Okay. Without further ado, id like to get to our second panel and introduce the speakers. The theme for this panel is the sharp end of deterrence. And i think its a great follow on to the challenges of command and so let me start with the gentleman thats just right next to the podium dr. Eric setzekorn ph. D. , whos an author of arming east, deterring deterring china in the early cold war. Dr. Dr. Sets akorn is a military historian and specializes in the history. The u. S. Army in east asia after service in the u. S. Army and the Intelligence Community he received, his ph. D. From, George Washington university army, east asia. His second book he previously published, the rise and fall of an officer corps, the republic of china military. From 1942 to 1955. Dr. Shetty corners, an employee of the u. S. Federal government, has for many years at the u. S. Army center for military history. Hes also an adjunct faculty member at George Mason University and, the university of maryland global campus. Next, would be to his right, your left would be colonel l scott lingamfelter. United states army, retired. Hes the author of the book yanks and blue berets, american u. N. Peacekeepers in the middle east curling and father began his military career as a field women. Hooray yes he then served as a front military observer in the United Nations true Supervision Organization in syria, israel and southern lebanon. Sound familiar . Which the subject of his new book after 28 year military career, colonel lincoln felder served in the Virginia House of delegates from 2002 to 2018. Hes a contributor to the Washington Times and his book, desert red lake artillery and the first gulf war was also an official title in the usa book program. Colonel lincoln felder will be inducted into the next class of the u. S. Army field hall of fame. And again, last but not least to my immediate left is Lieutenant Colonel james lecture. United states army retired. His he is the of with my shield an army ranger in somalia. Colonel lecter is in is a retired u. S. Army infantry. He served for 27 years and participated in eight operational deployments, including somalia, with Task Force Ranger. He also worked at the National Policy advising the National Security council at the white house and, serving numerous tours at the cia. Colonel mcnair holds a masters degree in history and, serves on the board of directors for several veterans following the russian invasion of the ukraine, he has served a war correspondent. Again, you couldnt for a better set of three distinguished authors for our second panel. And so at this time, eric, please. Well, thank you all for coming. I think this panel deterrence is such a important word today as we grapple with the challenges that jim strategic challenges that face the United States. The u. S. Army has a major role, i think, to play in deterrence. So i hope this will be a productive hour. My work looking at the 1950s when we had a situation with a very aggressive china led by a mercurial leader. A lot of parallels to today. So my my research was really focused on what are some lessons, what are some ways that the army was to assist National Policy deter china in a way that was strategic, valuable but also done without breaking bank done while being cognizant of real challenges. For example, most of my work is on the 1950s, and when eisenhower came Office Severe challenges recruitment. Not a lot of people joining the army very much similar to today major problems with the budget again similar to today so a lot of parallels i mostly want to talk about taiwan give a little bit of a case study and my Research Taiwan very much in the news, particularly in light of ukraine and hopefully draw some Lessons Learned. I should note the disclaimer on the bottom. Im no longer an employee of the us army or the dod, but i do work for the federal government. So these views are my own personal views and any sort of official policy statement. Next slide, please. So how do you deal with china . How do you deal with an aggressive, assertive, militaristic china, which is threatening us allies, u. S. Allies who are much smaller, much smaller military forces and are not able to defend themselves. That was the question eisenhower had to face in 1953 when he became president and. One of the things he did was to korea. Korea at that time there was an ongoing conflict and basically said, how do we how do we deal with this army . What are you doing . What policies can we implement . And he out that the army actually was fairly the came Korean Military advisory group. He had built up a large korean force. This force had been trained this force an equipped us military advisors attached to korean units, not always effective on operations, but for holding the line, maintaining the front lines. The koreans have been effective given clear, simple missions. The us officers felt that this was a sustainable war program and eisenhower really picks up this example, sees whats going on in korea and says this can be replicated. This can be replicated in taiwan this can be replicated in South Vietnam in thailand, in the philippines. And so in the 1950s, we have a cluster of military advisory groups being formed in east other parts of the world as but particularly in east asia. This is a place, you know, its far from the content of the states. It can be quite expensive to ship troops out there to sustain troops out there, particularly in east asia. Eisenhower, that the army has a very, very strong role to play, to deter china by building up local forces, building up local allies to fulfill missions on their own with u. S. Support. And next slide, please. And perhaps the best example of that in taiwan. Taiwan in the 1950s, just like today, was facing a very hostile threat from prc engagements. The taiwan straits, skirmishes on some of the outlying eisenhower. There had been some some efforts made during the truman administration, but eisenhower looked at taiwan and said, this can be a case study. This can be a wonderful example where can demonstrate to our allies we stand with you. Were not going to put u. S. Troops on the ground but we are going to supply you with weapons supply of training. Were going to demonstrate a commitment to your through military assistance. And thats what we see is that the figures are absolutely staggering especially if you think of you know the size of the us army today. Taiwan in 1955 had over half a million troops out of a population of about 11 million. So absolutely very, very large military. Again fulfilling that sort of model. Eisenhower looked at in korea a. Simple mission youre not asking taiwanese to invade the mainland youre not asking taiwanese forces to to another area. Theyre going to be defensive. Theyre going to be holding the beaches, so to speak. Theyre going to be dug in. Theyre going to be have hardened, hardened logistics facilities. And part of that was if the taiwanese are holding up of this defensive posture, the us personnel are going to mainly be providing instruction and. Thats a key point, probably for deterrence. I think in our current era, how do we maintain deterrence for a long period of time . China is probably not going to go away in five or ten years. In the 1950s, they recognized that this was a perhaps generational challenge. Its not enough to train a soldier in south korea, in taiwan, because in two years, in three years, they will a civilian. You have to create an institution. You have to create an institution that is to change, that is going to adapt as decades pass, and that the majority of the u. S. Personnel assigned to taiwan, they were in schools. What we might think as gsc brand schools training officers, theyre not there was a phrase in afghanistan shoulder to shoulder. That was not the model in. The 1950s, the us 1950s saying we are not going be shoulder to shoulder with you on the beaches were going to train, were going to support you, but you are going to be they want the us allies whether they be south korean, South Vietnamese or taiwanese, you are going to be the one with the weapons. You are going to be the one deterring china and potentially fighting china. Next slide, please. And this model, i would argue, is fairly effective. And the proof of that is when you have crisis situation building an institution is great, Building Organization is wonderful. But really a crisis is when comes to shove. And in the taiwan straits in 1958, you have situation where mao zedong wants to test the us commitment. And so one of these offshore islands, a quemoy currently called kinmen, same place, just the different transliteration. The prc begins shelling it thousands of rounds, shelling this island, its only about four or five miles in and about two miles wide. Theres 30,000 taiwanese troops on it. So is kind of a a test, right . The u. S. Back out or will the us double, but because of the hard work, because the preparation, because of the investment, the u. S. And made prior to that really that that sort of tough decision doesnt have to be made because the facilities are hardened the troops are well trained military advisers on island that is American Military advisers. Yeah you were taking some casualties but were still effective. Morale is high. We plenty of ammunition. We have plenty of food. We have plenty of water. So the mag is also supplying wonderful information to american Decision Makers saying yes we dont you know we have a situation here but its not you dont need to send the aircraft carriers you dont need to have air strikes. The chinese mainland. We are fulfilling our mission. We are holding steady. We are holding firm and really the only u. S. Military unit that deploys taiwan is maybe 800 men from an air defense unit. So in this case, the investment in deterrence, the u. S. Armys hard work in the 1950s allows policymakers to take their time. They dont have to react off the cuff to threats. They can pause, they can wait for the situation to develop. And in this case, the investment proved have a good rate of return. Taiwanese they do not break pressure. Taiwanese military leaders are providing good coordination. The us military, they invest made to deter china by supplying local allies with education, with equipment with weapons had paid off. Next slide please. And thats important legacies. I mean, if we look around asiapacific today, we look at where the us has key alliances. South japan, thailandbut certainly in taiwan. And i would argue that not just helping the us with crisis situations but enduring legacies is something the us army can do. A wonderful job with. The us air force, us navy, oftentimes they have a smaller footprint. They a more limited sort, face to face contact the us army in the 1950s and later has continue to have a strong relationship with taiwan. We look some of the equipment, for example, the apache helicopters today, what are the Taiwanese Air force, a taiwanese fly, ty fly black ops, they fly apaches, they buy patriot missiles, they buy abrams tanks. So deterrence is not just about helping in the near term, but it also provides enduring legacies. And so that strategic and thats a wonderful phrase, love. Admiral radford, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff during the 1950s, he said these places are strategic. Where, you know, the us army can invest money and get a high rate of return it cost 1950s prices. Not so much. Today. 225. A supplier, a taiwanese soldier, 30 500 to supply a u. S. Army soldier. So with budgets being constraint, thats another way supply. And our allies support our allies can provide a way forward. Last slide, please. So i want to highlight that this deterrence, which i were going to speak about in detail, the us army is absolutely critical asia pacific is, not just a theater for the navy and for the air force, but the army has a extremely valuable role play, extremely Important Role to play. It should be said its not not always easy. I dont want to sound too much like a pollyanna either. You know, the grass is always greener. Its challenging, right . Military Army Officers want be in command. They want to, you know, be a Battalion Commander or move up to brigade, getting people to fill these positions can be tough. And it also takes a lot of coordination. It takes a lot of coordination with allies. But also here in d. C. And i think thats why forums, like aoc can be so valuable, the us army needs to understand military advising, providing military equipment is always a very delicate process politically, and thats something that has to the army always has to keep one eye on is it works with local allies and. Ill leave it at that. Thank you very much. And look forward to your questions. Thank very much. Eric scott, please go run on up. Great. Why dont we move to next slide . First of all, i want to thank joe in particular and the and the book program and my publisher, university, kentucky, who has been so helpful to me in getting work done. Glad to see natalie here. Ive had a very rewarding career. I to say to you that being a grandfather is the best part of that as. We like to say our grandchildren are the desert of life. Next slide, please. So why this book . First, surprising. Many people are unaware that the role of of the role of the American Military and particularly our officers played in the United NationsSupervision Organization since its founding in 1948 after israel modern state into being the experience and the stories of many United Nations military observers and motors have received scant treatment frankly in the military literature and so yet these lessons that we learned very important including the inherent danger and importance and professionalism and level headedness in the face of danger, particularly when you consider that these military observers were unarmed and what was a de facto combat zone, finally, theres much to consider from our experience and adventures to inform future opportunities if they should rise next levels. So my sources are similar to what you would find from from any author. But the most important aspect of this book was the 18 testimonies from 18 former unknowns that i was able to receive in this Work Together and their story enlivens the stories of this book nowhere else. So youre to find their testimonies replicated. And i got to tell you every single officer that i can talk to essentially to me, well, ive been waiting for years for somebody to ask about this. And im very honored today to introduce to you one of those on those former marine colonel danny lindemann, who has come all the way from california, need to be at this lecture. And so i want you to welcome next slide please. So the American Association with the answer and so was was not new when i arrived in 1981, there had been senior u. S. Marines who had led on. So in their early years and americans held Important Roles in the as the chief Operations Officer and the chief of Observer Group lebanon for some time the prominence of u. S. Officers and un so added to our credibility of the 36 of us who were assigned with 257 other unarmed observers from 17 nations. Next slide, please. As you can see, we had a very diverse assem of people from different some 17 countries, 293, we had 36 from sweden, which was a nonnato country at the time 36 russians and 36 americans. And danny and i were actually damascus with the russians, and we used to joke with them, how come there are only two americans and an 18 russians here . And we would say, well, we just want to keep it even it looks like its important to know that there are there are different flavors of peacekeeping operations, that of peacekeeping in that a peace enforcing in the un charter. There are two types of peacekeeping. Chapter six, the pacific settlements dispute, and Chapter Seven threats to the breach in and aggression the former suits, peacekeeping and the latter suits Peace Enforcement, which each ever chapter is chosen. Its very, very important that we have the configuration, the mandate and the mission support. Correct from the beginning. But importantly you must also have buy in from the parties to the conflict. It is sadly convenient that as we give this lecture today, the middle east is on fire. Finally, you must a force that is welltrained and competent and excellent. In 1981, we had three major in organized operations in the levant. We had un so that was organized under chapter of the u. N. Charter that t dennis and i rved in with our colleagues there was the united Observer Force, Observer Force in,he Golan Heights. Its job was to keep the israelis and the rians at peace. There were 1280 troops in that, alonwi 66 unarmed observers. And of course, there was United Nations interim force lanon, another armed peacekeeping effort of 5931 armed troops and 88 unarmed un. So observers, 25 of whom were americans it too, was under chapter six. Why . They were all organized under chapter reveals the uns hesitation to avoid seven Peace Enforcement require even when that might been a better configuration. Next let this is a this is a picture where we were organized and spread out across the area. We ranged from beirut, the north to cairo in the to oman and jordan in the east. And syria in the northeast. And jerusalem, of course, in the central area. And also had their hands full, keeping all those things together. Next slide, please. Most of the american observers were in lebanon in 1978 prior to the israeli invasion of lebanon that year. We in our International Partners occupied five fixed ops north of the Israeli Border inside lebanon. Next lot. In 1978, unifil formed in the battalions, highlighted here were armed note that there on the left hand side is the tier pocket. It was occupied by the Palestinian Organization while the running along the south labeled the dfa enclave was occupied by Christian Lebanese army breakaway units that were allied with the israelis. Remarkably, the un condoned and unifil didnt control of the territory was mandated to occupy from the beginning and since the un acquiesced, the combatants refused surrender essential territory to unifil. Next slide, please. After 1978, israeli invasion operation litani designed to push the Palestinian Armed elements out of lebanon. So ops were supplemented by six mobile liaison teams designed to resolve disputes. And these also unarmed troops. Next slide, please. Despite our smaller numbers 12 , the United States influence and answer was considerable. First, we were highly trained warriors for an area officers who were competent in that respect. Second, the u. S. Was a power player in the un and considerably generous financially. Finally we had a Regional Force structure adjacent to the middle that could provide sense assistance to un. So when things went south. Next slide. Sometimes our warrior do attitude rubbed other nationalities wrong. On occasion, we had to rein our enthusiasm to amicably with nationality as with other nationalities not given to our particular form of elan. It would have helped, frankly if wed had better diplomatic awareness before we had showed up on the ground. Our un training was very thin, very little on peacekeeping and conflict resolution. They did teach us what to do if combatants stole our property. Just acquiesce. Our best training was passed down to us by those who had preceded us and were experienced observers. Slide, please. Discovery learning best characterizes the experience. Answer with little formal training. First, we had an opportunity to learn from other nationalities beyond those that we traditionally associated with in germany and in the far east. Second, there was much to learn from the arabisraeli conflict art and culture. But the eye opener was learning even episodically, how to deal with the parties to the conflict. As we reported, violations, resolve disputes negotiated hostage and dealt with hostile fire as unarmed. Next slide. In general the levant was relatively sedate in 1981, except for southern lebanon, which i call in the book the wild west without a good saloon. As i wrote in the yanks cease in lebanon were no more than fragile periods of attenuated violence. Indeed, the nature of the conflict throughout the region, in particular in lebanon, was that of a dysfunctional family and, an understanding that conflict was not made easier by exhibiting what i termed the intolerance of which is a tendency to reduce calm issues to a simple common denominator, to uncomplicated something and make it digestible, when in fact it very complex at several levels. In reality, the complexity of conflict there required that rely on our acquired good judgment and widths. Next slide. Heres some on the bottom left as a wounded irish soldier being evacuated in april of 1980 by u. S. Army major harry klein, he was wearing sunglasses. The upper left was taken by the marine captain mike fallon in march of 1978. Of israelis destroying a palestinian position in. Southern lebanon in the center is u. S. Army major charlie. Later, a general officer inspecting the shelling damage done to the u. N. Headquarters in occur in lebanon in april 1980. The upper is a bullet riddled u. N. Vehicle. And so vehicle at the lower left is mike fallon with a plo soldier merely, leg and arm child. But armed. Next slide, please. Being an unarmed military dangerous business in lebanon, we so observers carried weapons all that were in our holster were hard work, resourcefulness patience and decisiveness. Unifil had the weapons. All we had was a blue beret and wits the former useless and bullets. The latter important in avoiding them. Next slide. The upshot of our was found learning about nationalities and complexities in peacekeeping and the value of doing peacekeeping that included the importance of impartiality, professionalism, learning from others, teaching others. Since we didnt everything and they didnt either. And of course Building Military relationships. Next. The downside came danger. Moreover, you had to be seen as trustworthy by the combatants. Sometimes they would tell us a lie that they to be true. To see if we would share it with others. If the lie made it back to them, they would no longer trust us. If it didnt, they would. U. S. Marine lenny some cuts. Lenny sopko said. You must assume at some point everybody lies to you and that could endanger your life. Finally, if force contributors in peacekeeping. Consider this to be a one off mission. The combat will immediately exploit that and undermine the peacekeeping authority. Excellent question. So what are some lessons . Here are some important ones. Dont fall into the intolerance of ambiguity trap. Nothing is simple. You see that today in the east, the combatants must buy into peacekeeping. Or it will fail. It will be elusive at best. You must have a strong and enforceable mandate. The armed peacekeepers must have have clear, clear rules of engagement, particularly in deadly force. Theres got to be consequences for violations of peace. Peacekeeping training for both the peacekeepers and peace enforcers is vital. Peace operations requires Detailed Planning. The same kind of Detailed Planning that you do for wartime planning. And you must have competent and units. Peacekeepers are not police holders. And you have to keep in mind. Next slide, please. So whats the future . Peacekeeping. So there were many lessons and we ought to consider them, particularly when we look at a place, ukraine, believe it or not. One day there may be peace in ukraine and there may be the opportunity for the International Community to do some peacekeeping in that region of world. We have many Lessons Learned from the past past operations and we always go forward best in the and in the country. By going back first, we always go forward. Best when we go back first and correctly correctly configuring peacekeeping essential under u. S. Rules or non u. N. Coalition arrangements. I so i should say u. N. Rules or non u. N. Coalition arrangements. Finally. Will the combatants agree to honor the peace regimen . If not, the danger is profound. So heres some final thoughts. Next slide. Slide. We as a nation need to think about the value of peacekeeping going forward. President said it will. Here its on the wall in his library, independence, missouri. And as ive concluded in my book, yanks were indeed sentinels of peace and did so despite. The cynical view by some peacekeeping wouldnt work. Personally, i believe we were to be peacekeepers in our time, and apparently so did the nobel committee, who awarded us the peace prize in 1988. Thank you very much much. Thanks very much. Appreciate that, jim. Please over to you. Last but not least. Yes, well, good afternoon. I appreciate the opportunity to be here. I want to thank joe and with say not only for this for for supporting the book. My book. Ill just have a few comments today about my book with my. Try to summarize a little bit and then present some themes from the books highlight well with my shield is a personal memoir. It wasnt wasnt the intent to tell story or to put the spotlight on myself by any means. It the real intent here is to honor the men and what happened with task ranger here on the 30th anniversary of events. Just just or just past october 3rd and fourth, an honor that memory. It amazes me or sometimes it surprises me from generation to generation how people forget or dont know what happened there. So thats thats certainly the intent of of writing this book. Its not a story that. You know, i really particularly enjoyed talking about every day. I really appreciate comments from the Previous Panel of dan morgan about his experience iraq. I had a very similar experience with an armored brigade in ramadi just to the west of where dans guys were and then talking about my current experiences, ukraine, its kind like being drug through one of those interactive museums that go from from generation of war to generation of war on my experience with that. So again ill talk about with my shield is a little bit. In october of 19 or excuse me in the summer of 1993, i was a lieutenant in the third ranger battalion. I had joined that battalion previous actually as Operation Storm was taking place just a couple of years prior with the full expectation that our battalion join that fight or join that operation. And when that didnt happen, there was extreme disappointment and kind of shock to honest with you. But over the next three years, our battalion to train like we were to the super bowl, and thats the level focus and intensity in a ranger battalion. And so we did that. And then by the end of that three years, i was getting ready to be promoted and i had a orders to go to the advanced course to my next level of army development. And i started to take my eye off the ball a little bit to shift my focus. I got married, summer, not a month or two. After that, we began to weve got the information were going to expect our our child. And i was ready to leave and go to advanced course as i, i had one more training event to go to. I deployed on that training van up to fort bliss, texas. And then while i was there, we got news that an emergency was taking place. Somalia with the peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts going on there and it soon became apparent that there were factors, events in time and space that, as Winston Churchill would say, were beyond time and space. And i was a member of Alpha Company during that exercise. We received the orders for one Ranger Company to be sent to join a task force, and that was going to be big company. But immediately after that news came in, i was individually summoned to Battalion Commanders tent and he informed me that i was going to fill a gap, be company and join them as a member of Task Force Ranger. So instead of send going home and and leaving the battalion. I found myself flying over the rooftops of mogadishu as a member of Task Force Ranger and. For me, one of the greatest collections soldiers and warriors that have ever been assembled. And so it soon became apparent that that was that was really my my destiny at that point after wed been deployed over to mogadishu, we did six missions in the first weeks through september. And while wed made some contact on those missions, we hadnt achieved our mission of capturing the leader of the somali insurgents. Mohammed very indeed. And we were operating in a city of over a million people. And we would were various raids and strikes throughout the city trying to capture general added. And while wed not done that, we had gotten into some combat, made some counter, wed even taken some casualties. Thankfully, we hadnt lost anybody, killed. But we, we would come back to our operating base at the airport and kind of wonder if we were really combat veterans yet previous that summer general helmer and his Sergeant MajorBasil Plumley from the book we were soldiers and young had visited our battalion and they talked about the battles in vietnam in the yard during very intense battle that his battalion experienced outnumbered by thousands and. And it was very ironic for him to speak to us like that because while we really enjoyed that and looked up to him, we thought well never be in a situation like that. I mean, this is the us military that had just rolled over the iraqis and we had all this technology as was talked before and thatll never be a situation. We found it interesting, but but relatively. But yet those were the standards of warriors that we looked up to. In addition, then surviving members of the World War Two ranger battalion. So those the standards that we had as rangers in our experience and. So we sit around wondering, have we met those standards . But soon, on october third, we received a mission to conduct daylight raid into one of the strongholds. Again, a city of a million people. And although it was a daylight raid, we thought we could execute that mission. And so as we took off that day, that afternoon, to execute this mission, while the rangers cheered, we soon brought the task force around and came in out of the sun from the west and inserted, and the mission went fairly well for the first. For the first, our special operations very well rehearsed. Very, very well oiled machines, if you would. And so we executed that operation in accordance with the the plan that we and while there was a lot of fighting going on, which was a little bit unusual for operations we still were able to execute what we were supposed to do until towards the end of the mission. As were fighting my job on the ground, along with my foreign observers, was to direct some of the aircraft that had snipers on board to try to take out targets. And then we lost one of those aircraft. So i wont go through all the details of the book, but that aircraft was shot down by al qaida trained rpg. And we soon found ourselves with a much different situation than we had anticipated with the raid that we had initially conducted. And so as the combat went on and it became more and more intense and and more somalis joined fight thousands upon thousands to converge in that crash site and we began to secure that crash site. One of the things that that me and my team did was bring in attack helicopter gunships that were assigned to our task, not not just arbitrary other units out on the battlefield, but assigned to our task force that wed work with of virtually and over again. And were able to contact these attack helicopters and bring them into the fight and one of the key themes of the book is not just our Standing Shoulder to shoulder on the ground but we were teamed with those aviators and matter what happened, they were not going to leave us on the ground. And once we got that fire support initiated by those helicopters, they didnt they didnt relent on that for our support for next 18 hours, an extreme hazard to themselves. One of the things that most people dont know is there were two aircraft that were shot down in the city, but a total of five aircraft were destroyed in the course of that operation. They were able to get back to the air base and crash in friendly territory. So again, extremely hazardous to the airmen and the that they didnt leave us on the ground. Again, not to get into the details of the book, but soon after that, i was wounded. Later on in the evening were we were finally linked with the United Nations forces and other forces from our our task force. And i was evacuated finally through the medical system through landstuhl, germany, then back here, not far away at Walter Reed Army medical center. And again, thats another one of the themes of the book is not just to focus on the rangers and special operators, but the incredible things that the army medical system does for our soldiers, the most advanced trauma that can receive, you know, in world literally. So again, those are of the themes of the book and i try to springboard forward to, you know, why was i selected be in Task Force Ranger why did those those things come together in time and space and it didnt become immediately apparent to me beyond just the the execution and operation. But then a number i was able to stay in the army to walter reed and the Army Surgeons stayed in the army stayed in the infantry, stayed in combat arms and. Then just a few years later, al qaida returned to the National Conscience with 911 attacks and then the global war on terrorism was initiated. And so, as i mentioned before, i participated in that on a number of different tours, both in iraq and afghanistan. But one of the points of the book is, you know, joint special Operations Command, you know, not only executes training and and precision operations, but theyre very introspective. They went back and looked at this operation and well in mogadishu. And while a number of things were validated, extreme training, having a very, very disciplined unit, we looked at some of the mistakes were made and there were there were a number those but joint special Operations Command was able to take those things those are the Lessons Learned and prepare a capability that was ready to go on on the on the initiation of 911. And so those are some of the things that that came out of that. And i appreciated later on in my career again, as i as i mentioned, i was with brigade in ramadi and some of the combat lessons i learned previous, especially in somalia, i was able to apply and hope to help some of my fellow soldiers some of the later on. So i appreciate the opportunity be here today. I hope youll visit us down at the u. S. Pavilion where were at. And again, thanks to aoc. Jeff, thanks. Okay. Once again we just keep rolling it with distinguished authors and distinguished speakers, i would please questions. Weve got some for that microphones there. Be bashful. And if you dont want to give them a softball give them a hardball question, please. Questions. Fellow first off. Thank you to all three for wonderful my question ive got actually one for each of you but ill just do one for the doctor. Dr. So is with regards to military assistance group, so you posit that what we did with the taiwanese was, was an effective if i understood your, your presenter correctly, could you also assert that we werent a success in korea since since the north koreans came south and eventually the chinese entered the war . Or would you counter with, well, there was a more professional military for us to work with once we formally entered the war, and then finally our advisory effort in vietnam, of course, we inserted ourself into the of a civil war. But very, very robust advisory effort there perhaps some uneven successes and. Then i would conclude with what are the lessons for our advise and assist effort today. Like many of the people in the room you know i was part of our 20 year endless wars and we were all in and the reality is as an army, i dont think weve come to grips with weve lost both wars in spite of a lot of effort with advising us and assisting. So if you can contrast, our efforts in the sixties, fifties and sixties, with our 20 year efforts and lessons as we go forward, i know its a lot of sub questions in there, but i am interested in your thoughts. Yeah. Is this working . Thats certainly one of the Big Questions that i was grappling with while writing the book is that, you know how can we compare and contrast advisory efforts during ongoing combat operations are clearly more difficult. Thats just, you. You dont have time to pull people at the front lines and take taking put them in school. A couple of things i would highlight, though. When eisenhower, for example, came in did deterrence and building institutions. You can either invest a lot of money for a long time or like eisenhower said, were going to put our billions of dollars into this within a very short amount time. And you get a kind of a critical mass. And one thing you see in contrast, south is a little trickles a little trickles of funding, little trickles of personnel in taiwan by 55, you have 3000 Army Advisors running around. You have, you know overkill. Theyre like, well, we need hundred tanks. Do you see like youre getting 250 tanks right there was a desire then, right . Dont worry about little stuff. Make an impact. This is our time. Its going to pay off later on down the road. So think with the with the current operations. I think thats really the the lesson i would take from it is. Dont do. A thousand advisors, one year, 1000 buys in the next year, 1000 advisors, the third year put 3000 advisors in there. Its like, what is that . When jumpstart the heart does ekg machines all right, get that thing move and, get the heart pumping and then the institution that are allies trying to build will be a lot better off. Otherwise the patients going to die on the table, so to speak. Thanks, eric. Any other questions, sir . Yeah, ive got a comment regarding. Colonel william filters book. We discussed this in some detail amongst all the u. N. Observers, advisors. There are definite lessons to be learned in combat. Operational from that book. And that is it follows a principle. If youre to enter a cloud attack, military response, a country, an area operation, know your enemy. But above all, who know know who can be your friend in that tactical area of operation . And be sure that you cause the enemy to give up his to fight not your friendlies. Give up the will to fight for you. And there are many lessons. I wont talk about today. But we can find. The question is to germany. Get through france. So they knew who was friend. They knew who was their enemy. Theres another story talked earlier and this follows peacekeeping on a way to stalin grad where you had a german officer cornered horses in a church. Where do you think that village did after that too to the or nazis in the village. So there is the principle we can learn from that book. Know your enemy, know your friends more than you know. Your enemy. Thank you. Its scott. Did you want to elaborate . Amen amen. I think youre right, danny. I. There are many lessons learn in the peacekeeping business, and i mean. It isnt new for us. We. We were in on so since 1948, the truth the matter is under af which in the Golan Heights could have almost been called u. S. Dorf because, it was Henry Kissinger that put it together and did a very, very good job. It in fact under af is probably one of the better examples of successful peacekeeping that we have anywhere on the books. Unifil was a real problem because it was so organized. From day one we had one captain, a marine captain, mike fallon, who when unifil was hastily put together. And to give you some context on this and, i write about it in the book, recall in 1978. This was the time we were following the camp david accord. And they had come into being and when the lebanese invasion operation litani took place, president carter was very nervous. He that that invasion may disrupt entire camp david effort. And as a result, he and the United States government pressed hard to get unifil stood up quickly and place. Well, theres old saying in the army, if you want it really bad and really fast, youll get it. Youll get it bad and fast. And unfortunately, unifil was very poorly organized. I was saying to danny and some others before, it might have been quite wise had the u. S. In its zeal to press forward to get unifil in place, which again was an armed effort, supported by the unarmed observers myself. But if they had down and talked to marine mef that have been floating out in the mediterranean and created proper planning cell for general erskine was the first commander of, that unifil organization. We may have found that on boarding or deploying that unifil much more effective than it was and had the u. S. Been firmly behind unifil a wellorganized one that may have been made made very clear to both israelis and palestinians to clear out of the areas that the united that the un unifil group needed to occupy in to conduct their mandate. And so it its the poster child, unifil is the poster child for not to do it. So whats the point. Lots of lessons. I dont think thinking about it seriously enough, the army and i think we should should. Thank you, scott. Any other questions. Weve got time for any more. Joe. You know, i actually had a question, colonel lecter, of wonder if you could speak to, you know, light of the situation in somalia back in the nineties with chinese increasing strength in africa today, what should the army what should the army be doing . What lessons can they take from your experience or the experience of . The rangers and the special Operations Forces in somalia back then . What should the army be doing to counter chinas efforts today . Well, a great point. We know now in hindsight that al qaida observed, you know, u. S. Or how u. S. Policy was changed by the shock of combat in somalia and that emboldened them in part to execute to continue the campaign, the United States, and execute the 911 attacks. And so i think resolve is one of the things thats important. No matter how hard that might seem to be at the time, we need to understand that our are watching. And i think just as importantly with china, we should look at the Current Situation ukraine, how the Current Administration is handling that. And im seeing that firsthand on the ground. Our lack of a coordinated effort our lack of resolve there or our lack of commitment is being observed very closely. The chinese and theyre learning lessons from that on how far they can push us. Without a doubt, theyre just going to push and push and push. And our lack of response, lack of resolve in ukraine will not directly related to china. Policy is something that theyre observing. So i think resolve. I think discipline. I think doing what you say youre going to do and backing allies or backing your interests when it is in your National Interest or what needs to happen. Okay. Last call. Any other questions . Well, i want thank this panel. Three distinguished authors. Youve heard their real and personal stories. And lets give them a round of applause. You. So before, as we conclude here, what id like do is give a thanks again to Noble Foundation for their sponsorship and also a little reminder, please scan the qr code if you need your free copy of the venture meets mission. I think well worth your time to take a look at that. Certainly. I want to ask joe if you would stand up right now. Joe has this all together. Hes done a yeomans job and hes really the brains behind the outfit here. So lets give him a round of applause. And again, thank you for staying with us for these 2 hours. We really it. As i said at the beginning, youve got a real treat here of six distinguished authors. Not only have you heard about their books, but youve had real and personal anecdotes of how they have managed and also within these terrible times that weve faced. So i would like to once again give a round of applause to the six authors