And then welcome. Thank you for joining us today for the july installment of the and lecture series on the topic of Herbert Hoover versus the Great Depression. My is noah gould and i manage alumni and student programs here at the acton institute. I would like to thank our generous donors as well as all who make events like these possible. The format of this event will be a 30 minute lecture followed by a q a this event is being recorded and streamed live, so please wait for the microphone to be passed you for your question. It is my privilege today to introduce dr. George nash. Dr. Nash was born in holyoke massachusetts. He received his ph. D. In history from harvard university. Dr. Nash is the author, the conservative intellectual movement in america since 1945, which is considered foundational work in its field. Dr. Nash is an authority on the life of president Herbert Hoover. Between 1975 and 1995, he lived in iowa near the Herbert Hoover president ial library, where he prepared three volumes of the definitive scholar biography. Under the general, the life of Herbert Hoover, he was commissioned for this project, the Herbert Hoover president ial library associate. When volumes one and two appeared in 1983 and 1988, he presented copies to president Ronald Reagan in oval office ceremonies in the white house. He is the editor. Freedom betrayed. Herbert hoover. Secret history of the Second World War and its aftermath and of the crusade. Years 1933 to 1955. Herbert lost memoir of the new deal and its aftermath and. Independent scholar, historian and lecturer with specialties in 20th century american political and intellectual history. Dr. Speaks and writes frequently about the history and present direction of american conservatism, the life of Herbert Hoover, the of Ronald Reagan, the of the Founding Fathers and other subjects. His writings have appeared in the American National review, new york times, book review, wall street, as well as actons own publication on religion and liberty among many others. Hes a senior fellow at the Russell Kirk Center for cultural. Since 2004, he has been associate of the Hauenstein Center for president ial studies at grand valley state university. Dr. Nash brings a clarity and depth to complex topics that is rare. Im grateful to call him a friend and so pleased to have him join us today. Please join me in welcoming dr. Nash. Thank you. Thank you. No offer of that very gracious introduction. And good afternoon, everyone. It is both a and an honored to be in your as the guest of the acton. And i want to thank noah and your colleagues for inviting me to this platform. And for all the courtesies you have extended to me on march 1929, Herbert Hoover was on top of the world as he took his oath of office that day to be president of the united. He could look back a career path that had curved unbroken lead upward. Born in iowa. In 1874 and orphaned before was ten. By 1914, hoover was an intern, acclaimed mining engineer living in london when world war one broke out. That year, he quickly became an Internet National humanitarian hero by creating an un press Relief Commission that delivered food for more than four years to the civilian population of german occupied belgium, which was under constant threat of starvation. Belgium was just the beginning. Between 1914 and the early 1920s, hoover directed, financed or assisted a multitude of relief endeavors in europe without parallel in the history of mankind. Tens of millions of people owed their lives to his exertions. It was later said of him that he saved more lives than any other person in history. During the 1920s, the humanitarian, as he eventually came to be called, ascended, still higher. The ladder of public esteem as secretary of commerce in the cabinets of president s and coolidge. Hoover became one of the three or four most influential men in the us government. In certain ways, he was a progressive and reformer. He openly the doctrine of lets say. Fair and advocated some governmental regulation of private enterprise. But he also emphatic plea rejected old world social schism and outright government of business. He called his political in a book of that title american individualism, a philosophy grounded in what he called americas most precious social ideal, the ideal of equality of opportunity. Hoover was too much of an engineer to content himself merely praising americas social. When the nations economy fell into a severe recession in 1921, he Warren Harding to convene president s conference on unemployed. With hoover as chairman and driving force this highly publicized conference laid, the intellectual foundation for his president ial response to the Great Depression a decade later, the conference popularized the idea that government should not sit still during an economic slump. To the contrary it should act to mitigate downturns, especially countercyclical expenditures on public works. Hoover scoffed at the classical economic teaching that Business Cycle fluctuations inevitable. Instead, he believed the National Economy could be managed by cooperation and what he called coordination between the federal government and the private. At the heart of his political philosophy was a vision of a vast informal partnership. A federal government equipped with Scientific Data about conditions and a private economy led by enlightened trade, associate nations. Hoovers approach has come to be known as associational ism. To him it was a proven progressive for noncoercive, nonpolitical promotion. The general welfare. By 1928, hoovers reputation was immense. As he campaigned the presidency that year. Some of his supporters produced a film about him with the title Herbert Hoover master of emergencies. And you can watch it today on. In november he was elected president in a landslide and without ever having held an elective public office. Why . Once inaugurated, hoover acted quickly to fulfill the publics great expectations. Privately, however, the new was not as sanguine about the future as he appeared to be. For several years had watched with apprehension as the stock market had soared to specter heights, a surge fueled by massive investor borrowing of money to buy shares as. Secretary of commerce. He had tried vain behind the scenes to the Federal Reserve board into restraining the bull market. In the spring and summer of 1929, the nervous chief executive again attempted persuade the Federal Reserve board and the barons of wall street as to break the speculative. His largely covert actions little effect. When the crash came in october, hoovers First Response was to assure the nation that the fundamental business of the country is term. And he defined that as the production and distribute of commodities was again in his words on a sound prosperous basis. But as the markets downward spiral continued, he realized that the debacle effects had not been confined to wall street. The National Psyche itself had suffered a shock if the mood of fear, uncertainty and hesitation in business were not checked, he said the economy could plunge into a grievous depression. Hoover now took steps that changed the course of American History. Instead of allowing the business downturn to its course. He on a scale unmatched by any previous president. Convinced that countrys difficulties were cycle trickle a term he used. He dominated the public stage with a flourish of activism. He convened series of conferences at the white house with Business Leaders who pledged to maintain wage scales, their current level in defiance of economic orthodoxy. A high wage policy. He and many others argued, would sustain purchasing power and thus stimulate future production goods. Hoover also conferred with leading labor leaders who promised not to strike or seek destabilising wage increases during the emergency to counter an expected in unemployment. He promised that the federal government would augment its public works expenditures in a big way. He asked the nations governors to do the same. To hoover. These measures were eccentric nostrums. They reflected the teaching of an increasingly popular proposed keynesian, so called new economics that he others had been promulgating since the unemployment conference. 1921. His program of recovery won widespread approval. In effect hoover was practicing a kind of psychotherapy designed to restore the nations badly shaken confidence confidence that to him was the key to renewal of prosperity. By stabilizing the economy through a high wage policy industrial peace, public works spending and other actions. He believed that he could the fear of unemployment and the emotions again in his word, that were threatening an economic breakdown. Both then and forever. After hoover was proud of the agreements he had forged. Proud of his break. With the fatalism of laissez faire confidently deliberately and selfconsciously he had abandoned the principle of political noninterference. The Business Cycle as never before. The president of the United States had placed one man himself in charge of guiding nation back to prosperity prosperity. And having done so, he was quick proclaim success. On march 7th, 1930, he told a News Conference that im quoting now all of the evidence indicate that the worst effects of the crash upon employment will have been passed during the next 60 days. Less than two months later, in an address to the chamber of commerce of the United States, he said, i am convinced that we have now passed the worst and with continued unity effort, we shall rapidly recover. He declared his great economic experiment that had that his great economic experiment, his term had quoting succeeded to remain equal degree. Hoovers optimistic prophecies of early 30 eventually cost him dearly in public disillusion. But at that, they did not appear so outlandish. Many other seasoned observers and analysts, including distinguished economists, shared his belief that the worst was or very soon would be over, and many gave him credit for calming the public mood immediately after the crash. For a time appeared that hoovers policy of cooperative action of government, an interesting term, had vindicated in the early months of 1930, the stock market, much of the ground it had lost the previous autumn, but then, as what happened repeatedly in the next three years, just hoover thought he had restored economic equilibrium unexpected arose in june 1930. Congress and hoover approved, the highly protectionist smoothawley tariff. Hoover took solace from its flexible rate provision that permitted the president upon recommendation by the Tariff Commission to raise or reduce tariffs by as much as 50 . In this way the white house technocrat, he could take tariff making out of politics and adjust rates on a scientific basis. And i dont believe he would have signed the bill without that provision for which he fought hard. Now just how destructive the smoothawley tariff proved to be remains actually a subject some debate but psychologically its impending enactment appeared to upset the edifice of confidence that hoover had been building as the congressional struggle over the tariffs reached a climax. The stock market tumbled in what was described as a of liquidation. By midjune when the new tariff took effect the market had wiped out all of its gains of past seven months. Then in the summer of 1930, across much of the midwest and south, worst drought yet recorded in American History ravaged crops of 30 states. Millions of acres of planted fields were ruined. Farm income in the devasted region fell by 25 . No one could blame hoover for the drought. But as 30 were on a number, commentators became critical of his performance as president. Time and again, they accused him of timidity and vacillation in his dealings with congress. Hoover said the pundit walter suffered from a peculiar weakness. He had not yet mastered the political art. It is easy to see why politicians in both parties distrusted him. He was simply not one of their kind. His aura of impersonal. His dislike of political rituals. His workaholic seriousness. And his reliance on nonpolitical experts set him apart from what he derided as the beer garden on capitol. That was during prohibition. He was also to pin down ideologically. His unusual blend of progressivism and antistate pleased neither the left or the right for. His part. Hoover believed as he told audience shortly after the crash that the most dangerous animal in america is the man with an emotion and a desire to pass a new law privately, he was more pungent. He labeled one senator the only verified case of a negative iq. When he had when in 1931, hoovers was born, his first sponsor was. Im glad she doesnt have to be confirmed by senate. In a whimsical mood. One day, he remarked. There ought to be a law allowing the president to hang two men a year and being required to give any. As the political headwinds against him gathered force. The president gave little sign of his politics, convinced as ever that the key to recovery was the revival of spirit of confidence. He asked the American Bankers Association in october of 1932 instill a feeling of assurance in their clients. He appealed to the bankers to improve their borrowers courage and attitude and in december, he advised congress that the best contribution government could make to economic was to encourage what he called the voluntary cooperation of the community. Meanwhile new manifestations of what hoover called frozen confidence were appearing in the autumn of 1930. A growing of significant american banks began to fail. It was now apparent that the slump was not a typical transitory recession. It was something worse. In 1931, the pace Bank Failures quickened, abetted by a deepening crisis in europe. In september, turmoil abroad took a stunning turn when Great Britain was forced to abandon the almost Gold Standard standard. Britains decision triggered financial tsunami in the United States, fearful that the u. S. Dollar would be the next currency devalue many foreign depositors rushed to withdraw their holdings in the form of gold from american banks. Many domestic also sought safety by removing their savings from banks and hoarding the money at home. Lacking reserves to accommodate the stampede. More than 500 u. S. Banks collapsed a single month by the end of december 1931. A total. Of 2294. American banks had failed during year alone. Desperate to stem what he called a degenerating, vicious cycle, hoover reached out to the nations banking elite. Early in october, secretly convened a group of leading new york bankers. He asked them to voluntarily organize as a Private Banking corporation with a capital of 500 million, a lot of money those days to be supplied. The Banking Community itself. The corporation use this fund to lend to banks that in hoovers word were under attack by. Unreasoning depositors by rescuing these tottering banks from the danger of closure. This new corporation, he hoped would revive confidence in the banking system. The new york bankers reluctantly acquiesced, but only hoover promised them promised them that if necessity requires he ask congress to create a governmental banking entity patterned after the war. Finance created in world for one. It soon transpired that the worried bankers had less faith, who very in cooperation than he did, unwilling to risk their own to save their weaker brethren, and anxious for uncle sam to assume the burden of the corporations procrastinated and loaned out less than 10 billion in the first few weeks of its existence and for hoover, the fateful moment of decision was now at hand. According to an old adage that h. L. Mencken popularized in politics, a man must learn to rise above. This. Herbert hoover doubted, yielding to the perceived dictates of necessity. He called upon congress in december. 31 to enact a program of emergency governmental action to end the nations growing credit paralysis. He asked congress to establish a Reconstruction Finance Corporation with broad to lend money directly to beleaguered banks and commercial institutions. Never before had a peacetime president proposed to intervene so massively in the workings of private. Not bankers, not investors, not captains of industry, but the government would now attempt to lubricate the nations credit and make the wheels of commerce turn again. In january 1932, congress voted to establish Reconstruction Finance Corporation. During the next five months the rnc authorized more than 5000 loans to more than thousand banks and other commercial in financial difficulty. The rnc did not restore the nations confidence, but it did save many businesses from ruin and quelled local, regional financial brushfires that might easily have turned into national conflagration. Yet even as hoover embraced government funded credit expansion and other intrusions into market economy, he simply heinously donned the heavy armor of fiscal conservatism. If confidence in the economy was to be revived, announced the federal government must raise taxes and rigorously balance its. Budget, which was now running its largest peacetime deficit in American History. The Financial Stability of the us government, as measured by a balanced budget, was absent essential. He believed if the government worked to prevent another disastrous run on the dollar and preserve the all important Gold Standard, this incidentally, and i must emphasize this point was just hoovers thinking in 1932. It was the prevailing orthodoxy of the time. Few republicans or democrats dissented, although they argued about which kinds of taxes might be raised. In june of 1932, congress and hoover signed into the largest peacetime increase up to that date. American history. Meanwhile, the deepening depression was taking a growing toll and human misery. By mid 1932, Something Like 20 of the American Labor was out of work. During 1931 and early 1932, hoover had stoutly resisted a growing clamor on the american left for direct financial federal assistance to individuals. He had exhorted his fellow americans to maintain their true traditional system of mutual selfhelp, voluntary and local governments responsibility for people in need. Any tapping into the federal coffers warned. Any federal usurps of these local and voluntary responsibilities would strike at the roots of he said, and laid foundations for the destruction of our liberties. Sounding at times like an Old Testament prophet, he had admonished americans to solve their problems outside of government and, reject the opiates of public charity. Moreover, he had practiced what he preached. In august, 1931, august hoover established the president s on unemployment to coordinate the countrys relief preparations for. The coming winter. The new committee dispense no federal money. Rather, it would assist existing network of local and nongovernmental relief agencies in an elaborate National Campaign for private contribution. In midoctober hoover himself initiated, the appeal on national radio. By early winter, when the effort wound up, it had raised approximately 100 million. That would be more than ten times that amount in money. At least. 100 million. It had been the most successful volunteer fund drive in American History, but was it enough . In the spring of 1932, facing the growing exhaustion of state and local resources for relief of the unemployed, as well as tremendous pressure congress, hoover a program of federal funding channeled through the states. Although he insisted that the fundamental policy of state, local and private for relief had not changed, there was no denying that he had been forced by partisan necessity and a growing National Consensus rise above principle. Hoovers political somersault, one enemy, called it a astonished official washington and touched off a donnybrook. Congress over the precise terms. The legislation, as finally enacted in july. The emergency relief construction act among other things, authorized the reconstruction finance corpora to lend the word lend now up to 300 million to the states to finance for needy and distressed people like the rc, the emergency relief and construction act broke the barriers to new era of Big Government by accepting federal in this form. First, for economic recovery and, then for general relief. Hoover and congress had taken a step toward franklin, new deal and having done, hoover seemed determined. Go no further. In the autumn of 1932, as this rca act getting organized, turned into bureaucratic machinery, hoover was campaigning for reelection, and as he campaigned unsuccessfully for reelection he reaffirmed his volunteer mystic and again noticed this formulation in selfgovernance by the people outside of the government. And he lashed out at the statist regimentation that he sensed be at the heart of Franklin Roosevelts new deal and a climactic campaign. Hoover warned that the election was more than a contest between two men or two parties. It was a contest, he said, between two philosophies of government and its outcome would determine the nations course. For over a century come. For the rest of his life. He. This is one of his most prophetic utterance since in 1933. Hoover left office a political pariah. But this was not the end of the story. Rising from the ashes of his political immolation he waged until his death in 1964. What he called a crusade against collective and became Franklin Roosevelts most formidable critic. The right. Hoover perceived in the new not a pragmatic response to economic distress, but something more sinister, a form collectivism that if would destroy the foundations of american. I terrify and identifying himself what he now called historic liberalism. He relented, assailed what he termed the liberalism and totalitarian tendencies of, the new deal. On one occasion, he declared the new deal, having corrupted liberalism for collectivism, coercion and concentre version of political power, it seems historic liberalism must be conservatism in contrast and thus in the final phase of his long political journey. Hoover became a man of the right during his four years as president of hoover in certain ways, foreshadowed the new deal. But in the larger sweep of the 20th century hoover as, a former president , contributed mightily to containing the new deal and to reinvigorating the political philosophy that he had expounded the white house. In the process, he forged a critique of ever aggrandizing statism that has become integral to modern conservatism. It was among the enduring of his legacies. So how shall we judge hoovers leadership during the Great Depression . It to be a near consensus among historians that hoovers presidency was a failure according to one narrative favored liberal historians and shaped by keynesian economics. Hoover fell short because was too anti statist, too committed to volunteer cooperation and, too devoted to fiscal conservatism, the Gold Standard. In this interpretation, the Great Depression was crisis of capitalism and hoovers failing that he did too little, too late, a competing favored by many free market economists argues that the Great Depression was not a crisis of capitalism, but a failure of government whose interventionist policies exacerbated the nations economic woes. Among these policies errors it has been argued the tariff, the tax increase of 1932 and the high wage that hoover insisted upon in 1929. In this line of interpretation, hoovers failing was not that he did too little, but that he did too much. Both of these schools of scholarship you will notice are hoover centric. But there was another on him that i invite you to consider as i close between 1929 and 1933. The supply of money in the United States contract by nearly one third a staggering almost unbelievable decline. Why did this. In their monumental monetary history of the United States published in 1963. Milton and Anna Schwartz placed the blame squarely on the policies passivity and ineptitude of the Federal Reserve board, the guardian of the nations monetary system. It is a complicated story, but in the judgment of friedman and schwartz, it was the fed that was mainly for converting what they called a garden variety recession into a major catastrophe. Since 63, friedman and schwartzs indictment of the fed has won considerable acceptance among economists and reinforcement from the principal historian alan. But as schwartz, meltzer and their monetarist are substantially. What should we now say about herbert. In all of American History, no president has been more conscientious, hardworking than he for three years and more. He strove without stint to induce the American People to shake off their confidence. Repeatedly, he pleaded with banks to resume lending with depositors to stop and for moral action that would arrest the credit freeze. Could it that his incessant labors not so much right or wrong as your relevant it reminds me of the greek mythological figure sisyphus forever condemned to push a heavy boulder up a hill every time he nearly reached the top. Atop the rock would roll back and six of us would have to start over from 1929 to 1933. Herbert hoover arguably was our modern source of us. Every time that he seemed to be on the brink of success taming the Great Depression, some new crisis would. While the silent killer. The contraction of the money supply would grind on each time like scissors us. He would start over, unaware that much of his perpetual motion may have been doomed to fail to futility by the monetary policies of a Government Agency beyond his control. So i leave you with this food for thought. Perhaps someday historians will conclude that hoovers presidency was stymied. Not so much by his political limitations, political philosophy or but by something neither he nor virtually anyone at the time quite understood the fatal misjudgment and errors of the federal board. Thank you. I understand there is for questions and there will be some of the microphone. So if you dont raise your hand, ill call in you and then mic will be provided so that i can hear your question. Yes, right over there. Fine. Start with an easy question. How would Herbert Hoover govern today . How would Herbert Hoover govern today . Today, i first of all, i doubted he would recognize complexity and of the federal government for there is no federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in existence during hoovers time when all those banks were failing. That would be one. One example on there is not there was not the expectation of massive federal intervention has now become commonplace. Now that theres any jittering the economy, we all turn to the white house and congress and so on. Automatically we expect the the president and the political elites to respond. And they are judged upon how much manage the how well manage the economy. So i think hoover, though, if you look at his later prophecies and arguments against new deal would would probably still want the Gold Standard offer for example he would probably be a fiscal hawk or as turned into especially in the last two years of the depression. And he turned a partner primarily because he thought that the gigantic federal deficit would undermine Foreign Investors confidence in our stability that would lead to a run on the dollar and collapse of the Gold Standard and all sorts of bad things were presumed would presumably happen. So i suspect you would be something if hes consistent with what he was then he obviously times change and recognize its a hypothetical, but its that the very inspector a perceptive perspective rather on on this time would be i think interesting in another respect he was greatly concerned that if we gave up our system of local. That 100 million that was raised that i mentioned a lot of that went to the united around the country to support for Hospital Systems that were running deficits and so forth. So there was this network which he believed was still viable. And by traditional standards, it was the need had gotten to be so and so utterly overwhelming the school of chicago didnt get paid for several months. Pennsylvania had a million man out of work. There was no unemployment insurance. You see, so what Ronald Reagan called safety net and what the the liberal historians and such might call the welfare state was not in place. Hoover was relying, if you will, on the society to take care of it. And he was very concerned that the state would come in and suck the energy out that and replace it and lead a kind of a politicization of society. And he regarded himself prophetic. He said that under his program of organize all these relief networks the country and providing money through exhortation for private giving and so on. He said that that was done on a nonpolitical basis. Generally, it was the leading men and women of the community took took the it wasnt political machines. But by 1935, after roosevelt had come in and set up the wpa and the wpa and other agencies that provided direct checks to unemployed were then doing some maybe work like the civilian conservation corps and such, that the sector giving went down to a trivial amount. The red cross had done a great deal and hoover relied heavily on the red during his presidency. There are people who have argued the red cross was not sufficiently generous and it just simply was not coping beyond the minimal level with the magnitude of the of the relief burden. So but thats another agency that he relied upon. I think red cross also went down. So the government over and hoover foresaw, he prophesied that there would be a great political corruption to come from that. And there was some in the late thirties, particularly in a couple of states one of them, kentucky, where in the Center Democratic senate primary, 1938, the fdr candidate wanted to win and he was defeating an anti fdr or trying to defeat an a. F. Tr a democrat and the men on the wpa were kind of told, you know, if you want, keep those government handouts coming, you know, you ought to vote for that caused a National Furor because they in a sense Government Employees and what happened was and some of you know this the hatch act passed the next year by congress. This meant that federal civil types could not be brought out beaten by the the political people into giving money for campaign say would say im hatch like you cant you touch me im neutral. So this was a protection act for the Civil Service so that the kind of scandal that erupted in kentucky, money was being used as a kind of a of a weapon to get people to vote a certain way so that that could not happen. So hoover could claim with justification that he had been vindicated. He had predicted that roosevelt, with the feds, taking everything over, would turn this into a kind of a political vote getting apparatus. And there were some instances in which that. So i think he would be concerned about the administration of welfare. I think he would be stunned. The thought that we all got thousand dollar checks during covid and so forth. But our expectations are different. That was an emergency. It was meant not to last. So i think that hoover would see some reason for feeling relevant even today, although he would find that that that the geography landscape of the government to be quite different. You know the federal government in. 1932 or so was a symptom amounting to Something Like 5 of gdp. And now its what around, 20 . So its Big Government has come and hoover would would, i think, have some some real. Concerns about that. Another question, perhaps. Yes. You mentioned a tariff early on. That was pivotal. A Pivotal Point in this process. Could you explain more that was so pivotal and it was so contentious. Yes. The Republican Party was traditionally the party of high tariffs going back to a foundation of the republican around the time of the civil war and in 22, a Republican Congress with harding as president had passed a very high tariff policy, which on on imports as a way protecting that was the term protectionism protecting american industry from cheap Labor Industry in other countries. In 1928, hoover promised the campaign that would do something to help the farmer. So the farm, the farm sector of the economy was not prospering very, prospering very much in the 1920s for various reasons and and that was traditionally a republican stronghold. But they were restless and hoover to kind of keep them in the republican column promise they call a special session of congress to provide relief for agriculture. And one of the forms of relief that congress proceeded to of legislate in 1929, after hoover called a special session of congress, was something called the marketing act to create the federal farm board. But thats thats one track that he followed. But one on the tariffs was to raise tariffs on, imports of agricultural goods that undercut american farmers, and therefore arguably undercut their prosperity. Well, the whole thing got out of hand. What started off as supposedly a kind of a focused a adjustment of the tariff to give farmers some further protection. Whether you think thats a good right idea or not, that was the intent. It turned into a general revision by all sorts, with all sorts of industries lobbying and wanting that. So the outcome eventually, after and months of haggling in the congress was something called the smoot hawley tariff, named after reed smoot, utah senator, republican and Willis Hawley of oregon in the house. Hoover was not that great a fan of tariffs privately but what he wanted was get this mess out of the log rolling in congress where youll all vote for something thats important to your district if you vote for me and so everybody was sort of trading in the congress and all the rates were being raised and so it became of a carnival and it caused a lot of public commotion. So congress narrowly in the house is only 44 to 42, voted this through in the senate, i should say. The house was so close. And then hoover had, the question of whether he should sign it. Hoovers interest had not so much in the the the the size of the rates which were already quite from that earlier 1922 one. But they were now to go higher still. What hoover wanted was something called the flexible provision, and that his rationale, his enemies said, his alibi for signing the bill when he did because it the executive branch through the Tariff Commission authority to recommend to the president adjust most of the rates upon investigation. So if you put a high on something and someone objected to that and said this is way too this is this is not science scientific, its not sound, the Terror Commission could recommend to the president to he could adjust it downward. So he saw it as a way of getting this out of the hands of this unruly and and a very shortsighted congress and get it into hands of kind of a rational expert Decision Making body. And hoover had that in him. You know, this sort of faith expertise, the progressive reformer or the engineer, the man who looks at the data and doesnt get carried by emotion to trying to make what so the bill was passed and about the time it passed the stock market tanked, probably in anticipation that this was going to clog up the the realm of commerce between nations. Many Foreign Countries did not it and in some sense retaliated by raising some of their tariffs our goods and democrats in particular made a fuss about this, arguing that it was going to destroy trade and the possibility economic recovery. Now turns out that our foreign was very small in proportion to our gdp. Our imports and our exports were less. I think each less than 5 of the total economic. So you could look at it now say it was not as big a deal as it seemed to be at the time, but it did put tariff higher. And the reason hoover accepted it, as i said, was he thought that there was a loophole where could kind of streamline it and get it back down to a lower and sounder. So the argument among historians has been and among democrats and republicans then was was this a catastrophe or not . My own view is it was it was not a positive thing to do. But i dont believe and i think many other historians come to a similar view that this was somehow great all purpose, explanation for everything bad that have happened afterward, that in other words, the importance of the smoothawley tariff was overstated and you can still say if youre a free trader type, especially, that it was not a good but i dont think it was the causative factor that turned the garden variety recession into the Great Depression. So i hope thats adequate. Roosevelt kind of was against it, but during the campaign of 32, he had to kind of pull his horns a little because the farmers america liked the high tariff, and roosevelt had been promising to it. And then he realized he might lose the farm votes. So he kinds of, well, were were only going to, you know, to lower a reasonable level and well do it by negotiations. So. So kind of tried to smooth that over, but that was kind of the politics of the matter. And so that that was kind of the last gasp, though, of tariffs. The smoothawley got such a bad name, and ever since its been held up as this kind of catastrophic policy error that we have moved in more direction of free trade, starting with, i think its called a reciprocal free trade act or something close to that. In 1934, under fdr. So thats usually up as a bad example. My own point here is that its import in the total context. I think has been overstated. Im not the tariff. Im saying that its not is somehow the the the bugaboo that it was made to be. Thank you. Dr. Nash. Another wonderful lecture. Certainly appreciate the clarity. Bring us back to herbert. My question is, you would expect from west michigan, are there any instructive parallel contrasts with the ford presidency . Ford, of course, went through a very Economic Situation not as dire, of course, as the Great Depression. But im just curious if youve speculated about that a little bit. Okay. I tried to do. Thats fair question. Of course, when when ford became president very shortly thereafter, the democrats scored huge gains in the 74 election. And so, like hoover in his last two years, ford faced a Hostile Congress and, the rest of congress with a president ial election coming up. So there is that that parallel to ford i would sense would call him kind of an Old Fashioned centrist or he was not who would want to to the left. He had one advantage, although i dont it helped him that much given the the emotions raised over nixons impeachment attempt and the and the fords pardoning of him and then the sharp economic concurrent economic decline and then the falling apart of south at the same time. So there is a whole host of of things happening on watch that made it an uphill climb for him. But one thing he did have that hoover was ford was a man of the congress. And so he he knew how to deal with the political. Hoover was an outsider. Now he had good friends and allies in congress, but he was not generally liked by members of congress. The conservative wing of the Republican Party who thought he was too much of a progressive. Well, as he progresses in the Republican Party, the socalled rhinos of the day of la follette and norris of nebraska and, they were called by one of the conservative senators, sons of the wild , because they were so cantankerous and not club able. They work in harmony and they held the kind of, the balance of power in the senate and. Many of them hated hoover, whom they thought was of insufficient progressive. And one historian once said of hoover that he was too progressive for the concern over this and too conservative for the radicals. So he kind of fell in between. So i think trump ford was did come to be disliked the way that hoover came to be disliked. Trump rather run. Ford did not have the same weight to bear in personal terms. Hoover it was personalized for hoover, you know, there were in this country, some of you have heard these are unemployed people, living in shantytowns on, the edge of cities. The other the armadillo. The armadillo show was nicknamed the hoover hog because there was so little meat on armadillo blankets. You put a newspaper yourself on a park bench that was a hoover blanket. So hoover was was vilified and so he had come in with this great expectations, almost this wonder, this great engineer, great humanitarian. And yet he and so many people personalize their their anger and took it out. Hoover the the joke that went around in 32, which roosevelt told on the campaign even, was that there was hobo who held up a sign he was hitchhiking. And he said, science says, give me a ride or ill vote for. And supposedly he crossed the country in ten days. So. Hoover its too bad because. Hoover, i do believe cared, but did not have a kind of a persona owner that exuded, whereas roosevelt had what was called the big smile. And this this sense of fatherly concern. And so roosevelt had something that hoover lacked that was that kind of empathy that he could have with people. Hoover could that empathy in particularly in private settings. But it was harder for him to project that way. So one of hoovers political weaknesses was that people saw him as just this the stern figure, always working, always droning on about our ideals, so on. And so he he lost. I dont think that gerald ford suffered quite to degree, but he he did have and some of them you could analogize hoovers. Well, thats all the time we have for questions right now. So thank so much for joining us today. We thank you all for coming. Thank you. Before we wrap up, i want to just highlight three Upcoming Events in august. Have our next installment of the acting lectures with dr. Caleb fuller on his most recent book. And then in september, well have greer from hope international, talking about the gift of disillusionment. Another talk on leadership. And then we also have a free and Virtual Society conference in new york city clergy and, other nonprofit leaders. So thank you so much for joining us today. And lets give a round of applause to dr. Nash. Thank you and his wife betsy, and her father. [applause]