In the years following the Supreme Court's decision in
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016)
— which held that "bare procedural violation[s],
divorced from any concrete harm, [do not] satisfy the
injury-in-fact requirement of Article III" — district
courts have had to grapple with the question of standing under the
Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681,
et
seq., and in particular, what injuries resulting from an
alleged violation of FCRA are sufficiently concrete to invoke
Article III standing.
This blog post discusses claims arising under Section
1681b(b)(1)(A) of the FCRA. Under that section, a consumer
reporting agency (CRA) may furnish a consumer report to an employer
In the years following the Supreme Court’s decision in
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) — which held that “bare procedural violation[s], divorced from any concrete harm, [do not] satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III” — district courts have had to grapple with the question of standing under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681,
et seq., and in particular, what injuries resulting from an alleged violation of FCRA are sufficiently concrete to invoke Article III standing.
This blog post discusses claims arising under Section 1681b(b)(1)(A) of the FCRA. Under that section, a consumer reporting agency (CRA) may furnish a consumer report to an employer “only if” the employer first certifies that it: (1) “has complied” with the disclosure-to-consumer requirement under Section 1681b(b)(2); and (2) “will comply” with the notice-to-consumer requirement before taking adverse action as required by Section 1681b(b)(3).