Test. Test. Test. Test. We see that with direct dissent. We see that with air bases being built on atolls in the middle of the south chinese sea. The United States cant allow that balance of power to shift in that way. Were slow to realize that. I think part of it is because we dont look at a longterm view of how we, the United States, should be involved and lead in those regions of the world. For our students, id like to id like to connect this to actually what happens in policy making. About the generals comments. Gives us a chance to look at a particular problem in how strategy can make a difference. Ive been thinking about the president s decision to go to cuba and to build more normal relations. Theres a question about when you go and if that undermines your defense of human rights and democracy by giving credibility to this regime. But one of the things, you know, phillip talked about indirect means and the general talked about the importance of cooperation in this hemisphere is that for me strategy helped resolve this question. One of the big barriers weve had to deal with these transnational problems in our region is the fact the United States have become marginalized by fighting over cubas ability to participate in hemispheric matters. Every time we went. It was a significant barrier to getting cooperation from our partners on a range of issues which are important to us. I think in the end strategy helps you decide, well, yes, there are arguments for or against dealing with a repressive regime in cuba. Work being closely with mexico and others who dont like our policy and find it harder to cooperate with us because of our cuba policy. You say, okay, herebys a framework to help decide this argument where we have policy arguments on both sides. For me, that was a strategy to help did the president do the right thing. I think thats the place where strategy can make a difference. If you have your ideas focused on the kinds issues. You say, how did it fit into the broader framework. It is the thing that allows you to at least come to a set of rules to help you engage in the process of policy making. Thats interesting. I think what youre talking about there is just the need to have a kind of intentional process for reconsidering the old threats. The ways in which Foreign Policy can be rooted in habits. There was a house i think they now call it the International Affairs committee. Hearings in 2008 on grand strategy. One of the comments that was articulated at that was the United States doesnt have a grand strategy. What it has is a lot of habits. I may just throw that out as a question to the entire groups. What old scripts do we have right now that are worth intentionally discarding. Let me tackle that a little bit. Remember i argued to you if you accept it if this transnational hypothesis is right, that the old line between domestic and foreign policies is blurrier. So actually a lot of the Foreign Policy issues are really domestic policies. So right now, there is a huge global struggle under way over the character of domestic governance. There is actually a hostile block of powers. Lets call them iran, russia, china. Theyre not formal allies in any sense. Theyre not united what theyre for. What does unite them is what they are against. What he interest all against in domestic governance. They are all against what we think of as Classical Liberal ideals of governance. That is, there are against freedom of thought versus dogma. They come down on the side of dogma. When it comes to open participation based on merit and opportunity, instead of hereditary or faith driven or criminally driven oligarchy or aristocracies. Theyre in favor of oligarchy and not in favor of opportunity. When you look at the economy, basically do you prefer an open Economic System with maximum opportunity for new entrants or do you prefer monopolies in league with the government. They tend to prefer monopolies in league with the government versus opportunity. All the things that go with this. This is an old argument about how to rule societies that goes back now more than 200 years. Notice now for example right now whats happening in central and south america on these issues. Look at the domestic issues in brazil. Where you have a brazilian government thats on the verge of being impeached and replaced. Look at the domestic governance issues and whats just happened in argentina. Where an antiliberal government has been overthrown in preference to a liberal government. Look at the tension thats going on right now in the country of ecuador. Look at the tremendous conflict thats now unfolding in venezuela. With a totally antiliberal government moving towards complete dictatorship in a country undergoing full economic collapse, fighting against people who are trying to clamor for the restoration of liberal ideals. That is a domestic struggle thats also occurring all over everywhere else in the world. Whether were talking about the recent elections in indonesia or were talking about struggles in india or in burma. If you think about that, the struggle does not fall neatly into the category of a Foreign Policy issue. So then you ask yourself though of course the United States should care about how the struggle turns out. We dont want the antiliberals to win. If we want generally to foster what i would call an open civilized world. So if we dont want the antiliberals to win, how do we support the people who favor liberal ideals of governance . Its not as general renuart pointed out, the use of military right and left. It might be thinks like defrost the difficult environment in the americas. The problems with cuba were interfering with our ability to rally liberal causes in latin america actually and kind of paradoxically. But think about the positions that america would adopt in a lot of different controversies around the world in order to align itself or strengthen these causes in these domestic struggles. Do we care, for example what happens when the antiliberal elements challenge norms in europe in places like hungary or now even a little bit in poland . I dont think the United States is indifference to that but its not as if we can intervene in hungary. How do we wield our instruments . How do we exercise an indirect approach to simply tilt the odds a little bit that one side comes out on top instead of another . Take china, for example. This is where ill close. The great issue of china. Yes, there are surface encounters with china in places like the south china sea. But the fundamental issue of china is what is china going to be when it grows up. The chinese themselves do not know the answer to this question. And theyre deeply uneasy and anxious about it. Right to the level of the top leadership. And, by the way, any american who claims to know what chinas going to be in ten years, one way or the other, is someone whom you should not listen to any further. So, but then does the United States care how china resolve these great domestic struggles . Of course it cares. It will have enormous effects on us. Ask yourself, how then, if the u. S. Cares a lot, does it foster one outcome over another when obviously direct intervention in china is out of the question and not feasible. Thats where you come in to ideas of you foster certain kinds of norms, create certain kinds of incentives. Whether its a broadly shared consensus law of the sea that unites everyone around china but china, that chinese notice and see. Whether its other kinds of norms where you make global capitalism and the digital revolution look like it could work. Et cetera, et cetera. This is the place where we need to figure out how to advance our conversation on how we foster these sorts of transnational advances on all the issues we care about while increasingly not relying on blunt force direct intervention which the American People mostly dont support anyway. Can i piggy back on that for just a half second. Another great example of how combining elements of National Power can create political change. Many of you may recall the tsunami that occurred in indonesia, thailand, and the area in the 2005 christmas season. The very First Responders to all of that were the United States military and brought millions and millions of pounds and dollars worth of aid to the banda aceh region and others. Youll also recall maybe that that was the hotbed of the revolution in, with the government in that portion of indonesia. Subsequent to that infusion of International Aid and development, the rebels agreed to peace talks, not without the understanding that this influence, this infusion of global good through the use of military and later civilian activities maybe provided the opportunity to negotiate an internal political discussion that could lead to peace among rebelling parties. I think that when you think about solving a problem in that multidimensional way, it leaves a strong impression. Interestingly, relations with cambodia and vietnam considerably warmed after that, and they were observers. They just watched what happened. So, the United States is the only nation that has that ability, that unique ability, to incorporate each of those critical elements of National Power in a way that you dont paint the picture of military, you paint the picture of a nation with compassion, with values and with the willingness to help. And i think, to sarah, the importance of trade in this is critical. I think, philip, maybe we have a better opportunity to influence directly via trade than maybe we do in all of the other areas because both countries are critically dependent upon each other for their livelihood. Im going to leave plenty of time for your questions, so, if we could have the microphones come down here on either side. Lets see, we already have one person with a microphone, good. Am i on . Yes. Keith wilson from the Political Science department here at iu. Thank you for the extraordinary panel. I wanted to maybe get back to the original question about grant strategy, and i guess im struck by maybe some disconnection between the principle of a grand strategy and the practice of it. Dean steinberg had mentioned the usefulness in certain context where theres a lot of murkiness going back to the grand strategy as kind of a framework for solving problems. My own reading of the National Security strategy, if we were to take that to be an example of the grand strategy, leads me to believe its a great articulation of a variety of different principles, but then, general, you may know better than anyone, when it comes to actually facing challenges, a lot of times you can go to the National Security strategy and the grand strategy at large and you can find solution you can find a number of different courses of action that can result from that. I just wonder if you could articulate maybe some of the weaknesses to the grand strategy, and ultimately, if, in fact, the grand strategy leaves you in a situation where youre not able to get to some of the very Practical Solutions i think that professor zelikow alluded to. Again, what really does it accomplish . Let me just very quickly, and then ill let the others mention. The important element that dean steinberg mentioned is that its a framework. Its a document that we look at and helps us sort of figure out what the vision, the interest those principles are of the president. From the military perspective, we then take a National Defense strategy review that tries to translate that into each department of the Armed Services. But its also a document that other nations look at to understand wheres the u. S. Mind in all this. One of the failure one of the pitfalls with becoming too specific that may not be the right word, but too direct in a grand strategy, is that you now limit yourself. So, you really want the overarching National Security strategy to outline those key principles but not limit your response. Recall, were 100 wrong in predicting the future. And so, what you want to be able to do is below the level of that grand strategy create the framework that allows the u. S. To be agile in some fashion as it applies itself to unique problems anywhere in the world. And ill stop there and let others ill add this. One thing that you can do is, it is and lets not call it a grand strategy. But one thing that leaders can do is describe the world theyre in, and basically, offer a diagnosis of the patient. As i tried to do in a small way. And then you can ask yourself after youve heard it, hmm, does that offer me any insight that i didnt already know . And by the way, around the government, if you can describe the world in a way that kind of maybe adds a little clarity or a little focus that wasnt there before, then youve advanced the ball. Thats actually a very important thing that you can do. Thats actually a very important i remember when Franklin Roosevelt was giving his fireside chats, he wasnt laying out a roadmap. And before pearl harbor, he didnt lay out a roadmap for how the allies would win the war. Mostly, the purpose of the fireside chats were just to tell americans, heres the world youre living in today. In fact, in one fireside chat, he asked them, please take out a map of the world. And the newspapers printed a map. So that he could simply tell them about the world that they lived in today, so they could basically understand the diagnosis that disposition would call himself dr. Win the war, dr. New deal giving way to dr. Win the war. This is what the doctor was saying is going on in the world. And later, youd hear more about prescriptions. And the other thing then if you want a grand strategy, grand strategy really just begins to provide a roadmap that offers some sense of direction of which way you should drive. Maybe very detailed directions, but usually not because you dont want to tie yourself down and you dont want to annoy anyone. So, these doctrines are often just terrible bureaucratic things that are cures for narcolepsy. But or induce it. What you should ask yourself whenever you hear an important strategic statement, or read one, is did this tell me anything about what the United States wants to do that i didnt already know before i read this statement . Or if it says, like, the United States wants peace, strength and prosperity, gee, i could never have guessed that. All right, so, then that tells you really nothing. And then its basically, these are just placeholder documents that are designed to allow you to do whatever it is you actually need to do and make sure its consistent with the strategy. So, but occasionally, rarely, the government does Say Something that actually tells you something you didnt know before you heard it about what its going to try to do, and then that can be important about overall goals. Down here in front. Adam. Thank you for the opportunity to ask a question. My name is adam lift, professor of International Relations here in sgis. I have a question for the entire panel, but was inspired by some of the things that philip was saying. And i extract two important themes from what you were saying. First, the idea of the scripts being old and being in need of an update. And second, a theme that was echoed in the remarks of several other panelists, the unpredictability of events. I think a key part of strategy, grand or otherwise, that is often left out of the debate, perhaps because its less sexy, but is arguably essential, fundamental, is the importance of designing institutions to effectively, efficiently and expeditiously achieve those objectives. This is very much in my mind these days because two of my Major Research projects today are on looking at the rationale behind and the likely consequences of both chinas and japans creations, establishment of new National Security councils in late 2013 and the implications those likely have for Crisis Management with the hook of a possible East China Sea lowlevel incident. So, how do we, how does america need to reform or restructure the key institutions in the government and in the military and reallocate resources effectively to maximize the flexibility, adaptability and Rapid Response that this new 21stcentury, the challenges we face require . Thank you. Adam, you stumped them. No, i think we could spend a semester on this, and we do in many different contexts. I mean, i think that first of all, its important folks understand where institutions get value, but not to overstate it, because i think this is, like grand strategy, architecture gets a lot of attention in the academy, and you know, is often kind of more of an academic exercise than a reality, that somehow, if we just move the blocks around, things are going to work out. And theres no doubt that institutions, both domestic institutions and international institutions, can solve some problems that are difficult to achieve in the absence of institutions. The fact that you can have repeated interactions, lower transaction costs increases predictability, knowledge, dependence on each other. So, there are plenty of reasons to do it. But its also true that the institutions have to work with the Underlying Forces that are taking place. And they are the substitute for it. So, when we think about all these architectures, whether its reorganizing the government, if we had a different nse or a different state department or pentagon or a different interagency process, yeah, there are Different Things duked on the margin that would mirror things phil talked about the margins, the trends, do we have ways of talking about the transnational domestic things and whether our institutions are, you know, surface those things and bring the right people to the table. But i think for me, its always been substance is more important than the formalities in the organization. Its understanding the points that philip and others have raised here and their importance. The process can adapt to that and will adapt to that. And weve seen this over time. You can make changes in the organization on the margin, but its only when you get the insights about the substance that you really begin to then make the adaptations and get the commitment that allows the organizations to adapt. Let me you may know, this is the 30th anniversary of the goldwaternichols act. And currently, senator mccain and the Armed Services committee are undergoing kind of a review of that, and should that change in some way. And you know, im here i am as a military guy saying we need some more government involvement in this, but one issue with respect to goldwaternichols is while it drove the National Security strategy process, it really then focuses attention on the department of defense and how it was organized and created the joint commands and the regional commands. It didnt say anything about that whole other behemoth out there that is the rest of government. And we dont have right now any instrument other than the National Security council and the consensus that it reaches through the principles to the president to drive the rest of government to be more interagency focused. A number of us have sat in Deputies Committee meetings and principals Committee Meetings and National Security council meetings, and i think all of us probably have the frustration that so often you spend Great National resource in terms of the people that are involved in that room and you walk out without a decision. And how can we not get there . And i think part of it is that we still need to connect the other half of what a goldwaternichols did for the department of defense so that government and you talk about, you know, these old, rusty things that we have government is forced to have those interdepartmental discussions in a way that drives to decisions. And obviously, thats something i think steve yesterday on a panel said he would like to see new president s sort of not create a 100day road map and then charge toward it, but rather, step back and take 100 days and do a new assessment of how the government operates and maybe where we ought to go and what we ought to change. So, i think there is some of this that without some direction from congress, it will continue to be very difficult to move with the agility that we need to in some of these areas. So, a quick let me go out for a quick example. Look at capacity of what you want to do, then work back from that. So, just an example, the United States theres a lot of problems of public disorder around the world. Very quickly, if you look at these problems of public disorder, this is domestic disorder at its roots and would ideally be solved by police and administration of justice with then heavy use of the military as even in those countries as a last resort, because military units arent going to stay there and police the town for the next 20 years, right . So, then u. S. Government wants to help with policing and administration of justice. So, when the United States actually was asked the question of how has the capacity in the u. S. Government to train policemen better to solve problems of great disorder . Looked around. State department. Like, and who the state department had no particular administrative capacity to know how to train police, but there was a bureau at the state department that knew policemen. So, what they did, basically, is gave the state Department Hundreds of millions of dollars at one time and said and what the state department did is, any companies out there that say they know how to train policemen . A couple companies raised their hands, say yeah, we know retired policemen who would be happy to take your money. So, the state department then just becomes a contractor for people who for private companies that claim to have the capacity to do what it is you need to do. Now, and this turns out not to be a good story, and it gets addressed and patched in various ways but never really has become a good story. And by the way, to this day, it is not a good story. Why . We look to a Foreign Policy agency to have the expertise to handle an essentially domestic function. If we wanted to solve the cyber problems that mr. Cate mentioned lets suppose we wanted to create safety codes i sometimes prefer fire codes to create safer systems. You would not find the institutional knowhow, the capacity to do that in the department of state. Actually, if you ask where would you find the capacity to do that in the u. S. Government, this would be a hard question. One place you would look, actually, is the department of commerce, which has an entity called nist that hardly anyone has ever heard of, that actually has a little capacity in this space. But thats what i mean, is that these are Important International problems. The capacities to solve and address those problems usually lie in outside the traditional National Security agencies or dont exist in any agency at all. So, then ask yourself, how do i build this capacity, and then ask yourself the question, and by the way, what label do i stick on that, and ill figure out later what meetings they go to. Let me go to ken moss in the far back. Well make this one the last question. Thank you very much, nick. Ken moss, retired here in bloomington, taught a number of years in the National Defense university. First, a very brief comment thats already partly been amplified. Foreign governments and foreign audiences study these u. S. National security documents. They read them like romans read end trails. And to some extent, almost to a point that is distressing. And ill leave it at that. I can tell personal stories, as certainly a number of the people on the panel can. Id like to pick up on a point that general renuart has pointed to in part, and i guess link it in the relation to the program and the relationship between this process, the National Security strategy process, and the academy at large. There is an argument often made that our National Security process within government has become so absorbed by the daily momentum of events and demands that there is not much longterm thinking, and that the longterm thinking, in effect and im trying to say this as succinctly as possible is increasingly being outsourced, in effect, to the think tanks. Thats where you have to go if youre going to get longerterm, visionary thinking that is beyond the four or fiveyear cycle either of u. S. Elections or other matters. Is that something that you would agree with . Is there a problem in that . Should there be more longterm thinking within the government, or is it a responsibility that increasingly is going to have to fall on the outside specialist who comes in, either into government at times, or floats out . Let me just briefly comment on that. I mean, having been head of policy planning. This is kind of the standard rap on government. On one level, of course, its true. People say, in fact, you have to deal with the crisis in the moment. But i think the bigger problem is recognizing that you can think long term, but you act in the short term. And the real issue is bringing the horizon of the long term into the decisionmaking that you have now. So, i dont think its the absence of longterm thinking, i think its the lack of effective tools to take those broad perspectives and to think about, if we want to be in x place in ten years, what will we be doing now that gets us there. And i think its that nexus. So, you just get a disconnect between the two. And i think it takes a very special kind of set of frames of mind and intellectual tools to be able to link the two, and im going to leave on this as in my life as an academic, who is a former policy planner, is that this is where the academy can play a really important role, is to think about that part, not just think about grand strategy in the abstract, but to think about how you take those perspectives, those longterm trends, the kinds of things that philip talked about, and translate them into choices that were making now. Because otherwise, you can write long policy planning papers, you can write think tank papers, but theyre not going to matter to the decisionmakers, the actors, unless you can say, well, if you accept my broad, longterm trends goals, et cetera, what would that mean for me to do today . And when we engage in that kind of analysis and thinking, then were actually bridging the gap between those different mentions in a way thats useful and meaningful to the policymakers who are not indifferent to the longterm impact but have very few people explaining to them how the choices they make now will have those kinds of longterm consequences. Nick, im going to apologize and that seems like a very good point to end on, so please join me in thanking our panel. [ applause ] coming up russian president Vladimir Putins annual call in program. And then a Senate OversightCommittee Hearing on fema. Today is tax day and the house of representatives will spend much of this week on oversight of the irs. They return today for legislative business to work on a measure related to Homeland Security departments headquarters. Tomorrow they begin debating a series of bills on the irs. The Senate Returns at 3 00 p. M. Eastern to continue work on reauthorizing funding for the federal aviation administration. Current funding expires in july. Watch the senate live on cspan 2 and the house live on cspan. Today tom price talks about the budget process followed by a discussion on long term budget reforms hosted by the committee by responsible Committee Budget live at 1 00 p. M. On cspan 2. The campaign 2016 buskins its travels to visit winners from this years student camp competition. Our bus visited nevada to recognize justice