If we honored on my view Reagan Administration, so this one will be more informal recollections about what it was like working in the administration for president reagan and the atmosphere at the time. Each of our panelists will offer about 15 minutes of comments and we will adjourn for a q a. For my fellow historians, this is your time to do the expert interviews you have been wanting to do. Introducing my three panelists, this is the man who needs no introduction, because i introduced him three hours ago. Ken adelman. For our purposes here, he served as one of president reagans ambassadors to the u. N. And was also a troubleshooter in another way. I want to talk to you about your role in helping put that together. In the middle here, again, a man to those of us who here in austin we need no direction, bob inman. A very important alumni of the Reagan Administration as well. He was the nsa director and was referenced by one of the speakers in the earlier panel, that was the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for the first two years of the administration. And admiral, i do not know of i have told you this before, but a couple of years ago i came off a debt came across a letter from session urging president elect reagan to appoint admiral inman to be the director of the cia. For our purposes, dr. Henry nau, one of the directors of Economic Affairs for the first several years. And we have a tremendous breadth of expertise represented on the panel. We have henry the work at the whoe house and the others spanned the first and second term, so we have a ambitious breath of experience. Mr. Adelman i will be, as henry viii was with his sixth wife, i will be brief. I will mostly react to things that were said. Let me say and react first to the panel. Before, there was a wonderful, wonderful panel. Kudos for everybody and it and will for putting it together here the clements center. The whole question of agency and how much a president actually does. It is an ageold question. We have on the wall, all the Time Magazine persons of the year since 1927, because i believe that people really do make history. They do change things, and the study of the flow of the times is a good excuse for those getting in and flowing. There is a big difference between transactional president s and transformational president s. A transactional president is an inbox president. And a transformational president is one who really wants to make a change. As i said in the talks, the fact is there were four pillars of Ronald Reagans strategy. Whether he thought this was a strategy or not, i have no idea. Whether he really put this together, i have no idea. But they were very distinct. Number one was the delegitimization of the soviet leadership. That was his First Press Conference as president. They lie, cheat, steal to further their aims, and ended with his speech through the nation when he left office. The suspicion about the soviet leadership and the system was prevalent. No other president had done anything like that. Nixon, carter, nobody had done anything like that. It was not done. It was brandnew. Second, the overall defense buildup. That, i concede, was a republican view than anything at that time. I would say that that was the closest anyone would have done was as ever public and president. Number three is the fbi. That would not have happened with Ronald Reagan. People ask all the time is right to make work best if other people or to talk reagan into accepting that the fbi. Tell you the truth, issue never came up. I think reagan it knew what he wanted. He did not want the fdi to be [indiscernible] in any respect. That was will set with him. These factors were from reagan and from his thoughts. Point was the real reduction in nuclear weapons. Not the limitation of increases. Again, nothing that carter ever thought of or wanted or advocated. Nothing that nixon or ford ever wanted or advocated, but reagan insisted on it. At least three and a half of them are unique to Ronald Reagan. And no one else would have done that. The second overall point i would make is on a very good panel before us, which i learned a lot from, the question of the human rights. A very nice job on that. I would make three overall points. Number one, Ronald Reagan, in retrospect, gets for going after human rights against communism, not against authoritarian, south african, south american bad guys around the world. I think it was totally justified. Authoritarian dictators never massacred tens of millions of people as communism did. Authoritarian governments can change. South korea goes from authoritarian government to a free government. Taiwan does the same. Chile goes to an authoritarian government to a fouryear government. Communism never changes. I think the idea lets really stress human rights against communism rather than against authoritarianism. I think it is justified. Second overall point on human rights is i am sure it is in your paper, but this is a gigantic factor. It is iran. The shot was a bad guy. Ronald reagan comes in, he is sworn in 30 years ago, and that was the day that the hostages were released from iran. There was a trauma in the United States about that. There was a clear evidence that if you go, like carter did, to remove the leader, you would get something a lot worse. And you got something a lot worse. People said it could not be worse, but it was. I was fortunate at the inauguration. I had a blacktie party at my own house, and the night of the inauguration i had my parents in town, my brothers, my wife, rumsfeld, cheney, all kinds of people. That night, i left my own blacktie party and went over with jimmy carter, to welcome the exhostages, who had just been released. So i followed the story very carefully. But the idea of the experience in iran was a gigantic overhang for the human rights situation. The third point i would make is you have the grade on the curve on human rights. Carter spoke about the human rights policy, and i do not know if it was any different than reagans. He toasted the shaw overran iran as a island of stability in a turbulent area. I do not think that was human rights. I do not remember him taking a stance on south africa, south america, or other places in not one that was radically different from the reagan situation. He gave a few more speeches than reagan did on human rights, but i do not see any policy. The only big difference that i dont see any differences and other president s. President obama talked about human rights. He hung on to mubarak for a very long time. And then, he had acceptances certainly the most horrendous Human Rights Violations since world war ii in syria, of which obama did nothing. I cant imagine a human rights situation where you have over half a Million People in a situation and an american president is basically doing nothing but mentioning it a few times. Not actually doing anything. I think that is the most tremendous human rights record i have seen since world war ii. Those are my views on the past. Really quickly, i would have to say that working for Ronald Reagan was a delight. I was very lucky because he was interested in certain things and not interested in a lot of things. Most things he was not interested in were not interesting. There were not situation that he cared about, i was lucky. He cared enormously about my view. When i was sworn in as arms control director leading into the united nations, 1983, a very eventful year, there were no talks ongoing. I went to the white house 38 times to meet with him. Almost once a week. I can imagine what would it be like if we had ongoing talks, but it was always something. The meetings or because Ronald Reagan was interested. He liked to talk about it. If you look at a thousand or so broadcasts he did before becoming president , you think of the hot button issues people use to get elected. To get the nomination of the Republican Party. They were god, guns, and gays. The 3gs. Ronald reagan spoke practically of none of them in radio broadcasts. He mentioned that i think abortion was one out of 1000, gun control may have been one, and gays were none. Those with hot button issues to the electorate. School prayer, but they were not to Ronald Reagan. Over half of his talks about soviet affairs or arms control. He had to choose them, and made a good choice. I was lucky he was interested in this field. He knew what he knew, and knew what he did not know. As i said in my remark, he asked us to get together that night. He gives the overall view, trying to the soviets to go along. Try to eliminate this, and he was happy with whatever solution we came up with as long as it was doing that and the overall guidance that he had. And fdi, the really hot button issue, he did not have or need our opinion. He had his own opinion. That was his program rather than our program. Thank you. Admiral . Mr. Inman gerald ford does not get the credit he deserves on the issue. On the issue of human rights. Because you included that in the helsinki accords. When we talk later to those who survived the time, they said it is what gave them hope that there was external support that would eventually lead to the communist losing power. Very good point. Mine are reminiscenct of a very long individual who is very approachable, likable, easy to work with. I First Encountered him at a place called bohemian grove. I was the guest of george h. W. Bush, who is making a lakeside appearance. This is critical if you are aiming toward hoping to run for the presidency. They were both pushing reagan and were longtime members. There was a lunch after the speech, and the three of us retired as his guest, when governor reagan spotted us. He told the story about the barbary pirates in standing up to fight them, and when he finished, mr. President bush turned to him and said dam, he is good. Fastforward. Next encounter with the governor was after he had taken the oath of office. The day after. I had been approached in late november. What i consider being the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and it was easy. I said hal, no. I was getting ready to retire. I was passing up promotion opportunities for people i had helped along. I went out to australia for a visit, got pulled out of a meeting, and he said you have to take this job. I said i was not going to. And then i got back from that trip and i had my First Encounter with weinberger. He persuaded me to go to the dci, offered me a job in the pentagon in the process. I thought it was exciting until my wife center are you crazy . I turned it down and thought things were behind us. I was so immersed with president carter on the final negotiations for getting the hostages out. In fact, my last conversation with carter as president as the president elect is sitting next to him in the limo was to tell them that hostages were in the aircraft but not permitted to take off until carter was no longer president. Next morning, the secretary runs in and says the president is calling. I thought it was carter following up, but it was the president. He could not have been more charming. He went through the whole rationale. When they lost new hampshire, he invited bill casey to run his political campaign. He asked him what job you would like in the administration, and casey said the director of Central Intelligence. They laughed, go forward to tuesday night in november, he has won. He turns to bill and says are you ready to be director of Central Intelligence . He said if i cannot be secretary of state. [laughter] about an hour later, the phone rang. It was barry goldwater, winninglating him on the election. Hes utterly at one request. I have a candidate for the director of Central Intelligence. He said i have already given the job to bill casey. There was a long silence. Casey and goldwater hated one another, Republican Party politics. They thought about how to deal with it, and the president said i got more calls generated by barry about you than anyone else running. And someone suggested doing a shotgun marriage where inman was the deputy. I had a conversation with you, and you declined. Now we are in office, and speaking as your commander in chief, i need you and want you to take the job is bill caseys deputy. Under the circumstances, mr. President , i would be honored. Hopefully no more than 18 months, two years. He agreed to that, and set by the way, i nominate you for a fourth star. So that is how this ersatz career ended up. It was very strange. I was confirmed on the 13th of february. I was still the director of the National Security agency until the 30th of march, and we saw more problems between those two agencies in that six weeks. I like about sending letters back and forth by the doe. Casey wanted to run totally different than any past director. Normally, the director deals with the outside world, the deputy runs the agency. That was not what he wanted to do. He wanted to personally run the clandestine service, covert operations, and the analytical side. He did not want to do anything with a science, technology, administration, any of the community stuff. I had been in the job six days and the president wanted to see me. I go down and it was very simple and direct. It was the first time he ever called me by my first name. He said bob become a bill told me you were going to do everything with regard to budgets and the rest, rebuild the intelligence community, and spend whatever you need to spend. Frank, you decide where to put it in the Defense Budget to make it happen. You could not have had clearer or simpler guidance. We made a fiveyear plan and found that the drawdowns have limited the Training Establishments and had no real limits and how much it could rebuild and at what pace. Because he had asked for cabinet status, bill had been granted that, which meant i was subcabinet. Casey never went to a Cabinet Meeting or an nsc meeting in the last 18 months. I went all of them. The only thing he went to was the National Security planning group, where they had the approval of covert offenses that were done. It was fascinating to sit up angle and watch the president. He was an amazingly relaxed man when people were talking. What i picked up by the second or Third Session was the role ed meese was playing. You had 10 minutes ago, and he would ask questions. The president would pick up his pencil, and the president would summarize the meeting. What he summarized would answer his questions. He had not bothered with all the other. He knew he was going to get the essence of what was important from ed. There were so many encounters. He loved to tell jokes. He did not meet joke writers. He was natural. Early on, there was still separate men and womens press cores for the White House Press corps, women had six new members of congress on trying to be funny. Schneider from rhode island wearing a groucho marx mustache. Damato, the senator from new york said that the president knew i was going to solve the budgets deficit and show his old movies at the white house. He would charge people to attend them. They all finished, the president goes up, looks down at them, and says if my movies made that kind of money, i wouldnt he here. [laughter] mr. Inman that was just his nature and his ease. He was not interested in the details unless they were pertinent to something that was on his mind, and he would pursue them, grasped them, and hold onto them. We were meeting about a year in, and he made a comment that nothing useful to the u. S. Had ever come from arms control agreements. Mr. President , i would like to suggest maybe sometimes there were. What . I talked about how they made the decision, given the limit, to do more mobile missiles as you came to deal with. He said no one has ever told me that. He picked it up and used it. It was classic. When he saw something, he would change his mind if he accepted the plausibility, and move with it. The shift in his dealing with the soviet union posed a substantial debt to margaret thatcher. Gorbachev had come to power. The years were finally behind them, and thatcher was the first one to me gorbachev. She called the president and said ronnie, this is someone we can work with. That began a process. At this point, i was out, but my departing week mrs. Thatcher had called. They had concluded that they urgently needed to be able to stage two Ascension Island to be able support foreign deployment. It was an island that had been leased out to the nsa for collection purposes. We were being told this, and ambassador kirkpatrick at the u. N. Said oh, mr. President , you cannot approve that. It would destroy the hemisphere solidarity. Again, one of those unfortunate outburst, what hemispheric solidarity . The british have been with us since the war of 1812. He turned and said sorry, tell maggie she can move Ascension Island. And one final note, it was clear from the beginning he focused on people and what motivated people and what the influences were on people. Knowing he was going to head for dialogue with the soviets, i introduced a character into the mix called suzanne massie. She was the former wife of a naval officer, and had written a book called the land of the fiber. It is a magnificent book on russian art history. The soviets hated they did not get any credit for it. I recommended they bring her in to brief him. He was taken with it, and have her back several times before going, and she was the one who was insistence that the Intelligence Committee was totally wrong, especially on religion. Communism has wiped it out. She says it is still alive, it is submerged in the process. Fastforward to george w. Bush and his First Encounter with putin. He had been briefed that in fact, putin wore a cross that his mother had given him. When george asked him, putin showed him the cross. Bush asked him. He had opened his shirt and showed him the cross. And that was the background behind saying i have looked in his eyes and sing his soul. And seen his soul. We had a year were things worked and one where they didnt. I am rambling too long, but what i meant convey was the warmth of the individual. How sharp the mind was, and by and large, how little interest he had in details a broad policy. The contrast with president carter could not be more to distinct. Carter wanted every detail. So it was quite an adjustment. Finally, on his attitude when he first got in office, during the transition, they brought the head of the french search a to the west coast. He told reagan that he was going to be challenged militarily by the soviets in his first year in office and it would probably occur in Central America. That was why when they came to washington, the focus on events in Central America got a great deal more prominence because they believed it was not just castro, but it was the soviets. A cautionary note about who gets access to a president elect and talks to him during that transition. I better stop there. Mr. Nau when will told me about six months ago that he was thinking about a conference on reagan, i simply said to him how long can i stay . There arent that many such events going on in the academic world, certainly not at our annual conventions in any case. I think this is extremely worthwhile opportunity. I am also humbled to be on this panel with these distinguished gentleman. It is probably the reason why i am not wearing a tie. But let me make a few comments about my impressions of reagan when i was in the white house. In the transition team, and then in the beginning of the Reagan Administration through the fall of 1983. We ran a small shop, about five people on the international, economic side of things, and dealt largely with his Economic Policy. The summit process at that time, g7, was extremely important for both, forcing us to think systematically about our own domestic policies and try to project to the other allies, and an effort to coordinate the policy. Those did not occur once a year, but about 68 times a year. We had meetings once a month and exchanges back and forth. I was on the American Team under the secretary of Economic Affairs in the treasury department. I did not meet reagan until the early 1980s, february, when he came to washington after i had been asked to serve on the Foreign Policy advisory board. My First Impressions were very favorable. This was a meeting at the csi s on k street, and we had assembled maybe 50 of us, and the minute reagan walked in i had never seen him personally but when he walked into the room, i often wondered what was it that struck me about him . He surveyed the room when he walked in. He never just went to his seat. He walked in, looked around, made eye contact, and had a stature. Ive thought about that a lot over the years in writing about him, and i think one of his attributes as a leader at in this kind of situation was his presence and the concept of his presence. It is an actors concept. And cave, he filled the room. That was to some extent part of his charisma. He made a comment that meeting that endeared him to me as well, because he told us we were specifically about the policy aspects of what he would be doing if you was elected in february 1980. He said look, i have plenty of people helping me with the campaign. I want you to think about what i should be doing once i get to the white house. He said you know what . If i do not get into the white house, who needs it at my age . That could have been interpreted as a flippant comment, but i turned that as this was not about Ronald Reagan. This was about the country. There was some kind of selflessness. He was selfconfident, but not narcissistic in any way. Very comfortable in his own skin, and genuinely because of what he believed, the ideas he had developed over the years. This sounds strange when you think of Ronald Reagan, because his image is one of an amiable dunce. That was how he was identified when he came to washington and his critics. But he was extremely bright. I would urge people to examine the record and go back and look at his days in college. He was a very bright guy who had a voracious very good memory and was interested in lots of things. He read lots of things, in some ways unusual things. And one of the things im working on currently is to put together what he read when and look at memoirs of people he was dealing with at that time, like in his early hollywood years to see if they remember any of the conversations they had with him because he was reading so much and was so interested in political questions when he was in hollywood in the early years that bill holden tells a story during those years that when he came into the cafeteria, people would try to sit someplace where he would not join them, because they did not want to have just and the debate and talk about politics during the course of the meal. The man was a good deal more intellectually active, and i think the record what we have now discovered in terms of the writings that he did, the speeches in the 1960s, the letters that he wrote, so far there have been more than 10,000 letters collected that Ronald Reagan wrote. Handwritten. All handwritten. Jefferson only wrote 18,000 letters, and that was feeling that was the only way you can communicate. Scholz said, the man who writes a lot thanks a lot, and someone who thinks a lot has probably read a lot. There were a number of time for reagans press secretary asked if he would release the books he was reading . Reagan refused. He said no, its not necessary. These lists have been put together by people over the years. But i mention this and emphasized that because for those of you who are looking at the archival records and so on and be aware or at least double check any time you want to reach the conclusion it was not reagan who was doing this or have these ideas, but one of his staff people, because reagan had a unique way of interacting with his staff. If you look at the issues he was concerned about, and in my case the economic issues, reagan needed every one of his staff people when thinking about Economic Policy. He did not need anyone. He needed them all. He was the only one who put together the pieces. When you think about Economic Policy, he had supply sliders, he at monitors, here fiscal conservatives, trade, trade liberalization, all of these groups. His strategy had a way of putting those things together, and that story has been told. I have told it, by the way in a book that was published in 1990 by oxford called the myth of americas decline. It is a detailed account. There was a strategy. The most important thing to read when you are looking at those early years with reagan policies, whether it is Economic Policy or Energy Policy or anything, go into these. Bill clark did in a normas job as the National Security adviser for Ronald Reagan because he organized more than 100 National Security directives that were done during that times. Everyone of those with a 34 month process will be brought together the agencies and try to integrate and organize reagans ideas with the details and responsibilities with the different agencies, and some of those, especially with ones with respect to the soviet union, are getting some attention, but there are a lot more in there. On the summit, i would urge them to read the memos that went to the president before those major summit meetings. There were three of them i was involved in. And there was a first summit with developing countries, which was a precursor of the g 20. It was the developing countries in cancun of in october. This started with an intense, wonderful book. You have to read it. I was struck by the williamsburg summit. It was the reykjavik summit of Economic Policy. We had very severe conflicts of the allies that versailles, but williamsburg was where we got together. We began to see where we were going. From that summit, which had an annex, and details the kind of policy we were going to pursue. The french, within six months, or pursuing many of those policies. It became the basis for the washington consensus, which became the foreign act for Economic Policy in the 80s and 90s. And that set out a very coherent set of economic policies that more or less spread to the countries and many other developing countries, and coincided with one of the biggest booms that i call the great expansion. Not the great moderation. The great expansion that took place between 19802010. We have real, annual gdp growth during at that point in the world. This includes the 20082009 recession. The chinese kept growing very effectively. You have to ask yourself the question, how did this happen . We heard already and will here tomorrow and the next day about all the factors that could have perhaps caused this. I would urge us to think hard about, as ken mentioned, maybe the first question ought to be one of these outcomes do they cause . Dont look for factors come because there are hundreds out there. Dont look for those that might account for why these things would have occurred, even without those agents. Ask questions about what the agents did and what did they think . How did they implement their thoughts, and here you need to trace reagans ideas into the policies he put in place. How do those change structures . Changed circumstances . In the case of the information revolution, which some people regard as the reason why the economy came back in the 1980s, the question is what it have come back if we had not revitalize the economy that existed in the industrialized countries and the developing world in the 1970s . Remember that . That was the whole decade of stagnation. No growth and high inflation, increasing trade protectionism, commodity pricing out of control. A very bad era, and somehow that got turned around. I think you could make a case, and i do make this case, that reagans policies as of the to do with that. So tracing how agents think about a policy, whether or not the policies they can lament are consistent, and whether or not they can be linked in some reasonable way with outcomes. You can develop a nation which just is not depend and explanation which just does not depend upon this notion of things happening this way anyway. Why is it important, i suppose to Pay Attention to the role of, in this case, Ronald Reagan, who had some very clear ideas he formulated over a long stretch of time, but the policy just put them into policy, and they coincided with outcomes we might have predicted on the basis of those policies. Every time we have had moments where we have implemented policies like reagan did, monetary stability, efforts to try and manage inflation, some deregulation nasa deregulation and trade liberalization, every time where we had policies like that, we have extraordinary growth. Under harding, we had growth of 14 in 1922. If you look at william hardings policies that he put into place in 1921, took over a very stagnant economy and wilson. We had a boom in the course of the 1920s. It happened again under kennedy, and under reagan. Will happen again under trump . There is a good question for us to think about. There are many reasons it doesnt look like it will. Nevertheless, they try to make that case for agency before you revert destruction. The reason for doing that, just to make policy accountable, because of things happen, agents are not important in terms of what happens, if you cannot hold leaders accountable. You have to look to faith, i suppose, or whatever those developments are you are pointing to that leaders either adjust to and succeed or do not adjust to and fail what are those general and structural changes . Where do they come from . Reagans legacy, a final thought about that. I wonder about it because i know, from my own personal experience in the academic world, there are very few people in the academic world who served in the Reagan Administration. I contrast, there are a lot of people in the academic world who served in the Clinton Administration from earlier in the carter administration. There will be many coming out from the obama administration, including david axelrod, who is Running Institute for politics at the university of chicago. They will be turning out a lot of legacy stuff on obama. Not much being done on reagan like that. Reagan, in two ways, was in one of the most certain president s we have had in the history of the country. Let me identify those two factors. First of all, he is one of five president s who led the country through an existential crisis. You have washington, lincoln, wilson, roosevelt, all dealing with wars, and reagan dealing with, in effect, the preemption of a war, the preemption of the cold war. Much more difficult to do, by the way, than to manage in some sense, and much more commendable than to manage a war after it breaks out. Reagan preempted a war. And second, he is one of a president s who was reelected twice and turned over the white house to his own party, which suggests not only that he was able to engineer outcomes, but he was able to bring the public along with him. He retired, of course come with a 68 approval rating. Thoroughly three of those other eight, by the way, were founding fathers. Jefferson, madison, and washington. Five of them included lincoln, mckinley, roosevelt, of course, and now reagan. In the 21st century, reagan is one of the old only president other than roosevelt was reelected twice and turned the white house over to his own party. I think that says something about both of those things in terms of what he accomplished and how he was able to bring along public opinion. It is the extraordinarily leadership of this. I will leave it at that. And i will open it up to questions. Exec. Director inboden lets turn it over to the audience for questions. Mr. Nau but really quick, to set in context the role of nancy reagan. An enormously close and loving relationship. She was devoted to him, and determined to protect yourself. Determined to protect his health. So the instruction, the day we began the 21st of january, 10 hours a day, the president is available. If there is an evening function, that comes out of the 10 hours. She was unbending on that. It does bring discipline, and that is the skill with which he brought management and time management in the first year, many of the events were domestic. By the eighth year, 90 for international. The impact of those two individuals and the viewer around in which the policies and developed. Exec. Director inboden we would turn it over to questions. Please identify your name and institution, for our friends at cspan. Hi, good evening. Thank you so much for the terrific talk. Im from the hebrew university. We coauthored a paper on the Reagan Administrations reaction and thoughts to the israeli strike in june of 81. There are several questions that interest me, and i will limit myself to one. How was a strike actually perceived by the president himself in the close advisers, because we have seen several accounts that seem to be clashing, and there is a revisionist account which we have our own take on, but i would be very, very much interested in hearing your thoughts on it. Is it framed as a huge success , oravor of nonproliferation is sort of a stab in the back by an ally that did not consult before launching it . We will stop. So other people can have the time. Thank you. Mr. Adelman i couldnt hear the question. Exec. Director inboden what did you observe up president reagans response about israels response to the Iraqi Nuclear attack in june of 81 . There are competing accounts about what president reagan said about it. Was he supportive of it . Surprised. Mr. Adelman the entire u. S. Government was surprised. Looking at 800 miles, the absolute outer limits of the aircraft to reach, do the strike, and come back, that meant Precision Targeting information. Only britain and israel could automatically requisition this. Everyone else had to ask for it. The question then was what is israel doing in the last six months . It was in a whole lot of other potential targets as well. The decision i took was to constrain the automatic requisition. 200 miles, anything, that was defending. Beyond that, for offensive purposes, they had to ask. Sharon was so furious he came to the u. S. To try and overturn that. It was weinbergers strong support that kept it in place. The actual dialogue with the president about it was from weinberger as well. But it was a reaffirmation of what we already knew, that if israel considered it to be potentially lifethreatening, they would not ask for permission to ask. I do not think that has fundamentally changed to the present time. Aleman, needing to add on that . It was a most of the great it was still something. It was a situation mr. Nau it is a situation where she could not stand voting for because it was the most mild, almost unsuitable combination of israel, but it was still antiisrael. I think Ronald Reagan, if i had to guess, i dont know, thought that the attack was totally justified. Part of the argument was that it was a preemptive attack. The nuclear reactor, as you know very well, had not run on critical. Why do you not just wait until they go critical . The counter argument was very simple. Would you be happier if they went critical . That would have been blamed on israel for putting all the radiation in the air. I always thought that was kind of a stupid argument. I never heard Ronald Reagan say a word against it. I heard some speak against it and vote against it though. Exec. Director inboden henry, i know you were in the white house at the time. Mr. Nau ivr do not remove or anything from that particular incident or stretch of time, but i remember reagans reaction of the versailles summit to be israeli invasion of lebanon, which occurred on the second day of that summit, i think it was, and later on, immediately he changed the subject of the conversation, and the europeans, one after the other, came out strongly against what israel is doing, and the president jumped in and said look, we need to look at the facts here. We need to see the kind of circumstances they were facing and not jump to can vision. He was very protective, you could say, in that situation. Exec. Director inboden but if i could add one thing on the timing is it a. As you may know, iran contra broke three weeks after reagan took office, so you have this summit where administrations are rising high, john dexter were the picture, and he was governor quickly after that. I had the same question. And for the cameras, i am from the university of virginia. Mr. Inman the president began his morning with the senior staff. Rather than intelligence coming to brief, the National Security advisor did, as does the left of the shift from mcfarland of poindexter. They ran through several items. The president was doing good, but jim baker would stop it to say how . What happened when . What happened . The president would listen very carefully, and then you would have the bakerreagan shift. In reagans reaction, if the president said good, he was a great. Not asking questions are challenging. What the president lost in that change was somebody listening carefully as they are slipping pretty quickly through all of the things they are doing to raise questions