Transcripts For CSPAN2 Panel 20240703

[background noises] good morning, everyone. Welcome to the second panel Foreign Policy in the United States the brookings institution. We have a terrific panel which will be a continuation of these issues. The past here, let me introduce them. In the deputy secretary in and out of government our very own, an expert on European Security and Foreign Policy and indo pacific issues, good to see you here. Next door from carnegie, a fellow on the craft program. In his recent book, 2020 entitled tomorrow, the u. S. Global supremacy a critical view on different policies and looking forward to discussing that. Finally, mariana has recently joined us as a nonresident fellow but she herself is as it hovered and working as a senior worker, a very impressive project called managing that we will be talking about the issues. A couple of days ago we had secretary of lincoln around the corner at the school of advanced International Studies and he said a number of interesting things. He said in we are going through what is essentially a hint moment in History Today that postwar period has ended and the new one has not started. Talking about basically we know where we want to go but dont know how to get there will russia and europe and defense and the way forward and the world were becomes unhinged. What does it mean for europe and Transatlantic Alliance . Between russia, china and america. Thank you can you hear me . Thank you for the question, this is what kind of path europe needs to take in this idea of being in unhinged moment and an inflection and we have heard this over and over again which seems to me having worked in this field, we are always at an inflection. Seems like every five years nato is in process or we are out of crossroads or something. We are definitely in place of change but we have been before and what helps us deal with change and the unknown is a lot of structures we built are still in place that that they dont need to be tweaked and changed and brought up to date but this is something we can hold onto that we didnt have before when there were crises in before. We have these structures that give an idea of how we can navigate. Thats one of the great tools since the end of world war ii, the structures it has and the ability it has shown to Work Together to help their membership so we have these structures to help us in one thing we are going to have to focus on, weve got this work in ukraine that will have a tremendous impact on what this will look like. As it navigates what happens once hes finally comes ukraine. Youve raised a number of very interesting issues. I go back to secretary blinken who said what we are expensing now is more than a test of the postcold war order span of it. Want to skip to you because i want you to respond as a european. But stephen, europe passed between the great powers and whether or not we can hold on to cold war systems and institutions. What we mostly call as a rulesbased order. If theres a victory for ukraine at the end of all this is there . First of all well done to everybody whos come out and a postpandemic september friday morning. Its great to see people filled the room in this setting. So i think that its good to get beyond the massive abstraction of rulesbased order and liberal International Order which nobody including the is able to define come right . I think right now theres a a choice to be made with respect to the way the Transatlantic Alliance understands itself and where its going for the next several decades, and essentially the choices is like this. The United States could continue to take the lead in a much more competitive Global Environment in counterbalancing china in the indopacific as well as russia, a more aggressive and unpredictable russia in europe. Europes side of that bargain will be to probably have to come over to washingtons side more in terms of the threat perception of china derisking economically from china, and it would probably remain dependent on the United States for its own security. And right now i think that is a prevailing approach from the Biden Administration in washington and transatlanticall transatlantically. I think that that is not going to put the alliance on a good footing to secure its goals in five, ten, 20 years because i think it is past time for europe not to be dependent on either the capabilities or the willpower of the United States to come to europes rescue in a moment of crisis. The fact that were sitting here and talking about contemplating donald trump returning to the white house in a little bit more than a year should be very telling in that regard, but i think it would also be a mistake to get fixated on the figure of trump himself. There are some deeper reasons why i think the United States is ill equipped to manage the russia problem in addition to the china problem in addition to all the headwinds that it faces in its own society going forward. And one of the reasons why i think secretary blinken is right to call this a least a potential Inflection Point or the end of an era is that the United States recommitted to European Security after the cold war really because of the lack of threat because things seem so good, t seemed like the United States could remain the leading guarantor of European Security and even expand its commitments under come with an expanding nato precisely because the costs seen below. Read the entire congressional debate on expansion in 2004 to seven countries including the baltic countries. Nobody was taking seriously the question, will the United States actually have to come to the defense of nato territory in these places that many of which bordered russia . So we face a very different environment and to think it would be a mistake to look at decades of seemingly fairly consistent use commitment to European Security and assume that that is the most lowrisk way for the Transatlantic Community to achieve its goals because the underlying conditions that elicited the u. S. Commitment have changed so profoundly. So i would favor more of a division of labor approach in which europe i think no better moment the now uses the opportunity now to take over the lions share of the defense burden gradually over time, but starting now, and that would free the United States up to handle both security in asia and pressing domestic needs. So, tara, i want to come to you now. [inaudible] is this on . As as a european listening to s may be the battery is out . I can borrow your mic for a quick question. So as a european listening to this debate between two u. S. Thought leaders, what do you hear and what is the lesson for europe as it charts out a course between United States, china, and russia that clearly is i think the overlapping one, overlapping aspects of what both jim and stephen said. But how does it sound in europe . Thanks so much, actually. It is great to be a very unruly struck by both the gym and stevens interventions and as listening to stephen just thinking that think i agree with them, europe needs to do more but for the past 30 years its not more, the idea for europe that was at the u. S. Is going to guarantee it security was going to do so through nato in particular. So now if we are looking at a situation where a native commitment might not be so strong and the u. S. Might refocus, we have europe that is not invested in defense of doping in his be an either or. I dont think it is nato or europe. I think this debate honestly is 30 years old. The situation is about is totally different but we need to have the discussion if nato is not going to be the main character of European Security, we find ourselves extremely vulnerable. I mean in military terms. In economic terms weve understood our vulnerability clearly, the post, how we faced covid and the realization that we were so dependent on chinese and Indian Markets in particular for Key Pharmaceuticals i think was really a seachange moment for the eua, and i honestly dont think the eu could have acted the way it acted since the beginning of russias invasion of ukraine if it hadnt gone through the covid pandemic. The fact that the covid pandemic led to debt neutralization to really overcome a number of taboos and european policymaking was a true moment. I mean, the Commission President said she wants to lead the geopolitical commission. Weve heard countries like france and germany talk about european sovereignty but these are more about division about europe is to act in the world and is to act as an economic powerhouse. Talking about European Defense european capabilities in terms of sins, it is still something that is not so easy to do, not so easy to do because i think washington is very contradictory there. We do hear voices more and more voices coming from both sides of the aisle saying europe needs to do more, but at the same time it should also state in nato. So how is it supposed to do more if, if we cant think of European Security be on nato and if the u. S. Is likely to commit to stay longer, i think we really find yourself in a very contradictory situation. Im talking of the European Security order here. Im not even talking about how russia features in all this and how russias working ukraine features in the European Security order, and china features and european decisionmaking. China is still a Major Trading partner for the eu. It will remain so. The are a number of countries in the European Union who do not want to see a change right now. Were talking about derisking absolutely and we are preparing for it, but derisking is a tactic, not a strategy. Derisking is not a longterm plan plan. Its a preparation. What is the eus longterm plan in dealing with russia, china and the u. S. . And im not putting the three on par. We have very different relationships with these three countries, but the way europe and the u. N. In particular can position yourself as a geopolitical actor as having an impatient on the world stage is something thats going to take time. This is a new vision for the eu. It is almost apathetic to european project. The european political project was a peace project. It was the very idea that we did need geopolitics anymore, that were going to overcome geopolitics. We are facing a moment right now where we are realizing that this is not possible and that we need to become a geopolitical actor and we will need to reconcile the tension of being a peace project and being a real political actor at the same time. Tara, thank you. Youve given us a sense of the internal european debate as well. Lets put it out there. It isnt a consensus on some of these issues inside europe or among transatlantic partners, and when it comes to the topic of asia, pivot to asia, or meeting the challenge from china, i think weve heard Timothy Garton ash represent one particular perspective early in the early panel, essentially if europeans think if you want to visit to asia, help us went in ukraine. And stephen here has put at e other way around. Do more in ukraine so we can pivot to asia. Obviously both of these views, opinions are out here in this town. But i want to bring this to europe, European Security, data issues. Margiotta, theres a war ragig and ukraine. You are following the debate in ukraine as well as looking into European Security. How do you formulate what this war means for us, for the future of European Security . Is ukrainian victory essential for future European Security architecture . If so, how would you define that architecture . Thank you so much, asli, and let me just take a moment before i attempt to, i mean, i got it all figured out. I can tell you right off, but before answer your question, some of you might know im ukrainian. My family is still in ukraine. Many of the people that are close to me are still in ukraine, adages want, i cant speak him half of the entire country i want to take this moment to thank all of you who, through your efforts, through your thoughts, for your contributions, through your taxpayer dollars have been supporting ukraine in this hour of need. It is not an overstatement to say that my country stands today because in large part because of the support and solidarity it has received from this country, as well as kind of the western civilized world, as we like to call it. This was the answer to the devastation to a wartorn continent that seem to not be able to kind of put its business in order for the first half of the 20th century, becoming the locus of two world wars, right, and what we learned in the interwar period is that having a lot of small quoteunquote sovereign nations that have either weak unprotected statehood with all the possible disputes about borders and languages and matching borders with languages and with its ethnicities, with rising rental launches powers in the mix on one continent is a recipe for disaster. And thats what ultimately resulted in the bloodiest, most destructive military conflict in history has ever known. So much of the thinking in the first postwar years was how do we prevent that from happening in the future . Many of the debates about containing germany, right . A lot of these projects, including the u. S. Sort of underwriting the security of the continent was to prevent the resurgence of germany. That might seem absurd to us today but that was very real thinking at the time. Basically this was a new experiment. It was experiment and integrating these really very Different Countries that have lot of historical animosities between each other for centuries before, and the prosperity and the success of a european project, no matter what we think about how the bureaucracy is in brussels and all that. Im sure we all have our horror stories. Ultimately, it was an incredibly successful project in europe after a devastating war. The u. S. Role in that, not just financial through marshall plan, but to being kind of this outside power to the various actors could do for instead of kind of battling it out between themselves was a very stabilizing factor. Ultimately, there was much political purchase, much political weight to the nato alliance, as much as a defense component of it, and that is why the lines did not disintegrate after 89, after the end of the cold war. It hung together perhaps without as much purpose, what else. But it still persevered. It kept on and it expanded. In very stark contrast to what it happened in east of the warsaw pact. The moment the powers of the patron was removed, the thing fizzled away. So there is an inherent value, right . Theres something that keeps this european project together and the u. S. Security guarantee is very crucial to it, and to bring it to ukraine and just a couple of sentences, postsoviet settlement left was basically a huge ukraine sized security vacuum in the middle of europe. Again, over ukraine, over moldova, over georgia, over his other sort of soviet periphery, the former periphery of former empire. The basically recreated that into worse situation of small countries with sort of developing weak sovereignty, right, still going through the throes of postsoviet transition, battling a lot of its own problems, institution building, trying to provide for their security with a resurgent former and real power. It is no surprise at all that the next big war in europe should break out in exactly that security vacuum. So with ukraine i nato, its not just a wish list that ukrainian leaders have. Lets remember that there was no appetite for nato in ukraine. The first of these ten years of ukrainian statehood and it was only a function of her bunches russia coming back on stage that puppet ukraine related to consider that as the only other alternative to its security. So ukraine and nato, lets go, lets say on this question for a little bit, jim. Is it the original sin, or a solution to our problem possibly ending the war . By way of original sin im referring to 2008, bucharest, the much talked about nato decision to keep ukraine and georgia in the waiting room, signaling that they will be, they might be perhaps one day members, but not right now, and there are two arguments out there. One, that was a mistake that provoked russia, and the second argument obviously is that, that tempted russia but didnt deliver enough guarantees and, therefore, it was the half measure that backfired. One, you could give your sense of the nato enlargement debate . I i know you worked on these issues inside in and out of government, but also looking forward, is nato part of the solution here when it comes to ukraine or European Security . Well, thank you. That question we could stay for a couple of hours. I would love to talk about this. I was involved with nato enlargement from the first day. As you and the pentagon working in the Europe Office there in charge of partnership for peace and all of getting nato candidates ready to go, to get into the alliance. Ive worked on that ever since one way or another. Original sin, thats an interesting way to put it. I think when i look back on 2008, it was a mistake that was made and shaped by the politics and the personalities who were there in bucharest in 2008, doing it themselves at the negotiating table while nato was in the process of trying to have a summit meeting. It was a mistake that, other said at the time that this was going, this is not the way to approach ukraine membership but by having them turned away in bucharest without something there in terms come something stronger than then, it wasg them in a very awkward position absolutely without the map, without of the things well. I think it was, the understanding of the table certainly on the u. S. Delegation there was not deep enough to understand the ramifications of what they were doing. There were other pressures and politics going around that table. Table. Have them go in a direction that was a very have step as you sit and think weve had to pay for that with the invasion of georgia and the ukraine. We see whats happened but i do believe in 2008 in 2008e of statecraft by the United States and some of the allies that led to a bad draft communique and led to where we are. In terms of today, in looking to the future what we dont want to my mind is another villainess that happened a couple months ago and i communicate and approaches almost in some ways worse than 2008. I think we are looking at a future thats got to include nato and eu membership. Timothy play this out. The only to separate what i think an appeal before. I dont have to repeat them but it is part of the solution. Its not about how did we do it . And house at the Washington Summit the pressure on the administration not to have a vilnius but to bring in ukraine at this crowning summit, anniversary summit, election summer, summit, a lot of political pressure there. The idea of ukraines future in nato will be acute this summer. It will do whatever one is going to be looking for. As far as im concerned we got to do it then. We cannot afford to have another taking it down the road or another ms. Speier like 2008. So that is part of the solution. Eu membership is got to be part of that, too. They cannot lag behind just what we did in the 90s and the 2000s. Jim, you were saying regardless whats happened on the battlefield . Absolutely. There was a time, not so far ago when i i would say were goino have to see we are on the battlefield that i think we passed that point. Also im a bit more and where things are going on the battlefield and i think will be a place where we can do that. I dont think we can wait. We got to do it, got to do it this summer. Steve, im going to get you admit because i know you have used on this enlargement issue federative urgent from gems, but tara, the french position on nato and ukraine has been interesting. Its really involved almost 180 degrees difference from being very opposed to now being a champion of ukraine membership issue. It seems that vilnius with president macron. Is this a real shift . Is as Public Relations exercise . Is this reflect the divisions inside europe . Tell us how you read this. They say its a real shift. I would say to be actually the more important shift is the one Eu Enlargement, which french was conducting. To me that is more of a strategic ship from the french side. The french have been known to block Eu Enlargement forever long time. Theres a a debate in europe t whether you deepen the union, whether you enlargement. A number of people were saying you can do both simultaneously. There was a division inside your people who so we need to watch because of strength is its openness, its capacity to absorb and the french were very much more of the idea that we needed to go towards an ever closer union, something the brits really didnt like and was very much part of the Brexit Debate when the brits decided to leave. They did what the subject of an ever closer union. The french are pushing for that. To me the idea now france has endorsed of course ukraine come into eu but also moldova, so we dont speak of so much about it was actually an integral part of the strategic debate because there are Russian Troops in moldova right now and there are threats to moldova and security on a daily basis by russian forces. Thats important to say. The fact the french have moved on this is really interesting to me. So macron was very optimistic opportunistically he could champion his ideas of european sovereignty even more. The fact that we are going to go to witness this greater European Union with ukraine and moldova but also the western balkans would be integrated come cellucci of the duty of 35 Member States with complicated neighbors, but also complexities in terms of how you get all these countries into the single market, how you make sure there is a level playing field, how do you make sure the eu is competitive. Because again that you as an economic powerhouse, and this is its trend today. I think me that that is the more interesting shift and i in a way macron gave a speech earlier this year when he atoned for french mistakes in terms of french attitudes towards eastern, central and Eastern European Member States, which i found actually quite interesting. To me honestly that is on the french side the much greater shift than on the nato enlargement side where the french are very much in favor of ukraine come in but the keepsake also as fungus eus is blocking nothing could happen but the nato as long as the u. S. Is not endorsing it publicly, then anyway its very easy for paris to say it once ukraine and because it knows things will not move. Is a safe position. I want you to sum up european sovereignty, which is a big buzzword in europe, but rarely heard in this town. Its a big concept for geopolitical europe. In one sentence, what is it . Its about building critical infrastructure, protecting europe all the while remaining open, protecting the rulesbased International Order and the trend of panic alliance plays a huge role in european sovereignty. Theres also the sense that europe needs to grow stronger in terms of protecting critical matures, protecting its economic strength but also wants partners. This is not an inward looking eu. What about the eu Building Partnerships, transatlantic very much alive, very much central to it but also Building Partnerships with the middle east, with asia and thinking of this new corridor which was announced at the g20 meeting, in the middle east corridor which will play a central role in terms of the eu presented itself as an Infrastructure Provider and partnering in the very different way with asian and middle Eastern Countries not looking at your providing infrastructure and hope it actually building true partnerships. Stephen, when he was the ambassador, u. S. Ambassador to moscow, bill burns is said to have cooled nato membership, ukraines never shipped to nato, the reddest of all red lines for russia, which is something that is in your recent New York Times article which appeared right before vilnius. You have a publicly diversion position from jim. Using enlargement was a mistake and will be a mistake for ukraine. Now, we are in this war. Edwin is part of this war. The term proxy war has been thrown about in the first session. Its almost unavoidable to mention nato in this context. Have your views changed and can nato afford to lose in this instance . Its very important that ukraine, you know, continue to exist as an independent country that, of course, we hope the war will end and on what terms n remaining huge question. But we face a really difficult question about what is the best way for ukraine to be secure, independent, prosperous, hopefully democratic and noncorrupt in the future. This is where where a litf recent history i think is illuminating, some going to get a little bit back and i will come to the present question. It strikes me a lot of those supporters today of ukraine joining nato are being offered an invitation to join in the near term, sound a lot like the critics of nato enlargement when a postcold war process of enlargement began in the late 1990s. The critics among whom included George Kennan argued that although there wouldnt be any nearterm catastrophe with russia, that launching enlargement as an openended process, not a onetime thing, not an ok, we will do it, maybe thats the end, but as an explicitly continuous process in which new countries moving closer to russias borders would be constantly considered and the door left open. This is something that would create a new dividing line in postcold war europe when it was still possible that a dividing line might not exist, or still seem possible, and the United States and other members of nato but the United States in particular would therefore gain new security commitments that would be harder and harder to defend, more and more peripheral from the core u. S. Interest in ensuring a basically peaceful and stable europe, particularly western, northern and central europe. And be more prone to antagonize russia and turn russia hostile. And i would add to that argument that he would be left especially vulnerable . Well, it would be those states, in the middle of an expanding nato military alliance, and potentially more agreed to russia, and not actually given protection by nato. So to date i dont think that the process of nato enlargement has been something that is benefited ukraine, even as i understand perfectly well that make sense for ukraine to want to get into nato. So you mentioned 2008. I think were all dissatisfied with the 2008, for good reason. But in what direction are weak dissatisfied . Was the problem that ukraine wasnt given membership, or was a problem that the whole question was very publicly broached, an empty promise was made, this was provocative to russia without providing security to ukraine . And we shouldnt not gone down that road to begin with. So im in that latter camp, and, unfortunately, look, theres an unfortunate dichotomy right now and the public debate between the causes of the war, something and come to russia, russian realism, russian aggression, was nato enlargement a factor . They were both factors. They are more mutually reinforcing factors than they are competing factors. Its in part precisely because russia sought a sphere of influence in postsoviet territory, particularly areas with russian speakers, that nato enlargement to those areas was so galling to so many russians, as bill burns wrote in 2008. So these are both in play, therefore, i would be would be very concerned about extending nato membership to ukraine, particularly because for nine years now that the war between russia and ukraine has occurred, every nato member has chosen not to directly fight for ukraine, making a pledge to do so would potentially lack credibility. I think it would force us in response to station large numbers of troops, perhaps nuclear weapons, in ukraine. If you think about what was done in west germany, and that was west german in the cold war to make deterrence try to seem credible in that case. So we have a real problem in this case. I think an easier path for ukraine though is very promising, and as fiona hill said, earlier, we should not give Vladimir Putin what he wants, which is an opportunity to make what happens in ukraine a showdown between the United States and russia. Maria anna, im going to get to you in a second, but likely to jim, a quick answer. Steve was saying membership means and nato ukraine, and natorussia were essentially us having to defend ukraine article v, possible nuclear weapons, possible nato troops. How to prevent an escalation if ukraine was given a membership pass, even membership at the next nato summit . I i want your answer to be quick because theres a nuclear, burning nuclear question ever go to mariana afterwards. Well, you point out all the reasons that a think a very good job of pointing the other side of this question. Its not something that is black and white in terms of how do you do this. Nato hasnt had to do and enlargement move with this kind of complexity ever, getting consensus within the alliance by itself will be tough. I think you have to approach it in in a more savvy way than we did in bucharest in 2008. I think we have to approach it in a way thats not could put ukraine in it even worse place, which is what happened in 2008. I think the approach needs to be one that provides deterrence for ukraine, it is got to be shaped in a way that might be different and have been shaped in the past in terms of an extension of membership to the past newer allies. In washington i think we need to take a first step, and it is really a, which is to invite them in, to invite into membership. In other words, you dont bring them in immediately at washington. Youre now a member, wave a magic wand and there you go. Start the process. Start the process but its got a be stored in a real way. It cant be a nifty process. It cant be an empty promise. We had too much of that. Its got to be real. It cant be another committee. It cant be another Ukraine Committee and nato. Its got to be something that means that membership is coming. And its got to be done in a way that show strength in nato and unity in nato that weve agreed to do this. The problem in bucharest was the wasnt the consensus there. There was mass confusion there and the Bush Administration came in and pushed an approach, and it didnt work out as we know. The. The statecraft issues there. Washington, they can be done with more savvy and a think its got to be done with the strength of nato unity. I dont think we have another choice but we can do it in a way that helps us deal with the problems that you laid out and have been laid out here as well by my call expert mariana, two questions, i want to sell them simultaneously first is a short one. Is there still a real threat of Nuclear Escalation . We know that Biden Administration has been cautious about escalation on the ukraine front. President biden talked about world war iii. It was being caution in which what weapons weapon surt range, et cetera. Last year this time there was also a real threat of Nuclear Escalation. People talked about the phone calls and diplomacy. Do you still see a threat for Nuclear Escalation on the side of russia . This one can be short. The real question i want to ask you is how does this end . O, both easy questions. And that when a short, to. Ive got it. Before i very quickly answer your two questions, i would like to weigh in on the previous debate just very briefly. Look, theres not that many options out there for Ukraine Security. Theres three things you could do. One is for ukraine to become a belarus, a satrapy of russia, part of its sphere of influence, whatever and follow that route and thats the scenario russia have been pursuing. It would very much like to do that, and to be honest if ukraine publics were on board with that, i think the west would be just like yeah, whatever, you know. Its their choice. The problem is ukrainians, the public, stage ii back revolutions in order not to do it, two public massive protests. In 2004 and thousand four and 2014. They just are not acquiescing to the scenario, no matter what people in washington and moscow want. Ukraine has an agency and all of this. Two is to become part of integrated European Security architecture, and in that theres nato. Theres really nothing else. With all due respect, eu security structures of basically nonexistent, of all intents and purposes. So how this happens is a big set of questions. Certainly i agree with those who said that 2008 and bucharest was the bane of half measures, it was a opposite of what was a Teddy Roosevelt advised us to speak softly and carry a big stick . Well, that was the opposite of that. And the third solution for Ukraine Security is to become this builtup militarized garrison state, maybe follow an israeli model where there is a strong alliance, bilateral alliance say with the United States, but really just become this kind of very mobilized, you know, on the territory of ukraine. Does europe want that . We dont know. And even with the best efforts and ukraine a part can it still stand up to russia thats like three times the size with all the resources . Could ukraine have done better to provide for it security over the 30 years . Absolutely absolutely. But still with the best efforts though, you know, those capacities with a been limited. With all that, is there a threat of Nuclear Escalation . Absolutely. When there is a hot conventional conflict on the ground, stakes are raised. Theres definitely a heightened risk. President putin has used Nuclear Threats abundantly for political effect. They seem to have worked because they seem to have worked, he continues to use them. They worked in the sense of inducing caution on the part of the west, not deterring at all altogether western support, but very cautious approach. Tactics in terms of providing assistance, in terms of limiting enduse and so forth, all of it very justified but, unfortunately, costing a lot of ukraine lives in the meantime. And actually hampering the prospects for successful ukrainian counter offensive, and that leads me to the question of how all of this inns. The short answer is we dont know. Nobody knows, right . A war is a war. Right now it could seem like a slog on the southern front, the more we could be reading the news that the second light of defense is broken, ukrainian troops poured in, reserves are redeployed. We dont know, we dont know that. It will in some day and when it ends, the question of longterm security for ukraine and for europe at large will have to be solved in such a way that none of this can happen again. So, steve, less than one minute and then i have a quick question to tara. You talked about israeli model. We had a lot of questions from the audience. How does it end . What steps need to be taken . Do you envision peacekeepers, security guarantees . Their specific questions to the psalm sharpies that call for negotiate in Foreign Affairs at his call for negotiations. Basically how does it end . All right. Give me one minute. One minute, steve. So i would favor a combination of the israel model quoteunquote very flawed analogy but the israel model, a well armed, welltrained ukraine with support from its international partners, including the United States for arms and training, significant support, and integration into europe. But i dont favor nato membership. I dont think theres any kind of savvy way to get the alliance on board because there are deep objections. We them come out and vilnius,n washington and in berlin to that course of action. But im really concerned by the idea that nato membership is an alternative to the israel model, to a well armed, well supported ukraine, as if this piece of paper, article v, is going to provide security. We need to learn Something Back to the league of nations about that, right . Now, that may have worked in the past three decades quoteunquote because we dont actually know that but for Data Security guarantees, russia would have invaded other countries, possibly, but we dont know. But in the case of ukraine, ukraine is going to have to be armed, well supported, and physically able to deter russia through its capabilities, right . And so this native option i worry that theres a kind of fantasy being created that nato is a Silver Bullet and then because of those words this will never happen again. Well, i have to apologize publicly to tara because were running out of time. Theres china and theres trump, possible next Top Administration that were europeans that we would like to talk about but alas, a round of applause please for our panelists. [applause] and thank you all. [inaudible conversations] comic of the conversation on freedom of expression and the First Amendment pic is part of the Cato Institute is constitutional dazed symposium working the day in 1787 that the Constitutional Convention finished drafting u. S. Constitution. Live coverage starting at one p. M. Eastern here on cspan2. Join us tonight for the premiere of cspans new series books that shaped america. In partnership with the library of congress we will explore tenn books from American Literature that provoke thought, won awards, led to significant societal change and are still talked about today. This week will feature common sense, the 47 page pamphlet written by thomas paine in early 1776 have height of a tension between american colonies and great britain. Our guest richard bell talks about how thomas paine to his pamphlet strongly urge for american independence from the british monarchy and six months later the declaration of independence was signed. Watch books that shaped america featuring Thomas Paines common sense tonight at night eastern on cspan, cspan now our free mobile video out or online cspan. Org. Also be sure to scan the qr