Transcripts For CSPAN Panel Discussion On Missile Defense 20170407

Thank you for being here today. Of the president strategies and had involvement with missiledefense. On the secretary defense of the obama administration. Yorty met the director of the missiledefense program. Tom will talk about missiledefense 2020 and next steps. Laura is a Senior Scientist in the program. Aboutso has a book missiledefense and will speak to that and a number of issues, i think. Our third panelist is a major general, retired friend, and his last posting was the director of strategy for norad and nor calm. He headed up several commands were already missile and air defense, and was director of at one point. I want to thank you for coming and those unable to be here due to a scheduling conflict. To kick is words often than we will turn to the panelists, indeed as mentioned earlier, the Trump Administration is kicking off a major review of the missiledefense policy. If we go back to the 2010 missile review conducted by the last administration, it is defensethat it placed is the number one priority for missiledefense. Our allies and partners can contribute for defense of their. Wn key assets no one else will do the job or shifted the job of defending the United States for us. Of the obamaclear administration, that are Missile System is aimed at north korea forthat is not intended roger a were china. One of the recommendations in toms report would say shift focus a little bit and include an ability to engage holistic missiles and numbers from russia and china. We will want to talk about that and any implications for stability. Clearly, we think about missiledefense today. The driving decision is north koreas continuous missile testing and missile program. The reality, while north korea ,oses a threat to United States and poses a threat today and that is likely to grow. Missile defense not the only part of the u. S. Approach to that problem, but it has to be fundamental. A lot of qualitative improvements are underway, giving credit to Missile Defense Agency Director jim. Thats for pushing things along and for the modified kill vehicle, and the sensors as well. A lot of work underway. When the questions we want to discuss is the pace and whether is it appropriate. As we get into, the panel, whether we should be looking today to grow the system beyond our 44based ground interceptors that are deployed and that we would like ready for operations if necessary. These will be among the issues we discussed. They will be among the issues that the new admit administration will have to discuss and i think we will get a good start today. We will start with tom. High, good morning. Thank you jim and the rather panelist for joining and to think senator sullivan for coming out this morning. Im going to give an overview of the report of missiledefense 2020 and, on the basis of both the president ial directive and the nda, the administration will be looking at posture and strategy. Also, by explicit president ial direction, the relative balance between homeland and regional. Every month or so, north korea lately has been doing something new in terms of missile development. There are other new threats out there is well. I think, given the circumstances we are in, i wouldnt not be surprised to see a relative rebalancing in the near term in favor of homeland, at least relative to where we have been in recent years. We hope this report lays out a menu of options or a road mop map to how one might do that. Before you started, i would like to knowledge my coauthors who are both here. We have put a lot of work into this effort. I would like to thank many smart people in and out of government to let us bend their ear about this. Greeley whot fort kindly gave us their time. And finally to the csi s who put together some great graphics to help communicate some of this stuff. One reason we wanted to put this together, the home land Defense Security discussion is either underinformed or misinformed. To some extent, that is understandable. It is hard to know all the different kinds of kill vehicles, and all the Different Things in development. One of our secondary purposes is to serve as a compilation, a guide to the perplexed on all the complexity. Bring stuff together in one place. The problem with how this is frequently discussed, including with a lot of historical baggage, unfortunately tends to confuse the debate. Tohink in respect missiledefense in particular, the discussion is to much divided. Taking intot account the difficulty, and on the other side, folks snickering snickering. A better understanding of the past in the Current Record might have that help to modify that. First is to bring together information in one place, a reference guide of where things have been. Secondly, at a menu of options of what might be considered and look at the benefits and limits of those. Third, make some of our own findings and recommendations. I will just say the current need a range of reliability, capability, and capacity improvements relative to where we are today. Adjustmentsgetary would be in order in the fourth quarter. There has been a lot of back and , over theicy wise last 20 years or so, and in the reports, we tried to highlight and emphasize the continuity. On the one hand, the strategic continuity but also the programmatic continuity. Side, go backic and read president clintons speech in 2000 where he said he was not going to decide to display deployed national Missile Defense. Then look at the speech george w. Bush gave in 2001 given reentry. I think theres a lot of continuity there in terms of, not necessarily the exact readiness, but in terms of strategic rationality. The idea of being simply, we are completeng to accept vulnerability to certain kinds of threats. Risk unwilling to deterrence failure and aspect to different kinds of things like north korea. Appreciating the lineage and evolution of the programs is also important. Looking at the roots, for instance. Appreciate cant some of the reliability issues and silasbe ekbs today. They are still the events prototype designed put together in the 1990s under avian treat restrictions. Furthermore, we are left with little choice to embrace kill vehicles still under development in short order and put them to use. Waitingce then, we are for a true design turn on the kill vehicle. Instead of light extending the program and for ways. Extending the program in different ways. An old economy tends to get embrace. The dichotomy that regional missiledefense is good and effective, but homeland Missile Defense is bad. Extends beyond the particular systems to the mission itself. Is thatissiledefense you can take it as an argument of faith that Homeland Defense is impossible. Side ofsee the other the cheerleaders that can Technology Issues out there, dont do is just as either. What we try to do is try to be fair and candid in both directions. We criticized from both sides. There are a lot of shortcomings, but i think that the past, that you heard this morning and what you mentioned now, really is a good one. The dichotomy i because ais important lot of the past testing and development that is been taking place in the regional systems, applies to applying it forward. Let me start to walk through a little bit of this. Jim mentioned highlighting homeland missiledefense as the top priority. This was actual a general overview of xo atmospheric intercept gives taking place as an ekb. Kb it has fluctuated a lot, there was a big surge for the deployment back in 2002, but this isnt just gnb. Emphasis ofoverall green, being homeland, and blue being regional. Taking pictures, we will have all of these online for you to download them to your pleasure. I also want to put this in a historical perspective. S is, as senator byrd senator sullivan might mention, as is our modesty in the number of interceptors we are talking about. If you look at the far right, that is why 17. Compare that to the clinton administration. 250. O before that, the g pals whose job it was to after a limited threats. Before the sei phase one and that sort of thing, but in terms of the overall context, you see that modesty. I keep looking for the keyboard done here, sorry. The other context that here is the legislative environment. This past year, Congress Went back and updated the missile act which was 17 years old. First of all, we dont talk about national Missile Defense anymore and some new words. This is talking the future tense about we ought to deploy things, we have done that. I think congress has correctly gone in and updated this. There has been a lot of hyperventilating about the updates. Thinking, it says the schools cannot teach backgrounding anymore. Has sufficiently appreciated this. It is a complete sentence. It is the subjects and objects of this defense that have changed. , how itso about enforces. Applyrd limited may not in the same way we might think about it in 1999 context. At these look adjectives, and you compare them document and theres a lot of continuity. Sdio, and mba, we do see the in respect to deployment. Just within the past 10 years, as we heard about this morning, this is specifically the homeland element that we have broken out. This is the falling tree graph, those are the five depths the spending there. A 24 decline over the past decade. Going auts, here he gmd. E deeper into gnb this goes into the trend, it is pretty clear. These all kind of look like that. Through, we have a sorter on sensors and that of thing. Were going to blow through a little bit of that. View ofhow you the long interceptors, the lineage of where we are today. Fleetmitation of the tbi gb i fleet is there is a lot going on. Ptors you can see all the c1 and c2s. C2s dontely, the have the communications to the ground. The ekbs of today. To go out and get a twostage booster was never done. To get at that flexibility. That means you are not able to buy more time and fire later. You have the fire sooner. All three stages have to find that a burnout before the kill vehicle can be released. If you are operating from alaska, that is going to limit you. Mdame also moved to the three faces. For is the current roadmap going forward. Advanced robust, and is their categories. The second is the are kb. Areill talk a little bit rkv. This should have happened a decade ago and never did. Theyre not starting from scratch and are leveraging a lot of the parallel work going into other programs. The idea is to make it simpler, more modular, and have fewer points of failure. Is the kinds of reliability issues that have come up again and again. Rkving to that arcade will use the diversity in the fleet. It shows just how many different gbi fleet. N todays it will draw the seeker from the , and draw telescope upon that. It is not going to be starting up on scratch. In the advanced section, is the mo kb. That is quite a bit far behind rosen to where the plan was parried multiple kill vehicles, maybe a single booster, to compensate for some of the discrimination challenges, really improve your magazine capacity. It is pretty far out to the right in terms of that. This charge here is the centerpiece. What is going on and what the agency currently plans. We call this the skittles charge. You can taste the rainbow and kind of see a lot of muscle movements on what is happening there. The green is c one. That is the oldest kill vehicle put back into 2004. Ce two. Is the the blue is the c2 plus and the v. Anges are kb rk now, as i said, this is the best snapshot of what is going on and what is intended to go on. We would point out a couple shortfalls of what mda currently plans. One is likely to be, a big gap between things that are going to be put in place this year, the 44 by 17. After that, we are going to sit kv comes until the r around. Especially if it goes to the right. Might hurt later on. A second limitation is that, as we heard earlier, notwithstanding a recommendation in 2013, by the department of defense to go out and buy spares, thatsts wasnt done. After we get to 44, we are going to go down. Every time we test something, where going to have to pull it off the ground and that starts to add up until you get to the that into you get to the next generation. That is one of the several reasons why you are here and folks talk about the importance of capacity, instead of going down, it goes down by at least four if not more in the next couple of years. Comes online. V 2020 could be too ambitious. If that is too ambitious, thats reduction might be more important. The third limit is that, unfortunately, mda i think is planning on putting the rkv on some of the oldest boosters for cost. That might reduce some of their effectiveness. Lets talk into testing. Im sure we will have a discussion about this right now. Through in the instance of the testing budget. There is good reasons why it has gone down so much. Had to go back post 2010 and of the problems and then put it back together again. Some of this is the overall topline reduction pressure and some of it has to do with that choice. It really is the case, this is one of those instances of the mischaracterization of the testing record of gmd overall. Maybe the one exception i mentioned, that they went back and had to fix what i am you these are dumb problems. Or Something Like that. It is not high technology. One of these failures is because of the silo cover not opening. And the missile not coming out. That is the sort of thing that is not about the kill vehicle, more about the difficulty. Gotten muchmda has more forthright in articulating these failures. Sensors, no Missile Defense system is better than the sensors to tell it where to go and what to kill. We have what we call the mother of all testing charts in here that, not only goes through the ,ull 31 flight intercept tests and what became of them, failure explanations and things like that, but also what sensors were involved. See from the late 1990s on to where we are today, a pretty consistent increase as more radars are stitched in, as aegis and other things are brought in, you see a lot more of that. I think that is a good thing. There is probably a lot more to do on the center side. Probably the single most important thing that we recommend on the center side is the spacebased, probably infrared, tracking sensors. You get to that field of view, which you can not only inform form of overall, weve characterized the test record has a kind of nothing you would not expect for prototype. Sum that fits what we are,. Whats the key the key is to get out of that test been, that , thatype bin prototype. This is a quick picture of the sensors that evolved over time, over decades, that are slowly coming online. Youll see the top. Some of these highend take a look at the bottom. These are broken down by category. The last category at the bottom, the space space, that has what has gone off the cliff. This is mda spacebased budget overall. You get the idea. In terms of future options, we had a lot of uav direct of an energy, concepts that have been circulating and continue to come back. The difficulty is the budget is not there for them, we have another report last year talking about budget pressures especially. The r d value of onward. Tween 2010 and admittedly, some of its still potential, but that is the for mdasmediocrity r d. Good things going on but and relative terms we should do a lot more. Run through our recommendations, i will not read them all, thats why we gave you the book. We shouldf policy continue to have a more robust and layered Missile Defense for a variety of threats against both ballistic and Cruise Missiles. Of the mdl port explicitly. It will be interesting what i come up with. We dont talk about cruise Missile Defense just yet. In the budget side, restore home went Missile Defense to a level commensurate with being a first priority. Within the budget, prioritize theand ticket look at mlk and direct energy. Continue the current course for interceptor capacity, but look at accelerating mlk the as well. In terms of capacity, i would say continue to look at adding to the 44 in the coming years, and continuing to grow that out. Fork really has a lot of capacity. We will talk about activating the hedge that was described in that 2013 deity hedging strategy, activating the hedge, which was explicit in that report. Up for greeley is the most Cost Effective nearest Term Solution to do that. Onre is a lot of attention the east coast site possibility. Breast costs less costly approaches to that. Not want to exhaust the entire mda budget on new capital improvements. If there is a way to add capability with transportables, that is of underlay probably a more costeffective way to get added. It bit you will hear more about that. Adding thea of capability, but there might be cheaper ways to get there. In terms of sensors and tax texting casting, the space layers the most important. I will leave it there and turned over. Thank you. [applause] think you very much. Very nice presentation, terrific report. Credit to yourself and your team. You are up next. Ok. Thank you csi us, i am grateful for the opportunity to participate in this panel. There was invited because i coauthored a report last year on the event defense program, i would be happy to give you a copy if you are not able to get one. We were pretty tough on the gmd. You can probably tell by the title. We were tough with congress, the bush and obama administrations policies. I will be straightforward about that. Was to spark details, engage discussion about the role of strategic Missile Defense in our country. I believe these wellinformed conversations are essential to. S. And Global Security we cannot have a informed debate about the current value of the system without a clear assessment of it. This is critically important when the content is contentious convoluted to these longstanding debates. Since it has been almost 15 billion, the chengdu system after its inception, we thought we would take a look and see where we are , what the capability is, how we got here, and what are lessons that we could learn from that. Established on the findings of the official u. S. Government sources. We drew heavily from the gao, from the antigun Testing Office , test and evaluation. We found this system is in worse shape than most every last. We tried to look at why it ended up this way. We ended up looking a lot at the oversight and accountability system set up around the system. We found that it undermines the gmb system of development. Rather than summarizing the , i will make three short points that i think reflect the differences between our reports. Tom the first, we agree that the system is in poor shape. Tom has described the gmd system as being in its adolescence for an advanced prototype. He notes the system currently has serious reliability issues. This is a substantial agreement between the both of us. In nine of theat 17 tests since 1999, the kill vehicle failed to destroy the target. That record has not been improving over time. Also that the tests were developmental in nature. Prototype tests the type of test, they were expected on simplified conditions, not operational conditions, which are considered to be much more challenging. Defenders sile had significant information about the time and place of the looks,launched, photos the condition has not very much. The weight csi report describes i think we have quite a about thenformation test program. We have an office at the pentagon which evaluates that. This looks at the Missile Defense and ever every year, provides advice on the testing program. A report,port and the assessment was that the test today to our quote, insufficient to demonstrate that an operational useful defense capability some of the shortcomings it is yet to be tested against an icbm range target. We expect to see that later this year. Hasnt used interceptors against usedgle target, has not them against his salvo targets. Expect theions youd system to be facing in the real world go against the complex a set of complex countermeasures. Says is low. Sandia continues to discover new Failure Modes during testing. Eres where we agree robust testing is critical. We strongly agree with the recommendation for improving real some of the testing program. Testing only helps reveal control issues. It also helps provide information we need for liability in a quantitative way. U. S. Stance to launch multiple interceptors at a target to make up some ground for interceptors with low reliability, they provide limited improvement unless the effectiveness of the interceptors are it has. He need to know clearly what the reliability which needs to be discovered and testing. The second point i wanted to make is why did this happen. Heres where we make some diversions from the report. The 2002 Missile Defense is under a different acquisition system, more flexible than most major defense Acquisition Programs. Those were set up to prevent premature and expensive fielding among people call it fly before you buy. Systems into a special which allows corners to be cut, it also allows giving unrealistic timelines for an appointment which essentially ensures that this corners could be cut. Real andthat that has lasting consequences, we document that it shows from dsi report to. Problems are the do with the lack of budget. Because thetead development has been given to them by schedule rather than bringing this. This is not accepted even its service list scheduled my. Is, other major nearly every single interceptor was fielded before has gone through a successful intercept test. The fixes had to be made to an already fielded set of interceptors. Is a problem especially when youre developing something is, located as the gmd system, it is one of the most complicated projects the pentagon is ever taken on. Without acquisition progress at the process at the end of the obama bush administration. They do not seem to be sufficient to the task of many of these problems. We still have tests being. Onducted poorly vetted projects are started only to be canceled later wasting time and money. Hat could be better spent congress has exploded this by adding strategic defense portfolio projects that have not been asked for by the pentagon, such as the third continental interceptor site oarsmen repeatedly shown to be deadend skagit such as interceptors. Allowsck of rigor also thinking about how well the system works. We collected more than 30 quotation defense officials over the last decade, on which they say the confidence of this despite no testing of it to support those assertions. Concerned about that. Believing it works better than it does to lead to risk your decisionmaking, reduce the moretive further perhaps effective approaches for the problem of ballistic missiles. If you think you are defended you may be less prone to engage and difficult negotiations that are necessary to slow or stop and push back north korea must Nuclear Missile programs. The third point i wanted to make is the recommendation for moving forward, where we have overlap and differences. I appreciate the work in this , letting out a menu of options. I was left look to see more analysis to see which ones you think are further, since we have so many budgetary constraints as far as the foreseeable future. Given the analysis, we do not see a reason that spending more us a way out of the problem without making tough decisions. We have seen the 15 years under two administrations and under the most flexible acquisitions program, we do not have a working system. I understand the desire to be more agile and efficient, and im a technical person, not an acquisitions person. I see from the outside, but i am concerned without due attention, we run the risk of repeating the same thing a 40 billion system, now has not demonstrated realworld capabilities. Think, rather than holding us to this flexible approach, we should be demanding the highest rigor and accountability, really. Aking tough choices this issue is acute for programs such as strategic Missile Defense, which is highly politicized, has strong debates. Especially because we incur the financial and strategic costs of deploying Missile Defenses, whether or not the system works. Complicated decisionmaking, but it provides an incentive for russia and china to increase capabilities and sizes of their nuclear arsenal. The disincentive for the u. S. To engage is it far as it might diplomatically in north korea. Those are costly there. Whether or not the system works. While the csi s report makes interesting recommendations for Technology Paths that could be used to improve u. S. Abilities to offend defend the homeland, hype word these should be vetted by a strong process. We have the tools to do that. Congress should not create programs such as the third site or spacebased missile programs, especially find the spacebased Missile Defense program problematic. The is one of recommendations of this report, but at this point its premature. Analysis lots of good and the highest advice about , thesubject in 2012 National Academy of Sciences Published a report about space Missile Defense. They concluded that the actions would cost 10 times as much as other options, and more than 300 billion for what they called, an austere capability. There are committed the u. S. Government not spend a single dollar more on u. S. Space Missile Defense. I have not seen revolutionary technology that would change this assessment. This is a prime example where the process is important to keep us from our worst impulses. Research and development is one thing but putting up interceptors and space would be the first time anyone plays a dedicated, destructive weapon. That is a bridge we have not crossed yet. That sets a precedent that would make things more difficult for the u. S. To make space secure for beneficial military, scientific, economic, and putting a test bed and space provides no defensive capability and provides no offensive capability. I agree that we should build more bridges between skeptics and boosters, and i would hope that proponents and critics would love my dedication of rigor. Critics should award get untested equipment out of the field, and it provides credible information about how it works and what its potential in the future is. Heart testing. Systemhould be oversight providing a military reality check on myths. I believe there. [applause] think it very much for the presentation. Over the year. Thank you for the opportunity to be here, tom, thank you for you for the great work they have done. Pinchhitter here. I got i got the come on down late yesterday, so i am happy to be here. Its an interesting topic. Background, i am an operator, programmer, tester. I have been around the system for a long time. Comments are brief. Reinforce, some of them challenge, but the basis will be the dialogue we have from the questions start coming. The entire be mdf was a challenge. A challenge from the technology aspect, from the battle space aspect, 15 time zones as a system. Challenges from the physical aspects. Per it is been waxed and waned over time based on the distance of threats. Weve always had the nearterm threat, the homeland has not. In 15 years that has changed. 9 11 significantly changed the attitude. It was get something sooner rather than later. I will not say haste makes waste, but haste will make your to force decisions you would rather not. It can force you to set off a designer technique youd prefer not to commit to at this time. It can compel a decision that may limit your options in the future, and when faced when they did with a Decision Point of National Security decisions get made and we accept the limitations and future constraints and will have to work through them. Thats where we are today. Paper talks about adolescents and teens. Only mature adults . Lets look at the sensor family. They were not designed for the task of being asked to do. That patchwork of sensors had to grow. As we attempt to grow family of interceptors. The variety of gbs is large. If you ever saw a variety of the components inside the gb as you would say my god, what a fruit salad this is, that looks like a vegetable. [laughter] spotty, record has been successful tests before him seen. Youve got to her number you testimony test what are your attributes and criteria you are trying to verify. For test failures since irc and test success. All tests as i say it is, what are you pursuing. You set your objectives, designer tests to evaluate those objectives, you assess what happens, then you determine if you need to retest an objective, however i found it flawed shortcoming before the next test. The 2014 return to flight was the most challenging intercept and the significant valuable test. Take strides in airbnb, weve been here before. We had technical challenges, with setbacks, budget issues. We had advocacy issues. How many people here in 1990 thought this would work . There are a lot of people who did not think it would work. But we endeavored. Now is the basis of all our Missile Systems. Patriot act one. 1988 the first in the software. Tracks the ability to ballistic missiles. Back to the muscle, the interceptor designed to kill a theater ballistic missile. I want to desert storm with two wereles, thats all there in the fall of 1990. We can argue it happened in desert storm. Ts reverberated with me not much has changed. But what we learned in desert with no ttp,uable no foundation. By 2000. On the eve of oif, we have gone through countless soft health 4 hardware off upgrades and we had interceptor. We almost the very in a jailbroken in the fall of 2002 because it had failed to achieve one nuance in the kp p. We got through the jay rockefeller. Enough. He kp p was good we want to oif in march 2003, not with two muscles, but with a full quiver of 13. 13 big ones, two of them fully instrumented for test. Taken off the reins and sent forth. What im getting at is it is a long hard road to get a capability to the field. You can look at ages, ages has come massive strides. I do not know where navy. It our navy theater by youth. Interest today has arrived. Ad has arrived all these programs have their ups and downs, political challenges, Technology Issues, but they all arrived to posting Missile Defense system. Id argue and the question was asked i think this capability when you harness it into the system with the other sensors, were starting to stretch that operational theater of war to this strategic level war. The globalse have environment that gmt must operate in and deal with. The enormity of the battle space is staggering when you stop and think about it. We cant afford to walk away from gmd. The may be able to discipline the process that has gotten this year. I do not think we should say it is a traditional Acquisition Program or process. Ismust not forget that that not the only thing we can cease our effort or cease all efforts and missile air defense solely on gmd because our adversaries are not. They are advancing in north korea. Capability, lunch fuel, mobile launch. Air, sea, land, missiles in the last year from one of our future adversaries, potentially. Being usedl systems by conventional forces in unconventional ones. For gmd we need to improve our sensors and comics, create a tire shop for the kv. Senator laid out, we are on the right, the our arkady is critical, it will enhance our ability to improve the system. , andrs are critical growing gb i fields or more gps coming have a more a more robust quiver would be good. To be the ability to be of the cycle in and outs he can do modifications without loss overall capacity is good. Im not certain where the location should be. One of the two we have now or create a third. Based on where those fields are and your sensor architecture, that affects how you engage different threat aspects. Directorate energy is the fun of. The deputy at fort lift air Defense Center i received the task to deploy a counter rocket artillery system in one year. Documents,equirement we were outside of the acquisition process, we had 365 days. , ande Directorate Energy all of those believers were in my office. The reality was it was not going to get there in 365 days. Im still waiting but we are making progress. We met that requirement and we deployed a system that was g, and is still in theater today doing this task. We put it through tests and you know what . A d or cd of like minus. We, from come something is worth a lot. Its still in theater and performing today and has been improved. With respect to the five points the senator put out there, i think he is spot on. With respect to testing, testing is important. An element of the Systems Engineering model, but you just cant say, every 12 months we will take a test. That would be a waste of resources. Testing is difficult, difficult to plan, to structure, to execute. Especially in the gmd realm. What did the battle space we are trying to replicate. You look at the places you can and cannot operate from, you look at the Environmental Constraints and restraints. Negotiate the closing of international a stormring storm that had taken my airspace away because airliners were diverting into meyer space so i could get a gmd test offer. Stop and think about that. We ceased International Air i was losing my window of test opportunity while i had it shipped sensors and everything strung out across the pacific taking a pounding in this bad weather. Approvaltely got the and we held International Air traffic to allow us to do this test. We were down to about the last 15 minutes of our test window. Not simple. Build your test, ss criteria, but you need to test you execute your test, evaluate your data, then you say, invalidate, found something new. The new reorganize and plan for your next test. He cant say every 12 months we will test. Integrated test plan lays out numerous tests that will get after different criteria, attributes consist. Cannot reach up to 2021 and pull a test forward and executed in 2018. Of preplanning and pretest situations their targets that have to be built that are oneofakind. Although we have developed a therelan, and that is out and dot signs off on that plane every time it is updated, the ability to pick and choose what test i will do this year is a difficult and challenging thing. I will end there. I think i have run my gums enough. The key think we need to focus on, we do need to move forward. The threat has brought a back into imd and any in my opinion goes well beyond Cruise Missiles. When you look at the whole operating environment air supremacy is no longer a guarantee nor is air superiority. As we do a review, in the coming year or years, were going to expand to include Cruise Missiles. Against it ought to be just the entire missiles not just the missiles. I look forward to the dialogue and questions. Thank you. [applause] thank you friend. Would like to have a conversation, i will ask a few questions. Ill leave a few minutes to offer questions from the audience. Lets talk about the goals of the system, will talk up the question of size and qualitative improvements. Then well talk about testing. Senator sullivan talked about goals specifically worth request to north korea spect north korea. Her column saying the system should have a near certain you destroying north korean icbm. That, thisd off of threepart question, well start with you, tom. Well. Aura to respond as shouldappropriate goal possibleabout digit threats . Second what is your figure in that . , and you can take time on this question, why should we design a system that is explicitly aimed at engaging . Ussians and chinese vehicles if we design a system and a missile is launched at us from russia or china, the system try to engage without question, but as ad it take gadgets finds a set of threats, missiles, and vehicles from russia or china with more advanced countermeasures . First on north korea, then iran, then russia, china. On north korea, i dont recall the particular three or four we are speaking of, but i would say the question of home and north korean missiles obviously i will be in touch in terms of the new threat assessments, what was done back in the 2000 10 p. M. Tr, then again in 2013. Ok,s looked around and said this is worse than it was in 2013. Happened in what is 2013. The new administration will look at that. It is not like anybody has something to say there will be 37 as opposed to 39 icbm threats. Thats with the new administration will look at. Take a look at the threat again. Do notme i checked i think we are better off than we were in 2013. They will look at that realistic terms. Where is iran and that makes . Mix . Recognizing that iran could break out, and diphtheria. Period of eight years they could get a sense of that agreement. Women a prediction about iran. The iranian icbms of come around. This does get looser as you pointed out in some respects as it goes forward. I do not think anybody knows what will happen is going to happen with u. S. A runner relations this year even. We heard in the exchange earlier today, its not simply a function of what you do in there garage alone. They get assistance from folks. Think the past administration looked at this and said we have to hedge against this for some extent. You cannot wait for the icbm plumes out of tehran to say, maybe we need to think about the east coast of the United States. Here, isnt options an ally dr like thing . Is it spx on the ground . Is it spx ashore . Is it some expand radars, you ew are sites . Right now our Sensor Network is ground and seabased, its also pointed in the other direction. The omnidirectional, beginning fairly focused on one particular trajectory for a long time. Our Sensor Network to a remarkable degree reflects that focus. What were seeing is nothing special. Theyve been talking about that for a couple years now. H respect to thats a terrifically detailed answer. On that note and correct to russiachina. I expect this would be a significant conversation. It was an excellent answer. Let me ask a similar broader terms you agree that an objective of the gmd system or u. S. National Missile Defense should be to stay ahead of the threat from north korea . That systemds, deployed at any given time is deployed prepared to deal with not just a known threat, but the plausible threat for the relative here term . And of verified intelligence assessment and make those plans accordingly. Normally thats part of the which isnts process, not part of the same way we do Missile Defense. Yes, certainly a formalized process. Staying ahead of the threat. Some senses we have been lucky or fortunate that the icbm threats have not matured as quickly as they have been predicted, 2015 came and went thewe did not see tested flight i be icbms from north korea or iraq. Iran has made much slower progress, not even as liquid been tested very often. You nothing solid fuels. Possibly there was a test last year it was unclear. To theemed really be intelligence. You agree with the objective and areola postured to meet that . With the sacred defense to the most likely as you build about defense, you do not ignore other potential threats. Dont make a decision that precludes the building from my mind its about 360 degree capability. You may wait in the defense of the most likely avenue or adversary. Thats the way we approach the problem. From the aspect and iran, the next guy to worry about, probably if you think of all those who you probably have to keep that in your mind. And when do you make the decision or is there a decision of, now i must ask because maybe they are a problem. And denying need to start investing. Or if im going to invest, be it nextrs, wherever it that and knowing my first concern is north korea. How can help the defense and set the stage for defense to the east. Give you relief from having to answer first on the next question after this. Looks quebec to russia and china. Hand, if either of them launched a missile into the United States, he would of systemexpect that the would be directed to attempt to engage that. The question is whether we should attempt to design a system that is explicitly aimed threats,g with limited limited text from the russia or china. Do you think there is a high probability of unauthorized or accidental attacks from russia do believe that is important for the United States to have the ability to negate a limited attack, in the midst of a conflict, and are you concerned this is a leading question are you concerned that that requirement will begin to draghi to a much more complex system, and that it could actually compete with the ability to get the current and planned improvements that system in place to deal with the north korean plan . When they begin by quoting backo to you the gmds would be but thatnst any source phrase, any source. That is the phrase that appears in our report, also used thick in the early 1990s with respect to the chief analyst. Im getting there, im getting there. The question is, first i want to establish i think the u. S. Policy that is frequently overstated to say that we have nothing to do with that. The second part of that is, what would you try to do . They came up earlier, think the general you emphasized the Cruise Missile problem. That is explicitly one of the three things that the muscle defeats review to ask the department to god a look at Cruise Missiles where we talking about . , north koreas air force . Probably russia or china. Congress i suspect had that in mind when they put that into the bill. Instance, i think it makes a lot of sense to look at those call them on strategic these missile threats to homeland. I would also say we are to be looking at that in a serious way for forces and allies in nato. Socalled for Cruise Missile threat. In terms of the strategic ballistic thing if you were to go that way, at most you would the purpose of raising the threshold for the time being, or perhaps for taking some kind of asset. That may not be gmd, it may be Something Else entirely. I think every administration should ask and answer the question and know for itself, how do you think that makes sense . Of the nextad question with you, you are welcome to comment on this as well. Are you confident that we know how to develop, even a limited a russian orst china threat has advanced countermeasures . And second, are you confident that we have an understanding of how they develop and deploy costeffective Cruise Missile advancedhat involves Cruise Missiles with significant stealth capabilities . Coming up of ssns. I would tell you from my perspective on the first question, i do not think the there. Ogy is i cant say definitively efforts have been put against it but i think the technology could be achieved. It would take time and effort on another dynamic comes back to, was very sources, this regular will face and my potentially face . Correctly have stated in our overall strategy, on the cruise Missile Defense, for my time at north come, we looked at a defense system. Air goes back to the basic defense tenants. I cannot defend everything. I do not have an umbrella over the nation. And ie whats important will do my best to defend that. Do we have the capability today to give you confident cruise Missile Defense . That depends how close you want to be carrying that from the asset we are trying to defend. , i lost t before its a big loss. Ugly as many people thought it was, laughable if they thought it was, i was in key west last week. , theree still flying must be contributing to the mission set because they have been there a long time. We have that than flying in the alr, i know we have lost them and replace them, they have been contributing the dunes capability or capability like giblets, i think is essential. May be essential to get back to the ladies. I agree with that. In the interest of time, i would just ask one more question. Theou think about requirements and acquisition for the and been used to system, if you are going use regular order for both nonrequirements and acquisition, what you think how would you apply it . And you stand still current efforts to improve the system going back through the process . Would you say as of a certain point in the future we will apply this regular order acquisition approach or how would you do that . Testing, what do you think would be an appropriate number of tests per year on average, understanding that it varies by the program with respect to its development . For an operational system, one would expect a regular pattern. Effects, first on requirements and acquisitions, second on testing. Questions, im not in a collisions expert. I know we are blessed with them here in washington, d. C. , what ii look at it is would ask from the apartment systems is to save us from arrest impulses, to set up the incentives right. We want to see successes. If a system like the gmd does not have a clear path to be owned by Service Services budget as something goes through developmental and Operational Testing and think its uploaded out, isegypt has moved that acquisitions process still doing what it ought to do to make the gmd system forward . Tothere a credible way replicate if it does not going to j 5000 for example, to make sure that interceptors and i could feel that before they are well tested . Normally you will have to go through operational tests to be secured. Tom makes a good point in his t of at the dod budget acting like a fund. This sets up this dichotomy where it is perpetually and research and development. Just a be clear if i could come to think the gprs and in the ground today have been adequately tested . I dont. Do that for think they should be pulled out of their polls in the United States have no defense at all . Or do you think we should go from where we are and have what whatse we can based on appears to be a very real and growing north koreas threat . I would leave them in the ground of course, yes. I would may be to permit with the arkady and put it through processes. E j 5000 testing, think testing officials puzzle have often said and we just heard this, its hard to up the tempo because theres a lot of analysis. Even since throwing money at the problem does not really make it easier. Are plenty of places you can watch them missile from towards to test sites on the interceptors from. Its a difficult dynamic. To have a cultural problem and expecting test access . Knew agriculture problem. Every time you launch an interceptor we expect to see something building and flash in the sky. Agree in one sense having been on the joint Staff Service staff, they say you complain about something long enough you end up on the other staff or you are responsible for it, or plan the solutions that the agency and gmds been given a card talk carte blanche. We had a requirement document in the 90s. Id think it could go find that if i had to for the gmd system. Process andk at the it is cut andnd dry, deliver the kc p or you are done. Thats a grand waste of effort time and money. We did something in between, what are we going to do, but he hope to achieve this capability . Put your marks on the wall and lets develop, test. If you come back with a 67 requirement of 85 or 90 , we ought to have the dialogue. , 67 is pretty good. How may times did they were given base . Th he . s a hero is inr looks at the center sited there is no benefit to moving mda back to the other process. Maybe there is insufficient folks looking over their shoulders, maybe that is possible. Some think theres quite a bit of oversight going on. Positive there. , fat unders back that process was not doing great in the 90s. Where we sing with the fat and sm that has gone forth outside of that process . 24 out ofthad, 23 or 28 how do you account for that record and that development seats . S outside of the j if that is the cause, gmds problem, how do you account that . To design,r got everyone knew it was a prototype 2004, is why we are sitting here extending it want. Thats why the next design rpd is so important. Thank you. 11 30. Almost up at is that a couple minutes. Raise your hand, which the microphone. Gentleman in the second row. John harper with National Defense magazine. Tom you mentioned the and fortune importance of spacebased senate centers. I was hoping the plaintiff could panel could flesh that out. We have satellites that can detect missile launches what what what a spacebased system entail . Looking ahead to the Missile Defense agencys plans to address this capability, how realistic are they, either technical or a budget very first perspective . I think this is maybe the most important thing that ought to be added to what we are doing now. That, everyay administration, the last five, has had a spacebased central air not for detection for but for tracking and discrimination. Theyve had it as a criminal elegant element of leverage Missile Defense. Nobody has done it. For whatever reason it continues to get pushed back. This is something that i think the administration has indicated they want to look at they should look at. The voice of april has said going to spit the vice admiral has said going to space is a must, right now it continues to be a maybe. Having said that, to demonstrate theysatellites in orbit have dramatic gesture medically increased longterm range already. Didnt necessarily have to be battle star galactica covers the could be smaller and cheaper. Richard. Richard fieldhouse, former Armed Services stafford. I want to ask a question that gets someone at your answer to jim on russia and china and somewhat to the discussion of. Esting it wasnt clear to me from your answer so well put it this way; would you agree that any of our homeland Missile Defense efforts should be intended to have the effect of improving our security , relative to strategic stability questions, a russia china question. All of our Missile Defense systems should be tested and demonstrated more effectively before they are deployed . I goes to the either the russiachina issue which i think is what jim was getting at if we are going to design a system specifically to try to stercept their strategic Missile Systems, it is relatively easy for them to forease their capacity systems over one, etc. Is, thoughould say correct one of your other colleagues who said in 2014 that even at 44, you are with less than the number of interceptors that moscow to place today. We dont sit around agonizing around the impact, but they have 68 all caps. They are pretty upfront about this. The reason i pull out the quote is, we are just so far away from that in terms of number. As much as anything. While i think that the systems we are advancing today, sms, as well as part continuing to blur the line between national and regional as it were. I think we are just so far from that. Youou get to a point where begin to have that capability, you would still have to have a lot of numbers to really affect that. Think actually you could have improvement of strategic stability rather than hurting it. That was the concept right, was androtect critical assets, raise the threshold and support the overall posture. Not crazy, it has been kicked around many times, making sure you have strategic survivability for Different Things. Thats what informs strategic stupid stability. That is where we have emphasized from a talk about rushing here look at how would you might improve strategic stability, not as an umbrella, but with these particular side issues. I will put a name to my concern briefly, that is that your requirements established to deal with relatively limited russian that resources will end. Ward that im skeptical we can defeat the advanced countermeasures of today let alone those of tomorrow. If we pursue that, and people done,e that it should be they may come to say ok, we are going to throw more money at the qualitative side. That could be a large hole not an incidental. Ondly, lets say its some 10 effective, lets build more. Im concerned about the cost implications and effects on civility russians and chinese believe our system may be more capable than it is as they are doing their planning. Set of issuestant that i think this administration should address. Ofont look the possibility looking at that capability. Rushed,d missile is the United States should try to engage it. He said that same thing Christmas Show Cruise Missiles . The challenge is that we do not yet have an asset for nationwide defense. We do have a reasonable concept. Defense, national capital, and of so on. But you dont see it as an impediment . No i do not. I dont disagree with your point. I think what we will do is have one more question and then the german here in front. Russell king there is a particular missile advocacy organization. South, including missiles flying over the south pole, and latin america, there are regimes that we have close with. Onships in 1962, we had a threat coming from cuba. Im not seeing any missiledefense assets south of the gulf coast or at the gulf coast. How do we consider threats in the south . To puty important enough in this missiledefense framework . There is nothing there. We are all looking in the other direction. You could detect it, you could do much about it. We what are you tried to defend against . Is it the venezuelans russian mark . Principle of the electability, mobility. If something happens, if it happens, we are able to adapt to it. That is what we emphasize in the report. You cant line the United States coastline with the fences. Defenses. The past year, i have been part of an exercise with the defense agency, some of the other Combatant Commanders we hit nations who are today, not really an adversary but in the future, they have the capability to be. Whatever it is, as an six sm 6, whatever you have. Now we play the game. If we have a threat out of south america, how do we do with it deal with it . They played that at the time. ,f you want the lines covered they will be covered. But i am not covering the state of texas. That is the dynamic of what if. What are we going to do . On who is the bad guy today. Not the potential bad guy, not the wild ones. I think that is a good place for us to conclude. Noted, thisand tom gives us some ability to deal with the region. In the meantime, we have our hands full with north korea establishing a posture. They could see that they would not be able to direct United States. It is an important part of our deterrence. Those two are pretty significant challenges. I trust them well. Thank you all for being here today. Please join me in a round of applause. [applause] this weekend,