Transcripts For CSPAN Hearing On Drone Threats 20220717

Chairman peters drones readily accessible. The faa estimates by 2024 about 2. 4 3 million usafs including 1. 5 million recreational drums at model aircraft and about 800,000 commercial uafs will be registered to fly in u. S. Airspace. Between 2016 and 2019 Airline Pilots reported on average more than 100 drone sightings per month to the faa. Uass operating in our airspace creates higher risk of rogue drones, either failing to obey safety rules or operating with nefarious intentions, threatening manned aircraft operations, airports, Critical Infrastructure facilities and high profile widely attended events such as sporting events, concerts and more. While most individuals operate their drones responsibly, we have already seen careless and malicious actors misuse these technologies to engage in reckless or criminal activities. In september of 2017, a privately operated drone in brooklyn, new york was intentionally flown beyond the operators line of sight and collided with a u. S. Army blackhawk helicopter patrolling a temporary nofly zone around new york city. Thankfully, the blackhawk and its crew landed safely, but there was significant damage to the helicopter, and the incident created an unacceptable risk to the Service Members in that helicopter. In 2019, a drone significantly disrupted Flight Operations at Newark Liberty airport for 90 minutes, causing nine flights to be diverted, halting 43 planes inbound to the airport, and also causing significant delays for passengers. These events demonstrate the severity of the threat posed by uas, and if we do not act, it could only be a matter of time before someone who is recklessly operating this technology causes an accident that can have catastrophic effects. And as we work to avoid unintentional disasters, we must also account for the escalating threat of weaponized drones from terrorists and criminal organizations, who could launch a domestic drone attack on Mass Gatherings, high profile landmarks, and buildings or federal property. This includes foreign adversaries who have deployed drones in conflicts abroad and could have the capability to deploy them here in the United States as well. We must also be prepared to counter drones operated by criminal organizations that are reportedly using uass for illegal activities, including trafficking illicit drugs across our borders. I am grateful to my colleagues who have led past efforts to address these concerns and to improve the safe integration of uas and american airspace, including senator johnson for authoring the preventing emerging threats act since 2018. The authorities created by this law have bolstered our nations ability to protect numerous large public events, including the super bowl, from uas threats. Todays hearing is an opportunity to discuss renewing and updating these authorities, which are set to expire this october. As well as the bidens administrations domestic counter uas National Action plan, the first coordinated government plan to address the evolving security threats posed by uas. Im working on Bipartisan Legislation that i plan to introduce in the coming weeks to reauthorize and strengthen counter us authorities to better tackle this threat today. Im pleased that we have a panel of expert witnesses from dhs, doj, and the faa who can discuss what lawmakers can do to ensure the federal government is better equipped to safeguard against potential threats from uass. Id now like to recognize Ranking Member portman for his opening comments. Thanks, mr. Chairman. Thanks to the witnesses for being here. I look forward to hearing from you. Were here today to discuss the emerging threats posed by Unmanned Aircraft systems, or drones. In 2018, under the leadership of senator ron johnson whos here this morning, we provided as congress some new authorities to the department of Homeland Security and department of justice to counter the threats posed by the use of drones. Unfortunately, those authorities are about to expire, and this expiration could not come at a worse time. Cartels and Transnational Criminal Organizations use drones to smuggle drugs and surveil u. S. Law enforcement in furtherance of illicit cross border activity. These cartels have also begun to weaponize drones in order to commit attacks. So far, these attacks, as far as we know, have been in mexico. But i think weaponized drones along the border are now an emerging threat. To give you a sense of the scale of the problem, in joint testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security in march, representatives from dhs said that in a previous five month period, cbp identified more than 30,000 individual flights near or at the southern border where half of those flights violated faa regulations. We know that at a minimum, these drones were used for surveilling our u. S. Law enforcement efforts and for smuggling drugs into the country, including fentanyl, the deadly synthetic opioid. Relatively small amounts of it can kill hundreds of thousands, millions of people. So its subject to being smuggled in relatively small drones. My office has repeatedly asked dhs since february of this year for more information and statistics of these drone border incursions and how they plan to address this emerging threat. Moreover, the Biden Administrations domestic counter drone National Action plan provides no explicit additional authorities for dhs to counter Unmanned Aircraft systems as it pertains to the border. Make no mistake, the mexican Transnational Criminal Organizations will benefit from the lack of additional counter Drone Authority for cbp and other agencies with responsibility for securing our nations borders. For these reasons, im eager to hear how dhs, the doj, and the faa have used their existing authority to mitigate the threats posed by illicit use of drones. I also hope to discuss what new authorities this committee can give the administration to improve the counter drone mission, especially at the border. Recently, the Biden Administration provided this committee with a comprehensive legislative proposal which seeks a number of changes and expansions to existing counter drone authorities. I look forward to working with senator peters, senator johnson, and other members of this committee to review this proposal. The committee has already done good work to address the threat to National Security and economic competitiveness posed by chinese made drones when we reported out the bipartisan American Security drone act last year. Among other things, this legislation would prohibit the federal government from purchasing and using drones manufactured by our adversaries. Im very concerned about reports of the purchase by dhs and the doj, Law Enforcement of chinese drones and the National Security risks that this poses. Im pleased that the legislation that we reported out of committee, but has not yet gone to the floor, is included in the Senate Passed package. You seek a package and i urge our leadership, particularly Speaker Pelosi in the house, to swiftly pass so this can become law. With that said, i look forward to productive conversation about the current drone threats to our homeland and actions being taken to prevent them. I look forward to hearing from the witnesses. Thank you again, mr. Chairman, thank you. Chairman peters it is the practice of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs committee to swear in witnesses. So if each of you would please stand and raise your right hand. Do you swear that the testimony you will give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you god . Thank you. You may be seated. Todays first witness is samantha vinograd, the acting assistant secretary for counterterrorism and Threat Prevention and Law Enforcement policy in the office of strategy policy and plans at the department of Homeland Security. Ms. Vinograd began her career serving president george w. Bush as the deputy u. S. Treasury attache to iraq, and subsequently served on president Barack Obamas National Security council as director for iraq, director for international economics, and Senior Advisor to the National Security advisor. Previously, she was a cnn National Security analyst, a Senior Adviser at the biden institute, and a visiting fellow at the university of Chicago Institute of politics. Ms. Vinograd, welcome. You may proceed with your opening remarks. Ms. Vinograd chairman peters, Ranking Member portman, and distinguished members. Thank you for inviting me to testify about the department of Homeland Securitys efforts to protect the homeland from the increasing threat posed by Unmanned Aircraft systems, often referred to as uass, or drones. Today, i will explain how the department has relied on authorities granted in the preventing emerging threats act of 2018 to counter the malicious use of drones and why we are asking congress to reauthorize and expand our counter drone authorities to fill specific gaps that are exposing the homeland to serious threats. We are committed to judiciously and responsibly implementing our authorities so that we can stay ahead of the threat while protecting privacy and civil rights and Civil Liberties and absolutely everything that we do. The Threat Landscape from drones is heightened and candidly escalating extremely fast. Drones have been used to conduct dangerous counter attacks, have interfered with aircraft and airports, have been used to survey, disrupt, and damage Critical Infrastructure and services, and more. Nearly every day, Transnational Criminal Organizations use drones to convey narcotics and contraband across u. S. Borders. In fact, cbp has detected more than 8000 illegal cross border drone flights at the southern border just since august 2021. In light of this threat environment, it is critical the dhs had the authority to protect the homeland from uas threats consistent with our statutory missions. To date, dhs has relied on the preventing emerging threat act to carry out critical uas missions, including protecting the president and Vice President , safeguarding sensitive assets, facilities and special events in the maritime sector, protecting federal facilities and personnel, and countering illicit narcotic and contraband trafficking. Based on our experience through over 300 deployments, theres clear evidence that there are gaps in authorities which are exposing the American People to significant risk. For example, even though the transportation security administration, or tsa, is responsible for protecting airports, it lacks authority to proactively and persistently protect transportation infrastructure from drone threats and invert disruptions and real tragedies. This is especially concerning since the tsa has reported nearly 2000 drone sightings near u. S. Airports since 2021, several of which have resulted in pilots taking evasive actions. 65 evasive actions, in fact, and the disruption of airport operations. Furthermore, state, local, tribal and territorial Law Enforcement are often the First Responders when a malicious drone incident occurs, but they are not currently authorized to detect or mitigate drone threats, thereby delaying a response. Critical infrastructure owners and operators are often the victims of drone surveillance and have even been targeted for kinetic attacks, but they have no authority to detect drones or to request mitigation from authorized Law Enforcement. Bottom line, our partners are absolutely critical to protecting the homeland from uas threats, but lack the authority to do so, which, again, exposes the homeland and the American People to significant risk. Dhs therefore strongly supports the administrations legislative proposal to reauthorize dhs and dojs current authorities, as well as to expand them to remedy the gaps that ive identified. It would grant tsa the authorities it needs to protect the nations Transportation System from uass. Threats would also authorize partners and Critical Infrastructure owners and operators to engage in detection of uass. Lastly, it would create a limited Pilot Program for Law Enforcement to engage in protection activities in their jurisdictions under the strict oversight of dhs and doj. The proposal would require that authorized Critical Infrastructure owners and operators adhere to comparable safeguards and standards to those that federal entities follow. Nonfederal entities would be required to use federally approved equipment, receive standard standardized training and certification, conduct risk based assessments, coordinate with faa to ensure aviation safety, and very importantly, adhere to federal privacy, civil rights, and Civil Liberties protections. We just cannot keep pace with this threat environment without these additional counter drone authorities. It just isnt possible, and we hope that this committee Will Champion them. Congressional action is urgently required as our Current Authority will expire in less than three months, and the lapse would be catastrophic. I thank the committee for holding a hearing on this important topic and look forward to your questions. Chairman peters thank you miss vinograd. Our next witness is brad wiegmann, Deputy Assistant attorney general in the National Security division at the department of justice. Mr. Wiegmann brings a wealth of government experience, having served in legal positions at the department of defense and the National Security council over the span of two decades. Previously, mr. Wiegmann worked at the private law firm of shea and gardner, where he focused on civil litigation and legal policy matters. Hes also served as a law clerk for judge Patrick Higginbotham on the United States court of appeals for the fifth circuit. Mr. Wiegmann, welcome to the committee. You may proceed with your opening comments. Mr. Wiegmann thank you, chairman peters. Thank you Ranking Member and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the department of justice. We strongly support the administrations legislative proposal to allow us to continue to protect Major National events and Important Department facilities from the threat posed by misuse of drones. This legislation would also enable us, as assistant secretary vinograd just said, to expand our counter drone efforts, both in respect to the types of facilities that we can protect and to empower our state and local partners to participate in this critical mission. So we understand at the doj that drones are bringing great benefits to our society and our economy, but like many advances in technology, drones also bring serious risks to the public when theyre misused. As has been alluded to already in the opening statements, were seeing an increase in the use of drones for a wide spectrum of criminal and other dangerous activities. They can be weaponized to conduct attacks using firearms, explosives, or other materials. They can conduct Cyber Attacks against wireless devices or networks, and they can conduct espionage or traffic in narcotics and contraband. Beyond these nefarious uses, drones are often used carelessly to create hazards to the public. Let me just give you a few recent examples. In february 2020, a subject was arrested and charged in connection with his efforts to use a drone to drop explosives near a georgia mobile home park. Between september 2021 and february 2022, four defendants pled guilty to conspiracy to deliver contraband via drones into fort dix prison in new jersey. Weve recently seen mexican drug cartels using drones to drop bombs on their rivals in mexico, as well as to traffic drugs into the United States. In may of this year, a defendant was sentenced after using a drone to drop fliers over spectators at two separate nfl games in california, and it obviously could have been something much worse than flyers. Under the Current Authority that congress has granted, the fbi has conducted 70 counter drone Protection Operations at large events, ranging from the super bowl to the new years eve celebration in times square. That represents only. 05 of the over 121,000 events during that time for which an assessment was requested so that counter drone support could be provided. So the demand for counter drone support has far outstripped the federal governments limited resources. During those 70 operations by fbi, our counter drone teams detected 970 for noncompliant drones in restricted airspace. They located the operator in 279 cases and attempted mitigation against 50 drones. Our Current Authority, as chairman peters mentioned, to counter drones expires in october if its not extended by congress. The reason we need this authority is because our use of this technology would otherwise run afoul of various criminal statutes. So our proposal, our legislative proposal, would extend our Current Authority permanently and then expanded to address some critical gaps. Now, i just want to talk about a few of those briefly in my opening statement. First, as has been mentioned, the legislation would authorize state and local Law Enforcement and owners and operators of Critical Infrastructure to use certain detectiononly capabilities. We need to empower others to help us take on this responsibility. Notably, the detectiononly technology does not jam, or otherwise disrupt, drones, or other aircraft, and therefore, it does not pose any risk to the safety of the National Airspace. This can be safely done today. Second, the legislation would authorize a limited Pilot Program for up to 12 state and local Law Enforcement entities each year to engage in both detection and mitigation activities. By mitigation, i mean actually interfering with the flight of the drone. This would allow our state and local partners to protect sensitive state facilities and Mass Gatherings in their jurisdictions. Now, the participants in the program would be required to receive training and vetting and to follow the same rules as federal agencies must currently follow and all of their activities would have to be coordinated in advance with federal partners, including the faa, which could withhold approval if there was a risk to the National Airspace. Third, the legislation would enable the Marshal Service to protect high risk prisoner transports. Current authority covers our prisons and courthouses, but it doesnt expressly address high risk prisoner transport, so it would fill that gap. I want to say a word about privacy and Civil Liberties. We are committed to ensuring that we respect all Constitutional Rights and privacy as we conduct our counter drone activities. The technologies we employ typically detect only communications being passed between the controller and the drone to direct its activities. They do not extract text messages, email or internet search histories from phones or tablets used to control drones, nor do they allow us to listen to voice calls. We typically collect information such as the drone vendor and model, the controlling device, serial number, the geolocation of the drone, the location of the controller, and the most recent takeoff location. This is much like the information thats going to be required to be broadcast by the new remote id rule and is currently required for manned aircraft. As is required in current law, the doj will continue to have guidance that contains express protections for privacy and Civil Liberties. And state and locals would be required to follow the same rules. I appreciate the opportunity to testify today and look forward to answering your questions. Chairman peters thank you. Mr wiegmann. Todays final witnesses is tanya coultas, deputy associate administrator for security and Hazardous Materials safety at the federal Aviation Administration at the department of transportation. In her role, she provides executive oversight of National Security policies, plans, and programs involving manned and Unmanned Systems. In addition to several other security related topics. Ms. Coultas has over 30 years of combined federal executive, local, state, military, and International Experience supporting Defense Intelligence safety, disaster response, and Crisis Management efforts. Previously, ms. Coultas served as a Senior Executive for the dhs National Protection and programs directorate now cisa , office of Infrastructure Protection and for fema. Welcome to the committee. You may proceed with your opening remarks. Ms. Coultas sure, okay, plan b. Chairman peters, Ranking Member portman, and members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me to speak with you today about the faas role ensuring safety, security and efficiency of the nations airspace as it pertains to Unmanned Aircraft systems, or uas, or drones. At the faa, we are constantly working to welcome these beneficial new technologies into the national air system, while minimizing any impacts to our existing air Transportation System and to the public. Eevery day, commerciallyoperated uas contribute to our economy by inspecting infrastructure, supporting agriculture and other industries, assisting Public Safety agencies, and conducting a myriad of other tasks. Congress has recognized these tremendous benefits to our economy and society and has been fully supportive as we integrate this technology into our airspace in a safe and secure manner. However, the faa does acknowledge the potential misuse of this Technology Poses unique security challenges that enable malicious actors to exploit vulnerabilities or circumvent traditional groundbased security measures for our Security Partners. For that reason, congress authorized the department of defense, energy, justice and Homeland Security to use technologies designed to respond to uas that pose a threat within their mission responsibilities. You are directing the faa to work with these agencies to ensure that detection and mitigation measures do not compromise the safety and efficiency of the airspace. The faas chief role is to support our partners testing and eventual use of these detection and mitigation systems, many of which use radio frequency and other technologies that could potentially interfere with air navigational systems, communication avionics systems which are all critical to safety of flight. Along with developing our plans for certification of uas detection and mitigation systems, the faa is also tasked with testing and evaluating these technologies for potential use near airports. We and our Security Partners have developed agency specific and jointly agreed upon processes to determine when, how, and what detection or mitigation technologies can be safely used in a particular location. We also developed notification protocols to be used during an active detection or counter uas event. The administrations proposal to expand uas detection and mitigation authorities so that other federal departments and agencies, as well as other public and private Critical Infrastructure entities, will be able to use tested systems to safely protect sensitive facilities, operations, and people from the malicious or errant use of uas. The proposal, which the faa does support, would give limited uas detectiononly authority to the nonfederal Law Enforcement community, as well as airports and Critical Infrastructure owners and operators. It would also create a temporary Pilot Program for nonfederal Law Enforcement to begin using uas mitigation technologies under federal oversight. In addition, the faa would be authorized to assess Civil Penalties against those who use detection or mitigation technologies in an unauthorized manner that endangers the National Airspace. All areas of new or expanded authorities include robust safeguards to ensure the current level of safety is preserved. We recognize that expanding uas mitigation authorities beyond our current federal partners will present challenges, and for that reason, the proposal for the Pilot Program reflects an incremental approach to evaluating such authorities and safeguards that include interagency coordination or participant Selection Training of system operators, and requires Program Participants to work through dhs and doj in coordination with the faa. There is no question that a seamless Security Framework is critical to advancing the administrations goal of fully integrating us into the nasa, maximizing the Public Benefits from this technology. By taking deliberate steps to support those entities with duties to protect against emerging uas based threats. The United States will continue to lead the way in the full integration of uas while maintaining the safest, most efficient and most secure airspace system in the world. We thank the committee for its leadership on this issue and look forward to working together to balance safety and innovation with security. Chairman peters thank you, ms. Caultus. Well, this this committee is constantly focused on all of the threats that the homeland faces on on a daily basis. And clearly, the three of you have outlined significant threats posed by uass. But my question for you, mr wiegmannn, is how would the fbi assess the potential threat from uass along the threat spectrum . Is this low, is this medium or is this high . And what i think mr. Wiegmann i think what i would say is the fbi director has testified before that this is a very significant threat. Given the easy ability to to buy a drone commercially, its easy to get. Theyre easy, very easy to use and not that difficult to weaponize as weve talked about. And thats what were seeing. The fbi director predicted a few years ago that we would see an attack, a drone attack, on a mass gathering. Happily, we havent seen one yet, but i think its a matter of time until we do see that type of misuse of drones or an attack in the United States. Chairman peters thank you, ms. Vinograd. In your testimony, you discussed the potential use of uass as weapons, as well as interference tools. They could target airports as well as other types of Critical Infrastructure here in the country. I would like you to explain for the committee more specifically what authorities does dhs currently lack to counter this this threat. And what should this committee focus on as we draft legislation to reauthorize the current legislation . Ms. Vinograd senator peters, thank you. As my colleague just noted, the threat posed by the malicious use of drones represents a significant and increasing risk to the homeland and the American People. Currently, under the preventing emerging threats act of 2018, we are authorized to engage in protective measures against Credible Threats posed by uass to the safety and security of certain dhs protective missions. That includes, for example, the protection of government personnel, president , Vice President , federal facilities, sensitive assets in the maritime sector and elsewhere, as well as Mass Gatherings. What we have witnessed over the last four years as we have judiciously and responsibly implemented our existing authorities is that there are significant gaps in our ability to protect the homeland from drones. We have seen an increasing number of malicious drone incidents in and around airports. We have witnessed 2000 sightings of drones in and around airports since 2021. Since 2021, aircraft have had to engage in 64 evasive actions that includes four commercial carriers doing so. There have been 30, on average 30, airport disruptions each year. And in these scenarios, seconds matter. What we are seeking for the Transportation Security Agency or tsa is the ability, based upon this escalating threat environment, to engage in the proactive and persistent protection of the transportation sector to include airports. This will literally help avert tragedy, both as it pertains to the potential loss of human life and economic impact. When airports have to shut down, that costs millions of dollars. So this will help avert tragedy. Second, we are seeking authority for state, local, tribal, and territorial partners, as well as Critical Infrastructure owners and operators to be authorized to engage in the detection of uass. Those authorities would be implemented under the supervision and oversight of federal departments and agencies. We are also seeking the ability for a timelimited, a sixyear Pilot Program for state, local, tribal, and territorial partners to engage in mitigation of uas as it pertains to state, local, tribal, and territorial partners and Critical Infrastructure owners and operators. As the committee knows, dhs relies on partners all around the country to help protect the homeland. We cant be everywhere. What we know is that the threat posed by uas is widespread across the country, and it is critical that our partners have the authority to help protect the homeland, in addition to the tsa getting the authority to critically protect the transportation sector. Chairman peters thank you. Well, certainly, we know that state and local enforcement agencies need additional authorities. Certainly theyre gonna be, you know, the tip of the spear when it comes to protecting our country from these threats and in working closely with the federal government agencies. However, there have been concerns that have been raised by folks that such an expansion creates some significant challenges in terms of training and preparedness. So, mr. Wiegmann, i want to ask this question. The administrations proposal would establish a Pilot Program to test out these expanded authorities to to state and local Law Enforcement. However, these entities need to have proper training, including how to protect individual rights to privacy, as well as effectively executing this this Pilot Program. How would the department of justice ensure that these entities have the necessary training to properly execute these authorities . Mr. Wiegmann thanks for that question, senator. Training is a big part of it. We need to ensure that the state and locals are going to do this, they know how to do it and they need to know be operating under the right rules. So one of the elements of our bill is to establish a Training Center that the fbi would operate in conjunction with dhs. All of the state and locals would only be under the pilot up to 12 entities per year. But we would work with each of those entities that are designated to participate in the Pilot Program. During the training, they would have to learn what equipment could be used, learn how to operate it, learn what the rules are. Because they would have to follow the same federal rules in terms of any data they collect, how it can be retained, disseminated, and used, when they can engage in mitigation activity, what the rules of engagement are. All those are things they would have to be trained on and then certified. And then even after that point when they are doing their riskbased assessments as to which facilities or events theyre going to protect, thats all subject to federal oversight as well. So this is not the kind of thing where we just hand it off to the states and let them take over. Its something that we, the federal authorities, would continue to be actively involved in, both in training and making sure theyre using the authorities appropriately. Chairman peters how will providing additional authorities to state and local enforcement better prepare the department of Homeland Security to protect. Lets focus on Mass Gatherings such as National Security, special events and special event assessment rating events. Ms. Vinograd senator, as i mentioned, dhs cannot be everywhere. We rely on other state, local, tribal, and territorial partners to help us protect and to advance a variety of dhs missions. If partners are granted this authority, they can help prevent catastrophic attacks against Mass Gatherings of a variety of size and in a variety of venues. As my colleague mr. Wiegmann just mentioned, these authorities would be implemented under strict supervision and oversight of the federal government, including ensuring that these individuals authorized to conduct these operations are operating under comparable federal safeguards as they pertain to privacy and civil rights and Civil Liberties. As i mentioned in the context of the tsa and airports, when were witnessing a drone threat, seconds matter. Currently, authorities that are on the ground cant detect proactively drones, nor can they mitigate them. Those seconds that i mentioned, senator really matter and the inability of our partners in their jurisdictions to respond could cost lives if our partners are not granted these authorities. Chairman peters thank you, Ranking Member portman. Youre recognized for your questions. Sen. Portman thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you to the witnesses for their testimony. This is obviously a serious issue, and i agree with ms. Vinograd, who said that a lapse in the authorization would be catastrophic. I think it would help these Transnational Criminal Organizations among others. And yet we need better data to be able to put together the right authorization to write sound policy. We know already what happens on the border with these drones. We know theyre used for deliveries, not just for drugs but also narcotic, also currency and firearms other contraband. This committee has among its responsibilities, oversight of dhs and these border activities and we have a particular interest. And this issue of the synthetic opioids that are streaming across our border today, the numbers unfortunately are higher than ever. Last month, enough fentanyl was seized, which is a synthetic opioid thats killing about two thirds of those who die from overdoses, which is at a record level, we know that there was enough seeds to kill about 200 million americans in one month and no one in the border thinks that we are seizing most and not even a significant percentage of whats coming across. So its its a big issue. This is a great question for you understanding this increased threat from these Transnational Criminal Organizations. How do you assess dhss current performance encountering the use of drones for cross border illicit activity. Ms. Vinograd senator, thank you. I share your concern about Transnational Criminal Organizations and the malicious use of drones over the border, both as it pertains to smuggling contraband as well surveillance of Law Enforcement in addition to other threats. Currently d. H. S. The secretary of Homeland Security has designated three areas of operations along the southwest border has covered facilities or assets. This allows dhs cbp more specifically to engage in c. U. S. Operations in these areas of operations. Let me be be more specific as i dont have much much time. Um in your testimony you stated from august 21 to may 22 cbp detective, more than 8000 illegal cross border drone flights at the southern border of these 8000 flights. How many were successfully mitigated by dhs . Ms. Vinograd i can ask cbp to get back to you and your staff with the specific numbers. We have been asking them for this since february persistently and we are not getting the information. Its important we have an authorization but we have to have information if we dont have the statistics today. If you dont have it, despite many, many inquiries from us that concerns me. I want to work with you again on this reauthorization but weve got to have better information to be able to do it properly. Lets talk about china for a moment. Recently, the directors of the fbi and british m 15 warned of the National Security and economic threats posed by china. They identified it as our longest are our greatest long term threat stealing our Technology Dominated our markets. And they talked about the us drone market . They talked about the use of drones. Heres an example, according to a report by Washington Post china is the leading provider of drones to u. S. Law enforcement agencies. They have support from the chinese government. Heres our own Commerce Department saying it has been added to an export blacklist last year after bloomberg reported that it supplied Surveillance Technology to Chinese Security forces in xinjiang where millions of muslims have been forced into internment camps. So theres a report that last year that the secret service purchased eight of djs drones. The fbi purchased 18 of them. So let me just ask you these questions on the record. Ill start with mr. Wiegmann. Does the fbi currently purchase and use chinese made drones, yes or no . Mr. Wiegmann we do. Does dhs currently purchase and use chinese made drones . Ms. Vinograd dhs has prohibited the purchase of foreign made drones, small uas, absent waivers in very specific circumstances. Okay, so this report that i mentioned said that the secret service had purchased eight of the drones. Youre saying thats inaccurate. Ms. Vinograd im saying that with certain waivers. With specific waivers, dhs can purchase ms. Vinograd with certain waivers, we are purchasing certain foreign made so you are. Ms. Vinograd i can follow up with more specific details. The answer is yes. Ms. Vinograd in a closed hearing, i can provide more specific details sir. Okay. I dont want to leave you out. Does the faa currently purchase and use chinese made drones . Ms. Caultus the faas responsibility is for the integration of uass into the nasa and testing of the u. S. Technology to ensure its safety and its use in the nest. What thank you. Again, given what the fbi has told us, what the Commerce Department has told us, what we know from reports. I cant believe we have to write legislation to force this. I hope we can get the legislation passed. If we cannot get it passed, would you support what we do . Ms. Vinograd i share your concerns about these drones and would welcome a conversation. Mr. Wiegmann we share the concern as well. We want to shift away from uh from use of chinese drones and the fbi is working and other parts of doj are working on that objective. Were working to shift our our use of drones away from chinese drones to other alternatives. In the meantime, fbi takes steps to do thorough cybersecurity and supply chain reviews to ensure that any risk posed by use of the technology is mitigated, but we do want to shift away from it. And so we we definitely support the the aims of the sponsors of the bill. I think weve provided some technicalistance and some technical issues about things that we need to changes we make to the bill to make sure that we could um could support it and could conduct our mission consistent with the provisions. But we share the objectives of shifting away from these drones and using other alternatives that dont pose the same type of supply chain risk. We appreciate your support of the broader legislation. We hope to continue to work with each of you on Getting Better data. We have a special interest in this committee. Thank you. Five years ago, when we were drafting and passing the preventing emerging threats act of 2018, we obviously understood the threat the drones posed to the nation. I was very frustrated at the time that we could not offer greater authority. We are still taking what i consider baby steps. 2000 sightings around airports, 69 evasive actions. Lets get down to brass tabs. Lets find out what our capabilities are. Have we under the current authorities brought down drones around the types of events that dhs can come to . Ms. Vinograd dhs has engaged in detection and mitigation of drones in and around with the Current Authority. Have we advanced our technology in five years . Ms. Vinograd yes, sir. Do we have capability right now to prevent drones from entering the restricted airspace around an airport . Ms. Vinograd tsa could respond to an emergency around an airport. What we are seeking is the ability to i am asking is our capability right now. Who has the authority to establish a restricted airspace around an airport, a stadium, power plants . Ms. Vinograd the faa. Have we established that restricted airspace . Mr. Wiegmann we work with our federal partners when requested. Is the airspace restricted to drone use right now . Mr. Wiegmann yes. Do we have the capability of knocking down drones . Ms. Vinograd yes. Shouldnt this legislation at a minimum rate you the authority so that we can start knocking down drones when they enter restricted airspace . Ms. Vinograd dhs is a deeply supportive of that. To me, that would be the number one priority. There is no constitutional right to have a drone, correct . Mr. Wiegmann no. You mentioned Civil Liberties. Mr. Wiegmann we would want to do so responsibly. You do not want to knock them down and create a bigger problem. If we establish restricted airspace and somebody flies in the drum, they have no Civil Liberties to worry about. Mr. Wiegmann i agree, senator. I do not think it poses a Civil Liberties issue. In the proposal of administration gave us, have we contemplated the priority and grant them the authority to be nothing down drones. So that state and local authorities have the ability to knock those drones down before they pose a threat. Mr. Wiegmann we have that authority now, senator. Have we not down any drones around stadiums . Mr. Wiegmann yes, we have disabled them. At a number of events. We have done that, yes. My main point is we have to move faster and it is great to have Pilot Programs, but that is five or six years in the future. The public is going to demand react quicker if a commercial aircraft hits a drone. I want to make sure in this piece of legislation we have the authority and the funding and the personnel to start protecting our restricted airspace as soon as possible. Is there anything that will prevent that from happening . Mr. Wiegmann that is why we are here. We agree with you and we are seeking the authority to do just that. I am concerned about a Pilot Program that will work with 12 state local, tribal. Mr. Wiegmann it will take time to ramp up, but it is 12 every year. It takes time to do the training. They will be able to do multiple missions. My point is, we have already taken five years, which i find frustrating, and it takes time, but we can ensure it takes less time if we prioritize this as a serious threat and we establish this as a priority to make sure he takes less time. Do you understand what i am saying . I think 12 Pilot Programs that year is completely too little and i am hoping it will not be too late. Lets start ramping up this piece of legislation. We spent trillions of dollars. We should focus on this because this is a serious threat. I do not want to have it be too little too late. Mr. Chairman, i appreciate you pushing this. I want to work with you to strengthen this. I do not think it is Strong Enough yet. Lets not have a piece of legislation that is too little too late. The bill we passed years ago is too little. Fortunately a has not been too late yet. Lets do a good job on this one. Chairman peters senator, you are recognized. You work in the office of strategy policy and planning . Ms. Vinograd i had my first visit to the state of missouri on friday. I look forward to going back. You work with robert silvers there . Your name is on a memo with him. The subject is organizing dhs efforts to counter disinformation. This is the memo that recommended the establishment of the disinformation board. It was turned over to me and to senator grassley by a whistleblower. I had the hardest time getting any information about this board out of your agency. We know virtually nothing had it not been for this whistleblower. Since i have you here, let me ask you a question about it. Whose idea was it to establish this board . Ms. Vinograd the department of Homeland Security has engaged in disinformation work pertaining to threats to the homeland and the American People for over a decade. There were discussions about the need to ensure that there were guardrails in place across the department to protect civil rights and privacy. There were discussions about creating this internal working group. Whose idea was it to set up the board . That is not at all but the memo says. What the memo says. It had managerial authority. All of that is in the documents. Lets not go back to those disproving talking points. Whose idea wasnt to establish the board . Was it yours . Ms. Vinograd senator, there were a series of discussions among personnel. Cool . Ms. Vinograd i am not going to go into that. Why not . If are under oath. You are under oath. Ms. Vinograd the charter assigned by the secretary of Homeland Security. The working group included representation did the charter a working group . Ms. Vinograd this was a working group. Did the charter call it a working group . Ms. Vinograd i dont remember. No, it did not. Was it your idea to establish the board . So you are not going to answer my question. How was he jingle with chosen to run the board . Ms. Vinograd she was chosen consistent with practices of hiring and betting of employees. I was involved in one piece of the process. As part of the standard process for political appointees. What time frame . Ms. Vinograd early 2021. I do not recall the exact date. January, february time period perhaps. When did the secretary sign off on her being the head of the board . Ms. Vinograd i do not know that the secretary signed off on it or not. She testified that it was his decision. Ms. Vinograd i believe he testified he was ultimately responsible for her. Did you recommend her to the secretary . Ms. Vinograd after speaking with her, was it impressed and noted my recommendation to others. I think that sounds like i guess. Did you were you aware of her long history with comments on twitter about ms. Vinograd senator, i was aware of her expertise in the field of disinformation and was impressed by her expertise. Did you know about her her many comments spreading disinformation about russia, about the Trump Administration about conservatives. ,secretary mayorkas said he was not aware of any of this at the time. Im just curious, were you aware at the time you recommended him er to him. Ms. Vinograd in in my capacity as acting assistant secretary for counterterrorism Threat Prevention and Law Enforcement policy. I had not read all of her tweets, but as i said, was aware of her expertise in, well when you said you hadnt read all somehow she got through this vetting process with no one apparently aware of what she has said on these public platforms. I find that sort of extraordinary. Was the white house involved in the selection of ms. Jancowicz . Ms. Vinograd i am not aware of the full scope of the processor as a president ial appointee, that the standard processes were followed. So to your knowledge, the white house was not involved. Is that fair to say, my knowledge is im a political appointee, the white house was involved in my process. Ms. Vinograd two to your knowledge, with the white house involved in selecting her, yes or no . Ms. Vinograd i really dont know. What is the current status of the disinformation board . The disinformation governance board never met. The secretary has asked that Homeland Security Advisory Committee to review how the department can most effectively address disinformation and how to do so in a way that protects civil rights and Civil Liberties. He has also asked that the hr sac review how the department can be as transparent as possible with the American Public and increased trust in the work that we do. The hsac was asked to conduct their review within 75 days. And while that work is pending the disinformation governments board is on pause. Its not meeting, theres not work underway. Last question i know the other senators we need to ask questions. Did the board ever meet any twitter executives. We know we have minutes of planned meetings with twitter executives to ask for cooperation. Did that ever happen at any point to your knowledge . I disagree with your characterization of the purpose of a meeting that never happened. The meeting with twitter never happened. I would say that i regret that it has taken months to get the most basic information about this board. Had it not been for a whistleblower who dont provide the documents. That is totally unacceptable. Senator harper, you are recognized for your questions. How do you pronounce your name . I believe maam that you mentioned that that Unmanned Aircraft systems also known as drones represent the Fastest Growing sector in aviation to today. I understand that as of september two years ago, there were 1. 7 million drones registered with the faa and that this number will only increase in years to come. Could you explain to us how the expansion of drone use has impacted the current Threat Landscape and how the faa plans to grapple with continued disruption to u. S. Airspace by drone users . Ms. Coultas what the faa does to contribute to the security of the airspace. Could you speak louder . Ms. Vinograd the faa has been working with industrial users over drones as well as hobbyist and industry. Things we have been doing to help mitigate and work with our Security Partners and ensure safety. The faas number one priority is to ensure that drones are integrated in a safe matter and does not affect passenger and commercial flights. Things we have been doing is we put in existing 997s, working with Security Partners who request air restrictions over certain events. Some of those may be mass gathering event read we have talked about stadiums, super bowl and other types of events. There are other events throughout the year that we work with our Security Partners to put in additional restrictions around those events. We also look at conducting field top exercises and work with state, local, tribal and territorial partners. And using such scenarios that if a drone would come into the airspace, or as you heard them say, a chairlift, or a noncompliant or criminal actor, how would we responded to has the authority and what does the response ordination look like . We have been working on that the last several years. We have remote id would starting september of this year, manufacturers will be required to have all drones to have a cell identifier, or license plate. All drones after september will have to have that on all drones and operators of drones will have to be compliant with the remote id rule by september of next year. Thank you. My second question would be to each of you, protecting our Homeland Security is of the utmost importance when it comes to addressing threats posed by drones. Last week, my family was at a beach and one of the visitors brought their drone. Sat down in front of us and send it out over the ocean some distance and brought it back, taking pictures of us, and that was pretty amazing. Two or three days ago i was in wilmington, delaware and we are experiencing an epidemic of offroad dirt bikes in wilmington, and all kinds of cities around the country. People ride their bikes all over the place creating mayhem and havoc. One of the tools to stop that is to track them using drones. They can be used to actually stop them. We need to be mindful of that. Protecting Homeland Security is of the utmost importance when it comes to the threats posed by drones read given that they can be used by criminals to conduct espionage as well as trafficking of drugs and firearms. With coordination between the department of Homeland Security, the department of justice and the faa is critical. Can we each take a moment or two to explain how your perspective Industries Work together . And what your state and local counterparts do monitor counter threats posed by drones . Would you take the first shot at that, please . I agree, the department of Homeland Security agrees that drones have a variety of beneficial uses from emergency response, and more. We are focused on the malicious use of drones. The department of Homeland Security could not utilize its current authorities without incredibly close participation by our federal partners, including the faa, as we seek the secretaries authorization to designate it. We are coordinating every piece of that authorization with the faa, for example. When we get a request for cuas activities to protect an event, or a mass gathering at the request of the state executive, that goes into an Interagency Working Group that reviews the risk, the threat and capabilities. We got a question earlier, and i will stop here, about tfrs, temporary flight restrictions. Dhs works closely with the faa when dhs requests a tfr. And they are necessary to grant waivers to allow activity to allow that First Amendment protected activity as well. Mr. Weidman . I think the counter drone business is very much a team sport. We work with uas, dhs, and faa whether we want to or not. Everything we do, we work together. Horizontally there is a lot of collaboration. And we are working vertically with our state partners, including delaware, the Delaware State Police are part of our working group on drug activity. If we can get the authority we are asking for today, we will be working much more intensively with states and locals across the country. This is an activity where Law Enforcement and Homeland Security officials are working together all the time together with the faa. I have several more questions i would like to ask, take you so much for joining us today for your collaboration and commitment. So much. Senator lankford, you are recognized for your questions. Thank you to all the witnesses and for the ongoing work. I do have some questions about the collaboration you all were discussing at this point. When i was visiting with some of the folks at our southern border several months ago, theres some of our border stations that were trying to get counteruas equipment up and running in one of our areas along the border. We had over 10,000 incursions in just that area with uas coming across the border from mexico into the United States. And they were very eager to be able to get that. When i asked, whats the issue, the equipment was there, the people were there, they were waiting on authorization and there was an ongoing dialogue between dhs and faa to discuss how were gonna get this up. So literally the equipment, the people, the need, everything was there. So my question is about this collaboration, how long does it take in this particular instance we had a situation , where that same equipment along the border was being used in a different region of the water and had been for a while but in this particular region it took months to actually get counteruas equipment up and working in that area. I share your concerns about the malicious drone threat at the southwest border. The secretary of Homeland Security has authorized three areas of operation along the southwest border. We have three up and running. There are three or four additional aors that are pending. We work to make the process more efficient with the Program Management office which is part of my team. We have started doing concurrent processes with faa so this can move as expeditiously as possible. There are four areas of operation, i dont know if it is one of the ones you visited, that are still pending. We will try to get these authorized as quickly as possible. What is the hold up . Where is the spot where it is getting stuck . Ms. Vinograd i will turn to my colleague from the faa in a moment. These aors are being authorized and there is a lot of coordination with the faa. There are different complexities in areas of operation. But each area of operations is different, which is why we are still back to the same spot. This seems to be on geologic time rather than clock time because it is taking months to process. It would be on the faas test, and then i talk to the faa, and they say it is on the secretarys desk. What i am trying to figure out is how to get this unstuck. Ms. Vinograd i cannot go into further details except on one of the aors, it is just a matter of a few weeks at a maximum. The others are more complex and i would be glad to speak in a closed session about what that looks like. We are committed to doing this with urgency. How long does it take to get one of these done with faa to look at existing technology . Ms. Vinograd it varies based on the technology and the location, and the complexity of the request that we receive. It can take just a matter of days, but others it does take longer depending on what the actual area is and other tfrs that may be in the area. A matter of days i can get, what is longer mean . Im not issuing the tfrs, it varies. We are working with our Security Partners. It can vary as long as we have the information working closely with our Security Partners. I cant give you a definitive how long because the operations all vary. Here is my challenge on this. I will take one specific region, the southwest border. Everyone is trained and ready to go, and they are waiting on a piece of paper to be signed in washington. I start calling and saying, where is this . How do we get this unstuck because they are dealing with thousands of uas from mexico carrying narcotics and doing surveillance. I am just trying to figure out how we get this unstuck because it is on someones desk. If there is a need to assist in the process, this committee has very engaged to get processes unstuck. Senator, ive tried to be of the business in on sticking. I am happy to followup in closed session but we are deeply committed to making sure this aor happens in a matter of weeks. The other aors are more complex but we want them to be unstuck quickly as well. The one that will be unstuck in a matter of weeks, how long has it been pending . Ms. Vinograd when it first started, it has been just a few weeks since we could move to the next stage of basically looking at this particular airspace and making sure the equipment can be more safely used. That would be excellent. Let me ask the same question. We do this with the bureau of prisons, there is an issue of cell phones being snuck into prisons, stopping people that they are threatening outside of the facility, bringing narcotics in, this is been a big issue for the bureau of prisons. Those are fixed locations most of them in remote areas, what would be the challenge of getting this counteruas across all of our prison facilities, starting with the most remote, why is it that happening . We are working on that. We deployed technology at a number of prisons, i think it is several. There are another 20 coming on board. It is a question of getting people trained and working with the faa on the tfr and so forth. I understand you are impatient because it is a huge problem. And i share your view and we are working with who is definitely concerned about this issue. We had charges at a prison in texas where people were smuggling contraband. Thats not the first one, there is others. I share your concern and bop is ramping up. I would say good except that this is something we have talked about often. What is the slow down, we are trying to figure it out because we will do the bonds and the pilots and approved the process, and it seems to be years to actually get execution on something that should be straightforward, especially in an area that is remote that does not have the complexities of the city, that this should not be as hard as it seems to be. Senator scott, you are recognized. Thank you Ranking Member for hauling this. From listening to you all, you know the importance of this and are taking it seriously. Legislation such that the counter chinese drone act and to protect the privacy of american citizens. I am proud to have led the drone act, but i think we have to go farther. Lets take the next step and ensure that the federal funds from the federal Communications Commission cannot be used to obtain equipment and services produced by chinas drone companies. Mr. Weigmann, there are certain specific provisions taken by doj and dhs against drones. So, why do you need to waive all of title 18, and why not keep the existing waivers in place . It helps us interoperate with them if we have the same authority, so that is one. Two is, while you are correct that our Current Authority for dhs and doj only extends to certain provisions in title 18, and we have been able to use that effectively thus far, we cant predict in a changing Technology Landscape that other statutes wouldnt come into play in the future. If there is new technology that will get a new statute, so we think the cleanest approach, since we dont think Law Enforcement is using the technology we have talked about today to prevent threats should be criminal at all. So, there should not be a criminal provision they are subject to rather than just a few statutes. We are happy to discuss that with the committee if that is not their view, but we think it is cleaner to have the same authority dod has, which is a full suite. Do you have examples, where have you needed this in the past . We have been able to work with the existing exemptions in specific statutes, we cant predict whether as technology changes, other statutes come into play. Senator langford talked about the prisons. They have been used to drop drugs, weapons and contraband to inmates. Cartels are using it to smuggle contraband across the border to prisons. How will this improve Law Enforcement efforts to counter this threat . The capturing drugs act . Just dealing with the prison fight issues. Doesnt change anything . We already have the authority to protect prisons, but it expires in october if we dont extend it. We have the authority in prisons we just need to extend that authority. The proposed reauthorization would authorize a limited Pilot Program under which dhs and doj in consultation with the department of transportation could permit certain agencies to use counter drawn detection and mitigation authorities. Can you talk about the Selection Process for this Pilot Program, and heavy you talked to agencies in florida . Ms. Vinograd i will turn to colleague from the department of justice in a moment. What we are seeking is two things for state, local and tribal partners. The authority for sltt partners to engage in detection of drones through uas. In addition, we are seeking a sixyear Pilot Program for sltt partners to engage in mitigation. These individuals would comply with federal standards of certification, use authorized equipment in coordination with faa and fcc. And we believe this is critical, so that sltt responders in florida and elsewhere would be able to take urgent action to mitigate drone threats. Are you talking with anyone in florida . With this be through Sheriffs Department or police . We have talked to Daytona Police about that. As we select cities around the country to participate, it will be their level of interest. Their expertise and so forth, and we will see how that process works. We havent figured out the criteria. But i imagine there will be organizations all around the country. You have thoughts about whether we should blanket outlaw the ability of Chinese Companies to sell drones in this country . Whether the federal government ought to be able to buy them, any thoughts on that . Ms. Vinograd from the departments perspective, we share your concerns about china generally, and concerns about chinese manufactured drones. Dhs has issued internal guidance to prohibit small uas manufactured five foreign countries. There are limited circumstances in which waivers may be granted. The problem is you know they dominate the market. A little bit. If we need to use drones for Law Enforcement they are kind of the main game. We are working to transit ion away from that. We are taking steps to mitigate supply chain risks but eventually we want to transition away, so the waivers are necessary for that purpose. They serve a useful purpose for all manner of things which we do. But we are trying to transition away from them. From the faas perspective, we are responsible for the integration of drones into the National Airspace and testing them to ensure their safety. But we dont have a position on the purchasing or requiring. Did you see the step that came out in ukraine stuff that came out in ukraine that dji drones were being tracked, did you look at that where is it classified . Ms. Vinograd i have looked at that. Thank you, senator scott. Senator rosen . Thank you, chairman. I appreciate all of you being here today and what you have been working on. I want to focus on protecting our stadiums. Because my home state of nevada is the entertainment capital of the world, we are quickly emerging as a Sports Capital of the world as well. We have a new home of the raiders. Las vegas is the first city to secure the draft, super bowl and pro bowl all at once. But unfortunately that makes it a target rich environment for bad actors. The executive branch has recognized the need to protect stadiums and sports events. The faa has talked about temporary flight restrictions over stadium events, including for Unmanned Aircraft. Congress subsequently codified these requirements. However there have been increases in violations of flight restrictions by drones. I asked that i be permitted to enter a letter to the record from a coalition of sports organizations in support of the proposal. The faa, as it considers new policies, is important to take into account these long standing protections for our stadiums and ensure that our policies keep up with evolving threats . Thank you for your question, senator. At the faa, we do agree that as we continue integrating drones of the airspace, that the ability for detection and when necessary, mitigation, is in place as well. We are working with our stadiums stakeholders to ensure, as you mentioned, we already have standing tfrs for the nfl, major league baseball, nascar, as well as division i colleges. And we work closely with the super bowl another larger events to ensure that we put the appropriate air restrictions around those mass gathering events held at stadiums and other venues to ensure about the safety of the event and security, but to ensure the safety of the airspace over that event. Let me ask you as a followup. You have draft legislation from the administration that does youre talking about all the things that youre already doing. Shouldnt we be specific in identifying stadiums and other types of Critical Infrastructure so we are sure that communities have the resources to protect themselves . Yes. The legislation specifically says Critical Infrastructure and we did not define exactly which sectors or entities within the Critical Infrastructure sectors. I would say i would leave that up to congress if they wanted to give us more specifics and mention, but we take that as its all entities because Critical Infrastructure encompasses in addition to stadiums is chemical facilities, its the energy sector, it is dams, it is a whole host of different sectors that may want to come and petition through dhs or the justice to the faa to get both temporary restrictions or permanent restrictions in addition to being able to use detection equipment and then eventually maybe mitigation. I would defer to my dhs colleague if she wants to expand on that. I concur with my faa colleague. We have no objective to more objections to more specificity. We just want to ensure that all Critical Infrastructures, owners and operators to include stadiums and sports venues have the authority that were requesting in the bill. Im just worried that theres going to be confusion and so we can at least may be defined as a minimum a Certain Group allowing for the flexibility of course to add more as needed. So well continue to work with you on that. But i do want to build on what senator scott asked about the Pilot Program to extend the counter drone capabilities to work with state and local Law Enforcement, again protecting all the Critical Infrastructure. First of all, do you agree that the Pilot Program should include stadiums . I think you do. Youve probably been talking, as you say, youve been talking to florida. We have a great Fusion Center in las vegas. We have a lot of things to protect there. Have you been speaking with anyone in nevada and do you believe that the training and surveillance should be shared across these multiple Law Enforcement agencies and that thats a good thing to involve the communities. Yes, i agree. We are in touch with folks in nevada and look right now, we can only protect, you know, the super bowl, the world series, etcetera. One of the main purposes of the bill is theres thousands of theres a couple of 1000 nfl games every year. Theres 20,000 baseball games every year. We were only covering tiny, you know, the super high profile. And so the big advantage of this state and local pilot is to allow that force multiplier, right . For the people who are on the front lines, be able to protect those venues for the ordinary game, you know, thats going on. And so thats a thats a big piece of it, including in nevada. And i fully expect that the jurisdictions that we participate in the pilot would be scattered across the country. I think your force multiplier, thats the way we should look at our state and local communities as force multipliers . You cant do it all alone. I have about a minute left, id just like to quickly move on to Cyber Security because we know that the drones really present significant Cyber Security risk, of course, country of origin as weve talked about with china manufacturing, but theres malicious actors, they can exploit data. They can spoof our gps, they can hijack control of drones that are necessary Law Enforcement drones perhaps. So, assistant secretary vinograd. Can you talk about some of the specific threats and could you list them in what you might think is the most the highest threats we need to be worried about first to the least, if thats possible. And all threats, maybe not quite equal . Ms. Vinograd just to clarify, cybersecurity threats or drone threats more broadly cyber more broadly . Cybersecurity threats to the drones, i guess. Ms. Vinograd certainly. Well, senator, you mentioned um several key ones which are the exploitation of um information on that drone or information that is being transmitted between the command and control center. Just to clarify, rc u. S. Authorities. The hearing today is about counter u. S. Authorities. Your question is more specifically about drones moving back to the subject of the hearing, which is a counter piece of it, how we how we stop this stuff. Intercept the signal between the command and control center and that is the only information uh that we that we interrupt and that we in certain cases retain. When we look at drones being used for malicious purposes, we are certainly concerned about a malicious actor of some of some kind trying to engage in some kind of cyber attack to change the course of that drone, weaponize it. And or use it for its online purposes like surveillance like intrusion into an unauthorized facility and things of that nature. From a counter u. S. Perspective again we are focused on the signal between the command and control center. And then from the actual drone perspective we are very aware of Cyber Security risks that could allow the drone to be manipulated for a range of malign purposes. I guess well have to work on that with cisa. Im just concerned that making sure that our state and local communities understand which threats they have to deal with, the highest threats going down so that we can be sure to protect the ones we love. Thank you. Mr chairman, thank you. Senator rosen, senator padilla, you are recognized for your questions. Thank you. Mr chair. Before i ask my questions, i just want to be very clear that uh the potential threat posed by you a. S. Is one that Congress Must address before the existing authorities expire. We absolutely agree on that. I know in california weve seen how rogue uas can disrupt critical functions including wildfire suppression efforts. So my questions are not related to the need for reauthorization, but making sure that we do so in a responsible way. Now the first area of questions has already been covered by senator scott and that had to deal with the sort of broad exemptions to title 18 that are called for in the administrations proposal. I know there was a recognition and back and forth of, you know, that is not currently the case theres a lot of specific , exemptions and it may not be pretty, it may not be easy, but youre making it work. So theres more than one way to get this done. Instead of just asking that question over again, i will follow up mr. Whitman with this. Title 18 for the u. S. Code includes prohibitions against for example committing war crimes, intimidating voters and engaging in video voyeurism. So i understand why the department of justice and the chess might need to be exempt from the wiretap act. But why do you need to be exempt from prohibitions against the examples i just gave. Yeah, we dont, although again, to be honest, none of those activities would be authorized by by this statue because you can only take under the statutory regime those actions which are necessary to detect and then mitigate a credible threat. And so its hard for me to imagine a voyeurism or war crime coming into play there. So its the statue would not give protection against those offenses because of the way its structured, right . It would not exempt you from those offenses because those would never come into play. I hear you, but sadly as weve seen, you know, from administration to administration interpretations and philosophies can shift. And so what we do put into statutes in terms of exemptions does matter. I think it is important question in a different area. Whether its broad exemptions or more specific exemptions is one thing, but were also discussing the proposal to have a reauthorization thats permanent and not one with a sunset provision. The proliferation of drone usage as well as the Rapid Development of Drone Technology itself. So its technology and how its applied and used demonstrates why the government needs to have clear authorities in my opinion to engage in uas activities. But as i mentioned, the pace of Technological Development as well as the ever growing uses for drones, including for valuable journalistic and Civic Engagement purposes, seems to suggest that theres considerable value in congress regularly revisiting this area of the law. The administrations proposed legislation seeks a permanent uas authorities rather than including a sunset provision that would require not Just Congress but the executive branch to come together in a few years to evaluate how well the expanded authorities called for in the statute are working and have some debate, whether it is three years, five years, seven, whatever the timeframe makes sense. Why shouldnt we all be required to revisit the broad authorities being granted in this bill in a few years . Ms. Vinograd senator, just to be clear what we are seeking this legislation is the lack of a sunset clause for most of the authorities. The sunset clause as it currently stands is really impeding the departments ability to effectively use our authorities insofar as it makes it incredibly difficult for us to engage in multi year planning, multi year testing, and things of that nature. We agree that theres a critical need to regularly engage with the Congressional Branch on how these authorities are being exercised. Under the preventing emerging threats act of 2018, we are required to report to Congress Every six months, which dhs has done judiciously. In addition, in this bill for this Pilot Program, two years after the enactment of this bill, we are also required to report to congress on just that Pilot Program. So you may disagree, but what im hearing is an argument for a longer reauthorization and a shorter one. But i still believe in in the power in the sunset mechanism to force these conversations that keeps us from talking every day, every week, every month. Not just every six months, not just every two years. But as i mentioned in in my preface, continuously evolving technology and innovation makes additional things possible, additional performance and capabilities, let alone the growing number of uses of the technology. I think more regular required conversation from congress to congress and from administration to administration would be worthwhile. So i know its been a long morning for all three of you. I will leave my comments and questions at that, but look forward to working with you as this proceeds. Thank you, mr chair. Thank you senator padilla. , senator cinema, youre recognized for your questions. Thank you to our witnesses for joining us today. The counter drone authorities expiring this october are critical to our Homeland Security. These authorities allow dhs and doj to protect arizonas Critical Infrastructure and communities. As chair of this committees border subcommittee and the commerce committees aviation subcommittee, im also keenly aware of the threats posed by drones to our nations borders and airports. In arizona, cartels are using drones to smuggle drugs across the border in an attempt to evade Law Enforcement and across our nation, there are too many examples of drones blocking flight paths and even shutting down airports. We must maintain and enhance our nations capabilities while also safeguarding privacy and the rights of legitimate drone users. I look forward to working with the chairman, the administration, and my colleagues to do just that. So my first question about future threats is for mr. Widman and miss vinograd. Drone technology is rapidly evolving. And while most drones currently rely on our f technology in the future, more advanced drones may become the norm. At doj and dhs, what are you doing to prepare for the drone related threats of the future . Future, including autonomous Unmanned Systems and drone swarms that could conduct synchronized operations . And as Congress Considers reviewing the existing authorities, what can we do to help you research and mitigate these threats . We agree that the technology is evolving incredibly rapidly and what the department of Homeland Security is committed to is trying to stay evolve ahead of that evolving threat. We do so through our science and technology directorate, where we are engaged in a significant amount of Critical Research testing and evaluation, such that we can try to stay ahead of the curve as it pertains to the evolving technology. In addition, as my colleague mr wagman mentioned, we are seeking exemption from title 18 such that we can ensure that we have the ability to keep pace and or stay ahead of the evolving threat environment. As this Technology Rapidly increases and candidly proliferates the kinds of threats that drones may pose to the American People and to the homeland. I dont have much to add to that other than we obviously work with our colleagues at dhs and dod also in Technology Working groups to make sure we are doing the best we can to have stateoftheart technology and counter this threat. Thank you. Ms. Vinograd, as chair of the border subcommittee and the aviation subcommittee, im particularly concerned about the threat that drones posed to our border and our airports. If the current authorities expire in october, can you discuss the impact that would have on our Border Security . Ms. Vinograd the expiration of existing counter u. S. Authorities would be catastrophic. From a Border Security perspective, our counter u. S. Authorities currently allow for critical counter u. S. Operations at our border at our borders and the expiration of those authorities would allow a range of adversaries, including Transnational Criminal Organizations to increase their malicious use of drones to engage in smuggling, surveillance, and other malicious activities. Thank you. My third question, can you describe how the administrations legislative proposal would help protect airports and flight paths from drones, and specifically how do the current gaps in the federal governments authorities hinder your agencies from achieving this . Ms. Vinograd i will say that of all the things that keep me awake at night, one that is foremost on my mind is the potential for a major tragedy at an airport. We currently at the department of Homeland Security work in Close Partnership with the faa at airports. However, dhs, the Transportation Security Agency or tsa lacks the authority to engage in proactive or persistent see Us Operations at airports. What that means is tsa is not authorized to be on the ground at airports engaging in proactive detection, and if necessary, proactive mitigation. I will tell you just from a threat perspective, weve had 2000 sightings of drones in and around airports since 2021. In 2021 and 2022 year to date, weve had 64 evasive actions by aircraft, including four commercial carriers taking evasive action, senator. Weve had 30 airport disruptions just in 2021. This already amounts in significant economic damage and a potential for a real loss of human life. Im very concerned about the lack of explicit authority at airports. That is why we are seeking explicit authority for tsa to engage in proactive and persistent detection and mitigation in Close Partnership with faa. And to build off of my colleague from dhs. Obviously the number one priority for the faa is the safety and security of the airspace and around airports. We too are very concerned about the number of drones sightings that we consistently see across this country. Were working very closely with our dhs partners and we are the dhs partners and the faa is supportive of expanding the authorities to tsa to give them the authority to be able to do not just the detection but the mitigation if necessary at the airport environment. Thank you. My next question is for mr widman. Like all technologies, drones hold both promise and peril the same drones that our adversaries could use to surveil a sensitive government facility can be used by journalists to ship footage for the news and to hold government accountable. So i know that doj has devoted considerable time and resources to ensuring that privacy and Civil Liberties are protected during cuas operations. Can you discuss some of these safeguards, and how often are drones that into restricted airspace actually interdicted and when they are, what data is intercepted and for how long . Under the statute we can only intercept data that is necessary for countering a threat. So as i mentioned in my opening testimony, what were typically talking about is, i have a list here of the type of data, the drone vendor and model, the drone and controlling device, serial number, the geolocation of the drone, the location of the controller, and the most recent takeoff location and home location. Were not talking about content of communications. Were talking about metadata signals, information essentially that the drone is generating that allow us to find out where it is, where its going, where its been and whos controlling it so that we can hopefully, you so we can hopefully interdict it. Once we collect that information in the ordinary course, if its not of any use, we we discard that information right away. But under the statute we can only keep it as long as is necessary and in no event longer than 180 days unless its necessary to keep it longer for a specific purpose, like for a criminal investigation, if someone has violated airspace and we need the information in order to pursue a criminal investigation or prosecution. So all of this has laid out an existing law in the statute, the restrictions on what you can collect, how long you can retain it, and when you can disseminate it are all in the statute and those would be carried over under the new bill. So we would continue all of those same privacy protections under the new bill. And they would also be applied to state and locals. So to the extent state locals are engaged in the same activity under the Pilot Program, they would also be bound to respect all of those privacy protections. So i dont know if that answers your question. Yes. Thank you. Thank you, senator cinema. Id like to take this opportunity to thank our witnesses once again for participating in todays hearing and in discussing the administrations proposal to both extend and expand current authorities to counter uas, to protect our homeland from serious threats posed by Unmanned Aircraft systems. As we heard today very clearly from each of our witnesses, a malicious actor could deploy uas to cause a catastrophic incident at any time and we cannot and must not wait for that incident to occur. As chairman of this committee, i will work to ensure that these authorities do not lapse in october so our federal Law Enforcement partners can continue to out there very crucial missions to protect us from these threats. I also plan to introduce legislation in the very near future with senator johnson that both extends and provides a careful expansion of these counter uas authorities. The record for this hearing will remain open for 15 days until 5 00 p. M. On july 29 of 2022 for the submission of statements and questions for the record. This hearing now stands adjourned. Next, elliott morris, u. S. Correspondent for the economist, discusses the history of polling in the United States. Then Boris Johnson fields questions from the house of commons nearly one week after announcing he will step down once a successor is chosen. Then the members of Congress Attend a ceremony honoring a world war ii veteran as he lay in honor at the capitol rotunda. Cspan is funded by these Television Companies and more, including sparklight. The greatest town on earth is the place you call home. At sparklight, its our home, as well, and we are facing our greatest challenge. That is why we are working to around the clock to keep you can did. We are doing our part so you can do yours. 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