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Scholarship on “retrospective voting” has found that voters punish governments for exogenous events, such as natural disasters, terrorist attacks, or crime waves. In studies from the United States and India, for example, there is a robust relationship between floods or droughts and an electoral backlash against the incumbent. However, the relationship appears to be complicated by the government’s ability to provide voters relief.
We argue that certain incumbent politicians are systematically better positioned to provide relief to their constituents. This variation shapes incumbents’ likelihood of being punished for natural disasters. In particular, because local politicians are often dependent on the assistance of policymakers at the state or national level, local officials who are aligned with politicians at higher levels of government are advantaged in efforts to obtain relief funding. As a result, incumbents who are aligned with the party in power at the state or national level will be less likely to be electorally punished in the aftermath of a disaster.