yesterday that to a large extent this is a story about a company cutting corners, taking shortcuts, sacrificing safety to achieve maximum profits, at the end what is it that we have to show for it, 346 lives were lost due to the negligence of what happened on those two flights. Mr. Muilenburg for me its very important to focus on the families of the victims that as you see are sitting right here, i know that the Company Started the boeing Financial Systems fund that provides Financial Assistance to the family of victims and to support education and economic empowerment, so by my calculation that comes to 144,002 each of the families of the People Killed in the two flights, first question, have you ever reached out to the families before boeing made this an ounce mint in july, mister muilenburg . Congresswoman i did not reach out personally. Thank you, how did you communicate about this fund with the families the u. S. Created this fun for them . Congresswoman our reach out to the families is an area i think we clearly needed to improve, i feel terrible about these two accidents and having spoken fairly with but my question is how did you communicate with the families about this fund . Our boeing Global Engagement team reached out, we had connections into both ethiopian and indonesia working with our Airline Customers. So you never personally reached out to any of the families . I do not personally and it is something i regret, i wish i had done that earlier. Thank you, how did you and how are you now working with the families to determine the best way to use these funds . Congresswoman a couple of things, one for the first 50 million that you identified we asked mr. Feinberg an expert to administer that fund so he is making progress through the rest of the families and we will continue that, on a second we have engaged with the families that was one of the topics of discussion at our meeting and we are gonna continue that going forward. Thank you mister muilenburg, it was reported in this article by cnbc that the families of the 737 max have only until december 31st 2019 to file a claim with the boeing compensation fund, is that correct . Congresswoman im not sure if that is the deadline but my expectation is. Congresswoman its not something that i have established. There are so many families trying to receive basic justice, i want you to take a look at them for a one second, obviously you havent spoken to them, i am going to continue thank you mister muilenburg. Can you assure us today that if these families except these funds they will not in any way hinder anyones ability to sue or take any legal action against the company . Yes congresswoman this fund is completely separate from any legal activities. So you can give me that assurance today . Yes,. I want to ask for unanimous consent to introduce this article that i found faa discovers new safety concerns during boeing 737 max test. No objection. Thank you. Changing subjects for a second, are you expecting this aircraft the 737 max to fly anytime in the near future . Congresswoman we are working with the faa on that, we have currently said a baseline. What is the date of expectancy . By the end of the year. So soon, because i have lost all confidence, i sit in the transportation and infrastructure committee, i heard some of your testimony yesterday and i think that many of the families have asked for your resignation and i have thought for a long time, i dont want to blame you but at some point you have to take full responsibility of the negligence of these two fights and i want to ask you, are you going to be stepping down as ceo of boeing . Congresswoman now. Doesnt surprise me because i saw Something Else, boeing increase ears pay, this was last year. So obviously you dont to step down but i think at some point to build trust and confidence in your company because i do agree with you, there are thousand employees outwork in this company that dont deserve to be put through this, but as you scl that takes full responsibility for what happened and i have not heard you doing that, with that i yield back my time. Congressman if i could respond to that, i am responsible, i take responsibility for these two accidents that occurred on my watch and i feel responsible to carry that through, as i mentioned earlier i grew up on a farm in iowa and my dad tommy responsibility and he asked, he told me when youre face or challenges you carry through and i dont want to run away from challenges, my intent is to see this through, i think thats part mister muilenburg if you had an ounce of integrity you would know that the right thing to do is to step down. The gentlemans time is up. Would you like to finish what you are saying . Whoa congressman thank you, i understand the congresswomans view here and i respect those imports but as i said the way i was brought up when faced with a tough challenge like this, something that occurred on my watch i have a keen sense of responsibility to see it through and i think thats part of what i owe to these families and to their memories and i am committed to doing that, to me this is about being responsible and ensuring safe travel for the, future that is my focus. Thank, you i yield back. Mr. Colin allred. Thank you mister chairman i want to begin by offering my sincere is condolences to the families that are here today as the father of an eight month old child and particular devastated to see the babies in these pictures, i do believe that boeing is a Great American company and that is part of the reason im so frustrated we are here today, i also want to say that the faa has failed in its duty to make sure that we fix, and we must ensure in this committee that we fix this process, make sure that this never happens again, industry capture of safety regulation in any area is not only dangerous to the public, its bad business. This has cost boeing dearly, its costs our airlines dearly thats why its so important we get this right, mister muilenburg i hope you are gathering todays hearing, but our concern is not a mistake that we made we are certainly concerned about that but we understand that mistakes happened, even in the Great Companies they make mistakes. Its the concealment, its the purposeful concealment technical problem but yeah we have to have whistleblowers saying some information, you only got this information on october 18th about these text that are going on with some of you are people, you have not fully complied with us weve had to fight and scratch with all the information to try and fix the system, that makes me angry, that makes you wonder if your word of accountability is a different meaning than line, now this is not about pilot air, ive heard some of my colleagues mentioned pilot air, this is about cottage traffic design flaw and regulatory failure has caused us to lose hundreds of lives, tree of your aircraft have gone down, in dallas where i represent we have two airlines both of which have extensive hubs in my area, they have invested heavily in your aircraft this crowning in these catastrophes have cost them one billion dollars, theyve canceled many flights and they are hardworking employees are feeling the financial effects of your negligence, now when the 737 max flies again after it has gone through the needed changes that are just now being done which i think some of this process has shown that you knew which had been done in the first place, it will be a profitable aircraft for your company, so my question to you is how will you compensate the airlines and their employees who have lost so much through your negligence . Congressman we have been working with a number of airlines, including american and southwest as you might have seen our last quarterly report, we took a charge of several billion dollars associated with what we call customer compensation those discussions with the two airlines and many others around the country and around the world are ongoing and our intent is to make things right with our customers, we feel terrible about the impacts it had, we know the airlines have been affected, we know that communities have been affected and we have a deliberate engagement approach with each and every airline and we are working our way through that, we have set aside Financial Impact associated with that and you have seen in our public reports. Let me follow this closely, there are hardworking employees and both these airlines have no role in this, who have been doing their best and impacted by this, i find southwest twice a week. And someone always asks if its a mask max, what they out to do sir, i yield back. Gentlemen, miss david will be next, the vice chair of the subcommittee. Thank you. First id like to again extend my condolences to the families that are here, i appreciate your continued willingness to show up and be a part of this process, aviation is extremely important to kansas, this state that i hail from an hour state has a strong aviation history and its vital to my states economy and its vital to the u. S. Economy, i think you know that already, mr. Muilenburg to piggyback off of the questioning weve heard today and what weve heard from you today and what we heard from you yesterday and the senate, you have reiterated time and time again the many for a Pilot Training, we have seen documents, the committee has reviewed documents with an emphasis on an effort to minimize Pilot Training requirements for the 737 max, my interest is having you provide some clarity on the apparent in consistencies our hearing and seeing, would you agree that Pilot Training is important to boeing . Yes. When boeing marketed the max to potential Airline Customers did they ensure the customers and if they purchased the maxi would be unlikely that they need to put their pilots through some simulation training. To work with our Airline Customers we did computer based training as a design objective. Okay i have some slides. So i have a presentation from a 737 max training that one of the marketing officials provided from july 2017 which was a few months after they certified the max, can go to the second slide please. This graphic shows a quote if you look in the box, here we have marketed two days previously and a course has been approved, mr. Muilenburg after the certification did the representatives emphasize that they had reduce the link that Pilot Training that boeing had originally expected . Congresswoman im not familiar with those discussions and i know that john if you have any awareness we can certainly follow up on that question. Okay its clear from this slide that boeing had expected a Different Number days of training then when it ultimately ended up with, this slide here contains text from an email chain from chief technical pilot mark forkner, it says that the faa approves a level b training, the entire email contains a lot of exclamation points, he was very enthusiastic, he says this has tirelessly scene efforts, we can see the rest of the text, year so level b resignation means a seven three seven max had computer training requirements but not more simulation requirements. Thats difference in the training, the baseline training for the 7 37 max is a 20 plus state Training Program that includes significant simulator time. So in a separate email chains, can you bring up the next slide please. We are very familiar with this quote by this time of the day, mr. Forkner tells the faa official says he was working on to Jedi Mind Trick or is, that he was accepted by the, they push on the requirements, despite the companys commitments to safety and Pilot Training is clear, from the questions weve heard today, what is up here right now this is your chance to provide some clarity on how you match all this information with your continued statements about commitment to safety. Congresswoman i think its a very good question and the idea here is that incremental training adds to safety, we dont make training decisions based on economics we try to make it based on safety and as john pointed out earlier. If it wasnt based on economics what was a push john . Safe operations for airlines, many of our Airline Customers who receive the 737 max they also flew 7 37 and jeez, a typical pilot and a given day they have a flight on ng and a max. What youre saying right now sounds inconsistent with the information that we have been seeing that you are committed to safety and that youre not taking into account the Economic Impacts of the Pilot Training that people would have to do, the last thing i want to say is, based on whats congresswoman powell said, can you tell us right now, that december 23rd 2019 is the last chance that families are able to file a claim for the boeing compensation fund, that you will extend that because that is only two months from now and that seems completely ridiculous that people only have until december 2019, so congresswoman until that was mentioned earlier i had recalled that deadline, i can tell you that is something that we can extend and i will give my team that direction, if there are families that we can help we will take the time, our commitment is try to help the families and i know monetary help never relieves the pain, never well but hopefully we can help in the communities and i dont want to put any kind of artificial timeline on that so if that is that can straight we will move it. Thank you, i yield back. Thank you chairman, to the families and friends of those who perished thank you for bearing witness to what was really lost in the catastrophes, id like to explore some of the financial forces that may have contributed to the protests free as relates to the corporation, can you answer yes or no. One of your primary duties as a ceo is to focus on increasing the price of the companies stock, is that right . Congress then one of our objectives is to increase the shareholders value. Ill take that as a. Yes is your total compensation or realized gains part of boeing performing . Well thats one component of a, yes. Mister muilenburg do you know what the stock price was when you became ceo . Congressman i do not. It was 140 dollars a share, that was june 5th 2015 number. What was the stock price at the last trading day before the Ethiopian Air accident this year . Would you know that . I dont know. Let me help you, it was 422 dollars a share on march 8th, so in a little over four years, your Company Stock rose it tripled from 1999 to 2009, it went from 42 to 49 dollars a share but from 2015 to 2019 it tripled, from 140 dollars per share to 422 dollars per share. That is very significant, in fact you and your board authorized a 20 billion Stock Buyback Program in december of 2018 two months after the lion air incident that helped drive up the price of boeing stock. You only share of Company Stock, correct . That is correct. So in short you benefited from increasing the stock price, in fact a report from the american prospects shows that you made over 95 million from 2015 to 2018, you are pocketing almost 2 million a month, almost half from stock dividends, the way i see it, your relentless focus on stock price and you are Companies Bottom line may have negatively affected employee performance, would you agree . Congressman i dont agree with that, our Business Model is about safe airplanes. So you dont think that employees felt pressures to perform . Congressman the realities of competitive environment, the pressure to perform is there but that is never equal to safety. But in november of 2016 boeing conducted an internal survey watch, and which over 40 of employeess stated they felt undue pressure, a boeing employee said that management was more concerned with cost and schedule and safety and quality, another adam dixon said a boeing engineer said his managers warned in quote, very directly and threatening ways, and of quote that pay was at risk if targets werent met, its pretty clear that there has been a culture of greed and compromising safety at boeing, mister muilenburg you did everything to drive profits over safety, you skirted recertification requirements or regulators at every quarter, even youre a ploys ad mid to lying to the faa, there are basically two ways that this plays out, you either truly didnt realize you had a defective plane which demonstrates incompetence or negligence, or you did have a defective plane and knew it but still try to push it to market, in which case its just clear corruption, either way mister muilenburg youre the captain of the ship, negligence and competent starts at the top and it starts with you you padded your personal finances by putting profits over safety did, and now 346 people, including eight americans are dead on your watch. Today you said you made mistakes in and you are accountable, if its in fact is authorized and the max is grounded, youll may be asking for a bailout, that is before the Financial Services committee, i think its time that you submitted your resignation, dont you . Congressman i respectfully disagree with your premise on what drives our company. Whether or not you and your colleagues are incriminated in the ongoing criminal investigation and, the facts remain, it was either gross negligence, incompetence, or corruption, you are at the top and i think it is pretty clear to me, to the families of the victims and the American Public that you should resign and do it immediately, i yield back mister chairman. Next will be a mess Lizzie Pannill fletcher. Thank you very much mister chairman, i thank you for being here today, and thank you for holding this important hearing, i join my colleagues in addressing my condolences to the family and friends who are here with us today and those who cant be here with us and of course they are on our minds and as are the victims and i think that really needs to remain our focus as we are here today, we convene this hearing to get the facts and understand better what we can do as members of congress to prevent a tragedy like this from ever happening again and we understand that these are real people whose lives have been affected and lives that have been lost and forever changed, so i remain aware of that, we want to do what we can, so one of the things that has been an issue that we touched on a little bit earlier today but i want to follow up on is this delegation of certification authority, this is a critical place where Congress Needs to reassess whether this program should continue and i understand and theyre being questions about this earlier that boeing was really able to avoid installing some of the latest safety features by using this amended certification and i think both boeing and the faa failed to evaluate the impacts of am cast on the whole aircraft system because of this. So mister muilenburg my question is first, the jatr need to ensure they have open lines of communication without fewer of punitive action, do you agree with this recommendation . Congresswoman we agree with having those open communications. What changes, if any has boeing made to improve the relationship and ensure that boeing employees have access to make safety determinations . One of the big changes we announced roughly two weeks ago now was a standup of a new Safety Organization centralized within boeing, direct reporting lying to the chief engineer that reports to me that will includes our representatives the delegated representatives and i think that will enhance transparency, directness of communication lines with the faa and also increase independents from our airplane programs to create that functional strength, so those are changes we have announced and are now implementing. Our other changes under consideration or is that the extent of a recommendation at this time . We have multiple recommendations or actions are underway, it includes the Safety Committee for aboard that was set up by the admiral that includes a restructuring of all our safety review boards so they are now integrated company wide, we are setting up a new design Requirements Organization that as technology continues to involve of all we do a better job of sharing those requirements and we have a new engineering structure so that all 50,000 boeing engineers now report directly to our chief engineer. Great thank you. There are additional actions and investments so that list i just gave you thats a set of initial actions its more to follow. I want to move on through a few more things, were any employees subjected to him punitive action during the development 37 max for reporting as youssef a staff . Congresswoman im not aware of any such cases, if there were cases like that we dont expect retaliation, there is no tolerance for retaliation, i can personally say there were any but let me check the records for that, from a policy standpoint we do not tolerate retaliation. I would appreciate if you could get back to the committee if any summit employees were subjected to this. Another recommendation is that the jatr requires increased faa involvement in critical areas that have to do with boeing, i am aware they have implemented these changes, have you identified any changes to the delegation process that congress can help with as we evaluate these issues . Congresswoman we are starting to evaluate those opportunities, so discussions are ongoing with the faa and others, we think the area of Human Machine Interface and how we set those requirements for how they operate the workload environment, they are also older regulations that could be updated to take advantage of doing technologies and were identifying of specific lists and that area, those are two examples and i anticipate there will be more. Thank you i see i have exceeded my time but if you could send the recommendations that would be much appreciated, thank you. I yield back. Gentle 80, representative plastic in, thank you for those in the audience and condolences to your families, for those in the industry we are looking closely to what you all have to, say i want to ask you about mcas, following the lion air accident 610, boeing issued a bullet in, the subject concerned quote, and commanded nose down due to angle of attack during manual flight, this bolton describes in detail what can occur during an aoa failure in increments lasting up to ten seconds and that repetitive cycles continue to occur unless the stabilizer is evacuated, i know that not once did the builtin mention by name one in fact requires such a nose dive command, so i have a copy of a manual bulletin a number tvc dash 19, i asked that this be added to the record. So why was mcas not mentioned in the bulletin . Im going to ask john to add to this one but its what we were attempting to do, we wanted to remind pilots of that existing emergency procedure and the reference to multiple imports is the behavior that you would expect airplanes to see as a result of this, so it was to get the pilots information of the airplane as opposed to diagnosing the system, so that was the intent. The intent was to inform them of this mode, rather than provide details, since then theyve been getting feedback on the pilots and we know we need to provide more information, and the effects we will provide the manuals. What it been easier to use the term mcas. We may be, couldve the pilots couldve wanted Additional Information on the definition of mcas itself, in addition to the effects of its Failure Modes, our goal is to optimize whats in the training manual so we dont add more information than whats useful. How large are the training manuals . I cant comment on. That they are pretty substantive so why would that have been a difference to add that, i saw you nodding your head, did you want to add anything . Well they are very substantive in size but we do go through a process deciding whats the right level of information to be there, we can incorporate all kinds of information, in hindsight and in response to the pilots requests we are gonna put material on mcas, we will have a lot more information to address this. So is that the decision as to why i was ultimately excluded because he was seen as what, not something that the pilots wouldve . Our intent was to provide information on how to fly the airplane not necessarily diagnose system failures, that is always a balance that we try to get in our training materials and clearly here we need to provide more information. So the reference to mcas was excluded, was the reference to mcas excluded in order not to bring attention . Congresswoman the intent was to provide the training materials that powers we need to fly, rather than try to educate them on the system details, again that scenario that we fell short in and we need to provide Additional Information. So boeing describes how erroneous it could cause, so as many as four different alerts, do you believe that several of this indications when simultaneous when a proud beat us confused on how to respond. Congresswoman when you have an aoa in the case of lion air that it was miss calibrated, once you got to a certain threshold you had a difference in altitude, so when i got to assert into speed they may not come out at the same time but they are probably fairly closely linked together. So the question was what a pilot be confused on how to respond, and i yield back. So is really about if you had an aoa issue it can trigger a number of different indications from the flight deck to help you identify what could be going on and if you have a stabilizer moving you perform the runaway stabilizer procedure we went out at the request of our customers with a detailed message about mcas and explain what it was. Thank you mister chair and i want to start by also offering my condolences to families that were here and those, loved ones that have been morning all those that were lost in these unfortunate tragedies, mister muilenburg im going to dispense what a lot of my colleagues had touched on, just dive into some poignant directions. Boeing did not consider mcas activation to present a catastrophic risk, correct . Let me repeat, that boeing did not consider erroneous activation to present a catastrophic risk, correct . I believe the hazard analysis if that is what you are inferring to, then yes. Single mcas. Is that correct . It was not considered. Thank you, as a result of this boeing did not perform detailed evaluations, Failure Modes and other analysis, to fully understand the effects of this, correct . Im just looking for a yes or no. We did a full analysis using the processes that we used, we did check into this. In fact similar test boeing it in initiate this to the 2. 5 degrees of stabilizer, motion correct . Congressman i think youll have to follow up with, you i think we went beyond two point, five i think we went to three point oh. If you can follow up that would be great. Boeing didnt consider erroneous mcas activations in those tests, did it . Boeing didnt consider repetitive erroneous mcas activations in this test . We did consider multiple mcas inputs. Did boeing assume that pylons would have the redundancy of this during aircraft activation. You assume that they would recognize it and trim it out. So is that a . Yes yes. And retrospect given that the erroneous activation of mcas played a Critical Role in both 737 max crashes, would you agree that this was a flawed assumption that the pilots were the backup . Well used an Industry Standard that has been around for a long time, around pilots actions in these cases, that assumption did not play out. So is that a yes or no . Its an assumption that didnt play out and i think its one of the things that we need to address going forward. So that would be a yes . In retrospect given the erroneous activation of mcas played a Critical Role in 737s max crashes, would you agree that this was a flawed assumption that the pilots were the backup . Yeah i would say the assumption we need to be addressed. So yes . Yes, thank you. Mister chairman i yield back. So we begin with what will hopefully be a brief second round, i appreciate the witnesses and the members of the committee. Do you know how many 7 37 max aircraft had been ordered from boeing prior to the lion air crash . Congresswoman i dont know the exact number but we could find it for you. We were told he was to 80 and you can test the fact that Southwest Airlines would have got in a 1 Million Dollar rebate per plane had the pilots had to go a simulator or de training. Chairman i believe that i was part of the contracts. Did you have contracts like that with other customers . I dont know if theres any other customers with that specific laws but its not uncommon for us to have this. So that would of told old obviously 280 Million Dollars that wouldve had been paid, i think a real key issue is is how we got to this point and how mcas was on the manual, thats my question since way back when. Lets move on to undue pressure and next steps side. Slide. Here goes booths was the survey that was provided to us by a whistleblower, it was in 2016, if we go to the next slide, i am concerned about consequences if i report financial and due pressure, 29 , then if we go to the next slide, when these engineers lines are frequently blurred when the engineers acting in and applications role and when they are in an ar role. That was 2016, i will give you and a minute a chance to respond but it seems like you didnt pay much attention to the survey any undue pressure because we then have, i may have read it improperly before but it says he was the leader of a 7 37 program, he was writing to the general manager, talks about exhausted schedule pressure, im sorry to say im hesitant to put my family on a boeing airplane, that is two years later, it doesnt seem like anything was done to relieve the undue pressure and this culture where people were afraid for their jobs and there was confusion, which also points to why we need to change this process, and wait a minute what chat do i have on, 2003 i said i dont understand how this is going to work when i voted against this process, so someone works for boeing, pays for boeing and then works for boeing pays for boeing, but this person is fire wall theyre not responsive to boeing budgets to regulator but thats not true because apparently they go back and forth between being a Development Engineer or being the ar, so, what happened between 2016 and 2018, can you point to any significant steps to change the culture and relieve this undue pressure . Congressman i cant and jon feel free to add in as, well this survey is the survey that we proactively do with our team, the goal here is to identify any sources of undue pressure, in this case this is the survey results that we sought, we gathered all of these results and we share them with the faa and weve taken followup actions associated with these and putts. Thats good but im asking for like really concrete examples when you have the leader of a 7 37 team, workforce exhausted, schedule pressure, it doesnt sound like those things were effective. Congressman if i could im attempting to answer the question, its a very important topic. You will also see on the survey data here that over 90 of our employees are comfortable raising issues and i think the number is 97 understand the process for doing so, those are very high scores, we want to hire but we try to create a culture where employees can speak up and raise issues so we can take action in response. So that is the culture we are trying to incentivize, i will say that we have Competitive Pressures every day, we operate in a tough Global Competitive world than ever takes priority over safety, i know weve had this discussion but our only long term Business Model is safety and thats because our airplanes last for decades and having a culture where people are willing to speak up, including those that responded to this surveys part of creating this culture. John you might be able to comment on specific actions we have taken. I think there are actually two separate things, this was looking at the va ours in this was undue pressure, this was what the have the act on we did training with the managers about how they should deal with a ours and how they need to be treated and what is undue pressure and we do take followup actions, we do audits and the faa actually came in audited what we did and they have agreed that all actions were taken, i think the other pressures that were alluded to two years later was on a arent my understanding and that talks more about the pressures. Again as i mentioned earlier i did receive a letter from that individual and he raised some good points, things that we want our people to raise and we talk to our 737s team. But you didnt produce the production rate, if i could, i dont want to pull on this. But its actually better for safety, consistency of the factory safer for our workers. Unless its moving a little too quick so just to go back to the issue of how this all happened and it started with a phone call and theres an 11, i brought that out in the beginning, you had an exclusive boeing customer who cold and said, cant match fuel economy and no training necessary, we are buying all airbus and then, i mean the story is we dont rush, but you have a 50 year old air frame, some of the reasons the problems we had and why you had to develop mcas as opposed to more stable platform is because we are dealing with a 50 year old air frame, you still have a hydraulic controls youre in the new airplanes. My understanding is when you have something serious going on you actually get a prioritization and a more visible way but we are being told that safety was always paramount and people didnt feel pressured and things were not trashed, i just dont buy that and instead of building a cleaner she designed you might have lost market share for a year or two but then you wouldve come along with a fabulous 21st century airplane that might have been better than the air bus and you wouldnt be going through when youre going through today, you know that was a critical mistake that was made back then and i believe it exerted pressure throughout the organization from the top down and its going to be very hard, very hard to restore confidence and you know, again when you have a guy who is a leader of the 7 37 program saying im hesitant of putting my family on a boeing airplane and that is very sad comment on what is happened to the culture of the company. For that representative brown. I want to clarify my comment on Computer Software you may recall that question i do want to preface first by saying i know the difference between hindsight and at the moment, and hindsight everything is clear, today we see a cast as a much more significant part of lake drool fisted but i do believe that at the moment, by your design and development and promoting, i think it was a big deal that you underappreciated, so let me just ask this question here. So you have the Flight Control system, a number of control systems are an in, Flight Control Services Like the stabilizer and controls, like cockpit, controls. You have linkages between the two, all of on the 7 37 Flight Controls services operate by a input by a crew. The mcas is i understand it is the only Computer Software that actually operates the Flight Control without crew and put it, is that true . Yes or no . So as i mentioned earlier this operates independent of the crew and moves the rudder surface and in response to wind gust and so its up to three degrees, so crews dont put any input on it, it happens automatically based on. Okay fair enough, i appreciate that clarification. Emergency procedures, you know mister muilenburg you mention this in testimony, effort a before from boeing and even when you are asking questions, the urgency procedure first of all the conditioned is and commanded stabilizer occurs continuously which means that the stabilizer goes down, which means the nose is gonna go down, you try to bake the correctional, but youre not getting any relief, right . Thats a runaway stabilizer trim, right . Yes or no. That could be how it might behave. It occurs continuously, stabilizer goes down the nose goes down, right . Right. So now if its continuous which means i do the control, either the trim button or the oak i dont get any relief and then the Quick Reaction handbooks as do the cutaway of the runaway cut off. So when you say that you dont which means if i do the trim but in or the control biden and i take my hands off it would still be going down. That sounds like you have multiple feelers going on, if you have Something Else thats causing it. I am talking. About an trim movement causing a nose down. But if i trim and nothing happens thats a runaway stabilizer trim, isnt it . It is two different failures. So if i have a runaway stabilizer trim its continuous, but with the mcas activation its not continuous. Correct it moves to a certain stop. They can stop and i do some correction like they did on a lion air and then five seconds later mcas activated again, so the concern i have is what do you say that the emergency procedure should be the same but the conditions are different, what is continuous and one is intermittent, it happens and stops when i provided input and then it kicks and again, i know you have litigation and i think maybe thats why you dont answer the question. Congressman let me try this, so the runaway stabilizer procedure, whether its caused by mcas or some other failure mode, the procedure is to trim the airplane, manage the power and then hit the cut out switch if it continues. As a pilot dont you recognize it because like it says in the queue are eight, its continuous, right, is that right . The difference youre pointing out is there some runaway stabilizer where its one continuous. In the case of mcas its still Continuous Movement but it can happen multiple times. Here is the point, there is nothing in the documentation though that says to the pilot what continuous is, the pilot is thinking continues means i tried to change it and it does not change, but if it changes and comes back thats not really continuous thats intermittent and this is where, this is where and you say youre making changes in documentation and, i really hope that youre looking at an emergency procedure, a Quick Reaction procedure that expresses this and addresses this if it continues to be intermittent. To that point thats one of the Software Changes we made, its no longer intermit, which only operate ones. Got it, thank you mister chairman, i go back. Thank you, yesterday in response to media reports you denied that there were significant changes they were not fully vetted by the faa. But the authorities found the response to the Safety Assessment was to accept the submission. It seems to me there is a difference between accepting the submission versus fully vetting the changes, so if that was the case, this gets to the heart of the certification questions, too much has been given to the authority or any other remanufacture, can you tell me square that circle, what fully vetted by faa means then fully accepting submission means, it seems like there is no way to square that serve. So you have a comment . You know i think that there has been some implications here about what the role was. The certification deliverable was obtained by the faa, who is not delegated and toe to the very and it had reviewed it and provide this and said if these comments are unincorporated then its delegated to find compliance is but they had reviewed that document for several months. Congressman can i just add just to square this off, what i was referring to is during that time period, from its exchange really 2017, the fact that we extended to the low speed operation envelope, that was discussed with the faa and many ways and we conducted many fly tests, some of them included pilots on board in the aircraft and then ultimately left to the certification of the airplane with the software, including extension to low speed operations and we are talking about two ends of the same equation there. So i appreciate it i know you will mind there that we will continue to go through the documents you provided us and go through faa documents as well to clear that up from our end of things. Congressman i do think we have identified some areas where we need to improve the documentation, in some cases recording of decisions and make sure there are communicated to all parties and thats one of the areas of improvement that we also identified and working jointly with the faa. Well related to that the paper trail side of things. On october 28th a statement from boeing said that his comments in these text message exchanges reflected a reaction to some Leader Program that was not reacting properly as opposed to that being an mcas not functioning and then making those comments that he did however if its only, it doesnt matter if he was just a simulator problem or mcas, there is no paper trail im aware of yet that tells me anything was fixed, whether it was an mcas problem or simulator problem that was supposed to be fixed, if youre using the simulators i was supposed to be fixed in order to test a max i dont feel better about that either so is there a paper trail to whom someone can report this, who is ultimately responsible for fixing the simulator in fact that being what it was and can we hope to get those documents. I also want to ask the faa faa something, but reported across the faa and let them know about the simulator. Congressman again we are not sure what you meant in that message but it appears that use working on a simulator and referencing the low speed mcas, we need to confirm, that we do know that he was working at that time at least our best understanding was that he was at that time working what we call an unqualified simulator so it was in numerous simulator that was being brought up to standard, it was not yet out of position where it fully represented the airplane itself and. Would he have known that . And why. He knew he was operating, our understanding is that he was in a Simulator Development process and it appears from his comments and he was surprised about some feature of having spent some time with simulators its not uncommon for us to have to work on the software and get it fully representative of the airplane overtime. Regarding the paper trail i dont know if we have any details on that. We will follow up, we will follow up with that, so thank you. Thank you chairman, mister muilenburg i would like to talk to you about the aoa alert it was an operable on the max, imax is where they didnt purchase the option, the optional aoa indicator and it seems as though 20 of the purchased, the aoa, disagree alert was an operable on 80 of the aircraft, does that sound right to you . Congressman i can give you the exact number but its correct that it was not implemented correctly and we made a mistake on that and we discover that our engineers discovered it and we have subsequently. Thats good for now. When did boeing learned that the aoa disagree alert was not operable on 80 of the aircraft . I cant get back to you on the exact timelines but i dont want to guess but it was. When did you personally learn about it . I just dont recall the exact timelines but i do know that there was a lag between our discovery and it being reported to the faa and again. Was there a lag between the discovery and youre finding out and then the faa finding out . Congresswoman in the communication timeline on the aoa disagree alert was too long the communications were not knowing the way we should have done them and that is one of the reasons we revised our review board structures. So i agree with you that it was too long, i also want to just know the issue of candor that congressman already brought up that it relates to the communications that they had with the regulators and its customers and the flying public, so as i understand it when boeing learned of the defect it waited, you waited three years until 2020 to actually fix the problem . So congresswoman in 2017 is when we found the discrepancy, we immediately convened a review board to understand whether it was a safety issue, we analyzed and realize its not critical for safety and flight, we notified the faa, the faa independently convene their own safety board. So you continue to manufacture the max and distribute it to the customers, did you at that time, were you providing these max aircrafts within defect to your customers without telling them that . Congresswoman yes, the air plane did not confirm that it was not working, im not sure why we didnt notify the customers. Who wouldve been the want to decide not to notified the customers . Was a youre Marketing Team . It probably wouldve been somebody on the engineering team. So i might not be a safety critical thing but this really fazes ethical issues and issues of candor that we have been talking about and i want to bring up, i think we have a couple of slides here. Okay so this is the cover of the flight crew operations delivered to lion air on august 2018, and i want to note that this was one year after the alert, that it didnt, which they didnt purchase the indicator, it was in fully functioning and that lion air didnt fully purchase. I think any the next side, the disagree alert was an operative, so this shows the august 2017 that boeing became aware that the disagree alert wasnt working and i was in until the lion a, lion air crash that they let the faa know. I guess regardless of whether or not you classify the alert as a safety feature or critical safety feature it was required on that aircraft, was not . It was part of our configurations back but there was no crew action associated when you get the message, so the crew awareness. So it was part of your what . Congresswoman who is part of the airplane base signed, it should have been implemented on the airplanes, it was not correctly implemented, we made a mistake the safety review board was brought together and they came to the conclusion that they could implement that in the 2020 timeframe in the next software cycle as you reference. How do you decide which things are baseline that you will not adhere to any which ones you are . Congresswoman we missed on this one, we made a mistake and weve owned up to that, we need to fix that. My time has expired and hopefully i will get to ask you another question because at some point we need to get to how we make sure as legislators this does not happen again, i yield back. Thank you chairman peter a. Defazio. I want to talk about the pilot trailing following the crash and the effects to the mcas system, there is an ongoing conversation about what additional Pilot Training if any would be required so i just want to make sure that i understand a couple of quick questions, following the lion air crash boeing developed a software for the crash, correct . As part as the process, does boeing need approval of the standards by the faa Flight Standards service . Not necessarily for that specific change. Well its my understanding that in december of 2018 they met with evaluation groups to discuss and plan the max, the system enhancements, correct . And part of that conversation it was that they were tasked with evaluations in the fight said it is a shin board report, what level of Pilot Training did boeing proposed to the faa . They wouldve been level b training, computer based training. Would it surprise you to learned that they recommended level a training at that time . Im not aware of that. Youre not aware that boeing recommended level a instead of level b. Now im not aware. Are you aware mister muilenburg . Now im not aware of that. Well according to a letter from boeing to the faa, boeing said for the level a training it would only be required and boeing stated in the letter that its position which i have the letter in front of me and im happy to present to you all that boeing believes that the rationale for the original recommendation was still a palatable and that boeing believes there isnt a difference to the law, doesnt affect Flight Safety and skills and ability, to still believe that statement is true . With the Software Changes being made it was going to prevent the mcas from operating. Do you still believe that level a training will still be the appropriate level. The Software Training will prevent them from seeing condition like that again. Do you understand that the faa responded to that by saying that they didnt, they cautioned boeing that level a training might not be the appropriate level and that they were willing to evaluate the proposal that boeing was proceeding at its own risk. Im not familiar with that. Mister muilenburg are you familiar with that, to proceed with only level a boeing would be proceeding at its own risk. I am not but we can certainly follow up on that and we will. Thank you, its my understanding that following that exchange that the faa said it would be okay to proceed with scheduled flight simulation tests, are aware of that part of the process, the Flight Simulator tests were scheduled. Do you know when those were earlier this year . What timeframe are you referring . To wall the simulator tests were scheduled for march 13th, are you familiar with those tests . I recall that there were some similar tests done in miami around that time, yes. What day did the Ethiopian Airlines crash take place . There was march of march 10th 2019, before the simulator test, thank you mister chairman i yield back. I want a response to a previous question i believe mr. Hamilton said that the faa was completely aware of the much enhanced mcas system but the fining of the jatr, the faa was completely not aware of mcas because the information discussions were so fragmented they were delivered to disconnected groups within the process, it was difficult to recognize the impact on the implications of this system. If the technical staff had been fully aware of the details of the mcas function the jatr team and an independent Group Believes the agency likely whatever acquired an issue paper for using the stabilizer in a way that it had not been previously used. Efficacy use the stabilizer to change the field. This was a case of using it in a new way that the regulations never accounted for and should of required an issue paper for further analysis by the faa if an issue paper had been required, the j a tiara team believes it likely would have identified the potential for the stabilizer to overpower the elevator, so there is a breakdown there and we just have to determine if its intentional, unintentional, how much of it lays on boeing and how much of it lays on the faa but in this case it seems they are buying it on boeing and with a quick clarification. Thank you mister chairman, i really appreciate, it in my response to the Flight Control systems and the role of Computer Software, you offered up two examples, one is the auto damper and the autopilot, these systems both of them as you know are engaged by switches on the flight deck by the pilot, the switches and the operations are clearly documented and flight and training manuals, the crew knows when theyre activated in fact i know that at least in the face in the auto damper there is a warning light when it fails, those systems are not in the same category as mcas that operates behind the seam, so ill just conclude by saying that at the moment during the Design Development and promotion of mcas, mcas was the only Computer Software that operated the Flight Control systems without knowledge from the pilots or pilot and putt, for me as a pilot thats a big deal and not just in hindsight but at the moment during the design and development that should have been a big deal to everybody involved, thank you mister chairman, i yield back. As the ranking member. I want a point of clarification as, well there has been instances on the a way indicators when it should been on the cockpit and theres a difference between an aoa indicator and an aoa sensors, the aoa sensors had an impact bond but in aoa indicator is not a secondary flight simulation, so ive never seen in an airplane that has an aoa indicator and it and there is been a lot of emphasis on these ai indicators in the cockpit and its a little frustrating because to be quite honest with you those are more for a maintenance reference and they are for, they are not a flight inches instrument but i appreciate this hearing gentlemen. I am told that miss davis has a brief question, missed a base. Thank you chairman, so the certification process is my primary concern here as a legislator, as a member of congress who sits on the tee and i committee, our job is to create the framework where this will be promulgated, so i think that, the first thing i want to say is this might be the first time and boeings history that were facing a situation where the cultures of the top management was controlled more by a profit then short term concerns, then bringing up safety, based on all of the things we have seen here today i am interested and figuring out how we make sure that as we come up with that framework that my need to be reevaluated, whether its the Type Certification or when we drill down into it what gets into a manual or not and how much Pilot Training is required, i have heard you say a number of times the system can be improved and im wondering if you have any specific areas that we are as legislators need to be looking at . Congresswoman i appreciate that question and law weve had some challenging questions today i think we have an objective for the safety of the aviation system, we believe there are several areas we can Work Together, summer on the regulatory front and we discussed earlier things around designing guidelines and the Industry Standards and need to be visited, there are some regulations on the books. We believe. What are the longstanding Industry Standards . What is a longstanding Industry Standard that you specifically think. I think around reaction times and Failure Modes and scenarios, so what we assumed on pilot reaction times in an mcas failure scenario, we think its time for us to revisit those from an industry standpoint, especially for digitally enhanced airplanes going forward, we think that there are opportunities for us to Work Together on talent development, the pipeline for future pilots and maintenance. Do you think any of these standards need to be looked at include things as a manufacturer you would be in charge of . The two things that you mentioned have to do with Pilot Training. The first one has to do with design criteria. I think its both, i think this regulators should be updated but then theres also our own internal guidelines and design guides that need to be updated to reflect what were learning from these two accidents. Weve also updated our design Requirements Organization internally need to do some more across the defensive military sectors and i think thats an area where the government can help, i think investing in future simulation technology, taking advantage of Virtual Reality and augmented Reality Technologies to enhance Pilot Training opportunities is another area. The science and human factors. Another example. So do you think that, what comes to types of certification, and improvements, or advancement of technology, that have been made weve spent this whole time talking about the family of 7 37s that got the original certification in 1967. What do you think we need to be doing to make sure a lot of new technology entire new systems are being integrated into the aircraft, were doing our jobs to make sure that this does not happen again because youre talking about a lot of movements that youre already making it, sounds like we need to be making sure that faa asked regulators know about these things before we run into a situation like this. I wouldnt recommend that this is one of the recommendations that faa work with industry and an each product ruled group at, thats required for that area. I believe this will be the last questions, and he i think she has not yet have had an opportunity to answer questions. Thank you very much and i know its tough for the victims and the families here i just want to say that thank you so much for being here. Ive been in and out of this hearing for almost all day today, during a previous life, when i worked in business, my job was a medical technology and, in that sector there something called the monitoring database if theres a warning were required to report those things publicly and report those things publicly and many of the questions i have asked we have had a number of hearings with the faa and others, how do we create, moving forward a more robust, post market reporting system, for issues that occur . My first the question really to mr. Muilenburg is, in hindsight, when should you have ground this plane . Congresswoman, we have asked ourselves that question many many times, if we knew back than what we know now, we would the ground it right after first accident, we could save one life we would not have done it. That is, what we would have done. Mister muilenburg i spent the last four years a in my life in business as the head of a fortune 500 company ive seen touch decisions firsthand from the inside theres a lot of conversation today about the compensation, earlier this afternoon you have indicated its up to the board of directors. I pulled up the proxy statement from 20 nay 19, and did a little back of the envelope calculation what i want to make sure is that people, who loved those who dive sitting in this room today, are short by you, that boeing executives, who now regret not acting in making those decisions, understanding the pain theyre going through, my back of the envelope calculations is on the number of underlying Stock Options and you still have, is that just in Stock Options, to performance based issues and, the restrict stocks the company has done that i want to understand that, you are not going to personally benefit and profit over the swings in the stock price over this last year because i look at morgan stanley, they expect, once these planes are grounded your stock will reach 500 dollars a share, thats a long way from there today, but you said earlier today that your, board of directors made compensation decisions back on the envelope to stop options if at 500 all, you have 30 million, based on the price of options issued i understand how this works. If you are if you are bored in february and weve met, issue a performance grants, your restricted Stock Options, oh awards you are stuck options for the 2019 time period, and when you say to this committee and this Family Members sitting here today to decline those awards . Congresswoman we do not issue Stock Options i just want to answer a question our work, we are bored will do a comprehensive review though make the decisions its not about money for me its. Thats why i said i understand you dont get stuck options, and you get the asia in 2013 and you are stowing going to get millions of dollars from those but the, board can decide to give you performance based issues the psycho this time around or they could give you a stock units, will you commit today to, decline those, if you bought chooses to give them to you . Congresswoman, i anticipate this year and your bona psycho is zero. Thats not what i focus. I do not come to this company for money. And, my board will do their work, i believe we already announced last week we expect annual bonus cycle to be a zero pay out for exactly if this year starting with me. Thank you for being here, and thank you. Mister chairman, i yield my time. Thank you to the gentle lady. And i asked to put record todays hearing remain open until such time witness will answer questions that may be submitted to them in writing, some submitted by various members and the commitment, that we get answers on that folks instant displacement of any litigation i ask questions, this gray as and others, and i also ask that for consent directly remains open for 15 days for any additional comments by members or witnesses including their record of todays hearing. No objection so ordered again, my condolences to the families, thanks the witnesses for their testimony and, this meeting is adjourned