Transcripts For CSPAN3 Discussion On U.S. Policy Toward North Korea Panel 3 20240713

Panel with a quote from the 19th century philosopher, but im going to do it here because i think it is relevant. He said that, you know, life is best understood backwards, but you need to live it forwards. And i think what were going to try to do here today is to try to understand trumps north korea policy backwards and think about some of the things that have happened in order to understand how were going to be living it forward and whats coming in the coming year. And i think thats really important because for several reasons. One, this is one of the most the Biggest International issues of our time and at stake right now in whether the approach is effective or not is not just whether we address the north Korean Nuclear threat but also a chance of reconciliation between north and south korea and the efforts to stop the threat of Nuclear Weapons are also at stake. In addition i think its a critical window into understanding how President Trump conducts Foreign Policy. This is his signature Foreign Policy issue. And i think its also important because it will help us understand what the trump era means for future american president s, what precedents have we set here that will inform how we engage with north korea going forward. Just to introduce myself, i am you are urie friedman. I want to introduce fellow panelists here. Im going to start to my left. Colonel Douglas Macgregor is a decorated combat vet man. Hes executive Vice President of burkeman llc. He was commissioned in the lets just go on here. Okay. Im going to cut it short. Im going ocut to cut it short. Its not a funeral. You can also catch him on tv a lot. I think i just caught him on Tucker Carlson the other night. Ill try to be a little more brief but cut me off if you want. Tell the truth about ruger. Dr. William ruger tell serves as Vice President for the charles coke foundation. Before that he was most recently associate professor in the department of Political Science at texas state university. Thats good. All right. And that is all. Scott snyder is senior fellow for korea studies and director on the council on foreign relations. Hes the author of many books including south korea at the cross roads. Thats good for me too. There we go. Consider everyone introduced. Just to tell you a little bit about how were going do this, well start with opening remarks. Then well have a time for question and answer and have time for all of you to ask questions as well. To start off, colonel, i would like to start with you. Im wondering, you know, as you think about trumps approach to north korea, how are you assessing it at this moment in time . Okay. Is this working . Are we using this . Can you hear me . Okay. During the introduction, i was reminded of something that happened to me just before i left the army. I received this decoration for the kosovo air campaign, not that i was very happy to be part of that but nevertheless. They gave me the Defense Service medal. Somebody in the room said what did you get that for. Somebody else said 18 to 20 years of undetected crime. I think that pretty much sums up the truth about everybody at some point. Were all concealing something, so keep all the intros short. I think the best way to think about where we are is the first meeting that President Trump had with president moon. He, of course, was the brandnew president who had obviously no foreign experience, Foreign Affairs or military experience. And suddenly hes meeting with arguably one of the most important men in the larger Security System or Alliance System for the United States in the world. And president moon comes in and he knows absolutely nothing about korean politics at this point. Hes had no real briefing other than superficial observation. So, he doesnt understand where president moon came from, why his election is a tremendous achievement and a break through. And shortly into the conversation, president moon says to President Trump, you know, we koreans would really like to have operational control of the peninsula. And President Trump says what do you mean . He said we would like to have command of our forces and all the forces on the peninsula. We call that ot con. And President Trump said ot con . He looked up and one of his special assistants went out of the room and shortly thereafter in came mcmaster and others. Oh, thats not up for discussion right now. Lets not worry about that. Thats not an issue. That is probably one of the most important issues for the Korean People today. The president of south korea, in order to be taken seriously as the head of state for a sovereign country, must be viewed by everyone as in command of his armed forces and what happens on that peninsula. Now, theres talk about eventually moves to ot con and theres been discussions for years about it. But this is something that the president wasnt aware of. Now ultimately he becomes aware of it. And in subsequent discussions in the white house, he said, well whats wrong with giving the South Koreans command of their armed forces . They should have that . He said, by the way, whats the problem . Somebody says we cannot allow anyone to command American Armed forces but americans. He said then why dont we pull them out . What . Remove forces from the Korean Peninsula . And he said why not . Theyre very prosperous. Theyre very powerful in their own right. You know, koreas economy is larger and more robust and capable and diverse than russias. And, you know, theres no particular reason why they cant defend themselves. So, these were the kinds of arguments inside the white house. President trump came to Office Understanding that he was at a strategic Inflection Point, that the International System had changed. It actually had begun changing in the 80s. There really was an end to the cold war, contrary to popular belief, and that there was reason to question wisdom of distributing u. S. Armed forces all over the world in 800 bases. And he also saw this as a way to save money, to extract savings on the defense budget. All of these things came into play. But what he never understood, and im sure my colleagues will talk about this as well. He never understood the reactionary nature of washington, d. C. And the large federal bureaucracies that are permanently invested in no change. And i think thats been his greatest failure, if you will, to figure this out too late, to the point where hes been unable to affect very much change, to be blunt. Well, my remarks will follow nicely, i think on the colonels. In fact, in many ways i agree with him. In important respect, i think trumps policy has been successful because it has avoided war and has opened up space for, you know, more jaw jobs as they say instead of war war. And despite people like john bolton throwing sand in the gears of what President Trump has tried to achieve. I think especially this week we see some of the ways in which President Trumps advisers have attempted to box the president in from making the changes the colonel talks about. His discussion has opened up the peninsula which is valuable because of how stagnant the conversation has been going particularly when it comes to u. S. Commitments and what our allies should be doing to share the burden of collective or common defense. So, in many ways, like i said, trumps been successful at avoiding what we could imagine being the worst result on the peninsula which i think as we saw in our last panel would be a devastating conflict, conventional conflict or worse, you know, which is almost unthinkable, hopefully. But unfortunately when people are talking about bloody nose strikes or the libya model, this starts to become a little bit more real, unlike i think some of the sound voices youve heard today. But that they put denuclearization as not merely an ideal state that is worth mentioning but not taken too seriously, but the goal and a measuring stick of u. S. Foreign policy around nukes in north korea. A couple of things on this. It is unrealistic, and idealistic, right . We are at the center for the National Interest, connected to president nixon, to henriquez endure and to those ideals of realism, looking at the world squarely as it is and the problem with denuclearization is that it does not take that realism seriously, you know, especially in light of how the United States and others have treated states theyre giving up Nuclear Weapons for Nuclear Weapons programs. Think about libya, or ukraine or the question of iran today. With those examples in mind, why, rationally would kim give up Nuclear Weapons, give up that program . It does not make a lot of sense rationally, and so whether we like it or not, i think that Nuclear Weapons are great equalizer. There is a nuclear revolution, as they say in security studies, and that is meaningful to the context of the current discussion around north korea. So, i think it would be better for the United States to focus on testing, issues on Missile Technology so like with the soviet union during the cold war,, and it is important context youre, and students of asia understand that when china, under morale, first came to Nuclear Capability, this was not someone that most people would have thought of as being extremely rational in the sense of doing things good, right . He was rational in the sense of being procedurally rational, but was clearly an evil character in the kind of mannequin spirit looks at foreign leaders, but china behave responsibly since the day him in a clear power and so oftentimes the kind of worst fear of people who want denuclearization, which is that you have some have used by an irrational actor, and the rationality is reduced to the domestic sister, that is not really the way to look at international politics. But if kim wants to use the benefit, of this position of power in north korea, why would you want to commit suicide engaging in a nuclear war against United States . It would be an utterly suicidal movie would only do if you had some kind of odd ecological view. That is not the case with kim and so, i think that because of what it would take to get denuclearization from him, either assumes a different world then came that we live in would be too costly to achieve relative to our interests and therefore, the kind of scene approach here would be to be much more realistic about what our desired and state can actually be. Now, focusing on arms control rather than denuclearization i think shows greater realism around north korean incentives and interests and our own. I mean, our primary interest to make sure that north korea does not use Nuclear Weapons against United States of homeland or our troops abroad and so the best way to get that is to reassure kim that we are not pushing for regime change and to make our deterrent threat Crystal Clear so both reassurance on one hand and making it absolutely obvious to kim that if he to use Nuclear Weapons or he attacked the United States and our troops abroad, but this will lead to something that will be intolerable, and that is how deterrence works and i think the cold war shows the kind of work and it can work here. And that much lower cost aggressively nuclearization so no, to conclude, i think it is important that north korea in the context of u. S. Reggie as a whole. You cannot look at a country in isolation from that larger approach the world the United States and other countries try to set. So i would argue two things here. Lets say that we continue on with our path. We continue with primacy. We will continue to face difficult resource allocation challenges. That is just a clear. We are seeing that in the sense of a desire under obama to pivot to china but the fact of the United States was bogged down in the release met the resource allocation constrained what changes could be made. So, if you are a premise or it would be good to take some unlike the north korea issue off the table get it into a stable footing so that the u. S. Can continue to use resources in the middle east and europe and elsewhere, so, you should still walk this, and that means more diplomacy and more kicking the can down the road or north korea. Of, course i think that this grand strategy of primacy is a recipe for trouble and for hegemonic decline but again, even if he were to stick to the approach, there are better ways to diplomacy so if you are a promises, you want north korea to settle down in that means more diplomacy and less talk of bloody no strikes in things like that. Now, if you are for real is a magistrate like i do what many people in this room do, the u. S. Would be wise to settle issues with north korea so that we can focus on more important priorities while meeting our security needs visavis the Nuclear Threat and that largely could be through deterrence and that also means the United States will be able to help solve in some way some of the more challenging issues with north korea, that we can move offshore and our troops will be less critical relative to south Korean Forces on the peninsula and maybe even move towards some normalization of the south korea and north korea situation but again lies most realist i think that is largely a job for south korea and north korea and we can be helpful in our diplomacy but i do think it is important that we shift gears from where we are, but either way, again, i think that deterrence and defense needs compellings in offense. Im a supporter of deterrence and defense versus compel its and offense but i also believe that denuclearization remains an important objective, for u. S. Foreign policy visavis north korea and i think at the same time the Trump Administrations engagement with north korea has had some positive effect and so in a way i feel like when harry asked me to join this panel, i was checking my calendar i thought it would be january 6th 2021 rather than 2020 because here we are assessing the Trump Administrations approach to north korea and there is still a year left but my standards for assessing whether the Trump Administration has been effective is, as the administration been able to produce the north korean threat or capabilities that threat not only u. S. Allies but also the United States . And in fact, the threat to the United States has been a distinctive element of progress that we have seen during the Trump Administration. I am sympathetic to secretary pompeo when he is asked questions about north korea these days, he says, well, we are not doing what we have done in the past. This field approach to the, past we are not doing but i believe we are on the verge of the Trump Administrations approach also being in that dump a heap of failed policies because in fact, we so far are not achieving denuclearization. We are also not achieving peace and there is a risk that north korea is morphing into a potentially even more dangerous strategic threat that could actually hold hostage the entire region and so for that reason i believe that although trump brought needed rhetorical innovations and cemetery, we really have not seen the results that we can call effective, and some of the prior discussion gets into issues of u. S. Foreign policy beyond whether or not we are effective with north korea, we can talk about those. The Trump Administration is put those on the agenda in very unique ways but what i want to do is just to go back and take a look at war turning points into u. S. Policy towards north korea under trump and evaluate the parts lives and the negatives and actually, there is one a year so, 2017, fire and fury, i think that trumps speech at the un threatening to annihilate north korea was quite striking not only for its rhetoric but also for the fact that it drew for the first time a personal response from kim jongun. Trump got kims attention. And arguably he did in a way that plausibly raised questions for him about whether his Nuclear Project was going to generate the desired results. He even said as much in his public response to trump and so i think you can argue that that set a framework for a dialog approach, for diplomacy. The singapore summit tree is a second, i think, turning point but i think this one has had mixed effect. On the one hand, the Trump Administration in 2017 in early 2018 was leading a relatively Effective International coalition that was imposing maximum pressure, and most notably as we discussed earlier today, china was imposing very severe restrictions on north korean exports but the minute the trump announced he was going to be with kim, because the chinese view north korea through a geostrategic lens, the maximum pressure strategy was out the window. In other words, i think the price of summit diplomacy and that being the sacrifice of the maximum pressure and really for the u. S. Approach to be effective we need both element in order to be able to move the ball forward in order to create an environment where north korea really felt like it a choice between north korea between survival and Nuclear Weapons. The other thing about the singapore summit that i think is notable and really underscores the underlying challenge and failure of u. S. Policy towards north korea and the failure of diplomatic dialog is what it became very clear that the North Koreans believe they were meeting trump from a position of strength, the Trump Administration believed that kim asked for a meeting with trump because theyre in a position of weakness and i think that fundamental mismatch of assumptions played out in ways it still have not been resolved. I think both sides have contradictory assumptions as related to diplomatic engagement. The first turning point was really about the hanoi summit and i think what the hanoi summit did was it hard on north koreas choices. I think that it actually probably introduced a very intense internal debate inside north korea about what to do and it also i think showed differences within the administration about how to deal with north korea in hanoi, which they never took advantage of that debate because the u. S. Policy makers, about how to deal with north korea, they did not put enough on the table, and it turns out there was not a missed opportunity for the Trump Administration as it approached north korea, because the North Koreans never created an opportunity that the Trump Administration could miss and the other attractive hanoi was that in the end, it hard and north koreas position and that is what we saw last april in kim jongun speech, essentially demanding a concession imposing a dialog and i think that is still where there are and what that has meant is that despite our collective desire to see diplomacy work with north korea, the North Koreans have not been available for conversation, and so we can talk about what might or might not be put on the table. We can call for flexibility and i personally believe that the special representative probably provided a lot of ideas when he met with the North Koreans, last time they met in stockholm, but the North Koreans have not responded to that and it takes to in diplomacy to tango. And my fourth moment, well, it will happen this year and so i cannot say too much about it. All i know is that the North Koreans have said they have a new strategic weapon and the Trump Administration is presumably going to have to respond to that and i think the question is going to be, will it signal acquiescence to north korea as a Nuclear State, which i would argue actually, it has geostrategic significance because the north korean strategy is to play off the u. S. And china against each other as a Nuclear Capable power. In the past, north korea was not a strategic actor because they strategic actor because they did not have strategic way to try to play off the u. S. And china, and goodness knows there is plenty to play off against, but without the fact, and i think, a Nuclear North Korea intentionally trying to generate division between the u. S. And china will be bad for all parties concerned. And so, we will have to see how it plays out but i would say my bottom line is that i like some of the innovations in approach. I like the fact that we had established a top level line of communication between the u. S. And north korea, but if im going to grade the success of the policy, i do not see material, i see the North Koreans poised to use what they have accomplished over the past two or three years, in, ways there will be even more potentially dangerous to us in the future. We will dive into all of those issues in a moment but i want to start with something that we are all seeing in the headlines today with the situation with iran and doug, i am curious about what you think about what is happening in, iran how it could affect the way President Trump approaches north korea and do you think it could have any effect on its north korean policy and the focus on that issue in the coming weeks and months . Well, those of you have spent any time in washington know this is one crisis, one conflict focused town which means that as long as we are preoccupied with iran, little or no attention will be focused on northeast asia. That much is pretty clear, so i would not expect to see much movement, that is the short answer. Yes, and scott, there is a lot that separates these two issues. But i am curious, you, how do you think kim john own and pyongyang and arthritis might be viewing what is happening in the reason i ask is because, ive heard different things. Ive heard there were fire and fury threats from President Trump and now kim knows that he doesnt take this seriously and maybe this established more deterrence because it told him that actually should take trumps threat seriously and maybe that will deter further provocations, others argued that if kim needed any more convincing and you needed Nuclear Weapons to avoid the fate of befell iran, here is a case study number one in why you need Nuclear Weapons so how do you think these events are being interpreted . From a north korean perspective, and probably the most disturbing aspect is that trump moved the bar, by taking actions that resulted in the death of a military leader of a state actor and if i were in north korea up to now, i would feel that there was a line that the u. S. Had observed between non state actors and state actors. Now that would give me a little bit of pause, but, at the same time, the prospect of actually moving toward voluntary denuclearization, or really the opportunity, potentially to, take advantage of a u. S. Focus on iran by trying to lock in potential further achievements in terms of building the new strategic weapon, i think it is an opportunity the North Koreans will try to take advantage of. What might that look like . Without before the testing or doesnt necessarily have to be that . The really interesting question is, the line is blurred. So, that could actually generate some deterrent effect for the North Koreans but, if it becomes clear that the u. S. Is committed to focusing on iran, then i think that the temptation to try to take an additional step probably primarily dictated by isil been launches solid fuel capabilities is, that is the next step that is dictated by the strategic capabilities and objectives the North Koreans have been focused on. Two questions for you on the iran situation. I am curious, one, what does it say about the tactic of maximum pressure which was applied to iran before it is a model in north korea in terms of the way in which the Trump Administration will achieve its objectives and then secondly you mentioned the larger grant strategic picture and thinking about north korea. How do you think about what this means for a grand strategy in asia, given what we are seeing with iran and weather, as doug mentioned, whether the focus can be taken off north korea and americans brought a strategy in asia. I will take a second. First i mean, for those who think that we need to be going into an era, or are going into an era of great power competition, which we ought to be, competing then, clearly taking deeper steps into another middle eastern endless war, quagmire or conflict, whatever you want to say is going to affect the ability to really shift that approach and so it may make north korea lasting confident if we are engaged nobody conflict in the middle east again, or more bloody conflict, i would say on maximum pressure, remember what is the goal of maximum pressure campaign, right . It is regime change, and people who have supported this, whether it is people in the administration or some of the think tanks here in washington have said, well it is regime change but it is peaceful, and we are getting, these sanctions are backed up by coercion but the fact is if the goal is regime change and we talk about this and that is the goal of american Foreign Policy as opposed to peace or stability, well, why would you want to get rid of your Nuclear Weapons . Because youre going to see that resolve either way, . Right one is either, youre going to have regime change and that was just to the North Koreans, well, we have a game changer. Remember what the indian diplomat said in response to the first gulf war which was, their take on the United States unless you have Nuclear Weapons . And lets say that maximum pressure fails when it comes to iran, does not necessarily mean that kim is going to want to give into something he things might not be effective in the first place so i think we are really created a problem here and again i think our middle east policies in general have been quite problematic i have been harmful to american interests, but especially in terms of what they have said other regions of the, world going back to libya model, you can watch what happened in the dream pipe to cut off the and not think that other authoritarian leaders, dictators, did not see that take note. And, scott you mentioned, in terms of the four kind of pivot points of trumps north korea policy, the fourth one this coming year is a bit of an unknown but we got a taste of it over new years when kim made certain statements that i think were immediately interpreted with a coherent narrative, im curious if you think the general analysis of his comments was accurate but i was struck by the fact that kim seemed to not rule out dialog with the United States but then seems to suggest at points that he was not particularly interested in denuclearization talks and im curious if you think it is fair to read kim jonguns statement over new years as a kind of death knell for denuclearization diplomacy for a period in which we for the last 25 years have been focused on the goal of denuclearization, do you read kims comments as ruling that out going forward, and in any case how what do you think his comments portend for the coming year . Yes, the North Koreans are in a retrenchment phase. They have fallen back on, i, think there are old statements which basically say peace and normalization first, denuclearization maybe later. And in some ways you can get that in direct opposition to denuclearization first, sanctions lifting later approach on the u. S. Side and knew no way, i think the more interesting question from todays discussion, earlier panels, and this panel is the question of, is the u. S. Really committed to denuclearization and what does that mean . My argument would be that there are three reasons why the u. S. Has to keep denuclearization at least as a rhetorical goal while taking a more pragmatic approach in terms of trying to engage in arms control like discussions if the North Koreans will show up and the first is about the nuclear non promotion nonproliferation treaty. At least currently they remain in the penalty box. If we say we didnt hear about denuclearization, there is no penalty box. Second, the risk of blackmail against non Nuclear South korea, and really in some ways that is the strategic move for north korea. It flips the board, but they would like to see and the third is north korea is a state which has the greatest concentration of power, single individual, on the face of the earth, and we really want to have the worlds most powerful weapons in the hands of a regime that is even more concentrated in power than pakistan . Do you think we got an answer to the question of whether, over new, years through think got a answer to the question of whether kim is trying to pressure President Trump to do a deal that is favorable to north korea ahead of the 2020 election, or whether alternatively he is basically saying im giving up on you know, doing a deal with the United States at least until have some clarity on who will be the president 2020 . Yes, the North Koreans are checking and if trump is vulnerable enough, theyre gonna be happy to engage the otherwise the focus is on preparing for the next president , the next, spring of 2021. I think one of the things we have to remember is that a good diplomatic deal is not where you get everything on the other side gets nothing. I mean, a reasonable deal in which we get some of what we need a north korean can find some of what helps them with their interest in which they dont have to give up too much would be much preferable to a crisis or back talking again about a much more hostile approach, militarized approach. So i do not think we should be upset if we have to give a little at the table. That is to me just how diplomacy works and that is kind of a broader problem i actually have with how washington tends to view relations with another country. I mean, it is black and white. It is the good guys in the bad guys which is not to say that we should not have moral clarity about these regimes. I, mean north korean regime is a terrible regime run by a terrible man but the fact is that we can engage with these people in a constructive fashion to meet join interests because of the fact that kim does not want to be deposed. Kim does not want north korea decimated in a Nuclear Strike and we do not want south korea or the United States hit in a similar fashion so there are ways in which we can reduce tensions with some of our neighbors if maybe not all of them and i kind of go back to the rolling stones, thing you might not get what you want but you might get what you need, and i think that is a valuable approach to thinking about encouragement abroad. I would agree with that, and i think that the special representative also indicated agreed with that when he made a direct Public Appeal to the North Koreans last month to come to the table and to talk. We have to have a partner. I think we should raise the question of why we are driving any of the process anymore. I think there are three powers in the region that really are involved in this and they are the ones who must try, this first and foremost, south korea, so, along with beijing in tokyo, they live there and we do not. We will inevitably leaves south korea. We are not permanent. There and we need to come to terms with that reality. I think what President Trump wanted to do was to get what he thought would be the best deal possible for south korea by offering the u. S. Militarys withdrawal. That was killed very early in the pentagon and in the state department. People said, well germany was reunified but that changed nothing for us. We stayed. That is what has to happen on the peninsula and i would argue that that is false, fundamentally false and mix in the agreement impossible. So the other thing is that we need to understand something that i think the koreans understand very well. North korea and its population, this state will not survive contact with south korea. Once the contact between the koreans in the north and the koreans in the south becomes more frequent and more penetrating, north korea has had it. It is just too much of a magnet, south korea, it is too appealing, it is too attractive and i think mr. Kim knows that and i think the one of the reasons that he keeps going back to beijing is he is looking for reassurance is that when this in fact happens, where will he end up . So i think we need to step back and look at the region understand that from the very beginning, president she also stated very unequivocally unequivocally, if you, mr. Kim launch any action against any neighbor you are on your own. That includes the United States. We will not help you. If however you are attacked by the United States or any neighbor, we are obligated to help you and that message was also delivered to President Trump so that at this point i think president moon should take over and leave this process, not us. And we should support what he wants to do, including the measured withdrawal of our forces against some program, some schedule for denuclearization or whatever it is that president moon comes up with. And finally, we talk about regional war all the time, and this is a hair trigger and you get a regional war. Anybody here been recently to northeast asia . I see no evidence that anyone in northeast asia once a war anywhere. I did not have a regional war, you need to have someone who wants a regional war. Ive seen a regional war. The last expression, is we have an all expression, intelligence is always wrong, and based upon my 28 years of experience, intelligence was always wrong, ive never signed on for this cataclysmic picture for this dramatic power in totalitarian career. I dont see it at all. I really think north korea is circling the drain in every serious way. Nobody here seems to be aware of another family north korea. I dont think people are aware of the level of organized crime now and the problems on the border with china as a result of, this because things inside north korea are not good. They are bad, very bad. And there is also a failure to understand that some of this ostensibly new Technology Comes from russia, but russia is not going to do anything on that peninsula with north korea if beijing says no. Beijing is in charge in that says, so, in the final analysis, i am wondering why we think we have to take the lead at this point, why President Trump simply says, look, we want to support the people of korea and we need to Start Talking about the korean nation, stop talking about south and north. Talk about the korean nation. We want to support the korean nation. We will follow president moons lead and do as president moon wishes and stop trying to drive and shape this process, i hope. And just to delve a little deeper on that, doug, what is your understanding of how long President Trump had an idea of a linking the u. S. Troop presence and potential withdrawal to denuclearization talks . Because a lot of times in washington, you go and talk about u. S. To present its and it is a taboo subject. They say that a separate from the denuclearization talks. It is not often together, so what is your understanding of how it did not make any progress and secondly, do you have thoughts on how this would actually work, how you might look at change the u. S. Presence there in the region to denuclearization . Briefly, some of you will remember when President Trump is recently in japan, he spoke in the context, in the course of his remarks he said, i do not know what we have troops in japan. The japanese are very wealthy, this is an extraordinarily successful country. Why are we maintaining force here to defend them . Japanese can do that. Well, it was a nine alarm fire back here in washington. Withdraw troops from japan you know, i have been down this road because i worked with the warplanes commission and i remember discussing this many years ago. Okinawa is smaller than allowed in, county virginia. When you look at okinawa, there are only so many places you can put forces. All of those forces today would be eliminated in about an hour or less by conventional missiles with conventional warheads, precision guided fire from the chinese mainland. Who are we kidding . It is crazy. It is silly. Now, north korea has fallen apart. There is no question about it. Militarily, it is a shadow of its former self, 30, 5 40 years ago. Much like the forces that we saw in Eastern Europe when the wall fell. Those things were in ruin, the whole thing. South korea is brilliantly equipped. It really is, and North Koreans know, it there is no mystery about this, so i think trump understood from the very beginning that disengagement from overseas commitments with Foreign Military power was an essential feature of adapting to change in the world, so i think he always had that on his mind and still does. Now, how do you do that . That is something that you sit down with your korean ally insole and you say all right, look, lets come up with a schedule. You sit down with the North Koreans, lets look at what theyve got, how long is going to take to do this, it may be three, years for, years five years, what difference does that make to us as long as it happens . I let the koreans reach this and have a way to verify it and it could be verified by a third party. I do not care if it is, iaea, or anybody else, the bottom line is lets offer it up and let it work itself out. Weve got to get out of this 19th century colonial mindset. We are not the british empire. We do not want to be the british empire. We need to remember, when did the british leave india . When they were broke. They were financially ruined. We do not want to wait until we are in financial ruins and then have to leave, under circumstances they are not at all attractive. One thing that is striking about that is when i think about President Trump i think he did, scott, as you mentioned, hes shifted the paradigm in Nuclear Talks with his own personal involvement, president ial involvement but i think one of the areas where you could argue that he tripped of his policy is that he did not necessarily change the paradigm of the substance of the negotiations themselves, that is when will you couldve done it, won, by having other countries secluded, to, by putting these military presence questions on the table instead of saying we cannot discuss them, that is the subject that should not be named. One other thing, well, that you mentioned is, this question of arms control, rather than glowing going to global zero, rather, nuclear zero in north korea. I am curious, what could that have looked like . Lets play alternate history here for a second. If you had, if we, had of trump announces it is going to meet with kim jongun and he hobbles with his advisers they say, you know what . Listen. Trump could even say this publicly, my predecessors were fools. They all did not know what they were doing. They left me something really bad, and now i have no choice but to try to reduce the threat to the u. S. What could that have actually look like in terms of how trump would have approach north korean policy differently than he did . I mean, the problem again is that there is a lot that you have to deal with so, can you credibly make commitments that you would need to for the other side to be willing to move . Like i said earlier, one would be confidence Building Measures around certain activities that the United States will do acts if north korea does why, so, one thing would be on testing, if the North Koreans can commit to a moratorium on testing that would be good. The same thing with the missile. One of the things that we sometimes forget in this is that, and i think this kind of place off what doug just said is that its different states have different interests here. I mean, the United States his chief interests is to make sure that there is not that north korea does not put a new earth put a Nuclear Weapon on top of a missile to construct the United States here at home or, lets say, one of our territories. So, bargaining on those, issues which do not go to the heart of denuclearization but really help meet those interest that we have, are the things that you can imagine north korea giving on because we are not striking at something that they may consider existential, and it kind of goes back to something you were saying. I, mean you are talking about using nukes or survival, the problem is that these are bound together right now, at least, for kim and so it is not a choice there. They are actually intimately connected so if we can focus on where we can kind of disconnect benefits from existential needs, then, you can actually see something work. I mean, one way to do it wouldnt be to think about the history of the u. S. Soviet arms control regime as well as how we thought about the acquisition of the chinese model and to maybe think more historically and that is been one of the problems of our kind of and keep the russian denuclearization reproach is that we are not thinking i think its outside of the box or actually just inside of the cold war box in ways we can make this happen but instead we have viewed this as this is simply intolerable and we will not accept it, again, as we said, there are elements of trying to get there but think about improving north korean command and control to prevent against accidental launches from Something Like that, that is going to help make america safe much more than talking about bloody nose strikes. I would agree with that, but i would pull out one strand on this issue of the fact that weve got a dual problem, conventional and nuclear and i think there is room for the u. S. To be much more active on proposing conventional conference confidence Building Measures and tension reduction talks and in fact, we just, i do not want to say we missed an opportunity by the north korean senate, they sent a very interesting signal in november when they responded positively to secretary ex secretary espy is cancellation of an air exercise in south korea and that could have been an opportunity because the singapore agreement does not really talk about that conventional arms reduction case. That could have been an opportunity to put forward a proposal for conventional arms reductions, and that is something actually we could do ourselves, but it will be better if we did it together with the South Koreans. They already made a little progress on that with the North Koreans last year. You know, the conventional arms reduction piece may be necessary because of the level of mutual distrust that makes it so hard to get at the nuclear piece that i see it as a way of getting to eventually the very tough issue that has to be dealt with of the Nuclear Understanding related to the Nuclear Capacity of north korean satellite. Im going to go to audience questions now so please just raise your hand and i will call on you. Yes. And please just state your name and affiliation, and please. I thank you for the stimulating discussion. My question is those, the Trump Administration who are dealing with increasing host nation support, does that fit into a coherent policy on north korea . Or is it in line with trumps concerns allies are taking us to the cleaners over the years. How does that fit . In that put back to the table, in, fact the president use of private troops . How does that all fit in . Anyone want to . I think that President Trump, as i noted earlier has always been privately in favor of withdrawals, so, to some extent i am sure ratcheting up the price probably made sense to him but he frequently fails to understand this is not a game of the price is right. This is not the private sector. This International Diplomacy and if your purpose and being there is to simply solve the armed forces as mercenaries to the highest bidder, that is probably at stake because that suggests all sorts of bad things. The other thing is, we know from experience in asia, people in asia are far more polite than we are and the koreans, the japanese in particular, the two of them are very reluctant to say to us, thank you very much for all that youve done but you know its really time that you left. They are not going to do that. That is not their nature and if you have watched the press, the have seen in korea there has been a lot of public sentiment directed against u. S. Forces in korea. One of the things that always struck me is incomprehensible was our occupation of the Imperial Japanese at armies headquarters in seoul and using it. Who the hell thought that up. What it is asked or. It is right up there with lets, all the generals, all the great men who think of themselves as a great man moving into saddam husseins palace. My god, why would you do that . What does the arab think you are about . Hes going to conclude that you are no different from the french and the British Imperialist that he has dealt with in the past, so, it is not the best answer in the world but i think the trump sometimes wants one thing and does another because there is no one to advise him differently, and the advice that he does get usually is, whatever you do, change nothing. Okay, yes, sorry, the microphones will come around. Daniel davis from defense priorities. You guys with different versions of a couple of things, this idea of machiavellian black and white one way or another, win or lose kind of negotiations, so i guess it is kind of a win win a possibility, you are also talking about how trump would like to go and some of the directions you have been mentioning there but hes always pushed back on some of these others like what happened when you try to go to syria three times, and i was got pushed back. How can we, either he himself or the Community Get to the point of where we overcome the inertia and almost the fear of, well, north korea cannot come up with anything good, it just has to be what we tell them, or trump push back against all those forces . I mean, i guess in some ways, the problem is, you know, washington maybe it was not ready for trump in the sense that there was not an established counter elite to the prime assist Foreign Policy that could support the president actively and on all levels of government and in the fight in the media and in the think tank world, really, where kind of these social discourse is around how the United States ought to engage the world are formed and so, thats too, bad right . There was not the connection between a ready, willing, active, sustained, mobilized counter a league that could then, that trump could lean on, that counter relief would help. That assumes that President Trump has the instincts of realism, and some people would challenge that, particularly this week, but assuming that he did, we just did not have that confluence and i think in order for it if an approach to the world to win the day, so that he could make the kind of moves that were talked, about is that you either have to have a president who is willing to buck the establishment completely and to Pay Attention to it and make sure it happens and fire people who are not living up to that, and replacing them with people who will that can fulfill his, i, mean they are political appointments. They ought to approach things the way the president wants them to, of course, they can give good advice but they ought to fulfill that, but if we had a president who want to do these things i wanted to seek it out, the maybe that could work, but the other thing is you kind of have to have a new counter a league at the least it either challenges or ten supplant the older elite, if youre really going to get long term change it is not dependent a president who doesnt, plus the establishment pays attention but the establishment, pays attention and will have a singleminded but it and even that you wanted all kinds of challenges so that is kind of, i think, the problem here and so, while i am a kind of long term optimist about american drench strategy but a short term pessimist because of some of those barriers. I think one of those berries as well as an issue in congress, i think questions about, there have been efforts to create, an effort now to an astronaut to reduce troops below certain level in south korea, it is also hard to imagine our control solutions, on arms control deal getting through congress at the moment, do you feel like there is vision constituency in congress . Yes, i mean, you have to change the incentives by which, that these people face and that is difficult Foreign Policy because it is not a popular issue that voters are not really going to Pay Attention to but there are some ways to try to do that. I think we have seen some interesting things happen out of congress and not just things that are partisan which you would expect, we think about an interesting bipartisan restrained oriented attempt by congress. You also saw this over yemen, the debate on yemen, so, you are seeing more of a kind of cohort of republican and democratic congressman and women who are open to new ideas about americas role, and you also saw with the mcconnell amendment that is not a dominant coalition. Yes. That is again, this is going to be a long term project of the United States responding to kind of structural incentives, the challenges we face, like our, deficits in some, ways the structural things are going to pinch on primacy one way or another and hopefully also you can see the kind of change social discourse, is set of, ideas capture people and create social entrepreneurs inside and outside of government that can then push us towards these new ideas, so that you dont just have this kind of automatic, you know, we have to lead, we have to be forward, we have to smother pure competitors, all of those things we talked about. I think north korea is the wrong test case for changing americans role in the world because what the Trump Administration did was to actually try and test whether kim jongun was going to change, whether he was going to abandon his isolation and join in the world, engaging in reciprocity and integration with the rest of the world and he did not get much traction on that and so, you know, maybe if that position for american Foreign Policy is one that should go forward, north korea is just the wrong test case for it and it should be applied to some other case where you have a different kind of regime that has not been so isolated and continues to show unwillingness to engage not only with the u. S. But with the International Community in constructive ways. After all, the north korean strategy is not just to hold the u. S. Hostages to hold everybody in the region hostage as well with the Nuclear Capability in order to, as an asymmetric strategy, which is a result of their own weakness and the unusual political system that requires isolation and an enemy in order to perpetuate itself. Okay, another question . Yes. Job, moscow formally with the defense department. I would like to pick up on scotts notion of Inflection Points. I think one thing was not mentioned there not to be for first. Weve got to keep in mind what the three elements of maximum pressure. One was economic sanctions. The other was the credible use of force. And the third was the questioning of kims fitness to continue to roll north korea. Regime change in other words. Scott correctly mentioned that the United Nations speech where trump talked about the use of force in very vivid terms. But the other element that he talked about which i think really got kims attention was the notion of regime change. He described the horrors of that regime. He did it not only at the un, he did it in the state of the union message, with the guy up there waving his crutches and weeping, and he did it at the National Assembly of south korea. So the message kim got was this guy is serious about attacking our very legitimacy. That i think was the atmosphere that signed up to the singapore stomach summit. The missing Inflection Point i think, scott, is chinas role. Just before the singapore summit, suddenly china, xi jinping, who hadnt bothered to talk with kim in five years, certainly invited him to beijing for a con fabric. And after that conference, the attitude of the North Koreans toward working with the u. S. Seemed to change dramatically. The rhetoric went back to the old cold war kind of accusations. So i think china we cant dismissed the role of china. Thats one thing i agree with don. I disagree on several other points, but when you said china is a key player in this region, they certainly are the key with north korea. They have feasted for the last 20 or 30 years on having north koreas serve as a major distraction to the west. And china was always supposedly the responsible stakeholder, the good faith negotiating partner that can keep things under control. Meanwhile, tradings out reported role for leverage over the west on taiwan, human rights, trade, south china sea. We always backed off and said we cant get tough with china because we need them on north korea. So i think china is the key player in all of this and ought we ought to identify it as such. Yes. I think you made some very good point. But on my interpretation of pitching a somewhat different. I think that president she told mr. Kim to get down there and to sign the document, to go along with what was going to be presented as a first step. So i dont see them as obstructing at all. I think this whole business revolves around our military presence in northeast asia for the chinese. They would like us to remove that military power. And im someone who would like to demilitarized our relationship with asia. And that includes china. So i think if you talk to the koreans, you know koreans, i have spent some time there, if the chinese showed any evidence of being interested in intervening on the Korean Peninsula, all of the Korean Forces, south and north, would combine it and fight them to drive them out. The koreans dont like the chinese in that sense and they dont trust them. I think president xi would very much like to see north korea gradually go away. I think hes quite willing to let mr. Moon president moon managed that state to extinction. My argument is that i agree with him. I would like to see president moon manage north korea to extension. And im quite confident that can be done. And i go back to some things that were said by my colleagues here. Weve got to get out of this mentality that everything is shaken bake and instantaneous. We have to understand that things take years. Everyone in asia take their time. The biggest problem we have with mr. Cohen bill when he went to visit north korea was he said i want to get down to business and this is why dont want to talk about. And he offended everyone because everyone expected to spend hours, even gays, first show socializing. Talking to each other. We are americans dont understand these things very well. And we have to let this process unfold. I do not subscribe to the notion and i think it was scott that mentioned this that mr. Kim is necessarily through suicidal, anymore than the iranians are. They have all got a finger on some pretty precision guided missile with a Nuclear Warhead account went to launch it. On the contrary i think they dont want anything to do with it. So i think weve got to back away from that again i go back to what does mister president moon thick. What does president moon want . Its his country, not ours. And as soon as we reach that point and stop tweeting korea as part of the territory of the greater American Global and by, the better off we will be. And the more rapidly things will improve. And the chinese will welcome that as well. They dont want American Military power on the peninsula. Remember, if you are chinese you, look at the Korean Peninsula, what do you see . You see the potential for innovation. And no one wants that. No you and i know that we are not going to mount an inflation. Thats not going to happen. Thats one of the reasons eisenhower and did the korean war when he did. Mark clark was in command and he had a plan for 800,000 troops and the eighth army to invade manchurian. 57 of the American Population when eisenhower became present didnt think the korean war was worth the effort. So ivan did our cut the best deal he couldnt get out. We also have to understand the limitations of American Public support. We have been admiring ignoring those four years. There is no support for war on the Korean Peninsula anymore than just as there is no support for a war with iran in this country. So lets sober up and understand our own limitations, and start listening to the people that live there, specifically president moon. My worry though is that you have a lot of what we might call value fanatics in the United States, who just cant tolerate the idea that illiberal regimes that we could kind of essentially sanction them not sanction like in the negative sense but give support to them merely by allowing them and recognizing their list existence. And so i think that you just have so many people that want to overturn and change other places. Its a kind of a religious in the nonreligious sense fanaticism that some scholars have talked about us flowing from the kind of liberal impulse, right . So if you look at john near shammers newark on liberalism, that its in some ways potentially court to our liberal being, and again im a liberal in the oldfashioned sense, so i think its not always the case that you actually have to have theirs but we have to recognize that whether its iraq or no iran, and the regime change arguments about north korea, the idea that anyplace anywhere would not look like the United States to some people is just intolerable. And im a realist. I would love people to change peacefully into something that is akin to my values as a liberal. But im also equally william to say hey look, our goal is to make sure that americans are safe in the world that is not perfect. Fall in whatever you want to see and we have to live with places that are not just like us. And i think that again, its manicure news some, liberal fanaticism, thats always going to be a barrier to us realizing i, think, what we need to do. I just want to know a couple of i guess Public Opinion some Public Opinion data in south korea. Public support for the alliance is about 70, 80 . In the u. S. Doc is right, there is not support for a u. S. Military action against on the Korean Peninsula, but there is very strong support for the alliance relationship. And i think that is because americans understand the importance of deterrence and the role that a foreign presence can play in terms of helping to tempt down the risk of conflict, especially in a place like the Korean Peninsula. And so, im not quite so sure that the American Public there may be a desire to reduce the level of britain that the u. S. Is undertaking globally, but i think as we do it it should be done in a prudent manner. And on a case by case basis that actually examines what we are doing rather than taking precipitous action and. So you know, that is one reason why and i also come down critical of the big money demand to south korea and japan for troops that turns into potentially mercenaries and why there is value in trump reaching out to the North Koreans in order to try to talk. But we just have to have a partner and also we have to have a company diplomacy with potential adjustments that come as the result of the foot of that diplomacy if we can achieve it. Scott, just to stay with you a moment. One thing we havent discussed so much as the upcoming 2020 election and you mentioned Public Opinion. How u. S. Policy could change, depending on who is elected. Im just curious if you when you think about how are north korean policy could look in a second trump term versus our north korean policy could look under a democratic administration, do you see major differences there . Do you feel that even if Public Opinion is people are not going to be voting necessarily on u. S. North korea policy whether a change of administration would have a big impact on where we go after 2020 . It could have a big impact but i think its way premature to be able to say how, given that there are a lot of differences among Democratic Candidates on policy toward north korea and nobody would take the risk of predicting what trump might do in a second term on a specific issue like north korea. Okay. Do you feel though that and this is for anyone do you feel like trump has created a precedent . When you can think about what he has done is especially breaking a taboo of women american president meeting with the north korean leader, is that he has created space for democratic or Republican Administration in the future to be able to do this. And to just have a very different approach to north korea. And he has been the one to plow through and breakdown all the ways of doing things and created a space for if we want to do things differently and if we want to discuss. Thats one option. Another option is especially hawks on north korea saying look trump was the most unconventional president we have ever had, the most taboo breaker we have ever had, and it didnt work with him. Engagement with caused north korea at the highest levels theres never going to work. This was our opportunity and we need to for 60 approach he has taken. Im curious if you have any thoughts on the President Trump has said and whether it will be durable beyond his own administration . You know, there are a couple of things we need to keep in mind. Alliance structures. Only last as long as he interests that support them endure. When those interests no longer endure, when they change, they vanish, the alliance changes and vanishes. A great example, in 1905 the british signed an alliance signed up for an alliance with japan. Principally because the british were in trouble financially, they could no longer manage all of their colonial or sections, maintain their position in asia. They anticipated that there could be a war with russia. They knew that the japanese had some experience with this, and so an agreement was reached that if there were a war, that japan would essentially defend british interests and professions in asia against the russians, and at the same time sent 100,000 japanese troops to india to defend the carpet pass from russian invasion. Today we find all of this fanciful but it was quite real. Thats the way people thought. That alliance was allowed to lapse in 1923 and the rest is history. Why did it laps . Because it was no longer the perception that such a war was likely. So the people sitting in london, even though the japanese were willing to maintain it, decided we dont really needed anymore thank you very much. And at the time, the british certainly did not fear japan. And they did not think of japan over 90. We have Alliance Structures that are legacies of the cold war that persist into the president. I think most of them will fairness over time. Its one of the things that henry james said sacred cows are never slain, they think cleveland they simply vanish. The sacred cow of nato and other sacred cows were differential even wish. Theyll be gone. The belief will be empty and things will change. I think we are seeing that in europe right now. Were going to see it around the world. Thats why again i go back to the idea that who are the key states in the region, what do they want . And lets accommodate those desires. And i think president moon is the best barometer for that from the standpoint of our interests. And i guarantee you that in our absence militarily, cooperation between many people in asia that has not happened for sometime will suddenly begin to happen more frequently. Since most of the rationale for not doing what i advocate is china. Yes, i mean, im going to be with scott here. Im predicting a second term for trump. Im gonna stay away from that. I dont want to be the 1 millionth person wrong about that. But i would say that if Vice President biden becomes president , then i think well have a lot of back to the future and thats not necessarily a good thing. But i do think that trump has broken enough to china punt not intended that what you see is some of the younger candidates in the Democratic Party and so not just bernie sanders, who has held the streets for a long time are open to a lot of new ways of thinking. The big question is whether theyll become more conventional as they become more established if, you will, right . So if someone like me or pete, is he going to become more conventional when hes no longer the more maverick or mayor pete, but is more a kind of creature of the Democratic Party writ large . But one, i think, really hard anything its that because President Trump with the Republican Party that had been fully dominated by george w. Bush and bush second inaugural, that kind of fanatical liberalism rescue for, read the second inaugural. Its right. I think that now you have younger republicans want to get down to the george w. Bush, has become a break for some people and sure there are more established republicans to go along with it but think about people like matt gates, andy pains, chip roy, mike lee, i mean, it is not just rand paul anymore, that are pushing on some of these, issues whether it is human or other things and i think that is heartening, and so, if you do get a president biden, you can actually see more republicans because a, you will have some additional reason for this but be, now some reason to push back against an establishment approach. That is what i actually thought was going to happen with Hillary Clinton, that Hillary Clinton would be this kind of uber prime assist and, republicans would react in a partisan way and because of some of the ideas turning within conservatism itself, that you could see that just a little bit delayed with the advantage that now trump has made it more acceptable for conservatives and republicans to support realism and restraint. Any other questions . Yes. Sure. My name is just goalie, i am from the whimsy institute for state, crafts book on the first panel. Thank you for this exchange. This is quite a way to end the conference. I am so impressed by the caliber of the speakers in everything we have said. I wanted to go back to what doug said earlier, he acquitted president eisenhower and it provoked a thought in me that i hope you can kind of react to which is that despite near unanimity, maybe that is too much, but i believe that there is a lot of affinity and appreciation in this room for everything that has been discussed and the need for restraint and the militarization of u. S. Foreign policy in east asia its not sustainable, that we do something about, it the question is what about the military Industrial Complex that president eisenhower and others have talked about. How do we push back against a narrative that anything like troop withdrawal or any other kind of changes to the u. S. Posture in east asia would only embolden our enemies, make u. S. Security less certain and so on and so forth and you know, the fact that there are Defense Companies and weapons makers the profit from militarization in this formula so, what are the ways that we can kind of address that, i kind of almost, an elephant in the room when it comes to these types of recommendations . I dont really want to start but at what i would say is, you know, my own view is that, you know, the u. S. Defense posture should be set based on the threat and the needs that are required in order to achieve a defense and, im not really in a position to discuss the military Industrial Complex per se, but, my vision of what asia looks like unfortunately as someone who has spent most of his life studying that region is that rather than cooperation in a new regime in northeast asia there are a lot of historical animosities and so i worry about china and japan. I worry about korea and japan. And it would make my life a lot more interesting in a post u. S. Has demonic northeast asia, but i dont think that it would necessarily make the life of the people in northeast asia more happy. I am not as pessimistic as my colleague, and i think the world will move, on history will move on, without the ever present u. S. Military establishment. So, i dont mind the notion i dont buy the notion that we are the linchpin for peace, and i think many others would take the opposite. I think we certainly need to reorient this, to different kinds of production. We need to maintain a force structure that is enough to ensure our defense but not too much to frighten the rest of the world if that makes sense to you. I think this business of bullying people which we have been involved in certainly since 1991 really needs to stop. We need to stop bullying people. I think we have time for one last question. Yes, and then professor moon as well. Okay, go ahead. Doctor democrats realize about scott status realism, which real isnt just the National Interest represent here . If you want to take that . Scott . Mine is just dependent on developments and a careful analytical view of the situation as it develops in the International Relations world. There could be a different paradigm. We have seen a shift in the air before, and so i am not afraid of that. I welcome the analytical challenge but at this point i would say that we may be at a kind of Inflection Point but i am not so sure. I mean, it is not yet i think completely clear in northeast asia that we have reached that point. And what is your realism . Gosh, i have nothing more to add up then to say, again, i think the world is moved on and we have not. We have not, we are stuck in the past and the sooner we can unstuck ourselves, the better. My realism is that you look at what our core objective of, National Interest, you look at the strategic environment and the threats, youre tactics and operations and for structures to meet those threats and dangerous in the world but you are willing to make trade offs to prioritize and also to see the world coldly as it is and if you look at the nuclear revolution, you look at the fact that we have too big most between us in the rest of the world, you look at the fact that we have the world strongest army, navy, air force, marine, corps right . You look at the fact that we have weak neighbors. You look at the fact of the balance of power in eurasia, the balance of power, heck in east asia, is not likely to be threatened by a real hegemon in the same way as we have worried historically within the kind of realist tend and what that says to me is that the United States does not have to be so forwardly engaged and to play such a firm and aggressive leadership role in other regions of the world in order to sustain our safety, the conditions of our prosperity and our liberal system here at home. The problem, actually, with the way the walking Foreign Policy establishment generally tends to do things that they see us is indispensable and that what we do abroad is actually going to be supportive of those things that i just mentioned is our interest when in fact oftentimes they boomerang against us and so, i would say that the real real islam is cognizant of the changes in the nature of the world about the threats and what our interest are. We will go with our last question over here. Hi, i am hung park with korean news media, that was sort of like a roundup question, im sorry im going back to more itemized questions, you have mentioned how koreans should resolve this by themselves, leaving the u. S. Out but one obstacles that the north wants to talk the u. S. That is one major, and the obstacle that is hard to actually convey what you have said, that is my first question, and my second is, u. S. Withdrawal will probably lead to the chinese involvement in korea, in south korea, u. S. South korea had allowances for 70 years. China and korea have been tied up for 5000 years so, with that be okay considering the high competition from u. S. And china are rising, and my third question is, if u. S. Withdrawals from korea, we will have a Nuclear State of our okay because we were under the Nuclear Umbrella and in the north, how would you respond to this . Thank you. I think some of you will remember that when President Trump ran from office, he raised the issue of Nuclear Capability and he said at the japanese feel that they should have their own nuclear deterrent, what is wrong with that . You, know i once had a conversation with one of the frenchman who created the Nuclear Force in france and i said, just out of curiosity, how many Nuclear Weapons you really think we need . He smiled, and he said, one. I, said dont you think he said, one. I said, dont you think you and he said, one. Theres a call for the people on the Korean Peninsula, at once again, talking to some chinese diplomats, one of the things that i learned a few years ago is that there are almost 2 million koreans living inside china, just over the border in what used to be manchurian which is now part of china, and one of the things they made very clear to me was, we do not want any more koreans so, we are putting up a wall to keep the koreans out. I said, whats wrong with the koreans . He said, my god, they are a huge source of trouble, i said, what do you mean trouble . He said, they will not assimilate. They refused to become chinese. We do not want anymore, so when you talk about chinese involvement on the peninsula, of course you are going to do business with the chinese, but i do not see that china is going to try and invade and govern korea. I cant imagine why they would, and theyve made that pretty clear. Again, weve got to look at china a little differently from the popular image that has been created in the United States, and that image is that it is another version of the soviet union that is bent on world conquest. Visit china. 1. 2 billion people, there is enormous problems just managing the place. I dont see the evidence, and the chinese have a remarkably Small Nuclear deterrent, in, fact israel can deliver more Nuclear Weapons faster than china can, so, does that answer your question . The other thing was, what do we do with mr. Kim who wants to talk to us . Well, we make a very clear that we are very comfortable with president moon and that we are going to support what president moon recommends and put the ball back in his court and let him talk to president moon. I think that will be expect acceptable to president xi for the reasons we have already discussed. My only point would be that, pursuing more restraint when it comes to the Korean Peninsula does not mean that the United States can continue to engage with south korea. In, fact we should be engaging on terms of Mutual Benefit much more. We should be reducing, for example, some of the barriers to us cooperating. We should be trying to find ways to engage with north korea in a way that could be new mutually beneficial and we should be able to, do i think, stand on our bully pulpit without the risk that would convey to others that we might turn that into a kind of military aggression. That would give us an ability to be more moralizing without necessarily being threatening. I can say, look, if you want to be more like south korea or you want to be more like the United States, then look at our experiment. Again, restrained is not isolationism. It is about engagement in a productive fashion. I wish we had more. Time we will have to wrap up there. Please join me in thanking the panelists and thank you all for coming. At the us institute of peace im delighted to welcome you here for a very important conversation to prevent violence in a fragile world. Our speakers here