To solve him on this one. Right now, we are gonna shift over to thinking about some of the more diplomatic aspects of the problem set and one of the things we heard from the Previous Panel is a lot of Solutions Come from the diplomatic toolkit. We have another remarkable panel to help us think through the. On the extreme right from your perspective, ambassador patterson is the former assistant secretary of state for near eastern affairs. She was ambassador to four Different Countries egypt, pakistan, colombia and el salvador. She was also the assistant secretary of state for national law enforcement, the aptly named drug and thugs portfolio and she was the acting ambassador and deputy ambassador to the united nations. Next, we have ambassador doug silman of the institute in washington. He previously served as the u. S. Ambassador to iraq and kuwait and was the deputy chief in baghdad and ankara. At the end, doctor vaez was on the International Crisis group where he previously served as the theme youre iran analyst before he joined icg he headed the project at the federation of american scientists. He has a phd in biomedical science from geneva, masters in International Policy from the Johns Hopkins school for International Studies where he studied with jon alterman. So im quite delighted to have ali on the stage as well. It seems to me that the last panel kind of kicked it all to you guys. So this is a fundamentally diplomatic problems set. What are the unexploited diplomatic opportunities . Not the lowhanging fruit although its interesting to talk about those. Diplomatically, what are the big things that we need to do that we are doing . I want to pick up with a last panel left off, but i want to make a few remarks about the state of american diplomacy in the gulf and frankly in the middle east generally, and simply put it, it has a rather dramatically, and what are the implications of this . If we dont know what is going on out there in key areas. Its not just about sending personnel out to bust heads, although that has grown obviously in some cases, but we just dont get about like we used to and i suspect relevant to the gulf that this is particularly true in saudi arabia where we dont know what is going on with the clerics, we dont know what is going on with the royal family and we dont know what is going on outside the major cities although many people are visiting there and this is a truly destructive result of what took place in benghazi although in fairness, it has been going on for years since the beirut bombings in bombings of our embassies, our embassy in yemen is closed. Our embassy in libya is closed. After the attack, we went back to saudi arabia instead of three and four years so, what are the implications of this, apart from not knowing what is going on that which diplomacy cant succeed . We look afraid and it aggravates enormously since a withdrawal on the ground because when you ask somebody to come to your fortress instead of going to their office, the signal is you are afraid to engage with the local population and the sense of withdrawal is i think much more dramatic so the first thing i think is to build a diplomatic capacity to enable people to get out and to do that we have to take more risks and we have to have people who speak the language and who are there longer so, what are the opportunities . There are still opportunities. The first i would say is to do everything we can to heal the rift among the gcc countries. I would be the first to say to people in the administration have worked on this that it was always perceived as a second tier goal. It certainly had nothing to do with israel security. It really did not affect that so it was always sort of relegated and was never a highlevel issue, i would argue but i think it does have implications, really serious implications and that is what i would call the effect because what i have seen is this rift in weaponized in places like libya and the horn of africa. There is certainly potential, i would think, for it to be weaponized with the peace deal with the taliban and of course the russians in general have taken enormous advantage of this. So i think we need to do everything we can, the u. S. Needs to do everything it can to work on this. I think its very unfortunate that did you see is collapsing i know the Security Architecture was always sort of a myth but the fact that the u. S. Was there and working on this, there were, i think modest, modest successes overtime. There were certainly successes on the economic side and theyre pretty boring, like coastal immigration and economic integration but they are things worth doing and i want to mention one more reason we should work on the golf and the gcc and that is the imf report that came out about two weeks ago and what the report said was that, and i know many of you in the audience are very familiar with the gulf and will sort of poohpooh this because scholars and others have been predicting the fall of the house for Something Like seven years but it basically said that without massive fiscal improvement, the countries in the gulf would have serious Financial Issues and 15 years, saudi arabia in particular, kuwait, and everywhere in the uae would be insulated because of their sovereign wealth funds, but there is a very interesting article about the implications of this which would be that they would turn on each other, or assistance in jordan in lebanon and the palestinians would drop and very critically because i think this issue has been under studied by scholars, guest workers would be sent home to already struggling countries like egypt and pakistan so in other words, i think given our longterm strategic objectives in the gulf, we need to do everything we can to encourage security and energy integration, no matter how hard it will be and i dont think it will be all that hard if we concentrate on it and to work on this for our long term objectives and then finally on the opportunities and i know doug is going to talk about this as well, four years ago, five years ago when we started to think it wouldve been a lot easier to get the iranians out because they were basically just wanting to stick it to the saudis and had no real strategic interest in them and i think its probably a lot harder now but im not sure. This is an issue that just cries out for sustain u. S. Engagement to try and reach some sort of settlement because of humanitarian costs being so high and secondly, the real cost, as my colleague Jerry Firestone keep saying is that it is ruined the saudi relationship with the u. S. And that has strategic implications as well so we need to do everything we can to prepare them and that would be the next place i would put u. S. Diplomatic emphasis. Thank you. During a crisis in early january at one point i was put on fox news, and talking to a couple of their anchors and they played for me the clip from senator rand paul when he said this means the death of diplomacy, so how do you react to that and i said ive been a diplomat for 35 years and i believe that diplomacy will never be dead and i think what you heard at the end of the first section with recession is, there are really lots of opportunities for diplomacy it is just that that is not the priority, either of the Academic Community or the administration to identify and implement right now. The final question we had coming from over here about the growth of multipolarity is where i wanted to start the discussion discussion, looking at the middle east in particular i was in riyadh and abu dhabi last week this is the only game in town in the gulf for middle east. That means the emiratis, the saudis, the kuwaitis, the omanis, they are looking for other alternatives, looking at 5g infrastructure but also looking around the region, there is no other country that i can pull to gather the different regional powers or International Powers like the United States. Some people want to draw a parallel between the british withdrawal from empire after world war ii or britain gave up the United States actually is not doing that. First of all we are not a colonial power in the traditional sense. We dont occupy countries and run them around the world what we have is a soft economic power and and agreement and in good places representation of the government government. Even though relatively less powerful we arent losing much of our influence and power and our deployment list we choose not to use it. So looking at multiple any growth, there are a lot of opportunities at the end of 99 and beginning of 2000 and what i saw was positions from washington and iran to walk back from a war between the United States and iran. I disagree with the evaluation of the first panel with the iranian escalation because the United States took responsibility for killing soleimani, iran felt it had to respond directl as i ran so those missile strikes on the iraq bases were irans parallel strike to even the playing field. But after that both sides went back secretary pompeo and secretary mnuchin double down and the iranians said we will not do anything for now but with this region we have taken our retribution for the killing of soleimani so what both sides of dennis walk to the brink, decided not to jump off and walk back to the areas of comfort and support the proxies and attempt to put pressure on the allies of the United States to reduce the impact of u. S. Economic sanctions and for the United States doubled down on economic sanctions and try to figure out individuals who might have , where the individual impact could potentially work on iranian policy. Several areas, and this is really more for another discussion that are not sure anyone is working on it but we think there is a real role for american diplomacy but it is american diplomacy to build internationalizes with our european allies, with our golf allies, with israel and potentially in some cases even with china. First of all, is a jcpoa two point oh. It is pretty clear iranian recouped is not coming back in the way it did before but it is also pretty clear that iran is willing to move in that direction, and david zarif over the course of last summer laid out on a few different occasions slightly different visions of what iran might be able to accept including accelerating the Additional Protocol by a couple of years, seemingly in a way that President Trump complained that he had gotten a better deal, on a nuclear deal than obama had gotten. That would seem to be the direction. If you look at the use of iranian Ballistic Missiles against u. S. Forces in iraq, you can almost see that to a large extent i see that irans strategic projection is going to be more easily done with missiles because, one it does not have the same International Implications if you were using conventional warheads and iran was able to use those Ballistic Missiles to strategic effect. You can look at those Ballistic Missiles but it appears to be cruise missiles guided by drones but again, a technological win by iran so iran may not be as concerned about keeping its Nuclear Weapons program as it might have been in the past. That also moved to the second issue, how do we work with our allies in the gulf and the International Community to reduce the regional threat of irans missile programs and again, there is lots of experience in the u. S. Government in the state have of the d. O. D. Indian elsewhere, how do you walk and do an effective arms control agreement, especially missile control agreement, im not sure anyone is going there now but what im in the gulf, the big elephant in the room is not Nuclear Weapons or post missiles, its actually support for proxies, and those in the jussie sea countries are very concerned about it continued iranian interference with troops in this society that pose policies, this is now more prominent in iraq and syria than it has been in the gulf, and i think that the maximum Pressure Campaign has probably reduce the amount of money the iranians have to fund some of these external activities in and again, this is something maybe a leak unaddressed, we have been hearing some implications that the iranians are tiring specifically of support to the houthis in yemen that hasnt done much but prolong the war. But they are not great iranian allies. They are too disunited havent always used iranian training and weapons the way they wanted so there may be an opening for the discussions to deescalate in yemen as an opening to other Security Issues. Its also possible a few weeks ago where there was some talk of a larger discussion of Regional Security issues that might bring in missile programs. Members of u. S. Forces and other allied forces, all as bargaining chips with the iranian to have them reduce your support for group so again i lay out these issues not because they are happening but i see opportunities for the United States to grab some of these diplomatically and move forward, but we cant do it unilaterally. Its going to have to be done with our allies. Were going to have to get over this growing multi polarity in the world. We will have to bring together the most influential nations in the most effective nations, probably in different groups for these different issues. Thank you. Ali . Thank you very much, john, it is a great pleasure to be at csis another ear of taking credit for my education, i will also take the blame i hope you will also take the blame for whatever mistakes and make today. But i thought it might be useful to shed some light on iranian strategy here. The first panel i think did a good job in discussing the confusions around the u. S. Strategy. Now, the iranians, as you all know, for the first time of the Trump Administrations maximum pressure strategy, adopted a strategy of maximum patients. They decided to basically stay in the nuclear deal to the extent possible, sit under ads, be careful in the region, the number of issues between the u. S. Navy and the iranian navy came down, israel targeted iranian assets in syria hundreds of times and the iranians basically did not respond. In the hope they can isolate the u. S. And thereby neutralized u. S. Sanctions and the possible did not really work at the end so as of 2019, when we pushed for basically bringing irans oil exports to zero, the iranians decided to adopt a policy of maximum pressure of their own and is two two different forms, one in the nuclear realm, every 60 days it took a step back from their obligations under the jcpoa and in the region we saw a string of attacks starting from limpet mines on tankers in a port in the uae to attacks on tankers in the gulf of oman, to the east coast pipeline in saudi arabia, to shooting down of a drone, to the very brazen attack on saudi oil. This obviously culminated in the killing of general soleimani and then iranian retaliation than i agree with doug that for the iranians taking a direct strike on a u. S. Military installations somewhere in the region was crossing the psychological threshold in the same way that killing an iranian general by the u. S. Was crossing the red line so, the iranians basically wanted to establish that this cannot happen again and the iranians have deterrence of the rug, im curious what the general would say about this, from what ive heard everyone agrees that iran is quite risky it is chirac luck that no one was killed in the attack on the base in iraq, but in any case, now is there a debate in tehran, whether they should go back to some patience for the remainder of President Trumps first term or to stay where they are and doubled down on the maximum pressure strategy and there are arguments on both sides, you can probably guess who is advocating for what within iranian system. Moderate forces of iranian politics obviously want to go back to trump patience and the irgc and more hardline elements are quite content with what they have done in terms of regional pushback because they believe it has demonstrated irans capabilities, a lot of people in the region were concerned, impressed, by the accuracy of the force that was used on saudi aramco, the force of the ballistic matte missiles on u. S. Bases in iraq. It is demonstrated vulnerabilities of the other side, the fact that we dont have a single Patriot Missile basically protecting the bases in iraq were not a single missile was fired and the low flying cruise missiles that were hit coming to hit aramco, and i think they want to drive a wedge in the coalition the Trump Administration is put together and their view is being that that has been a relative success. We saw some shift in the uae position, at least some escalation in tensions and even with the u. S. By september we came pretty close to a potential deescalation package that president macron of france was trying to negotiate so you put all this to better get their, there is a debate in tehran about the costs and benefits of continuing on this path but the biggest question is how do we change trumps calculus and if trump is there for another four years, so we are talking about another five years of iran under sanctions, what should iran do, and i think the majority view is iran should not become another cuba, a country that lives under sanctions or another iraq that was weakened under sanctions and toppled easily so my only sense is the hardliners now have the upper hand in iran and the moderates are more and more isolated. If i want to bet, and it is a risky thing to bet in washington in front of a crowd. And cspan. And cspan, is that i think the iranians will probably slow down the Nuclear Escalation because on that front we have and it up in an implicit less for less situation, the iranians are obviously doing last with regard to their obligations and getting less out of it, but i dont think they want to escalate any further out of fear that they will push the europeans into the arms of the Trump Administration and then the major milestone coming up for the iranians which is the lifting of the un conventional arms agreement in october that i think they will care about because it would be the first time in a new years that they would be able to buy conventional arms and maybe narrow the gap in conventional capabilities in the region so they are keen on keeping the deal alive and then until october and between october november were talking only about a few weeks to see who will be the next u. S. President. So on the nuclear front, i think we will see a slowdown but on the regional front i think the hardliners will get the upper hand but will do it in a way that is comfortable with iran as it operates in this zone of asymmetric warfare trying to impose a cost on the u. S. By targeting u. S. Assets and us facilities in iraq and near u. S. Companies like exxon in the south of iraq just to make life difficult for u. S. Without killing americans in the hope it would be some sort of drawdown of u. S. Forces. Which would not political victory for the iranians. But in the places where there is possible deniability, i believe the iranians would go after americans among the places that is of concern to me and not necessarily the focus of our discussion today is afghanistan. If this deal with the taliban falls apart, the iranians might, and they have ties with the taliban, they might try to go after u. S. Forces in afghanistan, where plausible deniability works much better than in iraq, syria or lebanon so that is a major concern but i think one question that i hope either we can answer in this panel or the next panel which is fundamental to resolving this dilemma and shifting towards the grand strategy priority of Great Power Competition is to answer these two questions. One, what level of iranian employees can we tolerate in the region . Because obviously there is a ceiling to iranian influence as a persian nation of arabs and turks, as a shia nation among sunnis, but they are part of the region, they are of the region, we cannot exclude them from the region and all the coalitions that weve tried to put together in the past few years from the middle east Strategic Alliance to sentinel, the Maritime Security forces in the region, to the warsaw conference, all have been aimed and excluding iran. These are not mechanisms that can bring about a regional motive event day. So the question is, what degree of tolerance influences tolerable to us and also does iran have legitimate can security concerns, and if we agree that they do, what is the solution to that because one has to understand, for the iranians, they are Ballistic Missile program and therefore we defense policy, which is basically this policy of hiring policies and partners around the age in the region to deter strike on their own soil, is their weapons system so theyre not going to give it away, especially under pressure, and threats from the inside. The only way that they might compromise on it is that we change the threat perception, so those are questions im also pointing out for our discussion today. Thank you very much all of you. One of the troubling problems in untie the u. S. Not of this presence in the region is in many ways the measure of iranian success is survival. The measure of u. S. Success if we resort to diplomacy, diplomacy is never done. There will always be further engagement or effort to shape iranian behavior. Theres a way in which we are set up so that the iranians will always perceive themselves as long as they survive, to be successful and we will only see our diplomacy is being on the way to being successful, but not arriving there yet. How do we deal with that problem of finding success in order to encourage a continuation of the process . Boy, thats an easy question. What i have tend to say especially to younger diplomats as they enter the service is the job of the diplomat is very seldom to solves a problem. You can get an arms control agreement that solves a piece but even with the United States and the soviet union, never ended the tensions of different sets of ambitions. Most of what we do is diplomats is make sure situations do not get out of hand and lead to violence or economic deprivation if possible and it is hard to define complete total success when youre looking mostly at keeping the status quo or slightly improved status quo. It is hard to get credit for things that dont happen because people say they would not happen anyway. Exactly. If you look at the jcpoa, i mean, and can talk to this little bit more because she was more intimately involved, it seems to me to have been a pragmatic attempt to the by the Obama Administration to deal with one of the Serious Problems of the iranian threat, the potential Nuclear Weapons program. It did not deal with Ballistic Missiles, it did not deal with proxies, it did not touch on human rights inside iran, its minorities, political opponents, all of the things we might have wanted to see included in a deal because i assume the Obama Administration decided it would not be able to put all these things and one agreement have a successful conclusion. So the necessarily pull back the scope of the agreement theyre working on to have as much success as possible, International Consensus and you saw what happened. There was a broad perception at least in part of the u. S. Political structure that this was a failed agreement. I think it was not a failed agreement because it was a good application of internationally coordinated economic sanctions on iran. It wasnt in complete agreement that only dealt with part of the perceived problem. That is the problem we have to deal with. I think thats right. And i think this is not the official obama explanation but i always thought the jcpoa was going to take the Nuclear Issue off the table and in the next ten years the old boys would die off. And the Obama Administration, towards the end of its tenure, explored and talked about some of those openings with iran, whether it would be counter narcotics or some kind of scientific exchange, whether there were things you could do to sort of bring them back into the international fold. There was never any allusion, the Ballistic Missile program or the proxy problem, those were all seen as way down the road. John, i just ask you something on the jcpoa experience because i think we actually have some valuable lessons for a path forward. Before and after the jcpoa, before we start of the secret negotiations in iran which were critical to the success of the nuclear deal later on but i think that already burned bridges with golf countries, and also israel to the certain extent, because theyre also trying to deal with the iranians behind their back and this is by definition going to come at their expense, so, now we have tried different scenarios of trying to either encourage the golf countries to negotiate on their own or to negotiate with iran behind their back, or to stop them negotiating with iran, which i think is the case right now. And i think the lesson of the jcpoa is that these two processes should happen in parallel. You cant have a second arms control negotiation discussion about the region in subsequent steps, but rather, these things have to happen in parallel because any narrow transaction with iran will not survive in the context of what exists more broadly and secondly, i think after the jcpoa, it there is also, to limit the concerns of the gulf countries, what did we do . We sold them billions of dollars worth of arms, right . That has exacerbated irans sense of conventional weapons asymmetry in the region, push them to doubled down on their support for proxies and partners in the region, and on the Ballistic Missile program, and the Trump Administration that used as evidence that the jcpoa was a bad deal, and it did not correct irans behavior on those. Determine washington is a self looking Ice Cream Cone so, if the u. S. Were to try to engage the iranians on aspects of missile development, regional behavior, provide a pathway out of the maximum pressure, what should the regional priorities . She shouldnt be about the iranian presence in iraq . Should it be about yemen . Should be about afghanistan . If the u. S. Work to try to keep this pathway, on the regional picture or even the relationship with saudi arabia, who needs to be a reassured . At what kind of reassurance what they find reassuring . But the questions dont get easier. I think the gulf countries have been sort of schizophrenia recently because i think what they wanted was for the u. S. To sort of keep iran in a box and poke at them periodically and stand up. But what they did not want, and this is where they got scared and all the other escalation, they did not want a real shooting war, and they became worried about that, as long as we did not respond, because our response was just inconsistent and incoherent and that precipitated some of them running off, allegedly, to tehran, to get their own deal, and certainly some of these countries have longstanding relations with the iranians anyway, so i do think they need, i think they are in a state of great anxiety right now about what our policy is and dont quite know what to do with it. I would be interested in what the other panelists thought. I went down to riyadh last week and was speaking to the Diplomatic Institute in riyadh and the National College in abu dhabi among others and in both places there was a lot of interest in the top earlier from the gulf Cooperation Council, and whether or not the Cooperation Council is an effective mechanism to pursue golf policies or how it can be made more effective, and many of the questions were about what can we do to bring the cutter is back in because the schism in the gulf and cutlery search for strategic depth anywhere outside the region, most specifically with turkey, is causing competition, as mentioned and other parts of the region. There was the beginning of an idea of how can we reunify the gulf . What is it that riyadh or abu dhabi has to do to bring the cutter is back in and to begin to former unified position on iran because we dont want to do this separately, we want to do this together so, one step might be an intermediate step of continuing with this administration has done, and try to help the members of the gcc unify themself. There is a new kuwaiti secretary general at the gcc who seems quite energetic as he is starting his mission literally two weeks in but i think that there is a mechanism that can help provide a bit of a political push that might also provide us a more effective way to canvas the countries of the gulf, get them on the same pages us and we look at these are the strategic questions we have to address. I would know the two diplomats did not identify any iranian regional behavior that we should prioritize. Thats easy. My own view is that would be yemen, because i think about the lebanon, iraq and all the other places, that is probably still the easiest because iran and the Strategic Interests is the laced. There is also the perception are strategic interest is least in yemen. Someone said the Monroe Doctrine to keep the ottomans off the Arabian Peninsula so i think that is where we should start but again, im not governor anymore and the strategic picture may of shift in the past two years. I think you can add to the beginning of discussions with our european allies in the Security Council and with the gulf states and with israel, how could we get back into negotiations or discussions on a Nuclear Weapons agreement, a jcpoa to point out . The fact that zarif has laid out some options for moving forward is a good one. However, i also think that in this discussion, its going to be pretty clear that israel and the gulf states are going to want to move quickly, either as part of that or on a separate track toward Regional Security issues. Ballistic missile programs and two separate paths there but i think yemen as macron was pushing for in the summer maybe away into some discussions that could then be broadened where there is International Consensus and again i think that the United States should be working with our traditional friends and allies in europe and asia and the gulf and with israel to develop that consensus and we can help shape that consensus we put in the effort and begin to define those two goals. Do you think the iranians are willing to have serious discussions about proxies . Whenever i talk to iranian officials about their original activities, they proudly tell me that they just support Political Parties and that theyre supporting democracy, and the shia support hezbollah, that is not approaching of the iranians, i will try to put down lebanese citizens, you have these discussions with iranian proxies in your mind. The iranian mentality is not a bizarre mentality it is a bazaar mentality. So when you talk about proxies, not all of the same, especially the ones that are very close to iran, where you have the kind of alliance you get between it to nato allies like iran and hezbollah for instance, and it all depends on what kind of Security Issues we are willing to provide. For instance, while we say this is really counterintuitive, almost amounts to blasphemy in the city but i would argue with the iranians are able to buy fighter jets after they were stolen from russia it would actually reduce the reliance of hezbollah because when you think about the proxies as irans weapons system, you see this problem in a totally different way than if you look at it from a perspective of many countries in the region, that they see it as an expansionist policy, right . Iran wants to restore the persian empire right now in the shia form this time but i agree that yemen is actually a low hanging fruit. Yemen is not a major strategic priority for iran and iranians have signaled in the past they would be willing to get more helpful on yemen. The question is again, what would they get out of it, if we define this the way that the saudis have right, now which i think is problematic, as a way of moving a cart, that they cannot consider escalates the houthis or emeratis or sit, americans i think the iranians will try to be spoiling but if it resolves in a way that it will help the iranians either get a ceasefire with the u. S. In the current escalation path we are in, so enough to allow them to keep the head above the water for the next few months or maybe in the short term generally, maybe that is something they can consider, but again, if we, devise even when we think about diplomacy, if we still think about it and zero some terms, it is going to backfire. One of the themes that is run through this panel but the core of a lot of this is saudi iranian animosity. I dont think any of us expect that saudi iranian animosity, rivalry, whatever you want to call it, can be completely resolved, but i think it is an important question of, how much can we expect it to be mitigated . Can it be a sort of working relationship . Whats the sort of, i dont want to say, the floor, but what should our realistic aspirational goals the for the nature of saudi iranian ties . Well, it was that way for decades with the two pillars. Obviously, that was before. A different iranian government. Different iranian government but not inconceivable that you could, to, me it is not inconceivable that you could go back to some kind of live and let live scenario, but you certainly cant go back to it under the current scenario that we have, which is maximum pressure. Its just simply out of the question, as hes been aligned but i think you can get some kind of, and again, the Obama Administration sort of explored and talked about these, some kind of confidence Building Measures that would, because one of the worries we have not talked about with the saudis and bahrain is iranian influence in the Eastern Province and those populations in the gulf. You could get some kind of confidence Building Measure so we get a process started but i just think its impossible given the current situation. Another argument of course is that the way to reassure the saudis would be to increase the u. S. Presence in saudi arabia except the u. S. Is trying to send the opposite signals, we want to reduce our presence in the region. That is the Obama Administrations strategy. If we let the region come to its own equilibrium but the question is what that journey looks like and whether the equilibrium is one we find desirable, or even acceptable. One of the issues that we have to deal with, that is difficult is the fact that iran conduct policy at least on two different levels. It conducts state to state policy negotiations, but it also conduct policy through proxies and support for non governmental groups in many parts of the world including latin america and asia and across the globe. One thing that has to happen from the standpoint of the gulf, maybe israel and the Trump Administration is to draw this question into the discussion in some way. To a large extent, i think the decision to kill soleimani with a drone strike was to show iran that there were actual consequences for iranian officials to their unofficial proxy led policies, at least in iraq. So, to some extent, the killing of soleimani has ripped the bandaid off this idea that we will, in our policy, simply do what iran does and what iranian supported groups do. That will be one of the biggest problems in terms of addressing security, unless iran can be brought into this discussion, as always suggests, through a broader Regional Security it, i dont know, a new paradigm or something that conceives of a role for iran in Regional Security that does not produce a Regional Security arrangement that is aimed at limiting iran, which is the current system. That is very difficult for this administration. I think that will be very difficult for the gulf states. I dont know enough about israeli policy to move on in the gulf, but i think that is a big leap and its not a first step but maybe yemen is a first step into that much longer discussion. Look, i would make two points. One is, if you look at iran saudi relations, first of, all i dont think theyre bound to be enemies forever. There may be bound to be rivals, but not necessarily enemies, and weve seen this movie before in other regions of the world, right . I mean, its a cliche but you look at france and germany in europe, you look at brazil and argentina in latin america, so its not an unusual setting. And the ultimate solution is what doug was talking about, in which both sides believe their interests were preserved. The question, is how do we get there . I argue it is the same way that some of the conflicts are just impossible to resolve, like the israel palestine issue. When we put our finger on one side of the scale, the fact that weve put our finger on the sunni side of the gulf is part of the reason this issue cannot be resolved and even again when we have tried to bring about some sort of balance like the Obama Administration in the second term, it has been done in ways than it does not actually exacerbate the situation. At this stage, i think its very telling to think that the only deescalation that has occurred in the past few years, in the region, has been as a result of the uae thinking the u. S. Is unreliable. That is very telling. That the only positive thing that has happened as a result of that, not because of a positive that the u. S. Has done. The question, john and i were at their security conference with Foreign Ministers and he mentioned the saudis of send a message, i followed up later and apparently the message was sent through the emeratis that maybe there should be a security dialog between iran and saudi arabia in pakistan. The iranians have responded positively but the saudis have not. The running interpretation, correct or in protect is that it was because of u. S. Pressure. I think it is in the u. S. Interests without any doubt to try to push both sides, not just the iranians and saudis, but also others, it is some sort of dialog. Even if it does not resolve the issues immediately, but you have to start somewhere, the process took years in actually kissinger was on a born with the process but let it happen, and thinking that the u. S. Has nothing to lose and can still do its own diplomacy with the soviets but let these other countries have their dialogues. Again, you see countries like oman and kuwait really trying hard in the last two months to figure out and deescalate but i think the real obstacle is why do we go to the audience for a couple of questions. Right here in the front . Did you identify yourself, please . I am with Penn State University and on the Advisory Board of csis. My question really has to do with the recent changes in iran and what do you think the administration and the government in iran is getting ready to drink the poison, and the reason i say that is, and this is going back to comey who said, drink the poison and make a deal. The past election last friday, the candidates they were offering were all conservative. It is no doubt that the conservatives will have a takeover of everything and this person will now be the speaker. That gives the government the capability of making a deal without having to explain, so, nixon going to china. Im wondering if you all think that is a possibility and if it is, what should the u. S. Policy be to address many rapprochement in that sense. Thank, you and if you could pass your microphone to the gentleman there . Peter humphrey, Intelligence Analyst and former diplomat. I believe in weapons evolution but i dont believe in Quantum Leaps of memory so i have to ask who is helping out iran with these drones, and should we be chatting with them as well . Thank you. So, on the domestic political scene in iran, you know again, it is one of those counterintuitive things. I dont think the system is becoming more monolithic in fact, once you get the conservatives control of all levers of power, which is something we had seen before in 2004 when irans negotiations failed and the more modern forces of iranian politics discredited, the same thing happened, apathy by the middle class. They do not going to vote. This is to use that context to disqualify a lot of the moderates, knowing that the backlash would be limited and the department was taken over by the hardliners and then the presidency was taken over by ultraconservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and that created a lot of fighting in the iranian government. But i think whats happening right now is the system is hunkering, down closing down because it feels it is under siege from all sides, maximum pressure. From their perspective it is not just an economic course of policy, its multidimensional, there is an overt dimension to, it a cyber dimension so again, as john said, survival is victory and youre trying hard to survive by trying to close down the circle of elites who are in decisionmaking position. That does not mean they would not want a deal. In fact, i want a deal with President Trump, back in september. But there is a misconception about drinking the poison chalice in this town. People dont understand that when Committee Strength the poison chalice, he did not bring about the demise of the regime, he did not compromise the principles of the regime. But he ensured and guarantee the survival of the regime. The Trump Administration is basically signaling to the iranians that the only deal that is acceptable to them is a deal that would come at the cost of the Islamic Republics survival, and thats never going to happen so it doesnt matter whos in charge in iran as long as they believe that they cant get into a mutually beneficial deal with the Trump Administration, i dont think theres a serious prospect for diplomacy and on the question of external help, look, the iranians have proven over the years, obviously theyve had some help from the outside, live from Ballistic Missile programs, they have had help from syria, north korea, you know they have some cooperation with russia, some transference from china but overall, you know, this is an issue it has topnotch universities and it has been able, it has been forced to basically develop some indigenous capabilities that again has created some degree of deterrence, and you talk to israeli officials, for instance after the attack on saudi aramco, there was some rethinking about the balance of deterrence in the region because this technique of using low flying cruise missiles and swarming tactics by jeep drones, i mean, these are like ten, 15,000 dollar drones, i mean, if these are used against israeli critical sites like the Chemical Plant in haifa or the nuclear plant, it is a major gamechanger and it creates all sorts of dilemmas, both for israeli officials, do you address this now when hezbollah might have ten of these missiles, or do you wait ten years what hezbollah has 10,000 of them. At the risk of a major backlash that could happen if you take action now . Or you know, on the iranian side, how far do you push without the risk of killing yourself or your military leaders, leaving them vulnerable and susceptible to retaliation from the u. S. . So, that is what im saying we are in a pattern that is constantly evolving, but we shouldnt expect the weaker party, which is iran in this case, to unilaterally either capitulate or give away capabilities that it sees as critical to its national security. Back to your question about the hardliners takeover iran, i think ali is basically right. As long as there is only pressure to pull down the regime, its not going to amount to much in one of the things that i would like to see is a better articulated and more consensus u. S. Foreign policy on iran itself because when i see, when i saw what i was in the administration and still see is divided opinions. Some people are hoping that economic pressure on iran will cause the collapse of the regime, the Islamic Republic will fall and Something Else will come in its place but it cant be as bad. Others are looking for specific changes to iranian policies which are critical to u. S. Interest in our allies, Nuclear Weapons, crews, missiles support for our proxies and the strategies for these two are entirely different but i think we are kind of mixing this all in together. Im not confident, every once in a while, i wonder how easy iran is going to be to negotiate with, i pull out my copy of the united constitution and read the preamble which is anti american and talks about exporting the achievements of the revolution, supporting the oppressed of the world against the repressurize. There is a lot in the basis of the Iranian State which supports and expansionist or radical iranian policy. The question in my mind, and i am not an iran expert is, can a more conservative hardline iranian government soft pedal the revolutionary ideology in exchange for some sort of Economic Security benefits, and i think that is at this point known, because it has not really been tried since the jcpoa. General votel is waiting. We will take a brief break as we set up the podium for his top. Please join me in thanking abby aly and doug and anne for an excellent top