Transcripts For CSPAN2 Panel Discussion On National Defense Strategy 20221119

Listen to expertise. We will see you in a few moments. Thank you very much. Next to be you in person. I think we are going to get going with the next segment. I am delighted to be joined by our colleagues. We have a lot to cover. It is a good think that i know they will have a lot to say. Please remember to keep in mind we would love to have your questions toward the end. I want to dive right in and i want to start with you if i could. I would love for each of you to give your reaction to what was shared with us. If there are areas of interest or confusion or that you think are important to be aware of, anything that really caught your attention. Mike thanks, melanie. I will focus on one issue because it is the issue that has troubled me with the National Security strategy and Foreign Policy in general, which is the potential to overdo the china threat. I dont think they do anything wrong, the choice of term pacing challenge is right on and he explained very clearly why it is a pacing challenge and they described specifics in areas that should worry us and that we need to take them seriously. We got involved to prevent Nuclear Catastrophe is the overriding concern and world war iii well underway, or at least on the doorstep. I think he is right from the pentagon point of view to take the china concern. Seriously. Concern very seriously. But i am concerned they may overdo it, that with the National Security strategy accuses china of genocide, think it is the wrong term. It is a human right of use, that is bad enough. Lets call it that. Lets not china doesnt go around threatening Nuclear Weapons on a daily basis, but Vladimir Putin does. So getting the balance right of which is the greater threat is quite important. The secretary convincingly argued the pentagon has to worry about both and i think the overall National Security strategy and overall tone of washington verge on overdoing it. Ive had some on this stage who have called china an adversary. I dont think that is the correct term. They are a serious rival. We should be working with allies in the region to try to steer china back towards greater compliance. That should be the purpose of our competition, as opposed to competition for its own sake. We slightly overdo the antichina rhetoric, not so much in these documents we discussed today, but the broader structure of u. S. Government policy and where the debate in washington is going. Melanie the concern is that to a certain extent, the general sentiment could drive policy in unhelpful directions in terms of the u. S. China relationships more broadly question mark mike broadly . Mike yes, and in some areas where administering islands where no one lives. We have been sworn by the white house that we feel the obligation to defend japans gleams claims to those islands. If the scenario begins, how strongly do we react in the military domain . That is the kind a thing or a think the temperature and the relationship could be relevant and im interested in keeping that temperature calm and coolish even the we are resolute. Melanie we believe the dark open for you to of her comments. While i have your attention directly, i am also very curious , given your expertise, about the Nuclear Posturing of the npr and what you see that stands out to you as notable. They very striking feature to meet was the extent of commonality and Nuclear Policies and forced posture from one u. S. Administration to the other. If you look at the 2010 to 2018 and 2022 npr, there are some differences. The Obama Administration canceled the Nuclear Cruise missile, the trump npr reinstated it, the biden canceled it again. There are a number of nuanced differences, but by and large, there is tremendous commonality. Each of these administrations recommended the replacement of each leg of the u. S. Nuclear triad, recommended an upgrading of the command and control medications system, recommended the refurbishment of the u. S. Nuclear weapons production complex. Each of these administrations and nprs rejected a shift in u. S. Policy on the use of Nuclear Weapons. I would characterize the Biden Nuclear review as a centrist, mainstream document, a strategic call will have criticisms. They will say the United States needs to do more to take on the challenge from the nuclear competitors. Aggressive swell also have a criticism. They will say the u. S. Went ahead with these programs and we will get into a costly and destabilizing arms race. I think the npr, the 2022 npr is representing a broad consensus in u. S. Inking. U. S. Thinking. I think it will received bipartisan support in congress. I think it will be wellfunded. A recent why is so much commonality between 2018 and 2022 is because of the external environment and the security environment. This is not 2010 and things have really deteriorated. I think the emphasis in both 2018 and 2022 on deterrence is a result and understandable a natural result of this change in the interNational Security environment. Melanie i want to respond to something mike said, juice russia and china are not the same. When the trump National Security strategy came out, there was a response to it led by the Academic Community saying stop calling china a threat. We are going to manifest this if we keep talking about and treating china like a threat. Something that distinguishes this national the set of policy documents is the lack of equivalence between russia and china, the extent to which they are not mentioned and the distinction made about the types of threats versus challenges that they pose. And then something that was said that this these are marked by continuity, especially the npr. I couldnt agree more that is exactly what is called for in the current climate, that anything that smacks of significant change could potentially be very stabilizing and while this isnt the classified or complete version, these documents are to our allies and adversaries and will be read as such. A couple of things that struck me from the npr is that we are dealing with a new and identifies an apples to oranges problem with the missiles. It mentions emerging technologies, new and destabilizing military systems and that we have to figure out how to create a stable balance, how to offset this, how to dig her to deter. There are problems that dont have an obvious solution and i think we will see the department wrestling with that going forward. Finally, i wanted to note there are multiple mentions of technology that appear as sort of acknowledgment or aware that technologies are making weapons and systems more lethal. We think investing in Nuclear Verification technology is important. We Value Investing in the next generation of technologists and arms controllers. It does not say how the department is going to go about implementing this on a strategic level. It is just lacking in that way. Lots of language, less verbiage and more of we are mentioning this and less of how this is going to operate as a strategy. Melanie you mentioned arms control at the end. I incurious on your read on how it addressed arms control given todays strategic environment and the challenges in that particular policy area. If you read the language of the npr closely, i think the language reveals an administration that would really like to make further progress in arms control that would like to reduce the role of u. S. Nuclear weapons and u. S. National security and Foreign Policy. It is an administration that recognizes the Current International conditions make those goals very difficult to achieve. The world has changed very much since the heady days of obamas prague agenda, which looked forward to a World Without Nuclear Weapons. Many of the senior officials that served in the mama administration are serving in the Biden Administration, they recognize that the world has changed. Russia and china are expanding Nuclear Arsenals and they seem to be increasing their reliance on Nuclear Weapons, certainly russia is increasing its reliance in Nuclear Weapons. Both are acting aggressively and also north korea is acting aggressively in its own region. For arms control, you need a modicum of trust between the negotiators. But that modicum of trust has been completely lost. As amy mentioned, you have emerging technologies that are simply not amenable to traditional, verifiable arms control methods which increases the challenges to arms control. The Biden Administration in its npr makes the effort to be in the right place on arms control. It says we will place renewed emphasis on arms control, but it then goes on to explain why it has realistically low expectations about what can really be achieved. It is clear that the focus now of the Biden Administration is not going to be further nuclear arms reductions. It is going to be trying to stabilize emerging nuclear arms petitions. It is going to be to try to reduce the Nuclear Risks from these competitions to avoid Nuclear Escalation resulting from misperceptions, from accidents, from miscalculations and so forth. In the near term, i think the most practical thing the Biden Administration can do is to agree with the russians on reinstating the inspections under the new agreement. Because the pandemic, these inspections were suspended. I think that would be important but a useful step to reinstate these inspections and realistically discussions will begin on finding a replacement for the new treaty before its expiration in 2026. Right now it is hard to conceive of americans and russians sitting down but i think eventually it kill it can happen. China is a different story. There is a crying need to sit down with china and try to understand their strategic perspectives, allow them to understand our strategic perspectives and to avoid behaviors that could bring us into conflict with one another, even inadvertently. The u. S. Will continue to press a very stubborn china to engage in this bilateral strategic stability dialogue, and i hope they have success this will be a big priority for this administration. Traditional arms control and formal agreements on limitations and reductions of nuclear arms, you are not going to see that for quite some time. Melanie given what bob has described, do you see with china, particular portions of Nuclear Posture, enterprise in its entirety, areas where you would Pay Attention to trying to find those ways of Risk Reduction, and are there things that are particularly worrisome to you that you would think would be a good place to start . Amy we have decades of history negotiating with the soviets and now the russians, and many of those conversations for years were just on fundamental concepts like mutually assured destruction and what does deterrence mean and what is the critical nature of second strike capability. We dont have a history of sharing these concepts with the chinese are even discussing them. At the same time, you look at the u. S. Russian history of arms control, it evolved over time, not just with new technologies but with greater trust, allowing leaders to facilitate in place for onsite inspections, which was something ahead of the cold war that was inconceivable how an Inspection Team from your west and meet looking at your Nuclear Weapons. We evolved to a point of having inspections and tools and technologies and inspectors on the ground. To even get to a point like that with china, there would have to be a lot more infrastructure in place on the chinese side. I understand some of those conversations have begun between the u. S. And china for maintaining a secure stockpile, and a certain modicum of Nuclear Safeguards and those conversations should definitely continue. China has been clear and has no interest in entering into arms control situations and while numbers are well below those of the United States and russia, i think this is a prime moment to continue the dialogue. Melanie lets put these two documents in closer conversation, which is the department intended them to be. Mike, i want to ask you and then move on to the remainder of the team to talk a bit about what you see in the ndf or ncr independently or together, what does it suggest to you about structure and whether you can take that broadly, conventional nuclear or all of the above . Mike i will answer by reflecting on a point bob made about president bidens own personal desire to see Nuclear Weapons have a smaller role in international politics. I remember my semipersonal anecdote senator biden in 1990 passed at the Congressional Budget Office through a young man you may have heard of, jamie ruben, working for senator biden to do a study on u. S. And soviet Nuclear Force capabilities, now that the cold war was over. I recall i dont mind the details, and some of them were probably private but we had an option that postulated as few as 1000 warheads on each side and some people thought that was absolutely crazy talk. But other people involved in the discussions, including some close to senator biden, liked the idea of thinking about how we could cut by 95 . Everyone knew it wasnt going to happen right away, but that gives you a history of our current president and how he thinks about Nuclear Weapons. I have no doubt he would like to see them play a smaller role with the reality is it is fairly hard to see how you scale back. So on for structure i dont think there will be a big debate about change or reduction. We will see how we can get some kind of extension but even that is problematic when youve got different kinds of Weapons Systems and the inf treaty is gone now and we dont know how to think about the weapons, russia has more than we do and china is building up. Even freezing where we are will be hard enough. You can have a debate about reducing and using minuteman missiles as test missiles to try to extend out the lifetime of the Minuteman Program by a few years, but that is the biggest debate you can have on that topic at the moment. And the submarines to be safe. So i think you will not see a debate in the force structure structure. I dont think we need to have the ability to make 80 to 100 per year. Everything i year everything i hear is they are holding up pretty well. I would think about saving money there, but i dont how to save money on triad except for delaying the icbm replacement and i dont want to save money on commandcontrol commissions modernizations. We need those systems to be really resilient, better than they are today. Limited prospects for savings within the department of defense , accounts in particular, limited prospects for structure reductions and to cut back on the department of energy National Security ambitions for plutonium production capability. Melanie what about the conventional structure . Do you see anything in the nds and some mention of it reductions . In particular in the campaigning and the capabilities that will be for campaigning . Anything suggestive of a particular direction or change . Mike that is the best i have Heard Campaign explained respect your questions. That is a little bit of a missed opportunity with his National Strategy and it is meant to suggest that this is not meant to be a structure or budget document and i think it should be. The area i would have most welcomed some new thinking would have been with the navy, because if you think about the history of this debate, back in the mid2010s the out going administration, he asked manders to document how they were using naval assets and with the navy did was take that data and some it up and say, we need a navy that is big enough to sustain this current level of operations at a pace that is reasonable for our equipment and failures. That is how we built the vision for the 20 40 thinking. I might be slightly over simple fine, apologies to the navy if you do not think i am right, that is my understanding of how these ambitions were developed. So based on current Operational Requirements of 2015 or so with the navy. It is not the right way to do it. The outgoing secretary of defense mark esper and 2020 gave a speech where he outlined a vision for a 500 ship navy, but in fairness to secretary esper, he was going to do that by scaling back existing ships. Today we have 300 or so. The 20152016 analysis aspired to 355. That remains the number of record. Esper put the 500 out there and i have to give him credit as a former soldier, but he had to. It is still the most specific proposal on the books, but it is not official policy. I could go on, but i have going on gone on long enough. On one hand the navy is thinking too ambitiously thinking going from 300 to 355 and based on requirements that are not requirements but operational patterns. On the other hand, we may want to go well above 355 if we count unmanned underwater systems and the newer or erotics based capabilities that we probably should have, including some of them in the Western Areas to make sure china doesnt think it can take taiwan before we can get there. Melanie i want to pick off where mike left off and combine the question for you about structure in posture about deterrence and what you see in the npr for extended deterrence. Bob sure, let me add to mikes anecdote. Talking about 1000 warheads in 1990. In june 2013, president obama undoubtedly with the strong support of Vice President eitan proposed that the new limit of 1550 Strategic Nuclear warheads, he dropped to 1000, and this was said publicly in a speech and was rejected by the russians. I think given the difficulties today, i dont see that proposal being resurrected in the near future. In terms of extended deterrence, if you look through the 2022 mpr, you see many references to extended deterrence, you see the National Defense strategy as well. The u. S. Allies are concerned whether the United States will be reliable in reading its security meeting it security commitments, in part as a result of the Trump Administrations transactional approach, dismissive approach to u. S. Allies. They felt they needed reassurance that u. S. Security assurances they can bank on. This has been a big priority for the Biden Administration and i think they have been successful so far, especially in europe. In europe, there are a variety of modernization programs, the x 35 a to incapable fighter, gravity, etc. , and upgrade, and also program started by the Trump Administration, continued by biden of a low yield warhead for a submarine launched Ballistic Missile. I think those modernizations put together with the post ukraine efforts by u. S. And nato to ensure its partners that we would be there for them, enhancements to u. S. And allied forces deployments, additional Weapons Systems and in general the very robust reaction under u. S. Leadership of support for ukraine. I think all of that has given great confidence in europe on u. S. Extended deterrence. In east asia, it is a little different story. Our main allies in northeast asia, japan and south korea, have grown increasingly worried about the growing Nuclear Missile capabilities of china, in particular, but japan and north korea for both japan and south korea and they wonder if the ability of china and north korea to strike the u. S. Homeland with Nuclear Weapons will weaken american resolve to come to the defense of our allies as we are committed to do. Politicians in south korea and in the ruling party have various ways of strengthening deterrence. One way is to deploy u. S. Redeployed u. S. Nuclear weapons redeploy u. S. Nuclear weapons. Another way is to adopt nato type Nuclear Sharing Arrangements with south korea. And these arrangements involve training south korean pilots actually to deliver u. S. Nuclear weapons in the event of war. A third way is for south korea itself to develop its own indigenous Nuclear Weapons capability. The Biden Administration doesnt take any of these approaches, but what alternatives are there . You could see in npr are ideas for reinforcing extended deterrence. One idea is to maintain the capability to forward deploy in a crisis door capable aircraft, strategic bombers and Nuclear Weapons, in a crisis, not on a daytoday basis. We have not even exercised capability to deploy them forward in a crisis. Also the Biden Administration says we should have more visible demonstration as a resolve and have u. S. Missile carrying submarines. We should have a strategic bombers with dual capable aircraft in a rotational deployment in south korean airfields. We should establish and implement a Bilateral Consultative Group to talk about ways of enhancing. That is all fine, but the question is is that going to be enough for the japanese and koreans . Maybe i am reading too much into it, but i look at the joint communique issued just yesterday between secretary austin and the south korean minister of National Defense, and i see the south koreans urging us to go farther and i think a reticence which has been traditional in the United States to do more, to have more persistent deployments, or Permanent Appointment of a Strategic Asset in japan and in south korea. For me, i think it is going to be important to give our allies for japan and south korea a much more Important Role in the planning and execution in their region of the u. S. Nuclear extended deterrence. I think we have been a bit too reticent to do that in the future and i think we need to be more flexible. If the choice is between giving our allies in more prominent role in their own defense and affecting their vital security, that choice versus along them to go nuclear to develop their own indigenous Nuclear Capabilities, i think it is a nobrainer. We should be more flexible about that. Melanie i am going to press you on that. That is a very binary choice. Is that very binary of giving over some measure of control and independent nuclear is asian . Bob control, no. The only person in the world authorized to release Nuclear Weapons is the president of the United States, and echoes for nato, east asia, for everybody in the future. Not control, a voice. In nail councils, we had the in nato councils, we have nato allies and they discussed various contingencies, various kinds of targets and so forth. I think the japanese and south koreans should be able to do that. I think in the past u. S. Officials have hinted to say, we understand your concerns and we are going to take care of it on your behalf. That is no longer sufficient. I think for the governments of japan and south korea to reassure their own populations that the security is being protected, they will have to tell their own people that they have a voice, a voice in decisions affecting Vital National interests. I think that is going to be important going forward. Melanie since we have cover the easy topics so far, lets move into a bit of the tougher stuff. There has been a lot of attention to and worry about Chinas Nuclear behaviors and the expansion of its Nuclear Arsenal in the triad. As it has been mentioned, it means that in the nottoodistant future the United States will be facing a new dilemma, to fully Nuclear Armed adversaries at the same time and that this poses new kinds of dilemmas. Can you help me to think through what those dilemmas are and where we are collectively and finding ways to address them . Amy unto the easy questions for sure. Something that is inflected is that the department is still grappling with this, what is it mean and how do you differ deter russia and china simultaneously. They are very different Nuclear Capable states. So for the u. S. , what does this mean . I always want to feel like for arms control, it means that this effort is heightened human further. We dont want to get to the point where we are thinking about how to prevent the next step of escalation from conventional to nuclear. Want to stay at a low level in understand each others capabilities and intentions. In capabilities we have historically been able to regulate through arms control and intentions fall in line much we have a handle on capabilities. We know what an adversary has and what they can do. Other measures that lower the uncertainty about intentions or a fear of what the other side intends to do. Even under these most difficult circumstances and landscape, the importance of diplomatic efforts towards Risk Reduction i think is all the more important. The documents also mentioned in no Uncertain Terms the need to accept certain risks. We are not going to tackle all of the risks all the time and to prioritize the rest. I think a lot of what we are going to see if adjudication between various risks, threats, and the importance of all of them. The department is not equipped to counter all threats all of the time. There will inevitably be tradeoffs. Melanie you mentioned that it transmits some level of working through this of having these two nuclear competitors at the same time. Another area where i think there may be some russian marks remaining question marks remaining is another difficult topic, which is Nuclear Employment. I want to open back up to mike and bob to chime in what do you see in the npr about Nuclear Employment . Mike i agree that these goals of Risk Reduction are important and i think that at times russia and china will agree as well, but i am not sure they do today because they are manipulating and managing and sometimes deliberately increasing risk in order to retaliate against us for what we are doing to help energies are what they think we are doing in the way of reconnaissance near their territory. When russia makes Nuclear Threats or when putin brags in speeches about new Nuclear Weapons, he wants us to be anxious. He is not necessarily trying to reduce risk. He wants to control that process so i ultimately agree with you, there is that sort of corollary to that. So that is one issue about nuclear risk and threat. Another one picking up on what bob was talking about, i was struck reading the documents the last couple of days. The categorical statement by the United States and republic of korea north korea ever uses Nuclear Weapons in a conflict it would mean the end of the regime, and i do not literally think that is true. Why mean is we have to put our strange hats on and imagine different scenarios and trying to figure out what putin might be doing with Nuclear Weapons. If kim jongun decided in the course of a korean war to use a Nuclear Weapon, a single Nuclear Weapon, lets say in a demonstration airburst but lets say key destroys one a ship at sea carrying fuel and there are 10 sailors on board that die from whatever country, i dont think we commit to end the regime necessarily, because he still holds souel hostage. I think at some Point Nuclear response and regime change become possibilities if not likelihoods, but the statement that categorically, no matter what kind of weapons korea would consider is that will translate to the end of the regime. It may be useful for the purposes of the document but i dont like the u. S. Government to say things it is not paired to act up and i dont want to make us be precommitted to that policy if in war, heaven forbid, a war happens and kim jongun pops of a demonstration and then the Nuclear Posture review is pulled out and say now we have to end his regime or our award on no other be taking taken seriously. The other those are just two specific scenarios. Amy i wanted to go back to Risk Reduction. I would violently agree that putin is using Nuclear Weapons to manipulate Risk Perception that npr also mentions that the department of defense has to figure out how to counter putins new use of Nuclear Weapons in this strategically in the current context as he is waging a conventional war and periodically drops a few lines about Nuclear Weapons and it is presented as a novel role of Nuclear Weapons in a strategic thinking. All the while the United States retains the right to use it no longer as a hedge for future uncertainty as a backstop. I dont know they are actually that different. Mike great point. Bob on u. S. Policies on the use of Nuclear Weapons, i mention continuity and this is an area where there is absolute continuity or the obama, trump, and biden reviews all reject the idea that the sole purpose of u. S. Nuclear weapons should be to deter or respond to the use of Nuclear Weapons against the United States, its allies and partners. All three administrations have decided that the United States needs to keep open the option to consider the first use of Nuclear Weapons in response to a limited category of nonnuclear attacks. The language they use is exactly the same, whether the extreme struggles is to defend the vital interest of the u. S. And its allies and partners, they use exactly the same language. Before this administration began its Nuclear Posture review, there was hope, especially in the community and worldwide, that the u. S. Would shift the socalled policy and the use of Nuclear Weapons. In january 2017, and his last couple of weeks as Vice President , joe biden said that, in his view, the sole purpose of u. S. Nuclear weapons should be to deter respond to nuclear use, nonnuclear use against the United States, its allies and partners. This provided hope, maybe even expectation, but those hopes were quickly dashed and the reason is that the perceived growing conventional risks to the u. S. Forces and our allies, posed by mostly china and russia, undersecretary mentioned that the u. S. Remains the number one ally in military strength and that is true. Concerns were raised about regional balances, especially in the western pacific, and would we need to be able to threaten the use of Nuclear Weapons in response to conventional threats , not just conventional but nonconventional, nonNuclear Threats against our allies and partners . The administration, and joe biden was persuaded that we couldnt give up those options and also because of the number of emerging technologies that potentially posed strategic level threats, cyber, counterspace, and so forth. That because of these nonNuclear Threats, biden rejected the idea of going to eight no first use or sole purpose policy. Going to a no first use or so purpose policy. These were u. S. Allies along the natorussia border, u. S. Allies, japan and south korea. They believed that if the u. S. Renounced the ability to use Nuclear Weapons in response to nonnuclear attacks, they would be at the mercy of regional rivals that had impressive, conventional military capabilities. So that was rejected, to the disappointment of many. The Biden Administration decided to sweeten it a little bit by saying that the u. S. Goal should be to adapt sole purpose at some pitcher time. In fact some future time. In fact, the u. S. Should work with allies to put in conditions that we could put the policy and without risk to allies. The Obama Administration said lets work toward it. The Trump Administration rejected it. For the time being, this is off the table. Melanie i want to ask all of you if this document, when it comes to Nuclear Employment, does the npr help you to understand under what conditions the administration would or would not use a Nuclear Weapon in the context of a Russian Investigation in ukraine and the ongoing war . Bob i would say no. We dont have a clue what the u. S. Would do, we are facing this with russia and ukraine, and how would we respond to it . The current policy is not that we would use Nuclear Weapons against these large nonNuclear Threats, we would reserve the right to do it. We might consider the use and we say might consider the use and we want to maintain an ambiguous position. Whether or not we would in the event actually use Nuclear Weapons and in many of these cases i dont think we would, we want to keep potential opponents guessing. Mike bob gave a very nice expedition of the language. The other point is the only category of countries we promised never to use Nuclear Weapons against our nonnuclear countries and alliance their nuclear obligations. When you think about who that means, he said nothing about russia, china, north korea, and india, we could go down the list. But those are mostly the spots we worry about. We are making it clear but we are not making it clear. Melanie on that note, i am going to ask a question that i will admit ahead of time i could get a response for it. Ive heard smart people be uncomfortable with the fact that our declaratory policy includes not just the United States and allies but also allies and partners, with whom we do not have legally binding defensive commitments. What is your view both on why that is the case and the wisdom of it . Mike the case is taiwan, a partner and not an ally. Singapore, israel we dont have any formal allies in the middle east. They are all security partners. Anyone in that region who might be threatened might bring in that language. Melanie i wouldve thought that partner language was introduced for ukraine but bob, he said it was always in their. In there. Bob if you listened to the undersecretary, whenever he says allies he means allies and partners. It is almost a composite idea that you never separate them, and that has been the case for decades. Reason is this allies, we have a treaty obligation to defend them. We have that with nato, japan, south korea. We are obliged and we also have security relationships with countries that dont receive these legally binding commitments. But mike mentioned israel, saudi arabia, taiwan, ukraine at this point would be considered. How important are these security issuances to them . In some cases, really important. In desert storm, along predecessor to vigilant storm, in desert storm the United States sent 500,000 troops to the middle east, because of iraqs invasion of kuwait. We made this incredible commitment to defend saudi arabia, and we had no treaty obligation to do that. With israel, israel, often nonus Government People trained to do otherwise, they talk about israel as an ally. They are not an ally in the formal treaty it sense but no one believes we wouldnt come to support israel if it was any mortal threat situation. Now you have the cases of taiwan and ukraine. But i think it is very important whenever we say allies, never a u. S. Government percent makes the mistake of saying allies, one of our partners will say, what about us . Are you going to help us ensure our own security . That is why the official term is allies and partners and they dont have a legal claim on us but they have a political and moral claim on us in a number of cases, and they can take it to the bank. It is just as reliable if we had a treaty obligation to come to their defense. Melanie do you have anything to add . Amy i think it is really interesting what you say any time he said allies, he said allies and partners. Throughout these documents i have come across allies, consultations, it is heavily laden. Bob it is always there. Amy that said, the United States is leaning into these many laterals and increasingly relying on partnerships to achieve its security and i think the language is reflecting it. It is an expansive view of what it means to be friendly with the United States. Melanie i will like that some of the expansion and sensibilities that go with that in terms of obligations can start to make me a little bit uncomfortable and nervous if we have those kinds of relationships. Bob biden made that distinction clearly on ukraine. It was clear from the beginning that biden was saying, we have no obligation to protect ukraine. The ukraine sovereignty is important to us and that is why we are going to provide massive support to help it defend itself. But we have no obligation. A few weeks later at the madrid nato summit, the leaders got together and said, we are going to defend every inch of nato territory, and biden really sees that distinction. Melanie thank you all for entering so many questions. I do want to open it up to the audience and see what kinds of questions are on their minds. There is a judgment over here in. There is a gentleman over here in the back. Thank you to the panel. I am publisher. Can you explain the options available to the United States to deter none of their weapons, specifically in a scenario over taiwan and should this be detailed in the npr . Mike it is a good question. I think that melanie and kaitlyn and i wrote about Nuclear Deterrence and a paperweight published this year. There are a few points to make. One is that historically the United States has used Nuclear Threats in a previous taiwan crisis, mostly before china had Nuclear Weapons, but even in the modern era when china had Nuclear Weapons we always had over looming superiority and we have been more than willing to brandish that, try to convince china there was no useful passage to embark on. That is the history. To me, that is a big history why china is probably pursuing 1000 Nuclear Weapons. They want to checkmate that ability to make threats in the event they are winning a conventional fight and our only option is to go nuclear. At least trying to give china some degree of fair interpretation. There may be other motivations and they may want to raise the Nuclear Specter against us and make us think that because we care more about taiwan than they do as they see it that there threat becomes more credible than ours. Im not suggesting there always the good guys or defensive players in these crises, but is possible they want a thousand warheads to have parity with what we can bear so we cant make Nuclear Threats first in a credible way like we have in the past. If you got into the war itself, i dont think Nuclear Weapons very useful for most of the specific military missions i can think of. The land scholar agenda that i referred to earlier, that is a package of antiship missiles stationed in the western pacific, either underwater or on land, mobile rocket launchers that wouldnt require big aircraft carriers or runways, things target could target with its conventionally armed missiles, so you have a way to both with our own arsenal and hopefully taiwan would on the ability to sink those ships for they reach the chinese sure. There is no benefit to doing that with Nuclear Weapons. And i ship missiles are good with conventional warheads as long as it is modern and capped them there in time. I know i am bringing a couple of dimensions to this, the reason why china wants more Nuclear Weapons, is in part to make sure we do not have escalation dominance in that realm for a future contest and see contingency. I do favor keeping Nuclear Parity or favor against china, do not think that will be the decisive weaponry. With a blockade scenario youre talking about individual ships at sea. If you have a Nuclear Weapon to shoot at them it makes it a little bit easier, you do not get quite as close. The main question, can you find a ship in the first place . If you can you do not need a Nuclear Weapon to destroy it given the current balance between antiship missiles and Missile Defense. A long way of saying, it is a great question, there are Nuclear Dimensions to it, i do not think it is the size of one of the scenarios i can think of. Amy lets do a question on the right. Thank you. Thank you. The doctor mentioned how putin miscalculated the Global Response to his invasion of ukraine and how the u. S. And his allies did a lot to get ahead and deter that from happening. Putin decided to invade anyways. I was curious your thoughts about the lessons we can learn from that effort to enhance our deterrence efforts in the future. Thank you. Amy any immediate takers . Will i can begin with a male call but, i did not she would invade. Amy most people thought he would not do it. Will it is seductive when you are leader of a modern country that has been modernizing its military for 10 years that you think shock and all can went. We fell prey to that in the iraqi invasion in a low bit. They were careless, sloppy and so many ways in terms of not understanding the logistical pathways, the limited numbers of roads available, what greens could do to them with modern ukrainians could do with modern antitank weapons. It was poor planning with human tendency to think new weapons and antiwar plans will allow you to win fast next time that historically you cannot. That is why they made the mistake of invading. On the other hand putin seems willing to suffer a lot. He has a high tolerance for other peoples pain, including those of his own soldiers and their mothers. Maybe he would have been willing to launch this as a war of attrition even if you knew what he was getting into. It is sobering about the difficulties of deterrence in general. Bob it is another reminder that deterrence is not a question of calculating what might deter you. It is about what might deter your adversary. That is so subjective, you cannot into the mind of your adversary. It is a question of being less confidence confident about what you know about deterrence. Amy this is less of a case of the west failed to deter putin from invading, and more just a question of, when someone has designs on territorial expansion, deterrence toolkit we have is not geared towards that problem. There was a really big debate about the did deterrence fail or has deterrence help because no one has dropped a nuke . At the end of the day deterrence is a concept and nothing more. It is subject to psychology of individuals. The exchange that goes on between those psychologies. As the doctor alluded to, we think that when something doesnt happen deterrence helps, but it is a difficult problem. He was saying that about kim jongun, so i do not misquote them but the same principle applies. Amy i will pull them all into one place, where it lands in my head, deterrence fails sometimes. It is problematic. We should judge it on the analysis that preceded it. How much do we know about the person or policy we are trying to influence, and would did we align all the tools that were appropriate and increase the likelihood that deterrence would work . It is possible to fail, we always have to know what we will do when it fails. If it does not work, what we have with us that we know we will out on next. Lets go on to another question. The young lady, in the middle, please. Hi, good afternoon, i am a graduate student at georgetown diversity. University. Jumping up for your point of deterrence, and deterring your adversary. In the Missile Defense review there was a discussion about an integrated deterrence. Missile defense and Nuclear Capabilities are supposedly supposed to be couple mentoring. I want to get complementary. I want to get your thoughts on that. With the abm treaty, and told russia we are building these defenses for countering terrorism purposes. That spurred them to develop their own defenses. I want to get your thoughts, is it actually, are these concepts actually couple mentoring or are they intentioned like Ballistic Missile capable using nuclear cap abilities . Nuclear capabilities . I would say that pulling out of the treaty kicked up decades long of consequences that worked against the original intention of stability and permitted by armscontrol. We are offsetting defenses, now we have to have defenses that are better than the offsetting capability that is designed to penetrate them. There is an arms race component of this that is deeply unsettling. Any other thoughts . Will the other point to make, is that we make it clear in the Missile Defense review and the Nuclear Posture review, we are not trying to stop chinas arsenal of having a secure second strike capability against us. The chinese do not believe that. That was stated quite emphatically and clearly i thought that was nowhere the. Noteworthy. We do use it against a korean threat and hypothetical iranian threat. They are not couple mentoring when you deal with a highend power, the ideas you use a missiledefense as a partial solution to russias missiles then you create an arms race. We are now apparently conceding that we do not have the capability to prevent them from having a secure second strike. With north korea, and perhaps someday around we want to compete iran, we want to compete and have as good a Defense Missile system and shield as we possibly could. Bob i ask you, mike, at what point will we concede that we cannot defeat north koreas increasingly robust missile capability. For years we were pretty confident that north korea would not be able to penetrate our defenses with missiles. Now, with all their testing, with the probable production that is going on that we do not even know about the production of missiles. We do not have a handle of that. At some point, is going to be difficult to stop a north korean result threat . Missile threat . Will they be people able to easily overwhelm our defenses . Mike that is why you and i have advocated for a partial deal, rather than complete disarmament come is the official u. S. Policy under both democrats and republicans. You put aside what they have now, keep them from building more, and you have a permanent ban on icbm and missile testing. I do not think they have a way to strike north america, they might, i would like to freeze that rather than risk the world you are talking about. Amy another question, over here, the gentleman in the great gray tie. Thank you to each of you for such insightful comments, my question is, we need to have china as a pacing threat and pacing challenge. What is the likelihood of the night states and china, United States and china, or another thirdparty walking into a cycle of action reaction. What credible assurances can we give to prevent that were less than that from happening . Amy a question about just how scary is the world to you all . Over taiwan specifically . I would say, i think taiwan is good. Over taiwan or the korean peninsula. Cycle action, reaction in the conventional space . Either conventional or unconventional . I think she was trying to get you to answer your own question. If your question is, can i envision any number of ways that can happen and we could unintentionally end up in a conflict and shooting war with china, absolutely i think that is possible. Do i think it is probable . Right now i do not. I think dr. Cole mentioned there was some dangerous practices in the commons where our shared militaries operate. I know the military is working on making those less frequent, more manageable, more can occasions about them. I think there is mutual awareness of that kind of risk. I think that, while it is always possible, i do not think it is being overlooked in any way by the department. Could a taiwan contingency or some other emerge . Yes, that is part of why i think that using Nancy Pelosis visit to the island in the august and the chinese response to it, what you saw was taiwan and the night states, both being very calm and measured. Being acutely aware of not engaging in behaviors that would ratchet up the immediate risk. I think that kind of behavior will probably continue. We are just about at the end here. I will take one last question. There is a general in the middle who has been patient. To what was said earlier about force structure. In the marine corps over the last two years, there is a radical reform of how it is currently organized. When you read to the National Security document you do not see evidence of that level of internal analysis anywhere else in the other services were the committee as a whole. When it comes to balances and resources and whatnot. What would it take for the rest of the deity to undertake a similar level of dod to undertake a similar level of scrutiny. I do not think we see a 10 of the actually happening. Some a ton of that actually happening. Some, but not enough. Mike a very good question, i alluded to it earlier, you said what could be done, i told the navy we need a better plan than a 350 ship navy they some practices of 10 years ago. The other point i would make is i agree with your overall assessment. The spaceports in other parts of dod operating in space are making huge changes. The way we use satellites have made huge changes, that allows me my final 30 seconds you have another tribute to ash carter, who lost way too soon last week, i learned from him over the years, the kind of sad like constellations we have the 1980s and 90s, they were easy to find an easy to hit we have gone to a much more dispersed concept for many if not most Satellite Operations i think we continue to student. I think we continue to reinforce that. That is an area we are where we are ambitious. Melanie thank you very much for coming for another round of excellent questions, to be on a panel here, we appreciate it. It is fun to work with you. Bringing this impressive collection of expertise and the ability to articulate complexity and simplicity at the same time. Thank you for joining us i hope everyone enjoys remainder of your day. Thank you. [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2022] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org]