Howelle Jackson News Today

It has long been understood that deposit guarantees and too-big-to-fail (TBTF) policies create a moral-hazard problem—they incentivize banks to take on too much risk by shielding depositors and shareholders from losses in excess of equity (“left-tail” outcomes)—in American banking.1 Congress passed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) in 1991 to mitigate the moral-hazard problem by restricting forbearance and implicit subsidies for undercapitalized banks.

<p><span>Thank you, Beth [Zorc], for that introduction and thank you to the Institute of International Bankers for this opportunity to provide closing remarks to your 2023 Annual Washington Conference. For the last two days, you have been addressed by top U.S. financial regulators, including the chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the acting Comptroller of the Currency, and the chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, on issues ranging from banking reg...

Dropping Out and Cashing In: The Rise of DAOHQ | Magazine | The Harvard Crimson