Transcripts For CSPAN3 Politics And Public Policy Today 20161014

Been bombed twice. For the complete schedule, go to cspan. Org. Next, the release of a report on russias economic and political influence in europe. From the strategic and international studies, this is an hour. Good morning, everyone. Welcome to the international studies. My name is heather connelly, senior vicepresident here at ciss, that looks under europe and the arctic. And we could not be more pleased that you have joined us today. We are going to tell you about a report that we here at the center have been working on for the last, over a year and a half in close cooperation and partnership with the center for the study of democracy in sofia, bulgaria. So before we begin, and well ask you to sort of bear with us, were going to walk you through a little bit of this report. Not the full 63 pages, i promise. And once we finish that conversation about the report, then we will have a conversation about it. But before i begin, let me introduce to you the authors of this report. I would like them to stand and be acknowledged. First let me begin with my colleague, james mina, former Research Associate with the center for Strategic International studies and now with the office of secretary of defense. I would like to also recognize martin vladimira, another fabulous colleague for this report, an let me acknowledge and you will be hearing from him soon, the director of the Economics Program at the center for the center for democracy. Thank you, my colleagues. This report could not be produced without. We wanted to make this report truly transatlantic, and thats why we were so thrilled to partner with the center for the study of democracy. Before we tell you about the kremlin playbook, let me warmly welcome the chairman of the senate for the study of democracy, who will say a few words of welcome and get to the reports. Please join me in welcoming dr. Sheltoff. Thank you, heather, and thank you for coming today. This has been really quite in the almost couple of years, when we have been focusing on russian economic footprint in europe. Let me just say briefly in a nutshell that assess to modify this footprint, which is still largely unknown and ignored. And then the analysis through different optics, the governments deficits, government gap, even ill say governments failures in europe, both in European Union level and government level, this exactly deficits and goops, including the state is central in east european countries, provide ample opportunities for aggressive russian economic and political behavior. I would like to thanks once again the core team of the project, led by heather and ruslan for their leadership and persistence, and of course, my colleagues, martin and jameson. Thank you for coming today. Thank you so much. Well, lets begin, and tell you a little bit about the kremlin playbook. First, i want to begin with the inspiration behind what we were studying. We were struck by a letter that was written in 2009 by a very Significant Group of central and Eastern European leaders to the obama administration. It was an open letter. While the letter had other issues regarding the u. S. Relationship with Central Europe, the relationship with russia, within this letter, it had a very interesting observation, i will say. It is ascribing that russia uses covert means of economic warfare, and what we found so interesting about that, the use of the word economic warfare, but it was an attempt to challenge the transatlantic orientation of these countries. We thought, well, thats an interesting statement. I wonder if that is true. Could we determine whether that was true. And then there was another, several years later, hungarian Prime Minister, gave us additional food for thought, in a speech he gave in july of 2014, he mentioned that the wind is blowing from the east. It is possible to construct a new state built on illiberal and national foundations. We thought perhaps the economic dimension was having an impact on governance standards, democratic institutions. On and in fact, the democratic orientation of these two countries. And we thought, that would be an interesting study, if we could measure. If we could create a methodology, if key could prove in fact there is a correlation between economic in ffluence an democratic institutions. And then, of course, friday happened. And then we had a pretty significant statement. I would argue that historians will reflect on this statement. Im going to reflect on this statement for quite sometime where jeh johnson and general clapper issued, i think, a fairly extraordinary statement, which among things, mentioned about attributing particular activity to russia, and consistent with the methods and motivations of russia, such activity is not new to moscow, the russians have used similar techniques across asia and europe. We get really good timing. So we felt that this report perhaps could illuminate what secretary johnson and general clapper were perhaps suggesting, what are the tactics and techniques that perhaps have been used in europe today. So that was some of the, what i call the inspiration. Now let me introduce you to the perspiration of this report. We wanted to do the Study Questions again. Was there a direct correlation, could we make a correlation between russias economic footprint in a country, and a deterioration of their governance standards. If we could or could not, and we will tell you how successful we were, what is the impact, what is the amplification. What is the overall impact on the Public Confidence in democracies, in the institutions themselves. We wanted to get very specific. We wanted to drill down into five countries to understand how this worked. We can make broad general trend lines, but to understand, as we will argue, the playbook, you have to understand how it works individually in each country. We selected five countries. Latvia, serbia, slovakia, and four out of the five are nato and European Union countries. So the nato country, certainly the United States, has an ee mo enormous amount, and for syria, we want serbia, yet holds gre culture ties with russia. We would see any difference. So that was, and of course, we he wanted broad gee owe graphic, and then to see the countries in in between. So we wanted to focus, and this is why well spend time on the methodology and measurement. We wanted to be rigorous. We wanted to see if we could quantify economic, the dimension of russias investment, not an easy task, and thankfully, the center for center of democrat see has taken this great burden on. Let me introduce ruslan up to the podium. Ruslan. Thank you all very much for coming. What we were faced with is not just presenting the simple economic presence of russia in the region, but also, trying to capture the amplifiers, those instruments that actually allowed russia to amplify their economic presence. So what we have done here is weve combined four indicators that would think historically display to the largest extent, the instruments that russia has used to intimidate and influence political decisions with those five countries. And then we have combined them to show that this is not just pure economics, but that they are using other instruments to amplify that economic presence. As you can see, weve ranked these five countries using this combined metrics, which includes answer energy imports, the most often used economic weapon in the kremlin playbook. Weve put in there the fdi stock, we have added to that the corporate presence, and the Corporate Networks which has taken us the most of time, probably six months, to undercover the Beneficial Owners and Intricate Networks that theyve created, and last but not least, the other instrument that has been used, the exports through russia. As you can see, these countries show Different Levels of economic footprint. But they all show similar trend, and we think there is a distinct, we find a distinct pattern, similar between 200708, when there was a change from the using the Economic Opportunities towards intentionally trying to steer or to use the economic presence in terms of influencing the political decisions. And that we think we see in all the patterns in the countries. Now, let me just go to the most widely used economic instrument and that has been wide knowledge, energy imports, as we can see in the case of bulgaria and slovakia all Different Levels, but in all of them, two of the instruments have a high vulnerability to russian influence, and these can be, these are energy and corporate presence. In serbia, corporate presence, hungary, but then we have undercovered, all different other amplifiers, patterns that have used or amplified the impact of those ffour core on t country. There have been ways, and weve listed a few of them, concentrating on monopolizing sectors, critical sectors like energy, finance, and transportations like in the case of lo latvia, and expanded in a different directions. Also, using large scale, and this weve seen in particularly in bulgaria and hungary, large scale, in serbia, large scale products to lure key economic players that can then be used to actually amplify the russian economic footprint in those countries. Now, let me give the one example that weve seen, but it provides a very good view of how all these mingle together. Thats the gasprong case. Im going to finish up on the cost of the economieeconomies. They usually act through a local network of subsidiaries that corner the national incumbents and press them into basically playing along the lines that gazprom wants to use. Let me finish up by showing you that you cant help but notice that the highest prices, the highest price of gas is put on the countries where russia has had the highest economic presence, the highest economic footprint. These are bulgaria and serbia. The more youre captured economically, the more you actually pay in this case to gazprom. These amount to tens of billions of dollars over the ten year period that we are looking in 20042014. That, i would like to turn it back to heather on explaining how the economic footprint and the political footprint inter mingle. Thank you. So ruslan had the hard part. We had the easier part on the democratic standards, because we have incredible resource called freedom house, and they pro dues an annual report in nations in transit, my microphone goes, they annually provide us with an enormous amount of information on the Democratic Health and standards of countries in Central Europe. So what we did was using the freedom houses annual analysis, we looked at three specific indicators. Perceived levels of corruption. Independence of the judiciary, and media independence. That for us was in some ways the Health Indicator of a democracy. And what we found was a little counter intuitive. Particularly, for those countries that joined nato and the European Union at least by 2004, because we made an assumption that those countries would in fact only increase in Democratic Health. They were in major institutions. They were developing economically, and democratically. There was actually a decline in governance standards. This, we were seeing over a trend line, again, from 2004 to 2014. Latvia was the outlier. Stable in the indicators. Well talk about latvia as sorts of on example. Sebby yeah again was fairly stable. The numbers that you see on the graph and in the report, we chart country by country, and we chart the democratic standards and economic footprint. It is a little hard to read when youre looking at it for the first time and youre not sure what the squigly lines are. What we saw are the democratic standards were declining as the economic influence was growing. So let me sort of get to the answer to the first study question. Is there a direct correlation between russias economic presence and its democratic standards, if you will. We could not find a direct correlation. In fact, the findings were quite inconclusive. But i think the most important thing about this, and now im going to get really, too, the ahha of the report, was that we really observed a relationship between the economics and the politics. So as we mesh those two findings together, this is what weve observed. If russias economic footprint in a country is above 12 of that countrys gdp, there is a pretty strong likelihood, but not absolutely, that you will see where democratic standards will decline political influence plays an enormous role. Heres the catch. If the country had below 12 of gdp of russian influence, so the economics werent the strong part, but we found, again, this gets in the case of hungary and others, the political influence seemed more powerful than the economics. Finally, we had some different results, varied results. This is why we wanted to make sure. Our conclusions were not extremely airtight. In some cases, for instance, latvia, which has over 12 gdp that is russian economic influence, they had more resistance to russian political influence. And some of that has to do, quite frankly, with their anticorruption efforts, their transparency and some of the strength of their institutions. And then, of course, we had serbia, which again, below had High Economic footprint, but yet, we found the political influence to be that much stronger. So that was sort of that 12 line was something that we watched with great interest. So here is really the secret of the playbook. And before i begin, i want to sort of define a little bit when we talk about corruption. We do this in the report, and i just want to emphasize, for us corruption does have a definition. We do cite examples in the report. And we define corruption for the purposes of the report as the alleged or reported exercise of ones power, position, resources, in order to exploit or ex certificaploit overstate questionable means. These actions could be deliberate or unlawful, but may not be so. We cite or observations. But these observations do not suggest or accuse any specific individuals of wrongdoing. Just want to make that perfectly clear before we begin. Because corruption is in fact the key. So let me tell you a little bit about the unvirtous circle. This gets back to the flow problem, where russian economic influence can come through the economics, strategic sectors like energy, finance, like the media. And then it can create through the political influence, it can then in some ways metastisize. Reducing media freedoms, purchasing Media Companies to eliminate independent journalism. It can be financing of Political Parties that want to prevent diversification of energy, or to ensure that particularly protected sectors remain particularly protected. And the transition mechanism for this unvirtous, work its way with businessmen and with sometimes parliament, and it can become and grow so large that the country now is unable to take independent policy action. So decisions that you would think would be in the countrys national interest, diversification of key sectors, encouraging the highest standards, they are eliminated or individuals that have been placed in specific positions prevent that from happening. So it becomes a very corrosive element. What we have found, and some of this was brought to us by revelations in the Panama Papers and elsewhere, sometimes that good Investigative Journalism and openness can open researchers eyes as well. But we saw that some of these local affiliates had and through their intermediate years there was some direct connections to some of the west known kremlins inner circle. So we did see this was a very purposeful approach. Again, just some of the key highlights. The corruption end of it is a transmission. It can create those dependencies, and once that feedback loop becomes so strong between the economics influences the politics, sometimes the politics influences the economics, and it grows that cycle. Thats what leads us to what weve argued is state capture. It becomes so overwhelming, independent action is proven difficult. So what is the point here . Why is it working so effectively. And i think this is where we come to the point of the were getting close to the ahha after what we found in the report. The political influence is really about weakening the internal cohesion of these countries, and of these societies. Its sometimes about obstructing reform. So they cannot improve themselves. Sometimes it is making sure that the inherent fragility where you have free elections, a bit of volatili volatility, this is something continued to sort of overemphasize the dysfunction of democracy. Utilizing individuals that will be a challenge to the democratic system, and this is where the use of Political Party financing can sometimes weigh in. And what weve found is increasingly as the economic and political influence began to grow, that actually debates about issues very important to the kremlin, sanctions policy, Energy Diversification policy. Those started to become very difficult for the countries to maintain. You started to hear leaders changing their views. Changing their policies. And this is where we see some of the broader objectives. There is in fact a systemic war on information, and as we saw the economic influence grow, it was entering the media and telecommunications sector. That reduces independent voices. The other war on information part that i think is particularly challenging for United States and for europe is the fact that we dont know what fact is. When you have media stations and reports that obscure the truth or you dont know what the truth is, or various stories to tell you, the people dont know what to believe. What happens, what we found in instances where governments were spending a lot of time batting down stories patently false, but that was what the media was generating for them to respond to. It can be extremely dis orienting, and paralyze government institutions. Again, the media environment is quite restricted. Again, the other part of the unvirtous circle, public and private interests. Dr. Shekoff said in the beginning, a son goes to his father and he wants to be involved in organized crime. The father goes would that be private or public. And so in some ways, the commingling of private and public, that, again, is a challeng challenge if it isnt clear and allows the private interests to acquire Privileged Access to and to these strategic sectors. Why energy. Well, they ever the links there. But it is an enormous sector. Why finance and banking. Why do you rob a bank. Thats where the money is. Thats where the money is. That is where we have each country has enormous resources. The state has powerful control and interest over those key strategic sectors, and if you can in flew thenfluence them, c transform them. What are the objectives of the playbook. Clearly, it is the money. It is economics. This is about maximizing economic benefits and enriching members of the inner circle, whether they are at the local affiliate level, at the national level. Or at the international level. And i think one of the issues and ruslan will mention this when we talk about the recommendations, it is highly ironic that sometimes European Union funds have been used in the furtherance of the cycle if theyre not watched carefully and a cautionary tale that sometimes we may be involved unknowingly of furthering anticorrupt efforts. I think the second bullet for me, and the third bullet are what is the big reason why we all care about this issue. And some have, if theyve reviewed the port, whats the big deal, you know, countries have big economic interests and that comes with influence. The second bullet is the big deal. It is because ultimately it is about breaking the transatlantic consensus. It is about challenging our own democracies and the strength of those democracies. And maintaining the international liberal order. And why this is so important is because it fits into a very critical element of russias new generation warfare, which a stated doctrine, strategy of influence, not of brute force. Primary goal is break the internal coherence of the enemy system. When you so paralyze a democracy, you confuse it, tarnish it, it is corrupt. Ripping you off. It cant respond to you. You dont believe in the whole system. And then youre much more available to think about either other approaches, or perhaps being willing to accommodate very difficult issues that you wouldnt normally accommodate if you were a healthy, thriving democracy. So thats the playbook. But now what do we do about it. So im going to do the first part of the recommendations that deal with the United States, and nato, and then invite ruslan and hell talk about the European Union. Step one, understand, this is something much larger than what we think it is. When ive looked at Central Europe for over 15, 20 years, we tend to look at the individual issues. Oh, there is a political problem here. Oh, my goodness, what a strange economic decision theyre making. We dont look at the totality of it. We dont look how it works together. Recognize the playbook. Once you recognize it, you better be prepared to dedicate an enormous amount of policy resources and Financial Resources to break the transmission mechanism and develop greater antibodies or resilience against it. We want to focus on the transmission mechanism and thats corruption. And thats about tracking how this elicit financing flows. This is about us. As much as were talking about tactics and techniques that russia may offer, this is about our system acknowledging them and responds to them. We better track them, we better have a better understanding that the senior levels of our government and of european governments how this is working. We argue for a much more high level focused effort at the Treasury Department to track and prosecute if in fact these elicit funds are used in the u. S. Financial system. We have to encourage our nato members to see this, not as a governance challenge, but as a National Security threat. We have to start tracking these elicit funds, and having nato think of it as an element of collective defense and security. Obviously we want to heighten natos awareness and attention, and we think new positions like the nato assistant secretary for intelligence can play an Important Role in that, the really, the toolbox here is with the eu and trying to think through u. S. Eu cooperation, we need to use this much more powerlpowe powerf powerfully, and a new administration can look at this holistically and getting at stopping our systems from facilitating this influence. And as i mentioned, certainly, again, getting back to natos more holistic focus on this. Finally, i think, and this is not a criticism. It is just a change. U. S. Government assistance in this region has gone to nothing. It has diminished greatly. We understand that. There is successful members of the European Union and nato. Our analysis suggests maybe it needs to be revisited. Perhaps the u. S. Needs to completely refocus its efforts on this region particularly in the western balkans, but now we have to open procurement systems, putting transparency as a matter of priority. Independence of the judiciary. Investigative journalism. Thats not in a nice to do category. It is critically important to the health of this country as a nato member, as a member of the European Union. So we need to take this very seriously. Now, ill invite ruslan to finish this up and you can join us in our conversation. Thank you. Thanks, heather. Indeed, it is a simple two slides and what you should do. But let me just, before i just flip them over, let me just go back a bit to the point of 2008, because this when we think the switch happened from opportunity to intent. This was very widely proclaimed actually by kremlin that they are no prepared and theyre going to very actively seek to recapture Eastern Europe because theyre no longer going to allegedly support through Energy Crisis Eastern Europe at the expense of the European Commission. So they say the European Commission is already not able to support these countries, and we think that if not, then welcome back. And the critical thing here is capture. Let me underscore this. What we were noting is theres nothing wrong with the russian economic footprint in Eastern Europe. It is between 11 and 22 . In 2008, there have been two trends when kremlin has used corporate presence to advance its political goals, number one. And secondly, it might have even overthrown governments with internal political decisions and that is what is worrying. Thats why we think the European Union should focus on three key issues. And these are demonopolizing or using more precisely the antimonopoly European Unions of nation states. And finally, let me go to the bottom line again. The eu should also revamp and strengthen its anticorruption Good Governance mechanisms all across the union. Its getting there, but its taken more than a decade until now. With this, let me conclude our presentation and invite you to also find our report at our website. Thank you, ruslan. Let me ask Kathy Kavalec to join us and move to the podium. Cathy kavalec has responsibilities for policies in russia in the region. Prior to that, she was the deputy coordinator for u. S. Assistance to europe and eurasia. This is not an easy subject for the government to talk about. At least we have found it difficult to get some of our colleagues to come and share with us what we need to think about this and what we need to do, so welcome. We welcome your reflections. First of all, good morning to everyone. Thank you so much for hosting me here, and were really happy, very pleased, to see this report released. We think this is an important subject. It needs attention, and i think one of the first one of the more important things and you had this in your slide is recognizing what the playbook is. Were seeing behaviors and activities that surprise us and unsettle us, but it is important to kind of step back and see the whole and see what may be behind it, so i think your report tries to do that and i think thats a Great Service to all of us as policymakers and as members of the western alliance. I think this is a welcome addition to how russia is implementing its foreign policy, a policy that seems to increasingly reject the postcold war order in europe. Russias aggression in ukraine is a demonstration that moscow is willing to undermine existing rules. We agree these actions appear to be designed to weaken core institutions in the west, such as nato and the eu, and to cast doubt on the integrity of our democratic institutions. Russia wants to create confusion or divert attention from moscow. Peter has documented that the aim of russias Information Operations is to use disinformation cascades to advance the notion that the truth doesnt matter. For example, by propagating multiple theories of the mh17 shoot down, russia plans to leave the public with the truth is unknowable or can be believed because everyone has an agenda. Russia has similar goals in other spheres, politics, civil, and cyber. Let me mention a few examples, and you have already touched on a few of these. Disinformation, of course, in which russia uses disinformation and propaganda, taking full advantage of the internet and new technologies. We know about the troll farms and we have seen other examples of this behavior. Political parties, youve mentioned and touched on this. Theres growing evidence uncovered by journalists about russian connections with antiestablishment populist Political Parties in germany, hungry, and austria. We all have read the stories about the National Front in france borrowing money from a russian bank. Civil society. The russian government appears to be more willing to infiltrate and try to manipulate Civil Society out of russia, even creating a false flag and ngos. In april, the Swedish Security Service took the extraordinary step of discussing in public how persons linked to russian intelligence were participating in public debates over cooperation with nato on the antinato side. Of course, cyber, which has been in the news, and you made reference to fridays announce from the department of Homeland Security and our Intelligence Community, points to another area of endeavor. So what can we do in the west . And we welcome the suggestions. I think these are important. One thing i would just stress is that as we look at the range of activities, it is really whole of government effort. Maybe in the old days you worried about espionage and military activity. Now were looking at a broad range of activities, and the response cant just focus on any one area. It has to be coordinated, and it has to look at various lines of effort and what we need to do to strengthen our own defenses, for example, in cyber, which is a real vulnerability given the way the internet has been constructed. The other thing, of course, is cooperation with local partners and nato allies with the eu, with nato, first of all, to discuss, to share information, but then to coordinate and see what we can do together. I want to stress that as we discuss this behavior that our longterm objective remains to have russia as a global responsible player integrated into western institutions. Although russia has kind of shifted the direction, i think the best outcome for all of us is to have a constructive cooperative partner that agrees and plays by the rules that we have found to be so helpful to our democracies and our Economic Prosperity in the west. But until that time when russia wants to return and redirect itself in that direction, i think we need to confront the problems were facing and we need a flexible policy that pushes back on russian aggression, helps our partners build resilience and the antibodies to deal with there kind of behavior. We want to continue to cooperate with moscow when it is possible, and we want to maintain our ties to the russian people. So let me stop there and be happy to join your conversation. Cathy, thank you so much. We really would welcome your thoughts, your comments. This is a lot to digest. We appreciate that in a short period of time. Two things as you were talking that struck me, both my own personal reflections here in washington as well as some of the output of the my concern is we dont understand and dont place the priority and the urgency that this may be taking place. In my view just looking at the u. S. Experience, this is incredibly bold, and we have a generation thats not familiar with the language of active measures. But this isnt just active measures as we understood them in the cold war. Because of 25 years of integration, of trying to work with russia, bring them into our institutions own our partnerships and our relationships, their methodology is happening inside our system, using our system, and i feel like we just the surprise and the whats going on, in some ways thats the difference here. And that whole of government approach is the problem is whole of government isnt focusing on this. I welcome the urgency and the priority, which i think now more than ever has to be placed. Im looking for it desperately. The second comment i have and this is perhaps where we slightly disagree while absolutely russian efforts are designed to undermine and erode the creditability of the west, we posit a view it is proposing an alternative model to the west. This is where i think the behavior of such figures as the Prime Minister and the strong man who is reducing independence of media and judicial issues, that is how we take control. Thats how we get our hands over this globalization. And the challenge is this kremlin model is now becoming more attractive to the very countries we thought were permanently attracted to how democratic systems work. Tough questions. No good answers. I completely agree with you on the urgency. This is why i think your report is so important and so timely. I hope other institutions are looking at this. I know ive worked a lot with allied and partnered governments when i travel in europe. This is a frequent conversation. Because its new and because its kind of so all encompassing, its going to take a little while because we have to figure out what steps we need to take and whats most at risk. Strengthening journalism is very important, fighting corruption. All these things that have been always been important to us, but have become even more important now. Your point about the resources is an important one as we go through an election and welcoming a new administration. That Administration Needs to figure out what its priorities are, but i think this should be front and center as they look at funding and where they want to put their resources. On the other question, i think certainly thats another key question is kind of political trends, which i think is probably something i dont want to dive into too deeply as a Public Servant here on the eve of an election in the United States except to say that we i think it just points to the need to come back to basic values, democratic values, to remind ourselves and the public of why these democratic systems are so important, why these what the risks are if you go on an alternative path. These are systems that exist that come out of world war ii, of other experiences, that point to what can go wrong if we dont find a stable democratic system that allows for give and take and for ideas and kind of a balance of interests, what the risks may be. Now more than ever on the eve of our election, on the eve of other elections in europe, this is an important message. We see lots of oped writers opining on the topic today. Ill stop and leave it there. In 2017, for europe, all the elections, this is a very big year. I think the playbook needs to be viewed through that optic. Right. Id love to take some questions from the audience. We have unfortunately a shortage of time. After i take some questions, ruslan, i also want to hear because you work very closely with the European Commission on all these issues, what youre hearing from your european counterparts when they hear this idea, what is their reaction to that. Well start right there in the front. Please introduce yourself, your affiliation, and keep your questions brutally short, please. Sure. Thank you. Im laura. Id be very interested to hear a little bit more about the latvia case. Steven blank. It sounds like an extraordinary study, but im questioning why is it that nobody looked at the russian influence either through organized crime or through media because we know that many media empires in central and Eastern Europe are financed by russia or have actually russian ownership. And colleague right there in front, please. Sorry. Thanks. John hudson. I just wanted to ask kathy, whats the appropriate response to russian hacking on the dnc . Some people have talked about taking out an electorate grid or taking out russias online sensor and architecture on the internet. Whats the right response . If you cant talk about specific measures, what do we want the russians to understand by the response we give them if we do . Ill take those three questions here. Well see if we can squeeze in a second round before we go. In the latvia case, we do a deep case study dive into that experience. What we found were a couple of factors. There is some higher level recognition within latvias political culture about being more acknowledging the potential of the influence that could exist, but what we found really one of the key elements was latvias unique construct of its Anticorruption Office and its independence as well as its early investment in judicial reform. This Anticorruption Office does not report to parliament. Obviously, parliament should have oversight of these kinds of things, but it actually removed it. When paroltariliamentarians wer in over oversight, they were pushed out. There was assassination attempts against the deputy director. It has been a fight, and this is a were all works in progress in this department. I dont mean to be judgmental in anyway, but they were able to assert themselves independently. But theres still enormous challenges. Latvia recognizes there are still enormous challenges. There are some good lessons learned, i think, from latvia. Ruslan, do you want to take organized crime . Actually, its a very good question weve dealt with in the report. We did look at the ownership, corporate ownership, of media. It goes in really dense networks, telecommunications, that are able to spread multiple news stories from seemingly unrelated news outlets besides the very visible corporate presence, so this makes it even more difficult. There are two aspects to that. One because it is targeting the two most important checks and balances in our democratic systems. One is the media and the other is within the state. Thats the judiciary. Talking about the European Commission, we have done an eu study on the relationship between organized crime and corruption. And the difference between what we have in western europe and Eastern Europe to the judiciary without exception, so were talking about within the balkans down to southeast europe. That makes it very difficult. Thats why we wanted to focus very much on state capture. And the example of latvia shows that. If were able to get our Financial Intelligence units, our organized crime units, our regulatory bodies working on concentration on monopolies, that is going to reduce the pressure. That is the antidote. Kathy . Im happy to say first of all its not the state Department Taking the lead on what the response will be. I think thats a better question directed to the white house and the Intelligence Community and the department of Homeland Security. But in terms of response, there needs to be a thoughtful, principled strong response that see sends a clear message and assigns responsibility and makes it clear that we dont tolerate future intrusions. But the other part of it and i know department of Homeland Security is working on is resilience and defense of our own systems. I think thats a broader issue on cyber. Let me just leave it there. I think we can take one more question. Woman in the green is. Well be available after the conversation. On the timing of im sorry, alison. On the timing of when this redirection started, how much of it do you think connects to reconnection of kosovo to russian interests . We put a timeline on sort of key events, the georgiarussian conflict, and other things. Each country has different points. What weve found from the 2004 to 2008 period it was what we call opportunity. There were existing networks. They were being explored. We think in that period there was a lot of European Investment that was sort of coming in posteu membership that perhaps was crowding that out. It was more competitive. We did believe that the 2007 2008 period represented a shift. So we point many people point, even in the security and defense field, president putins historic speech in 2007 to the Munich Security Conference where he was signaling, i believe, a very significant shift in policy. Of course, whats hard to separate is was it intention or the Global Economic recession that created a multitude of things. Again, the russiageorgia conflict was becoming a confrontation in the buffer zone, if you will. I hate that term. We saw the acceleration of the use of the economics and the politics that was starting to then create that vicious circle, that unvirtuous circle, where it was growing. Today we see where it is a challenge to maintain unity of purpose and policy on eu sanctions against russia. It is difficult now that far antieurope, antiamerican, just antiparties, it is sort of fill in the blank, are now growing to such predominance on the scene at a moment where there is crisis in confidence in how democracies are viewing themselves and their way forward in a very disruptive society in which russia is helping with that disruption. It is a policy, which is why we keep saying looking at these in isolated issues, the difference here is how it is being used and its ultimate objective. Thats the part we all must recognize and take action. Again, its about us. Its about our societies, and that is what we have to focus on. Sometimes thats the hardest part to focus on, how were doing. If i can take a little bit of exception to the idea of the impact of all of this behavior, i think it is important to stress while, yes, there are pressures to lift sanctions or have been pressured to lift sanctions on russia over ukraine, i think whats more striking over the last period is the unity we have built in the transatlantic alliance. Sanctions have continued. They have been rolled over multiple times. I think when they were first introduced on a transatlantic basis people were surprised that we achieved that level of unity, that the unity has held as long as it has. Certainly we should recognize the risks, but i dont think we should overstate the impact. I think the fact that some of these behaviors are so blatant, so flagrant, that they create their own antibodies when we think about a case in germany and the shock that persisted, insisting an event that happened that did not in light of clear evidence that it had not happened created such a shock and recognition and raised a lot of questions about what russia was trying to do. I think some of the pushback will occur naturally as people see and confront what is happening and reject it. And a lot of that will happen naturally and through the institutions that we have. I think were stronger than we recognize, but i think we always have to be aware of what were dealing with. That is the perfect way to end the conversation. We rushed through this. Youve been extremely patient as we explained a very long and dense report. Thank you so much. Please go to the website. Download the report. Thank you for attending the premiere of the kremlin playbook. Thank you so much. [ applause ] our coverage of state races continues live tonight on cspan. Russ finegold is trying to win back the seat to ron johnson. The two debate at 8 00 p. M. Eastern. With harry reids retirement, nevada has an open senate seat this year. Joe heck is running against katherine cortes. Their debate is at 10 00 p. M. Eastern live on cspan. On news makers this weekend, more election politics. The executive director of emilys list talks about her Group Support of prochoice candidates. Sunday at 10 00 a. M. Eastern and 6 00 p. M. Eastern on cspan. Next, the release of a survey of American Political Culture that puts people into three categories. From the university of virginias institute for advanced studies and culture, this is an hour and 40 minutes. Good afternoon. My name is jay tolson. I am the editor of the hedgehog review at the institute for advanced studies and culture at the university of virginia. Thank you all for being here. Welcome to the vanishing center of american democracy. I think in normal election years that might sound overly dramatic. It might sound like an understatement this year. That is, of course, the title of the report that is an analysis of a recent survey, a 2016 survey, of American Political Culture conducted for the institute by the gallup group. If there is an overarching theme to this report, i think you could probably fall back on the old maxist adage that quantitative change ultimately brings qualitative change. I think what youll hear today is a lot of trends in our political culture that have been underway and not just our political culture, but our broader culture that have been under way in the last 40 years are reaching a kind of culmination, possibly pressing a tipping point, and that will obviously be the subject of the various panelists discussion today. We are delighted to have as well as two speakers from our own Institute Two outstanding outside panelists. From the institute, we have presenting first James Davison hunter, who is the executive director of the institute and he is the levinson distinguished professor of religion, culture, and social theory at the university of virginia. He is the author of culture wars, the struggle to define america as well as many other books, studies, and articles. Our second speaker who will be talking more specifically about the survey is our director of survey research, carl desportes coleman. Our guest speakers, we have two today. The first will be nancy isenberg, a professor of history at Louisiana State university, the author most recently of the acclaimed white trash, the 400year untold history of class in america. She is also the author of sex and citizenship in antebellum america and fallen founder, a life of aaron burr, a particular villain of this season of hamilton, but were delighted to have her here and that she heroically took the train all the way from baton rouge to washington. Our other guest speaker is tom as many of you know from his very sharp columns in the new york times. He was until recently the professor of Public Affairs jou journalism at columbia university. He was a Political Correspondent for the washington post. Before that, the Baltimore Sun before its demise and many other publications, print and digital. Were glad to have him here. He is the author most recently of the age of austerity, how scarcity will remake american politics. So lets move on with the show. First, James Davison hunter. Thank you. So thanks, jay. Thank you, tom and nancy for being here, carl. Thanks to the Gallup Organization for hosting this event today. I very much appreciate all the work you have done not only in fielding this work, but for being such great partners in the effort. And thanks to all of you for carving out time in your busy days to come and be here. Im just going to dig right in. Tell you first of all a little bit about the work that weve done. Everyone can agree that theres something unprecedented about the president ial election this ye year. Given the amount of ink spilled, the temptation is to say it is donald trump himself. This maybe true, but it also distracts us from seeing what else is new on the Political Landscape and not only new, but far more profound. The question we began at the beginning of this project and that has guided this research was this. What are the features of our Political Landscape that are present and that will remain irrespective of who wins in november . This can be a different tact than is often take in journalism and research where there is a tendency to see politics as the daily ongoing contest for power. It typically attends to the latest changes in political fortune, whos up, whos down, whos gaining, whos losing, what did they say today that will be contradicted by something they say tomorrow and so on. Its like studying the weather. Its raining today, but it will be clear tomorrow. Its cold today, but it will warm up by friday. In all of our work at the institute for advanced studies in culture, we are preeminently concerned with the climate rather than the weather. We are concerned with the cultural context of which political contests take place. These contests includes the ideals, the values, the symbols, the stories, the public rituals that either bind or separate people, but always direct them in political action. Political culture divides the boundaries of political leg legitimate si. Political activity emanates from political culture reflecting that cultures deepest values and beliefs. Political action in turn both reinforces and subtly reshapes the political culture. The everyday politics of a society then may change and change significantly, but the normative context, the political culture of a society, tends to change very slowly. When it does, the changes are of a great consequence. Changes that take place within political culture portend much about the future ordering of public life. So this is the orientation weve taken in the institutes 2016 survey on American Political Culture, a survey we designed but was fielded by the Gallup Organization in august of this year to roughly 1900 respondents nationwide. What i want to do over the next 12 minutes or so is to provide a brief overview of what we have learned so far and then ask carl, my colleague, to follow with a review of some of the data. The survey yields a number of important findings, and as we dig deeper, were sure to find more. But at the broadest level, the data make it abundantly clear is there are two basic fault lines in American Political Culture. The first fault line is between the general american electorate and the political establishment. The second fault line is within the white population, the white electorate, and it represents an evolution in the deep fishers of the culture war. So let me unpack this a bit. First, the first fault line. The survey reinforces a longstanding observation in sociology and Political Science that american democracy is undergoing a crisis of legitimacy. In the literature it is often talked about a confidence gap, but we seeing a growing disaffection between the American Public and the dominant Political Institutions. In certain respects, theres nothing new here at law. Theres long been disaffection in Public Opinion, and there are ways in which that disaffection may be hardening. It is important to note that disaffection is not a one dimensional reality. Analytically, we can tease out three dimensions. The first is mistrust of government. 2 3 of the American Public has little or no confidence that the government in washington will solve the problems it sets its mind to. By the same degree, the majority also believes that what americans really need is a new Political Party because the current twoparty system isnt working. Its 2 3 of the population. Over half of all democrats and republicans hold this view, but 3 out of 4 independents are especially adamant about this. This attitude of mistrust extends to other powerful institutions. Nearly 90 of all americans believe that wall street and big business in our country often profit at the expense of ordinary americans. The second dimension is cynicism toward leaders. And it seems to me this is a particular problem for the majority americans is how the government in washington and beyond is actually managed. Here the special ire of the American Public is directed toward political leaders and the Power Centers of government. The vast majority believe that most politicians are more interested in winning elections than in doing what is right and that while the system of government is good, the people running are incompetent. Again, this tendency spills over beyond the government itself to other leadership groups. Significant majorities believe our Economic System is rigged in favor of the wealthiest americans, that the leaders in american corporations care little about the lives of most americans, and the most educated and successful people in america are more interested in serving themselves than in serving the common good. The third dimension is alienation or estrangement, which has to deal with a sense of agency one has to fix the world that one is a part. These tendencies in Public Opinion are broadly if not deeply etched into american selfunderstanding, so its not surprising that significant majorities agree that most elected officials dont care what people like me think and that people like me dont have any say about what the government does. Indeed about 40 of the American Population feels like strangers in their own country. Now, a certain amount of disaffection is found across all dimensions, men and women, young and old, white, black, and hispanic, rich and poor, and so on. Yet theres also no question that the patterns we are seeing confirm what we both know anecdotely and from other survey work, that theres a predictable unevenness. Some are more disaffected than others. Im going to drill into this a little bit later, but just very briefly one sees the greatest intensity of disaffection in a population that tends to be more male than female, disproportionately represented in baby boomers. Less surprising is the fact that the most disaffected are disproportionately poor, a pattern that intensifies further with education and religion. The most disaffected are poorly educated and conservative in their religious faith. Ill come back to that shortly. The least disaffected group in america are elites, those who are disproportionately well educated and wealthy. These are individuals who are comfortably situated in life and they know it. It isnt a stretch to see why they have greater agency and thus less alienation and Greater Trust in the government compared to those who have less, but far more interesting are africanamericans and hispanics. While levels of cynicism toward leaders and experts and their personal alienation and feelings of a lack of agency, again among minorities, are comparable to levels in the white community. Its fascinating to note that both africanamericans and hispanics exude much greater confidence in the government than whites. In general, whites are twice as likely as blacks and hispanics to be very distrustful of the government on a variety of measures. These positive impressions of america and American Government are especially notably in light of perceptions of history and social circumstance where the majority of these minorities agree that our Founding Fathers were part of a racist and sexist culture that gave important authorities to white men and hurt minorities and women. In spite of the recognition of historical injustice, the plurality of hispanics and africanamericans remain hopeful, believing that the future for people like themselves will be better in coming years against all odds and difficulties. The africanamerican and hispanic communities tend to see a Brighter Future for themselves. So thats the first fault line, how it falls and some of the variation that we find within it. The second fault line, as i mentioned earlier, is within the white middle class, at least the general population itself. And this we believe represents an evolution in the culture wars. The cultural conflicts surrounding socalled moral issues that has defined so much of american politics for four decades was always one that took place within the middle class. Yes, there are class elements to that conflict, but they were mainly the differences between the lower middle and upper middle classes. In the intervening years, the intraclass tensions have intensified and in our view transformed into what is best considered two very different social locations with significant class cultures. Since 2008, the cleavage between the highly educated professional and managerial upper middle class on one hand and the less educated, less professional, nonworking class on the other hand has deepened and hardened. These cultures are marked not only by different values, beliefs, and sensibilities, but also by strikingly different life chances. This is at the heart of the new culture conflict. Empirically, the line of division is drawn by education. It is the distinction very simply between the credentialed and the nonhnoncredentialed. T there is obviously variation here, but these two groups are notably and significantly different. For example, the noncredentialed are one and a half times more likely than the credentialed to have higher levels of distrust. This fault line also plays out in different tendencies in world view and Public Policy and their ideologies and their views of government, immigration, and voting patterns. In all we see consistent patt n patterns of difference in opinion rooted in education while hardly representing polarities are pulling consistently in opposite directions. Education then is clearly discernible kravas in the political cultural landscape. How wide is that rift and how deep does it go . When we push this analysis further in two different ways, it becomes apparent that the fishers disguise a much deeper rift in American Political Culture. Our first analytic turn is to push the education factor out. Beyond those who are merely credentialed with a College Degree to those who hold graduate degrees. We oversampled for this population. By virtue of their educational credentials, they are the best positioned in the population to operate effectively in the global economy. By any measure, these are social elites. The second analytic turn was to introduce the cultural factor central to the old culture war, that mainly of belief. Among the poorly educated, we pull out those who are religiously conservative, in this case most evangelical proper protestants and catholics. We call these the disinherited. These two groups sort themselves out in predictable ways. The disinherited are poor. The horizons of financial betterment are poor. Theyre disproportionally found in the midwest and southeast in the least densely Populated Areas where created on the coast, the mid atlantic, and the far west. They tend to reside in the most demographically dense areas of these regions. These lines of division, those pertaining to educational credentials and faith, are both familiar and new. Together they represent a rift that is at the heart of this new cultural conflict. This plays out on every front in ways that reveal deep fishers that are in fact fundamentally different world views. I should note that in our analysis and youll see in this a minute with carls presentation we add as a point of reference and as a way of highlighting the importance of religion a middling category, a category we call the disadvantaged. These are noncredentialed. They have the same educational profile as the disinherited. They are also religiously moderate, liberal, or secular. One of the ways in which these groups contrast is on the Different Levels of disaffection. The disinherits are seven times more likely than social elites to have a very high distrust of government. Likewise, the disinherited and the disadvantaged are five times more likely than social elites to be highly cynical of leadership. Not at least the disinherited are over nine and a half it ti more likely to be highly alienated. These are neither small nor subtle differences. They reflect a world that has left the disinherited and disaffected suspicious of government institutions and this in the face of a pervasive sense of powerlessness to do anything about it politically or otherwise. Another way in which we see these groups contrast is in how they perceive solidarity with some groups and differ from others. The legacy of racial conflict, ethnic tension, and religious prejudice has always been at war with the ideals of a just society. And certainly those lines of difference havent disappeared, but where do these lines figure in . In the 2016 survey of American Political Culture, we asked the question for the following groups, do you see their beliefs and values as being completely different, mostly different, mostly similar, or completely the same as americans like you . The one thing that each of these groups shares in common is the perception is that the beliefs and values of the wealthiest are very different from their own. Another point of commonality is only moderate danistance from t values of beliefs of africanamerican and hispanic communities. What stands out are the cultural distance from conservative christians, gays and lesbians, muslims. The social elite perceive the beliefs as radically different. Social elites perceive only minimal cultural distance from gays, lesbians, and the nonreligious. While the disinherited see themselves as very different from all three. Theres nothing middling about the distance they perceive between their own beliefs and the values of those of the wealthiest americans. Its not surprising that these different class cultures predispose people toward vastly different visions of Public Policy, such has welfare, obamacare, gay marriage, gun control, and immigration. On this last issue, for example, 2 3 of all the disinherited favor banning entry to all muslims until we better understand the terrorist threat to our country compared to just 14 of the social elite. The same pattern of difference can be seen in their views toward, quote, building a wall across the border between the United States and mexico. The final point ill make here is that while social and cultural factors clearly predispose the American Population toward sometimes starkly different political orientations, the survey also shows how clearly aligned the disinherited and social elites are with the two candidates, trump and clinton. But the findings of the 2016 survey on American Political Culture also suggests that the candidates themselves have an independent role in intensifying the political divisions. They crystallize political differences not unlike a flag around whom supporters unite and act together. This dynamic may be especially important in a context where personalities loom large where other institutions fail to coalesce in coherent ways. With that, ill pass it over to my colleague carl bowman. Id like to begin by thanking people who have individuals who have been involved with this project. Stephanie has been incredibly responsive and has worked well with us throughout. Its always a privilege to work with james on a project like this. So i have a few comments. Im not going to try and duplicate everything james just covered. What i want to do is give you is just a few figures to highlight some particulars, some of the things weve found. First, it doesnt take a political poll to realize that this is an unusual election, and it doesnt take a social survey to know that confidence in leaders and Political Institutions is at a low ebb, but it does require systematic measurement to unpack the disconnect, to examine its contours, and to explore the depths of what is happening in our political culture. As the donald trump and Bernie Sanders campaigns have highlighted, Many Americans are angry and frustrate. Many have lost confidence if not in the system of government, at least in its leaders and the way it is currently functioning. Consider this series of statements. More than half of all americans our survey reveals agree with all of these statements. These days the government in washington threatens the freedom of ordinary americans. 56 agree. The american way of life is rapidly disappearing. 58 of americans agree. America used to be a place where you could get ahead by working hard, but this is no longer true. 59 agree. The leaders in american corporations, media, universities, and Technology Care little about the lives of most americans. 63 agree. The most educated and successful people in america are more interested in serving themselves than in serving the common good. 62 agree. People like me dont have any say about what the government does. 64 agree. Our system of government is good, but the people running it are incompetent. 71 agree. 7 out of 10 americans. Our Economic System is rigged in favor of the wealthiest americans. This is something that was echoed by candidates this year and 73 of the American Public agree with it. Most elected officials dont care what people like me think. 74 agree. We need a president who will completely change the direction of the country. 72 agree. Political correctness is a serious problem in our country, making it hard for people to say what they really think. 73 agree. Almost 3 out of 4. You cant believe much of what you hear from the media. 75 agree with that statement. Most americans vote without really thinking through the issues. We have 86 agreeing with that. They are as critical of themselves as voters as they are political leaders and institutions. Most politicians are more interested in winning elections than in doing what is right. 9 out of 10 americans agree with that statement. What have we heard here . Americans believe that government threatens us, that our leaders in and out of government are only in it for themselves, they have little say in what the government does. That you cant believe what you hear from either politicians or the media. They have a distinct loss of confidence. As james pointed out, we have gone beyond these individual statements of disaffection to try to discern underlying patterns. The initial analysis suggests the crisis of legitimacy of governing institutions involves first a loss of confidence in government, including the truth of what we hear about its functioning. We have called this mistrust. Its towards the lower left in that figure. And second, a profound skepticism about the interest and intent of those who rule and wield power. This is on the lower right. We are calling that cynicism. Together, mistrust and cynicism frame popular attitudes toward Political Institutions in particular Public Institutions more generally. The final dimension of disaffection, the one at the top has more to do with how americans perceive their own life situation. As one where they feel estranged from those who hold the reigns of power. Where they see their world changing in ways they dont understand. Where the connection between hard work and thriving has been broken. And where they feel powerless to change these things. These concepts of mistrust, cynicism and alienation were not concepts we carried into the survey and into the analysis. We had so many complaints in the survey that people could agree or disagree with and then we could explore the patterns of relationship among them and we were able to isolate these as somewhat distinct dimensions of disaffection. It is no wonder when such objections become majority opinions that americans conclude politically events these days seem more like theater or entertainment than like something to be taken seriously. Almost 9 out of 10 americans agree with that. To be sure, most americans believed this for decades. But, it is settled in to the point where only one american in ten would reject the sentiment. And where the number who completely agree has grown by 50 since 1996. Similarly, the number of americans who say they have no confidence at all that the government in washington can solve problems, even when it sets its mind to has grown by about 50 from 21 to 30 in the span of two decades. The prior figures here are from a Previous Survey that we did in 1996. The state of disunion survey, which was fielded by the Gallop Organization in which provided Historical Context for some of the items we went after in this study. What one of the surprise of our study, gimven the recent discor and conflict was the finding that some of the disaffection we have been describing is not most but least pronounced among minorities. Take the issue of whether the nation is in a state of decline. 56 of whites say the nation is declining while only 30 of africanamericans and 26 of hispanics say the same. In fact, hispanics are the only group of the three where more say the nation is improving than declining. And minority perceptions of solutions to our nations problems are also distinct from those of whites. Only 43 , less than half of whites say it would make our nation more dangerous if more americans legally carried weapons in public, compared to 62 of hispanics and 83 , the vast majority of africanamericans. Views on immigration banning muslims increasing the tax rate on the wealthiest americans break down predictably along racial and ethnic lines as well. Indeed, we found that race and education are the two best demographic predictors in our study of who americans will vote for in the president ial election. With race being the strongest. But beyond the demographics, the best single clue as to how someone might vote on election day is not what they say or believe about Hillary Clinton or donald trump, but how favorably they few president obama. 94 of those who view obama favorably say they will vote for Hillary Clinton. While 90 of those who view obama unfavorably say they will vote for donald trump. That there is a political fault line between american whites and racial and ethnic minorities is clear. What is equally as clear is within the white majority, this is the second fault line that james talked about. Political disaffection is most deeply felt among those without a fouryear College Degree. Its not just a matter of it varying systematically with education, theres a break point at whether they have that particular credential. In our efforts to understand this further, the americans who lack a fouryear degree and those who went on to achieve a higher credential than college, a graduate degree of some kind. The latter, whom we call the social elite have views that differ from those without a College Degree. The disaffection of the less education is deepened by a religiously conservative belief system as james pointed out. Indeed, noncollege educated americans with conservative religious views are the most disaffected of all americans. We have called them the disinherited who contrast with less educated americans whom we call the disadvantaged. I have time to give only a couple of tastes of the difference between these three groups, the disinherited, the disadvantaged and the social elite. But, the disinherited and the social elite in particular inhabit dramatically contrasting political cultures. We limited the social elite to those who are not religiously conservative. Consider their president ial preference. 85 of the disinherited say they will vote for donald trump while 84 of the social elite say they will support Hillary Clinton. The contrast is almost as great here as the contrast between minorities and whites. Similarly, twothirds of the disinherited favor building a wall between the United States and mexico. Only 10 of the social elite share this feeling. You cant come up with survey data that will give you pie charts that contrast that dramatically. Another striking thing about the social elite is, not surprisingly, they dont feel at all im missing a slide, it looks like. Yes. Okay. They dont feel at all like strangers in their own land. They its about 8 or 9 of the social elite who say they feel like a stranger in their own land. If you go to the disinherited, its nearly 50 thats in the 40s. That sense of not belonging and the strangeness of structures and the way institutions operate is really concentrated among the disinherited. The last chart i want to show you here is the social distance, the cultural distance thing that james mentioned and i may be able to do this better if i can see what you see. What we have here on the left hand side are the disinherited, the disadvantaged in the middle and the social elite on the right hand side. At the bottom are the groups that each of these three groups feel they share beliefs and values with. That was the question that drove this graphic. So, on the left hand side, you see that the disinherited feel they share the beliefs and values of white americans, completely. Thats true across the board. These areub