Speech. The protection of First Amendment does say that Congress Shall make no law. We are going to leave this but you can find it online at cspan. Org. Tab and youseries can find it there. We go live to the center for the National Interest for discussion on iran and the Nuclear Agreement. Good afternoon, everybody. Thank you so much for turning day inthis springlike washington. Cspan for coming along. And in a few tips on how we are this to handle that morning. It is being filmed live. A, andu have the queue and state your name clearly so the world knows who you are. The subject today is highly relevant. Ran sanctions and the nuclear deal. We heard a lot about iran during the election campaign. Articularly from the president but i think there is some confusion as to what the actual policy is, given that we have a an whichdeal with ir no one seems eager to tear up, even though the president says it is the worst deal ever negotiated. Secondly, we have a major fight isis,he Islamic State or which the president claims is one of our Top Priorities in Foreign Policy, and yet ironically, the countries we rely on to beat isis will be iran. There is great pressure on capitol hill for more sanctions not for the, nuclear deal but because of its behavior in the gulf, support for insurgents in yemen, and the human rights record. To discuss this, we have an extremely more talented you will before us. I am. Ot to announce you for the senior director Regional Security programs here at the center for the National Interest. And the first speaker i will turn to is dennis ross and then i turned to mark fitzpatrick. Dennis ross has a distinguished. Ecord served several president s as a key negotiator for arabisraeli ts. He has a distinguished fellow at the washington institute. He has written numerous books, the last of which is a must read on the relationship between with american president s and interesting background material which i think is quite new. Has lived forck the last 1015 years in london, working at the International Institute for strategic studies the chief spokesperson of nonproliferation but he is an american. But he served in the state department, doing what he is doing now. Now moved back to washington and is the executive america. Of iis as he runs the office they have here in town. And they hold meetings just like this and there are publications just like we do. Prominence in this town has to do with his of thedinary knowledge iran nuclear component, in the iran nuclear deal. We particularly talk about how we deal with these conundrums that ive mentioned, including in the as really ambivalence towards the iran deal. Mark will talk about the actual deal in itself. Where it is succeeding and where it has differences. With that in mind, they will minutes tobout 13 open up and then we will be free to question. Dennis . Thank you. i want to talk a little bit what i think the Trump Administration confronts. I will not try to explain what the policy is because i think the policy is something that is still being developed. This from to look at the standpoint of the kind of. Hings they might do so let me start by sort of noting two things to begin with. Obviously, as jeff said, the president of the United States refer to this as the worst deal ever negotiated. Think, theflects, i view of what the negotiations produced but an inherent sense that the deal itself has within it producing a number of full or abilities. And i want to address some of that. Dimension,second obviously, and that is if you listen to the general, he said iran has become much more aggressive in the region since the joint company has a plan of action. And if you think about it, the administration is confronting as what they see as the vulnerability flowing from the deal in the nuclear dimension, but also, is dealing with or thinks it must deal with, what are the implications of the deal itself. With theo they do joint comprehensive plan of action . The confirmation hearings made it clear that he thought that a goodough it wasnt deal, we had to live up to it. And i would suggest that it makes sense. If we were to be the ones to rip it up because it wasnt a bilateral arrangement, we would make ourselves the issue, not irans behavior or add behavior. If, in fact, what the administration wants to do is find a way to increase leverage on iran to affect its behavior, and one of the things that it is important for the of ministration to do is to make it clear that the focus should be on what iran is doing. We shouldnt be making ourselves the issue. Words dont isolate the United States. Think about how you can do more with the spotlight on irans behavior and what is wrong with the behavior. And here i think there is something that can be effectively done. One thing the Obama Administration didnt do effectively, and i will come back to this later, and a sense, the Obama Administration became defensive about the issue of iran not getting the economic benefits from the deal. Colleagueanians, my who is here, wrote a piece with two other members of the washington institute, which i think effectively focused on iran having to create a narrative about how iran was living up to the deal and we werent. And one of the reasons iran isnt doing nearly as well as it might in terms of the economic benefits from the deal is that iran, when it comes to creating transparency in its Banking System and fulfilling the standards that the Financial Action task force has required with reports to Money Laundering and terrorist financing, iran doesnt meet the standards. And one of the reasons therefore it becomes difficult or banks are hesitant to do the kind of financing that would be necessary for some of the bigger aboutis that they worry the consequences of being slapped with big fines because they might be dealing with someone who is connected with terroristdering or financing. So iran isnt getting a lot of the benefits economically from the deal but that is because iran is continuing not to meet the standard that everyone else is supposed to meet with her guards to their banking requirements. And it would be effective, i think, to try to focus on that but also on what they are doing in the region. When the general says that iran has become more aggressive in the region, well, that is a good thing to remind everyone. Existedsanctions that under the Obama Administration, they were very clear that we would continue with this on Human Rights Violations and on terrorism. This is because of irans behavior. Not because we are dreaming these things up. So that is a context that i can trye administration on and should draw on. If i were advising the administration, what else would i advise them to do . I would just say, by the way, i am not advising the administration but if i were advising the administration, there would be a number of things i would focus on. And they go back to concerns that i myself had about the joint comprehensive plan of action. One of the Major Concerns i have is that because at the end of 15 years there are not limitations on the size or quality of the Nuclear Infrastructure that the the gap could have, could be such between that and having a weapon could be sick differently small and iran might at some point be tempted to go for a weapon. And i always say this is one of wanted thengs that i Obama Administration to do that they didnt do and that the Trump Administration could do was to bolster the determinants. There is a number of things the ministration could do to bolster the deterrence. Change ourould be to declaratory policy. Within the joint comprehensive plan of action, the iranians make a commitment to never seek or acquire or develop Nuclear Weapons. And if we see them doing that, itians understand that to be too late sanctions. Our declaratory policy would be to use force to deal with the Nuclear Structure and not sanctions. Secondly, after 15 years, the iranian there is nothing in this arrangement that prevents uranium. From producing so that is something the administration could establish under the kind of principle that if they do that, it would be a trigger. Ie third thing, something savored for a while, the Obama Administration was able to restrain its enthusiasm over this proposal that i was in favor of at some point giving the israelis the ordinance thatrator, a massive bomb is a conventional device that beingactually deal with built into a mountain. And we should give that to the b2 can theyst the dont have a plane to carry it and the reason to do that would be twofold. One, even if we change it declaratory policy, maybe the iranians wouldnt believe it but if the israelis have this capability, they would likely believe that the israelis would act on it. And moreover, it would signal that we would be prepared to support the israelis under those circumstances. A fourth thing i would like to see happen. One of the concerns i have is that the uraniums are almost bound to cheat along the margins. Reason than to test how good the verification revisions were within the joint comprehensive plan of action. And again, if you are going to bolster to terrance, you have to establish that for every transgression, no matter how small, there is a price. For smaller transgression, the price should be proportional that there should still be a price. , ite is a joint commission is something that obviously brings together the five plus one who negotiated it but we have rdc the negotiations the access enriched materials beyond what they are supposed to. The procurement channel that was established for the express purpose of ensuring that we would have a clear picture into dual use capabilities, dual use materials they were acquiring, the iranians have only made five requests to this procurement chair which is another way of saying that they really are not using the procurement channel. Saidow that the germans they having gauged in illicit behavior trying to acquire dual use materials. We shouldint is that have some understandings, at least with the europeans, rather than being in a situation where in the joint commission we flag things from doing things they shouldnt do, they should see there is actually a consequence. There is actually a price for doing things they shouldnt do. Thatu establish over time when you transgress or violate, there is a consequence. So they get used to the idea and it becomes very clear. Aere is a big violation fit area i would like to see did terrance bolstered and i think the new it ministration could do are theyeful providing more than they were before . This could be something where we increase the price to them. There was a fear that if they get them, if the play into the hands of the hard wires. It would weaken rouhani. There was an analysis that the Obama Administration did that you could empower rouhani, doing the deal with the plan of action, empowering rouhani and being the more pragmatic constituency and whenever you did anything that might impose a price on them or be seen as provocative, it would hurt them. By the way, that is exactly the opposite of the logic that was for the Nuclear Issue. If you actually want to it could actually cost iran, it doesnt benefit iran. If you want the iranians to see that using she and militias to weaken the region is something that actually works against the iranian interests, they will pay a price for it. Should we be doing more to arms that they are not supposed to be providing . Yes. Should we look for ways to raise the cost . Yes. One of the things that iranians have not been shy about, they have been very clear that the nuclear deal doesnt prevent them from doing anything they want to do in the rest of the region. I dont know why we cant respond in kind. Maybe i will wrap up by simply saying the following if you raise the issue of the iranian elections, look. That how you think about the iranian election and what will happen and what we might do there are very few people who predicted that rouhani would win the last election. So the idea that we will govern our behavior by what we think will affect the iranian election is kind of about as good as thinking you could predict what would happen in our election. So we should be pretty humble thinking we could affect the election. There is a cautious towards the trumpet ministration, in no small part because they are not sure what the companys ration is going to do. So i would say we shouldnt be overly preoccupied with trying the iranian election which we are not good at, in any case. We should be doing what we think is the right thing to do. And i would simply remind everybody here that the iranian said to us that as long as there were sections they would not negotiate on the Nuclear Issue. Issued thatndously and they did negotiate. Im not arguing for a big increase in sanctions. Beingam arguing for not shy about designating where there is a need to designate. We should have done what the white house did. Not calls on the iranians to test Ballistic Missiles. They can say that since they dont intend to have Ballistic Missiles, anything they test isnt subject to that but look at the Ballistic Missiles. Look at the range they have. By the way, they could carry Nuclear Weapons. Is no reason why the administration shouldnt be going to other members of the five plus one and say that we told them not to do this and they are doing it anyway. So we should be implementing the sanctions that we have. Where iranian behavior justifies doing more, we should do more. Especially with the other members of the five plus one. We should look at ways of having an agreement on if they violate, what the price will be, at least with the europeans. And we should look for ways to raise the cost of the uranium for what they are doing in the region. On the what is applied Nuclear Issue should be applied on their regional behavior. Much thank you very dennis. Very clear, there he provocative. Raises a lot of interesting questions to discuss, hopefully. After mark has made his mark. Probablypatrick we all agree that iran presents problems in several areas. One area where they dont present an immediate problem is in the nuclear area. Because they are no longer marching had fast towards having to producing Nuclear Weapons in a short amount of time. Poe locked them from having that. They dont have that capability, we are not talking about going to war over these issues. So the region is more peaceful than it might have been otherwise. Andiran continues to enrage , in many ways, is problematic. And i agree with the proposition that the United States should be willing to sanction iran for these other areas in a nonnuclear field when warranted. And lets talk for a minute about what when warranted means. When sanctions can be more effective policy tools in changing the behavior in question. Be the policy to first choice. But a hammer isnt the only tool in the toolbox. Thatranted also means applying sanctions in other areas doesnt violate u. S. , whetherns intentionally or inadvertently. And undermining the sanctions release sanctions relief would violate it. I agree up with the washington institute, a very good report and i agree with several of the recommendations. Three in particular stood out. One is that the United States should not appear to be suspending the sanctions relief promised. A second was that the United States should avoid the rhetoric such as talking about the impact sanctions could have on investment in iran or the uncertainty new sanctions would introduce. You know, as dennis mentioned, there are many reasons why Foreign Companies are disinterested in engaging in investing in iran. Reinforce the iranian narrative that the United States is to blame for this lack of interest. A third recommendation was that the United States should avoid discussing the jcp away altogether when referencing resolutions on weapons. Main point is to prioritize its objectives. Blocks all iranian pass to a Nuclear Weapon is the first order objective, because only with Nuclear Weapons would national a direct Security Threat to the United States. Impairingands parent i rons Ballistic Missile program is the second objective. It is important but it isnt on par with stopping weapons from being developed. And stopping iran shipments to yemen is the third problem. The real issue in yemen is the internal political solution that is needed. More sanctions wont cause iran to buckle and renegotiate under u. S. Terms, as some who want to scrap the deal have argued. Realizes important to that sanctions alone werent jcpoa. Ible for the when the Obama Administration agreed on a major that they agreed to protocol. So it was in sentence and disincentives. Some say that obamas decision to allow enrichment was the original sin. I guess so. Without sex they were not going to give birth to a deal. It wasnt going to be a virgin deal that only benefited the United States. It is too important to their national defense. Their air force is so decrepit that they rely on Ballistic Missiles for their defense. If we really want to achieve a solution to the missile issue, it will require a broader arms i dont seeement iran excepting missile agreements that apply to itself but if they apply to others through multinational deal or sector or separate deals, maybe we have a possibility. We need enhanced export controls using the procurement channel. The german report about procurement wasnt specific as to whether irans ongoing procurement was in the nuclear or missile field. And you probably is mostly in the missile field. Civil defense measures are another tool you can use to deal with the missile threat. Some of the iran sanctions bill under consideration and congress seem to be drafted explicitly for that purpose of undermining oa. Jcp o the terror free skies act seems to rescind iran air as a specially resonated by the u. S. Treasury which would make it would bet licensed which means it is an explicit violation. This and other sanctions bills are designed to go to he ran into being the one that kills the jcpoa. Talking with iranians, i dont think they will be easily goaded. I think they will take a lot that we dish out at them because they dont want to be the ones to be seen as the party responsible for killing the deal. As is written last week, even of the trump team has maintained that it will abide by the deal, the global there to this already being set that if the Trump Administration that the Trump Administration is the unreasonable actor. If that scenario my dealings with europeans and others suggest that is the narrative and that means our partners are not going to join us in reopposing any sanctions. One other example of an idea that was put out there in new sanctions designating the Iran Revolutionary guard corps as a terrorist organization. It seems designed to warn against doing any business with role given the pervasive of the enterprise plays in the iranian economy. But that would be the letter. Thatll be the purpose of that. And there is no economic purpose designated. Iran has Authority Designated as a country as a state sponsor of terrorism for good reason. But if it is to be designated, and i think it is coming, i think it would be wise until west mosul falls. Because the militia is involved in the attack on isis in western mosul. And it would be counterproductive to sanction their sponsor, it would create difficulty in continuing to press that battle. And it would increase danger for forces in iraq. Classify as a group. Any potential Diplomatic Solutions to regional issues in which they are involved. If theyre part of the solution, it will be difficult as a terrorist group. It will be 10 amount to an unofficial declaration of war on iran. He exaggerates. He exaggerates. But there are a lot of iranians who would see it that way. So we create an emotional response in iran. We have to ask whether more pressure on iran would be a good idea. And we could see ironic i determine who is going to be the winner or lose her in iran. There is probably nothing we could do to be certain to help. I have a feeling there is a lot we could do to hurt him that like benefit a hardliner if he turns out to be the candidate of the hardliners. I think you have to admit he is a far better partner than some would be. If the objective of the exercise is to prolong enmity we another generation, should keep doing things that get the goat of the iranian people, like for bidding all of them from entering the United States under the terms of the visa ban. Reinforce the conservative narrative that the United States cannot be trusted antiiran. Concilably last point, im giving a talk this weekend have been thinking about parallels. We saw and the north korean case how abandoning a diplomatic deal that limited north Koreas Nuclear program, abandoning it has contributed very much to what seems now to be an insurmountable problem. The 1990 four agreement with north korea was not perfect. The North Koreans cheated, if they did, but the deal significantly rolled back their Weapons Program for a significant time. Similarly in the iranian case, it is far better to implement incomplete but effective agreement than it is to scrap it in hopes of achieving the best outcome but end up with the worst. I thank you. Thank you very much for excellent and provocative presentations. We will open this up to discussion. Forve quick questions speakers. Dennis, could you say a little about how you think the netanyahu government now sees the nuclear deal . Mine for lead reading between the lines is while they do not like it, then longer in a up mode but rather, lets make sure it works mode, if that is the case, then presumably that would have great resonance on the administration. And mark, you sort of alluded to the Upcoming Elections and you mentioned the ban on travelers from several countries. Me that this was a case of hitting ourselves in the face, particularly given the fact the iranians were banned. Once we know and like have never been connected. Mark i think within israel, there was a view within the establishment that there were flaws in the deal and concerns about the deal, but the deal brought time and rather than scrapping it, the smart thing to do was to ensure it would be ways to and figure out take advantage of the time. Heard from different voices. It as 15 years that you are buying. Others say as little as eight years. They feel the prospect of the walking away after it goes up, terminated as opposed to suspended. It then might increase. About wheny more they can start putting the advanced centrifuges starting in the year 10, but in any case, the basic view was you are buying time, what can you do within the region, what can you do within the United States to maximize the impact of the time . Netanyahus view was similar except in one area. Been riffing all along on the concern that iran is being legitimized as a nuclear state. s big concern was iran will find a way to become a Nuclear Weapons state. There will be a focus on serious and 4 enforcement, but i think there will be some push to find a way to renegotiate that. I suspect some will make the argument showing you will not scrap a deal that youre are open to be tougher on the iranians and might get other members of the five plus one to keep the Trumps Administration on the reservation, and if this is a way to keep them on, maybe you go back and talk to the iranians. Mucht think there is interest in renegotiating the deal. The travel ban is one of the dumbest ideas to come out of the white house in the last month and it applies disproportionately to iran because it has the largest population of the seven countries, probably more than the other six combined. It is a well educated, middleclass population. Likely to visit their relatives in the United States. It hits the iranians hardest. There is no prospect for iranians to get out of the assu. For iranians to get out of the box because there is no way to abide easily theit was a bad idea. Barbara, i will start with you here. You have got microphones in every direction. I think what has been missing, although mark touched on it a little bit, is what is the context for the iranian policy . Madeleine albright put it well. When you make policies, when you hit a ball in one direction, it may not go where you want to go. Dennis and mark to talk about what is the context of this. The policyat impact dealing with isis, syria, yemen . Should we be encouraging saudis to be more aggressive and even less swelling to talk to iranians about the region . Do you think the Trump White House even has a clue of how to put that together . There are a lot of moving parts to be sure. Let me take the second part first and then i will address the firstparts to be sure. Part. I think the policy is being formulated. But if you have a secretary of defense who came out, you now have someone who also has a lot of experience in both of them have part. Experience and one thing you should be, it is worth keeping in mind, they have a lot of experience losing american soldiers to shield militias in iraq that were armed and financed and trained by these iranians. That weighs heavily on them. Inform theyt will way they approach iran in the region. I think they there is a focus on iran in the region in some their ownnly because experience, what they see from traditional partners in the region, and the fears they have, but an interesting way, it is easier to deal with. If you are not going to teradata, which i think they conclude you should not tear it up because of the reasons, they understand from talking to europeans and others, it becomes more on theocus region. Now you come back to the priority on isis. At the end of the day, if you will defeat isis, you have to have a plan for what comes after. You raise to the role of the militia, more more on the region. Mosul been in outside it, but some militian iraq, when they have places most of the young sunni males disappear. Sectarianism. It does not make the prospect less likely. Part of the challenge is if youre going to have a strategy isis, it iswith trying to discredit it, having a plan for sunni inclusion, it is governance,n for and it is not clear exactly how the iranians help in that regard. If you look at the story in iraq, they have not been helpful in that regard. You get into, if youre really going to approach the region, you need the sin is with you. Today trying to draw the sunnis in with you to play a bigger ise dealing with isis, it not made more likely if it looks like you will partner with the iranians. It is made less likely. Analogy, theyour cue ball hits the eight ball and they can train in different directions. Fundamentally, youre going to need the sunnis with you. Question becomes is there a way to bring the sunnis with you if you dont have a the cue ball hits the eight ball and they can train in different directions. Strategy that counterke you will iran. If you have a strategy that looks like you will counter what iran is doing in the region, does that then put you in a better position to say, maybe you do not have to do as a . Obama gave the interview with Jeff Goldberg and said the saudis need to learn to share the region with iranians and he said this before he went to the sonnet the summit, it did not exactly endear him to them. He was the one foreign leader the king chose not to meet at the airport. There was an article written the day after the summit. Comeid the president had and asked the leaders to act we ask. Obviously he did not come to ask that but that is what they heard. It is a complicated region. If you will have a strategy toward isis, you have to have a strategy toward iranians that i think is effective in countering them. Differ is my i may basic approach to the iranians is built the pressure on them but leave them a way out. If you dont build the pressure on them i do not show what he does comes with a cost, they will continue to engage in more active uses and that only ends up deepening sectarianism. David, were you next . Thank you. Ask both speakers about the possibility of a small scale but direct skirmish between iranian and u. S. Forces somewhere. Maybe inside iraq, i dont know. How likely do you think that is, what do you think would happen, and what do you think would be the effect if any on the Nuclear Agreement . It is a good question. I hope iranians are paying attention and hearing what Administration Officials are saying about the harassment of u. S. Ships and the next time that it happens, they will be sank. I suspect they would be. Here is the case where the United States has put out a position. If it happens, which it might, theyou cannot be certain boat wont have gotten the word, there will be a flare up. Then the question is, do the Communication Channels in the Obama Administration work to overcome the flareup . I think those channels are working at lower levels but there is no one answering the phone in the state department yet. Itould hope he would see to that it did not flareup because he knows he would lose. He is not in charge of the original operation but he can have an impact on it. It is obviously a tough issue for a lot of different reasons. If you look at the iranian behavior right now, they look to me to be somewhat more cautious. Interesting, when Michael Flynn said we are putting the iranians on notice, and the predator the president backs it up with a i found that not the found that not the equivalent of the obama redline, but when you say on notice, you raise expectations about what you will do. Does it mean more designations . Mean you will act militarily militarily . If on the if you are on the iranian side, you should be more cautious. I think the potential for the very thing you identified in your question is higher than it was not because the iranians did not take notice of it. I think they did. If we look back during the quiteraq war, they acted independently of what decisionmakers were saying. Risk that we could have that incident, yes. I think it is a highrisk. You look at the secretary of defense with his experience, and i think the potential is pretty high. What to the isdefense iranians do about it . Response is more rhetorical but if i were doing what i used to do, we might see it express itself in places like iraq. Analogy, i think when you make policy, you have to be a chess player and not a checkers player. You have to be thinking three or four moves ahead. The answer to your question was not, what is the immediate invocation as it relates to not so much vertical escalation but a horizontal escalation, there is a risk of that. Let me go through who i know alland i do not your names, the lady here, the gentleman in the white suit, and the lady next to david right there. That is four. Stephen . Ok. Yes. Deputy managing editor of the weekly standard. The travel ban, it seemed especially silly. Lotguessing they are a friendlier to us than those who dont. Ask, i think the idea that he is a moderate is debatable. I might agree with you he is someone we would rather deal he doesnts it true have influence and do we think that whomever is president of iran, that is where the buck who we arehat is dealing with and who needs to sign off on any issue . Clearly, iran is not led by the president. The political nature is one of consensusbased decisionmaking among various groups in the elite. Theyis the only election have, for the president at this point. Moderate,say he is a but he is far better than a hardliner. The question about context, context under obama was that it was a transactional deal and we got limits on the program and there was a hope that it might be transformative, that iran over time would change in ways that would be better in all the policy areas where we have concern for iran. That hope is still out there. Given the demographics of iran, it is fair to hope that it someday can and we can affect how that evolves negatively or positively. We cannot finetune an election outcome for continuing to chastise iranians i dont think works to our benefit. Think of the refusal to take a stand on the Green Movement . Are talking about demographics of iran changing. Do you think the United States needs to be more supportive of freedom movements in iran . Not think the Green Movement has much standing in iran. It is a moot question really. A question for you. You talk about the importance of showing iranians there is a for transgressions. What is the appropriate price if what inetric tons a practical sense would you have wanted to see the administration and moret circumstance broadly, i dont mean to raise a trivial question but i think it is a genuine a genuine question. More explained in explain in more granular detail the kinds of ways you try to raise the questions on iranians if you do see things they are doing that you dont want to see . This goes back to barbaras question. How do you do that . Will a blizzard of designations change their behavior or not . How do you do that when they continue to punish you in so many horizontal ways, whether it it is not aq simple answer to the question exceeding byy are a small amount, what should be the price. If you sit had is and talk and say, lets come up with these consequences or they are engaging in what would be small amounts of violations or infractions, that they can engage in behaviors not consistent to the deal, it does not make sense to me if what you want to do is the idea that for a transfer action violation, there will be a price. There can be limited kinds imposed but that ought to be something you discuss and work out in advance. That is the point i was getting at. Idea that because they can hurt you in a number of ways, you should be self deterred, well, they can read that. It is not like they are constraining themselves in terms of what they are doing right now. Like they are holding back. It is not like they are holding back. , yes. Try to do more i will try to do that. They are not supposed to be doing it under the concert under the terms of the resolution as it is. It is not like we are in the wrong about this. True you have to think through every move you make. It is also true that if every time you are afraid that when they engage in behaviors they should not be engaging and, that you cannot do anything, that message is clear to them. Like their involvement in some places in the region are with the iranian public. The fact they spent a lot of is notn the outside something so welcome at home. I would do a lot more to expose that so the public would be aware. Is not when i say to raise the price, there are different ways to, including shining a spotlight on that. Iran hasght add that one of the worst environmental crises in the water east thanks to shortages and mismanagement and that is hurting a lot of people. Next. Klesko governor of virginia. Here is my question. First of all, a quick observation. It sounds to me like the panel believes that weve already improved the ability to did to deter iran by the statement of the president to general flynn. So actually our Foreign Policy has improved already. Here is my question. Everything we said today is all about handling iran, the Nuclear Program, how to handle it. I dont mean to be naive but can i get a clear statement of what iranians are trying to do . Are they trying to create a caliphate . Are they trying to protect their own regime . What are we trying to stop them from doing in the first place . Let me say, i am more of a when i trycialist so to offer a suggestion of what iranians are trying to do, i may be 100 wrong. Most of the states in which iran is involved are on their periphery, many of them involve shiite populations that they see themselves as a natural leader of a probably part of it is state byn of the defending neighboring states and part of it is defending coreligionists. Im sure that is a shallow answer and dennis could do better. I think iranians have a self image that they are the dominant and they have a tendency to look down on many neighbors. That by right,el they should be able to dominate the region. They have offensive reasons because they think they have the right and defensive because this is a way to protect the regime. So, they think they should be the dominant power within the region. It is true there is a periphery but there is also lebanon and you look at the investment they assad. De to back the argument that they would like to have a core door basically from iran through iraq to syria and the mediterranean, i think is probably not wrong. They can rationalize that in defensive terms, but others see it in office of terms. The fact that they were clearly interested at one point in trying to open up through syria, they might argue, i know how israelis see that, you know, the fact that they have given over know,0 rockets, you certainly again, they have a huge stake. It is one place where they they have a huge stake in that and it helps to explain the level of investment made in syria. That their use of hezbollah in particular, it has shock been like the troops in lebanon. The reason there has been an importation and the huge numbers are there, very large numbers, it is because the actual numbers of forces available to the regime have declined as much as they have. Militia to hold territories. Anyway, one last observation on this. For a long time, before the conflict in syria began, i always looked at hezbollah as being a Lebanese Organization first and basically an instrument of the iranian second. Given the way they were employed in syria in a way that was not in hezbollah or lebanese interest, it became clear to me they were basically an instrument of iran. Recalledyou say iran regards itself as an exceptional power . It does, absolutely. Absolutely. , obamasstion now with a Trump Administration in power, how does the what does the Trump Administration want on iran, on isis, and finally, on that issue, because when he sees the change, i would like your analysis on that. Represent the Trump Administration and do not want say thata position to i know what their policy will be. I might not express it very well. Drawingink at least from the press conference, it does seem the president has an interest in broadening the circle and creating a regional it is not a simple thing to do. Think, both the saudis at this point are hopeful they view, fairly or not, that the Obama Administration saw the iranians as part of a solution to the problem, not the source of the problem, and they therefore became deeply distrustful of the administration. I think when the administration put iran on notice, i think they like that. I think the language toward iran is generally reassuring to them but i think they will have to be. What the policies will it is not just what is being said. It is actually what is being done. Mattis is someone they know well. That is a source of summary and should reassurance and there is an expectation within the region. An interesting thing is they are not keen on having this ripped up either. But this has always been a andinction between israelis the key gulf states in particular. Of israeli israeli view iran was in a nuclear lens. Was through what iran is doing on the ground in the region, with a saw. They were more concerned about obama doing a deal on the they sawssue because that as a suggestion the deal would, at their expense. They were worried basically if iran can cause all sorts of problems when theyre under sanctions, unimagined the kinds of problems when they no longer that was kind of the perception of the gulf states and they have annexed dictation of what will be done, but it remains to be seen what that means in practice. Could you say your name . I am a reporter for the washington post. I would put this to both of you. We used to hear a lot about whatcans held in iran and role they played in potential diplomacy or dealmaking or sanctions involving the United States and iran. Release ofsince the the nuclear deal, we have heard a lot less about that. Iere are probably more that am not aware of, but at least two americans held there. Do you expect that to return as an issue, a front burner issue, and if so, how, and do you think the travel ban will influence the thinking or behavior with . Egard to the likelihood thank you. It is a very good question and tomorrow marks the oneyear anniversary it should very much be on our minds. How we deal with it and what used, it is a tricky set of issues. The answer to your question about whether this will continue as an issue, i think it is yes. Of ways can the revolutionary guards hit back in a nonnuclear area . They do not want to kill the nuclear deal. They will sanction the united you understand what i mean . There are various ways the iranians can hit back, taken taking the dual citizens, there are more british dual citizens in jail right now that americans, it is one of the tools that they half. They have. One person whose name never seems to get mentioned is robert, who has been held for a very long time, who the iranians have not been straightforward on in terms of his status. Has views his status at different points to try and affect the administration. I agree with mark that this has been a practice. The there you see competition within the regime as well. Time in they own Obama Administration, when we wee trying to get this back, clearly got indications of, there would be times when it looked more promising and then suddenly, it all changed. Then the judiciary is entering into this. In terms of the competition with in the elite and kind of the interplay with those forces. Agenda, juston the because of the fundamental humanity of it. It gets back to, we are in the early stages of administration whose policy has not really been articulated yet. I think we need to have a better sense of what that will be so we understand more of the priorities and what they really are. Ok. Three more on the list and then we will call it a day. It was president obama in his interview who said after about your 13 under irans breakup time, it was reduced reduced to zero. That has been the fundamental flaw with the agreement. It is not that it does not provide protections between now and your 10, 12, 13, it is what happens of longterm and where do we find ourselves in the future. Under the agreement, we are basically agreeing today that a lot of things that were sanctioned and prohibited prohibited in the past will become perfectly permissible and something we agreed iran will to do starting in the year 2010. He said an area of particular concern is higher enriched uranium. Level much and to what iran can produce highly enriched uranium. Critical, would you want to worry about breakout time, the more highly enriched uranium they have, not just one but many very quickly, so you throughout that wethy suggestion just tell the iranians that if they exercise this right that president obama and others agree they should have, we will use military force to take out their capability. The lawyer in me says what youre threatening to do is use military force the iranians will have a completely founded claim, the deal was they would have an unfettered ability to produce as much uranium at whatever level they wanted at the future and you are saying, if you do that, we will bomb you. Iis essentially what guess my first question is do you think of the Trump Administration gets that support in other if not, do you think it should be seen as credible by the youians, and we ask whether agree with that suggestion and if you dont, what is your solution, you know, lets be clear, they could come up with explanations,ble we need lots of highly enriched uranium, we decide we need a nuclear navy and you americans use highly enriched uranium for yours, so we are anticipating when we have one, you know, it might be a completely phony explanation but as a legal matter, i think they could put it forward. If they do that, what is your proposal . I would like to know what you think we should do if you do not agree with the proposal to just bomb them. Terrific questions. Up directly follow on that point. What i run has 10 years from now, under the agreement years, they are limited to 3. 67 . After, there is no limitation on the enrichment. My point is the Trump Administration may be in office for four years or eight years. It is not likely to be in office for 15. Does ahat extent position like this taken by an Administration Today have credibility with iran . For both ofuestions you, we are running short so keep it up. So quick and to the point. The way i would do this, i would not just announce this right now. See theould like to Trump Administration do is go to the other members and say we should at a minimum agree amongst ourselves that they should not be allowed to produce highly enriched uranium. Did comey secretary out and say they would have no justifiable reason for producing but they did not take it further than that, and i would like to go to the other members and say, lets have an agreement among us that we will communicate to them that this is not acceptable, and that we will read that as an indication of them in fact wanting to put themselves in a position to have a Nuclear Weapon. Try and private to see if others will except it, and if it is not accepted by the others, still be prepared to communicated at least in private and at some point, say it publicly. Bind anyot necessarily administration. Just like when i say i want to change on the clear toward policies, you want to begin to condition the environment and get everyone used to the idea that iranians should understand they should not be tempted to move in that direction. My big fear that you are also noting is i am worried that they think we have deferred having a weapon but we have not given up the option. I do not want them to be tempted and i think we need to think about what we can do to make it less likely they would be tempted. After 15 years, if iran abides by all the limits and the inspections do not turn up violations, is that iran would is aa Nuclear Program that socalled normal Nuclear Program and would follow the same limits applied to others and the ability to enrich as much as they want would be a right, but there are also other limits that exporting countries can put through Nuclear Suppliers group or other norms or political restrictions. Countries can decide collectively that we do not want any that is not legitimate for the purpose, especially if it had a past with Nuclear Weapons development. I do not go along with the idea of saying we will bomb them, but i think the policy is a reasonable one. Be we will enforce it might a matter for Nuclear Future administrations. Through the inspection process of, if they abide by all of the rules, and there are no outstanding questions about the Nuclear Program, then they will be eligible to get the socalled broader conclusion of all of the Nuclear Material for all purposes. Reason for any suspicion at all, im pretty sure the Trump Administration would make that known and we would not draw that conclusion that all activities are for peaks will purposes. Able tohas not been reach the standard required for additional protocol, i think the country concerned about iran would probably want to renegotiate the deal at that point because they would have legitimate concerns that something is still amiss and iran is not behaving like a normal country and we do not want those limits to come off and that would be my approach. Thank you. Wait a second. I just wanted to go back to two different points dennis ross made. The first is the idea of somehow providing deterrent strategy. Would be quite something, a Delivery System in use with Nuclear Weapons. I say it raises a number of issues of beyond the ability to attack a single site. We are seeing other countries were advanced suppliers are offering Nuclear Weapon platforms. Other issues are involved here. Quite suchd it to be a troubling aspect. They have so many extra unused centrifuges that to cannibalize 15 or 20 years, to keep the existing level going, so they dont need to going to the marketplace for that purpose, the iraq reactor which they will be building, still in the early design phases. Surprise theyly a are not in the market looking for Replacement Parts or whatever it might be. For conventional purposes. We have been using it now for conventional purposes. The last i had a list had on the list was talking right now, still on my list, madam . Ok. My question is about , and what that would mean internationally. If sanctions are imposed, how would they be received by your and russia and china given the broader state of turbulent relations with the Trump Administration, and is there a way to structure a sanctions will that would make it more effective in terms of convincing partners to go along . Does it have something to do with structuring of ownership, and the need to be transparent as a shareholder, at what level . I dont see much appetite today in europe for such a designation. If the irgc had been involved in activities of a particular interest to europeans, like Human Rights Violations, they willing to go along with the designation. I dont think that is the purpose for the designation. Willingthe purpose seems to bea to inflict punishment on the iranian ike iranian economy. The sanctions should be smart and directed at the cave year that is egregious. Violate and we we shouldtain have a good idea the sanctions are more effective in changing behavior than other possible tools. Ok. I basically agree with him on that designation. I do not think you should actually require that. Thank you very much. Thank you for an enlightened and provocative off audience. Thank you cspan and we wish you a good day. Thank you. [applause] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2017]