Transcripts For CSPAN2 Panel Discussion On Missile Defense 20170407

Good morning everybody. Thank you for being here today and jim miller president and ive had involvement with Missile Defense over a number of decades. Starting on capitol Hill Services committee in the late 80s and early 90s. And continuing on through my time including undersecretary defense of the obama ministration. We have a great panel here today. Youve already met some jericho who is senior fellow here in International Security program at csis. Tom will talk about in particular his important missiledefense next steps. Doctor greco, thank you for being here today as well. Scientists in the Senior Security program. Also support we will. Guest that and a number of other issues i think. Our third panelist today Major General retired ron. Director strategy plans and policy for norad. Then also has up several commands for an air defense and at one point was director of tests for the Missile Defense agency as well. It is a great group. I want to thank you general especially for coming today and for i just want to say a couple of words and we will turn to the panelists. Indeed as mentioned earlier by senator sullivan, the Trump Administration is picking up a major review of muscle defense posture and policy. If we go back to the 2010 missiledefense review conducted by the last administration i think it is notable that it placed the defense of yours homeland as the number one priority for Missile Defense. Our allies and partners can contribute to missiledefense for defense of their own key assets and population to support our deployed forces. No one else can do the job or should do the job of defending the United States for us. It also made clear the prior review of the Obama Administration that all missiledefense system is aimed at north korea and iran and that is not intended to affect strategic instability with russia or china. One of the recommendations in toms report would say, they shipped that focus a little bit and include the ability to engage listed missiles in very limited numbers russia and china and we will talk about that issue and potential implications. But clearly as we talk about this the driving consideration is north koreas continued missile testing the continued efforts on the Nuclear Program and reality that while north korea poses an uncertain threat to the us today, it does pose a threat today and it is likely to grow in the coming months and years. Missile defense is not the only part of the us approach the problem but it is a fundamental part. Currently, a lot of improvements under way in the system. And we give credit to and for the modified kill vehicle for improvements to command and control and sensors as well. A lot of work underway. One of the questions we want to discuss is whether the case is appropriate on the qualitative side and if there any places that we missed period of quest we want to chip discuss as we get to the panel whether we should be looking today to grow the system beyond that current 44 groundbased interceptors that are deployed and that we would like ready for operations as necessary. These will be among the issues we discussed. It will be among the issues that the new Administration Defense will have to discuss and i think will get a good start today. Well start with tom. All right well good morning. I am thomas karako. I would also like to thank jim and the other panelists for joining and also thanks sullivan for coming out this morning. As jim mentioned i will give an overview. A report of missiledefense 2020. And on the basis that the nda and president ial the administration will be looking at missiledefense policy, pasta and strategy. And also by explicit president ial direction. The relative balance between homeland and regional. And you know, every month or so north korea lately seems to be doing something new in terms of missile development. And there are other new threats out there as well. I think that given the circumstances we find ourselves in, i would not be surprised to see a relative rebalancing in the near term in favor of homeland. At least relative to where we have been in recent years. And we kind of hope this report will layout options. Kind of a roadmap for how one might do that. Before i get started i want to acknowledge a couple of folks including my coauthors, ian williams and wes rumbaugh who are both here. We put a lot of work into this effort. And i want to thank the many smart people in and out of government who let us spend their air it has been going on for a while. Also for those root who kindly gave us their time and finally to the csis ideas lab. Particularly carolyn who put together some great graphics to help us communicate some of this stuff. Let me say that, you know one of the reasons we wanted to put this report together, i think that the conversational homeland Missile Defense remain unfortunately too polarized and misinformed. It is understandable it is hard to keep track of all of the different kinds of kill vehicles and all the Different Things in development. Gb eye has its own rules as well. It is one of our secondary purposes here. And to serve as a compilation and a guide for the perplexed on the complexity. Bring things together in one place. But i think the problem with how this is frequently discussed runs a little deeper. Including with a lot of historical baggage. Unfortunately it tends to confuse the debate. And i think with respect to homeland Missile Defense in particular, the discussion is too frequently divided between on the one hand cheerleaders, who do not think take sufficient account of the difficulties of some of the things. And on the other side, kind of folks slithering or deriding. I think that both a better understanding of the past and the Current Program of record might help mollify some of that. So we tried to do three things. A reference guide of where things have been. Secondly benefits of a lot of those. And third make some of our own findings and recommendations. So as not to take the lead i will just add think the Current Program the gmd and related systems in a range of reliability, capability and capacity improvements relative to where we are today. And as well as think some policy and budgetary adjustments would be in order in the forthcoming mdr. There has been a lot of backandforth policy wise and problematic wise over the last 20 years or so. In the report we deliberately try to highlight and emphasize the continuity. On the one hand there strategic continuity but also the programmatic continuity. On the strategic side i think, go back and read president clintons speech in 2000. The one where he said he was not going to decide to deploy national Missile Defense. Then look at the speech of president george w. Bush gave in 2001. Announcing withdrawal from the and not in terms of the exact assessment of that readiness but in terms of the strategic rationale. The idea of being very simply that we are not unwilling to accept complete vulnerability to certain kinds of threats. We are unwilling to really accept and rest deterrence value with respect to certain kinds of actors like north korea. And on the programmatic side i think appreciating the lineage and evolution of todays program is also important. Looking at really the roots of gmd and nmd. I think one can really appreciate some of the real ability issues of ek bees and silos today. If you dont appreciate that in many respects theres delete event prototype design put together in the 90s under abm treaty restrictions. And furthermore the 2002 decision to have a limited defense capability in two years with little choice but to embrace a kill vehicle still under development. Furthermore, to adopt a lot of legacy cold war systems that had not been designed for this in short order and put them to use. So ever since then we are still i think kind of waiting. A true design turn on the kill vehicle. But instead of it being life extending the program in different ways. I think the conversations are a result of some of these things suffer from a weird dynamic. A old dichotomy. That regional missiledefense is good and effective but homeland missiledefense is bad. And the perception extends beyond the particular systems to the mission itself. Regional missiledefense is effective so goes the argument. You can take it as an article of faith that homeland Missile Defense is impossible. Ill send the other side that the cheerleaders who do not acknowledge some of the issues out there, do not do the issue justice either. So we tried to be fair and candid in both directions. Means we get criticized from both sides. I will just say there are 11 shortcomings. But i think that the path forward, you heard that about that this morning and jim mentioned just now about the rkv really is a good one and especially it begins to, the dichotomy i mentioned is important. Because the path will leverage a lot of that testing and Development Taking place in original system and applying it forward. So that commonalities between the atmospheric kill vehicle on one side and the atmospheric kill vehicle on the other side. Let me start to walk through a little bit of this. Jim mentioned the bmdr. This is just a general view. It will be taking place with nsm as well as an ekv. But this is the historical emphasis between homeland and regional really going back to 1999. Those fluctuated a lot. There was a big surge especially for the Capital Investments for the deployment back in 2002. And but its not just the gmd its kind of the overall emphasis. And in a Historical Perspective this is i think senator sullivan mentioned this is all relative modesty in terms of the number of interceptors we are talking about. If you look on the far right that is 2017. That will be in the ground by the end of this year. Compare that for instance to the clinton administration. Three phases of the clinton administration. 100 to 250. Before that the g pals whose job it was to go after limited threat of 10 to 100 rvs. And after that, the sdi phase 1 safeguard an sentinel and that sort of thing. But in the overall context, i think you see that modesty. Sorry i keep looking for the keyboard down here. The other context here is a legislative environment. And this past Year Congress went back and updated the 1999 national missiledefense act which was 17 years old. If you acronyms were in there. First but we dont talk about national Missile Defense anymore in so many words. And this is talking future tense about you know we ought to deploy and we have done that. And i think congress correctly has gone in and updated this. I think unfortunately, there has been a lot of hyperventilating about the update. That is my way of thinking proves that schools do not teach a sentence programming anymore. All the focus has been on the adjectives which are limited. But no one i think has sufficiently appreciated is a complete sentence. And that the subjects and objects of defense in that sentence have changed. It is no longer about really national missiledefense territory but also as you can read, allies and forces. And, you know, the word may not apply in the same movies to think about this in 1999 or in sort of the g pals kind of context. I actually think you take a look at these adjectives and compare them to the 2010 bmdr and theres a lot of continuity. If you go back we see a surge from in the 2004 timeframe but just within the past 10 years, as we heard about from this morning and i hope you can hear. This is specifically the homeland element that we have broken out. This is kind of a fallen tree graph. Those are the five dems as well as actual spending as we heard this morning. 24 percent decline over the past decade. For the top line but then some deeper cuts for, and here we will go a little deeper now into gmd. And these are components of gmd. Lets go down and defined this. I can say about 50 graphs in the book. They all kind of look like that. Now let me, the keyboard again. Let me walk through the chapter and intercepted development and a chapter on sensors and that sort of thing. Im going to go through a little bit of this. Let me just prepare the long view of interceptors, the lineage really where we are today. One limitation of the gbi fleet today is, a lot of different kind of interceptors going on. It is also the case and you can look at here you have c1, c2s. And relative friendly to other deployed systems today. Unfortunately the c twos dont have ondemand communication to the ground for instance. The e kvs of today. There is also unfortunately shortcoming of the three stage booster. That the intention to go out and get a twostage booster was never done. They were looking for a selectable way to get at that flexibility. What it basically means is you are not able to buy more time and fire later. You have to fire sooner because all three stages have to burn out before the kill vehicle can be released. And especially if you are operating from alaska. That is going to limit you. Let me also move now to the mdas three stages. And the categories, what it really is, this year being the 44 gbis in the ground, the c twos and dd block ones. The centerpiece really the r kv. We will talk a little more about, although our kv is not a dramatic departure it is that kind of design turn and in some ways it should have happened is decade ago. But it never did. The good news is that theyre not starting from scratch. Theyre going back to leveraging a lot of the parallel of this been going into other programs but the idea is to make things far simpler, more module are cheaper and have fewer points of failure. These are the kinds of reliability issues. And also the rkv will reduce the kind of diversity in the fleet. It just shows in a chart how many different types are in the fleet. And a lot of discrimination algorithms have been floating around and draw upon all of that. So its not going to be starting from scratch. Then further on the future the advanced section is the mlkv which is far behind in relative where the plan was. Multiple kill vehicles atop a single booster to compensate for some of the discrimination challenges and really improve your capacity. Unfortunately the timeline for that is currently 2021 . Pretty far out to the right in terms of that. This chart right here is actually kind of the centerpiece of whats going on and what the agency currently plans. We call this the skittles chart. You can taste the rainbow and see a lot of different muscle movements of whats happening there. The green at the bottom is a c1. That was put back in 2004, the red is the ce2. And then the blue is a ce2 plus and orange, Pay Attention to the orange that is the rkv. Testing in 2018 and potentially deployed in 2020. Now, as i said this is the best snapshot of whats going on. What is intended to be going on. We would point out a couple of shortfalls. One is what is likely currently to be a big gap between things that will be put in place this year, the 44 by 17. After that we are going to presumably wait. Sit and wait. Until the rkv comes around. That could have caused later on. It could especially if rkv goes to the right. It can kind of retard some of the efforts to increase capacity in the near term. And it might unfortunately hurt rkv later on. A second limitation is that as we heard earlier, notwithstanding a recommendation in 2013, by the department of defense, to go out by some operational and test, that was not done. After get to 44 we will go down. Every time we test something that we have to pull it out of the ground to test it is wellness operational. That starts to adamantly begin to get the next generation. That is the current picture and that is why think is one of the simple reasons why you are here and folks are talking about the importance of capacity. Instead of going down, we go down i think by at least four, if not more. Just in the next couple of years. And then before rkv comes online. Again, the schedule you are hearing 2024 rkv and it may be too ambitious. And if it is too ambitious it could be more important. In the third limit is unfortunately, mda i think is planning to put the rkv on some of the oldest boosters. And that perhaps for cost and it might reduce some of their effectiveness. All right, lets talk into testing. Im sure well have a little discussion about this right now. I want to walk especially through, forcible dust and is as of the testing budget. There is some reason good reason why the testing budget has gone down so much. They had to go back past 2010 and figure out, take apart the e kv, find out some of the problems and put it back together again. And so some of this is one of the overall top line reduction pressure and some of it has to do with that choice. But i think there really is the case, this is one of those, probably maybe the best instance of a mischaracterization of the testing record of gmd overall is with the test. With maybe that one exception that i mentioned. That they went back and had to fix the i u. This is not hightechnology. One of these failures is because of a silo cover not opening. In the missile not coming out. You know . That is a sort of thing that, its not about the kill vehicle is about the kind of difficulty. So i think mda has the past couple of years, been much more forthright about articulating some of these failures and the true cause of them. So sensors, you know, no Missile Defense system is better than the sensors that tell it where to go and what to kill. And we have what we call the mother of all testing charts in here. That not only kind of go through the full 31 flight intercept tests and what became of them. The failure, explanations and things like that. But also what sensors want involved. And you really see some of the late 1990s, to where we are today are pretty consistent with an increase as more early running raters are stitched in. As aegis and other things are brought in. You see a lot more of that. And that i think is a good thing. There is probably a lot more to do on the sensor side. Probably the single most important thing that we recommend on the sensor set is a spacebased probably infrared tracking and information sensors. Get the field of view from which you can inform not only gmd, but all of these other programs as well. Overall, you know, vice admiral searing has characterized the test record. As a kind of, nothing you wouldnt expect from a test bed for a prototype. And i think in some, that really fits where we are. The key where we need to go from here to the future is to get out of that testbed and get out of that prototype and get to the rkv design term. This is a lot of the sensors that have evolved over time. Over decades that are slowly coming online and you will see lrdr at the top. And some of these highend Capital Investments dont need to be made but this is taken down by category. And the category at the bottom, spacebased. That is really whats kind of going off the cliff. This is the space based budget overall and you get the idea. Now in terms of future options, you know we kind of put a lot of the uav directed energy and some of the boost concepts that have circulated and continue to come back. The difficulty of course is that the budget is not there for them. We had another report lesser talking at the budget pressures. Especially on mdas account. And admittedly since this is still potential but that is for the r d. I think they can probably do a lot more. Let me run through briefly, i will not read this all. That is what we gave you the book. But i think in terms of the policy, i think we should continue to have more robust and layered Missile Defense for a variety of threats. Against both ballistic and Cruise Missiles. I mentioned that, it is part of the report explicitly and it will be interesting what they come up with. We dont go live to programmatics. On the budget side, restore home and Missile Defense on a level with that being the First Priority and within the budget to prioritize our kv look at accelerating mlk b and directed in terms of interceptor capacity. In terms of capacity i would say continue to look at adding to the 44th or the 40 in the coming years and continue to grow that out. We heard about this morning. Fort greeley has a lot of capacity. [applause] a very nice presentation. A good tribute to your and your team. You are up next. I am rivel for the opportunity i suspect i was invited because they coauthored a report last year on the Missile Defense program is very detailed itt you a copy if you were not able to get one. We were teflon congress and the Missile Defense agency said to be straightforward about that but i and to spark a detailed and engage discussion and i do believe that these conversations with a Global Security we cannot have a debate about the current value of former Missile Defense so also a brush understand this topic so when it is contentious such as strategic Missile Defense but since it has been almost a 15 years and 40 million we thought we would take a look to see where we are with the capability is and how we got here a while we could learn from that. On the u. S. Government sources the pentagons own Testing Office and essential they found the system is in worse shape than most people realize. And resaw why it ended up this way. Rather than summarizing the lowercourt but first we agreed that the system is in poor shape. Thomas and his coauthors as an advanced prototype they have some serious liability issues. I would note nine of 17 test the kill vehicle failed to destroy the target and that hasnt been increasing and with advanced prototype conducted under supply conditions not optical which was much more challenging because it had significant information and the conditions have not varied all that much. But the away that the csis and the report and to evaluate that. Pendant with the release assessment and in the report that assessment was insufficient to demonstrate so some of the shortcomings we agree with those targets we expect to see that later this year. Some of the conditions you expect with the set of complex countermeasures. But here is where we agree substantially that testing is critical at least from with the recommendation and with the qualitycontrol issues in what you need for a quantitative way. So you have plans to launch multiple interceptors so you need to note that reliability of the sector and that doesnt help with there is a uh common failure that needs to be discovered in testing. So why did this happen grex this is remained a divergence. Missile defense under a different acquisition system. Those systems were set up of those and Proven Systems and moved into a special system bombing the of quarters to be cut but essentially ventures the corners will be cut. With this also shows up in the csis report. Because of the development has then driven by schedule rather than testing. As Missile Defense was accepted especially in the of past in the pented will ashley pentagon couldnt get the interceptor that was fielded before having a single successful test. And then to know that it just did not get done. Especially developing something as this complicated is enormous endeavor where the biggest projects the pentagon is ever taken on. We let the end of the Bush Administration did know seem to be sufficient to the task that we continue to feel the interceptors rather than the technical maturity. With vendor heavily controlled conditions which not vigorously that the projects are started on the timing could be better spent. I see congress explaining the lack of accountability by adding to their portfolio such as the third sight that is a constant and. In our report we have for then quotations over the last decade that they think that the system concurrently protect the United States. I am concerned about that. That could lead to riskier Decision Making and with the problem of Ballistic Missiles maybe less prone to engage in and negotiations and then pushed back with the Nuclear Missile program. So the third point is the recommendation to the supreme court. I appreciate the work in this report to lay out a menu of options. Old legacy more prior to rescission cent will negative prioritization but we dont see the analysis to spend more money without making tough decisions with 15 years under to if ministrations to be the most flexible Acquisition Program you can find. And i am a technical person but i am concerned without detention with a 40 billion system that still right now has not demonstrated true capability. So to be demanding the highest rigour and accountability such as strategic Missile Defense with a strong and debate but the weaker the strategic cost was strategic Missile Defense like russia and China Building to work as hard as those issues and north korea whether not the system works. One so what makes the number of interesting recommendations and then then we have the tools to do that. And into fine that Missile Program we have had lots of good analysis and said to talk about Missile Defense tell us what you think and they have concluded in more than 300 billion and not spend a single dollar more. I have not seen any revolutionary knowledge unbacked but to put receptors in space that is the average we have not crossed yet with the scientific economic event prides no defensive capabilities and not that we already have said to build more bridges between skeptics and boosters the hope those proponents and critics would have that dedication and hard decisions and it keeps untested equipment out of the field in the potential of the of future that includes hard testing. And also provides a reality check such as homeland Missile Defense and i will leave it there. [applause] laura thanks for that presentation. One. Thanks for the opportunity to be here and tom peshmerga for all the work they have done. I got the comedown yesterdays when happy to be here it is a very good and interesting topic with my background and operator, a programmer in the bin around the system for some time the my comments are brief summer reinforced for challenge what have been set but that is the dialogue when the questions start to come. But talons from the technology aspect. And with that fiscal aspect. Empire 30 has prior the wax and wane over time with the threat. In node is have the nearterm threat but homeland has not to. And 9 11 significantly changed it would Say Something sooner rather than later haste can force you to make decisions you would rather not. And preferred not to commit to it this time into a mitt your options in the future with National Security andrea except that limitation on future constraints were we are today talk about infancy and adolescence and adults selected the family on the chart. Use them if they were not designed for the task if that patchwork had to grow family of interceptors that variety is large if you saw those components you think what a free salad this is it looks like a vegetable. Yes the test record has been spotty but remember how and what you test for the attributes that you try to verify. We have had testily and test success. So what are you pursuing . If you design the test to evaluate that objective and then you determine the 92 retest . Is there a flaw before my next test . With the 2014 return flight was the most challenging and a significant valuable test to the agency we have been here before we do have technical challenges in advocacy issues, many people here thought it would work . Oh what people did but we endeavored because now is the basis of all of our Missile Systems. That is an attorney here very often but in 1988 it was mainly software. It gave us the ability to track. Interceptor designed to kill pa ii the lead to desert storm with two of them. That is all there was full meg petraeus. We can argue what happened did not happen in desert storm and that reverberated with me. But what we learned we went to desert storm with no tcp but 2003 we had gone through countless Software Upgrades with the interceptors we almost lost it full 2002 because they failed to achieve one nuance. But we got that with the teeleven and we went in 2003 to oif. To fully instrumented for tests so when i am getting at is it is a long hard road of the capability to the field. With massive strides all these programs have Technology Funding and political issues but they all run with the ballistic Missile Defense system in the theater. Vice think the capability of unharnessed and with the other sensors they start to stretch to the strategic level of four. For those that they operate with the field space is staggering. We cannot afford to walk away from gmd we should not say it is a traditional Acquisition Programmer process and we must not forget when it is not the only thing to focus on the with the seesaw effort in an effort defense because the adversaries are not longer rage sub launch capability there anc and launch missiles. To be used by a conventional forces. So we need to improve our sensors to create that were on the right path is critical in one hand stability of the system anymore robust ability would be good to cycle around for the modification i am not certain where the location should be. With one of the two that we have now. That affects how you can h. Been director of energy is nirvana at the air Defense Center i receive the task of the counter artillery system in for one year. We were outside of the acquisition process and all of those believers but the reality is they would not get there over 365 days. We met the requirement and deploy the system that was pretty ugly and and still and theater today doing the task. If we dont have nothing something is worth a lot. With respect to the five points to senator put out there but i think he is spot on with respect to testing bad is important the basis Times Engineering model for you cannot say every 12 months we will take a test that is a waste of resources difficult to plan, difficult to structure. Look at the battle space. And cannot operate from. I once had to negotiate the closing of International Airspace during a storm so to get that gm detest off. And i was losing my window. What editing was across the pacific taking a pounding in a lawless to execute uh test not simple. Uss the criteria and did i validate pdf and integrated master test plan. With a different attributes and i just cant reach out and tell 2021. Withholding any of preplanned yang to be done before i could get there. For some of these targets are one of. So we have developed a test plan that has been signed off on pdf every time it is updated to pick and choose what test we will do. I will end their but we do need to move forward. Thought thing going well beyond looking at the low whole operating environment air supremacy or superiority is the longer guaranteed. To expand to include Cruise Missiles. Not just the missile side. Thank you. [applause] we would like to do is have a conversation here so lets start about the goals in the questions of the of qualitative improvements and capacity than me will talk about testing. Specifically with respect to north korea and as i recall they should have near certainty so i will build off of that with a three part question so is that the appropriate goal before should we think about dozens of potential North Koreans . Where does every and figure and that . And why should read design a system for russia and chinese comics and then the system would try to engage without question. And that is what we expect to be more danced. Including russia and china for starters. And how many north korean missiles the that was back in 2010 then again folks will ground and i guess i would say what has happened since 2013 ended is not like of crystal ball to say 37 as opposed to 39 to look at that threat again but i dont think we are better offenbach and then to take a look at. And then to recognize after a period of eight plus years to go forward with that agreement and then it does get looser in some respect. In which you want with relations this year we heard the exchange it is this simply a of function of what to do and to hedge against to some extent you dont wait for the icbm. Is it on the ground . To expand radio up radar . And the sensor not work is ground and sea based so beginning to recognize is we have been focused on one particular trajectory for some time working to a remarkable degree reflects that. And what we have spent talking about that for a couple of years. Convention then with respect , a terrific read detailed answer so comeback to russia and china spinet it is an excellent answer. So under broader terms were to be the objective of the u. S. National Missile Defense should be to stay ahead of this threat to say in other words, that system to be displayed it in deployed at any of airtime. So to verify intelligence that is part of the requirements process that isnt part of the way to the Missile Defense spending but to have a formalized process in some senses we have spent plucky or fortunate the threat has not progressed as quickly as we predicted in did nazi tested and deploy icbm and iran has made much slower progress we have not seen the lows space launchers so you are keyed into that intelligence. Pie every with the posture taken defense to the most likely threat that is the way to go forward bill may a decision that precludes in my mind it is a three 1 6 to degree capability you can weigh against the most likely avenue but is a ray of the next guy to worry about . Probably. You should probably keep that in mind when you make the decision that now i must act because it did say relative threat or frame going to invest into the field with these sensors with my first concern being north korea with defense to the east. I will let you know, coming back to meshed and china on the one hand if either launched a missile at the United States of course, youd expect them to be attempted to direct to engage that to even deal with those limited threats from russia or china so does suggest itself deal think there is a high probability of russia or china or it is important for the United States to have a more limited attack strategically in the midst of a conflict . Are you concerned this is a leading question or about that requirement to be a much more complex system that it could compete with the Current System in place to deal with birth curia. First i will quote back but says that is very finely written that the system could be used against any source of any source it is also the phrase used in the early 1990s. So the question is first the policy that is frequently overstated it has nothing to do without. What woody you try to do . It came up earlier you emphasize the Cruise Missile but that is explicitly one of the three things asking the department to look at. Are we talking about north korea . The air force . No. Russia or China Congress had that mind when they put that into the bill. it think it makes a lot of sense to look accrues missile threats to the homeland also look any serious way balking at the way of strategic to pursue if the purpose of raising the threshold that perhaps we arent protecting some type of asset but i think everyone in the station should ask and answer that question. I will lead off the next question with you. Are you confident that we have a very limited system from agreements and countermeasures so how to develop and deploy accrues Missile Defense with the dreams Cruise Missiles with stealth capabilities . I would tell you from my perspective i dont think technology is sitting on the shelf. , but i think technology could be achieved with time and effort and more resources of the threat that i might potentially face and we said with the overall strategy with cruise Missile Defense than that goes back to the basic economic defend everything. Tell me what it is important and i will do my best. Do we have added capability today . List youre looking at the asset i will be honest and is it a before that would be a tremendous loss of the cruise Missile Defense capabilities as laughable as they thought it was a and they must be contributing to the missile threat to they have then writing a good time. With those capabilities and i agree with that. In the interest of time with just one more question with the requirements and acquisition process for our the gnp system. One and now for those requirements and acquisition. Will do stand down those current efforts of the system would you say okay with the regular order acquisition approach . What you think would be inappropriate number on average per year understanding that it varies with respect to its development with the operational system . And renal that we are flush with them here but what i would ask for that requirement to save us from a the worst impulses and then to use these successes it doesnt have a clear path that will lead is the Operational Testing for its acquisition process in the sense that there is incredible way to replicate . To make sure that those interceptors do not hit the field before they are well tested. And then to make a really good point ended is for research and development. Just to be clear d think it is inadequately tested quite. I dont in with no defense at all. To go from where they are. Based on what appears to be very real. I would leave them on the ground of course. And to go through that process and in terms of testing that officials have often said that it is hard to up the tempo fearing money at the problem with all the places they could launch that missile from or launch the interceptor. Is a difficult dynamic. We do have a cultural problem we expect to see flashes and bang in the sky. So i agree in one sense miss a few complain about something long enough that the agency has been given parboil launch car to the launching and we had a document pdf that i am not certain aikido find it today but on the other hand, with at that process and rigidity that is a great waste of effort to talk about. So what will we do with this capability . So lets test and if you comeback with the requirement of 85 for 90 65 today. But if i m0 today and with baby ruth . And then moving back and then looking over their shoulders is possible with that oversight but then pause right there that under that process and in Going Forward outside of that process. How do you account for that record and the Development Progress . That is the cause then how do you account for that . They never brought the design term. And that is why the missile. Spent were almost at 11 30 p. M. That is all hard stop. We can go for a couple minutes major hand for the of microphone. Let us know your name technician be importance of space race testers and was helping the panel could flushed at about autism behalf satellites but what would that laird system and tail . Said looking ahead to the plans to address this capability, realistic are they from a budgetary perspective . One of the things that should be added to what were doing now is to say that every administration of the last five administration has had a spacebased every single one is a critical element and nobody has done now. And so this is something that they should look at put to say where the threat is going but it continues to be a maybe the they have dramatically increased the range the past couple years they dont have to be battles are collected data. Battle star galactic as. As part of the former Armed Services staffer, i want to alaska question against tyranny answer or to the discussion of testing blood was not clear from your answer deal agreed that those Missile Defense efforts should be intended to have that security umbrella to strategic stability questions . And all the Missile Defense systems should be demonstrated effectively before they are deployed. With that russia and china issue is what we are getting at the police say bieber design a system specifically with the Missile System is easy to increase their capacity so want to plan you down on that. So rose said in an 201424 less than the interceptors to play today we dont anisette analyze the the they have 68 on us and they are pretty up front about that fact but i think were just so far away from that in terms of number so while i think the systems we are advancing today with national and regional it is so far from that if you get to appoint that you have that capability you would have to have a lot of numbers but actually you could avgas stability. But that was the concept of the safeguard to raise the threshold. Into be kicked around many times to have survivability and talking about russia how to improve strategic stability. I will put in name to my concern that if to even deal with these threats the resources will go. I am skeptical be have the ability and if people believe that it must me done so throw more money at the qualitative side. In to be 10 defective to be concerned about the cost implications. That even the russians and chinese could be more capable of the system. I think it is an important set of issues the administration should address. And whatever we have to try to engage that. The challenge with the Cruise Missile threats to not have a viable concept. With the reasonable concept. Negative mattis were selected defense. And dont disagree with your point and be will have one more question to the gentlemen in the front. As a retired federal employee i have questions about threats from the south is there an organization that says the golf course when negative gulf coast is more durable vulnerable a dozen now with latin america with the regimes like given venezuela to have relationships with Missile Defense. We of a threat coming from cuba but without seeing any Missile Defense assets i thought the Airforce Base had those but how reconsider those threats to the south . There is nothing there. Well look in the other direction you can correct me if i wrong but what you are trying to defend against. I dont know what that is that the principle of flexibility and mobility might be more valuable so if the actions we can adapt to that. We cannot go back to conrad of the 50s and 60s. The past year ive been part of tabletop exercises but some of those other combat commanders with the all access attack food today is really not an adversary but they are an adversary today. And then weve role that across the table. And then be played the game and then have a different threat to deal with that. But if we had a threat of of south america . At that time and there might be able to deal with that. But they played sat at the time. But i am not covering the city texas. What will we do . And the potential bad guy. Ed is a good place to conclude. As you both noted with those steve base assets give us some ability to merge within the region. And with that establishment posture to reduce the incentives to want to go back to the Nuclear Program because they cannot pretend the United States but it is an important part of the deterrence. Those are significant challenges. I trust them as a starting point. Thank you all for being here today. [applause] [inaudible conversations]. A Panel Discussion and income inequality. With catherine even authored two dollars a day. Almost nothing. Instead, author of coming of age in the other america. Then at 11 00 a. M. Eastern a discussed criminal justice with ravi in her book the circuit of truth and justice after syria. Author brian with his book grace and justice on death though. At noon eastern author discussions with Mark Schreiber author of pilgrimage, my search for the real pope francis. At 1 30 p. M. Eastern Michael Hayden author of playing to the edge. In american intelligence in the age of terror. At 3 00 p. M. Eastern thomas toby author of the speed of sound. Breaking the barriers between music and technology. Watch the 15th annual Annapolis Book festival live on saturday at 10 00 a. M. Eastern on cspan2s booktv. This weekend on American History t. V. On cspan three, saturday at 8 00 a. M. Eastern United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Director Sarah Bloomfield and Alice Greenwald president and ceo of the National September 11 memorial and museum in new york city talk about the creation and message behind both museums. Why would you build is in Washington People asked . Does it belong in berlin and jerusalem . So we designed the architecture and exhibition to try and answer that question. So the first part of your Museum Experience is hearing from the american g. I. Who asked that question which is how is it that human beings can do this to one another . And then throughout the exhibition we keep bringing back what american new and when america knew it. Sent at 10 00 a. M. Eastern the centennial of americas entry into the great war. From the National World war i museum and memorial in kansas city missouri. And at 2 00 p. M. Pulitzer prize finance historian David Mccullough how the founders valued education slavery and. The first seven president s of the us john adams was the only one who never owned a slave. Out of principal. Not because he could not necessarily afford one. And abigails feelings about where even more strongly voiced than his. Press the edit clock on the presidency. University of virginia president ial scholar Barbara Perry talks about the traits of a great president. The son of a good leader is a leader who is so confident but not arrogant. So confident in his own leadership and intellect that he did not worry about having really smart people around him. For our complete schedule go to cspan. Org. Acting Inspector General glenn hines spoke on allegations that they had