Transcripts For CSPAN3 Forum Focuses On U.S.-Japan Relations 20170731

Intercept information and leave the backpack plugged in somewhere, thats so much low risk than trying to rob a bank. Watch the communicators tonight at 8 00 eastern on cspan2. Four former chiefs of star, two from the u. S. Joint chiefs and two of the joint staff of Japans Defense Ministry participated in a Panel Discussion friday on the importance and future of the u. S. Japan Military alliance. This is almost two hours. Good afternoon. Im glad to see our audience survived the flash flood warning. Im Michael Green, Senior Vice President for asia and japan here at csis and professor at georgetown. And as the csis host i want to do our usual safety announcement. We survived the flash flood. If for any reason we need to evacuate, its my responsibility to give you instructions. And the general rule is well go out the way you came in and well make our way to either national geographic, which is around the corner, or well go straight down rhode island to st. Matthews. Our expectation is half the people will go to starbucks at du pont circle, but thats the plan. Im going to be very brief because ill have the opportunity to chair a discussion with our very distinguished panel of american and japanese retired senior military leaders. But first i want to turn it over to my friend who has organized this military Statesmen Forum to tell you about its intent, its purpose and a bit about what they achieved. Please, yochi. Thank you, mike. Thank you very much. I would like to First Express my deepest appreciation to csis and especially to dr. Michael green for cohosting this event with my think tank asia pacific initiative. I was here exactly six months ago in an event like this, exactly like this. And the theme was always the same, the u. S. And Japan Alliance in the era of economic competition. It was a preview of one yearlong project with dozens of japanese policy experts at the think tank. And the objective of that project was to identify that geopolitical and geoeconomic risks to japan and u. S. Japan alliance and the possible ways to deal with them. Today, we are here to share some of the takeaways from four days of conference which we just held in washington. Between retired military leaders and active Duty Officers, top active Duty Officers and the government high ranking officials from the u. S. And japan. This is a retreat type policy discussions. And this we have had this military Statesmen Forum for now four years. And dr. Michael green has been extremely supportive from day one. We are very much now in an era of radical uncertainty. And particularly how in reaction to these new heights of that uncertainties we are turning our attention to tried and tested values, institutions and methods. And the u. S. Japan alliance is among one of those tried and tested. And at this military Statesmen Forum we have reaffirmed that this tried and tested strategic values and significance of the u. S. Japan alliance, but at the same time we have keenly realized that this alliance has to adapt to a radically changing international environment, particularly in asia pacific. Now, one of the areas that we have to really evolve, more effectively, is in the field of economics, more accurately geo economics, increasingly that economic instruments are now used and utilized to achieve that geopolitical gain and objectives. In the area, asia pacific particularly, we are confronted with these challenges, particularly from china. But whether its china or russia or japan, the United States and europe, the trade policy now is increasingly has become to be a center, a center of what, or national strategy. That also reflects represents this new trend of that geoeconomics in where politics how u. S. Japan alliance can and should deal with them. Its a very, very new theme, a challenging theme. Geoeconomics also is employed by some countries to modify or revise and even undercut the international order. They just dont like the rules, a rule based order, they are now challenging that. Cyberspace is increasingly exploited, and even manipulated, not only to undercut compromise that free and fair trade, goods and services, but also to damage and undermine the democratic rules, process and institutions, democracy itself. And we are now also in the midst of that radical technical revolution, the Fourth Industrial Revolution based on a. I. , big data and so on. And its implication for that National Security, National Resilience is enormous. So those each strategic challenges that we have to deal with in this years military Statesmen Forum also has addressed those issues. We just could not talk about everything, but we did cyber security, geoeconomics, certainty and north korea and the others. We got support from active Duty Officers and incumbent government officials is indispensable to enrich the conversation and make that discussions at msf relevant and meaningful. And we are very much fortunate that we have members from joint chiefs of staff, department of defense and National Security council from the United States. From japanese side we have members from the selfDefense Forces, a minister of defense and the Prime Ministers office. Today, we have four members of the military Statesmen Forum, we have two cochair of the military Statesmen Forum, admiral mike mullen, former chairman of joint chiefs of staff and general oriki, a former chief of staff of joint staff selfDefense Forces. And all of you know admiral dennis blair, former pacom commander and dni chief, currently the chairman of the board of Peace Foundation usa. And general iwasaki, former chief of staff, joint staff selfDefense Forces. So we are extremely lucky and privileged to have four of them to share their observations and their suggestions with all of you today. So i once again would like to express my deep gratitude to my friend Michael Green for chairing this and moderating this. Thank you. I hope you really enjoy todays discussion. Thank you very much. [ applause ] thank you, yoichi. Well have a discussion up here on stage and then turn it over to the audience to ask questions including, i hope, from some of the participants in the military Statesmen Forum who are not on stage right now. Yoichi has, if you know him, in classic form come up with the right idea at the right time. Theres never been anything quite like this military Statesmen Forum in part because on the japanese side there havent been former chiefs of Defense Forces with the authority that these gentlemen had. So there was an opportunity to create this kind of forum given the broad not only joint but policy experience of the Senior Officers coming out of the top of the Defense Forces. But theres also more of a demand for this kind of dialogue. The threat environment as dr. Funibashi just said is extremely complex. The u. S. Japan alliance was an alliance that we generally for decades managed as a rear area support alliance for contingencies, particularly on the Korean Peninsula we were getting ready for. But now japans on the front lines. The north korean threat we heard today about another missile launch, puts japan on the front line essentially with the north korean threat. And the maritime challenges in the East China Sea and South China Sea from china are also right in japans front yard. So this is no longer an alliance that is primarily a rear Area Alliance for president s. Its in the front lines. Thats changed japanese politics, policy, strategic thinking. And it means that we on the u. S. Side have really a responsibility to understand how the threat looks and the challenges look up close from japan. And japan is also one of our most important Global Partners now. The alliance for decades we talked about as a global alliance, but i can tell you from my time in the nse beginning a decade ago, when we go into the g7 or g20 meetings, were usually more aligned with japan than any other country including our closest allies. So its more complex. We have less relative money to spend. Japans on the front line. All these point toward more sharing of strategic assessments and the group of distinguished former chiefs of Defense Forces and commanders and so forth are perfect to contribute to that dialogue. Most importantly, msf, military Statesmen Forum, has established itself in washington as a legitimate and important National Security sculptuins in. This was an off the record discussion, but i have permission from the organizers to ask a little bit about the discussion. I wanted to ask each of the admirals and generals on stage, you know, what their make jurjo takeaway was and particularly from this meeting, what is the conclusion, the surprise, the imperative thing we must do that you took out of the meeting . And im going to start admiral burr on this end. Then we will do reverse order for the next question. Well, i think when you are called a statesmen, thats another word for old guy. And im going to take a little bit 5d vantaadvantage to give a perspective on u. S. Japan military relationship in my time. When i was the commander of a guided missile destroyer in the mid 1980s, when we were operating with the Japanese Maritime selfdefense force, we were required to leave port separately to make sure that we didnt commune daicate with the japanese ship until we were beyond helicopter range of the coast of japan, because a press helicopter could not would then not be able to see us steaming together and communicating. That was the state of the alliance in the 1980s. In the mid 1990s, i was involved in some joint planning with japanese selfDefense Forces. I was required to put on a suit, grow my hair a little bit lon r longer, get rid of my shiny black shoes and go in a small delegation into the basement of the old Japanese Defense Agency Building in order to do some secret conversations with counterparts in the japanese selfDefense Forces and our greatest fear was of a press leak of these operations. So to be able to sit in an open forum with cameras and an audience and talk about important issues of the u. S. Japan alliance is just such a maturing of the alliance that we have seen in recent years that i dont think we should lose sight of the progress thats been made. And just in time, too. Because the security situation in northeast asia, in east asia and overall in the world has become much more pressing, much more complicated than it ever has been. And the interests of our two countries are exactly aligned in terms of our vision of what we think east asia should look like from the security, the economic, the governance values point of view. And that imperative has enabled us to be able to talk much more openly and honestly and freely about how we can pool our resources and we can pool our efforts in order to Work Together towards that kind of asia. So what i have seen in the military Statesmen Forum is an unprecedented level of frank discussion. The japanese are famous for their politeness. The americans are famous for their directness. Directness. And what that resulted to in the past was a lack of serious communication to really talk about points of difference that had to be worked around and the real understanding points of convergence that should be exercised. I would say in the four years of the military states forum, we actually get down to the honest appreciations of the constraints on both sides, the ambitions on both sides and then working towards, working towards common solutions. In the past four years, we have noticed, and frankly acknowledged, areas of convergence that the United States and japan share, common objectives on the major issues, but we are not the same country. And we dont live in the exact same locations so we dont have the same priority. So there are differences that we will discuss later in these discussion. We dont see russia quite the same way. We dont in the past, have had different interests with china. There are economic issues, which are different among the United States and china, between the United States and japan and our relations with china. And inevitably at the highest level of economic approaches and major security economic approaches that overlap. So there have been those differences, but rather than being joked over or papered over, they are addressed in this forum. And we have been able to, i think, come up with ways to go forward, which the event passed back to those of the jobs we used to have. And another rule is to try to be helpful to those we used to have rather than making their lives difficult. And i think we have been successful in that area. So let me stop there as far as the overall progress. And we will discuss the specific issues. I know later. Thank you. I would only comment, this is the third forum for me, two of them here and one in tokyo last year. And, i guess, reemphasize what admiral blair said in terms of just in time. And i have also experienced the same evolution that admiral blair has over time in terms of our overall relationship. Always allies, but certainly constrained. And what i really admire about what Prime Minister abe is doing now is looking for a way to have japan represented in the 21st century security environment. And that is an end to both move in that direction and then to empower his retired Senior Officers to have some of that discussion. And very, i mean, specifically, he and i were in the same job at the same time, and, in particular, during the fukushima tomadaci disaster. And it was actually, it was validation, i think, of the alliance, the way that we were able to support instantly support, not just the selfDefense Forces, but the people of japan. And by virtue of that experience, the friendship and respect that we developed for each other, this forum came along a couple years later. So it was very easy to commit to it. Ed aa admiral blair talked about the issues we have discussed in detail and im sure well come to those. But i have also watched the discussion mature. Very similar to the relationship. One of the individuals in the audience today is general skip sharp. Skip was the commander, the forces in south korea when i was chairman as well. And starting last year and again this year, weve worked to try to create some version of a trilateral view set with rock views as well as japan and the United States. And this year we had a former chief of defense there, general june, who contributed greatly for example. And then for my perspective, when i try to understand the problem, i really do want to try to listen to the perspective from, who i am with, what are your concerns . How do you hear things . And this is a forum that has afforded us a great opportunity to listen to our good friends so that we can understand the chances and then try to move forward together. So its its been more robust this year than last year than the year before that. And i think it will continue to be, in what i think, most of us in this room would understand or believe. Its an extraordinarily time right now of uncertainty, geopolitical uncertainty, geoeconomic uncertainty, and in that uncertainty, one of my beliefs is that you need good friends. And we have one in japan. Thank you. General orecki is going to speak in foreign english so you may want to take a second to get to your channel. Two is japanese and three is russian. Let me turn to general orecki. The other interesting thing about the timing of the forum is it began at a time when the japan selfDefense Forces in Public Opinion polls in japan emerged as the most trusted institution in japan. Thats the postjapan, its quite remarkable. So the role of military statesmen, and the idea of military statesmen in japan is very new, at least post war era. And they have an idea to train this debate and it is new and timely. Translator thank you for that introduction. My name is oriki. So we are switching from english to japanese. So this is not a weakness from japanese people not learning english, but we do have a very strong alliance. I want to say that. So we just concluded our post forum. And ive been attended this from the first forum. Between the United States and japan, we rotate the location between tokyo and washington, d. C. And so that means that last year, japan hosted one forum in tokyo. So mr. Mullen talked about this earlier, so i was when i was in active duty, we had a similar job and similar timing. Since then, we have been working on opinion exchanges and also transanalysis. So with him, i really experienced that kind of sharing of information. But now we are coming here as representatives from the United States and also japan. I thought that we had really good communication, but through this kind of forum, i really experienced that there was a gap and that there was something that we need to address. And then, again, from the first forum to the fourth forum, i think were developing really good communication and also good information sharing. And i think were becoming together regarding what needs to be said and to have really good communication. For our fourth forum, i want to say my personal impressions. First off, of course, that the South China Sea and some other various Security Issues are there, but our topic was about geoeconomics. And so what kind of economic implications are there to Security Issues, so dr. Greene talked about north korea, and there are not only military options okay, let me back up here. So there are certain things we would want from china or the relationship to russia. There are some options including sanctions. And so those are prospectives that we talked about. And also theres one belt, one Road Initiative in china. So when we look at that initiative, the indian ocean is very much integrated here. And also the role for the ocean. So when we look at the indian ocean in terms of obor, theres an economic implication to security. So thats something that i learned from everyone and also other experience that we had. So i think we overall had really good communication. Thank you. Thank you. Translator thank you. My name is owasaki. So since this is our fourth forum, i think we have gone through many of the topics already, and also these panels that are really opinionated. So i think that i dont have very much to talk about anymore. But i think that my participation is about 3. 5 times, not fully 4, not fully 3. My first participation, the first forum was in tokyo, but i was still in an tisk dctive dut could not fully participate to that one. So thats what i meant by halftime participation. But after that, i really am appreciative of this forum. Since i was a selfdefense fo e force. Also, im from the Japanese Air Defense force and had a tenure as a joint chief of staff. So looking back at those times, i really had spoken with my counterparts in the United States. But when i was in active duty, i felt like there was a gap in communication between the japan side on the United States. So when i felt that, i reached out to dr. Greene and john. When you and john came to japan, i was able to talk to you to gain perspectives. And i also talked to you about the need about more active discussions. Translator unfortunately, i had an opportunity to participate in this meeting hosted by mr. Abashi. And the issue pertaining to the u. S. Forces economic situation, what is legal, what is not legal. Of course, there are other differences between the two countries, but this is a first round of the conference. And we have been discussing a lot of the discussions about wideranging issues and the discussion connected here will be submitted to the two governments and the u. S. Forces. And for the sdf, i think we are able to give a lot of advice to those institutions. And, therefore, the accomplishment on the msf is quite substantial. Thank you. One of the major topics of focus was north korea and its in the news again this morning as i mentioned, and it is one of the drivers of change in our alliance. 20 years ago japan was still largely in the rear area. Today there are so many threats to japan, directly from north korea, missiles, cyber, so forth. And now directed toward the american homeland. So that creates some it creates the necessity of the joint preparedness as allies between the u. S. And japan. And, of course, it also creates the potential for fissures and different threats. So i want to turn to north korea and i think we want to address, particularly for the american panelists, the role of the military instruments of power within the north korean strategy. Its often said the military aspect is not realistic. But we have heard its not off the table. Thats important for japan, but i would like to ask our american panelists about that. I think it will be interesting to hear about the progress on trilateral cooperation with korea, particularly the japan korea piece of that. And how ready we are. And where we need to be more ready to deal with, to deal with contingencies emanating from north korea, including not only attack but also collapse or provocations. Theres a range of threats now that we have to think about. So let me start, im going to sort of direct certain questions. Yes, please. Sorry. You got no rest. So generally youre thinking about north korea, but also specifically im interested in your view on the japan korea piece of this. And how ready is japan . Clearly not enough. And how to make more efforts to be prepared for this growing challenge. Translator thank you very much. There was a launch of the icbm by north korea. That was reported. But then we consider the dplk that in 1998, the sky over japan, there was a flight and there was a Ballistic Missile that was launched over japan. But in any case, the range of 2,000 kilometers, something was launched by north korea. Even prior to that, we had a lot of information. And for the Ballistic Missile, that japan needed the equipment, thats what we claimed, but there was a time when japanese people in general did not accept that. In 1998, there was a Ballistic Missile that flew over japan. But after that, there was a much better understanding about this in the city. And the bm system should have been deployed earlier. But since then, this operation was the ground based network that was put in place as a result. And i think the flight system ready is quite ready. Naturally, in order to focus on north korea or the bmt situation, the civil fleet is flooded. And therefore together with the ages of the seven fleet, we have exchange of data and we share the information together in order to step up our preparedness. In essence, now naturally, when we think about the response to north korea, not only the Ballistic Missile, but when the conflict happens without the okay, we cannot go anywhere. Very difficult to take any measures without south korea. Maybe the south korea relations are not favorable, but politically, unfortunately, that is true. And there was ups and downs of the relations between japan and south korea, but i have been working at the sdf and then became the chief of staff. And during that period, the air, sea, the ground of south korea, i think we have always had good relations on the military basis, and political relations sometimes is up different. And so in terms of the personal exchange, blue house or the president ial office turned down the request. The military members of korea could not come and we could not visit them. However, there has been the good collaboration, between the japanese and the Korean Forces. And the issue has been discussed and have been making the efforts to conclude. And so we came to the very close to conclusion, but that was frozen. But south korea finally has been put in place. And the exercise, the frequency is not very high. But the joint maritime exercise, recent recently, the trilateral information training was carried out among japan, u. S. And south korea. So trilateral Relations Development from now. And for the first time in this conference, of course, response to north korea, we have had a lot of exchange between japan and the United States and general sharp has been involved in this conference recently. And for this year, we invited the general from north korea. And the korean side perception has been provided from him. And i believe that is such a valuable opportunity to listen to the south korean view. Having his view, he returned to south korea yesterday but japan locations or trilateral relations will be farther strengthened as a result. Translator in 2009 at the end of march i became the chief of staff of the sdf. And japan actually reached the pacific. That was in 2009. That was just ten days after i took office. And i had come from the army forces, and therefore so, i made my best efforts. And for the it was destroyed by north korea, so so many different ips dens took place during that year. And as dr. Green mentioned, if you can look at the current situation. Japan has already become the player of the front line. But i should say that japan has been on the front line for a long time. In terms of reaching japan, therefore we have to think or what we should have thought from them was the rocket used solid. So now because of the launcher, we do not know where north korea made the launch. So they are upgrading the ability of north korea and the icbm should be taken into our consideration. And the longer range is achieved. So japan and u. S. Have to deal with this. So the threat has existed. And in lretrospect, the threat has been higher. And between japan and the u. K. , i think theres optimism between Prime Minister abe and the president of the rok. They had a meeting and it should be about the future, it was about the issue of joint Statement Issued to look at the future. And for the security, i think we have some optimism between japan and rok. But the military matters. They are very often influenced by the political situation. Japan dispatched the units and the sdf and the Korean Forces were deployed in haiti. And there was some work to create the school together. And sdf and the Korean Forces Work Together on the same side and the Korean Forces, they used a truck and on that truck the jsdf members just put the debris. So then we worked together on the same side. And therefore, that type of relation should be further strengthened, reinforced. And the fact that we are able to reach that state, the trilateral relations will be strengthened. And so i would like to continue to make efforts. Given your previous job, i think it would be interesting to hear your thoughts on the role of military options, military instruments in the larger north korea strategy. And the press debate in a lot of the academic date deposits a binary choice, you engage in a dialogue within lots of stuff. And you know well, of course, theres a whole range of options and contingencies and so forth. So it would be hellful if you can also frame for us the role of the military power in dealing with the north korea problem going forward. Admiral blair and i talked about this in terms of the possibility coming forward. And i volunteered him to take a lead and ill fill in behind. Fair enough. Okay. If you were to listen to our discussion, if you were to read the press about the current north korean issue, its as if its a standoff between the dprk and the United States with the other countries of northeast asia and being sort of the backdrop against to which this occurs. If you listen to our discussion within the maritime within the conference over the last three days, you realize that this is an alliance problem for an issue at the United States to allies, japan and the republic of korea have to face. And i think that puts a lot different light on it. We need to evaluate our options in dealing with north korea in terms of their effect on our alliances. We want to emerge at the end of whatever happens with our alliance with japan and our alliance with north korea and their relationships with each other being stronger than they were, not weakened, much less completely dissolved by them. So i think we have to keep, what i was reminded with in our discussions, this is a complex alliance challenge, not just a mono e mono between he and donald trump. As we discuss the specifics of the issue, we had some insights which might be useful. When i was the Pacific Commander and the temperature went up on the peninsula, it was pretty much a peninsula problem. General sharps predecessor who is the commander of combined forces command would put his, would put his command on the higher alert. A series of well understood measures on the peninsula happened. And we were up on our toes in the peninsula. Now if there is an elevated level of contention and potential for military action, whether by north korea or whether we are considering military options in the United States, that affects a wide range of defense preparations in korea, in japan and in the United States. Not only are they Missile Defense preparations, but, for example, they are cyber preparations in both countries, that both countries have to make. They are much more extensive maritime and air defense preparations. And so the part of any military option that comes up in that region has to be a very careful set of preparations by three countries to defend their citizens and their interests in case north korea decides to take aggressive action. That can only be done by not minutes of notification but weeks of careful consultation and planning. So i think what you would hear from the military professionals is, whatever youre going to do militarily and dealing with korea, all three countries have to be involved and there has to be time to deal with a full range of possible reactions. Two other sets of insights we gained on some of the nonmilitary tools with which we are dealing with north korea, the regime was to make a generalization. We have been pretty much using simple straight stick sanctions to deal with north korea. They havent had the intensity of exquisite intelligence focus, cooperation with the private sector, understanding of the network that korea has developed in order to take advantage of the gray market, not understanding the Corresponding Organization within china, which is taking advantage of korean korean desires to import illegal goods to make money and to, and to cooperate with north korea. We need a much more tighter focused effort involving the intelligence agencies. And, in many cases, the commercial and financial authorities in the United States, japan, republic of korea and china. And i think that china can be far more effective if we do not just point the finger to them and say, its up to you, china, but involve the chinese authorities who have taken aggressive tools for dealing with corruption, which is a huge feature in a trade with korea with dealing with counterfeiting, which is a huge feature. The North Koreans are not only counterfeiting dollars but counterfeiting yen, they are counterfeit i counterfeiting dealing with drugs, in a way that is affecting those who live west and east of the area. So in a way of intensifying and nationalizing the regime on north korea, as i think the important insight is that we can improve. And the final one that we all who have dealt with north korea for a long time is, i think we have not done nearly as well as we could in terms of pushing information into north korea so that both the elites who are around the regime, and more citizenry can understand just how bad they have it and can understand that they are not, in fact, a subject of an Aggressive Campaign from outside. Estimate ps as that up to a fif North Koreans now have access to a cell phone. And that is a tremendous opportunity for getting information into north korea. There are many other opportunities. Although they have been sporadic attempts by particularly the republic of korea and to a lesser extent the United States to push information into north korea, i think we can certainly ramp that up as well. So i think those are the main insights that we had on north korea in terms of both being in a better military posture, increasing the information flow into the country and working with china in a way that has all of us working on the sanctions rather than simply pointing our finger at them. Thanks. So what to do . Anybody that has followed this knows, whoever is talking about it, say there are no good options. And there really are not into options here. One of the things that i was struck with in our discussio discussions when you look at a number of the military topics that was looked at over the relatively brief time, it is an extraordinarily high number compared to his predecessors. And, in fact, theres a view and we talked about this in the forum, that while his dad and his granddad may have had a more calculating purpose of the launches, his purpose very clearly is to get a Nuclear Weapon on top of an icbm as soon as possible. And if you read in the media, certainly of late, there is a pretty strong belief that is going to happen sooner than we predicted, as recently as six months ago. You combine that with the fact that he has not just eliminated the number of those in his regime at a pace that far exceeds his predecessors as well. Given not just what hes doing, but the pace hes specifically what they are doing about the military options, there are no good military options. In addition to being no good options, there are no good military options. And probably what is for those of us who understand what some of those options might be, it is the catastrophic outcome of those options, the potential that is there if it were a preemptive strike, for example, on what is going to happen to seoul, what is going to happen on the peninsula, what do we get ourselves into . What i believe with respect to kim jongun, i dont think hes suicidal at this point, at least thats my judgment. And so hes like many dictators around the world going to try to figure out a way to sustain being in charge in that country. So the idea that he would actually launch one of these weapons on south korea, japan or on the u. S. Is, again, that would be suicide for him and his regime. I still believe and use the discussion now about well, first of all, when you see what our president has said here in the United States, which has been very strong, what general dunford said, i think last week at aspen, which was focused on not taking military options off the table, that theres clearly going to be pressure on him as hard as we can to a point where he and china everyone up here and our successors have all worked this issue at one time or another. And the answer isnt absolutely through beijing, but beijing doesnt, from my they are spepe shouldnt get a free pass on this as well. Its too dangerous. So moving in that way of support of figuring out how to put pressure on this guy to make sure that there is not a disaster, i think, is key. But its been ground that previously had been plowed and been unsuccessful. So what are the chinese interests here . And how do you match up the interests and figure out where the overlap may be so that we can prevent this disaster. And i reemphasized what admiral blair said is, this is not just about the United States and north korea. This is about two great friends, two great alliances, and it is in the bread basket of the world for the five biggest economies in the world that are centered out there in one part of the discussion. As we postured what might happen in terms of discussion, the First Response from someone was the financial markers are going south immediately. And we all talk about that, we know that it is any outbreak there would have a huge economic Financial Impact globally, but to hear somebody say it as part of the, yes, we would expect and have to plan for this in this kind of forum was a little bit jarring and probably a little more real given and what is going on as recently as today with another test. You ended up taking the harder half of the questions. Well, thats thank you. Before we offer the audience a chance to weigh in, i didnt to ask about something i dont think you did address. And that is the significance of u. S. For military presence in the western pacific. And i want to get a japanese and u. S. Perspective, anyone or everyone. The Public Opinion polling in support of the u. S. Forces in japan is pretty good in both countries, generally, but there are voices arguing, for example, in the u. S. That its a mistake to have some of our best military assets within the missile range envelope of some of our potential adversaries. And then you have it with okinawa, a challenging political situation that may not be getting worse, but it is not getting that much better perhaps. Im interest in anyones view of how you see or how you would characterize the importance of our foreign presence in japan in light of some of the changes that are causing some of the people to argue we should rethink it. Do you want to start . Sure. When i was back in 2000 or so, i had a bumper sticker, west is best. Its much better to have your horses up there where the trouble might start and thereby keep it from starting. And if it does start, you can apply them more quickly. All the talk about vulnerability and so on, with the memories of pearl harbor and when we moved the American Fleet from the west coast of the United States to hawaii and then it was vulnerable, is useful to think about. But the degree of intelligence warning that we have the understanding of the political situation makes me think that we will not be, our forces would not be caught in their hangers at their pier in some kind of surprise attack. And that they aught to be there to shape the environment rather than simply react to it. I think it is much better to have our troops there. Another important function they served is that according to the realm in terms of commitment, the forces are there. And those in japan and those in korea who face threats in a much shorter range than we in washington or Washington State face, i know there are american troops there. And they are, were all in it together. So i think both for the reassurance point and for the endurance point. And i can tell you from the war fighting point is better, west is best. Just quickly, two thoughts. One is, and i think it was president chi in china, if it wasnt, it may have been his predecessor, but at one point the chinese leader says, this is a big portion of that. Well take the eastern half, well take the western half. And my response to that is, were not going anywhere. We have enjoyed a level of stability in that part of the world since 1953. And it hasnt just happened. Its ban lot of work. These alliances are part of that which i think are incredibly important for us to be there. Across the board, im reminded and would remind those listening, its 28,500 troops in south korea. Weve got 54,000 troops in japan and rightfully so. The other thing from a war fighting standpoint, i want my best foot forward. I want my forces, i want my best forces there. They understand their vulnerabilities. They understand the weaknesses. They spend a lot of time mitigating those challenges. And i want anybody that is there to understand, they are our best forces, and that they are, the forces we integrate within japan and with Korean Forces, we practice it all the time. And there is one of the things we did talk about in this forum was the readiness. And they are ready. They are ready. They are forward, they know it, they are the best we have ever had, and im very confident in it working. Translator so maybe my perspective is a little different. Strategy speaking, if theres a unit withdrawing and also rotating out depending on the location, there are different perspectives in terms of operation and also missions. In terms of operation, if we are to move a base, that sends a big signal to other countries. And so lets say relationships between korea and the United States and the japan and the United States, if we are to move a beast, then that means a big disrupt between those relationships. And that sends a big signal to the rest of the world. And i think that we are in a preparation phase or planning phase that we should be in deep consideration to consider what kind of presence that we are in need of right now. Lets say the japanese and u. S. Relationship, we will need a significant Strategic Dialogue or meeting with that forum. We should review what kind of roles and responsibilities each country should have, or will have, without that kind of careful consultation between the two countries. And i think well make a big mistake. I think the three panelists already talked about many of my opinions so i dont have very much to say, but if we are to realign or replace the United States forces from japan or from as asia, i think that this is a signal that we are taking a weaker position to the rest of the world. And, for example, the United States goes to korea and also japan as armed forces, we have alliances and also treaties and agreements. And i think the most important thing is training and also exercises. So if we have a Long Distance between two countries, that means that we need to have a one or two big exercises once in a while, so coordination becomes th less and less. So by having the forces physically in our territory, that means we can communicate closely. And also the political transfer becomes more often and more active. So thats why having physical presence in japan is really critical and also important to us. And so five years ago, there was a meeting with a whole air defense command. You might not know about the air command, but this one has a war fighting capability, meaning that the aircraft fighters and also other war fighting functions. So we have 50,000 airmen, but half of it belongs to this command. So this command takes the bmds command in japan. Meaning that we have a warning leader function under his command. And also a maritime ship belongs to this command itself. So theres a liason kind of function here. So we have different commands, separate commands between japan and the United States, but we moved this air command, air integrated command because we wanted to have the same physical base sharing together. So meaning that the United States command and also the japanese command, that i can share the same information to make decisions. I think that this shows the progress between the japan and the United States alliance and also defense corporation. And the recent missile launches from north korea. So we are ready to monitor those launches and testing from north korea together with the United States. And i think that moving a base is not a light decision to make. Thank you. I appreciate that from all four of you because i think that, from time to time, we have to recharge those batteries and make this argument and explain it in a different context. And i agree with what all of you said. Actually, the environment we face and the limited resources we have make this presence even more important. And for it to be effective in terms of deterrence and desuasion in shaping the environment, we have to be more joint in combined in our bilateral alliances. And our bilateral alliances have to be better to operate together. And certain scenarios, i think, one of the north korean targets in terms of the center of gravity with this missile program, one of the reasons they are doing it, is to try to split our alliances, to try to get them, by threatening the u. S. Stress, the bilateral alliance with japan and korea. And the answer is we are more joint, more committed. And in a very different way. I think chinas goal over the longer term and the tell of the sort of indicator, that was xi jinpings speech when he said the future should have no block. Meaning a less, immediate, threatening way, but Chinas Center of gravity is also to sort of gradually see our alliances get weaker. If we want to motivate china a little more on north korea, we have to demonstrate that north koreas actions are making our alliances more joint coming together. So to be ready to fight tonight, is that the saying in korea . To be ready, but also for the larger geopolitical game, we have to be more forward, more capable and more joint. Let me open it to the audience. I didnt ask about china so somebody can say, you didnt ask about china. There are a lot of issues on the table and a lot of issues discussed including cyber and everything else. Mr. Nelson. We have microphones. Thank you so much. Chris nelson, nelson report. Thank you, as always, for a terrific discussion. Chris, where . The nelson report. In my old age, im a follower of the Peace Foundation, so thank you for that. Theres hope for us all. From a military standpoint, theres a political issue potentially looming. At some point, were you still in your preparations, you would be asked, should we negotiate a freeze with these guys . Should we negotiate a peace treaty that accepts them as Nuclear Powers . From your military standpoint, what would that mean . What would be the downsides to it . Because you could see where we might be coming to that if its true, as general sharp says, its too late to stop these guys, except by military means, which is unacceptable. And as our friend scott snyder said for years, i dont see a happy ending here. You can see where we are facing this now with the icbm crisis. What is your response to the dilemma that im putting out. If youre asked, what is the military response to freezes, to peace treaties, to accepting these device as the nuclear power, what would you say . So to help the audience and some of our panel lists from japan, you are asking about the u. S. dprk treaty. Yes, and especially in the context of this discussion. This is an alliance problem, isnt it . If we are running around make ing the decision thank you very much. What would this peace treaty mean . Well start with the one of you two gentlemen. There are a lot of freeze proposals in the air right now. It was an interesting chinese proposal, in which they said that if north korea would freeze its missile and nuclear program, the United States and the republic of korea should increase their exercise program. As far as i can tell, the only benefit to that arrangement would be to china, which makes a lot of sense because it was china that proposed it. They would not only degrade the military capability of the United States and the western pacific, but they would also slow down the north Korean Nuclear development, which they dont much like anyhow. So the chinese freeze is transparentally selfserving and is something we aught to aught to reject. I think before you go into negotiations with the North Koreans, you should do a little bit of your history work. And this friends of mine, many acquaintances, many predecessors of mine have been involved in negotiations with the North Koreans and their record for negotiating in good faith, their record for carrying out their commitments once they have actually signed them and agreed to them. Its a bismol its perfect. Its perfect. Perfectly bismol. So i just think that it reminds you of the american cartoon of Charlie Brown kicking the football at lucy holding it in place for him, and she pulls away every time and he falls flat on his back every time. So im just a little jaded on the negotiation method, unless there is some reality behind it in terms of in terms of an approved military situation. Something that would lead you to believe that north korea, north korea was now more serious. So i tend to i tend to discount those. I think we should examine each one and look at the surrounding conditions to see if something has changed that would encourage us to do that. But im basically deeply skeptical about almost all of them. I would add two thoughts. One of them is no matter what we have given the batting record for negotiating directly with the north, as a perfect zero, forward with our confrontation with our allies, specifically. And that gets me back to if theres any possibility here, i think it is creating opportunities with china to then have all of us move to something with north korea that is almost sewn up ahead of time by everybody, what we agree on, then the discussions. And with china not sitting in the second row but leading at the table to generate possible peaceful outcomes. Thats what we all want. And what the specifics of that would be, im not sure, but that certainly is one path that i had a tendency to agree with denny on this. I think going direct is fruitless based on the imper call data that is out there. General iwasaki. Translator i did not understand the question that well, unfortunately, but so f far well, although we actually provide it, it is something that the north Korean Development has continued. And although there was a crisis in the sixparty talks and other things took place, but in terms of the result, there was no good result. And north korea continued to develop the Nuclear Weapons. So that should be the lesson that we learn out of our experiences. And north korea, the safety of the country and revival of the regime, i think that is a maximum requirement for them. In america, they say yes. And in exchange for that, this condition that nuclearization is important, but that has not been successful. The dilemma has continued. So one side must compromise. Otherwise, there is no solution. And therefore an ideal world, the u. S. And north korea alignment would be very difficult. I dont know whether i answered the question perfectly, but thats my view. Translator i think my view is similar, but if i might understand, that if you look at the world, the countries which are trustworthy, and there are those that are not trustworthy. If you look at the track record of north korea, even though there is a promise, the promise is likely to be broken by north korea. In some way or the other, they try to earn kind or try to accumulate their fund. And they attempt to take similar action. So in order for them to make a promise, an irreversible condition should be defined clearly in order to move ahead. In any case, for north korea, for Ballistic Missile and nuclear, the purpose of the development is the you are the riv survival of the regime. In order to have survival of the regime, china may be needed. But i think the final pull is the United States. And since that is the ultimatepurpose, and for that reason they want to be a Nuclear Country or the launching of the icbm. And so the purpose of the north korea in the reversible are the conditions, i think those two should be kept in our mind in order to deal with that. You dont invest in the diplomatic option everything, right . Because you dont put everything on that debt because we know from experience it probably wont work. And the design of this is to weaken our deterrence and to weaken our alliances. Is that a fair summation . Yes, sir . I agree with the other gentleman, a wonderful overview. An extraordinary time calls for extraordinary measures. What im about to raise, a question clearly is going to be extraordinary. Dont take that as a defense, particularly for our japanese friends. Its clear from what youve said and what one reads that there are no easy nor good, theyre all bad military options. And if you assume, as we read over and over again and i havent heard anything different here that the North Koreans objective is to secure a Nuclear Capability that will enable them to secure maximum leverage for its threat of use, thats what they want, and nothing seems to deter it, and if you look at it from that perspective and buy it, why would they . Why wouldnt negotiations or threat they seem to have sufficient military capability to threaten south korea particularly, that that makes that a difficult military and why would they initiate a conditioned military operation because worst case that could bring a nuclear retaliation, ultimately. Im not sure this is accurate. You all probably would know. But i understand fred kemp has come out with a recent book that says that kennedy in the earl 60s was confronted with the possibility, probability of soviet encirclement of allies and made the addition to use our Nuclear Capability calculating a loss of a million on either side. It was an extraordimeasure, extraordinary extraordinary measure, extraordinary times. Im sure that in the bowels of the pentagon and other calculations theyre looking at tradeoffs like that. Isnt it going to be necessary among these bad options to prevent north korea from achieving its objective at some point . Because its not going to get any easier. Now, back to the extraordinary measure in this calculation, it seems at the moment at least chinas china has the greatest leverage, that is wanting to use it. Maybe in minor ways, counterfeit corruption. Its not going to affect the overall calculation. But if this were a possibility to bring pressure on china given all the historic restraints for historic reasons, would japan consider developing a Nuclear Capability because clearly thats going to signal to china this could have complications for us. Thats my question. So this is what charles kr t krautheimer put in the washington post, the only way out is to encourage japan and i think you added the republic of korea, to develop Nuclear Weapons. An idea i recall hearing on the campaign trail last year, as well, at one point. Is it fair to ask you to respond . [ laughter ] why not . You face more Difficult Missions in the past. [ laughter ] really . Translator let me answer the question. The first, north korea. Icbm or nuclear, the armament has been developed because they do not have any trust in the other countries, and from this, they are armed, they could not feel assured with Nuclear Capability. I think that seems to be a motivation. And also the of course the development of the nuclear arms are very problematic. If you look at the world situation or if you look at the relations with north korea with the rest of the world, the Nuclear Proliferation or technological proliferation, of course the threat of nuclear, but there are other kind of threats spreading throughout the world. And to japan, to the United States, worldwide, i think this is a very unfavorable situation, very extraordinary situation. In that sense and the United States now, every option is on the table. That is a reason i think that every option is on the table. Another point, the Nuclear Option issue, for about a week ago, there was the opinion poll by private, the organization, about japan and whether Nuclear Armament is okay. In lok, 70 of the public say that they need to have the Nuclear Armament. And japanese answer is only 9 . Only 9 say that japan should be armed with Nuclear Weapons. I think that is a result of the poll. And i check that with the newspaper report. So about japan, in terms of national sentiment, in genuine, secretary, i think the result may come out. If you look at the national sentiment, id rather them going to other nuclear, the alliance with the United States, et cetera. So other types of deternities seems to be called for by japan. So the maybe i think that is more clever, the option. Military statesman really means cant be fired anymore. Others want to weigh in . I think we should remember, lloyd, that this is not a new dilemma that has been faced. In the battle of the cold war years when the United States had a huge military, huge nuclear arsenal, the soviet union had one, the countries that were caught in between adopted different forms of their own Nuclear Deterrence or reassurance. France and the uk decided that they wanted to have their own systems, and they developed them. Germany, turkey, norway, other countries decided that they would rely on the american deterrent, but it wasnt simply a declarative alliance. It was aircraft in which americans weapons could be delivered by aircraft, flown by german or turkish or danish pilots. There was the stationing of american shorter range systems forward. So theres a whole range of things that had been developed in order to reassure an ally that the United States Nuclear Umbrella extends over them without them developing weapons. And we actively have discussions with these at the official an official channel with japan and the republic of korea. So i think i think your principle of our allies having nuclear reassurance is absolutely correct. And then i think its up to the allies to decide where along that spectrum from answering their own arsenal to a sears of intermediate measures to simply relying on american declare tori policy as they want to. And as north korea develops its its delivery capabilities and weapons themselves, i think this conversation will take place. Agreements will be reached, and the countries will still be secure. I want to make sure im im trying not to get in trouble when i say this. But i think and it goes back to what admiral blair said earlier which is oftentimes and certainly lately this is portrayed as just the u. S. And north korea. And it has taken on a particular intensity because of the icbm potential which is now much more real. But we focus on that, and what i worry about is sometimes we forget, you know, that south korea and japan are already under the threat envelope in terms of missile capability. You know, theres certainly the development of the nuclear warhead. From an alliance standpoint, we have a responsibility to include them in these discussions and not almost de facto isolate them from them because were getting into this debate about us and north korea. We have responsibility. I recognize, you know, that now that its u. S. Citizens that could be under the threat here very, very soon, but i think its a responsibility for all leaders, american leaders in particular, to speak to our requirementsvie visavis the alliance in a forum like this for 3. 5 days is a fresh reminder of the importance of that alliance. I think michael said earlier, even after something really bad happens, that alliance is stronger, its not broken up because of what we did or didnt do. And sometimes we have a tendency to not make that kind of consideration given sort of the shortterm nature of right now. Japanese people, south Korean People are already well under threat envelope that theyve been dealing with, frankly, for some time. Not nuclear, but on the conventional side, very, very dangerous and lethal. And we shouldnt forget that as a part of how we move forward as this gets more difficult. Thats a critical point. I cant resist but three quick reasons why its a really bad idea. And i was the senior agent for the nec staff in the bush administration, and very, very senior people south of the president himself wanted to use this gambit of warning japan of nuclear. Its a bad idea, first, because we have more than enough joint power ourselves. We dont need it to deter or necessarily destroy north korea. Number two, if the north korean aim and in the longer term the sense the chinese aim is to wasteful spending alliances, why would we introduce into the narrative the idea that we dont trust japan, they dont trust our Nuclear Umbrella . It it goes completely against the tool we have to start dealing with the problem which is greater cooperation, greater alliance, solidarity. Three, chinas not going to listen to us. You know, we could go in and tell the chinese that japan or korea will go nuclear. Theyre going make their own judgments. Theyve been living alongside japan and korea for a lot longer than we have. Theyre not going to listen to us. What theyre going to hear is u. S. Japan Alliance is really in trouble because the americans are talking about japan Going Nuclear or the u. S. Korea Alliance is in trouble. Thats the signal wed send. So yeah. Now, if theres doubt about the credibility of our extended because were under threat, as admiral mullen put very well, we need to deepen the dialogue and think through how we restore a greater measure of credibility. Thats a far different thing i think. Thanks. Just add one more point, mike . Yeah. The a Nuclear Attack on either the republic of korea or japan would kill lots of americans. So a an icbm reaching los angeles would kill more americans, but we are already subject to north Koreas Nuclear threats equally, have many of our citizens bearing equal exposure and eventually ability as our vulnerability as our korean and japanese allies. I think that is someone of the strongest parts of the deterrent equation that exists. A provocative question but good discussion. Yes . Thank you for coming. My name is mitsui ekai, japan native, u. S. Citizen, maybe of the reagan foundation. I have a couple questions can you, too yeah, thanks. Since we have generals here, how can we defend seoul, are we ready to defend because it doesnt take Nuclear Weapons to destroy seoul. More importantly, how can we defend okinawa where there are a bunch of u. S. Bases there . How can we do that . Its its a military question. Thanks. Hand the mike to that guy right there. Three seats over. General sharp . To general sharp so the defense of seoul counts upon the combined forces of the republic of korea and the United States. And what korea has along the border thats organized there to do counterbattery fire, the air forces there in the republic of korea and from the United States, if today north korea started immediately pulling the laniards and artillery rounds started coming in, there would be great damage in seoul. We would relatively quickly be able to destroy that artillery through ground, air, and naval fire. I dont want to minimize it, but there are very solid plans, solid capabilities to quickly react to any sort of artillery coming into seoul that are very well rehearsed many, many times. It would be the end of kim jongun if he started that. Im absolutely convinced because we would not stop there. For those watching podcasts or dont know, general sharp was commander of forces on all the korean experience e peninsula and the Korean Forces. Thank you. Do you want to do yeah, can we defend okinawa . So theres another you did actually, but say generals, not admirals. [ laughter ] chip gregson was commander of many things, but through the force based in okinawa theres a little revenge going on here. I told general sharp he was going to get butt put on the sp then he had hiked it to me. Thank you. The defense of okinawa would be the same as the defense of the mainlands, air and Ballistic Missile defense, cruise missiles defense using the full weight of u. S. And japanese forces. More and more is planned, theres already a battalionsized unit more or less going in. Japanese forces are already done. The posture is getting stronger over time, and unless theres some miraculous parting of the skies and the situation gets better, our alliance is going to get stronger to defend the territory, the interests, and the lives of our japanese allies. Its a very, very big thing to attack the United States of america. Thats a huge, huge thing. And you know, the public discussion we get nervous, but we need to remember what a huge thing that is and the consequences that we would think about. This is not some ambiguous gray zone were talking about. Its two of our most important treaty allies and likeminded democracies. Other questions . We have one more in the front. Matthe matthew . Id like steve winters, independent researcher. This is a followup on the question that was just addressed. I did go to a talk by one expert on north korea who suggested that even if the regime were destroyed and the artillery was taken care of, that actually the plan of the North Koreans, they have would be to go even in a decapitated state to go to a massive guerrilla and partisan war using their whole population. And that this would not resolve itself in months, for years. A libyan situation, perhaps. Is anybody else addressing that issue . The assumption seems to be the military option is terrible, oh, maybe a Million People would be killed or how many million. But that it will be over in some sense, horrible as it is. But the suggestion was it wont be over. Would you hand the mike to the guy on your right . Again, as was talked about, i think that it is very important that we look at getting information into the people of north korea about what potentially could be the future, what human rights is about how the government is treating them, but look at it from their eyes, from the perspective of north Korean People. Without going into the classified plans or anything, those if something happened and we had to go north, there was instability, we had to go north, how do we make sure that the people first off are secured, how are they taking care taken care of, and how do we get this word to them as quickly as possible about the truth about what were really about . Its not easy. Much more work needs to be done on it. It is part of the plans that we do that. I think that with the more and more cell phones that are there, the more and more usb sticks that are getting into north korea, the more ways to communicate across, again, its not going to be easy, but it is necessary. If we dont and south korea doesnt and japan doesnt, and we dont work this, the scenario youre just describing of insurgencies and going to the hills and fighting for a long time, i do fear is really going to happen because of what north kor koreas people have been told, and i truly believe today. We as general sharp knows well and helped make possible, we planned for this with our korean allies. It isnt perfect. We arent perfectly aligned. We planned for it. We try to talk to the chinese about it. Thats very, very difficult. But its important for japan, as well, what happens if the north collapses or becomes unstable. I dont think we do enough dialogue about what this means to japan. I would like either general to weigh in on the japanese perspective. The panels are different from other panels because the panelists can order based on seniority wasnt an order, just a suggestion. Guidance. Guidance. Translator like yesterday, my junior controls senior. Thats the problem. Im a senior to mr. Yusaki. Once north korea collapses, then what happens . I think this is my personal view that if the internal conflict continues there, thats one possibility. Whats the cause of collapse . I think thats the question we have to ask, and then thats the most important thing. Kim jongun was assassinated or died of illness, i think we could think of all different reasons. And if theres no control, then including the military whats the cause for fight . Combat . There are things to think of. Whether it becomes a guerrilla war, theres no certainty. We think about the smooth transition or the chaotic transition, right after the war in japan, the u. S. Estimate was that the i think that japan would fight until the end, and there will be a battle on the mainland. However, it did happen. And the war ended. In case of iraq, Saddam Hussein fell, and then the internal conflict occurred, i think it all depends on culture and history of any given country. So those elements need to be considered. But i think we have to keep studying all kind of possibilities. Im from the defense college, and when i was a freshman, mr. Ricci was senior. If there is a oneyear difference, then you treat it like dirt. So thats the four freshmen see. So in front of the senior, before i speak, i think would be scolded later. So i always ask the senior to ask senior to speak first with lots of respect. And with regard to north korea, my view is very similar to mr. Ricci. I think it really depends how it collapses. For example, if the leader was assassinated, or it might the collapse in a way to gradually get absorbed to south korea. Since that would happen in Korean Peninsula, so the threat to us is if the internal conflict that took place, its possible a lot of spice lot of spies might come to japan. And once south korea is unified with north korea, when the unification happened in germany, the the west germany had lots of economic power, and then the technological power. And then east germany within eastern bloc had lots of economic power. However, when they got unified, that caused economic the depression. Translator lets apply this to north korea meaning that we will have a massive refugee problem if north korea would fall and thinking about those refugees, they might make their way to china or russia, they may take a ship to japan. So we would need to be prepared to accept or handle those refugees. And of course, the United States forces would take the initiative or spearhead some of the activities, and Japanese Selfdefense force is not going would not be the major, primary role, but we will have definitely a Logistical Support to the United States. Yes, maam, in the back. Translator id like to ask a question in japanese. This is so unusual because i usually cannot ask a question in japanese. I am from japan. Thank you for mentioning okinawa. Dr. Green, thank you for the question in defense of okinawa. Earlier, we talked about moving a base or moving a military power sends a signal that the alliance is weaken ed. So when you talk about move or realignment, what kind of skill are you talking about . For example, marines in okinawa or one unit in okinawa, or what kind of scope are you talking about . If you could clarify that, that would be great. And also defense of okinawa, history is speak speaking p the forces, there was an air facility that was built, and currently the air facilitys now used by the u. S. Forces, so what implications or impressions do you have about this transition in terms of history . So im speaking before mr. Ric k ricci. So i should take the microphone before the rotation here. Thank you for the questions. So current ly the replacement i being discussed. I mentioned earlier about that moving a base should not be a light decision. I am not saying either or fully move or any type of scope, but what japan is going through is part of a bigger scheme, better planning. For example, moving a unit if its done in an abrupt manner, i think that shows weakness. And of course in order for us to move a unit from the United States side or from japan side, there is going to be a long and careful consultation and planning. So thats whats needed for careful realignment. Regarding okinawa, thats my second hometown. Because i was staffed in okinawa as my first posting, and i spent six years there. So the okinawan people went through hardship during world war ii. So for my personal understanding, i think i have the understanding. So mr. Ottah left a message, and i think that rings deeply among oak now an people, meaning that o okinawan or japanese, theres a message there. I think the defense of okinawa is coming from that historical perspective, as well. Mr. Osaki, i agree with him. Dr. Green talked about a realignment of the u. S. Unit. My comment performance not specific to okinawa or any bases japan or the United States, i just wanted to mention that in a generic term and also about strategy. There are many defense strategi strategies, or maybe we should have a better scheme to consider one specific strategy. Regardinging a realignment of the a unit of okinawa, for the defense of okinawa, this is not only for the United States challenge, but for us Japanese Selfdefense force. So lets say that in the 1970s theres some kind of invasion, threats to invasion because there was an evacuation from the United States withdrawal and movement from the oak now the okinawan army. There are some movements and also some actions according to the plan undergoing, and theres 500 kilometers between the islands or maybe a bigger distance. We do not have a military unit there. Meaning that theres a military vacuum. So we wanted to plug that in militari militarily. So having that unit, that tla translates to deterrence. Not only to protect one specific island, but overall there should be a zone defensetype of okinawa island and multiple islands defense by placing a unit. So were getting to the end of the seminar. I wanted to ask admiral blair in the few minutes we have to explain some of the thinking of the china question. We spent a lot of time on the immediate military threats, appropriately north korea and i think before the end we should hear from one of the panelists, admiral blair, some crystallization of what the views were on the longer term, bigger challenge were dealing with. Had you sat in on our discussions on china, i think youd be a little bit surprised. We did not spend most of our time talking about carrier battle groups and putting coast guard units moving forward in the South China Sea. We felt that the military posture of the alliance was sufficient to make aggression against islands in that part of the world pretty unattractive, pretty high risk. We discussed more were the sort of longterm geoeconomic competition that china has undertaken with the rest of the world as shown in the ambitious one belt, one road infrastructure building plan across saerks and particularly in the ambitions to be dominate in the ten most important areas of technology in the future, as laid out explicitly in the chinese document, made in china 2025, which lays out artificial intelligence, highspeed computing, robotics, the 21st century dominant technologies. And openly and china openly saying that its going to use all of the consideration tools at its disposal to be dominant in those in those sectors by 2025. And as i say, i think you would be surprised that militarily trained people felt that that was the aspects of our competition with china that ought to get our greatest attention, that we could handle the military side of it, keep things quiet. But this big technological, economic, Human Capacity innovative competition is whats really going to make a difference in asia. And that the United States and japan and the republic of korea needed to get on with with being out front on it. So you know, Winston Churchill had this famous quip the only thing worst than fighting with allies is fighting without them. He and roosevelt and truman were wise and lucky to have general eisenhower in command in europe because if youd had a famous, you know, gungho war fighter like patton or montgomery, our war alliances wouldnt have functioned. And weve been fortunate in more recent history to have admirals and generals steering our military strategy who have a similar way of thinking about alliances and coalition and especially our closest and most important allies, japan in particular. And were all lucky today and with the military Statesmen Forum to have the wisdom of the gentleman on the stage and our panelists. Its raining, but lets conclude by thanking our participants for their wisdom and service. [ applause ] later today, kentucky senator rand paul addresses the annual National Conservative student conference sponsored by the young americas foundation. Well have live coverage of his remarks beginning at 7 30 p. M. Eastern on cspan. We have been on the road meeting winners of this years student cam video documentary competition. At east lime high school in east lime, connecticut, second Prize Winners jack mcdonald, mchighlight guzman, were handed 1,500 for their documentary on east lyme justice. And honorable wins at Cannon School received 250 for their documentary on health care. And then to concord, massachusetts, to hand out a second prize award to students at the Nashoba Brooks School where cara fritz, charlotte lisa, and caroline drupot won 1,500 for their documentary on the wage gap. In North Hampton, massachusetts, students from North Hampton high, phoebe up and alena frogani won 150 for their documentary on sanctuary cities and immigration reform. In ludlow, massachusetts, kendall vermet, liz gonzalez, and vraden barnett of paul r. Baird middle School Received an Honorable Mention prize of 250 for their documentary on the opioid