Transcripts For CSPAN3 Book Discussion On A Time To Attack 20140814

System in persian gulf. It was in 1990. It is not in 2014. It was right after war. And gensher was almost shocked. He came to washington, and washington declined. Therefore, you can see from the beginning, iranians have been seeking for a type of Regional Cooperation. And the foreign minister in 1991, 1992, 1995, he paid visit to all gcc countries. That time i was in foreign ministry, and he raised iranian willingness to establish such a cooperation with the neighbors. But gcc was not in position to agree because of u. S. Position opposition. I really dont believe iran is going to have a dominant role in the region. What is the conventional understanding here. Iran is preferring more Regional Cooperation with the neighbors, even including saudi arabia. I never mean its immediate. Its gradually within ten years, 15 years, this is to my understanding the u. S. Is going to have a gradually decreasing its role investment in the region, which would take five, ten, 15 years. Its not going to happen in one year. Ive got time for three more questions. One from a colleague in the front. And the woman in the blue dress. And adam. First of all, thanks for your speech, and i truly look forward to reading your book. My question brings us back to iran and to inside the country. Here in the u. S. And the west, generally its always very fuzzy when people, reports say that president rouhani is going to have a hard time convincing the hardliners. This big umbrell athe hardliners. Could you tell us your assessment of the hardliner challenge to president rouhani, and do you think how far can he go before the tight rope that he is seemingly walking on will snap . Thank you. To just make it very simple for you, what is the role of hardliners here in washington . How the problems of president obama in congress, this is exactly the same for dr. Rouhani. In tehran and washington, exactly the mirror image. Yeah, hello. Thank you for your presentation. Im in International Peace and security consultant. And i have a question visavis your opposition that the u. S. Is gradually, gradually disassociating or disengaging in the middle east. And i want to bring you forward two years from now where we have an incoming its a hypothetical. Incoming republican president in washington, republicans hold a majority in the two houses, and i want you to put your book and its recommendations two years from now in the future. And i want you to pay particular attention in your response to the issue of u. S. Commitments to israel. Thank you. No, i have no doubt about u. S. Commitments to israel. And it is israel who has declined president obamas attempt for peace process. It was not iran. You know better than me how much you the u. S. President , john kerry, invested on twostate solution. And who declined, who opposed the u. S. President and the u. S. Secretary of state. It was netanyahu. And despite all these facts, i know the u. S. Commitment to the security of israel. I have no doubt. But the issue is whether israelis are making right policies with the current policies they have in the region or they are isolating themselves and blaming the others. This is my issue. Whether we would have a republican president or not, we may have. Even this is to my understa understanding, i really, for me, its difficult to imagine again a republican president would repeat the mistake in iraq and afghanistan. I think america has got a good lesson. And then final question from adam. Former colleague from the new york times. Thank you. Wonderful presentation. Thanks. Introduce yourself. My name is adam stoltman, former times person and independent. Much of the discussion has been framed in geopolitical terms but the question that occurred to me is theres a school of thought, spoused in part by people warren will know very well, which sees the instability in the region especially originating in syria as the failure of political systems to respond. I wonder if youd comment from that perspective. And also if you accept that view what do you mean by that . The drought in syria and how that then led to instability and the failure of the regime to respond in a meaningful way. Tom friedman did a documentary around this. I wonder if you can respond about that and also if you do accept that view, do you see opportunity for cooperation between the west and iran in environmental areas. On syria, i myself, i believe president assad made a mistake at the beginning of the crisis treating the opposition. He could have a better treatment preventing the crisis. One, second, today the reality is the Assad Government is part of integrity of state and nation of syria. Believe it or not, if assad today is collapsed, who is going to govern syria . Who has a better alternative . What is alternative . Who is alternative . Do we have a united opposition . Do we have a united war on syria . The fact is that the army and the security establishments still are powerful, relatively united. Compare syria with iraq. What is the problem today with iraq . The u. S. Made the big mistake to dissolve Iraqi Security system and army at the beginning. For ten years, the u. S. Invested billions of dollars to educate or to train or to organize a new army and Security System in iraq. And you see that the army is weak today to confront with 1,000, 2,000 insurgents. This is the failure of the u. S. But i think iranians, they were wise enough to support assad and his government to prevent the collapse of army and security establishments of syria because no one knows whats going to happen after. Environmental issues, one. I think on weapons of mass destruction in the middle east, for last 30, 40 years, the only realistic major success has been dismantling of syrian chemical weapon. We dont have anything else. And this is only anduttthpxew o because of trilateral cooperation between tehran, washington and3d moscow. Before you can see if there is a real cooperation, what can be the result . No one else can convince assad to give up its chemical weapon because his chemical weapon was against israeli chemical weap s weapons. The refugees, today really there is a big room between the regional countries, iran and the u. S. , europeans, for humanitarian assistance. We have 9 million people, refugees are displaced. Perhaps 50 of syria is destroyed. We need the refugees to go back to their homeland. If there is any possibility of cooperation between iran and the u. S. And syria, first of all, i believe we need to bring the regional powers to cooperation. My idea is r5 plus p5. P5, the five permanent members plus five regional powers. Iran, turkey, iraq, egypt. They need to sit together to manage to find a solution for syria. One. Second, they need to agree on some principles in advance. We cannot rely on syrians. They are helpless. They cannot manage. You dont have any real united opposition to negotiate with. Some principles like integrity of syria, like the rule of majority, like free elections. Some principles, i think, iran regional powers and the world powers, they can agree upon. And then after agreeing on the princip principles, then definitely we would need a transitional period. We would need first refugees to come back. We would need billions hundreds of billions of dollars of investment for humanitarian affair. Resettling the refugees in syria. And then go to a free election supervised by United Nations. To make sure that this is a free election. And then whomever the syrians they elect, everyone should respect. Adam, thank you for that question because it enabled us to bring the argument back to the United Nations at the very end. As i told you before, im going to keep hossein here to chat with those of you who were unable to get your questions asked, to sign books. I encourage you to buy books, and i see the publisher in the back. Did you find some more books . Excellent. There are more books available. Its an excellent book. I want to thank hossein for being such a wonderful guest tonight, and all of you for asking such good questions. Well have more book tv programs coming up. Book tvs normally seen weekends on cspan2. The look at iran and the u. S. Continues with Georgetown University associate professor Matthew Kroenig whose latest book was released in may. A time to attack. The looming Iranian Nuclear threat. Thats followed by the three americans imprisoned in 2009 after hiking an the wrong side of the border and accused of being spies. They tell their story in a sliver of light. Then military historian john mcmanus on the difficulties in the days and weeks following the normandy invasion in world war ii. Tonight at 8 00 eastern on American History tv, Army Veterans tell their stories of the front lines in world war ii, including this soldier who remembers his First Encounter with a german soldier while fighting in north africa. We were fighting on a hill, 609, just beyond the pass. I went up one night to check on my company men and while i was there, there was a lot of big, big boulders on top of the mountain. Well call it a hill with a small mountain how were thinking here. And i heard this kind of scraping noise over my head, and i looked up and a german came down with a bayonet. Went right through the fleshy part here. Cut my light field jacket and fell on the ground in front of me. We had been told that the germans were picking medics off with their snipers. We lost about six of our medics, and they were shooting guys right in the head. And so we were given permission to arm ourselves. I wore a. 45 and we tookor red cross geneva crosses off over our helmets so they couldnt see us. If you killed the medics, morale goes down and the troops didnt know they didnt have anyone to take care of them. So its a situation that you really dont want to get into. So this guy fell on the ground in front of me. He got up and came at me with a bayonet. And i reached to catch the end of the gun. He pulled it back and his finger was almost cut off. And scar is still here. So he pulled back again. I was able to get my pistol out and shoot him. I wasnt scared. We had you react to your training at that kind of situation. But when he was dead, and i was standing there looking at him, i started shaking and sweating and just a weird, weird feeling. I never killed a person before and never did after that. I looked in his pockets to get identification so we could report through to both sides would do that. They could so theyd have records. I found a photograph about twoinch square. And it was a picture of him and two young ladies on there in german writie ining on the back. I found out later that was his sister and his girlfriend. I kept that old picture and i still have it some place. And i used to look at it often to remind me how terrible war is. Two young guys out there trying to kill each other. More front line stories from Army Veterans, including remembrances of dday and experiences in nazioccupied france coming up at 8 00 p. M. Eastern. At 9 10, life on the home front. Wives and children of soldiers share memories of pearl harbor, dday and fdrs death. And at 9 50, the war in sicily and italy. Author Rick Atkinson on the significance of the allied invasion of sicily and the Italian Campaign to the eventual liberation of europe. Thats all tonight on American History tv starting at 8 00 eastern. Heres a great read to add to your Summer Reading list. Cspans latest book sundays at eight. A collection of stories from the nations most influential people over the past 25 years. I always knew theres a risk and i decided to take it because whether its an illusion or not, i dont think it is. It helped my concentration. It stopped me being bored. It stopped other people being boring to some extent. It would keep me awake. Make me want the evening to go on longer and prolong the conversation, to enhance the moment. If i was asked, would i do it again, the answer is probably yes. I would have quit earlier, possibly. Hoping to get away with the whole thing. Easy for me to say, of course. Not very nice for my children to hear. It sounds irresponsible if i say, yeah, id do all that again to you. But the truth is it would be hypocritical to say no, id never touch the stuff if id known because i did know. Everyone knows. The soviet yen and the soviet system in Eastern Europe contained the seeds of its own destruction. In an attempt to control all institutions and control all parts of the economy and political life and social life. One of the problems is when you do that, when you try to control everything, then you create opposition and potential dissidence everywhere. If you tell all artists they have to paint the same way and one artist says i dont want to paint that way, i want to paint another way youve just made him into a political dissident. If you want to subsidize housing in this country and you want to talk about it and the populous agrees that its something we should subsidize, then put it on the balance sheet. And make it clear and make it evident and make everybody aware of how much its costing. But when you deliver it through these third party enterprises, fannie mae and freddie mac, when you deliver the subsidy through a Public Company with private shareholders, and executives who can extract a lot of that subsidy for themselves, that is not a very good way of subsidizing homeownership. Christopher hitchens, Ann Applebaum are a few of the engaging stories in sundays at eight. Now available at your Favorite Book seller. Georgetown University Associate professor Matthew Kroenig has written a number of books about iran. The latest is called a time to attack. The looming Iranian Nuclear threat. He says its worth trying diplomacy with iran but that the u. S. Should also be willing to take military action if iran does not comply with the agreement it signed in november 2013. This is about an hour, 15 minutes. Good evening. My name is stephanie fastler. Im the Program Director for the World Affairs director, washington, d. C. On behalf of the council, i welcome you to this author series event and World Affairs today program. In november 2013, an accord was signed in geneva between the five perminent be members of the u. N. Security council, germany and iran. This agreement was a preliminary one which would set the path for a more comprehensive deal on Irans Nuclear program and ambitions. This agreement came at a time when there was little hope for a resolution to the crisis. Both sides seemed entreached in their respected positions. However, diplomacy and negotiation conventional wisdom said, were the best ways to resolve the crisis. As the alternative, a military strike, would be catastrophic. In the six . Z months since the accord was signed, both sides have taken steps to demonstrate their commitment to the preliminary deal and to reach a new one in the future. Iran has reduced or halted its nr some of its uranium stocks and agreed, too lou International Inspectors to his facilities. The signatories have lifted some of the saunkss which have crippled irans economy. The current negotiations are a continual exercise in trust between the parties involved. Trust that irans activities will become acceptably transparent and trust the other signatories will keep their word. Given their indepth nature, what happens if these talks fail to produce the comprehensive agreement that is desired. Again, many have ruled out military action as being as bad, if not worse, than iran attaining a nuclear weapon. But what are the alternatives to diplomacy . Or the seemingly endless stalemate thats existed since november . Matthew kroenig author of a time to attack the looming Iranian Nuclear threat challenges the assumption that a military strike is out of the question. As well as some other commonly held policy wisdoms related to the iran Nuclear Program. Military action, he argues, should not be discarded as an option. Matthew kroenig is a Nuclear Proliferation specialist and internationally recognized authority on Irans Nuclear program. He has worked as a researcher and teacher at various universities in the United States. Before accepting a council on Foreign Relations International Affairs fellowship in 2010. Through the fellowship, he became an adviser an iran policy and the office of the department of the secretary of defense at the pentagon. And in 2011, a Stanton Nuclear security fellow at cfr. His previous book exporting the bomb was published in 2010. And his articles have appeared in the washington post, the national interest, and Foreign Policy. Most notable, is his february 2012 article in Foreign Affairs which became the basis for his current book. Matthew is an associate professor and the international fields chair in the department of government at Georgetown University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brent Scowcroft center on International Security at the atlantic council. Please join me in welcoming Matthew Kroenig. Well, thank you very much for that introduction, stephanie. Its a pleasure to be back here and to be back hereznhzbf about my new book a time to attack the looming Iranian Nuclear threat. Before i talk about what the book is about, id like to talk about what the book is not. The book does not argue that we should take immediate immediately action. The book does not argue the military option is the best option. Doesnt argue it should be our furst option. I think some people see the title and jump to the wrong conclusion. Rather, i argue we should solve the Iranian Nuclear challenge through diplomacy if at all possible. There are no serious experts who disagree with this position. Everyone agrees we should try to solve the problem through diplomacy. Nobody is saying to take immediate military ags. Nobody is arguing we should just give up and aquience to a Nuclear Armed iran. Since theres so much agreement an that question, however, its not really an interesting one. The more interesting question and i think from a Foreign Policy perspective, the more important question is what happens if diplomacy fails. If diplomacy fails to stop iran from Building Nuclear weapons, are we prepared to live with a Nuclear Armed iran with the threats that would pose for decades to come in and if not, are we prepared to take military action to stop iran from Building Nuclear weapons . So the argument in my book and the argument ive been making for several years is we should try to solve this through diplomacy but if diplomacy fails we should be prepared to conduct a limited military strike on irans key Nuclear Facilities. Its less bad than acquiescing to a Nuclear Armed iran and living with the threats posed by a Nuclear Armed iran for decades to come. The argument is essentially if diplomacy fails, then there will come a time to attack. The second thing the book is not is controversial. At least in my view, this argument is not controversial. Rather it simply presents the stated u. S. Policy for addressing the Iranian Nuclear challenge. President obama and other Administration Officials have said several times that a Nuclear Armed iran is unaccept annual and the United States will do whatever it takes, including use military action to stop iran from Building Nuclear weapons. So i dont believe the argument of the book at this point is controversial. There was a point when it was controversial. As stephanie mentioned in 2010, i worked as an adviser. 2010, 2011 worked as an adviser an iran policy. Thats where i first came to this conclusion. In 2012, i wrote an article in Foreign Affairs where i made this argument public for the first time. In that time it was controversial because the u. S. Government, the Obama Administration hadnt taken a public stand on this. And you had others arguing if diplomacy fails we should learn to live with a Nuclear Armed iran and learn to contain it. So when i wrote my Foreign Affairs article, many disagreed strongly with me. Opinion pieces, in public debates, including a public delay the here at the World Affairs council of washington, d. C. But then only a few weeks later, president obama came to my rescue. In march 2012, president obama gave an interview with Jeffrey Goldberg of the atlantic where he laid out his position for the first time that he would do whatever it took to prevent iran from acquiring Nuclear Weapons. That a Nuclear Armed iran was unacceptable. Our policy is not only to contain a Nuclear Armed iran but it wasnt even possible. Nuclear armed iran cannot be contained. So some people dismiss this as political rhetoric. Trying to look tough. Others question whether obamma would really be willing to do it. But his top officials, dennis ross on middle east policy for the first few years of the administration, gary seymour, his top wmd official at the white house for the first few years of the administration. Both say matter of factually that if it comes to that point, the president will be willing to use force and i quote them both in the book. So over the past two years or so, i think the establishment position on this question has done a near 180degree turn. And its shifted so much that now those who suggest that we can live with the nucleararmed iran are those dismissed as extremists. Rand paul recently got himself in political hot water just for suggesting that deterring and containing a Nuclear Armed iran should be on the table as an option. So as i see it, whats happened over the past couple of years is the Foreign Policy establishment has caught with this argument that ive been making for several years. I would like to think that my work and my arguments have played at least some part in bringing that shift about. So in some, the book is not arguing the military option. It should be the first option but should be a last resort if necessary to prevent iran from arequiring Nuclear Weapons. It presents americas stated approach for dealing with the problem. Thats enough about what the book is not. What is the book about . Well, in the back of the book, theres an endorsement from ambassador eric adelman. I admire him a lot. So im very pleased to have his endorsement. What he says an the back of the book is this is, quote, the most thorough book length examination of the issues involved in assessing the Iranian Nuclear challenge. That endorsement means a lot to me. In part because thats really what i was trying to do when i set out to write this book. Ive been thinking about the ooh rannian Nuclear Issue all day, every day for several years. I felt like i had a lot of information i wasnt able to convey in the Foreign Affairs article and other short writing and i wanted to get the information out there. Id try to write it for everyone who is interested in this issue, regardless of your political predisposition, regardless of what you thought the best way for addressing the Iranian Nuclear challenge is if you came in with an idea of what the best way is to address it. So thats what i try to do in the book. Provide a guide to the general public, policymakers, journalists, academics, anyone who wants to learn more about the Iranian Nuclear challenge. In the book, i talk about the history of Irans Nuclear program. I talk about all of the policy options available for addressing the issue. And third and finally, i talk about what the resolution of the Iranian Nuclear challenge will mean for the future of international order. So what id like to do tonight is take a little bit of time to talk about each of those three things. So first on the history. Irans Nuclear Program began with Nuclear Cooperation agreement with the United States in the 1950s. Under an adams for peace agreement. The United States helped iran set up a Nuclear Research reactor. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the United States was negotiating with the shah and the shahs government to help iran develop a Nuclear Energy program. Many people look back at this history and say, well, the United States is inconsistent if not downright hypocritical because it was willing to help the sha with his Nuclear Program back then, willing to help the shah acquire Nuclear Weapons. So it was good enough for the shah and not the mullahs. The United States has changed its position. Actually what i argue in the book is the United States has been remarkably consistent in its approach to nonproliferation with iran and elsewhere. Encourage the peaceful uses of Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Technology cincluding for nucler energy but resist its military implications. We are willing to allow them to have peaceful Nuclear Technology but not to build Nuclear Weapons. So these Peaceful Nuclear discussions with the shah came to an abrupt end in 1979 with the iranian revolution. A new government came into power. Antiamerican government really shifted. Iranian domestic politics. Irans relations with the rest of the world and with the United States. So those Nuclear Negotiations came to an end. Iran also under the shah had had peaceful gug fuful nuclear nego. At the beginning, irans new leaders werent that interested. Ile to khomeini said that acquiring Nuclear Weapons was against the tenets of islam. Hed change his mind in the 1980s. In the 1980s, iran fought a devastating war with iraq, and in the end, Saddam Hussein used debilitating weapons. At the end of the 1980s, as the war was coming to an end, the Supreme Leader changed his mind. In a letter to supporters, explaining his decision to sign a ceasefire with Saddam Hussein, something he really doesnt want to do. He called it drinking from the poisoned chalice. So bitter signing a ceasefire with his bitter enemy. But in this letter to his supporters, he said that irans military position was hopeless at the time, that he had no alternative but that he looked forward to resuming the war with, quote, atomic weapons which would be the necessity of war at that time. This is 1988 that we get an explicit interest from irans top leader in developing Nuclear Weapons. Its about that time that representatives from iran began meeting with aq khan, this pakistani scientist who was in the news about ten years ago or so. He transferred these doyourself atomic bomb kits to iran, libya and north korea. Iran got a jump start because of this pakistani scientist. Received cent ed centrifuges a centrifuge designs. The United States suspected that iran might be pursuing a Nuclear Weapons program. But all doubt was removed in 2002 when an Iranian Resistance Group Announced iran was building two secret Nuclear Facilities. Natanz and a heavy water plutonium producing at iraq. Arak. These werent the innocent technologies provided before. These were tail lor made for making material for Nuclear Weapons. So at this point the Iranian Nuclear crisis began and weve been dealing with it ever since for the past 12 years. After talking about the history of the program and i go and talk about the election of president rouhani and the interim deal struck in november that stephanie talked about. After that, i talk about where we stand today. How close it iran to having Nuclear Weapons. Does iran want Nuclear Weapons . Something i teach my undergraduates at georgetown is in order for Nuclear Weapons to happen, or Nuclear Proliferation to happen, theres a supply side and demand side. Those things have to come together. On the supply side, the country must have the ability to build Nuclear Weapons and on the demand side, the will to produce them. So in the book i go through and talk about the supply and the demand. So first lets talk about the supply. How close it iran to having a Nuclear Weapons capability . In order to build Nuclear Weapons, iran has to do three things. First it has to acquire enough fissile weapons grade fissile material to form the core of the Nuclear Device to fuel it. That can be highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Iran has to form that into an explosive device, the nuclear warhead. And third, have some way to dlufr that to an opponent. Ballistic missiles, submarine launch, Ballistic Missiles are the platforms advanced Nuclear Powers use. So some people look at that timeline, those three things and say we have years to solve this problem. But thats misleading because, really, all that matters is the first stage. And the reason thats all that matters is because right now, the United States, the International Community, if necessary, could take military action, could destroy those Nuclear Facilities to prevent iran from producing weapons grade fissile material. Once iran gets the material, the game is over. Iran can move that material anywhere. We wouldnt know where it is. Could be beyond the reach of our best bunker busting munitions. Our only option would to be pray they didnt build Nuclear Weapons. If were serious about doing whatever it takes to stop iran from Building Nuclear weapons, our real red line has to be the production of at least one bombs worth of weapons grade fissile material. So you might hear and public discussions iran is two months away or significance months away. Thats what those estimates are. Estimates for how long it would take iran to enrich enough uranium for its First Nuclear weapon. How long would it take . Best estimates are after the interim deal and after iran put these curbs in place as part of the interim deal, the best estimates are that if the Supreme Leader made the decision right now, to dash to its First Nuclear weapon it would take two to three months. Now if we get a comprehensive nuclear deal, the comprehensive deal would reduce irans capabilities, extend that timeline but not by much. A comprehensive deal pouwould extend that. Even if we get a comprehensive deal iran would be six months away and the worst case snacenao from having the ability to produce Nuclear Weapons. Iran is almost there. Iran is close to having the ability to produce Nuclear Weapons. What about on the demand side . Does iran want Nuclear Weapons . We often hear in public debates, we often hear it reported in the media that the International Community fears that iran is trying to build Nuclear Weapons. But that iran claims its only interested in a Peaceful Nuclear operation. Its kind of told as a he said she said story. What i do in the book is say lets treat this as social scientists. Im a social scientist by training. A political scientist. We have two hypotheses. One that iran wants Nuclear Energy. Two, that iran wants nuclear power. Lets look at the evidence and see what the evidence supports, which hypothesis is most consistent with the evidence. So i go through and look at the evidence and what i show is there are about 14 reasons, 14 things that iran is doing that makes absolutely no sense for an energy program. And really only makes sense to build Nuclear Weapons. And this makes sense given irans strategic goals. Iran explicitly says its goals are to first continue to for this regime to continue to exist. To protect this theocratic regime. That it wants to deter foreign attack, deter an attack from israel or from the United States. N third, irans leaders say that they want iran to be the most dominant state in the middle east. So if those are your goals, acquiring Nuclear Weapons makes a lot of sense. Acquiring Nuclear Weapons allows you to deter foreign attack because you can threaten to ee retaliate. Having a Nuclear Energy program, having a few Nuclear Facilities, dont help you to do those things. So in short, i believe irans leaders want Nuclear Weapons and they are close to having them. So we have a problem. What are the various options for addressing the problem . I see really three options ad the most viable. First, diplomacy. Second, deterring and containing a Nuclear Armed iran or third, tacking military action. I think these are really the only three options. But before i get to those options, i have a chapter on what i call the nonstarters. Options sometimes people put forward but that really wont work because some look at the three real options and say, well, diplomacy may not work but these other two options of deterrence and containment seem really bad. What are other ways people have suggest ed suggested . Some say maybe stop it through covert action. Continue to don conduct cyberattacks and and there have been these assassinations of Iranian Nuclear scientists. So maub ybe we can just keep do stuff like that. Maybe that will stop iran. But what i show in the book is these kind of mysterious activities and accidents have been happening to Irans Nuclear program for years. But every three months if you look at the iaea reports, irans capabilities continue to increase. Despite all this stuff thrown at them, their program advances. Its possible that their program would have advanced more precipitously if it hadnt been for this stuff but that also shows that on its own, covert action will not be enough. Some people argue we can have a japan model. The japan model option is that like japan, maybe iran could have an advanced nuclear capability. Essentially have everything it needs to build Nuclear Weapons if it wanted to. Be a screwdrivers turn or two away but that iran wont do it. Iran wont turn the final two screws and wed just live with it. I argue thats not a serious option either because these really noption to believe that iran would stop short. Once they were a screwdriver or two away, once its not a point the west could not physically stop it, theres no reason to believe iran would refrain from building weapons. The japan model very quickly would become the north korea model. A third, what about regime chaunge. Some argue regime change is an option. Usually people arent talking about george w. Bushstyle regime chaunge where we invade the country but just wait this government out. This government cant stay in power forever. Maybe some kind of new revoluti revolution. Maybe a new power that will be more willing to deal with us on the Nuclear Program. And argue that that would be nice if we could get it but theres really no sign this government is going to fall any time soon. And the Nuclear Clock is ticking much faster than the regime change clock. So well have to make difficult decisions on how to deal with the Nuclear Program before any new government comes to power. So having dismissed the nonstarters, i get into the serious options. The first is diplomacy. And so as i said at the outset, if we could solve this diplomat cattily that would be by far the best option. The longest chapter in the book is on diplomacy. Contrary to this idea that some have jumped to that i give short shrift to diplomacy or argue the military option is the best option. So i talk about the history of negotiations with iran from 2002 up until the interim deal. I talk about the various designs of possible comprehensive deals. I talk about kind of ideal deal in which iran would have no enrichment capability whatsoever. Which would be the best deal point of view. And then this limited enrichment deal which is what it seems were currently pursuing and talk about advantages of that and talk about some of the disadvantages of that. I think there are some real disadvantages as i pointed out. It would still leave iran only six months away from a Nuclear Weapons 7sbreakout capability. So i argue i also talk about a diplomatic plan b. Even if this round of negotiations break down, we wouldnt necessarily have to resort immediately to military force. It would depend on irans behavior after that. So if iran dashed immediately to build Nuclear Weapons wed have two to three months as i talked about before. But its also possible perhaps even more likely that iran would instead of dashing immediately to a nuclear weapon, go back to the approach it was pursuing last summer before rouhani was elected. Slowly building up its capabilities, putting more centrifuges online, increasing stockpiles of low echb riched uranium. That would shrink that dash time. In which case wed have a year or so before we had to take military action. So i talk about a diplomatic plan b to engage in coercive diplomacy to get iran back to the table. Try one last time to solve it diplomatically. We also need to be realistuc. We hope dip llomacy will work b it may not. The chance of a comprehensive deal is, quote, no better than 50 50. His former wmd adviser who i mentioned before puts the chances at closer to zero. And so there has been some optimism expressed in recent weeks but theres still a sizable chance that we wont be able to get a comprehensive deal. Moreover, even if we get a comprehensive deal it wouldnt necessarily solve the situation. It leaves iran perennially six months away from a Nuclear Weapons capability. If we get this comprehensive deal, declare an end to the Iranian Nuclear crisis, people will stop worrying about iran, the economic pressure will be lifted. Trade will resume. World leaders will start focusing on other issues. And in that environment it would be tempting for iran to cheat an the agreement and potentially build back up its Nuclear Capabilities and dare the International Community to try to respond. After all it took us ten years to build the sanctions regime we currently have in place. If that were dismantled, it would be very hard to reassemble that and put pressure back on o iran. I think theres a reasonable chance iran would try toniq sne out or build Nuclear Weapons. So if diplomacy doesnt work, if because we cant get a comprehensive deal or get a deal but it breaks down, what happens next . So this gets to the what is worse question . One option would be to give up and aquiitose a Nuclear Armed iran. Allow iran to have Nuclear Weapons. A Nuclear Armed iran, almost everyone agrees, that it would pose a grave threat to International Peace and security. First, i think it would lead to the further proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the middle east. And we shouldnt exaggerate this. I dont think every country in the region would immediately have Nuclear Weapons. But i think that over the course of 10, 20 years or so, at least one or two other countries would acquire Nuclear Weapons in response. Maybe saudi arabia, egypt, turkey. And so some of you might be saying, one or two countries in 10 or 20 years doesnt sound too bad. That will be cold comfort if were in the middle of a crisis. I hope to be around and kicking 10 or 20 years from now. Probably many of you do, too, as well. It would lead to proliferation in the region and also proliferation around the world. I think iran would be at risk of becoming nuclear supplier. And my first book, a book that stephanie mentioned is called exporting the bomb. System analysis yf countries have exported sensitive Nuclear Material in the past and all the Research Suggests iran would be at risk of doing that. Transferring uranium enrichment to other countries in latin america and asia so it could lead to the further proliferation of Nuclear Weapons around the world that way. And in this environment, when theres proliferation in the region, proliferation around the world, i think the global nonproliferation regime more broadly would be weakened. Countries would see that the great powers, the United States wasnt serious about enforcing nonproliferation. I think the regime could collapse and lead to widespread proliferation. Second, i think that iran would be emboldened and become more aggressive in its Foreign Policy in the region. We know that iran restrains its Foreign Policy because it fears Major Military retaliation from israel or from the United States. But if it had Nuclear Weapons it could feel emboldened to push harder. Deter Major Military retaliation with its Nuclear Weapons through the threat of nuclear retaliation, step up its support to terrorist and prox i groups, engage in more aggressive course of diplomacy, achieving its goal of becoming the most dominant state in the middle east which it wants to do. So in this scenario, you could imagine the middle east becoming an even more crisis prone region. In a crisis prone region with a Nuclear Armed iran, israel, United States, potentially other Nuclear Armed states, wed have Nuclear Crises every few years and a potential for nuclear war. I dont think irans leaders are suicidal. I dont think theyll cake up and say today is a good day for nuclear war but i think iran will have geopolitical conflicts of interest with other states, other Nuclear Armed states. Theyll get into high stakes crises like the United States and the soviet union did during the cold war. And in these high stakes crises theres always the rusk of things spinning out of control and nuclear exchange. Some people look back at the cold war and think, Nuclear Deterrence works. I look back and think we were incredibly lucky to avoid an exchange. So if theres an arms race in the middle east, that would be a place there would be danger for a nuclear exchange. So nuclear xange in the region could mean the end of the state of israel. Its a very small state. I think israels leaders arent exaggerating when they say for them this is an exstensial issue. Once they have weapons capable of reaching the east coast of the United States which the United States department of defense estimates could happen as soon as next year could result in a Nuclear Attack on the u. S. Homeland. So a lot of threats posed by Nuclear Armed iran. The United States wouldnt just accept these threats. Wed put in place a strategy to deal with it. A deterrence and containment strategy like we did against the soviet union during the cold war. But this would require a major increase of u. S. Political and military commitments to the middle east. So it would likely require signing formal defense agreements with our allies and partners in the region. Signing formal treaties with saudi arabia, with other gulf states. Perhaps with israel. So lets call a spade a spade. This would be the United States promising to fight a nuclear war on saudi arabias behalf on gulf states behalf on israels behalf. Would the United States really be willing to trade new york for paris . Fight a nuclear war if france were attacked . This would mean people would be asking, would the United States be willing to trade new york for riyadh . Fight a nuclear war that risks new york if riyadh is attacked . So in some ways this is an incredible threat to increase the crediblity of the threat wed do things during the cold war and east asia. Forward deploy u. S. Forces, forward deploy u. S. Nuclear weapons to make it clear to iran that any attack would potenti potentially result in a nuclear retaliation. Wed likely have to help israel develop secure second strike capabilities. One of the risks of nuclear war would come about because its likely iran and israel may think they have first strike advantages. Helping israel to understand that it has a secure second strike capability, helping it acquire submarine launch capablities, make sure its muclear arsenal was survivable. And so this would be a costly strategy, require major increase of commitments and its not like iran would have Nuclear Weapons for one day. This strategy would have to remain in place for decades as long as iran was hostile to the United States. And i think even with that strategy we couldnt deal with many of the threats posed by Nuclear Armed iran. With the deterrence and containment we could deter iran from purposely starting a nuclear war. Deter them from purposely transferring Nuclear Weapons to terrorist groups but many of the other threats we couldnt deal with with that strategy. Its likely iran would transfer sensitive Nuclear Technology. Would we be willing to fight a nuclear war with iran because it transferred uranium Enrichment Technology . Probably not. I think we couldnt deter iran from being emboldened. I think iran would become more aggressive even with the deterrence and containment regime. And we cant deter accidental or Inadvertent Nuclear War in a high stakes crisis. So its deterring and containing Nuclear Armed iran is not a good option. President bush and president obama didnt agree on a lot in Foreign Policy. But they both agree that a Nuclear Armed iran is unacceptable. So if thats the case if a Nuclear Armed iran is unacceptable if diplomacy fails, that leaves us with one option, the military option. It isnt a good option either. There are many rinks. The question is, is it worse or better than deterrence and containment if diplomacy fails . So first i talk about the Israeli Military option. Many people when they think of the military option think that israel would do it, not the United States. The problem with the Israeli Military option is they simply dont have the capabilities to destroy irans key Nuclear Facilities. Four key Nuclear Facilities. Two above ground. Israel could destroy those. Two facilities below ground. Israel might be able to get one of the facilities, the natanz facilities with bunker busting bombs the United States has provided but even with those bombs theres no way they could get the one buried under 295 feet of rock. The israeli option is not a good option. Thats one thing that both hawks and doves in the United States agree on. The Israeli Military option is not a good one. Of the u. S. Military option is much better. Because the United States has the cape blity to destroy key Nuclear Facilities. This would set Irans Nuclear program back. Its tough to estimate mao muho time it would buy. Some estimates range three to seven years. Once iran decides to immediately rebuild and doesnt encounter sig enough kant obstacles. If you assume that politics and geopolitics happens, that timeline becomes much longer. One of the things i talk about in the book as i look at the four countries historically who have had their Nuclear Facilities attacked, nazi germany during world war ii, iran during the iran iraq war. Iraq had facilities attacked during the iran iraq war. The israelis followed up with a strike of its own and the United States and the coalition followed up with strikes of their own. And jair syria had its Nuclear Reactor attacked from israel. In all those cases the countries conducting the attacks thought theyd only bee a limited amount of time. Unforeseen events completely unimaginable at the time came to pass that prevented those countries from developing Nuclear Weapons. None of those countries have nuclearmd. Le weapons today. So at a minimum, a u. S. Strike would buy a few years but its much more likely that politics and geopolitics would happen and iran couldnt acquire Nuclear Weapons in a meaningful time frame. There are rinks. Iranian military retaliation. But its um portent not to exaggerate those. Many people argue it would lead many people argue that it would lead to world war iii or a broader region of war, and as i talk about in the book, its really hard to imagine how that would play out. So first you need to focus on iranian capabilities. Iran doesnt have a conventional military to speak of. Rather they have been investing in these a sim metric capabilities, Ballistic Missiles, ties to terrorist proxy groups and the navy they could use to cause problems in the persian gulf. Thats what iran could do. It could conduct Ballistic Missile attacks, it could sponsor terrorist attacks and harass and attack ships in the persian gulf. But we also have to ask, what would iran do . Put yourselves in the shoes of irans Supreme Leader. You wake up one morning and your Nuclear Facilities have been destroyed but your country is intact, your government is intact. Your foremost plan is to protect your regime. What do you do . On one hand, you would have to strike back to some degree. You would look like a wimp if you didnt strike back. You would look like a wimp domestically and internationally. On the other hand, you wouldnt want to start a fullscale war with the United States, the one country that could ensure your military is destroyed, ensure that your regime is destroyed. And so most Iranian Military analysts assess that in the event of a strike, irans Supreme Leader would aim for a calibrated response. Would try to strike back, but not too hard. I think we could play on irans fears. In fact, in the book i talk about a strategy the United States could use to try to mitigate some of the negative consequences of a strike. One of the things i talk about is we could issue a threat to irans leaders, their public leader through various back channels and make it very clear if it gets to this point, were only interested in destroying the Nuclear Facilities, not overthrowing the regime or invading the country, but if iran strikes back too hard, if it closes the strait, conducts a major terrorist attack in the United States or other things we simply couldnt live with, then we would be willing to escalate the conflict. I think in that way we could play on what many people believe is the Supreme Leaders inclination, anyway, and trade essentially Irans Nuclear program, what president obama has called one of the leading security challenges to the country for a calibrated iranian retaliation. So thats not a good option. Were still dealing with taking military action against another country, another country retaliating. So what about this what is worse question . So what i do in the book, the penultimate chapter compares these two options side by side. There are many ways to do this. The way i do it is identify 12 of americas most Important National security objectives. The United States wants to protect the homeland, the United States wants to prevent Nuclear Proliferation, combat national terrorism, protect our allies. I list 12 of these kinds of interests. Then i go through and compare the two scenarios. A military strike on iran or deterring and containing a nuclear iran and ask how they affect these various interests. And one of the things i show, there are several interests that are clearly better protected by a strike. Nuclear proliferation, for example, i think is clearly protected by a strike. There are many other options that appear to be pure tossups. The United States would like to, in a sense that its unclear which option better protects the interest. For example, the United States would like to maintain regional stability in the middle east. A strike is clearly worse for stability in the shortterm, taking military action against another country in retaliation. But theres a good argument to be married that over the long term, acquiescing to a nucleararmed iran would be worse. As iran becomes boldened, its really hard to say which option is better for protecting regional stability. What becomes clear, though, is there is clearly not a special interest better protected in both the short term and the long term by acquiescing to iran. In fact, i tell a story about when i was working as an adviser on iran policy and i did a major briefing on this issue to Senior Defense and civilian military leaders at the pentagon. And defense officials like to receive their information in powerpoint slides so the final slide in the presentation a chart showing these two options and showing across these various interests. These two options and showing across these interests, interests that were approved in a various scenario were colored green, interests that remained roughly the same, kind of were neutral, were colored yellow, and interests that were harmed in a particular scenario were colored orange or red depending on their levels of severity. Two things stood out to everybody in the room. First, there wasnt a lot of green. A lot of orange and red. These werent good options. But the second thing that stood out to everybody in the room was the nuclear iran wasnt on the was noticeably darker of the military strike side of the chart. So the military strike, the risks of a military strike paled in comparison. The official looked me in the eye and said, if youre right, this is a nobrainer. And i think thats correct. I think they are bad options, we should try to solve this diplomatically, but if it gets to the point of choosing, conducting a strike on key Nuclear Facilities is less bad than living with threats posed by nuclear iran for years to come. So when the Obama Administration makes the statements that well do what it takes, i think its just bluster. I think its based on sound analysis and i think its whats in the best interest of the country. Ill just finish up by telling a short story. In 2006 i was in singapore for a conference, a scenario planning conference so there were academics, journalists, policy makers from asia, europe, the United States. And this conference was we consider these various scenarios for future states of the world and the idea was to think creatively, to have new in insights, and take them back into our day jobs. And one of the scenarios centered around a Global Financial crisis. Now remember, this is 2006. So we had all these educated people in the room, all these people closely followed the international economy. International politics. And the session was a complete bust. Everybody in the room said, you know, this is just implausible. We havent had a crisis like this since the great depression. We have learned our lesson, have enlightened policies in place. Its interconnected, globalized. So theyre willing to stretch their minds but this was going too far. Global financial crisis, simply impossible. And then, of course, Global Financial crisis hit the very next year. Of so i fear that we the Expert Community and also the general public are in danger of being similarly pollyannaish about nuclear war. I have decided to spend the first ten years or so of my academic career studying Nuclear Proliferation, because i do believe that Nuclear Proliferation poses a threat to peace and National Security. I look at the cold war and dont say wow, deterrence works. I think wow, we were lucky to avoid a nuclear exchange. So are we willing to bet the security of the international system, the security of the country, on the argument that something hasnt happened in 70 years, therefore it will never happen again. I for one as somebody who has spent a lot of time thinking about Nuclear Weapons would be surprised if Nuclear Weapons arent used again sometime in my lifetime. And i think if iran acquires Nuclear Weapons, leading potentially to an arms race in the region in response, i think that would be one of the prime candidates for the next nuclear war, potentially even one that could result in an attack on the United States. So we often say the Nuclear Proliferation poses one of the greatest threats to International Peace and security. We often say it poses one of the greatest threats to the United States. If thats the case, we have to do what it takes to stop it. In principle, military strikes on Nuclear Facilities and proliferating states has to be one of the tools in our tool box. So i think if it gets to that point and the United States must take tough action against iran, i think this would be consistent with americas approach to International Security over the past century. The United States has often been called upon to take tough action, to deal with threats to International Security. And the result, i think, has been the General International stability and prosperity for much of the international system. And i think dealing with Iranian Nuclear challenge is no different. And now is not the time to shirk our responsibilities. So thank you. [applause] and if you would, please, identify yourself and if you are with an organization. My name is andrew iva and im with the freedom for sudan committee. Also have a free beluch stand facebook group. I appreciate your nondefeatist and nonappeasement presentation. But other than the military option or the leave it alone option, the two you spelled out, mayor degan who ran antiiran operations for assad came to washington to present a third option, an option which he came to the white house first, tried to convince them, was frustrated and then he went on 60 minutes and presented it as what i call the degan option, where empowering the democratic or profreedom forces in sudan. I paged through your book. You do refer to tangentially supporting the opposition. You mentioned covert operations or regime change. But really, the full idea, the rich idea of empowering people fighting to be free is something we, the United States, have not been good at, and i think or its not in our culture. Either our military or state department or cia culture, and i think this is a third option that i would just like to throw at you. The one time we tried it when congress and the grassroots revolted against the cias betrayal of the Afghan Resistance in the 1980s, i was involved in that. We won. We forced the soviets to resistance, they withdrew with our help, and that led to six warpacked countries and 60 soviet republics going free. Thats what Southeast Asia needs, not just iran but a new regimes down in that corner. So i would like to throw that at you and get your comment on it. Thank you. Good question. So i talk a little bit in the book about the iranian election in 2009, because in the summer of 2009, and as youll recall, this is when ahmadinejad was elected for a second term. He was running against this Green Movement, and many iranians, when it was announced that ahmadinejad had won, thought they had been robbed. They thought that the Green Movement had actually won the election, so many iranians turned out to the streets in protest. There were many days of protest. You probably remember. And at that time, the administrations position was to keep a low profile. Because when the Obama Administration came in, they wanted to try this they had this dual track approach, as i talk about in the book, pressure and engagement. They started out on the engagement track and they thought reaching out to iran, by showing they were different than the bush administration, they were willing to engage in diplomacy that that would help iran. So the election in 2009, the Green Movement takes to the streets and the Obama Administrations first inclination was lets stay silent on this. We need the government as a partner in these Nuclear Negotiations, we dont want to embarrass them. And i think that was a mistake. I think the United States should have stood up for more open movement in iran. But we lost our opportunity, i think. After 2009, the Green Movement was demoralized. Many of them moved overseas or in prison. And we saw in 2013, i think i think what the election of 2013 just last summer shows, the Iranian Regime is as strong as ever now from the regimes point of view. So Hassan Rowhani was elected who was granted more moderate within the system. But hes still a regime insider. He was still on the slate of people approved by the Supreme Leader, so they passed without protest to a handpicked candidate of the Supreme Leader. So i think what that election shows is that the current government is Even Stronger than it was in 2009. So i think that the United States is doing some things to encourage democracy. In iran there have been some reports about the United States providing information technology, that we potentially allow opposition movements in iran to communicate, to organize. So i think there are some steps in that direction and we potentially could do more. But i think we still have the same problem i talked about in the opening remarks which is the current government is Strong Enough now that its really hard for me to see how they fall in time for it to solve the Nuclear Problem for us. Were engaged in these y my name is sam thompson i used to work at the state department with gary by the way on nonproliferation. I was disturbed by the title of your book and then was more encouraged as you progressed and indicated that you were favorably disposed in diplomatic efforts but then as i listen to you you are pretty cynical about the diplomatic efforts and you say even if we proceed down that path of diplomatic efforts. Thats my first point. Secondly, why arent you as concerned about north korea as you are about iran . Whats the big difference here . Weve come to accept that north korea has Nuclear Weapons. Theyll eventually they can hit our allies now with missiles and they have Nuclear Weapons to do it with. So weve gotten used to having that situation, but for some reason with iran, its totally unacceptable. I gather that the wild card there is israel, but id like your thoughts on that. And finally, i didnt think you really paid enough attention to some of the other detrimental effects if we did attack. Iran will certainly go full force forward with a Nuclear Weapons program. Any doubt that that was going to be the case will be removed. That will be a prime objective. And secondly, this would unite the iranian people behind the government. And i think thats a huge disadvantage. I didnt hear you address that. Thank you. Thank you very much. So first, you said that i antage poopooed the diplomatic option, i think is the language you used. To be absolutely clear, i do think the diplomatic option is the best option, but i think we have to be realistic. Solutel there is a good chance that we wont get a comprehensive deal. Thiident obama says less than 5050. And as i said, its possible ea that even if we get a deal, thaa would unravel. So i think even a better chancea that diplomacy wont solve the problem. But i do think we should pursue it because one of the advantagea of a military strike is it buys time, but diplomacy also buys ee time. I as long as were negotiating, av long as this interim deal is in place, iran is not making that final dash to a nuclear weapon, and if we get a comprehensive i deal, its going to mean, i think, that the International Community needs to maintain laser focus on iran essentially forever to make sure that it doesnt detect an attempt to dso break out and then respond to an attempt to break out. So i think its fragile, but ass long as we can keep that in place, we are delaying Irans Nuclear capability, and i think thats a good thing. So, again, i think its the best way forward. I just think we have to be realistic that its probably not a permanent solution in my mind, but we can use it to buy time and should use it to buy time. St second, on north korea, i think the main difference between iran sed north korea is in north ca korea its already too late. They are estimated to have six a to a dozen Nuclear Weapons, buta we dont know where they are so we dont really have a military option there. North we did have a military option in 1994. Ont h many people in the united av states, president clinton id seriously considered a strike on north korea in 1994. Many people advocated for it. And some of those people who ste advocated for it have said in recently that they were right, d that we should have taken action in 1994, that north korea has led to many problems in the pase ten years, and if we had taken action we wouldnt have to deal with those. So north korea has transferred 1 Nuclear Technology, its helped syria build a reactor, they y attacked a south korean war t e ship, shelled a south korean island. North korea is engaged in Nuclear Threats against our allies which makes ensuring ouru allies much harder. Engaged and even engaged in Nuclear Threats against us. You might remember they threatened East Los Angeles and austin, texas, of all places, and a few other things. T so i think if north korea hall thinired Nuclear Weapons, we would have to worry about that. Iran would likely engage in Nuclear Threats and we havent seen the full range of me consequences in a Nuclear Armed north korea. Its less than ten years. Ghbor 2006 was our first test so we could still have a nuclear war involving north korea. 10 the main difference is its not too late for iran. N still its too late for north korea. Ln we can do something about iran. In terms of the costs of takinge military action, there are a lot of costs and i only have 30. Minutes or so here and go into d other costs in the book, so i would encourage you to look at that. And and so you said if there is any doubt that iran would build tht Nuclear Weapons presently, that strike would convince them to go all the way. Many people make that argument. my view and what i argue in the book is i think iran has already code that decision. And theres no way really to wy explain their behavior over the. Past ten years, except if they have decided to build Nuclear Weapons. The Supreme Leader has been building up this program for cie decades. Its kind of, i think, naive for us to think he hasnt thought long and hard about what hes doing and what he intends to do with it. Len the second thing i point out inh the book is that if that is a concern, that can be mitigated completely by the timing of a strike. If we strike tomorrow night, then there is a danger that if theyre somewhat on the fence, p that would change their mind. But what i argue in the book, but we should also time it according to what the red lines are. If iran is proposing this ghng material that is the red line for us, thats when we should a take military action. If iran is enriching to 90 , if mian kicks out iae inspectors, then at that point we know if i theyre dashing to a nuclear weapon, so taking military action will be the only thing that even creates the possibility of a nonnuclear outcome. Uniting the iranian people, i think thats almost certain tha in the short term it would create a rally around the flag effect, that the regime would become more popular. But a rally around the flag flg tends to be shortlived. And many people who understand domestic politics much k better than me. I come at this from a u. S. Military strategy, foreign tanda National Security strategy point of view, but those who know it really well say it will create o a rally around the flag effect in the short term. W domest but over the long time, it will create opportunities for opposition figures to criticize the government for mismanaging the problem to that point that e it led to an armed attack on thn country, that it led to iran un having its Nuclear Program destroyed. To