Involved in denuclearization issues in reducing threats from nuclearization former Energy Secretary ernest moniz. This is an hour. Is a great opportunity to welcome back to csi s ernie moniz. When he was Energy Secretary, he was very active with us, and have him talk to with us about anything. He would talk about commercial Nuclear Energy, and he would come and talk with us about Nuclear Weapons, but we are lucky now to have him still staying in town, still staying active, and of course, he has become the cochair of the Nuclear Threat initiative. My old boss, senator sam done, is the cochair with him. I asked if he wanted to say and a remarks, and he said, oh, ernieo, im going to let do that. Charlie curtis, thank you for being here. Just as a bit of a safety announcement first, in case, we may hear a voice that says we have an emergency. If that happens, please follow my instructions. Weve got an exit right there and one over there that will take us down to the street. Well go down, take two left hand turns once we get there, go over at national geographic, by then ill have hot chocolate waiting for everybody. Nothing is going to happen, but i just wanted to let you know. Follow my instructions if we need to do anything. I dont think we ever had a more qualified individual to be secretary of energy then ernie moniz. Ernie was, if you could design someone who was perfect for the job, it was ernie. He knew government well. He knew the private sector very well. He had the honesty and objectivity of being in academia where he could reflect on what he saw, both in government and in the private sector. And he brought to the job just enormous energy. I look back and say, those are really golden years for us. Of course, he was working through a series of pretty tough issues at the time. And those issues have not gone away. I hope today that we may have an opportunity to hear a little bit about iran, maybe about north korea. With any luck at all, you are going to find this a fascinating afternoon. And let me say, we are delighted to have brent here. Anytime brent calms, we know we will have a great meeting. [applause] now add a little more of that applause and welcome ernie moniz. [applause] ernie thank you, john. Although, i thought you were going to say that the emergency announcement may be coming tomorrow, but maybe that is something we will touch on later on. But i really appreciate the chance to be back here, which has been an effective and respected organization. Recognized here and globally in that way. And of course, csis has had very close ties with sam nun. Introduced and sam obviously an enormous leader in Nuclear Security but a great friend and colleague and i now have the privilege of partnering with him on a routine basis that at n. T. I. And work with him in trying to reduce nuclear and other Global Security threat that nti, which he founded in 2001 along with ted turner. And sam, i can assure you, remains an extraordinary source of wisdom, so thats great. I have to add, Brent Scowcroft, since you mentioned being a d. U. E. , he was one of the introducers for my nomination, apparently with great sway in the senate, given the results. But i really brent is another really great friend. I have the pleasure in a different role of roaming around the same floor with Brent Scowcroft also quite a few times each week. I will mention charlie curtis, with whom again, very, very Long Association in government and charlie has dragged themselves himself out of retirement to help us in this help us in these first periods at n. T. I. So you know, last month, i had the pleasure of speaking at the university of chicago. It was the 75th anniversary of Enrico Fermis first controlled chain reaction. And that was really the launching of the nuclear age, and really the precursor to the manhattan project, which had already started technically, but his work was critical for the manhattan project, and that of course, developed the First Nuclear weapons. At that time, as people and this audience almost certainly no, it was already recognized at that time the dual nature of this technology. That on the one hand the potential that was realized of course, to make weapons that quite different from other instruments of war and their destructive power, but also technology that could have many beneficial applications. Energy was clearly there from the very beginning but then medicine, industrial applications, etc. So, this duality is something we have been facing life in the beginning of the nuclear age. And it is that duality, the fact that both of those applications really draw from a Common Technology base that has challenged both governments and international institutions. So, i have been focusing on this journey for four decades and have committed to extending what i think has been n. T. I. s outstanding work along with sam and a terrific staff, and the Broader National Security community john, brent, and others who are not in this room. Now, if judged only by the metrics that Nuclear Weapons have not been used since 1945, that Nuclear Energy provides about a sixth of global electricity that Nuclear Medicine saves countless lives, we can say that we have enjoyed the peaceful uses of Nuclear Energy on nuclear technology, while avoiding the use of a Nuclear Weapon since world war ii. But that said, i think weve had too many close calls with Nuclear Weapons, and the number of Nuclear Weapon states has, of course, grown. So today, now in the 21st century, we are challenged by a different nuclear age, and there are so many dimensions of that. First, i want to say that miscalculation and i will be using miscalculation throughout this speech as a brd bucket for accident, mistake, miscalculation, catastrophic terrorism so miscalculation, in my view, is th most likely is the most likely catalyst of nuclear use even though deterrence remains paramount, its not enough. Secondly, the sophistication of north koreas Nuclear Weapons program cannot be deny. Cannot be denied. Third, there are advocates in both russia and the United States for using or threatening to use Nuclear Weapons in a number of scenarios, the concept of escalate to deescalate continues to make the rounds in moscow and last months strategy expand the role of Nuclear Weapons, deeming them, quote, essential to prevent nuclear attack, nonstrategic attacks, and largescale conventional aggression. 9 11 heralded an age of terrorism with global reach, unconstrained by notions of the deterrence and Nuclear Power and Nuclear Fuel Cycle capabilities are spreading including in , regions rife with rivalries and conflicts. Its a different set of issues we have to think about going forward, which calls for reexamining Strategic Policies and nearterm decisions on the u. S. Nuclear arsenal, forced postures, doctrine, and the like. We also need to examine our response to International Challenges like iran and north korea, as well as the dangerous state of u. S. Russia relations. We must not unnecessarily convert significant diplomatic challenges into security crises as seems to be happening today with iran and north korea. We will post a version of these remarks, a longer version of these are marks that n. T. I. But today, im just going to start a conversation that we will be having with john and with you with five broad messages, and then a few remarks on the issues du jour, iran, and north korea. So these five points id like to make first, the combination of advances in technology, tensions between nations, terrorism and cyber dangers, must challenge traditional thinking about Nuclear Weapons policies, the risk of Nuclear Weapons use, the configuration and deployment of our forces and the priorities of our investments. Maintaining a safe, secure, and reliable deterrent is necessary in todays world but is not sufficient. The risks of miscalculation should be at the forefront of our thinking, and an important driver of our analyses. Secondly, preventing nuclear use is the core objective of our Nuclear Policy. Specifically, when the Nuclear Posture review surfaces, presumably in a few weeks, we need to assess its recommendations in part by considering whether they lessen the dangers of miscalculation, and thereby increase stability and reduce the risk of nuclear use or not. If the recently released National Security strategy is a guide as i said earlier, we could be heading in the wrong direction. I think school is out, and we will see what the npr says, but extending but expanding the types of threats against which Nuclear Weapons might be used under the banner of deterrence likely will make the risk and miscalculations, not less. For those who argue the u. S. Needs more usable Nuclear Options to enhance deterrence, they have a hybrid into explain high burden to explain what the present options are insufficient. The president already has options for flexibly employing the nuclear deterrent. By what logic should we stress that deploying more usable weapons against the backdrop of our current flexibility of our current flexible capability and are abilities that make it second to none make it less likely that they will be used . By what logic can we count on Nuclear Exchange to remain limited . In what way is it being addressed in ways that provide confidence in scenarios with very short decision time . Are we about to join those in russia who declare we need to be prepared to escalate to deescalate . What happens if the worlds Nuclear Superpowers start down this road . So these are questions with the kinds so these are the kinds of questions i think we need to be hardnosed in examining the n. P. R. Third, the United States and russia have divergent interests in many areas. Russias backing of the genocidal regime in syria, tampering with our election have increased tensions. The uncertain outcome of the mueller information is also a factor. Nevertheless, we remain convinced that we must find a way to resume a strategic relationship, and regularalize dialogue with russia on matters of existential common interest to include nuclear and traditional forces, terrorist acquisition of Nuclear Weapons, and more. Not as a favor to russia. We did this at the height of the cold war. We must do it again. To support this National Security imperative, we must forge a bipartisan, joint congressadministration approach to secure issues with russia. Especially now that last years sanctions legislation puts in place shared executive branch and congressional decision making. Sam and i have specifically recommended a Liaison Group of congressional, state department, and department of defense leadership, simile similar in spirit to that formed around arms control issues during the reagan administration. Fourth the International AtomicEnergy Agencies safeguards architecture need strengthening in the 21st century. The iaea is doing a good job monitoring irans compliance with the jcpoa using an array of knew verification tools provided by that agreement. Indeed, verification is really the heart of the jcpoa and it does not sunset. Over time, we may be able to consider involving the jcpoa verification regime to more nearly universal application. And fifth, we must make worldwide progress in developing comprehensive, based kabbalah advanced nuclear fuel services, including fuel supply, waste storage and disposition. Without this progress, additional courts, irans, are likely to present themselves in the future. Let me make a few comments about iran and then a few on north korea. On iran, were on the precipice of a new crisis in iran if the president refuses to approve the sanctions waivers and if the United States, not iran, that fails to meet its commitments under the deal. The Iran Nuclear Deal puts a straitjacket on Irans Nuclear activities, discussion of the jcpoa, however, typically misses its most important features. Such as the 15year limitation, that is until january, 2031, during which iran can have no more than 300 kilograms of uraniumenriched up to 3. 67 . This is a very, very tight constraint. And then the enduring verification measures covering every stage of Irans Nuclear activities. That is what is often missed and it deserved repeating. The real heart of the jcpoa is in its unprecedented International Verification provisions. Its based on verification, not trust. Its ironic that with the jcpoa, iran has the toughest constraints on its Nuclear Program of any nation on the planet, and the most demanding verification regime. Yet the president may take action imminently to remove these constraints with no viable alternative. Opponents of the deal are fixated on those provisions on the deal that sunset. They underplay or ignore the importance of the commit. Of the commitments that dont expire. A permanent prohibition of iran having a Nuclear Weapon or weaponization program which is unique. Permanent adherence to protocol with a unique time window to respond to iaea inspection requests for undeclared sites. Again, unique. And the requirement to ship out all spent fuel for the life of the redesigned iraq reactor, which i remind you, was the heart of the plutonium pathway that caused a lot of consternation. Yet, we hear that 15 years is, and im derided at n. T. I. For this, epsilon, compared tthe history of the persian empire. Thats a fact. But its entirely manufactured as an objection to the agreement. 15 years is a significant period in the political life of a country and iran, in fact, is demonstrating that with these widespread protests that shine light on the governments failure to adequately serve the peoples needs. The nuclear deal was never meant to be the end of the road in our engagement with iran. We, along with our partners in the jcpoa, should be using this time to build on the agreement to help shape the outcome when the Nuclear Constraints lift, which so far, we have done brave a little of as we approach in five days, the twoyear mark of the agreement implementation. Our European Partners are stressing this, the foundational nature of the jcpoa, and with the Nuclear Agreement this place, we can and should be taking action to address irans support for terrorism, the syrian regime, and its regional proxy the human rights record and other troubling aspects of iranian policy without the complications of the nuclear issue. We should keep the spotlight on the failings of iranian governance and the countrys economic situation. Indeed, turning up the heat on these issues with our european and regional friends and allies is essential, and reinforces the failings pointed out in the recent protests. Iran needs to respond to popular demands for more rapid modernization. With the jcpoa, irans leadership cannot easily blame their governance and economic shortcomings on the United States and external forces. We should not give leverage to the most extreme elements in iran by withdrawing from the jcpoa. We must draw lessons from the jcpoa for broader fuel cycle considerations. As we look ahead a few years, we are likely to confront more iranlike circumstances unless we can build verification enhancements to fuel cycle management globally and development Better Solutions for fuel and waste services. Advances in technologies, or in technology, are making weapons capabilities easier to acquire under a safeguards regime that can and should be strengthened to fully meet its purpose. The slow, but steady expansion of interest in Nuclear Reactors internationally and the uncertainty surrounding the future of u. S. Nuclear power are making it more important than ever to identify, incentivize, and implement an approach to fuel services that reinforces key nonproliferation and Nuclear Security principles. Such an approach supports reliable and economical commercial fuel market, minimize the spread of uranium enrichment capacity, and address the management of irradiated fuel in ways that dont lead to steadily increasing stockpiles of separated plutonium. Most important, all these approaches must be backstopped with International Safeguards and Monitoring Systems that take advantage of technological progress, and at the political and Financial Resources to back them up. At n. T. I. , we are expanding substantially our efforts in this area, and will be seeking to work with public and private partners to operationalize such an approach so that countries can have the