Transcripts For CSPAN3 Panel Discussion On Missile Defense 20170407

Missile defense over a number of decades starting on capitol hill, House Armed Services committee in the late 80s, early 90s and continuing on through my time including as undersecretary of defense in the Obama Administration. We have a great panel here toda youve youve already met tom karako, senior fellow in the International Security program at cis, director of the Missile Defense system. And tom will talk about in particular his report Missile Defense 2020, next steps for defending the homeland. Dr. Laura grego, thank you for being here today. Laura is a Senior Scientist in the global Security Program for the union of concerned scientis and and also has a recent report entitled, shielded from oversight, the disastrous u. S. Approach to Strategic Missile and and well speak to that and a number of other issues, i think. And our third panelist today, major genre tired fran. Plans and policy for norad and northcom and headed up several commands for army, missile and air defense and one time director of test. So its a great group. I want to thank you, general, especially coming to pinch hit for Keith Englander from the Missile Defense agency who was unable to be here today due to a schedule conflict. I want to say a couple of words to kick off and then well turn to the panelists today. And indeed as was mentioned earlier by senator sullivan, Trump Administration is kicking off a major review of u. S. Ballistic Missile Defense posture and policy. If we harken back to the 2010 Missile Defense review conducted by the last administration, i think its notable that it placed defense of u. S. Homeland as number one priority for Missile Defense. Our allies and partners can contribute to thee der Missile Defense for defense of their own key asset population indeed to support our Forward Deployed forces. No no one else would do the job or should do the job of defending the United States for us. It also made clear the prior review of the Obama Administration that our Missile Defense system is aimed at north korea and iran. And that is not intended to effect strategic stability visa vis russia or china. One of the recommendations in toms report would say shift that focus a little bit and include as a goal the ability to engage Ballistic Missiles in very limited numbers from russia or china. And well want to talk about that issue and any potential implications for stability. But clearly as we think about Missile Defense today, the driving consideration is north koreas continued missile testing, its continued efforts on its Nuclear Program and the reality that while north korea poses an uncertain threat to the United States homeland today, it does pose a threat even today. And that threat is likely to grow in the coming months and missile Missile Defense is not the only part of the u. S. Approach to that problem and to our allies approach, but its got to be a fundamental part. Currently a lot of qualitative improvements under way in the system. I i give great credit to Missile Defense Agency Director for pushing these along including for modified kill vehicle, for improvements to command and control, bmc cubed and sensors as well. A lot of work underway. One of the questions well want to discuss is whether the pace is appropriate on the qualitative side and whether there are any places that are being missed. And of course well want to discuss as we get into the panel whether we should be looking today to grow the system beyond the current 44 ground base interceptors that are deployed and that we would like ready for operations as necessary. Theyll be among the issues we discuss, theyll be among the issues that the new administrations Missile Defense review will have to discuss. And i think well get a good start today. Well start with tom. All right. Well, good morning. So im tom caraco, i want to thank jim and other panelists for joining and again thank senator sullivan for coming out this morning. As jim mentioned im going to give an overview of the report of Missile Defense 2020. And on the basis of both the ndaea and president ial directive as jim mentioned the administration will be looking at Missile Defense policy, posture and strategy. And also by explicit president ial direction the relative balance between homeland and regional. You know, every month or so north korea lately seems to be doing something new in terms of missile development. And theres other new threats out there as well. And i think that given the circumstances we find ourself in, i would not be surprised to see a relative rebalancing in favor of homeland at least relative to where weve been in recent years. And we kind of hope that this report lays out a menu of options or kind of a roadmap for how one might do that. Before i get started i want to acknowledge a couple folks including my coauthors, ian williams and wes rumbah both put a put a lot of work into this i want to i want to thank the many smart people in and out of government who let us bend their ear about its its been going on our research here for a while. Also those at ft. Greeley who kindly gave us their time. And finally to the csis ideas lab and particularly carolyn who put together i think some great graphics to help communicate some of this stuff. Let me say that, you know, one of the reasons we wanted to put this report together was i think that the conversation about homeland Missile Defense remain unfortunately too polarized and generally underinformed or misinformed. To to some extent thats pretty under its its hard to keep track of all the different kinds of kill vehicles and all the Different Things in development, gbi math has its own rules as well. Its one of our secondary purposes here is to kind of serve as a compilation, maybe a guide for the perplexed on all the kind of complexity, bring stuff together in one place. But i think the problem with how this is frequently discussed runs a little bit deeper. Included with a lot of historical baggage that unfortunately tends to confuse the debate. And i think with respect to homeland Missile Defense in particular, the discussions too frequently divided between on the one hand cheerleaders who i dont think take sufficient account of the difficulties of some of the things. And on the other side kind of a folks snickering or deriding. I think that both a better understanding of the past and the Current Program of record might help mollify some of that. So the report really tries to do three things. First as i say to bring together a bunch of information in one place, kind of a reference guide of where things have been. Secondly, at a menu of options for what might be considered and look at the benefits of a lot of those. And and third, make some of our own findings and recommendations. And so not to bury the lead, ill just say i think the Current Program, both gmd and related systems need a range of reliability, capability and capacity improvements relative to where we are today. And as well i think some policy and budgetary adjustments would be in order in the forthcoming md so theres so theres been a lot of back and forth policy wise and programmatic wise programmatic wise over the last 20 years or so. In the report we try to highlight and emphasize the on the one hand the strategic continuity but also the programmatic continuity. On the strategic side, i think go back and read president clintons speech in 2000, the one where he said he was not going to decide to deploy national Missile Defense. And then look at the speech that president george w. Bush gave in 2001 announcing the withdrawal from the abm treaty. And i think actually theres a lot of continuity there in terms of not necessarily the exact assessment of the technological readiness, but in terms of the strategic rationale. The idea being very simply that were not unwilling to accept complete vulnerability to certain kinds of threats. Were unwilling to really accept and risk deter rans failure with respect to certain kinds of actors like north korea. And on the programmatic side, i think appreciating the lineage and evolution of todays program is also important. Looking at really the roots of gmd and nmd, for instance. I also think one cant really appreciate some of the reliability issues of the ekbs and silos today. If you dont appreciate that in many respects they are still the advanced prototype design put together in the 1990s under abm treaty restrictions. And that furthermore that the 2002 decision to build a limited defense capability in two years left little choice but to embrace a kill vehicle still under development and furthermore to adapt a lot of legacy cold war systems that had not been designed for this in short order and put them to use. So ever since then were still i think kind of waiting a true design turn on the kill vehicle. But instead of being kind of life extending the program in different ways. Ill say i think the conversation as a result of some of these things suffers from a kind of unfortunate and maybe even weird dynamic. An old dichotomy tends to get the embraced. The dichotomy that regional Missile Defense is good and effective, but homeland Missile Defense is bad. And the perception extends beyond the particular systems to the mission itself. Regional Missile Defense is effective so goes the argument that you can take it as an article of faith that homeland Missile Defense is impossible. Ill say on the other side that the cheerleaders who do not sufficiently i think acknowledge some of the issues out there, dont do the issue justice so what so what we try to do is to kind of be fair and can dit in both that that means we get criticized from both sides. So ill just say there are a lot of shortcomings, but i think that the path forward you heard about this morning and jim mentioned just now about the rkv really is a good one. And especially it begins to that dichotomy i mentioned is important because the path forwards going to leverage a lot of that past testing, a lot of that past development that had been taking place on the regional systems and applying it forward. So so thats commonalities between atmosphere kill vehicle on one side and atmosphere kill vehicle on the other side. Let me start to walk through jim jim mentioned bmdr highlighting Homeland Defense as top priority of defense efforts. This is just a general view. That is going to be taking place with an sm as well as an ekv. But this is the historical emphasis between homeland and regional really going back to 199 so so its fluctuated a lot. There was a big surge especially for the Capital Investments for the deployment back in the 2002 to 04 time period, but this isnt just gmd, but its kind of the overall emphasis. Green being homeland and blue being regional. And for those of you taking pictures, well have all of these online for you so you can download them to your pleasure. And i also want to put this in a little bit historical this this is i think senator sullivan mentioned it, this is our relative modesty in terms of the number of interceptors were talking about. If you look on the far right thats 2017. That will be in the ground by the end of this year, but compare that for instance to the clinton administration, three phases of clinton administration, 100 to 250. Before that kind of the gpals, whose job whose job it was to go after a limited threat of 10 to 100 rvs. And before that kind of sdi phase one, safeguard and sentinel and that sort of thing. But in terms of the overall context, i think you really see that modesty. Sorry, i keep looking for the keyboard down here. And the other context here, another important context here is the legislative environment. And this past Year Congress went back and updated the 1999 national Missile Defense act, which by the way was 17 years old. A a few anachronisms were in first first of all we dont talk about national Missile Defense anymore in so many words. This is talking in the future tense about, you know, we ought to deploy well, weve done that. And and so i think congress correctly has gone in and rightly updated this. I think unfortunately theres been a lot of hyperventilating about the update that to my way of thinking proves that the schools do not teach sentence diagramming anymore. All the focus has been on the adjectives, like the word but but no one has i think sufficiently appreciated it is a complete sentence. And that the subjects and objects of defense in that sentence have changed. It is no longer about really national Missile Defense territory but also as you can read allies and forces. And, you know, the word limited may not apply in the same way we used to think about it in 1999 or in sort of the gpals kind of you take you take a look at these adjectives and you compare them to the 2010 bmdr and theres actually a lot of continuity. The overall budget top line, this goes back to 1985. Sdio, bimdo and mda, you do see that surge with mda with respect to the deployment in the 2004 but but just within the past ten years as we heard about this morning and i hope you can see this, this is specifically the homeland elements that weve broken out. This is a kind of a falling tree graph. Those those are the phi deps as well as actual spending. And as we heard this morning a 24 decline over the past for the for the top line. But then some deeper cuts for and here were going to go deeper now into gmd. And these are the various components of gmd. Really thats this goes with the trend, pretty clear. I can show you about 50 graphs theyre theyre in the book. And they all kind of look like now, now, let me missing my keyboard again. Let me walk through we have a chapter on interceptor development, another chapter on sensors and that sort of thing, were going to blow through a little bit of this. Let me put up here the long view of interceptors, the lineage really of where we are today. One limitation of the gbi fleet today is its a lot of different kinds of interceptors going on. Its also the case and you can take a look at here at some of the ce 1s, ce2s relative frankly to other deployed systems today. Unfortunately the ce2s dont have the ondemand communications to the ground, for instance. The ekvs of today. Theres also unfortunately a shortcoming of the threestage b the intention the intention to go out and get a twostage booster was never mda mda is looking for a selectable way to get at that flexibility. But what that basically means is youre not able to buy more time and fire later, youre going to have to fire sooner because all three stages have to burn out before the kill vehicle can be released. And and especially if youre operating from alaska, thats going to limit you. Let me also move now to the mdas three phases. This is kind of the current roadmap for going forward, enhanced, robust and advanced is kind of their categories, but what it really is what we are this year getting the 44 gbis in the ground of the ce2s and the cd block 1s. The centerpiece really is the rkv, well talk more about. Although rkv is not dramatic departure, it is that kind of design turn that in some ways should have happened a decade ago but never did. The good news is that theyre not starting from scratch and theyre going back and leveraging a lot of the parallel work thats been going into other programs. But the idea is to make the ekv far simpler, cheaper, more modular and have fewer points of failur these these are the kinds of reliability issues that have come up again and again. And getting to that rkv will also reduce kind of the diversity in the fleet. Ill show in a chart in just a minute shows just how many different types are in todays gbi fleet. The rkv in particular will draw the seeker, kind of the telescope and a lot of discrimination algorithms have been floating out there and draw upon all that. Its not going to be starting from scratch. And further out in the future to the advanced section is the mlkv, which we heard about again this morning. That again is, you know, quite a bit far behind relative to where the plan was. Multiple kill vehicles atop a single booster to compensate for some of the discrimination challenges and really img prove your effective magazine capacity. Unfortunately unfortunately the timeline for the mlkv currently is kind of 20, 2021 plus and really far out to the right in terms of that. This chart right here is actually kind of the centerpiece of whats going on and what the agency currently plans. We call this the skittles chart. You can taste the rainbow and see a lot of different muscle movements of whats happening the green the green at the bottom is the ce1. Thats thats kind of the oldest skill vehicle that got put in place in 200 the the red is the ce2. The blue is kind of the ce2 plus. And then the orange and Pay Attention to the orange, thats the rkv. Thats supposed to come online kind of in the 2020 timeframe, testing in 2018, potentially deployed 2020. Now, this as i said is kind of the best snapshot of whats going on and whats intended to be going on. We would point out a couple we think shortfalls of what mda currently plans. One of them is what is likely to be under current plans a big gap between the things that are going to be put in place this year, the 44 by 17. After that were going to presumably wait, sit and wait until the rkv comes around. That could have cost later on. It could especially if rkv goes to the right, it could kind of retard some of our efforts to increase capacity in the nee nearterm and might hurt rkv later on. Second limitation is that as we heard earlier, notwithstanding a recommendation in 2013 by the department of defense to go out and buy some operational and test, that wasnt done. After we get to 44, were going to go down. And every time we have to test one to pull it out of the ground to test it, theres one less that operational. That starts to add up until you begin to kind of get the next thats kind thats kind of the current and and thats why i think thats one of the several reasons why youre hearing folks talk about the importance of capacity. Instead of going down, go down i think by at least four if not more just in the next couple years. And and then before rkv comes again, you again, you know, the schedule that youve been hearing 2020 for rkv, that could be too am and and if thats too ambitious, then that reduction might be more important. And a third limit is that unfortunately mda i think is planning to put the rkv on some of the oldest boosters. And thats perhaps for costs and might reduce some of their effectiveness. So so lets talk into testing. Im sure well have a little bit of a discussion about this right now. I want i want to walk especially through first of all just in instance of the testing budget theres some good reasons why the testing budget has gone down so much. They really had to go back post 2010 and really figure out, right, take apart the ekv, figure out that some of the and then and then put it back together again. So some of this is kind of the overall top line reduction pressure and some of it has to do with that choice. But i think it really is the this is this is one of those pardon me, maybe the best instance of the mischaracterizations of the testing record of gmd overall is with a test with maybe that one exception that i mentioned that they went back and had to fix what the imu, most of these are not hightechnology problems. These are dumb problems. As everybody attests its kind of manufacturing stuff, its the maybe workmanship or Something Like that. But its not hightechnology. One of these failures is because of the silo cover not opening. And the missile not coming out. You know . And thats the sort of thing that its not about the kill vehicle, its about that kind of so i think so i think mda has in the past couple years much more forthright about kind of articulating really these failure and and the true causes of them. So sensors, you know, no Missile Defense system is better than the sensors that tell it where to go and what to kill. And we have what we call the mother of all testing charts in here that not only kind of goes through the full 31 flight intercept tests and what became of them, the failure explanations, things like that, but also what sensors were inv and you and you really see from kind of the late 1990s to where we are today a pretty consistent increase as more early running radars are stitched in, as aegis and other things are brought in, you see a lot more of that. And that i think is a good theres thing. Theres probably a lot more to do on the sensor side. Probably the single most important thing that we recommend on the sensor side is a space based probably infrared tracking and discrimination you get you get that field of view from which you can inform not only gmd, birth to death, but all these other programs as well. Overall, you know, vice admiral searing has characterized the test record as a kind of as nothing you wouldnt expect from a test bed for a prototype. And i think in some that really fits what we are. The key of where we need to go from here to the future is to get out of that test bed and to get out of that prototype and get to the rkv design term. This right here is just a quick picture of a lot of the sensors that have evolved over time, over decades that are slowly coming online. And lrdr youll see at the top as some of this. This is the sensor budget. Now, some of these high end Capital Investment dont need to be but take a look at the these are these are broken down by the last the last category at the bottom is the space based. And thats really whats kind of gone off the list. This is space based budget overall and you get the idea. In terms of future options, we have to put through a lot of the uav directed energy, some of the boost phase concepts that have been circulating and continue to come back. The difficulty of course is that the budgets not there for them. We had another report last year talking about the budget pressures especially on mdas r d account. And you see here the r d valley of death between about 2010 and onward. And admittedly some of its still potential, but thats the mound of mediocrity for mdas r d. Some good things going on, but i think in relative terms mda could probably be doing a lot and then let me just more. And then let me just sort of run through briefly our recomm im not im not going to read them all. But i think in terms of the policy i think we should continue to have a more robust and layered Missile Defense for a variety of threats against both ballistic and Cruise Missiles. We mention that, thats actually part we mention that, thats actually part of the mdr report it will be it will be interesting what they come up with. We dont go into a lot of programmatics, there arent that many to talk about just that yet. On on the budget side, restore homeland Missile Defense i think to a level commensurate with being the first priority. And within the budget to prioritize rkv and look at accelerating mlkv and direct in in terms of interceptor capacity, continue the current course that mda is doing. But look at accelerating mlkv as well. In in terms of thats in in terms of capacity, i would say continue to look at adding to the 44 or the 40 in the coming years and continue to grow that out. We heard about that this morn ft. Ft. Greeley has a lot of what what were talking about here is activating the hedge that was described in, again, that 2013 d. O. D. Hedging strategy, activating the hedge which was very explicit in that report. If you wanted to go and do that, growing out ft. Greeley is the most Cost Effective and nearest Term Solution to do that. Now, theres a lot of i think attention on kind of the east coast site possibility. We encourage some more cost or less costly approaches to we we dont want to exhaust the entire mda budget on new capital and if and if there is a way to add some capability and add battle space with transportables or with some kind of underlay that supplements the coverage of the east coast in terms of quality, thats probably a more Cost Effective way to get at. I think theres a lot of interest in that. Youre going to hear more about but but we get the idea of adding the capability, but there might be some cheaper ways to get and in and in terms of sensors and testing, i think really the space based sensor layers the most important one there. Im going to leave it off there and turn it over to some other thank you. Folks. Thank you. [ applause ] tom, thank you very much. Very nice presentation. And terrific report. Credit to your to yourself and to your team. Laura, youre up next. Okay. Hi. Thanks thanks so much, tom. And csis. Im really grateful for the opportunity to participate in this panel. I expect i was invited because i coauthored a report last year on the ground base mid course defense program. And its a pretty detailed id be id be happy to give you a copy if you werent able to get one. In the report we were pretty tough on the gmd system. You believe you can probably tell by the we were we were tough on congress and the Intelligence Agency and the Bush Administration and be straightforward about that. Our intent though is to spark details engage discussions about the role of strategic Missile Defense in our country. And i believe these wellinformed conversations are essential to u. S. Security and to global security. We cant have ap informed debate about the current value and potential of the gmd system and homeland Missile Defense without a clear presentation of it. I appreciate csis taking on this separating separating myth from truth is critically important when the topic is contentious as strategic Missile Defense is. Tom alluded to these longstanding debates. Since its been almost 15 years and 40 billion sunk into the gmd system after its inception, we thought wed take a look and see sort of where we are, what the capability is, how we got here and what are lessons if any we could learn from that. Our work was based substantially on the findings of the official u. S. Government sources. We drew heavily from the gao, from the pentagons own testing office, we essentially found the system is in worse shape than most people had realized. And i think thats an area of substantial agreement between our reports. And we tried to take a look at why we thought it ended up this and so and so we ended up looking a lot at the oversight and accountability system set up around the system. And we thought we found that it undermined the gmd systems deve rather rather than summarizing the whole report, im just going to make three short points that i think reflect the differences and agreements between our repor i think i think tom, the first is we agree that the system is in pretty poor shape. Tom and his coauthors describe the gmd system as being in its adolescence or essentially in advanced prototype and notes that the system currently has some serious reliability issues. This is an area of substantial agreement between the both of i would us. I would note in 9 of the 17 tests since 1999, the kill vehicle failed to destroy the target. And and that record hasnt actually been improving over time as you would expect for a system thats m keep keep in mind also that the tests were essentially developmental in nature. So as tom mentioned sort of advanced prototype test, but type of tests they were conducted under simplified con not not operational conditions. Which are certain to be much more challenging. Instead, in each test the missile defenders because of the nature of the test had significant information about the time and place of the targets launch, how the target and other objects would look. And the conditions hadnt varied all that much. Essentially i think were set up for success. Just the way the csis report describes it is that its difficult to assess whether these improvements have made the test as realistic as they could be. I i actually think we have quite a bit more information about the operational realism of the test program. We have we have a specific office in the pentagon to evaluate that. Looks at Missile Defense every year and provides advice on the testing program. In 2014 released an indepth and in and in that report the chief testing officials assessment was that the tests aretodate, quote, insufficient to demonstrate operationally useful defense capability exists. Some of the shortcomings is we agree its yet to be tested against an icbm range target. We expect to see that later this year. Hasnt hasnt used interceptors against a single target or hasnt used salvo interceptors against salvo some of the some of the conditions youd expect the system to be facing in the real world. Nor really against a complex set of set of complex countermeasures. So so further that report says the reliability of the interceptor is low and that the mda discovers new Failure Modes during testing. Heres where we agree substantially with csis also is that robust testing is critical. We strongly agree with the recommendation for improving the realism and pace of the testing testing testing not only helps Reveal Design and Quality Control issues, it also provides information you need to assess reliability in a quantitative so if the so if the u. S. Plans to launch multiple interceptors at each target to make up some of the ground for interceptors with lower reliability, salvo launching only provides limited improvement unless the effectiveness of the interceptor is already high. So you need to know clearly what the reliability of your interceptors are. And launching doesnt help if theres a common mode failure, which needs to be discovered in so second so second point i wanted to make is why did this happen. And heres where we make some divergence from the csis report. In 2002, Missile Defense was brought under a different acquisition system shs different and more flexibility than most major Acquisition Programs. Those systems were set up to prevent premature and expensive fielding of unproven systems. Most call it fly before you buy. It moved into a special system which allowed engineering corners to be cut. It was also given an unrealistic timeline for deployment, which essentially ensured those corners would be cut. And we find that that has had real and lasting consequences. We document that indepth in the report but certainly shows up in the csis report too. And we dont really see that the problems with the gmd system were due to the lack of budget. There instead the development has been driven by a schedule rather than technical readiness. And i think this has been fairly well accepted even in circles less skeptical than mine. A key example is because Missile Defense is exempted from the obligations to fly before you buy that other, especially in the past, that other major defense programs are subject to the pentagon was able to feel essentially untested prototypes. In fact nearly every single gmd interceptor was field ld brve having undergone a single successful intercept test. So as Failure Modes and flaws are discovered, the fixes had to be made to a field of interceptors as we see in some cases those fixes just didnt get done. This is a serious problem. Especially when youre developing something as complicated as a gmd system. Its an enormous endeavor, one of the most complicated projects the pentagon has ever taken on. We saw improvements to the Missile Defense acquisitions process at the end of the Bush Administration and during the Obama Administration, administr. They dont seem to be sufficient to the task of preventing resurrender reince of many of these problems. We continue to field in some in some cases with known flies based on imposed deadlines rather than their technical maturity. We we still see tests being conducted under heavily controlled conditions which are not really rigorously evaluated under operational positions. Poorly vetted projects are started only to be cancelled money that can be better spent. I see congress exploiting this by adding into the strategy Missile Defense portfolio, projects that have not been asked for such as a third continental intercept site. This lack of rigor also allows Wishful Thinking about how well the system works to dominate discourse about it. In our report, we collected more than 30 quo takeses from defense officials over the last decade and a half in which they state theyre confident the system can currently protect the u. S. , despite no testing evidence to support those assertions. Im concerned about that. Because believing it works can lead to riskier decisionmaking, reduce the incentive to vigorously pursue other perhaps more effective approaches to the problem of Ballistic Missiles. If you think youre defended, you may be less prone to engage in the very difficult negotiations that are necessary to slow or stop and push back the north Korean Nuclear missile so programs. So the third point i wanted to make is the recommendation for moving forward where we have certainly some overlap and some i really i really appreciate the work in this report. And really laying out a menu of options. I i would have loved to see more analysis and pricing prioritization to see which ones you think are further, since we have so many budgetary constraints for the foreseeable but but given the analysis in our report, we dont see a reason that spending more money will buy what we had without really, really making tough decisions. We have seen in 15 years under two administrations and under the most flexible Acquisitions Program you design, we still havent got a working system. And i understand the desire to be more agile and efficient in acquisitions and that im a technical person. Im not an acquisitions person so i see it from the outside. But i am concerned without due attention we run the risk of repeating the same thing we had had, a 40 billion system that the d. O. T. And ess right now still has not demonstrated real world capability. I think that rather than holding on to this flexible approach we should be demanding the highest rigor and highest accountability and really making tough choices. This issue is especially acute for program such as strategic Missile Defense, which is highly politicized, has strong entrenched debates, but especially because we incur the financial and strategic costs of deploying Missile Defenses, whether or not the system works, not not only complicating our decisionmaking, but it provides strategic Missile Defense provides an incentive for russia and china to increase the capabilities and sizes of the nuclear arsenal. And the disincentive, again, for the u. S. To engage as hard as it might on north korea. Those are costs that we bear. Whether or not the system works. So while the csi report makes a number of interesting recommendations for technology past that could be used to improve the u. S. Ability to defend the homeland, i come out really with caution that these ideas be vetted strongly by rigorous environments and alternative process. We have the tools to do that. Congress should not be creating programs of records such as a third site or spacebased Missile Defense program. I especially find the spacebased Missile Defense Problem Program problematic. This is one of the recommendations of this report, but i think at this point its unwise and premature. We have had lots of good analysis and the highest advice about this subject in 2012, the National Academy of Sciences Published its congressnally mandated report about missile d it was it was asked, tell us what you and and they concluded the spacebased options would cost ten times as much as other basing options and more than 300 billion for what they called an austere capability. And recommended the u. S. Government not spend a single dollar more on Missile Defense. I havent seen any revolutionary technology that would change this assessment. Its so this is a prime example where the process, i think, is important to keep us from our worst impulses. Research and development is one thing, but putting intercepters in space would be the first time that anyone has placed a dedicated destructive weapon in space. Thats thats a bridge we havent crossed yet. And that sets a precedent that would make things more difficult for the u. S. Military, civilian, scientific, and economic. And putting a test bed in space provides no defensive capability, and actually provides no offensive capability in space we dont already have. So i agree that we should be building more bridges between skeptics and boosters. And i would hope that both proponents and critics would welcome a dedication to rigor and real thoughtfulness and real hard decisions. You know, its a necessary, although not sufficient step to develop working technology. And critics should welcome it as a process that keeps untested equipment out of the field and provides credible information about how it actually works, and what its potential in the future which which is essential to any debate about the value of the system. So that includes real hard testing. I i think that our wellfunctioning oversight system provides a reality check on the miss that accumulated around a politicly hard challenge that includes missile def ill ill leave it there. Laura, thank you very much for that presentation. And fran. Over to you. Is thank you for the opportunity to be here. And tom, thank you to your team for all of the great work they have done on these reports. Im kind of the pinch hitter here for Keith Englander. And, you know ive got the come on down late yesterday. But im happy to be here. I think its a very good topic and very interesting topic. And if you know my background, im a little bit of an operator, a little bit of a programmer. I was a little bit of a tester. And ive been around the system in air and Missile Defense for a long time. My comments are brief. Okay . Some some of them reinforce, some of them challenge whats been said. But i think the basis will be dialogue we have when the questions start coming. And the entire bmds is a challenge. Challenge challenge from a technology aspect. Challenge challenge from a battle Space Fighting aspect. Fighting across 15 time zones as a system. Challenges from a fiscal aspect. And advocacy and support. And priority has been given, you know waxed and weaned over time based on the distance of a always always had the nearterm threat. The homeland has not. In 15 years, thats changed. And 9 11 significantly changed the attitude. It was get something sooner rather than later. And i wont say haste makes waste, but haste can force you to make decisions you would rather not. It can force you to settle on a design or a technique you would prefer not to commit to at this time. It can it can compel a decision that may limit your options in the and future. And when faced with a Decision Point and national security, decisions get made. And we accept the limitations and the future constraints and well have to work through them. And its kind of where we are today. And and the town paper talks aboutin fancy and adolescence in teens. Are we an adult, are we a mature adult. Just just look at the sensor family. Here are the sensors, use them. Although they werent designed for the task were being asked to do. So that patchwork of sensors has had to grow as we have had to grow a family of interceptors. The variety of gbis is large. If you ever saw the variety of components inside the gbis, you would say, my god, what a fruit salad this is, and that looks like a vegetable. Yes, the test record has been spotty. Four four consecutive successful tests before ioc. Youve got to remember how you test and what you test. And what are your attributes and criteria youre trying to and and we have had, you know, test failure since ioc and we have had test success. You know, all tests, as i say, its what are you pursuing. Set your objectives. You design your test to evaluate those objectives. You assess what happens. And then you determine, do i need to retest an objective . Have i found a flaw . Or a shortcoming i need to work on before i go to my next test for that objective . And the 2014 return to flight was a most challenging intercept and test. And a and a significant valuable test to the agency. You think of strides in theatre bmd. We have we have been here before. And the theatre fight we had technical challenges. We had set backes. We had budget issues and we had advocacy issues. I mean, how many people here, you know, in 1990 thought hit to kill was going to work . Ill tell you, there were a lot of people who didnt think it was going to work. But we endeavored. And hit to kill, i think works. Because now its the basis of all of our missile systems, okay . Patriot patriot pack 1. Not a term you hear very often. 1988, the first bmd capability. And it was mainly so and okay . And it gave us the ability to track Ballistic Missiles. Pack 2, run missile. The interceptor designed to kill a theatre ballistic missile. I know i went to desert storm with two. Two missiles. Thats all there were in the fall of 1990. Okay . We we can argue what happened in desert storm didnt happen in desert storm. It was kind of, you know, reverberated with me when five gbis. Not much not much has changed. But what we learned in desert storm was valuable. We went to desert storm with no ttp, with no doctrinal fou by by 2003 on the eve of oif, we Software Hardware upgrades. And we had the pack 3 inte we we almost literally lost it, hit a jrock in fall of 2002, because it failed to achieve one nuance in the kpp. We got it through the jrock. 70 of that kpp was good enough. And we went to oif in march of not not with two missiles, with a full quiver of 13. 13 big ones. Two of them fully instrumented for test. Taken off the range and sent and and so what im getting at is, you know, its a long, hard road to get a capability to the and you can look field. And you can look at agis. Agis has come massive strides. I dont know where navy area is, or navy theater from my youth, but agis today has arrived. Fad has arrived. Oka all all these programs had their ups and downs, funding, political challenges and technology but but they all arrived to contribute to the ballistic Missile Defense system at theatre. And i and i would argue, as the question was asked, i think the agis capability, when you harness it into the system with the tippy 2, with the other sensors in ctbmc, starting to stretch that operational theatre award to the strategic bubble of war. But but none of these have the Global Operating environment that gmd must operate in and deal with. The enormity of the battle space is staggering when you stop and think about it. And we cannot afford to walk away from gmd. We may be able to discipline the process that has gotten us here. I dont think we should say its a traditional Acquisition Program or process. And we must not forget that its not the only thing we can focus so on. So we cant cease all effort in the theater and the regional or cease all effort in air defense, solely on gmd, because our adversaries are not. They are advancing. Just look at north korea. Longerrange, sub launch capability. Solid mobile launch. Air, sea, land, launch Cruise Missiles in the last year from one of our future adversaries, potentially, okay . Battle systems being used by conventional forces and unconventional forces. For gmd, we need to improve our sensors, create that tighter shot group for the ekb. I think as the senator laid out, were on the right path. The rkb is critical. It will enhance our ability to improve the system. Sensors are critical. The tighter the shot groove you can give me, the better likelihood im going to hit the object. And growing and growing gbi fields or more gbis, yeah. More robust quiver would be the ability the ability to be able to cycle rounds in and out of there, so you can do modifications without loss of overall capacity is good. Im not certain where the location should be. Im not certain where the location should be. Increase increase one of the two we have now, create a third. Because based on where those fields are, and your sensor architecture, that affects how you can engage different threat director of director of energy. Yeah, yeah, thats nirvana, okay . 2004 is the deputy at ft. List, the air defense center. I received the task to deploy a counter rocket artillery system in one year. We had no requirements documents. We were we were outside of the acquisition process. We had 365 3cdays. I love directed energy. And all of those believers were in my office. While the reality was, it wasnt going to get there in 365 days. And im still waiting. But were making progress. But we met that requirement, and we deployed a system that was pretty ugly, pretty cloojy, and its still in theatre today doing its task. And we put it through tests, and you know what . It was kind of like a d i dont know whether it was a dplus or a cminute us. Something is worth a lot. Its been improved. With respect to, you know, the five points the senator put out there, i think hes spoton with respect to testing. Testing is important. Its an element of the you know, Systems Engineering model. But you just cant say every 12 months were going to take a test. Because because that would be a waste of and resources. And testing is difficult. Difficult to plan. Its difficult to structure. Its difficult to execute. Especially in the gmd realm. Look at the battle space were trying to replicate. You look you look at the places you can and cannot operate from. You look at the Environmental Constraints and restraints. I once had to negotiate the closing of International Air space during storm, a storm that had taken my air space away, because airliners were diverting into my air space. So i could get a gmd test off. So just so just stop and think about that. We we ceased i was losing my window of test opportunity. While i had ships, sensors and everything strung out across the pacific taking a pounding in this bad weather. We ultimately got the approval, and we held International Air traffic to allow us to execute our test. But we were down to about the last 15 minutes, our test window. Not simple. Not simple. You build you build your test, you assess your criteria that you need to you test. You execute your test. You evaluate your data. And then you say, did i validate, did i invalidate, have i found something new and organize and do the next test. The integrated master test plan lays out numerous tests that will get after different criteria, different attributes that we want to assess in the system. The the challenge is, i cant just reach out to 2021 and pull that test forward and execute it in 2018. Because because theres a whole litany of preplanning and pretest simulation that had to be done before i could get there. There are targets that have to be built, and some of these targets are oneoff or one of a so you kind. So you just you know, although we developed a test plan, and that test plan is out there and dote signs off on that test plan every time its updated, the ability to pick and choose what test im going to do this year is a difficult and challenging thing. Im going to end there. Because i think ive run my gums enough. I think i think a key thing we need to focus on is we do need to move forwa the the threat has brought a. Back into iamd. And a. , in my opinion, goes well beyond Cruise Missiles. When you look at the whole operating environment, air supremacy supremacy no longer guaranteed. Neither is air superiority. As we move forward, as we do a review in the coming year or years, and we are going to expand it, i think, to include Cruise Missiles, i think it ought to be against the entire mission set. Not just the missile side of it. Ill end with that. I look forward to the dialogue and your questions. Thank you. Thank you, fran. What we would like to do is have a conversation here. Ill ask a few questions. I would like to leave a few minutes for questions for the audience, as well. Lets start with lets start with talking about the goals of the system. Then well talk about questions of size and qualitative improvements and capacity. And then well talk about test senator senator sullivan talked about a goal specifically with respect to north korea. And as i recall, he said the system should have near certainty of destroying at least three to four north korean icbm. So im going to build off of that with a threepart question. It will start with you, tom. And then well ask both laura and fran to respond, as well. So is that the appropriate goal, or should we be thinking about dozens of potential north korean rbs, right . If you project forward to the possible threat. Second, what is the grand figure in that. And third, and particularly for you, and we can take a little time on this question. Should should we and for you, why should we design a system that is explicitly aimed at engaging russian and chinese entry vehicles. And stipulate that, if we design a system for north korean, and if a missile is launched at us from russia or china, the system would try to engage without a question. But but should it but should it take as a defining set of threats, missiles and reentry vehicles from russia and china, which we would expect to be more advanced Counter Measures, as so well. So first on north korea, then iran, and then russia china, for starters. Okay. Lets lets get started. Well, on north korea, i dont recall the particular 304 youre but speaking. But i would say that the question of how many north korean missiles do you defend thats thats obviously going to be in terms of the new threat you know, back assessment. You know, back in the 2010 bmdr. And then again, kind of in 2013 time frame. At that point, folks looked around and said, okay, this is worse than it was in 2013. And i guess i would say whats happened since 2013, i think the new administration will take a look at that. Its not like anybody has a crystal ball to say there is going to be 37 as opposed to 39 icbm threats that you need to deal with. Thats what the new administration is going to look take a look at the at. Take a look at the threat again. Last time i checked, i dont think were better off than we were in 2010 or 2013. And so i suspect that theyll take a look at that in realistic terms. And where do you place iran currently in that mix as you think about the jcpoa . But recognizing that either iran could cheat or break out, and after a period of now eightplus years, theyll begin to have more rights under that agreement to go forward with enrichment. Right. So we didnt make any particular prediction about whats the year that the iranian icbm is going to come around. As you point out, the jcpoa does get looser in some respects as it goes forward. You know, i dont think anybody knows whats going to happen in eight years. Whats going to happen with u. S. iran relations this year. We heard the exchange, there is always the foreign assistance problem. Its not its not simply a function of what you do they do in their frauj alone. But they get assistance from and and so, you know, i think that the frankly, the past administration took a look at this and said we have to hedge against that to some extent. And so, you know, you dont wait for the icbm plumes out of tehran to say, maybe we need to think about a radar on the east coast of the United States. So we say lets look at some options here. Is it an lrdrlike thing . Is it a is it sbx on the ground . Is it is it sbx ashore . Is it some expand raiders and some uewr sites . Right now our Sensor Network is not only extraordinarily groundbased or ground and seabased, but its also pointed in the other direction. And so the omni directional or beginning to recognize that we have been fairly focused on one particular trajectory for a long time, and our Sensor Network to a remarkable degree reflects that focus. And so i think actually what were seeing there is nothing you special. You see they have been talking about that for a couple years now. So i dont think thats anything and then and then with respect to ill tell you what. Could i ask . Thats thats a terrifically lets answer. Lets get laura and fran in. And then well come back to russia and china. I put people to sleep, is what hes saying. No, it was an excellent laura, answer. Laura, let me ask a somewhat broader terms. Do you agree that the objective or an objective of the gmd system or of u. S. National Missile Defense should be to stay ahead of the threat from north korea and iran . In other words, that system thats deployed at any given time is prepared to deal with not just the known threat, but the plausible threat for the relative nearterm . Sure. I think looking at a verified intelligence assessment and make those plans accordingly. Normally, thats part of the requirements process, which isnt part of the same way we do Missile Defense. But i think i think, yes, certainly a formalized process and staying ahead of the threat i think in some senses weve been pretty lucky or fortunate that these icbm threats have not matured nearly as quickly as may have been predicted. 2015 came 2015 came and went and we didnt see tested and deployed icbms from either north korea or iran. And iran has made much slower even even its liquid fueled space launchers havent been tested very often and we havent seen its solidfueled space launcher. Possibly there was a test last its its unclear. Havent havent seen that maturity. So i think, you know, really being keyed into that intelligence is important when planning. Thank you. Fran, do you agree with that objective, and are we wellpostured to meet that objective today . Yeah, i agree with the posture, or the objective of, you know, shape your defense to the most likely threat. As you build that defense, dont ignore other potential threats, i think would be the way going dont forward. Dont make a decision that precludes your ability from lifting and shifting. 3620 degree capability. You may weigh against the i think i think thats the way we approach the problem. The aspect of iran. To help that defense and maybe set the stage for a defense to the east. Thank you. Thank you. All right. Tom, ill give you relief from having to answer first. The next question after this. Lets come back to russia and china. So so on the one hand, as i noted, if either of them launched a missile at the United States, you, of course, expect that the system would be directed to attempt to engage that. The question is whether we should attempt to design a system that is explicitly aimed at dealing with even limited threats or limited attacks from a russia or china. So your report suggested so. Do you think theres a high probability of an unauthorized or accidental attack from russia or china, or do you believe that its important for the United States to have the ability to negate a more limited attack for strategic reasons, the reasons in the midst of a conflict, and are you concerned that this is a leading question are you concerned that that requirement will in terms ever both quality and quantity begin to drive you to a much more complex system, and that it could actually compete with the ability to get the Current System and planned improvements to that system in place to deal with the korea. So let okay. So let me first begin by quoting back to you the 2010 bmbr, which says its a very finely written sentence that the gmd system would be used against a missile from any source. But right . But that phrase. Any source. Thats the phrase that appears in our report. Its also the phrase that was used back in the early 1990s. With respect to the gpanels. Should it be designed im getting there. Im getting there. So the question is, first i want to establish kind of i think that the u. S. Policy there is frequently overstated. To kind of say that we are have nothing to do with that. But then the second the second part of that is, you know, what would you try to do. And i think it came up earlier i think general man, you emphasized the other Cruise Missile problem. And that is explicitly one of the three things that the missile defeat review tasks the department to go out and look at. Well, well, whose Cruise Missiles are we talking about . Are we talking about north koreas missiles, north koreas air force . Were no. Were probably talking about russia or china. Congress, i suspect, had that in mind when they put that into the into the bill. And so i think in the first instance, i think it makes a lot of sense to look at those called them nonstrategic Cruise Missile threats to the homeland. Ive also said we ought to be looking at that in a serious way for forces and allies in nato. Again, the nonstrategic socalled for the Cruise Missile threa and and i think in terms of the strategic ballistic thing, i think if you were to go that way, at most you would be pursuing the purpose of raising the threshold for the time being. Or or perhaps for protecting some kind of asset. And that may not be gmd. That may be Something Else entirely. But i think but i think that every administration should ask and answer that question. How do you think that makes thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Let me let me go to fran on this. And laura, im going lead off the next question with you. Sure. I welcome your comment on this, as well. Fran, are you confident that we know how to develop even a very limited system against a russia or china threat that has advanced Counter Measures . And second, are you confident that we have an understanding of how to develop and deploy a Cost Effective cruise Missile Defense that involves advanced Cruise Missiles with significant stealth capabilities . Coming off of coming off of ssn i would tell you from my perspective on the first question i dont think the technology is sitting on the i shelf. I i cant say definitively effort has been put against it. I think its you know, i think the technology could be and achieved. And it would take timehjx and the effort. The dynamic comes back to whats my resources. Whats the threat i know im going to face, whats the threat i might potentially face, and where do i put those resources. I think we shaped it correctly in our overall strategy with the gmd effort. On the cruise Missile Defense, for my name at norad north com and we looked at it and assessed it, that kind of goes back to the basic air defense tenets. I cant defend everything. I do not have an umbrella over the nation. So tell me whats important. And i will do my bes that. Do do we have the capability to do a confident Cruise Missile it depends it depends on the asset were trying to defend. I will be honest. Ive said it before. A loss of jlens is a tremendous loss for cruise Missile Defense as capability. As ugly as people thought it was and as laughable as they thought it was, i was in key west last week. We we saw the aero statistics down there flying. They must be contributing, because they have been there a long time. And we got them flying over in the aor, and i know we have lost them and we have replaced them. They have been contributing. So the jlens capability or a capability like jlens i think is essential to getting after a Cruise Missile and maybe in getting after uavs. I agree with that. That final comment in particular. Laura, laura, in the interest of time and to let the audience comment, im going to ask just one more question. But but ill let each of you respond, as well. Laura, as you think about the requirements and acquisition process thats been used for the gmd system, if you were going to if you were going to now use regular order, essentially, for both requirements and acquisition, what do you think how would you apply it . In other words, would you stand down current efforts to improve the system pending going back through the process . Would you say, okay, as of a certain point in the future were going to apply this this regular order acquisition and requirements approach . Or how would you do that . Second, on testing. On testing, what do you think would be an appropriate number of tests per year on average, understanding that as fran pointed out, it varies by the place the program with respect to its development . But for an operational system, one would expect a regular pattern of tests. What are your thoughts on first on requirements and second, acquisition. Second, on the timing and battle for testing. Thanks, jim. This is actually not an easy im not im not an acquisitions expert, and i know we are flush with them here in washington, d. C. But the way i would look at it is, what i would ask from that requirement system is to save us from our worst impulses, or to set up the incentives right. If were not testing as hard as we can, because we want to see successes, and if if a system like the gmd doesnt have a clear path to being owned by a service, and in a services budget, for example, as something goes through developmental and Operational Testing and then gets offloaded into someone like was moved out or has moved out, are we is that acquisitions process still doing what it ought to do to move the gmd system forward . In the sense that is there a credible way to replicate if it doesnt go into j5,000, for example, to make sure that intercepters dont get fielded before theyre welltested. Because if normally youll have to go through operational tests in order to be procured. And tom makes a really good point in his report about the gmd budget sort of acting like a Procurement Fund but really being rdt e funding, which really sets up this dichotomy where its its perpetually in research and development. Just to be clear, if i could. Yes. Do you think that the gbis on the ground today have been adequately tested . I dont. And do you therefore think they should be pulled out of their holes so the United States would have no defense at all . Or do you think that we should go from where we are and have what defense we can, based on based on what appears to be a very real and growing north korean threat . I would leave them in the ground, of course, yes. And i would maybe experiment with rkv and really put it through one of these the j5000 process or better description of that. In terms of testing, i think testing officials have often said and i think we just heard this from general man, its pretty hard to up the tempo, because there is a lot of prep and analysis afterward. And even throwing money at that problem doesnt really so many places i can launch that big missile from towards the two test sites that can potentially launch the interceptor from. Its a difficult dynamic. Fran, do we have a cultural problem in expecting test success and should we be addressing it . I think we do have a cultural and and every time we launch an interceptor, we expect to see something go bang and flash in the sky or flash and bang, the way it should happen, i guess. The dino owe i agree in one sense, laura. And having been joint staff, service staff. I say you complain about something long enough, you end up on the other staff where youre responsible for it. Or play in the solution set. The the agency and the gmd have kind of been given a carte blanche. Go go forth and do. Back in the 90s, we had a requirement document on th you can pull it shelf. You can pull i what is it supposed to do and how to do it. Im not certain i could find that today if i had to for the gmd system. On the other hand, when you look at the jsids process, and its rigidity and its cut and dry, buddy. Deliver deliver the kpp or youre done. Boy, thats a waste of effort of time and money. So we need something maybe in between of what are we going to do with this capability. What do you hope to achieve in this capability. Put your marks on the wall. Good. And lets develop, lets test, and if you come back with a 67 score against the requirement of 85 or 90 , well, then we ought to have a dialogue. If im at 65 if im at 65 today, 67 isnt much value added. If im 0 today, 67 is pretty you you know, the babe ruth, how many times did he get on base . A little more than a third. But hes a hero. Can i jump back . I think, again, the 2010 bmdr looked at this. And decided that they saw no benefit to moving mda back to the to that jsids process. You know, maybe theres insufficient folks looking over the shoulders. Maybe thats possible. Sounds like theres quite a bit of oversight going on. Last time i checked. But pause right there. I would throw this back that, you know, fad under that process wasnt doing so great in the 1990 and and what do we see with the fad and the sm that has gone forward outside of that process. Whats the record again . 13 for 13 for fad. 33 or 34. How do you account for that record and that Development Progress outside of the jsids . And this if thats the cause of gmds problem, how do you account for that . I think basically the bottom line is, the ekb never got the design turn. Everybody knew it was a prototype back in 2004. And it never got that second and and thats why were sitting here, lifeextending it along. And thats why the next design is so important. Tom, thank you. We are almost up at 11 30. I have to ask you, how hard is our stop . We have a couple minutes. Lets go over a couple raise raise your hand, please. Wait for the microphone. And gentleman in the second row, please. If you would let us know your name. John john harper with National Defense magazine. Tom, in your opening remarks are you mentioned the importance of spacebased centers, and senator sullivan touched on that, as well, earlier this morning. I was hoping the panel could flesh that out a little bit more. Obviously, obviously, we have satellites that can detect missile launc what what would a spacebased layer system work . And how realistic are they from either a technical or a budgetary perspective . So i actually think this is maybe the most important good most most important thing that maybe ought to be added to what were doing now. You know, after rkb. And that is to say that first of all, every administration left five administrations have had a spacebased central layer not detection but tracking and discriminatio every every one has had it on paper as a critical element of longrange Missile Defense. And nobody has done it. For whatever reason continues to give push back. And so this is something that i think that the administration has indicated they want to look at and they should look at. And has said where the threat is going, space is a must. But right now it continues to be a maybe, because we dont have it under way. Having said that, demonstrator satellites, right they they have demonstrating. They have dramatically increased the range of agis in the past couple years but havent finished that out. They necessarily have to be battle star ga lalacticas. Thank you, tom. Richard. Thank you. Richard fieldhouse, former Armed Services senate Armed Services committee. Currently independent consultant type. Thank you thank you i i want to ask sort of a question that gets somewhat at your answer to jim on russia and china. And and somewhat to the discussion of testing. And it wasnt clear to me, tom, from your answer. So ill put it this way. Would you agree that any of our homeland Missile Defense efforts should both be intended to and have the effect of improving our security relative to, say, strategic stability question. Which is a russia china question. And and that all our Missile Defense systems should be tested and demonstrated work effectively before theyre deployed. And that goes to the russia china issue, which i think is what jim was getting if at. If we say were going to design a system specifically to try to intercept their Strategic Missile systems, its relatively easy for them to increase their capacity, their systems overwhelm, et cetera. So i wanted to try to pin you down on that. Yeah. So what i would say is, and im going to call become another one of your colleagues, rose, who said in 2014 that even at 44, we are 24 less than the number of interceptors that moscow deploys and and we dont sit around agonizing on the impact of strategic stability that they have for 68 on us. And by the way, theyre pretty up front about the fact thats about us. The reason i pull out that quote is, i think were just so far away from that in terms of number. As much as as much as anythin and and so while i think that the systems that we are advancing today, sms, as well as are continuing to blur the line between national and regional, as it were. I think that were just so far from that. And if you get to a point where you begin to have that capability, you would have still have to have a lot of numbers to really affect strategic stability. And i think, actually, you could have improvement on strategic stability rather than hurting it. But, but, look, that was the concept of safeguard, right . Was to protect certain critical assets and raise the threshold and support the overall deterrence posture. Its not crazy. Thats been kicked around many times, making sure that you have strategic survivability for Different Things. Thats what informs thats what informs strategic stability. And so and so thats actually where we emphasize when we talk about russia here, is look at how it might improve strategic st not not as some kind of perfect but in but in the with these particular side issues. Ill put a name to my concern very briefly. And that is if the requirement is established to be able to deal with even relatively limited russian and chinese threats that resources will go toward that end. Im skeptical that we have the ability to defeat the advance measures today, let alone those of tomorrow. And if we begin to pursue that, and if people believe that it should be that it must be done, they may come to say, for example, okay, were going to throw more money at the qualitative side. That could be a large hole, if not an infinite hole. And secondly, lets say 10 lets effective. Lets build ten times more. Im concerned about the cost implications and the knockon effects on stability in the event that russians and chinese believe our system may be more capable than it is as they are doing their planning. And i think its an important set of issues that i think this administration should address. I dont rule out the possibility of looking at that capability. I and as i said, i believe that if a missile is launched at the United States, whenever system we have should try to engage it. But would you say that same thing for Cruise Missile the challenge with the the challenge with Cruise Missile threats is that we dont yet have a viable concept for nationwide defense. Fran alluded to this. And the what we do have, areasonable concept for, and it aint cheap, as you know, is for selective defense of the National Capital and of and so on. And you dont see that as an impediment to strategic stability, selective defense. No, i dont. No, i dont. And i dont disagree with your point there. Yeah. I think what well do is, have one more question. And the gentleman here in front. Yes, im roughly king, retired federal employee. I have a question about missile threats from the south. There is a particular missile Advocacy Organization that says the gulf coast is particularly vulnerable from missiles coming from the south, including missiles flown over the south p and as and as we know, in latin america, there are regimes like venezuela, they have Close Relationships with Missile Defense powers, and in 1962, we had a threat coming from cuba. If i look at figure es3, im not seeing any Missile Defense assets south of the gulf coast or at the gulf coast. I thought eggland air force base had some sort of Missile Defense assets. Im im not sure. How do we consider threats from the south are they important enough to put in this Missile Defense framework . Tom, do you want to go . There is nothing there. There is nothing there. Not just cruise, but ballistic. Were all looking in the other you direction. You detect it, but you wouldnt be able to do much about it. You can correct me if i am wrong on that. But i think this is why we ought to look for maybe what are you trying to defend against . Is it the venezuelan irbm progr i think i think that the principle of flexibility and mobility might be more valuable. Transportable and all these other sort of things. Might be more valuable so in the event something happens, if it happens, were able to adapt to it. Thats thats what we emphasize in the you you cant line the United States coastline with defenses, you know we cant go back to conrad at continental regional air defense of the 50s and 60s. The past year, ive been part of a series of tabletop exercises at the Missile Defense agency has done for the combatant for for others, not northcom, we have done attack where we picked a nation, you know, who today is not really an adversary, but we have declared were playing 2030 in the future. Their government has come apart and theyre an adversary today. We role that across the table. Combatant commander has got the assets hes got in that year. Whatever it is. Agis, sm6 or 7 or 8 or and whatever. And we play the game to say, well, this is the capability youve got and now youve got a different threat. How do you deal with it. I have not known although i was part of a test when i was at norad and north com about if we had a threat out of south america, how would we deal with and and at that time i havent seen coverage diagram so i cant tell you if i put an i imaginis ship might be able to deal with it. A ship on the other side of you you know, but they played thad at the time. Okay, ill defend alice. You want new orleans covered, ill cover new orleans. But i am not covering the state of texas, im not covering i mean, its selective, what i could do at that time with the technology we had. But thats you know, thats the dynamic, the whatif. What if canada goes rogue, what are we going to do then . I mean so you you kind of focus on who is the bad guy who is the today. Who is the potential bad guy. And then the whatifs and the wild ones. Yeah, thats an interesting poi they they could roll it and see how people deal with it. Fran, i think thats a good place for us to conclude. I just observe that as both of you as both of you and tom noted, the mobile and particular seabased assets give us some ability to deal with any threat that might emerge within the r and and in the meantime, weve got our hands full, first and foremost, with north korea and with establishing a posture visavis to reduce their incentives to want to go back to their Nuclear Program with respect to because they could see they would not be able to threaten the United States. They have other aims or they would have other aims. But its in my view, an important part of our deterrence posture visavis iran as well. Those are significant challenges and i would like to see us address them well as a starting thank you thank you all for being here today. Please please join me in a round of applause for our great panelists