Transcripts For CSPAN3 Western Intelligence Exchange And Gathering 20170415

It is hosted by the Woodrow Wilson center in washington dc. Welcome to the panel exchanging intelligence, exchanging data. Todaye three panelists who will give a paper. We start to my left with john fox. This paper will examine the role of the fbi and the formative years of the Transatlantic Partnership and focusing on the first decade of the cold war. That will try to give a Historical Perspective on recent discussions around the. Sa post9 11 activities , a paper that would look at the partnership or conversation within the context of intelligence organizations and organizational degree and look at it within the idea of intelligent studies and what it tells us about cooperation of the nsa and its partners. I and the curator of the International Spy museum here in washington dc. John, and right to fbi historian. His articles have appeared everywhere. He has a lot of pieces on the fbis website. Contributed chapters in several books and you can see him on the news, and he was a key player in creating the f fbis exhibition. John, why not you take it away from here. Has now the exhibit been completely refreshed, and luckily i had nothing to do with it. It has been taken over by other materials, celeste history and more current stuff. And talking on fbi history its role in the early u. S. Intelligence community. They are my ideas and interpretations and do not represent those of the bureau or federal government. Im sure they will be quick to tell you that if you ask. Do is talkd like to thet how the fbi got into Intelligence Community and how it develops, the end of four or two and the cold war. I will be talking about the expansion of fbi liaison operations. With some of the themes and ideas brought up why our two earlier papers, so it is a good continuation there. , at the end of the 1930s, there was not an organized u. S. Intelligence community. Army wereavy, and talking about if war breaks out what will europe do. The british were starting to look across the atlantic to say what kind of help can we get from the United States. We expect them to be neutral, but want an intelligence liaison comes up quickly you see the fbi interacting with british agents aree, and fbi invited over to learn how things are going in britain by 1940. This is before the oss is created in the operation he sets up and when williams is stephenson is setting up in new york. He is supposed to be there 5 and miwith mi . 6. Apparatus was not very effective or strong in the United States. Once by, may, who was captured. It was not something where they learned a lot. The 1920s and 1930s, counterintelligence was not a significant concern. Start noticing espionage operations going on, it starts to get more involved. Detectives and spies were often synonymous, the transition occurred fairly seamlessly. The fbi is sending nonofficial cover agents to central and south america to collect intelligence. Responsibility in the western hemisphere, and it is where the bureau begins to things to set up an intelligence collection operation abroad, and out of that effort, the bureau begins to realize that it needs not only to be sending people with cover identities sending back coded messages and so forth, they actually need official liaison representatives, so by the 1940s, the bureau was formed lasting relations with foreign governments, especially intelligence and Police Services of those countries and through the u. S. Diplomatic establishment there. Mexico, we have an official liaison from 1940 on. London, andawa and those become important. Ottawa was important because the bureau had been exchanging information. It was largely Law Enforcement related, but also internal Security Matters that are. Someone from london came over to get a feel for the u. S. Intelligence agency in 19391940, he learned that a lot of the information they were trying to send over to the United States Intelligence Services about german activities there was getting bottlenecked at the state department and it was a problem because it was not getting through to the people who would do something about it, so he found out the canadians had been exchanging the same kind of information for 10 years or so, but calling it criminal information and the state department did not care about criminal matters. Britainht that may be should start to establish some of those relationships, and that is how stephenson develops and comes through. Through the war, the bureau is becoming an important part of the growing u. S. Intelligence operation. It is kept out of parts of it to given limited access altra, but once it is over in england and starts learned about the fact that the british are beginning to break german codes and that there is counterintelligence significant information there, the bureau starts to get involved and they begin to have access at least to the british with that information. Army wanted toe. Ontrol from there in in the early days, we were not butmost security conscious, hoover started to crack down on that and the bureau kept a tight control on the information it was getting and the relationship did continue to develop into the end of the war, so altra is , germany has surrendered and the allied forces have taken over because it has a specific role in u. S. Intelligence that it has to continue. Is just a quick picture of the coverage of our special Intelligence Services, undercover operations, in central and south america. 1945, the fbis representatives in europe are starting to follow the army as it progresses, and as germany falls, the role is pows, interview people who want to immigrate to the United States. And provide name checks other Services Based on the fbi records, which are voluminous. So the fbi is providing that , butof Liaison Service also other services. A quick timeline of how our liaison offices are developing. Their purpose is not together to intelligence, but share information, and that becomes a key part of what the fbis legal a program is doing i tell. The fbis agents are beginning. O broaden their connections this is the legat paris. Most operations were small because they were for or liaison purposes, but they provided a significant function. In the cold war, the u. S. Begins to realize quickly that it had been deeply penetrated by soviet and the fear of agents this time round came from the actual fact there were foreign agents, so the fbi is starting to at that information. Elizabeth bentley comes in, and u. S. Intelligence begins to realize it has got a lot of issues, then you throw in the sigint issue because the army decryptagency begins to the fbi is working with the asa, which becomes the nsa, to make use of that information it is getting from soviet wartime cables. When he is arrested by the british, he gives the fbi information to arrest others. It allows us to identify that there was a british mole in the embassy in d. C. That eventually turns out to have been Donald Burgess defects with maclean because the western powers are on to them and are about to close on them, and because kim philby is providing information to the soviets, they get out in time to escape, but the idea is that this Counter Intelligence cooperation is continuing to go on as it did in it is a small part of it because the Transatlantic Community was largely based on , defense arrangements intelligence related matters, things like interpol dont play a role in this. The fbi has a falling out with interpol over a defector and the possible politicization of things. England, andrance, other western european powers play an Important Role in with the bureau does for the next number of years through the cold , since thence then 1990s, the program has only expanded. 19701990, 21 offices. By the end of the 1990s, we were up to 42, and we have more that70 at this point, so kind of relationship has only expanded and included things like Police Training and matters to build coptocop bridges. It was focused on the Law Enforcement side rather than intelligence, but having those interrelationships made it possible for the bureau to do its job. Thank you. [applause] i did not need the thing to go off. That was great. Thank you, john. Is anxt to speaker adjunct assistant professor of modern European University at montclair state university. He has written extensively on the relationship between the United States and European Countries in dealing with intelligence, including a couple. F articles on the cia giving a talk on project hydra cia. Mr. Wegener no pressure. Thank you to the conference organizers and Panel Members here. Project hydra, one of the neat things i find is that you have interesting file folder names. Sound more interesting than what is in there at this point, so im talking about something that is in the past, is relevant tos what is going on in the present. About two years ago, a german newspaper reported the German Intelligence Service had discovered 12,000 search terms provided by the nsa that had caused the service to spy on european diplomats, and this story became part of the postsnowden scandal narrative, but for the purposes of this talk, it is important because it highlights how routine this kind of raw Data Exchange has become. Common explanations for this increased interdependence are along the lines that since the end of the cold war, threats have increasingly come from nonstate actors or globalization has forced intelligence agencies to cooperate more. In the most present version of this narrative forced Intelligence Services to confront the transnational threat and to intensify liaison activities on this level. As historians, we like to look at the past and this is what i wanted to do here, and going back almost 50 years ago in the summer of 1967, america confronted a series of internal and external challenges, the vietnam war escalated, dissent at home, in detroit, buffalo, new york, and other urban centers there were race riots. Operablesphere of crisis, Lyndon Johnson tasks his Intelligence Services to investigate the true causes of this unprecedented level of domestic unrest. It seems highly unlikely that rather than present a true expression of useful dissent, coordinated byre chordae an foreign powers, especially the soviet union. Domesticsion of intelligence collection would be investigated. And to this day, part of our standard lexicon scandals. Among the disclosures brought to light with the cia had led , tracing civil rights and peace activists with a Computer System called hydra, which reports had suggested had stored the names of 300,000 americans. What i would like to do internet to 10 minutes is not relitigate the question of whether or not the u. S. Intelligence community overstepped its mandate but rather to ask to what extent the story of hydra tells us something about the Way Technology change the way Intelligence Services operated in the incipient information age, and this includes the implications of a shift for the liaison operations at an international level. I am presenting here is part of a project we are developing right now at the university. One professor is involved in that, and tomorrow my colleague germanesent from the side of the story, and i and here to tell something about the american side. Regarding the u. S. Side of the story, the project can proceed from a solid base of of andrature on mhchaos related intelligence programs in the late 1960s. From then comes political size perspective, intelligence oversight, or from a civil rights history perspective. Much of this literature however seeks to distinguish the between legitimate and illegitimate or. Egal and illegal operations , ale i think it is important more critical approach comes from surveillance studies. However what makes this approach problematic for the present purposes is that it emerges from the liberal critique of the surveillance state that is part of our analysis here. Andinstance is a plan punish with a panoptic disciplinarian regime that forms part of the public response to the events we are investigating here. What we would like to do instead is approach our research through the prism of an ivalent process we call and this sounds only slightly in and the original the original german. I think we might have to come up with a better english term here. Ofwhich the requirement shedding light on complex and opaque threats he comes paradigmatic for governmental as as efficiency and security while citizens also seek to pull away the veil of secrecy shrouding intelligence work, and i try to put this into a simple matrix here, so the government collects and and shares intelligence Civil Society actors protests and what to investigate the government. That is on the active level, and on the passive level, the same groups would ask for privacy and push for Privacy Protection while Intelligence Services might ask for enhanced classification and secrecy to keep their work secret, but within this framework, i interconceptualize as hydra as a center of calculation, which means a site that bundles and , mobilizes data from diverse sources. Just very briefly about the Historical Context of this hydra operation. It was in the late 1960s that we really see the postwar consensus that existed in many western societies and also in many eastern societies actually beginning to splinter and giving way to more dissent and the result was a phenomenon that we have termed a crisis of representation, both in a political and semiotic sense, questions of legitimacy of Government Action, intelligence, and security services, so now Civil Society groups are an area of enhanced inquiry. Have theme time, you beginning of Computer Technology to travel outside from campuses and military research sides into major bureaucracies, often causing a revival of early 20th of ary modernist utopias rationally organized society, and hydra fits into a broader pattern of widespread enthusiasm among managers, bureaucrats for the potential of modern Computing Technology to help intractablegly social problems, the same year as hydra, the fbi founded its National Crime information fromr to marshal data federal, state, and local agencies, and during the same summer, the department of justice started a project that would eventually turn into the interdivision information unit, a program to analyze data on civil disturbances. The usef these cases, of modern Information Technology was not merely an operational detail, rather the computers ability to find patterns in vast tounts of data appeared signal a potentially revolutionary application for the Law Enforcement and Intelligence Community from reactive policing to predictive intervention. Self came intoit existence in 1967 as part of mhchaos and was initiated by James Angleton in response to ident johnsons request, run by the cia special operations group, and headed by richard ober. Due to the sensitivity of the mission, this remains closely compartmentalized, and over the next seven years, the group collected information among radical leftwing and simple right activists and foreign groups and fed this information database,ydra david producing reports for the white house and other consumers. Theirere chosen for Counter Intelligence skills rather than for their technical expertise, and hydra was instead maintained by the cias office of Computer Services and ran on a remote query, remote input ibm 36067. That is the model we are talking about. Offices would fill out index cards to create, edit, or delete entries, then pass these cards along to the technical staff who would input it into the computer. In return, they received printouts of reports, and unfortunately i have not yet found so all this data was destroyed in 1974 for Privacy Protection reasons. I have not found a print of hydra data, but this is from the department of justice from the department of information unit that i talked about earlier, so i believe the date it would have been quite similar, so here we have for instance something about black panther leaders meeting, a number, actually it his his wife he is meeting with or traveling with, so this was put into machinereadable form and stored in hydra. The operation never really established the type of outside influence that president johnson and later president nixon had hoped for or feared would be the better word, but it did resent a lot of evidence of International Contacts between these groups. Time,h a view towards the to briefly summarize two areas where i think we can make an original contribution here. Aa of about the disability and threat perception. Basically what happens is that the computer enables people to see and enables Intelligence Services to trace connections that they could not see before, and one hypothesis regarding this aspect is that the new focus on complex transnational actors represented by hydra was a key ingredient in consolidating Government Action against terrorism in the on theth of the attacks olympic summer games in munich when72, and actually hydra it was shut down, its offices transferred to other cia operations, but the same staff in the Computer System were revived at the International Terrorism group for the cias first dedicated task force to terrorism study. So i think that is one area in which this new use of Computer Technology had an impact. The other part is the impact of quantification for intelligence cooperation. Why i call this the because ifbeast you , because if you are working from the assumption that the more dated you gather, the clear your picture becomes, then you what to draw and a lot of , and the other sources cia did that by reaching out to the department of justice and to nonu. S. Hing out Intelligence Services, and i earlywe will present some evidence on what that consisted of tomorrow morning. It is an interesting question, early, ad hoc exchanges of information transformed into the kind of exchange of all data that i. Entioned in the very beginning i am not aware when that starts, and maybe someone in the audience or someone to my left has any clear information on that. Very briefly to conclusions, very preliminary conclusions or whatr brief hypotheses this all means. On the one hand, it seems significant to me that when that when you go from exchanging information ad hoc and have a quid pro quo situation, that can be read or explained through a realist explanation of exchanging favors and acting in the national interest, but once you bundle information and databases in this way, it creates more of a liberal institutionalist set up i think is what political scientists would call it, so that seems to be one area that would be interesting for further research, and the final point is while of this is happening on the side of the Intelligence Services, by the late 1970s, informationuse of technology had become publicly associated as a threat to while researching this paper, i came across an article in the magazine counterpunch which it drew a Straight Line from hydra to a supposedly Global Infrastructure of oppression. To give you a bit of flavor, the cias counter in Terror Network was the direct descendent of the counterintelligence special Operations Unit chaos formed by James Angleton in august 1960 seven, specifically to spy on the new left and other radical political groups in the antiwar and civil rights movement. , the Counterterrorism Network had its own special network which members could communicate with each other and their collaborators, and while this may seem easy to conspiracys as mongering, it does raise a point that had also been addressed by scholars such as Richard Aldrich that as intelligence agencies poll of their targets into the tendedtional realm, they to remove themselves from conventional National Oversight mechanisms and at the recent flareup between the new Trump Administration and writtens gchq has shown, this concern about the implications for intelligence gathering and sharing and this big data environment is alive and well today. Thank you very much. [applause] thank you. Sorry for going over. No, that is perfectly fine. Speaker is a chair at the university of cologne, a degree in Political Science, and she is currently this are taking , but there she has taught classes on Cyber Security policy and intelligence and will give a paper today that i believe is your phd project in many respects on the Digital Network intelligence of the nsa and its partners overseas. Take it away. Ms. Diersch thank you very much. My presentation or my starts with intelligence organizations are to study, butng there is not much literature about bridging the cap between Intelligence Studies Political Science and organizational theory, so while intelligence organizations are just organizations they are special organizations. Why i just briefly state think intelligence is special because secrecy intelligence is not accountable to its environment and this would be a basic statement of organizational. , so organizations dont exist in a vacuum. They have an environment which they respond to and receive pressures from this environment and want to adjust to this environment, not necessarily because they have no strategy, but because their organizational survival depends on the resources they get from their environment, and also they are independent on a little bit of public support for them being makes that,ecrecy actually those organizations are a little bit more autonomous from the environment than other organizations, and what i wonder is that also true for other organizations in the security context. So what should intelligence organizations do if we look at organizational theory . I see intelligence organizations merely from a stand point of sherman kant who said intelligence is knowledge, a kind of activity, and i am focusing on the knowledge part. Knowledge is not only data and information, it is about practices and mindsets, meanings and understandings of factors of factors. Of actors. Seek their own National Rounds realms, government and society, they are , theyecause of secrecy build an Expert Community, so while being in this organization and are in contact with organizations from other countries, so they do liaison with them. They meet with them. They do trainings with them. Nationalout of there cultural box and get into this Expert Community box where they realize that they share the same issues. They share the same similar troubles and also they speak the same language. So for example, the sigint community, they all use their technical terms, and so they understand each other. Maybe they dont get the meaning of every word of the other person because there is a different cultural background, but there is a certain understanding between them, and so there develops this logic between them which can actually span from one Intelligence Community, so the american Intelligence Community, to another community, which could then be like the Germany Community for example German Community for example. We basicallyting seek knowledge from each other, like they seek information, they want to have Data Exchange, but they also want to have knowledge about the practices of the other organizations, and what i was , is this is that knowledge seeking and knowledge gaining and the transfer of practices in intelligence any sorts of from other Knowledge Transfer, for example other security areas, for example the military, but i am more focusing on intelligence and policing, and i think, yes, it is different, but maybe not so different, so that my thoughtssome of on that. I think this knowledge sharing, transfer, can be driven by different contexts. First, there is a market logic which is hes cooperation as an investment, so while being findtitive they can also middle ground, and this middle ground would be an investment for future corporation, for example. The corporate logic, i would say, then there is also the logic of burden sharing, which would point out more to a common interest, so a common target that needs to be under surveillance so to speak, and in this verdant sharing context there could occur the logic that the more capable partner is actually training the weaker partner to get better, so it is moving away from the just competitive logic, and then there is another logic which i would Call Division of labor, so each partner works on his part off one project, and there might also be some transfer of knowledge or capabilities occurring there, but i was wondering what are the effects of this Knowledge Transfer, especially in the intelligence have some i suggestions. The first hypothesis would be the transfer of knowledge, which could also include practices seems to only go from the. Tronger party to the weaker what is interesting about this fact is it is not really organizational learning. There is a lot of literature about organizational learning, so basically when organizations cooperate, they learn from each other, but in intelligence, it seems to be fit the weaker party so to speak learns from the stronger part, so there is not a butal, no mutual practice, it is essentially a diffusion of a pattern that was developed by one partner and put on the other. Organizational point of view, this would mean it might not be the most effective method that developed between aose partners, but product put on organization b. Let me tell you about an actual necessarilyoes not tell you that Knowledge Transfer is ineffective, but shows you a little bit about the dynamic of this knowledge or practice transfer. In october 2011, the nsa and bnd to theed a demonstration domestic Intelligence Services of germany. So this was october 2011, during the bndmonstrations, was showing how their system processed dsl wiretap collection belonging to a german domestic target. As a result of this vicestration, the bsv president formally requested the software from the nsa to further enable the bsv to achieve its mission goal of counterterrorism activities in germany. 2012, the in assay, nsa, bnd, keyscoreiscussed how could help Counter Terrorism in germany. Great value in working closely with both the analyticrtners on this craft methodologies, then this process one year later led to the actual provision of , then theo the bsv nsa entered into a formal relationship with the bsc. So what you see is a diffusion of practice from the formal partners to the weaker partners, an agreement negotiated the tween the services, so at a higher level, but not really discussed on a broader level, and alleged led to a formal relationship between the nsa and more more distant partner like the bsv in a short time. You could argue about the time period. It is like the first discussions where my point of knowledge started, then they have this formal relationship. What is relevant of this example . Transferhis knowledge is not mutual, so it is not the experience of one agency and the others together. It is just the diffusion. It might lead to a decoupling from the weaker partner that gets the new practices seems to be maybe further decoupled from background, and it also seems to show that Intelligence Services in their intelligence cooperation are very autonomous in choosing their partners and developing like cooperation, and also power, asymmetries seem to play from theo pressure more capable partner or maybe from the weaker partner that then drives the cooperation would be interesting. Are the mechanisms that actually drive or make the aoperation and the transfer little faster. Test foro want to these dynamics in a comparison with policing cooperation. I havent worked on that a lot, so i would it would be interesting to hear what you think about this comparison and, yeah, i am looking for to your questions and feedback. Thank you. [applause] mr. Houghton thank you. Almost everyone came in under time, which is great. To just reiterate some ground rules for the q a. First of all, wait for the microphone. Recording this so they microphone needs to pick it up. Identify yourself and let us know your affiliation when i do call on you. Keep your question short. We want to be able to get to a lot of people. We want to avoid 27 part questions. If your question is a statement, keep that shorter so we can get through people, so what have we got . Yes, sir, right down here. She is coming behind you. This is for jens. I except the point you are making about computers having an influence, but once something is clear is that people using a good file card system and using conventional Data Processing machines were capable of handling data the way you described. Name, the portray intelligence department, a British Organization running the blockade, receives 100 million messages. Withs card index systems well over one million entries and is able to process and retrieve every single record about any proper name in the indexes within two hours. If you go through a lot of security agencies in the interwar years, roughly the same level of capabilities are talking about, so if we think about bringing information history into intelligence history, which is what you are doing, i think it is important to note that computers dont really have any kind of transformative effect on the level you are talking about until later, although they do have a transformative effect on code breaking earlier than the period you are talking about. Very muchr thank you for that point. I think it is an important point because to what extent there is actually a revolutionary switch here in Computing Power is, im not qualified to say, and i imagine it was not great. Is that thissponse technologicalout history, but also cultural history to some extent. In the late 1960s and especially in the 1970s, you have a lot more books coming out about people saying the computer changes everything basically, so my question right now is how do these two things Work Together . Orit Technological Progress a quantum leap in imagination with what people associate with these technologies . But it is a great question. Thank you. Mr. Houghton what else down here . Time, thet that National Crime Information Center and hydrant were basically index card systems, so we are talking about the beginning of a change in quantity of information, but even then, the fbis index card system was massive, as was gchq and others, so it is about 1015 years later when you get the relational databases that that begins changing as an information process issue. Thank you. i would love to talk more about this with you. Actually our ambition is to take the project into the 1990s, mid 1990s, when you have the internet and everything, so we try to trace this development through from the late 1960s through the 1990s. Thank you. Hall, question for john. It has to do with the relationship during the cold war of the fbis counterintelligence and other agencies domestically and in our allied community. The question is this, im guessing that that relationship was it over time, but very much on a casebycase basis . Did the relationship change depending on the case, or in one period it was like this or that . Mr. Fox it is a good question. I would not. Periodize it. Is on aedge is that it casebycase, organization by organization. Ize cia, i think we can period e it. Fbing the period when the has official liaisons, the interaction is pretty good, but with the fbi you always have to take into personality as an issue sometimes, so i think it is too murky and issued to get an easy answer on that one. Next. Ughton right in the middle here, so she is coming from that direction. Tom maguire cambridge and kings. This question for john. You mentioned training briefly, which is my interest. I came across in some of my research sis concerns over mi5 training with allies on counterintelligence functions. Mr. Fox we have a lot of concerns about everybody. [laughter] concerns are making their job harder in that mi5 improving the counterintelligence capacity would make siss harder. Mr. Fox i have not seen that from the fbi. The cia have concern over the fbi . Thefox its funny, because Police Training that the fbi gets involved in internationally , it basically works into its National Academy program, which started in 1935, and it was aimed at training domestic states,n the united that by 1937, they are inviting others, so it becomes an international exchange, never on a huge scale, but with other police agencies. They dont get into the counterintelligence training. Part of it is the fbi is learning it. They are starting from the ground up to some extent, so their knowledge is limited. As it goes along, 1960s, the Kennedy Administration was to broaden that international Police Training and in the postcold war, the international Law Enforcement academy and other regional programs become very much part and parcel of that, but it does not surprise me that the fbi was concerned if mi5 was bulking up some of the countries that it had responsibility for in the counterintelligence realm. I would be interesting and knowing the sources and would love to go into that more, so talk to afterwards. I wonder if there is a preimposed attitude towards that as well. Mr. Fox given how penetrated the u. S. Government was, i dont think they could talk too much, yeah, we were a little miffed. Part of it was because we thought the british were a as to slow reporting back who these people were and what they had access to, so some of that is understandable. You dont have allied Intelligence Services necessarily come you have cooperating once. Mr. Houghton lets go right down here. Microphone to your left. Yeah, you know how to use it. A question for verena diersch. I am puzzled as to what Digital Intelligence changes about the general picture of intelligence. Hast of all, intelligence been large agencies for a very long time, at least since the Second World War and partly in the first world war, of course, ofeady, so the issues organization of theory and relationships between organizations and so on, this is old hat. We have huge literature on the american intelligence organizations fighting each other more than the russians and the chinese and so on. That is really not new, and the same thing about what you talk of internetnfluence intelligence and so on. Just to give you an example, you mentioned they made formal agreements. This is the oldest half of the oldest hats. Hats of the oldest hats. Of formal agreements, for everything they do together needs to have a formal agreement inc. As the officers involved need to have a legal base for , and telling state secrets to form foreigners. Not changed at all. The only thing that is new is of the internet and nobody knows what to do with it, including Intelligence Services. They know it is there and dangerous because it provides a hiding space for a lot of nasty guys. But they dont know how to exploit it. They are still working on it. I am not blaming them. I just saying it is more chaos than an organized process as you described it. Ms. Diersch the question, how the internet or cyberspace those organizational transfers, this is a question that i am still working on myself because you would think those technologies are also they are connected to organizational practice, so technology does not change everything, but changing maybe the dynamics, the amount of data that is exchanged or processed. I am still trying to figure out how i measure it in my research. Startnking was that i from the simple story and making it more complex well going with the dissertation because the other way around did not help me. What is also interesting is not just the new technology, but also the Access Points to the pointsn be different thisically, and also Corporate Partnership to the Communications Provider would be also a new dimension which would be important for my research, maybe. But i havent figured it out yet. But thank you so much for , and alsot out to me about the formal agreements, a normal process, i pointed it out too much, maybe. Comment for mys further research so thank you. If you do ask a question and your question is being answer, trying to listen to the answer of the question. Who is next out here . Thank you very much. Listening to your papers, i remembered what Michael Herman said that the cold war was partially a state of mind. This is something that all of you seem to be addressing at a certain point when it comes to Police Training there is a government, a bureau that is nation different Training Police officers. They are not only learning to fire a gun, there is more. They talk to each other. When they talk about the learning processes between the thereer and weaker part, is a learning process, a state of mind. At dissolution from a domestic of thesnationalization state of mind and the same might. Appen how can we grasp of that . That is under the surface. This is not something you put into an agreement. This what has been called the establishment or something we can call a community . Is that a system where you have a comment map . I think that is important. That is in all of your three papers somehow. Mr. Wegener there was that systemic community of the postcold war, which is where some of my later comments and training brought in, because it really does go worldwide. The focus becomes transNational Crime. Mr. Fox not simplyis reaching out to england and germany and france. It is reaching out to asia and africa and south and central america. There is something there and it is shared ideas and shared fears. Broadenshat in a sense or develops those kinds of relationships. Ms. Diersch i also think that you could answer this question by putting Different Levels to what is practice, what is knowledge. I think there are different els at which there can be under which a mindset could and other parts that are more stable and more international culture. It would be interesting to do research on that. I guess it would be very hard because you dont have the forces, same old story. Questions that maybe really interest me. Maybe we could talk about it later. It is an exciting thing to do in Intelligence Studies to look at mind and identities and so on. When you brought this up i had to think that. Mr. Wegener what i looked at and you haveion sources from both sides of the , the european and american sources, and they dont seem to fit really gather fit together. When you look at the other side you see the exact same aim. If we have sources been we are skeptical of the sources. How do people present themselves ,n the sources as rational realistic actors when maybe they might have other ideas as well. How much onthejob experiences have you collected . Ms. Diersch not very much. On mine . I suggest you dig a lot deeper and more. I dont think the nsa will help you. The truth is not in the books. The book is what can be published. Try experience more from the people. Ms. Diersch thank you for the comment. Of course, you are right. But then we also have the what they spoke about, you dont necessarily know that they tell you the truth or if they tell you from their past experience, which might be also objective. Of course, you are right. I guess you also have to see aom my standpoint from political scientist. I cannot just change my job description. Work with the things i have. So i work with the books. You are right. It is not the whole story. You are getting into the idea that men cannot write womens history and women cant write military history. To each his own. Anything else . It straight may when you were talking about relationships between Intelligence Services, you are thinking about state to state models. If you think about and economics model and think about firms of a chainange of buying and selling. Every player has a very strong local knowledge that might be superior to anyone else. That means that you have something to gain over other people. Convinced that weaker Agencies Agency at mirror stronger one spirit what you have is an organization where even the strongest organization is less good in specific areas than a small one. In the end, thinking about a different model about how agencies interact. An economics model is possible. It is different than the state to state one that we use. Cyber is a great equalizer. You dont need to have the resources that you do doing other kinds of intelligence. That is where the 400 pound cheetah can do some real damage. Intelligence agencies can put their intelligence into cyber and make a difference. You see this were a smaller agencies are doing a lot with less and it does appeal to the larger agencies. If they can be half the more efficient they can be more powerful than they are. Worlde doing the modern. Left. R. David chambers a question for the fbi, just to get a sense of this liaison history, in the late 30s walter defected and came over to the states, publish biggest splash and then test it testified and went to the u. K. And talk to british intelligence, and was going talk to the committee again in 1941 when he was assassinated just down the street here in washington. Was the fbi involved in any liaison . Just looking forward 10 years, should that have happened 10 years later, would that be the kind of thing they were involved in and dealing with the british . I am not sold on the assassination. The fbi was not directly involved, crisci and it up rcmp. Friends with the the fbi didnt know what to make of it. The state department interviewed him twice and did not get a lot out of him. The fbi saw that and talk to them him. The fbi 10 users had more of a clue at that point. When they go over to talk to he has been arrested and is under british control and he is talking. And they send over bob lamb. Ground and knows some of the things to ask and knows what the fbi already knows, so he can get a picture immediately. It changes and the liaison changes as well. Part of that just comes from experience. Question for john. In your comments about interpol. And that there was not a good liaison with interpol. If you stand back and look at it you imagine it would or should be. The bureau started to work with interpol and the 1940s. As the nazis to get over they stepped back. I dont remember the u. S. Officially resign that everybody stopped dealing with them when came in. After the war, when it started sending up again the bureau explores relationships with them. They end up having a blowup with the crew there. I think it is in 1950 or 1951 here it a couple of guys in czechoslovakia steal a plane and fly it to don and want to defectb onne at want to defect. They are on International Notice because of the hijacking. The fbi sees it as a political thing because these are two people trying to defect from the eastern block at this point. They stopped dealing with them. In the 1950s, the u. S. Government does not deal with interpol. In the 1960s, the Treasury Department is given permission to start exploding exploring a relationship with interpol. The fbi becomes involved again. For a time, the u. S. Government stood hands off because of the political issue. Want to deal with the eastern bloc members of interpol. You can see parallels of that today. Fugitive because of politics, it depends on who is asking. Of things happen. In dealing with france, for was ace, james foster soviet agent in the 1940s who worked for oss. She leaves the u. S. And ans up living in france. Would like her back in 1957 to prosecutor inc. As they decide to expose the spy ring she has been part of and they are rounding up the members. France will not expedite her because espionage is a political crime. That does not mean that the u. S. Did not get information from her and what she told the french intelligence agencies. That seems to come from selective blackouts in the fbi files and the fact that the documents coming from we have paris, talking about jane foster being in france. All the information is blacked out. As a grad student i like to the conclusion that the fbi is learning something from paris sources here. Just a followup. Are there a lot of other documents that are still classified . Mr. Fox from it. D. From that perio there is classified and there is also protections from that sources of information and the fbi makes use of both of those. In the case of what i am talking about, i believe it was the file i was using have been released to my dissertation advisor in the 1980s. Would they be classified today . I dont know. It depends on what the agreements are with the organization and where the information is coming from. One of the things i talk about with regard to the fbi and all sortsu can find of documents and some will release and some will not. On what it was at the time. Would it be declassified . Maybe. Time andf the issue of limits released and what is going on at that point and what the other side agrees to have you do with their information, it changes. Mr. Houghton the gentleman with the beard back there. Dave from the army. As a 15 year practitioner, thank you very much for playing in the sandbox. It is important for us to get your perspective as well. You bring a level of Political Science expertise that many of us dont have. You make this more interesting. In terms of something that would help you in terms of models, parallels work sometimes. If you are looking at nsa and others, you might want you consider the u. S. German joint Intelligence Committee or joint interrogation committee, but something that was hugely profitable for both sides up 2014, when it was shutdown. This is primarily by the Defense Intelligence agency. There is information out there on it. This issuelooking at from an nsa lens i encourage you to look at it from the nsa saw happened to that relationship. Did relationship. The political wind shifted thanks to edward snowden. They packed it up and went home because it could not be seen to be done anymore. I think it might help you consider another perspective on what you are trying to accomplish by looking at other Intelligence Networks that were both productive and have a political is that just got too hot to handle. Mr. Houghton here and there of then we will be out of time. This is michael not the army. , i am from aife place where you have to go to germany if you have a different department, if you go to a different city you have to register. This is where you get your Identity Cards and your passports and stuff like that. We are talking about 45 years ago. When they time shifted from index cards to punch cards. I have a problem there on these cards there were names that did not fit into the punch cards because the fields or to shore, particularly with people from portugal. Very, very, long could you had a limited number of fields. On the index cards you had something hand written sometimes , so i am wondering, referring to what you said, is there really no difference between index card system that took two hours and then you had computers the are faster, but container that contains the information may be more limited. So there is a possible difference between an index card and a computer in a positive. Pent stashed sense, speed on the other hand, you lose information until you go into a system where you have aand you have enough storage space. This is probably what youre talking about. You have more speed, but then again the contender container all was plays a role as well. Also plays a role as well. 10 you comment on that . I havent coding manual that plays a huge role. People have very similar mr. Fox you are dataibing an Electronic System works. If you are using a file cart system you have solved of the problem. The final card system is schematically identical to what he is describing. Mr. Houghton the final question. Can you define your understanding of the document that you can get a hold of at an archive . Mr. Wegener there are more than a million pages of files available. Documents in the files. Thats about what, two or 3 of any file . You can black out anything. Mr. Fox we dont remember anything anyway. Accommodation of destruction and the evidence we have. As social scientists, thats what we do with it. [inaudible] ive had it from both and ends. Its not that different. Failsafeton having a historical record is a pipe dream. It will never happen. That wass a memoir written for the benefit of the writer. Even cia or fbi documents are sometimes written not for us. Allen dulles was writing documents in the 50s saying one day this houghton is going to want to read this. I am all for creative destruction. Please join me in thanking our panel. This weekend on American History tvm cspan3. Tonight at 8 00 eastern on lectures in history, jeffrey nson on the 19 16 bonnie 1916 bombing. P. M. At happened after 2 about a half an hour into the parade the local press would see one of the most pathetic results of the explosion and of the parade. At 10 unreal america, the 1915 film on the fire line with the germans. One of the few times you see a pipe, he is loading film in his camera, watch the guy there. He just got hit. We visit the portrait gallery of the second bank of the United States in philadelphia. Exhibit,e a fine arts to tell the story of what it was like to live in 18th century america, the world that those people knew and the world that the revolution have built. And the presidency, historians discuss the relationship between Alexander Hamilton and george washington. Certain, he is a person of volcanic temperament but he learns early on to control himself. Whos a horse was more columns the very high strung, very skittish, very fast hamilton hamilton, and when washington isnt around gets himself into a lot of trouble. For our american tv schedule go to cspan. Org. This year marks the 70th anniversary of the integration of major league eightball. On april 15 1947, africanamerican Jackie Robinson played his first game with the brooklyn dodgers. History bookshelf, jonathan eig talks about his book, opening day, the story of Jackie Robinsons first season