Deterrence and Nuclear Balance. According to the u. S. Perspective, Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Balance are distinct. We can tell the difference between the two ideas, two actions. Deterrence is to maintain the status quo. The definitions work very well for isolated big conflict, if a conflict is isolated and big, then we can, you know, indeed tell the difference between deterrence and compelence. But, you know, if big conflicts, you know, come from escalation, that is always the case, you know, big conflict come from, you know, small conflicts, small conflicts, you know, may escalate to big conflict. So, in that case it may not be easy to tell the difference between deterrence and compelence. The reason is that it is very difficult to figure out who changed the status quo first. Then, you know, if you want an example, you know, you launch a conventional aggression and then you use your Nuclear Weapons to deter the conventional responses from your enemy. So in this case there are tw
But the speaker greater pride up that some republicans were talking about but the republicans that act is there peis structure but not if they lower their space what they are paid . Guest the deficits but to spend more than you take in that is the spending sensibilities for the congress. Host for maryland goahead quickly. Good morning. They you but help will support it has been opposed by several members of congress. That was practical the to that perriers him as a state a subsidy but chinas benz for a bid dallas fed is the great benefit to and though but to get into the water supply is very large harmful. But it is cheaper than gas and brings down the price. I support it. Host so as we talk on capitol hill the congressmen are getting their orientation today. Guest one ofs and learn are the ethics the traps that surrounds you all the time. If yous normal behavior are a businessman or something as aet you in trouble member of congress. Oft is the first thing most these guys come out of
We find ourselves in the 90s in a whole new world. The decline of Nuclear Weapons. We have an arms control treaty, start one at the very beginning of the decade. We have International Structure which is no longer why polar. It could be called unipolar. We have globalization is the recent pieces to it but it appears to be part of a fundamental new world order. I love that phrase. It has the imagery of military force that still there but not Nuclear Weapons. Economic measures of power were going to be so much more important. There was a prediction of the decline of the nationstate in the concept of National Sovereignty where International Commerce information, technology would replace this. The book that captures of course was friedmans lexus, and all of tree, eventually the world was flat. A piece in Foreign Affairs that was her influential also predicted this new world we were moving into. Military power was still relevant of course because the decade began with the war to throw the ir
Modest number of u. S. Forces fighting with iraqi troops. Well have that hearing for you to see in its entirety at 10 deln 30 a. M. Eastern tomorrow on cspan. Vice president earlier this week taking part in the wreath laying. One of several events in recognition of vearnts veterans day. Tonight well bring you another event with veterans who served hosted usskeegie airmen by the americans veterans center. Tonight at 8 00 eastern here on cspan. Next, a look at Nuclear Proliferation and security threats facing the u. S. The speaker is former assistant secretary of state for Political Military Affairs obert glucheie who served as chief negotiator during the north koreannuke clear crisis. He recently was at the university for a little more than an hourandahalf. Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to this the third session. This year the series is sponsored by the Johns Hopkins applied physics lab. Each year the rethinking eminar focuses on an aspect of national and international issues. Our semin
Might arise. Have its ot yet advanced warning capabilities. But if it were to develop them, and if it were to prevent attacks on china, it seems that would be a scenario in which warhead ambiguity would be a particular problem. And a lot of the analysis of warhead ambiguity today its hard to convince russia that a strike on a third country, like. Ran, was not a Nuclear Strike that is the easy case. A hard case is how you deal with notkes when the strike is on a third country, but the country with the advanced Early Warning capability, like russia. R china that being said, there are benefits and risks to prevention all Global Strikes conventional Global Strikes. When l. A. N. Was an analyst at mdu she is now the Deputy Assistant secretary of defense. Unlike a ballistic missile, where it is launching rare is going to land, highly maneuverable boost glide systems, and to an extent, hypersonic cruise missiles, have ambiguity about where theyre going to land. Countries observing them cannot