booktv. Including russias attack on a Nuclear Power plant in ukraine. This runs about an hour and 40 minutes. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] all right everybody as our special keynote speaker comes in, and i want to Welcome National security adviser to President BidenJake Sullivan and the Arms Control AssociationBoard Chairman tom countryman up to the stage. Tom will introduce jake, and we will have some time after the address for questions. Well start with reporters and then go to the audience. Tom will draw further instructions. Tom, over to you. Thank you, daryl. Welcome. We will be briefing the introduction because you didnt come to hear me. You came for the National Security adviser, Jake Sullivan. Let me just note that after his remarks we will take a couple of questions from the press pool here and then a couple of questions from the audience. If you would like to ask a question, jot it down on the pads by your chair and hold it up and our staff will collect it. What brings us together as an association is our belief that americas National Security, and global security, depend upon prudent restraint in Nuclear Policy, and upon active effort led by the United States to constantly reduce the risks of nuclear war, and to fulfill our legal obligation shared by other nations to negotiate in good faith the reduction and eventual elimination of Nuclear Weapons. To our meeting last year, President Biden wrote that perhaps more than any other time since the cold war we must work to reduce the risk of an arms race or nuclear escalation. Arms control and nonproliferation diplomacy continues to be an essential part of safeguarding global security. I think its a good thing that we have never had before a president with such long and intense experience in Nuclear Policy as our current president. I think that President Biden is fortunate to have Jake Sullivan advising him on these issues, and where both fortunate and honor to have him here today. Please give him a good welcome. Jake. [applause] thank you, tom, for the that very important set of introductory comments, and for the kind words. I also want to thank daryl for bringing us all together today. Most importantly what to thank all of you for giving me the opportunity to just a few words here this morning. 60 years ago next month in grainy blackandwhite video president kennedy addressed the nation. He was sitting behind the same resolute desk that President Biden its behind now nearly every day that i sit across from him, nearly every day. My fellow citizens, he said, i speak to you tonight in a spirit of hope. Negotiations were concluded in moscow on a on a treaty tol nuclear tests. After years of nonstop negotiations, or stop and start negotiations to be more precise, years of dialogue, years of commitment and courage, establishing the Nuclear Test Ban treaty was a huge moment. Not only for our own National Security but for the security and stability of the world. And as this group knows well it was one of the first steps that would slowly usher in an era of responsible arms control and Nuclear Deterrence measures. An era where nations could compartmentalize the issues of strategic stability, even if they couldnt cooperate on much anything else. An era where adversaries could disagree and debate across basically every domain, but could always find ways to Work Together to limit Nuclear Risks. An era where World Leaders chose transparency even during times of tension, especially during times of tension, because what was at stake was too important, too vital to our shared future. That is the foundation of Nuclear Stability and security that weve depended on for decades. And its the foundation for the Arms Control Association has helped to uphold across generations. But over the last few years that foundation has begun to erode. And today we now stand at what our president would call an Inflection Point in our Nuclear Stability and security. A point that the mets new strategies for achieving the same goal we have held since the cold war, reduce the risk of nuclear conflict. So today i would like to lay out what we are endeavoring to do in pursuit of this. Ill start with the cracks in the foundation that we see, the new threats that are challenging the postcold war nuclear order. And then i walk through how we are trying to adapt both our Nuclear Deterrent and our arms control strategies to meet this moment. As weve all seen recently some of the major cracks in our Nuclear Foundation have come from russia. Last year Russian Forces recklessly attack and sees the zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power plant in ukraine, the largest operational Nuclear Plant in europe, with little concern for the potential catastrophic consequences of a nuclear incident. Earlier this year president putin unlawfully suspended russias implementation of the new s. T. A. R. T. Treaty the places limits on the most destructive weapons in our arsenals, the kinds they could destroy the world many times over. Only a month later president putin began to take steps to station Tactical Nuclear weapons in belarus. And as we also just a few days ago, putin formally announced that he will withdraw from the treaty on conventional forces in europe, putting the final nail in the coffin of an equipment that once served as a cornerstone of european security, which moscow begin violating years ago. But even prior to russias brutal assault against ukraine, putin has been destabilizing the Nuclear Foundation our forebears laid. For years he defends the development of dangerous new Nuclear Capabilities like radiation spewing Nuclear Power cruise missiles, all while modernizing stockpiling old capabilities that are not regulated by arms control agreements like theater range missiles and torpedoes. Russias actions have been dealing body blows to the postcold war Nuclear Arms Control framework. But its not just russia that we have to look to to consider the full scope of the context we find yourselves in today with respect to Nuclear Security and stability. Weve also seen a change in approach from the peoples republic of china. By 2035, the prc is on track to have as many as 1500 nuclear warheads, one of the largest peacetime nuclear buildups in history. Unlike russia who was threatening to walk away from the negotiating table, from the arms control agreements our countries have relied upon for years, the prc has thus far opted not to come to the table for substantive dialogue on arms control. It has declined to share the size and scope of its Nuclear Forces or to provide launch notifications. And it is not shown much interest in discussions regarding the changes it is making to its Nuclear Forces. Simply put, we have not yet seen a willingness from the prc to compartmentalize strategic stability for broader issues and the relationship. And that compartmentalization as i noted before has been the bedrock of Nuclear Security, indeed strategic stability, for decades. Finally we are seeing increasing Nuclear Threats from the dprk and iran. In the last year alone kim jongun declared that he aimed to have code, the worlds most powerful nuclear arsenal, announcing plans to ramp up the Development Everything from tactical nukes, the icbms, two unmanned underwater Nuclear Weapons. He announced a sweeping your Nuclear Forces policy law that would permit pyongyang to use Nuclear Weapons first against nonnuclear states in direct violation of the nonproliferation treaty, the npt. Npt. And yes tested more Ballistic Missiles than any other period in the dprks history. Iran, after the previous Administrations Department from a deal that put strict limits on Tehran Nuclear development and prevented it from obtaining a nuclear weapon, Irans Nuclear program was left unconstrained. As a result i read is that operating more advanced centrifuges. It has enriched more uranium including at levels closer to weapons grade, and it is done so with Less International monitoring of its program then when it was under the strict constraints of the joint conference of plan of action. Taken together, the cracks in our postcold war Nuclear Foundation are substantial and they are deep. And today we are entering a new era, one that demands new strategies and solutions to achieve the goals weve always had, prevent an arms race, reduce the risk of misperception and escalation, and most importantly, insure the safety and security of our people and people around the world from Nuclear Threats. Same goals, new strategy. Thats the core of our approach to strategic stability, one that can be boiled down to two main lines of effort. First, update our deterrence capabilities in plans. And second, advanced new arms control and Risk Reduction measures. These are two sides of the same proverbial nuclear coin. Responsibly enhancing our deterrent capabilities allows us to negotiate arms control from a position of strength and confidence, and new arms control helps limit and shape our adversaries decisions on Nuclear Capabilities. And so today i would like to spend a little time discussing each of these sides of the nuclear coin. Ill start with the deterrence side of the coin where we are taking a twopronged approach. First, were our Nuclear Program here at home. In practice that needs replacing each leg of our nuclear triad, landbased icbms, Ballistic Missile sublease, and Nuclear Capable bombers. It needs updating our Nuclear Command control and Communications Architecture by replacing aging capabilities with nextgeneration systems. And it means investing in our nuclear complex and Defense Industry to help ensure that we have a responsive Nuclear Enterprise and a resilient base for longterm competition. And i want to be clear here, the United States does not need to increase our Nuclear Forces to outnumber the combined total of our competitors in order to successfully deter them. We have been there. We have learned that lesson. Nord to have a deterrent maintenance. Rather, effective deterrence means that we have a better approach, and not more approach. It means ensuring we have capacity and capability to deter, and if necessary defeat major aggression against our country, our allies and our partners. To enhance the effectiveness, we have invested in cutting edge not Nuclear Capabilities that will help sustain the military advantage for decades to come. Capabilities like conventionally armed hypersonic missiles that can reach high value targets. This includes Nuclear Capable missiles a cyberspace tool that will help United States retain advantage over every domain. Together, these modernization efforts will ensure arch turn capabilities remain secure and strong as we head into the 20 30s when the United States will need to deter two Nuclear Powers for the first time in its history. We cant go at this alone, which leads to the second prong of our strategy. Investing and strengthening our alliances abroad. That has been President Bidens overriding priority in many ways and his northstar since the very first day as president of the United States. As we work to deepen our alliances, we always remember that one of our greatest nonproliferation accomplishments has been the u. S. Extended deterrence which has reassured so many of our partners that they do not need to develop Nuclear Weapons of their own. For example, in april, the president reaffirmed our ironclad treaty, including an extended commitment. A step that created more cooperation during a potential nuclear crisis. It showed a recommitment to our shared nonproliferation objectives. Along with our nato allies, we are focused on modernizing an alliance keep the lady. Maturing broad participation in the Nuclear Deterrent to certifying our f35 aircraft to deliver modern Nuclear Gravity bombs. All of these steps from revitalizing our Nuclear Program at home to reinvigorating alliances abroad in those categories, they will be necessary in their own right, but taken together, with the same stability goals weve always had. They will show adversaries and competitors that in an arms waste with the United States, it will be counterproductive at best or worst. We will negotiate armscontrol agreements from that position of strength and confidence ive described. Those agreements are on the others of the coin which is what i would like to tell talk about next. In time, well talk about President Bidens very longstanding commitment to nonproliferation objectives and the long experience in being a leader in the space. He said, we must invent new approaches and foster new International Operation to meet changing threats. Those words only ring more true today. Under the president s leadership, we are advancing three new approaches to strengthen armscontrol and nuclear wrist bid there is wrists. We are exchanging bilateral discussions with russia and china without preconditions. Before i jump into this, let me just step back and say without preconditions, and without accountability, we will still hold Nuclear Powers accountable for reckless behavior and we will hold our adversaries accountable for upholding Nuclear Agreements. For example, we will continue to notify russia with major strategic exercises. There are preexisting Nuclear Agreements. Any response of russias new start, suspending daytoday notifications to russia that are part of this treaty. These steps will guarantee that russia does not see benefits from a treaty they refuse to abide by, and the principle of reciprocity, of key tenant of strategic armscontrol is upheld. It will also demonstrate to russia of returning to full compliance, including receiving detailed information with a pressing for officials. But by acclaiming a new start, we will it here to a central limit with russia, indicating a willingness to continually limiting Strategic Forces through 2026. We agree. It is and neither of our interest to embark on an openended competition with strategic Nuclear Forces, and we are prepared to stick to the central limits as long as russia does. Rather than waiting to resolve all of our bilateral differences, the United States is ready to manage Nuclear Risks and develop a post2026 armscontrol framework. We are prepared to enter into those discussions. Now, the type of limits the United States can agree to after this treaty expires will worse be impacted by the size and scale of the nuclear buildup. That is why we are also ready to engage china without preconditions. Competition can be managed and it will not fear into conflict. It is our hope that among the topics on the table for diplomatic discussions, beijing can include substantive engagement with nuclear issues. That could benefit the security of both of our countries and the security of the entire world. Next, the United States is willing to engage in a new multilateral armscontrol efforts. Including the security council. United states, russia, china and france. We are under no allusions that the armscontrol measure we believe it is possible, and as you know, four of the five Nuclear Powers are, with some exceptions, already d de facto committed to transparency and restraint in their Nuclear Policies imposters. The u. S. , the u. K. And france have also all demonstrated commitment repeatedly to responsible behavior. And, some of the p5 Nuclear Agreements with each other, for example, the u. S. And russia having a Ballistic Missile launch notification as i mentioned before. So did russia and china. But these agreements are limited and piecemeal. We can do more. The p5 provides an opportunity to manage nuclear risk and arms race pressures through a mix of dialogue, transparency and agreements. For example, a Missile Launch notification regime is a straightforward measure that is simply common sense. It is a risk of misperception and calculation in times of crisis, and we could potentially build more momentum towards further measures to manage nuclear wrists and arms racing. For maintaining a loop for Nuclear Weapons, to establishing a crisis communication channel among the capitals, to commit to the policy, doctrine and budgeting, to setting up guardrails for managing the interplay between nonnuclear strategic capabilities and Nuclear Deterrence, these are all areas where we could take further steps in a multilateral contacts this will help the nice states set the norms in short the values of the nuclear era. We are already making progress, including across every major multilateral body that seeks to limit nuclear or wmd risks. The nonproliferation treaty review conference. The conference on disarmament. A Bilateral Convention across all forums with results based discussions. We are ensuring we are fit for the threats we face today and tomorrow. For example, the fielding of weapons and emerging technologies that will create new and interconnected and unpredictable escalation pathways. We are working to establish new guardrails. Especially in space and cyberspace. Of course, with the advent of artificial intelligence, this entire picture becomes more complex and challenging and requires new kinds of approaches we have describing throughout the speech. The approach we are looking at takes into account technologies and tools that could include a potential conflict. Like ai enable systems. As the president says, we are making sure that we are leading not just by an example of power, but by the power of our example. That is why we have committed to conduct not conduct destructive direct antisatellite missile testing, and we are encouraging our allies and competitors to do the same. Its why we put forth principles for responsible behavior in space and principles for the use of ai in the military domain. Both of which, we are actively promoting an international forms. Let me close with this. 60 years ago, the president spoke to our nation in the spirit of hope. That is how he put it. The people the spirit of hope. Hope we could safely manage strategic competition and we could one day build a world of Nuclear Weapons and forge a future of greater peace, greater stability and greater security. Not just for americans but for everyone. Today, with new threats with Nuclear Foundation, i not only believe that we can find hope again, but we must. When it comes to nuclear risk, what is at stake for our people and our world is too important into consequential for our shared future not to be. We are under no illusions about the task at hand. There is hard work and likely long work needed to lay a new condition for this era. But for new deterrents and armscontrol measures, one for for this age, we can turn this into a moment of possibility. I look forward to working with all of you to do just that. Thank you for your time. Thank you very much. We appreciate it. I am heartened to hear that you remain not just open, but committed to activists in their search for solutions. I think you and you have covered so many topics that there are a lot of questions and we are going to start i think with a couple from the press. Lets go with michael. Wall street journal. When the treaty was agreed, it was assumed that 1500 Strategic Nuclear warheads will be a submission to the lifesized Russian Strategic force. Youve taken note of the chinese buildup and a growing number of experts are concluding that 1550 was necessary, and shirley something larger is required to deal with china and russia especially since there is a degree of military operation between these two powers. My question to you is, do you think the u. S. Might need to increase its arsenal behind beyond 15 50 in order to deter china and russia and give incentive to negotiate, and what would be required in terms of armscontrol with russia, changes in nuclear strategy, and dialogue with china to make it possible to stay at the current level of 1550 and perhaps go lower. As i said, we are prepared to abide by the central limits of the new start treaty, and we have indicated russia has indicated they are as well. I said in my speech that we agree with that. We agree with the russian position. I think it is important to recognize that when it comes to the issue of growing capacity above russia, the deterrent has to be comprehensive. That means that we modernize the nuclear arsenal. It means that we invest in extended deterrence in the alliances as i described. It means increasing arnon nuclear strategic capacity in ways, and putting all those together. We believe that in the current context, we have the number and type of capability today that we need, and i cant speak to every contacts and contingency way out into the future, but as things stand today, we believe we have what we need. In terms of the question on china and what it will take, look. The very first thing that is necessary is for us to get this conversation going in a real way. I believe that the prc could make a Bold Decision to engage directly with the United States in discussions of strategic stability and nuclear risk area it would be the responsible thing to do for the benefit of our two countries, and as i said, the wider world. Once in that conversation, the question of each size leverage and incentive and carrot sticks can be defined, but we have to pass the first threshold and we have not, as of yet, seen the prc be willing to engage in a conversation. We will have time for one or two questions from the audience if we keep questions brief. Writers, given russias recent actions with this rhetoric about ukraine, saber rattling rhetoric. Why do you think Vladimir Putin would be interested in discussing Nuclear Risk Management and a new start . I would point out that during the cold war are sylvia adversaries engaged in all kind of military aggression, destructive and brutal practices and engaged in armscontrol discussions with the United States. The soviet union were able to compartmentalize the issue of strategic stability as it related to the two largest Nuclear Powers from other policies that they were pursuing and other issues with the relationship between United States and russia. I cant predict what Vladimir Putin will do but there is a track record of our two countries being capable of engaging in these kinds of discussion that serves our National Interest and the broader common interest. We are available with clear eyes as i wade through the cracks russia has put in that postcold war nuclear order. It will be hard work and long work but the notion of russia being prepared in that conversation is rooted in the historical relationship of our two countries. I am teresa hitchens, yesterdays secretary austin bemoaned the fact that china has been unwilling to engage in military to military communications with activities in the south china seas all the way into space. Do you have any insights into how the administration hopes to be able to branch out because right now you have silence on the other end . China is a sovereign country and will have to make decisions to engage in military to military dialogue to manage competition responsibly and reduce conflict. We can only do what is right and responsible and rooted in our National Interest which is to say we are available for that kind of dialogue. We are available for crisis communication and strategic discussions from space, cyberspace, Nuclear Stability. That is something we say not to demand something from china or get down and beg for them to talk with us. We just say we are ready to talk when you want to talk. The rest of the world should look at this question and say what does it mean to be a responsible significant power in the world . Does it mean to be ready to engage in military to military communications where these Strategic Issues have deep and fundamental stakes for the entire world . Most countries would answer yes. I have the opportunity to spend two days in vienna and without going into the details of the conversation, this was a topic i broached with him. I thought we had a candid discussion on it and we will continue to indicate our willingness to participate in these discussions on an ongoing basis. We have received several questions from the audience, more than we could share but i will give them to you for as much time as you can give us. First, you have seen senator cotton pull out of new start as we approach the National Defense authorization act, what is your message to congress on why these efforts are counterproductive . I will send him a copy of the speech. I will not comment on any particular piece of legislation only to say that we believe remaining in the posture where we are prepared to pursue meaningful agreements. President biden knows that having worked with republicans. It was passed on a bipartisan basis with the stewardship of senator lugar. We would make an argument for a bipartisan commitment to this core tenant of our National Security strategy which is to have us engage in armscontrol and will continue to make the case that anything that would inhibit that or block that would not be in the american National Interest. Thank you. What happened, the second question, what happened to candidates of bidens advocacy of a sole Purpose Nuclear doctrine . That is, the sole purpose of u. S. Nuclear weapons should be due to terror or respond to Nuclear Threats against the u. S. Or its allies . As you all know when President Biden came into office, he immediately directed his National Security cabinet agencies to engage in a Nuclear Posture review which is the responsibility of a new president when they came in. That requires looking at the context in the world and taking a hard look at our own capabilities and posture at home. When he took a look at that he sat down with secretary austin, secretary blinken, chairman milley and other key players in the Nuclear Security enterprise. He reached the conclusion that the declaratory policy as set out in the Nuclear Posture review was right and fit for purpose of this moment. And we believe that it indicates continued commitment from the president perspective to try to come on one hand, ensure credible deterrent and on the other hand, were to reduce through the role and risk of Nuclear Weapons in the united ud states, in the world on a Going Forward basis. Okay. Finally, i want to note that we have with us as our lunchtime speaker austrian ambassador alexander, one of the driving forces behind the treaty on the prohibition of Nuclear Weapons which as you know is new element in the Global NuclearRisk Reduction equation. Does the Biden White House welcome this treaties contribution to reducing Nuclear Threats . Hi, ambassador. How are you . [laughing] so President Biden was recently in hiroshima, japan, and he wrote an inscription of the Peace Memorial where he wrote about a future that we can all wonder work towards, a World WithoutNuclear Weapons. That is something he supported as Vice President of long before that and continues to look to that future. So the basic principle, the basic thrust of efforts to work in that direction, they are not can inconsistent with the biden administrations approach to these issues, but the particular instrument is quite different from what i i just described y speech. We have our policy that we are pursuing. Others are putting forward different ways of trying to ultimately get to that longterm objective. We believe we do need to deal with the challenges and threats that we face and confront in the National Security landscape today, and that requires these two elements as i laid out in my speech, a Nuclear Deterrent element and an arms control element. I will leave people to judge for themselves rather than try to get into a debate as to how that relates to these other efforts like the treaty you described. I want to thank you. There are no doubt about 150 people in this room who would like to debate things with you. We appreciate your time. We instead will pressure, debate, and hector your colleagues at the white house and at the state department and defense department. As i think all of us appreciate theres so many countries that have made a a contribution to keeping the world safer, to building an arms control, nonproliferation architecture that as you note is under threat. Threat. Its my personal belief that weve only succeeded in putting together those pieces when the u. S. Is determined to show a leadership that only an openness that an activist approach. We welcome your comments to date. We want ask everybody here to stay in their seats and to allow mr. Sullivan to leave and get back to a normally busy day. Exactly. Thank you very much. Thank all of you very much. I appreciate it. [applause] [inaudible conversations] okay. Let me add a personal note also to thank representative buyer for being with us today. Both winners in government and not outside of government i have always worked hard to increase the intention that members of congress and their staff pay to nuclear issues. Sadly, i see that attention level decreasing in recent years, and to have you here today, sir, and to know about your leadership of the eye Camera Working Group is very important to us, and part of what i hope everybody sees as their mission to continue to reach out to and educate members of congress to get them to share your interest in the existential questions that we deal with. Now, we are a little bit ahead of schedule. What i would like to do, unless daryl tells me different, is to give you a coffee break, to ask kathy to ring a very loud bell at about 10 23 and ask you to be back in your seats by 10 25. We will start the next panel at 10 30 shark. In questions . Good. All right. Thank you. [applause] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] okay. Thank you, everybody. Lets begin with our next panel. We have three outstanding analysts in the field, and so i hope youll give them your full attention. We have just heard the National Security adviser describe how we hope to move ahead in reducing Nuclear Risks, and i hope you provided some optimistic, some optimism to all