Transcripts For CSPAN3 Fall Of The Japanese Empire 20150901

9th, prior to the official nagasaki ceremony, we go to a private ceremony at the Elementary School. And all the children who now attend the Elementary School come there and have a special peace commemoration ceremony. Its a very, very moving ceremony with this school filled with Elementary School students. And you realize that that is who the victims of the atomic bomb were. After the war, congregants of the Unitarian Church here in washington, d. C. Send art supplies to students at hunkowa Elementary School in hiroshima. And the students there use the art supplies at a time when there were very little supplies of any sort in hiroshima or nagasaki after the bombing. You see so many reports of the students visiting street urchins, basically. They were or fans. They didnt have shelter, had to put up these makeshift shelters that they lived in. So the fact of just getting art supplies was a huge thing for these kids. And so in gratitudes, they sent back drawings and paintings to the congregation and also the church. I understand these were lost for a long time and rediscovered. And now the members of the church, some of them went back to hiroshima recently and met with some of the kids. It was a very nice book and documentary by my friend about this. [ speaking Foreign Language ]. I thought it would add a nice touch to the exhibit, you know, more of a human side in a different way of americans who reached out to the people in hiroshima and of the gratitude on the part of the children who received those gifts. The marukis were famous japanese art aists who came into the city of hiroshima three days after the atomic bombing and saw the horrors and decided to do a series of panels that would depict the horrors of hiroshima. The first one was called ghost and what it shows is the image of hiroshima afterwards. People who experienced it said that they felt as if they were walking through hell. With fires everywhere, people naked, walking usually with their arms held in front of them to lessen the pain a little bit. Often their skin hanging down. Peoples clothes were blown off by the blast and the fire and people were mostly walking in this procession of naked people. Some said you couldnt tell men from women as they were walking. And you see this image here, the shock, the horror, the suffering in hiroshima after the bombings. The second panel we have here is called fire. It shows the reality is that the fire was everywhere and spreading rapidly and people tried to escape the fire. But escaping the fire meant this is the reality for so many of the survivors, it meant that they would have to leave others behind. They would have to ignore the cry, the help, the pleas from people who were trapped in their houses, people who were trapped under beams, people who were injured in order to escape. There were so many tragic stories about how children leaving their parents behind or parents leaving their children behind in order to escape when the flames were encroaching and many stories we know about people staying with relatives and friends rather than leave. And the folks at the gallery told me i could choose any six of the 15 panels that i wanted. And i decided i wanted to complicate the narrative. Not just portray the japanese as victims of the atomic bomb, but to put it in a different context and show that it was possible for the japanese to be victims of the atomic bombs, but victimizers at the same time. So i wanted two panels that were going to show that. And the first one here is called crows. This one, you have to realize that in hiroshima that day, august 6th, there were 3 let you know,000 citizens, 43,000 japanese soldiers and 45,000 korean slave laborers. And the koreans were badly treated by the japanese and had been for decades. And they were discriminated against in japan and they were also discriminate against after the atomic bombing. They got almost no medical treatment, no aid at all, and many of them just died in the streets. And what this shows is the crows. This one is called crows. And it shows the crows coming down and plucking out the eyeballs of the dead korean victims here. Its very controversial inside japan right now. Shinzo abe and his administration is doing everything they can to cover up the japanese atrocities towards the citizens of korea, the citizens of china, the other victims across asia of japanese oppression, so i want to show that part of it, too. And i also wanted this one to complicate it further. This was about the inherent p. O. W. S. There were p. O. W. S in a camp in hiroshima. 23 of them were at least in the bombing. Many of them survived the atomic bombing only to be beaten to death by enraged japanese citizens. And this shows the americans who were beaten to death by the japanese after the bomb was dropped. Theres something and im not sure exactly why, but maruki has depicted several women among the american p. O. W. S. There were actually no women there. So this to me is somewhat baffling, why they chose to do so. But what were seeing here is the progression. In the beginning, they focus just on japanese victims in hiroshima. Then they begin expanding and they start to show the japanese as victimizers and they show the theyve got one panel on the ra pe of nanjing. They have one on auschwitz. Theyre trying to make this a broader human story. This was done in 1968. The title is floating lanterns. If you go to hiroshima, as i do with my students, we participate in the evening of august 6th. We participate every year in whats called the floating lantern ceremony in the river there. The river is very symbolically important because so many of the people jump in the river in order to try to escape the flames or to cool their bodies if theyve been badly burned and many of them died. All of these descriptions of it is river that night was that it was just a sea of floating corpses. And what the people did in hiroshima to commemorate is they hold the lantern ceremony every year and were now able to participate. Its no longer restricted to the families of the victims. So what you do is you make a paper lantern. You put a candle inside. On the lantern, you write a mess aenl of peace or anything youd like to write. Then you go down, you take the turn, you get the long line that runs around. And you put your floating lantern into the water there. Its very, very beautiful at night. One year when i went there, yoyo mott was playing. That made it even more special. This is a depiction of the lanterns as theyre floating in the river. The cspan cities tour, this weekend were joined by Charter Communications to learn more about the history and literary life of Grand Junction, colorado. The mining of a certain mineral had a longterm importance in this part of colorado. All over the colorado plateau, and especially here in mesa county, outside of Grand Junction, we are surrounded by morrison rock. And within the morrison, we find a lot of dinosaur bones, we find a lot of fossils. Thats intrigued scientists for a long time. But the other thing we also find in the morrison is a mineral, a rock called carnatite. It contains three different elements. It contains radium, which is radioactive and used by marie curry to help solve and fight cancer. It also contains venadium, which is used to strerchkten steal. So during the build up to world war ii and during world war ii, venadium was very valuable. It contains uranium. Uranium is one of the best sources for atomic power and atomic weapons. Colorado congressman wayne aspeno was largely responsible for this Land Development through its water legislation. He fought the battle to reserve water for western colorado by making sure that we got our fair share. How did he do that . Beginning in his state career and going on to his federal career, he climbed up the ladder of seniority and was able to a exercise, i think, more power than you might normally have. Certainly in the United States congress, where he was able to make sure colorado and western colorado would be treated fairley in any divisions of water. His first major success was the passage of the Colorado River storage project in 1956. See all of our programs from Grand Junction saturday at a 7 00 p. M. Eastern on cspan2s book tv. And sunday afternoon at oclock on American History tv on cspa cspan3. Recently, American History tv was at the organization of american historians annual meeting in st. Louis, missouri. We spoke with professors, authors, and graduate students about their research. This interview is about 20 minutes. Naoko wake, an assistant professor at Michigan State university. Please tell us about your research with japanese americans who were in hiroshima and nagasaki in 1945. Sure. Yes, i am doing the historical investigation of japanese american and a handful of koreanamericans as well who were born in the states, but happen to be in either hiroshima or nagasaki in 1945 at the end of world war ii when the bomb was dropped on the cities of hiroshima and nagasaki. And their numbers are not huge, but substantial. There were somewhere between 20 to 30,000 asian americans, mostly japaneseamericans of the second generations, but Third Generations as well who were in japan. Actually, i should say in hiroshima. Because actually, hiroshima as a prefecture is the area in japan of the time who had sent the largest number of japanese emigrants to america before the war started. So the 19teens, 20s and 30s. Out of those 20,000 people, there were about 3,000 people, japaneseamericans who survived the bomb in hiroshima, and then later on decided to come to america, beginning in 1947. Because america is obviously where they were born and grew up in. Their history is very fascinating, although its being relatively little known. Fascinating in that it really changes our perception of survivors as japanese citizens, or people who are loyal to japan as an empire at that time. In that they were both victors and victims at the same time. The japanese americans who were in hiroshima and nagasaki, why were they there . So there are a few reasons why they are there. One thing i really like to emphasize is thats what many immigrants do, to go back and forth. They may be born and living in america, and yet their grandparents might still be back in japan. That was actually the case with most of the people i studied about. They might have been just visiting their grandparents because just they want to see them. Or maybe some of them were ill, so they wanted to see them before they passed away. So there are family reasons why they were there. Other reasons i can mention is that there are some concern about japanese american parents, first generation immigrants, who wanted to give their children the best education possible. And they realized given the race relation, especially in u. S. West coast in 1930s, america was not the best place to give them education. So they decided to bring their children back to japan so they could receive the best education, including education about japanese language and culture. Those things are really important for immigrants families to maintain. So educational purposes as a reason. Another reason i like to mention is that there was a fear among japanese and japaneseamerican residents toward end of the 30s in america that there may be some violence or mass incarceration once the war started between america and japan. So they decided to leaf america to avoid such a fate. Many of them happen to be in hiroshima and nagasaki, and thats how they became survivors. Is there a name for the japanese people use for those who survived the bombings . Yes. You were talking about hibakusha. Its literally people who are exposed or received radiations or the bomb. Yes. Its a commonly used term among japanese people, but also among american historians of the bomb, its frequently used. This term would apply to the japanese americans who were in hiroshima and nagasaki at the time. Correct. After the bombs were dropped, what happened to the japanese americans . What was their situation . Immediately after the explosion, i think their situation was very comparable to many other survivors, regardless of their nationality. Obviously, the devastation was just simply overwhelming. But as part of my work, i have been conducting oral history interviews with those u. S. Survivors. And one thing i am very fascinated by is how their National Belonging to both japan and america came out very strongly. Even as they tried to respond to the devastation in 1945. To give you an example, there are some japanese American Family members who lost each other. So they didnt know where they were. I mean, they really spent a lot of time looking for each other. One survivor, u. S. Survivor, i talked to, she was a young girl at the time. Unfortunately, her sister died of the bomb. Her family couldnt locate her body or even know whether or not she was still alive for three days in hiroshima. The family looked around and looked around. Finally, at the end of the third day, they were able to find her sister. The way they found out the sisters body was that, first of all, she was on the top of the corpses, so they were able to see her. Otherwise, it would have been rather difficult to identify the bodies of the sister. But also, more importantly, sisters body was still with the american underwear, which was made in america. The family was very much used to seeing. Because i think the immigrants life before the war, it was very common practice for japaneseamerican families to share the bedroom among the family members. Sometimes, among siblings. Other times between parents and children. It was sort of japanese style of sleeping that they transplanted in america. Because of those family lives and intimate contact, it brought to their daytoday experiences, they were able to recognize that. Thats because it was made in america. Thats because something the family members are exposed to in prewar family life in america. They were able to identify this persons body as her sisters. In many ways, it is unsettling stories. We tend to, again, think of bomb attacking japanese nationals. People of japan who at least had allegiance to japan as a nation. Yet, it really destabilized it, in that this person was not only had a cultural affinity and in many cases national sense of National Belonging to america at the same time as being from japan. The japanese americans who spoke english, were they able to have better access to assistance . Especially medical assistance afterwards . By the u. S. Army, you mean. I think in many ways, the immediate need for medical assistance was not met by anybody. Not only american medical assistance, but also japanese medical institutions and personnels were incapable of offering any support. I think at that level, their ability to be able to communicate in english was not really in any way the quality that benefitted them. I think after a while, they were able to work more for u. S. Occupational forces and their institutions, because of that not only the language ability but the ability to Cross Cultural boundaries. I can remember one survivor who was born in the u. S. And, of course, his english was good because of that. That was the primary language of communication for him. But he was bombed in hiroshima. Then he was looking for a job, obviously, after people started to pick up pieces and tried to reconstruct their lives. He was not actually interested in working for u. S. Occupational forces at the time. He was accompanying his japanese friend who was interested in having a job for, i think it was, i cant remember exactly which branch of the American Occupational forces that he was looking a job in. But this americanborn person was going with him. Then they just ran into an american officer in the hallway. The officer says Something Like, how are you . What are you guys up to . Something like that. Just to greet two people that he initially thought japanese, because they both look like japanese. If you dont start to converse with them. Just because of the cultural affinity, i guess, the japaneseamerican person responded in english. Then thats how he was recruited. Hey, you look like somebody who can, you know, work for us. Unfortunately, this japanese guy who was looking for a job originally didnt get the position, but the american person did. In that way, i think it did work in some cases, as a benefit for japaneseAmerican People. How long did it take for the japaneseamericans to make their way back to the United States . It varies quite a bit. Those with needs started to come back to the u. S. In 1947. Thats the year in which thats the year in which the first ship from japan back to america was operated. So beginning from that year to all the way to up to late 1950s. In some cases, early 1960s. There are people who just continue to come back. Thats the era when not only u. S. Born japaneseamerican, u. S. Citizens, but also some family members of those american citizens, whose citizenship was japanese. But because of the family connections and actual family members they already had in the states, decided to migrate from japan to america. Thats when the diversification of american Survivors Group started. It obviously started to include not only u. S. Born survivors of the bomb, but also japanborn but now u. S. Immigrant survivors of the bomb. Later on, they came together. It took them a long time to sort of come to america. It varied. There was a propensity of japaneseamericans who had been in the internment camps, not to talk about their experiences. Not even with their families, their children, later on. What about the people who the japaneseamericans who had been in hiroshima and nagasaki, when they came back to the United States, did they talk about what they experienced . I think the answer to that is largely no. Because actually, one practical reason why they remained silent about the experience is that if they come out as survivors, then their Health Insurance policy may be taken away from them. So radiation was considered to be one of the preexisting conditions in u. S. Health insurance system. So they were very afraid that they might lose the benefit of the Health Insurance policies because of the survivor. And also, i think there was a stigmatization in general that they were considered to be not good investment from employers perspective because they might miss a lot of work because they might have radiation illness or something in the future. Or in the case of women, they may not be able to reproduce or if they could, their baby may be deformed because of the mass exposure to radiations. There are those medical reasons, as well as political reasons, why they remained silent about their survivorhood. Also, i think, actually, its interesting that you raised the example of japaneseamericans internment camps. And Science Associated with that. Again, a big story of the bomb, but also micro level intimate stories of families. Often times, japaneseamerican families included some members who were bombed, survived the bomb, but irradiated. And also, other family members who stayed in america during the wartime and were placed in japaneseamerican internment camps. When they came back together after the war, it was very difficult for them to talk about each others experience. Because they were exposed to the massive power of nation state and state violence, and yet in very different ways. So how do you actually start to have a conversation about those vastly different and yet traumatizing experiences when they are just trying to rebuild a family. I think in some ways they mutually created a silence because in some ways, because of the intimacies as they wanted to regain within families. Are there oral histories a way to break that silence now . I believe so. I hope thats part of what oral history may be able to do for the benefit of better understanding the past. But also i should note that actually although i am collecting a lot of oral histories right now, there were some earlier effort to conduct personal history project back in 1970s and 80s. And most of the people who wanted to conduct oral histories with u. S. Survivors or asianamericans of the younger generation, mostly Third Generation americans who just like they were not really aware of japaneseamerican internment camp, but came to realize, oh, this is definitely the part of our past, my parents past, my grandparents past, thats when asianamerican Civil Rights Movement started. And thats when they started to come together as a group of people on university campuses, especially on the west coast, but also in east coast up to a certain degree, and tried to sort of assert their asianamerican identities. And a part of the emerging identity really pushed them to find out the legacy histories of their own ethnic and racial group. And part of that discovery was about their community members, Older Community members experience of being bombed. So they started out by talking to survivors in their communities. And thats very precious historical record because i think thats the only set of oral History Collections that we have as far as im aware of that about u. S. Survivors life experiences. So there are few oral history interviews that we have about them, but, yeah, i think im not going say the oral history is the best way to think about the past. Of course there are various ways in which we can think about the past. But oral history has a power of course bringing out individual voices. But also, it will be always based on interaction between interview and interviewees. And in case of the older oral histories, its really about not only about survivors themselves, but also about people who had this intense interest in finding out their own communitys history. So it goes both way. Its a mutual process that really is revealing in the way that is very unique to this particular kind of, yeah, historical record. Naoko wake, thank you very much. Thank you very much. Pleasure to talk to you. Youre watching American History tv which airs each weekend on cspan3. Follow us on twitter at cspan history. For information on our schedule and to keep up on the latest history news. And theres more on American History tvs facebook page, including video of recent programs and your comments. That is at facebook. Com cspanhistory. Now author Richard Frank talks about the japans surrender at the end of world war ii. Its an honor to be here on behalf of harry truman. Ive worn a suit and a coat and a tie tonight because harry would have expected no less from someone speaking on his behalf. Ive been working on this area now for about 25 years or more. One of the things ive learned over the years is that i need to start a little earlier than 1945. In fact, what i need to do is, really, talk about the whole context of the Asian Pacific war and the second world war. Imagine for a moment that we were to talk about the european phase of world war ii. By only having an an aul remembrance of the bombing of two german cities. And over the years since we conducted those remembrances, we gradually every or aspect about the war in europe. I think most of us would agree that it would be wrong given our humanity of the germans that were in the cities, at the same time, it would be equally wrong to totally close our eye toes what was happening in the european war. And because the generations that fought the war, the generation that remembers the war are passing rapidly from the scene, we now sit in a situation in which most americans have a very dim, if any, understanding of what the asianpacific war was like. A couple of years ago, i was at a conference where they were showing approved High School Level textbooks in the u. S. I noticed it didnt list china as one of the allies participating in the Asian Pacific war. A couple of years ago, i began working on an effort to try to come up with some reasonable estimate as the number of deaths in the Asian Pacific war. Recognizing that because of the lack of no solid data, its impossible to certify any specific amount. After collaboration with colleagues and always attempting to go to the lowest rather than the highest number, i came one figure of about 25 Million Deaths during the Asian Pacific war. Of that 25 million, about 6 million were combatants. About 3 million were chinese, about 2 million were japanese to balance other nations including the u. S. That means that of the deaths during the Asian Pacific war, 19 million were noncombatants. Of that total, roughly about a million were japanese. The sources are pretty close together with respect to japanese boss losses, maybe a little more, maybe a little less, which is to say that for every japanese noncombatant who died in the Asian Pacific war, of those 17 or 18 million, about 12 million were chinese. Now, ive been working on a current project from the Asian Pacific war, a trilogy on that and coming up with a catalog of what those numbers actually mean. Just touch on two things. Because of the conduct of the Imperial Army in places like shanghai, it produced this tidal wave of refugees in china. Numbering at least 45 million. One component of that flight was that quite frequently, chinese families set out in flight. Those families included parents and children, sometimes four, five, six or more. And at the end of the long road, which went far longer and far harder than most experienced, the parents would arrive in Refugee Centers with one or two children at an abandon the others along the way. That sort of story about what happened in china during the Asian Pacific war is really one small detail of the whole catalog of horrors. The other thing that we dont typically appreciate about the asia pacific war is that we think of a bombing of civilians as having been something that was basically a pro he toe type by nazi germany in spain, specifically because of the war, pablo picasso, the first effort to terrorize civilians in shanghai in 1932. Sort of a typical picture of the type of bombing that japan did routinely in germany. Now, i want to emphasize again that im not attempt to go suggest that we should deny the common humanity of japanese and japanese civilians. Quite the contrary. What i attempted to do in my work is to recognize the humanity of all the positions, all the places. I think its important when we talk about events in 1945 to really understand the total context of what is happening in this horrendous war which for china has been going on for eight years. From a chinese standpoint, america enters the war at halftime. And thats what were going to talk further about. Now, the other part of the context is we have now enormous controversy which has been spinning now for better than 30 years in this country over the asia pacific war and specifically its end. Let me review briefly how we sort of got here or at least the context with which most people are familiar with this controversy. In 1945, for almost 20 years thereafter, most people would be stunned to learn that today there really is no great controversy in the u. S. Over the war and specifically the atomic bomb. There was what is sometimes labeled as the traditionalist view. The use of the bombs were justify the end of the war and at least an abrupt utilitarian sense it was justified because the bombs saved a lot more lives than it cost. In the 1960s, in conjunction with other issues in the u. S. , there was what called night. Personally i have great trouble with that because i think any historian has new evidence, new interpretation. I think a negative term is wrong. I like to call this the critical canyon. Basically, it has three Main Elements also. As you can see here, they believe that japans situation was helpless, the japanese were trying to surrender and that american leaders the japanese were on the cusp of surrender while american leaders the devastation. The reason for that is given various, but the most provocative of that, of course, is it was intended to be the first shot of the cold war to intimidate the soviets. Interestingly enough, these two rival views clashed most dramatically in the post war era in 1995 and the controversy at the smithsonian institution. Ironically, as this was going on, it turned out in the background a lot of work was going on at exactly that moment, being published at exactly that moment where we fundamentally changed a lot of the ways we look at this. Basically, japanese historians gained access to material the japanese government had not released. Most importantly, the u. S. Archives began with information and there were a great number of papers because they talked about radio intelligence, classified could not be released and did want appear in the Public Domain from the late 1970s up until the 1990s. Finally, the soviet archives revealed some rather interesting information concerning the end of the war. So my kickoff point when i did down fall was basically based on all ooh this work that was going on in Counter Point to the controversy and giving the whole controversy, at least in my view, a very different spin. Because we know a lot more and we know the answers to some questions and we have found there are other questions that had not previously been considered. So lets talk about now what actually happened in 1945. President Franklin Roosevelt in january 1943 at the cass bland ka conference, potentially in world war ii which he describes as the un of the access powers. The. And peaceful. And the state Department Lawyers, in writing about this, emphasized the Unconditional Surrender gave the u. S. And its allies the right to do things in germany and japan that the International Law and military occupation did not provide. In fact, the state Department Lawyer said there really was no clear limit to how far the u. S. Goes under Unconditional Surrender. But it was instrumental in the whole policy process of how we were going to conduct occupation in germany or japan. So people who talk about how you can jetson Unconditional Surrender in 1945, either do not comprehend how vital it was to the ultimate outcome of the peace or if they do know, they dont choose to tell you that, which is another issue. So the first message i have to you is it was not simply a slogan for victory. It really was the foundation of a program for peace. Well, the president having articulated the goal, it fell to the joint chiefs of staff to come up with a military strategy to achieve that. That was their job. When they met and discussed this, interestingly enough, they achieved what in my view was no better than unstable compromise and the division was really more on what many of us would regard as a political as opposed to strictly a military issue. And the political issue was what would be the factor that would be most likely to undermine the role of the American People to see the war through to Unconditional Surrender. And when their services met so the services met to argue, the viewpoint was that time was the critical issue. And the Army Believed that the best and fastest way to, therefore, achieve Unconditional Surrender was by invading the japanese ar mad das. The United States navy had a dirvets view. The navy had been setting of japan for four decades. The navy had a proprietary sense that they knew what this war was all about and they knew how to end it. In the course of that, four decades of study, one of the most fundamental principals of naval analysis had come up with was it would be absolute foley to invade the japanese the defensive forces greater than any Expeditionary Force the u. S. Could project across the pacific, that the terrain of japan, everything that was most soaked was steep and all of that was negated by the terrain. This was the perfect recipe for massive casualties. It was the critical issue that undermined support for the war. The navys alternative was a campaign of block aid and bombardment. By bombardlity, they were thinking of ships bombarding from sea and Aerial Bombardments from the 1920s. By blockade, they meant something which has not been grappled with in most of literature. It was obvious instruments of war and weapons from coming into a nation, they could not block certain other items, most specifically food. Food could not be blockaded. Well, the british and the germans changed the rules in world war i and as american policy evolved with respect to the blockade, we were looking to totally blockade japan, which effectively meant everything including food. So blockade meant we were prepared the to threaten of japanese, mostly civilians. Thats what blockade was all about. Is an alternative to the invasion. Now, all of this argument which took place for more than a year finally reached a critical point in april may 45 and the joint chiefs of staff finally officially adopt the policy, policy paper and new order and that policy paper calls for the execution of a two phase strategy. The first phase was continuation of blockade and bombardment until november. And in november 1945 the u. S. Would em bank on a twophase japan down fall. The first phase, called operation olympic was meant to attack the Southern Island of kyushu to see if air naval base toes support the second face which is called operation cornette to target the tokyo yokohama area. Under the plan, there was a provision and then well see what happens, whether they secure the surrender of japan or not. So the order was issued. Kingly, the commander in chief of the naval operations, a man if an famously tearse about everything sent a written memo in which he makes abundantly clear. He says i want to make clear to you that i am not agreeing that were actually going to invade japan. I only agree that we have to issue an order now so all the preparations can be made to have the option of invasion available in november. But he says, we will come back and visit the issue of whether we will ip vad japan in august or september of this year. So king makes it quite clear right from april 1945 that the navy does not with invading japan. In that paper in which the joint chiefs refer to their strategy, there are two other fundamental problems we see. Japanese government in the entire history of japan has ever sur renders. By japanese count, thats 2,600 years. No historical president whatsoever sur renders. The second is, as far as theyre aware, theres never been the surrender of a japanese unit in a skirmish battle or campaign during the asia pacific war. Therefore, we cant be sure we can get a japanese government that will surrender. Moreover, even if we can find a japanese government that will surrender, we cant be sure the armed forces will comply with a surrender. I cant emphasize enough that it was talk. Theyre defining what is the ultimate american nightmare in 1945, which is not what we call, quote, the invasion of japan. Its the prospect of well organized capitulation. In april 1945 were estimating Japanese Armed forces total about 4. 5 to 5 million. This would be the prospect of defeating all of those armed forces in the japanese home islands, on the asian continent throughout the pacific. This is an incredibly horrendous prospect to face. But that is the real nightmare were fait facing, not, quote, the invasion of japan. Admiral king is the effective naval officer in washington. Admiral emmet is the senior naval officer in the pacific. Hes been embroiled in fighting the campaign on the island since may. He now sends a private communication between he and admiral king a message in which he says basically im no longer support an invasion of japan under any circumstances because its going to be at least like okinawa and this is totally unacceptable. So we have the navy, both the senior officer in washington and the senior officer in the pacific saying no, no, no, were not going to invade. Now, lets go to tokyo. January 1945. They face the new year not with resignation, but with resolution. A shot of what once was, the air power is much diminish. Above all, they are guided bay specific premise and that is that american being of a race and being pleasure loving are have little morale and that morale can be broken and they believe it can be broken by either defighting or inflicting enormous casualties on the initial invasion of japan. And they will, there ever, achieve guardianships to negotiate into the war far different from under the preserve the old order of japan. And they call this strategy operation decisive. And remember, it has both a military and a political component. To achieve what the japanese hope they can achieve in 1945. Now, in terms of their strategic planning, they really do one of the best jobs they do in the entire war since the opening phase. Whatever material power america pay possess, americans being of a race and being pressure loving have brittle moral and that can be broken and either defeating or inflicting casualties on japan. And they will have bargaining chips to negotiate far different than Unconditional Surrender that reserve in old japan. They call this strategy operation decisive. To achieve what the japanese hope they can achieve in 1945. Now, in terms of their strategic planning, they really do one of the best jobs they do in the entire war since the opening phase. Thats if they work out, this basically points. The first of which is conviction of the americans being impatient, dont have the patience to say on the campaign a blockade and bombardment and they will come in and blockade. This is an important point because the japanese recognize that they have no counter to blockade except their whole strategy is built on the notion that you must come and invade. Thats the strategic option thats going to give the japanese a chance to get an end to the war to their satisfaction. Well, they also operationally work out very quickly that while the american basically rely mostly on air and sea power, not on ground power in the pacific, and most of the air power is land based, therefore, any invasion of the japanese islands must be in locations thats within range of American Land based aircraft, specifically hover planes. And they get out their dividers and they run their dividers and they get kyushu and the main japanese islands, they recognize were coming for air base, were coming for kyushu. They realize southern kyushu is going to be a target. Anyone who looks at the map of kyushu will realize if the americans are coming for land bases, there are only a few places they can possibly come. They correctly identify three of the four bases were looking at and theyre not that far off default. They can flesh out this strategy and as you can see, by august 1945 they have 6 million men under arms, over 6 million, and they pass the home islands with almost 3 million, 2. 5 million. And most importantly, because theyre like a gambler placing all their chips on one bet, they have moved the majority of their forces down to kyushu, down to the invasion, and they mass the source somewhere between 500,000, 900,000 men. And theyve got 10,000 planes. Half of them are come kozzys. They are very confident that this is going to get the result they want. The bloodying of the invasion, whether they defeat it or not, and negotiate it into the war. They do something else. In the spring of 1945, the japanese government conducts this massive of the military forces and on the civilian front. Specifically, they announce and implement a policy that every single male age 15 to 50 and every single female is now a combatant, a member of a national militia. In a series of the defense of kyushu, they have a chilling itemization of how they city by city and town by town, mobilize some of these units. They have converted a large swath of the population. This effect ily works out to about 20 of that population. Theres about 17 million from the 1944 census. So my math will give me Something Like 20 million of these civilians are now become combatants. What this does for us, it almost perfectly obliterates combatants and noncombatants in japan. This involves mutual obligations. Then if they only target combatants. Japan now has basically made it almost impossible to separate out combatants from noncombatants. Swrg arrived at all of these measures and all of these policies and strategies, what we have to have is an imperil conference. Its going to sanction all of these measures. And its sort of a kabuki thing. Everyone looks at these rehearsed statements and they endorse a policy which is basically kept to go which provides were going to fight on to the end with notes on surrender. As they do this, they also have prepared staff papers and one of those staff papers has something to say about the prospect for the food supply and the down fall. It seemed to me abundantly clear that anyone reading this would realize what its saying is even if ketsigo works and it goes on for months, even assuming we can negotiate in, during 1946, theres going to be horrendous Food Shortages throughout japan that are going to put literally millions of japanese in peril. I could not find a source that clearly said, oh, yes, they understood what was in those papers. Since that time, edward drey has done a wonderful book on japans Imperial Army. I talked to ed and he said it was very clear that the senior soldiers in the Imperial Army clearly understood that kept to go basically meant not only all these casualties and battles, but basically a large swath of the population is going to starve to death in 1946. So i find it very difficult to believe that the senior civilians did not understand this and in certain ways we know they understood the significance and the food situation. So that is the sort of enemy we were counting and dealing with in 1945 in imperial japan. Now, mr. Truman, interestingly, orders a specific white house meeting on the issue of the invasion and orders the meeting and specifically identifies casualties as his major concern. At that meeting, the transcript is available. Plan was a twophase invasion of japan. We can talk about the casualty issue and the q a if you want to because i think it sort of moves out by what happened later. But in any event, whats interesting is mr. Truman only approves olympic, that first phase in november. He withholds his official sanction to olympic and as i was reading the transcript of that meeting, i noticed that harry truman, at the end, summarizes makes a summary statement and says, well, basically, so everyone around the table, all the advisers are all advising me that i should approve this invasion of japan. And i read what and i thought, this is no country bumpkin. He is making sure the record shows what is actually happening which is everyone sitting around that table at that meeting is advising the president that that is the best option to take. And mr. Truman approves it, but as you can see, because he only approves olympic, he still has some serious doubts about the invasion of japan. Now, between about 1978 and somewhere in the late 1990s and theres still a few things trickling out, we had a tref revelation when they released the radio intelligence information. In fact, its my belief that had mr. Truman and his administration had this material to make available, we would never have gone the direction weve gone in this controversy because people would not have made arguments about certain key issues like japan was close to surrender in august 1945. But the important points here are that, first of all, there are two streams of messages being intercepted. One are diplomatic messages and the other are military messages. And these reached the top policymakers in two documents. One is called the magic diplomatic summary. The word magic has some interesting background. The army chief signal officer back in the prepearl harbor days had a group of code breakers. And he sort of always referred to them as his magicians. So their product was this, knowing this magic and that term stuck for the range remainder of world war ii. So these tell you what senior levels the american government, what was going on in japan. And the other important point is that everyone getting this summary was giving the military thats a point that was argued over for quite some time. But i finally tease out that the delivery of this was identical. So what happens with respect to this summary . Well, with respect to the diplomatic summary, what this shows in abundant clarity is that although there are a number of japanese diplomates and available attach yeahs other here, what i call peace entrepreneurs, we knew none of them had the official sanction of the japanese government. So theres a lot of literature about the vatican or whatever here. But the bottom line was, we knew right then that none of these had the sanction of the japanese government. The only japanese which had sanction was highly secret. Now, when you sit down and you read back to bake the cable between sato and nos moscow and the Japanese Foreign ministry in tokyo, as a lawyer, i would describe it as sako is conducting a cross examination on behalf of the Truman Administration on the japanese diplomacy. Second of all, he says whats the authority for this . The former foreign minister gets the idea that there is someone at a high level that has authorized this. Then he columbus back and says, if this is a serious effort to end the ward, japan must come back and the members never comes down with an agreement on terms to end the war. They cant even come down with an agreement on what to offer the soviets back as a mediator. Sako comes back too this issue repeatedly. Terms, terms, terms, materials. If this is a serious effort, we have to have some formulation of terms. But finally, in total exasperation, we cant get an answer, they send two cables in the 17th and 18th of july, 1945, which in substance say, look, i think the best we can possibly hope for now is Unconditional Surrender modified to the extent that the Imperial Institution will be preserved. Here, they basically put together a panel where the key arguments of this whole controversy. In a message that is sent back, he basically says not merely no, but hell no, its not acceptable. He says Unconditional Surrenders is unacceptable in any kishgss and he doesnt offer the slight he promo, oh, by the way, a modification the way the Imperial Institution might be helpful, that might achieve a surrender to jap fles government. Absolutely not. So there you have it. Its in plaque and white in the magic diplomatic summary. Anyone reading that, the editors make sure this is clear what this is all about, but understand that merely offering this is not the surrender of japan. There have been a lot of books written about this and have talked about the importance of this institution. I cannot comprehend how you can miss this. I dont think you have to necessarily agree with it, but you cant ignore it. And i dont think the american leaders have any doubt about what this told them. Now, we have the military summary. And basically what this shows is this horrendous picture of the japanese mobilizing on all fronts and particularly packing kyushu with all these troops. By the end of july 1945, general douglas mccarthurs intelligence officer, writes a summary that says, at this rate, well be going in with a ratio of one to one and this is not the recipe for victory. Well, how bad is it . Well, the image on the left is what we thought we were going to encounter when we went to kyushu, when we ordered the operation. The image on the right is actually what we were going to run into on kyushu. Youll notice there is a dinners, a big difference, a horrendous difference. And at this point, there begins a back and forth at the highest levels of the american command about the issue of is olympic still viable . And there is the moment when admiral king strikes. Back in april, he said were going to revisit this issue in august or september. Hes not thinking about atomic bombs. Hes thinking about when the stars align for the navy to come down and argue about what is going to go on. General marshall, who has left the Intelligence Center dispatch, general marshall says basically in view of the intelligence, do you think olympic is viable . And general mcarthy thursday replies, i dont think its intelligence. This operation has to be done. Its good to go. Lets go do it. Admiral king puts those two messages together in package, sends them to the senior naval officer in the pacific and invites the admiral to comment on what he thinks. Of course, i think of admiral king at this point is like a good lawyer who said you dont ask a question if you dont already know the answer. This is where we leave it hanging. The indication that japan may, in fact, end the war and limit in my view, he further decides this is not the time to start one of the great books of the entire war at the joint chiefs and the command level in invading japan. So he just sits on it for a few days hoping hell be relieved, sparking whats going to be one of the biggest controversies of the war. And there is literature out there that makes an argument like this. Well, the atomic bomb was dropped in 1945. They dont surrender on that day, on the 7th, on the 8th. On the 9th, the Society Union intervenes and by the end of that day, the japanese come to some formula for ending war. Therefore, atomic bombs had no influence on the japanese decision to end the war. And if thats all they tell you, it seems like a really solid argument. Well, let me tell you what they dont tell you. What they dont tell you, first of all, is taking you through the basic historical context. And thats that their argument really goes like this. A government of japan, which is not surrendered in 2,600 years is presented with news of an event unprecedented in the entire sweep of Human History and in 72 hours they do not decide to surrender unconditionally. Do you think that sounds wiseble when you put it that way . And what really happened in tokyo is this. The Japanese Military leaders upon receiving those on the 7th when they get solid information, something horrendous is happening in hiroshima. Mr. Truman announced waits an atomic bomb. The armys position is were not going to conceive they have an atomic weapon until we conduct an investigation. The naefs spogs more ominous and their position is that, well, we dont think the americans can have that much material, so even if they have an atomic bomb, they cant have that many of them. They wont be that powerful. Or maybe they will be desueded by international pressure. Now think about this. Right at the moment when they first learn about the announcement about an atomic bomb at the top levels of the japanese government, theres both knowledge of the theory of an atomic weapon and more importa importantly a grasp of the practical realities of what it takes a huge Industrial Engineering feat to produce material and quantity. They get this from their own atomic bomb program, which department give them a bomb, but what did give them insight into how difficult it is to make material, which is exactly the point in which the german effort founded. So their position is not that they are unphased by news of an atomic bomb. Their position is that they entertain what are well grounded doubts about whether the u. S. Has an arsenal of powerful atomic bombs to use. This also i think pretty much puts to rest any notion that a bomb could have persuaded the japanese to surrender. Lets see you do five in a row. So on the morning of august 9th, 1945, the japanese learned that the soviets had intervened in the war. It is a tremendous intervention. Theres the basic numbers. 1. 5 million soviet soldiers, they are running into less than half their number of defenders who also were in units that had been stripped of e equipment, weapons and percesonnel who had been shipped to defend against the u. S. Invasion. The soviets had had this tremendous invenn tir toir of armored vehicles. Its not only numerically much inferior, its hopeless. The soviets have thousands of them. Its totally over whelm skpgt soviets are going to crush the army and move to korea and have other ambitions as were going to learn about. One thing they dont have is sea lift. When you hear arguments about the japanese are terrorized by the intervention because they are afraid of the soviets coming to the home islands unless the soviet armies are prepared to grab a lot of reeds is and breathe through them the the other thing is when you get into the reaction it goes like this. First of all, the initial reports grossly understate the soviet intervention. Secondly, the senior officer its absolutely essential to continuing the war. He sits down and drafts up a plan that says were going to eliminate the slightest vestige of any civilian rule and rule entirely through imperial headquarters and the Army Minister, he adopts that as an appropriate policy. So we have hard evidence that soviet intervention far from terrorizing the japanese government to surrender has produced this plan that had to be implemented that would have collapsed the governmental structure, which is going to stalemate and prevent the intervention. This is not good. Now in addition to that, later in the day when they have an imperial conference, the chief of staff in the Imperial Army says that soviet intervention is not favorable, classic japanese understatement, but it does not invalidate, that we can wait for the americans to come across the pacific to us while the soviets sit on the asian continent. So the notion that soviet intervention by itself forced the japanese government to surrender it seems to me as a lot of holes in it. Whats significant is the cabinet called the big six i mention mentioned earlier has a meeting and for the first time they actually sit down to talk about what conditions under which they will surrender. And they cannot agree. Three of them say that not only must the allies issue a promise of preservation in the Imperial Institution, but the allies must promise three other things. That japan will conduct its own disarmament, will conduct its socalled war crime trials and there will be no occupation of japan. They hold out for an institution but because the big six can only reach an agreement in classic japanese fashion when they have unanimous agreement this conditions offer a position of the legal government of japan. This is unacceptable to the allies. So the basic point is the legal government of japan never on its own va ligs agrees to vesurrend under any conditions that the u. S. Or allies would have accepted. Later in the day they prevailed upon that the Foreign Ministers stick only whats supposedly the condition of the institution is the way to go. The first time intervenes and announces that he supports the one condition offer, which the Foreign Ministry proceeds to send off to the u. S. And its allies. The Foreign Ministry version includes a phrase that were going to accept the ally terms which are defined in the proclamation. So long as they do not compromise the sovereign ruler. This is what lawyers like to call magic language because this basically says were falling back on the legal regime in japan and what this means is the allies have to agree that the em porer will be supreme over the japanese government but the commander of the occupation. So they have a veto over the occupation. So even after two bombs, soviet intervention, this is the japanese offer thats on the table. Theres also an argument that this is during this day that the bomb was unnecessary. They claim to have little effect. I have two comments. If you understand what the position was of the Japanese Military on august 7th or 8th about the significance of an atomic bomb, the delivery of the second bomb implies that we do have an arsenal of powerful weapons. By the afternoon, the Army Minister is running around telling people that the americans have an arsenal of 100 atomic bombs. They can drop three a day and the next target may be tokyo. Now thats from documents the Foreign Ministry accumulated about the process, which i think tells you that the notion that the bomb had no effect whatsoever. I think we can dispose