Transcripts For CSPAN3 U.S. Diplomacy And Counterinsurgency Policy In Vietnam 20170706

Good afternoon, everybody. Premium professor getting trade and investment policy here at the hum friday institute and school here at the university of minnesota. This is a special, special of our 20 years of seminars on global policy. The vietnam war was a series of event both domestic that ended the lives of millions of people and in that generation. Disputes have raged about every aspect of that war in the decade since it was over and they actually started before obviously. From time to time. And cant wait on the dispute involved. And thats what the seminar is about. And very fortunate to have with us to introduce today the students of the vietnam period my colleague professor paul stone of the Humphrey School and university of Minnesota Department of history. Ill introduce the speaker and handle the question and answer period following our pespeaker. Paul stone. [ applause ] good afternoon and welcome to this session of the forum. This is also a joint meeting with my class which is taking place right now which is called government ethics for the public will. Can you imagine a good portion of that course going on in this particular topic. Bob mentioned so many things that im not going to try to repeat that i will point out major focus. It was obvious but the president of the United States. President of the United States domestic and International Issues as a member of the History Department one of my main objectives is to wean people away from undo admiration for certainty. One thing im certain about is in the spring of 2017 were going to be paying a lot of attention to 50 years ago. This is exactly what he was talking about that i think this coming april, through the summer, well have a heightened sense of what it was to be in the United States 50 years ago. And this museum was designed. And youll notice by president humphrey and president johnson sitting there its dividing them. 20 years before that time. Harry truman had ordered two Nuclear Bombs in japan. 50 years prior to that he had gone almost exactly 100 years ago today. 1917. He had gone before a joint session of congress. And run in 1912 and in 1916. Staying out of these conflicts. Were absolutely certain that president johnson was aware of all of these things. Bob mentioned and my final point would be as time goes on new information those of you is that have the privilege of working in the Minnesota Society and the ford president ial library and johnson library. No help citing this. Pick up a piece of paper and had it hands on at the time. The president then had his hands on. Had gone to minnesota named Joseph Mccarthy about whether he was going to run for president or not. Its a very eerie kind of moment that brings history alive. And perhaps we will become less certain. And global director of the coround table here in minnesota. Of another little law school in cambridge massachusetts. He was at the team there. Hes been active and for quite awhile. The nations foremost on asian issues and he spent a good deal of his youth. So without thank you not only for the seminar and for all that it does. I would like to tell you a little bit about myself. The context of what im going to he reveal and then i want to tell you a story about Lyndon Johnson and how he personally set a different strategy for the war in vietnam in december 1966. Which was implemented in marchand april. And then after telling you that story i want to do the sort of a historian task of coming up with some background and some documentation. First of all i had a long and checkered history with vietnam. I began learning about vietnam when i was 9 years old in 1954 because my father was first at the geneva conference. Studying the war between corkor and he was in charge of state affairs until 1958 so our conversation often was about vietnam and was about east asia and i remember conversations with dad and people in his staff and tom cork ran and grow one that. As i was concluding college i volunteered with work. By the time i showed up in 67 a new organization. And is the result of what im going to tell you about Lyndon Johnson in a few minutes. So one year of Language Training i went to vietnam and spent about almost a year. And february of 69 i was moved down in july of 69, the head, later the head of the cia pulled me out of the field to really coordinate the u. S. Government and the South Vietnamese government. I came back and during that experience i learned a lot. Came back and went to law school. Started in my year of Language Training i learned to speak and read japanese which i can still do and then became more of an academic if you will. After i was able to convince the Ford Foundation to fund a project at Harvard Law School for the english transition, fear of the volaw coach in 1943. I only wanted to be part time. I got halftime work on this translati translation. With my friend and colleague. I did a couple of law review articles. Elite privileges 1428 to 1788 for the journal of ancient history. Later on i got to know general west motherland. I did an article. In the interim he was our ambassador from 1967 to 1973 that will figure in this story asked me to help him write his memoirs to i had another grant to do another study interviewing him for several months. Read all the cable that he sent to president johnson and nixon and some other stuff. And in a couple of months. A study of the Court Program in vietnam which flows from the story im going to tell you. More recently in 2012, i think he asked my wife and myself to translate this novel. They poorly translated in and this is a novel but i revealed in a way that nobody has ever known and its true but nobody knows about it. Which was the 1958 rape and murder of his wife by the minister of security. I throw that out there just as a little piece that theyre still at this in ho chi minh ease wife by the minister of security. I throw that out there just as a little tease that there is still at this date in 2017 many, many things about the vietnamese that we just dont know in the west. And also, i think there may be things about our own people we may not know that much about. Now, i would like to tell you the story. So ellsworth asked me to help him write his memoirs. So i started off in getting to know his background. And then i asked him a question. I said, mr. Ambassador, why did president johnson send you to sigh gone as an ambassador. And he said thats easy, Dominican Republic. How many of you remember the Dominican Republic in 1965 . Yeah, two professors. Anyway, so i sort of started and bunker could see i was puzzled. He kind of smiled and said its easy to understand. Johnson overcommitted himself in the Dominican Republic. I got him out and all the american troops went home and then he remembered. And then it clicked because i had known something about what happened after bunker had been appointed. You may remember in the spring of 65, there was a political controversy in the Dominican Republic. The military split into two groups. Typical for latin america, a conservative group and a sort of leftleaning group. The left leaning group pulled a coup, the conservative group was preparing to fight back. Castro was preparing to pounce. Then he had a problem. How do you get him out . You sort of stabilize the situation. Anyway, bunker by accident was there as the ambassador to the organization of american states and he worked on a political strategy to create a coalition among different factions of dominicans to come together for an election. And they elected a president. Peace, no shooting, no violence. And the American Forces went home. In the week in march, roughly march 7th, 1967, johnson called bunker in and dean russ told him ant this and said im warning you that johnson is going to ask you to go to vietnam ellsworth was surprised because he didnt see this coming. To my knowledge, this conversation was never recorded. Johnson has never told anybody about it as far as i know. Bunker i dont think has ever told anybody about it. He didnt tell his wife carol. He didnt tell his kids. He told me. So president johnson has passed away. Bunker passed away. I have yet to pass away. But i can pass on the story. So ellsworth is sitting there with johnson and johnson says i want you to go to sigh gosaigon war over to the South Vietnamese to we can withdraw our troops. This is linden baines johnson. If i remember, the vitriol and the stereotyping of johnson about a man committed to bombing and destroying of escalation. Here he is sending an ambassador to prepare the way forthe withdrawal of american troops. By turning the war over to the South Vietnamese. And bunker went out and i will tell you, i wont tell you the whole story, it will take too much time. But he went out and basically did that. So how did this happen . Why would johnson had made this decision . Let me point out that this decision was made by Lyndon Baines johnson himself. And i will tell you more about it as we go through it. This is a personal decision by the president of the United States to set a Strategic Direction for the american participation in the war and he was going to against his secretary of defense mcnamara, the joint chiefs of staff and did not consult the cia or the state department. The track record and the documents in the Humphrey Library thanks to professor stone, i was able to go there and find stuff which has been overlooked by scholars for many years that have been sitting there in the files which shows you the steps in the story. Let me try to set a Historical Context of the vietnam war coming down to the fall of 1966. As you know, the french colonized indochina in the 19th century. During the end of world war ii, the japanese, they were occupying indochina, and they overthrew the french governing authority. They placed the French Military in containment camps and they created a vietnamese government, a nationalist government. Please Pay Attention to the word nationalism i am going to talk about this a lot. They failed to do two things, the japanese. One, they did not give this government an army. So you had independent vietnam with its own government and no army. Secondly, there was a very special vietnamese political leader who nobody ever heard of. And he is a descendant of the first king of the dynasty that came to power in 1902. Had the japanese brought him back in the waning months of world war ii to be the leader of vietnam, history would have been different. They didnt do that. The japanese lose the war. British troops come back to South Vietnam. British troops come to North Vietnam and there is a free for all among the vietnamese about who is going to create the government, who is going to have the power . In this, in Early September ho chi minh and his viet minh plus communist they stage a coup in hanoi and proclaim themselves an independent vietnam and proclaim themselves a government. That night, i may get too much into the weeds for you, but there is an important theme here which we americans dont know enough about. That night, members of two political groups on the vietnamese nationalist side they met to say what are we going to do about the communists, they set up a government. And some of the men in the room wanted to go fight. The leader of the dai vets say we will not do that. Good vietnamese do not shed the blood of other vietnamese. So they didnt strike back at the communists. Within nine months onethird to half of the men in that room had been killed by the communist. On september 9th, 1945, the official gazette of the vietnamese government issued this order. I will read it in vietnamese and then english. [ reading in vietnamese ] order. This dissolves the two parties this is seven days after the viet minh have taken power. Will be brought before the court for serious punishment. The ministers of interior defense and justice will implement this order. Signed minister of the interior the famous vietnamese military leader. So within sevendays of taking power, the communists have already outlawed two principle forces. Ho chi minh needs an ally. On one hand they go to the chinese who come in but in march 1946 they make a deal with the french. They bring the french back to vietnam. Ho chi minh agrees to have the french army return to central and North Vietnam and in return, the french conclude that ho chi minh is the leader of the vietnamese people. Ho chi minh was created as a vietnamese leader by the colonialists. Over the next six months, their negotiations between ho and the french for an independent vietnam within the French Police are liquidating the nationalists. By the end of 1946 with the nationalist oppositions either liquidated or intimidated, the two parties start fighting each other. They fight basically to a stalemate in 1954. Along the way, however, which is overlooked and a friend of mine in france found this document in the French Colonial archives. This is the order for the execution of a young man who founded a religion and this is a report up to the north that he has been executed. So it was the communist many vietnamese believe who started the civil war by suppressing and liquidating the nationalists. The war ends in 1954. The french cant prevail but the viet minh cant either. A conference was called in geneva to work out a way for allowing the french to exit. Theres a new french government. Socialist, he wants to get out because he doesnt want to continue fighting. China suggests a deal. The deal is to divide vietnam in two with the communist having control of the north. And the french and their supporters having control of the south. The americans dont like this. But the french have already agreed separately with the chinese to do this. The vietnamese nationalists feel betrayed but the deal is done and the socalled geneva accords are publicized but nobody has ever signed them. The people can relocate. And a new government is set up in South Vietnam. It is technically the old french Union Government with a new prime minister. The question in the fall of 1954 is what are the americans going to do . Visavis vietnam and Southeast Asia. Well one of the things is we set up under dulles, looking to create containment against the mao in china. A decision was made to support the South Vietnamese government. This was affirmed by the letter of president eisenhower in october 23, 1954. My father wrote the letter. There is a paragraph in here which i want to submit to you and to all americans absolutely fundamental in explaining the morality and the efficacy of our effort in South Vietnam which paragraph has been overlooked as far as i can tell by every scholar and every commentator. I read, the purpose of this offer is to assist the government of vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong viable state capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means. The government of the United States expects that this aid will be met by performance on the part of the government of vietnam in under taking needed reforms. It hopes that such aid combined with your own continuing efforts will contribute effectively towards an independent vietnam endowed with a strong government. Such a government would i hope be so responsive to the nationalist aspirations of its people, so enlightened in purpose and effective in performance that it will be respected both at home and apraud and discouraged any who might wish to impose a foreign ideology on your free people. And we committed ourselves to South Vietnam. In 1959, the power in the bureau had shifted away from ho chi minh to lay zuan. And he pushed through a program of taking over South Vietnam by force. This was in the resolution 59 i think. Setting up group 555 which was opening up the infiltration trail down through laos and group 779 which was infiltrating people via sea. They began to shrink back, not use a policy of relying on the nationalist but relying on the family, police and catholics. This then created tension. The vietcong were able to increase their activity level, their cause more dissension. In november 1960, there was an attempted coup aimed at his younger brother. And i remember this because it was after the election in november. And we knew that dad was going to be appointed ambassador to thailand. And so we were all as kids getting ready to be new frontier people. And dad said one day, well i just got a call from the government and there was an attempted coup in vietnam. And they are calling me to get advice on what the americans should do. So i focused on that. Recently, the hanoi has released a lot of the documents party documents and we now have english translations of the orders of the bureau to the china Regional Party committee and the interzone party committee. These are instructions on setting up the National Liberation in the vietcong which was established at the order of hanoi. And they go through the ten principles of the nlf. The nlf starts to grow. The hanoi sends down more people. In 59 they sent down 542. In 1960 they sends down 1217 and this is a document from hanois ministry of defense which shows all the troops they sent south. This was given to me by a former North Vietnamese leader now in exile in paris. So hanoi escalates by creating the vietcong. They mobilized local people and started assassinating village chiefs, assassinating teachers, organizing people around a particular cause against him and the americans. What is the Kennedy Administration going to do . In the end of 1961, jack kennedy decides and their implications because of the bay of pigs debacle, he escalates on our side. In particularly a strategic hamlin program is begun. Which is a lot of argument to this day. And i myself have no clear judgment as to whether the program was that successful or not. It wasnt a total failure. Whether it was success as some people say, i dont know. In any case, the government had more strength in the rural areas through the Strategy Program but the lost the support of urban people particularly the nationalist people. And theres another coup. The first coup and this coup was led by Young National officers. This time the coup succeeds and he and his brother were murdered. The leader of the coup was min. And he and the other coup leaders come out of the french army. They were not part of the nationalist tradition and there was a new government. Hanoi responds in late 63 and early 64 with more escalation. Westmoreland becomes the u. S. Commander. 1964 is an Election Year in the United States. My feeling is that vietnam is not something that Lyndon Johnson wants to spend a lot of time. Hes got an instinct that this thing is not going to go in a good way no matter what he does. So basically, i would argue he does not elevate the issue during the campaign. Goldwater tries to make something out of it. And theres a famous ad about a Mushroom Cloud used to stereo type goldwater as a hawk. And there is a little incident which people made a lot of, my sense looking back at wasnt all that important which is a gulf of tonkin resolution in 1964 to get a blank check for future american escalation in vietnam. And the other two things by the way, we should not forget is in 64 and 65, i would submit Lyndon Johnson had his eye on one ball which was bringing to an end jim crow segregation in the United States of america. We need to remember it was Lyndon Johnson in 64 who on his own, i think within a week after assassination of president kennedy saying we are going to move the civil rights act. And he gets it done. And in 65, the protest at selma. I was at the end of the march from selma. Again, Lyndon Johnson with the help of the midwestern republicans. Couldnt have done it without dirkson. They pass the voting right to end segregation. And then hes got this thing going in vietnam. He also has the Great Society he wants to build up. So in early 65, hanoi escalates again. Hanoi begins to send out North Vietnamese regiments. Not vietcong village guerrillas. Coming down to attack forces and destroy them. By may and june of 65, the South Vietnamese army is losing about a battalion a week and there are no young men coming into recruiting centers. In june, general westmoreland sends to president johnson what is known as the 44 battalion request. General westmoreland basically says ive been sent out here with the a mission to defend South Vietnam. With the current trend in North Vietnamese increases and South Vietnamese losses they are going to take over within a few months. If you want me to save this country i need combat maneuver battalions and i will hold the line. Then, if you want me to actually move the communist back, i am going to need more forces in phase two. Which i will then use on an offensive campaign. By the way, to deal with this North Vietnamese escalation, johnson starts bombing. Starts bombing the north and the ho chi minh trail. And the rationale produced by Robert Mcnamara is pressure on hanoi to give up. We are going to be so tough that we are going to convince the communist that they can never win in the long run. They ought to give up now. So we get into 66 and where are we in 66 . Well we have bombing going on. We have 173,000 american troops going in the country. Johnson has Something Like 200,000 american troops committed to land warfare in vietnam and a Bombing Campaign going. And at this point, an Anti War Movement is being formed. This point, and it was mentioned to you before, i suggest to you is the beginning of the division in polarization and the kind of politics that we are now experiencing 50 years later. So the Anti War Movement begins to take shape in 65. The way it begins to take shape is if you ask me, it starts with intellectuals. It starts with campuses. It starts with religious leaders. Not out there among the people. And it begins, and the modern postmodernist notion of how we think and how we live is absolutely relevant to what happened here. A counter narrative was created. The narrative of the government, and in 65, the government produces this. It is called aggression from the north. A documentation of North Vietnamese in infiltration into North Vietnam. However, if you take the numbers in here, and you take the numbers from North Vietnam, they are almost the same numbers. Only these numbers are lower. The North Vietnamese was sending more troops than we thought. But the case was made and johnson when he agrees in mid 65, to send the 44 battalions and he says, if our commander requires more troops we will send them because we will stand in vietnam. The phrase he used in his speech is worth thinking about as we look at certain crisis and issues we have to face today, north korea. The phrase johnson used is we did not choose to be the guardian at the gate. But there is no one else. The counter narrative was put together first by two professors. This is my dads copy of the book. And what it does however to find a counter narrative to challenge the United States government and the notion of aggression is to go back to two books by French Colonialists. The counter narrative which created the american Anti War Movement which divided our countries, basically based on these two books. This is 53, and this is 52. By the way, this author is the frenchman who in 1945 and 1946 made the deal with ho chi minh. These two books are the case that ho chi minh was the nationalist and everybody should have always worked with him because he was the nationalist. There is no discussion in any of these french books about the dai vet or vnqdd or other people. In october 1966, secretary of defense in his report here goes to president johnson and says i cant win the war. Ive told you to send 200,000 troops. I told you to bomb. And it is not going to work. So this is from page 263 of mac nam mars memoirs. What should we do about this unhappy situation . I perceive no good answer. And therefore offer none. So he goes to his president and says, we cant win. And i dont know what to do. This is secretary of defense. Mit, ph. D. So what does johnson do after the election in about the second week in november. National security adviser, also another guy in the white house who is comber who has been charged with looking at the other war. Johnson calls them in and says there is a note to this and you can see the note in the file. I didnt know about this until i came down there. He says pulled together a little group. And rethink the vietnam war. Within one month, comber has come up with a new strategy which adds passfication and building the confidence of the South Vietnamese in other words no unilateral victory by americans. Think about iran and afghanistan in our time. If somebody elses country have to come through a civil war, they have got to do it. We can help. We cannot win the war and turn the country back over to them. They knew this. Johnson begins to move. Another Major Development i think is in late february and early march, 1967, Robert Kennedy comings out against johnson and against the vietnam war. If you read less is sleschenger is pleased with himself in figuring out that the vietnam war can be used against Lyndon Johnson to deny him the presidency and open up a way for Robert Kennedy to become president. This is his book from 66, the bitter heritage. If you go to this book and this book and the other book and fulbrights vietnam hearing, you will go back to french scholars only. None of these people cite vietnamese. Another frenchman Bobby Kennedy turns against johnson in the war by southerners who were not communist and do not want to be ruled by the north. The next week bunker is asked to go to vietnam for appoints two other people. He turns against johnson and the war on the grounds its an independent movement not controlled by hanoi, a spontaneous revolution by southerners who do not want to be ruled by the north. The next week, roughly, johnson asks bunker to go to vietnam and prepare a way to end our troop participation. He appoints comber to go out to saigon and set up a new Organization Called cords. The cords organization working with the South Vietnamese. This is where i was. We defeated the vietcong. And nobody knows it. He sent out general abrams to be the deputy to focus in on the South Vietnamese forces. So we had bunker at the top level dealing with the political evolution of vietnam. You had comber dealing with all the villages and all the cities. And abrams working with the South Vietnamese forces and westie focusing on search and destroy missions. If you read, these are declassified, all of the cables to johnson which i asked doug pike to do. At berkley after ellsworth passed away. You can read these. Every weekly. The thing that strikes me, if you read them, they are obviously written for an audience of one. These are official government documents going back to various people. But bunker is writing these to his president and what he is pointing out to johnson is every week we are making progress. Something has happened, political, economic, military, in this past week which gets us closer to the day when the South Vietnamese can get closer and our troops can go home. Now in november 67. How come general west more land didnt protest . In fact he welcomed it. So in november 67, johnson brings bunker and westy back to report back to the people. And westy is on meet the press. And he has a statement at the National Press club. And what westy says is that we are now entering phase four. It is the end game when we can withdraw. The westy is predicting in the fall of 67 that american troops will with draw from vietnam and then he is asked on meet the press, when . Well i dont want to predict. But it wouldnt surprise me if we could begin to withdraw our forces in two year, which would be november 69. The first forces came home in september 69. So johnson made a decision to move towards turning the war over to the South Vietnamese people. He sent bunker out to lead it up with comber and abrams. And westmoreland was involved. And by the fall of that year, the end game which had been pre figured in the manila conference of late 66, was we turned over to the South Vietnamese and we go home and they defend and protect their own independence. Why . Because they are nationalist. They have their own values as vietnamese people and that goes back to my fathers formulation of the american role and the vietnamese role in 1954. Theres a lot more to say but let me just stop and we can take some questions. [ applause ] i think we will do the usual sort of moving of locals here. In terms of questions. There are some questions that have come up on cards already. Im going to, i have taken a look at a few of them. One of the thoughts that, and first, i will allow myself to make some reflections on steves presentation. And in the interest of full disclosure, we have talked about this for several years and spent a great deal of time talking about it. And steve did go down last summer to the lbj library which is a remarkable experience. Steve indicates go back to the fourteenth century in some ways or to the period of america right after the civil war which i think steves point was that on johnsons mind, it is in fact only three days after jack kennedy has been assassinated no better memorial for jack kennedy. He doesnt say squat about South East Asia at that particular point. I think that the one of the fascinating things here in minnesota in the past several years is the hmong exhibit which was at the Minnesota Historical society and if you went to that exhibit, i did it several times one of the things that you see is that laos figures very prominently. In the Kennedy Administration thinking there is very little mention of vietnam. I would like your reflection on that steve in terms the civil rights movement, what was happening domestically and our attention or lack away tension on Southeast Asia. There is one story that i forgot to tell you. I want to tell this about Lyndon Johnson. So its personal. My wife is vietnamese so i dont know if you john roach. I dont know if you guys know john roach. John was a deputy dean of the Fletcher School for a long time. Was one of the founders. You must have worked with john a long time, congressman frazier, right . He was johnsons intellectual resident. When i was back at the law school after the war, i used to see him back in summerville and he told me a story about johnson and william full up fulbright. It was fulbright and the hearings that gave momentum to the counter narrative. And this is the last meeting that fulbright had personally with johnson. And he was trying to convince johnson not to fight in South Vietnam and he is going through the arguments. And johnson says bill, you have to understand. And finally to what makes the story, do you know about Lyndon Johnson and the treatment . Lyndon johnson was a big man and he had big hands and hed use them. He would do this. Hes say, paul, have i got your vote . Big hand on his knees and he would squeeze. Have i got your vote . So this time, it is fulbright who goes over, and squeezes johnsons knee and looks him in the eye and says lynn, they are not our kind. This is william fulbright, the arkansas southern segregationist. Look at fulbright in brown versus the board. This is Lyndon Johnson who in the United States is putting an end to jim crow segregation and when it comes to Little People on the other side of the world, whats he saying . He says im going to send american boys to die. So those people over there who dont look like us, right, so they get the same chance that we americans have here. And i dont care how many mistakes johnson has made in his life, but the fact that he can do that and stand up on that point of common humanity, to me, means he is a very admirable man. I am going to read two or three of the questions that came from our audience. And just give you some time to congressional tate cogitate on them and think about them. One of them relates directly to this relationship between the Great Society, johnsons domestic vision. You pointed out fulbright from arkansas, they were pretty close. They came to a division in the 60s and the biographer says the Senate Foreign Relations Committee became a salon before sort of developing conversations of antiwar activities. One of the questions is conventional thinking holds that johnson believed he needed the vietnam war to press his Great Society initiatives. Judging how you described johnsons political goals, it would appear you dont feel the same. If this is the case, the question is then why. So thats one question. And i think related to this would be, could one argue that lbjs problem was his lack of deep interest and experience in Foreign Affairs . This is kind of a revisionist view. Did this make him susceptible to the military persuasion . Finally, where does johnson get the reputation of escalation . Did domestic issues distract johnson from vietnam . There was, i cant remember, paul, do you remember, was it dave broder who made the description of Lyndon Johnson as president as the salami slicer . I think it was dave broder. I think this is a powerful insight. Johnsons skill and genius was in the senate of the United States slicing salami. And we have just seen last week president trump, paul ryan, and others, fail at the process of slicing salami. What is this referring to . Its the deal making. Its the log rolling, its how you get things done in a Pluralistic Society in congress. Chuck, you get a slice of salami. You get a thicker slices. And you get the end. But you all have to vote with me. I think when you see johnson dealing with this problem of vietnam which is clear i think he felt he inherited this is not something he started. He was a believer in the vietnamese and nationalism and in freedom. He really was a believer. Thats why he stayed at it. But he inherited. So he is caught between two basic vectors. He has got a vector of the military. His secretary of defense who is very close to Bobby Kennedy, right . Who was a potential threat and the joint chiefs and a lot of americans that believe that military power will solve all our problems. Just go out there and as we used to say, kick ass. And well beat them all up and theyre all go away and well win the war. And there is a bunch of americans getting stronger every day, which is the antiwar movement. How do you slice the salami . So what you do is you get the military almost everything they ask for and not everything. And then you do bombing pauses to please the doves and in the middle you propose the Johns Hopkins speech where johnson said to hanoi if you call off the dogs ill put a billion dollars into Village Development in indochina and in North Vietnam too. So johnson is constantly doing this. One of the criticisms that i think comes out which goes to the reputation point, why did johnson get this reputation of being escalation . Is he never went public with sort of his strategy. I dont think there is any speech by johnson that says look, folks, this is what i am doing. Westmoreland asked for 275,000 troops. I gave him 220. This all secretly done. Fulbright is demanding a bombing halt of two weeks, i give him a bombing halt of two days. We are going to draft a lot of americans but wink, wink. If you can get this deferment you dont have to fight. Ladies and gentlemen, may i also say to me, the social protests which broke out last november and carried donald trump into the white house, i think you can trace back to the draft policies of the vietnam war. Because who fought the vietnam war . My class at harvard college, 1967 . 1300 men, i think. Most of whom who had come from the american establishment. All of whom had been part of the american establishment for the last 40odd years. How many do you think fought in vietnam out of 1300 . I know of five. And i just learned about two more. I think the total we have our reunion coming up. I think the total in the class who did military service was, like, 25. If you are poor, African Americans in the inner cities, where did you go in 1966 or 67 . You went to nam. You guys may remember some of the songs, right . So there was no sort of standing up in a way of rallying the people around a very specific goal and mission. Lots of salami slices being put out there. You mentioned the songs. And i think that is a good way to talk about this period in terms of culture as well. I mentioned in the introduction that president wilson went before Congress Asking for this declaration. The songs were keep the home fires burning. My. E where are all the flowers gone. Gone to soldiers every one, et cetera. And joe mcdonald. What are we fighting for . I dont know, dont ask me, next stop is vietnam. Pretty harsh, direct stuff. In 65 if there was an anthem which didnt mention vietnam but became the anthem it was the birds recording of pete segers turn, turn, turn and its taken from the book of eclo ecclesiates. A time for peace, i swear it is not too late. John and yoko, give peace a chance. Imagine. It defined peoples political ideas for generations. Until today. What was the significance of the domino effect or domino theory if any. Why didnt lbj make his withdrawal more public . The second question i think for you historians is really the most interesting one. Why didnt he. And i am not a johnson scholar. I dont have a good sense of this at all. In retrospect and given the case i think i can make and i have given you the surface of a really big case based on lots of vietnamese books and data and songs and culture. And all kinds of stuff. Why didnt he do this . I dont know. My only explanation is the one i gave to you. Johnson instint is to slice this. And it is johnson it seems to me who keeps all the secrets inside himself. Everything is inside and the other thing that has come out in talking with paul and others. Lyndon johnson was a deeply suspicious man. He didnt trust anybody and my guess is for good reason. He had been betrayed more times by more people. So was he the right sort of person to be a leader of the American People in a limited war . War. The other thing we havent talked about in a long time and it didnt come up at all in the last 15 years about iraq and afghanistan, what is a limited war. And what is the degree of national mobilization. Korea was a transition point and people have talked about this. We came to vietnam with basically three big wars in our mind, civil war, world war one, and world war ii which were massive mobilization of the entire people for the grand cause and everybody was part of the war. The home front vietnam as we said before, who went over to fight . Johnson arranged the economy in various ways to inmyself the Economic Impact on taxes and other things. One of the decisions made towards the end of the vietnam war which we are living with today and i hear nobody talking about this. President nixon ended the draft and moved to a volunteer army. You see stories every once in a while about Young American soldiers who have been on their sixth, agtsz eighth, ninth tour in afghanistan. Our country is being defended by mercenaries. We dont really have much of a citizen army. If you dont volunteer, you dont have to worry about a military. Most americans have been spared since 1969, whatever, whenever nixon ended the draft. The first lottery was 69. And the second was 70. I remember that because i graduated so we have been trying to be a great power in the world for good and not asking our people to sacrifice. Something you said having to do with johnson and suspicious nature. One thing that he trusted very much was former president eisenhower. And when he think about the image johnson was being sworn into office, january 20th of 61, the baton is just the image is passing the baton coming from jack kennedy. Eisenhower is going out of office. When johnson leaves office in 69, going to eisenhowers Vice President nixon. What was the impact here is the phrase, the military Industrial Complex on prolonging the war. Some may remember this was a phrase used by dwight david eisenhower, beware at the military Industrial Complex. People were amazed that general president eisenhower was saying this. You mentioned eisenhower and that does give me a chance to get back to the question of laos. There is a very important link between that and our hmong minnesotans. The other thing which is traumatic for the man and for us was what i call his abdication in 68. He steps down. And i have a feeling based on sort of my own feeling at the time that this is a major watershed in the way if johnson he is sending us all to vietnam and if he doesnt believe in it, and if he is stepping down why should i go . But take it to the people. That communicated something that i thought was it set up this notion that we cant win. We are not going to win. Something is wrong. Nixon then tries to persevere, oh by the way, the other thing which johnson strategy of turning it over to the vietnamese and passification. You know what that was called . That was called vietnamization. Laird sends nixon out in february of 69. Nixon quoteunquote had a secret man to end the war. Which no one ever really knew. He sends laird out to figure out he was his secretary of defense to figure out bunker and westmoreland and im sorry, bunker, abrams and colby shows him this whole thing. Nixon says great, we are getting out. And bunker brokers the deal between them that we are going to leave. So the whole Nixon Administration is why are we staying one day longer. Why are you at who wants to be the last americans at the height in vietnam . That becomes that. If i could get back to eisenhower it is overlooked that when kennedy was talking with eisenhower he only raised one issue with the incoming president and that was louse. He said the key to Southeast Asia is louse. Communist forces were on the move inside louse. Kennedy meets in early 61 to figure out what to do about louse. They say we cant go into louse. The only option they put on the table for kennedy is like two divisions. There are no airplanorts. You cant supply. He says we have to cut a deal. So we have to cut a deal. We neutralize louse which the North Vietnamese do not honor. We need a counter to the North Vietnamese but we cant send americans. What do we do . We ask general to recruit them on. He builds up an army which in 75 actually we only took out a few. You were talk ability march of 67 and march of 78. Johnson has gone to mass and comes by huberts home. One ending says well continue the course and the other is i will not run for accept the nomination by party again. He said dont tell mureil. It makes that speech. It is viewed as kind of an Bobby Kennedy is pressing to find sort of the weak spots and saying are you going to be political this coming year and he responds if i would be political i would be running again. It just shows some extraordinary moments in president ial life. Here is one question thats probably good as we can head towards wrapping this up. Thank you for the detailed time line. I think we all think that. Looking at our recent experience with political conflicts how can we learn more with your concept of your associative power. I could go on for a long time. Let me try to suggest this. Power is actually a continue um. He says war is an extension of politics by other means. What does it mean . War and politics are on the same continue yum. War is down here with violence. They are inner related. The ultimate of war is nuclear annihilation. There is no resistance at all. Somewhere in the middle is what . Cooperation, collaborations, joint ventures. Thats what i call associated power. We have for 20 or 30 years been conducted our debates at the two ends. We talk about hard power and soft power. My argument is both are ineffective. Hard power universally going in there. Its u. S. Grant, westmoreland told me it is the civil war which is the American Military doctrine, find them, fix them, destroy them. Its the current phrase afghanistan. Go kill them and some how everything will work its itself out. I give you in terms of the success of the soft power isis, al qaeda. There are a whole bunch. I can give you putin, a bunch of people in the world who dont particularly like us or our values. Why are they going to rollover and do what we want for title 9 in 1966 which would set up what we have done. I have brought the copy of the bill and i brought what you aid 50 yearing ago. We wanted to help other people. We have to decentralize opportunity to them. He is of that visionary generation. You may have known he retired as he looks at the problem of the achievement gap in north minneapolis where does his mind take him . It takes him to the kids, families, environments in which they live. Working quickly i set up a Program Program for every village in vietnam. I was 25 years old. As a guy in saigon which i didnt want to be i could give briefings using the commander in chief, i could brief full colonials and tell them this is what you have to do or this and that. The Courts Program was working with vietnamese in the context of their own nationalism. Why did it succeed . Because of their nationalism. You addressed part of this but i want today ask more directly. Can you explain how it is possible they won and can you do this given there is a win. Relate today that this question, what about Henry Kissengers role . What was he always up to . I always shy away of sort of wrapping thing up neatly. This question puts me on the spot. Ki not fully address it because theres no time and because there are no documents which i found in files which give us a totally new understanding of Henry Kissengers role in the association which i hope to make my next book. Briefly speaking Henry Kissenger did not believe in the South Vietnamese abdomen he did not agree we would win. He believed they could leave troops inside South Vietnam. 90 wanted nobody wanted to communists to win. The South Vietnamese army holds not quite like iraq in recent years. South vietnamese stood up and fought. They had brilliant officers. They could all of the attention where the American Forces were and then the American Forces could go home. By 73 all of them have gone home and South Vietnamese have gone home. He gets to leave divisions in the south. Waps in 75 after water gate . North vietnamese, they do a test offensive. When it becomes clear president sford not sending the b52s he says comrades, this is our moment. A couple of months later the americans are not there. They panic and the South Vietnamese collapse. Now, kissenger, one last thing. Anybody want to guess of the people i named today, who was the person who was most influential in teaching Henry Kissenger everything he knew . I think we couldnt possibly find a better moment to end this. I want to thank Professor Bob under whose office this program is taken place. This is good indication and having Community Come into this room. I predict the sales and rentals of the deer hunter apocalypse will probably go up expo then shlly in urban minneapolis in the next amount of time. We couldnt possibly say much more except thank you for this presentation. I think we will there are moments we understand that history cracks that we can look at those moments. They can be in march of 1967 they can be march 28th of 2017 that our opinion changes. Thats a cracking of history as well. So i think we can all continue with this cracking. Thank you very much. An thursday well be live from the museum of federal revolution. From 7 00 to 9 00 p. M. Eastern well be join bid top museum staff to answer viewer questions about the american revolution. Here is a preview. Its behind these doors and its one of the most remarkable. As far as we can determine it is the only to survive. It does survive only because washington chose to take it home with him and his family took care of this tent and preserved it. The full story of the tent is presented in this theater. The tent itself is a wonderful emblem of the challenge of creating the exhibits. If you were to see this tent you probably wouldnt give it a second glance. It is tattered in places. Its over 240 years old, after all. We had to make its stories being the shelter in which George Washington made some of the most critical decisions of the revolution, where he was plunged into the depths of dispair to make that tenth tell its story. The first challenge we decided is we have to show it as washington used it in the field. We couldnt put it up the way he did because it was put up withal polls and ropes tied to the fabric itself. It would pull that ancient fabric apart. We challenged engineers to develop a sophisticated umbrella structure. Theres no tension, no damage done to it at all. That umbrella even had to replicate the slight sag because its not perfectly straight. Once we solved all of those problems the next challenge is how do you tell the story. We turned to historians, our lead Vice President of collections and they spent almost two years pulling together this story line, imagery, thinking about the music, the presentation, the light quality to really give this tent meaning. He instilled of what has become without him the army would likely have dissolved and the war would have been last. How do you take these small objects. They had guns and canteens and powder horns. How do you make these come alive and tell the incredible life and death decisions, the excitement of the revolution. Its a turning point in history. Thats what we strive to do throughout this museum. Its a very exciting place. Zblp thats are brief look inside. To see the live program join us thursday on cspan3. Sunday on q and a im not asking anybody to compromise their values or believes. Im asking them to open their eyes to other peoples so you can figure out your place in this infinite world. Brook gladstone cohost of wnycs on the media. She discusses the trouble with reality, moral panic in our time in which she looks at what constitutes reality today and how it has changed over the years. I set up our biological wiring and i wanted to show how we had evolved culture that was designed to validate us and not to challenge us, certainly not to contradict us. It gave us the ill liegs that our realities were watertight when really they were riddled with weak spots and places that would crunch in. Sunday night at 8 00 eastern on cspans q and a. Announcer 1979 cspan was created and is braulgt to you today by your cable or satellite provider. The white house naval photographic unit, up next on American History tvs reel america from 50 years ago the president june 1967. Events depicted in this half hour film include the six day war, the nominio