Appropriate review for congress. It allows us to take action, or we dont have to take action. It recognizes the fact that the sanction regime was passed by congress and that we have a role to play in regards to implementing any agreement as we now see in the jcpoa, that congress has a role to play. So its set up an orderly process. And this hearing is part of that process. It took you two years to negotiate this agreement. It took you two months in vienna to get to the final details. Were on day 4 of our review of 60 days. I have not reached the conclusion. And i would hope that most members, i would hope the members of the congress would want to get all the information allow those who are directly involved to make their case. We have hearings set up next week and the following week, and well get outside experts. Many of us have taken advantage of that opportunity in the past. And i would hope that weve all used that opportunity before drawing a conclusion. This is a very important agreement from the point of view of u. S. Foreign policy. Iran in that region is critically important to the United States security. But theres a second objective to the act, and that is to concentrate all of our effort on the bad guy, iran. And speak with unity as much as we could in the United States. So our negotiators could concentrate on vienna and not on washington. In dealing with getting the very best possible agreement. And i must tell you, mr. Chairman, i looked at the framework that was agreed to in april. And looking at the final agreements that weve gotten today. And our negotiators got an awful lot. Particularly on the nuclear front, which is beyond my expertise. We got things that there were many rumors during these last couple of months of what was going to be in this agreement and how it was going to be weakened from the april framework that, in fact, have been strengthened since the april framework. So i just want to applaud our negotiators for taking the strength of our unity and turning it into results in vienna. And well be talking a little bit about that. As we go forward. The objective is clearly to prevent iran from ever becoming a Nuclear Weapon power. That is our simple objective. We know who we are dealing with. This is a state sponsor of terrorism. This is a country that abuses human rights. Violates the Ballistic Missile area. We know all that. But we singularly are trying to prevent iran from becoming a Nuclear Weapon power because we know that is a game changer in the region. Thats the objective of this agreement. And the standard that we have to use because there is no trust in iran, the Supreme Leader on friday after the agreements were entered into said, we will trample upon america. We dont trust iran. But weve got to leave a motion out of this. Weve got to look at the agreements. And weve got to determine whether the compliance with this agreement by the United States will put us on a path that makes it less likely or more likely that iran will become a Nuclear Weapon power. Thats got to be the test that we use. Mr. Chairman, i have many questions. That i hope we will get answers today. I hope those answers will provoke a debate among us in congress and American People and help us make the right decisions. Since there is no trust, the inspection and enforcement regime is particularly important. We need to understand how it works. Do we have sufficient time to discover if iran is violating the terms of this agreement in order to take effective action to prevent iran from becoming a Nuclear Weapon power . Thats a question that we need to understand. We need to know the breakout times. We need to know what happens after the time periods. Do we have sufficient opportunity to prevent iran from ever becoming a Nuclear Weapon state . The commitment they make under this agreement. Are the inspections robust enough to deter iran from cheating . And if they do will we discover and be able to take action . Mr. Chairman you raised the 24hour window. I think all of us recognized there was going to be a protocol for inspection. But we need to know whether the 24hour delay knowing what iran is likely to do. Does that compromise our ability to have effective inspections . And i hope our witnesses will deal with that today because that is a matter of major concern. We need to note the answer to that. Have we cut off all pathways for iran to obtain a Nuclear Weapon . Particularly the Covert Military operations. We know thats a major concern. Thats why the pmd is particularly important, the chairman mentioned the pmd. And the work that the iaea are inspectors, International Inspectors. They have great credibility in this area. But we will want to know whether they have the capacity to do what were asking them to do. Will they have the access that we need . Because we do need to know about their prior military dimension in order to be able to go forward to make sure that we can contain any opportunity they may use for covert activities. Will we discover it and be able to take action . These are questions that we were going to ask. Weve read the agreement and still have questions. And we hope well get answers as to whether we have effectively prevented iran from using covert activities to develop a Nuclear Weapon. Will this agreement provide us iaea with sufficient access to the people, places and documents . So that we know their prior military dimension . Are the snapback provisions for reimposing sanctions adequate if iran violates this agreement . Thats an issue that i hope we will have a chance to talk about. At the end of the time limits in the agreement, iran will have the capacity to expand as the chairman rightly pointed out to an industrial capacity. They can get through there and Nuclear Enrichment and uranium enrichment. That, they can do. Do we have sufficient capacity knowing their commitments for nonproliferation, knowing their requirements of the Additional Protocols. Is that going to be adequate to prevent iran . Do we have a sufficient enough breakout time that if iran tries to become a Nuclear Weapon state after the time period that we have sufficient tools to prevent them from becoming a Nuclear Weapon power . These are questions we need to have answers to. Before we can make our judgments. Now, there are other areas. I wanted to be reassured that the United States still has the flexibility to impose nonNuclear Sanctions on iran for the support of terrorism, human rights abuses, and against a Ballistic Missile program. No one expects irans bad behavior to change on implementation date. We know who were dealing with. Will we be able to use the powers weve used in the past and build upon them to take action against iran, particularly in light that theyll have Additional Resources . Can we do that . And can Congress Work with the administration to strengthen those tools . Without violating the jcpoa . I want to know how the administration is updating the regional deterrent strategy against nefarious and stabilizing iranian activities and how were going to work with our partners to build up their capacity to counter iran, especially israel. The chairman mentioned the lifting of the International Arms embargo. Thats of great concern as to how it would impact on our regional partners. How will it impact an arms race in that region of the world. These are questions we need to get the best information we can in making our decisions. And lastly, let me mention this because i think its critically important. What are our options . If the United States walks away from us. How will we be perceived internationally . Will we be able to maintain effective enforcement of sanctions with our International Partners . And will iran come back to a negotiating table with a country that has walked away from an agreement . These are questions that we need to understand. We need to know that the options are right now, do we go forward . And what are the options . What are the consequences if we dont go forward . Mr. Chairman we have a full plate. And i look forward to hearing from our witnesses. And i hope that the members of this committee will use the information that we get today to debate the issue take the time that we have, and do whats right for the American People and ultimately make the decision that we think is best to prevent iran from becoming a Nuclear Weapon power. Thank you senator carden, i appreciate so much the way weve worked together on so many issues and the entire committee. With that, i know that our witnesses here today need no introduction. Theyre well known not only here, around the world in spite of our policy differences. I think each of us deeply appreciate the that make this. That may not be policy differences in some cases. But we deeply appreciate the tremendous effort that you put up put out on behalf of our country. We thank you for being here today. We thank you for being willing to be here today as long as it takes for everybody to get their answers. And with that, id like to introduce collectively secretary john kerry who used to serve with us and sit on this side of. Helpful to all of us in understanding the technical aspects of the deal. And someone we all appreciate deeply. Secretary lew who served in multiple positions here has been certainly affirmed by this committee in several towns. We thank you all for your Great Service to our nation. In spite of some of the concerns that we have here today. I think you all understand the drill. Take five minutes or so to explain as ive looked at your testimony. I know its very brief. Just to warn people in advance. Im going to defer my questions ben, and move to you immediately thereafter. And use my time to interject as things move along. So with that, secretary kerry. Well, thank you, mr. Chairman, Ranking Member carden, members of the committee and friends and former colleagues. We really do appreciate the chance to discuss with you the comprehensive plan that we in our p5plus 1 partners have developed with regards to this program. Let me emphasize to everybody here, this isnt just the United States of america. These are other Nuclear Powers. France, britain, russia china, they have a pretty good understanding of this field and of the challenges. And i appreciate the way in which they and germany which was the plus one all came together, all contributed, all were part of this debate. So youre not just looking at what this table negotiated. Youre looking at what the International Community, the p5 plus 1 negotiated. And theyre not dumb. Theyre experts every one of them in Nuclear Technology and ratification and verification. Smart people who spent a lifetime at this. I thank all of you for the role congress played. I was privileged to be the chairman of this committee when we passed the iran sanctions effort. And we all remember the debate, we passed it unanimously and it played a very significant role in bringing iran to the table and in helping to make it clear that we needed to bring about a serious and productive negotiation with iran. From the day that those talks began, we were Crystal Clear that we would not accept anything less than a good deal. And we defined it up front. As a deal that closed off the four pathways to a bomb. The two iranian pathways plutonium pathway and the covert pathway. So we set our standard and we believe we have achieved that standard. After almost two years of very intensive talks the facts are really Crystal Clear. The plan that was announced last week in vienna is, in fact a deal that does shut off those pathways. And provides us with guarantees for the lifetime of the npt and the participation of iran that we will know what they are doing. Now, the chairman mentioned in his opening comments, some phrase about unless we give iran what they want folks, they already have what they want. They got it ten years ago or more. They already have conquered the fuel cycle. When we began our negotiations iran had enough material for 10 to 12 bombs. They had 19000 centrifuges up from the 163 that they had back in 2003 when the Prior Administration was engaged with them on this very topic. So this isnt a question in giving them what they want. Its a question of how do you hold their program back . How do you dismantle the Weapons Program. And weve achieved that. Nobody has talked about dismantling their entire program. Because when that was being talked about they went from 163 centrifuges to 19,000. Everybody here at this knows what it takes to stop that. Its called military action. Theyre not going to stop it otherwise. Theyve proven it. Proved it during all those years. So under this terms of this agreement, iran has agreed now to remove 98 of the stockpile. Voluntarily, theyre going to destroy 98 of the stockpile of enriched uranium. Going to dismantle 2 3 of the installed centrifuges, and theyre going to take out the existing core of an existing heavy water reactor and fill it with concrete. Iran has agreed to refrain from producing or acquiring highly enriched uranium and weapons grade plutonium for at least 15 years. And if they began to do that, ernie moniz will tell you we will know it immediately. Iran has also agreed to accept the Additional Protocol and the Additional Protocol is an outgrowth of the failure of the north korea experience, which put in additional Access Requirements precisely so that we do know what iran is doing. And they have to ratify it before the u. N. Sanctions are lifted at the end of this process. They have to have ratified it. They have to have passed it theyve agreed to live by it from day one. Theyre going to live by the Additional Protocol. In addition, there are additional transparency measures. We can go into in the course of this hearing. Now, if iran fails to comply we will know it. And we will know it quickly, and we will be able to respond accordingly. By reinstituting sanctions all the way up to the most draconian options that we have today, none of them are off the table at any point in time. So many of the measures that are in this agreement are therefore not just for ten years, not just for 15 years, not just for 20 years, not just for 25 years of which there are measures for each of those periods of time but they are for life forever. As long as iran is within the npt. By the way, north korea pulled out of the npt. Iran has not pulled out of the npt. Remember that two years ago when our negotiations began, we faced an iran that was enriching uranium up to 20 at a facility that was secret and buried underground. And they were rapidly stockpiling enriched uranium and had installed nearly 2,000 nuclear centrifuges. They were building a heavy water reactor that could produce weapons grade plutonium at a rate of enough to produce one or two bombs per year and experts assess that the breakout time then as a result the interval required to rush to be able to produce enough material for one Nuclear Weapon was about two to three months. If this deal is rejected, we return immediately to this reality. Accept that the diplomatic support we have built with these countries that we have accumulated would disappear overnight. Let me underscore the alternative to the deal that we have reached is not what ive seen some ads on tv suggesting disen disingenuously. Some sort of unicorn arrangement involving irans complete capitulation. That is a fantasy plain and simple. At our own Intelligence Community will tell you that. Every Single Department of our Intelligence Community will reinforce that to you. The choice we face is between an agreement that will ensure Irans Nuclear program is limited, rigorously scrutinized and wholly peaceful. Or no deal at all. Thats the choice. The fact is that there are 189 nations that live by the npt. Five of them are as we know the main Nuclear Powers of the u. N. , and 184 of them are nonnuclear. In power. But they live by it. And we have lived by what the iaea does with respect to ensuring the surety of what all those 184 nations are doing. Including 12 that enrich. Now, if the u. S. Congress moves to unilaterally reject what was agreed to in vienna, the result will be the United States of america walking away from every one of the restrictions that we have achieved. And a great big green light for iran to double the pace of its uranium enrichment, proceed full speed ahead with a heavy water reactor, install new and more efficient centrifuges and do it all without the unprecedented inspection and transparency measures that we have secured. Everything that we have prevented will then start taking place. And all the voluntary rollbacks of their program will be undone. Moreover if the u. S. After negotiating this multilateral agreement with five other partners were to walk away from those partners, were on our own. Our partners will not walk away with us. Instead, they will walk away from the tough multilateral sanctions regime theyve helped to put in place. And we will have squandered the best chance we have to solve t