Morning, commissioners. You will hear six items for your consideration and one presentation. First, you will receive a preliminary report from the Public Safety and Homeland Security bureau on its investigation into the false Emergency Alert that occurred in awaii on january 13, 2018. Second, you will consider a second report and order and on recon to enhance emergency wireless alerts and the geographic accuracy of these alerts. Third, an order addressing the remaining issues raised challenging the commissions order connecting the auction 903 in which Service Providers will compete to receive support up to 1. 98 to offer voice and Broadband Service in High Cost Service areas. Fourth, you will consider a Public Notice establishing procedures for the connect america funds phase two auction which will award up to 1. 98 billion over 10 years that commit to offer voice and Broadband Services to fixed locations in unserved high cost areas. Fifth, you will consider an order to accomplish an office of economic and arnl itic. Sixth, a notice of proposed rulemaking proposing to eliminate the requirement that broadcast licenseys and permiteys who routinely submit paper copy of contracts and other documents to the f. C. C. As specified in the section of the commissions rules. And seventh, you will consider an enforcement action. This is your agenda for today. Item 7 on the agenda listed in the january 23, 2018 sunshine 74 ce, amendment of 54, 7 , and 76 of the commissions rules to delete rules made obsolete by the Digital Commission and deleted from todays agenda. First on your agenda is a preliminary report presented by the Public Safety and Homeland Security bureau and lisa, chief of the bureau will give the introduction. If you are ready, the floor is yours. Good morning, mr. Chairman, commissioners. Earlier this month, on the morning of january 13, people throughout hawaii were alerted on their televisions, radios and wireless phones of an imminent Ballistic Missile attack. The warning unleashed widespread panic and fear. The alert was issued by the state of hawaii through the Emergency Alert system and the wireless Emergency Alert system. But the warning was a false alert. Compounding this problem, it took 38 minutes for the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency to issue a corrected alert. As chairman stated, this false alert was unacceptable. He immediately directed the Public Safety and Homeland Security bureau to investigate the incident with the goal of understanding how it happened and how to help prevent such an incident from happening again. Americas Emergency Alert system provide timely and lifesaving information to the public and we must ensure that these systems remain effective. This includes maintaining the Public Confidence so when an Emergency Alert is issued, the public heeds its call. Today, the bureau presents a preliminary report on its investigation. Joining me here today are nicky, Deputy Bureau chief and Homeland Security bureau, and an attorney adviser in the Communications Reliability vision and justin, deputy chief of the burros Emergency Management division. These talented folks along with e bureaus alerting team has produced excellent work on this investigation, the wireless Emergency Alert that will be considered shortly and my recent testimony before the Senate Commerce committee. L within a very, very very short time frame. To nicky, james and the rest of the alerting team as well as others in the bureau who have helped on these projects in recent weeks, thank you. You have my pride and appreciation and im grateful that you are a part of the Public Safety and Homeland Security bureau family. I would also like to recognize ryan, field agent with the Enforcement Bureau who assisted james and justin when they were on the ground in hawaii as part of this investigation. James will present the report. Thank you. Good morning chairman and commissioners. As the chief said on january 13, the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency initiated a false Ballistic Missile alert using the wireless Emergency Alert is system which delivers Emergency Alerts and alerts through television and radio. Investing the false alert, the officials interviewed in person in honolulu and received a demonstration of how its alert Origination Software initiates alerts and tests. In addition, we have interviewed representatives of wireless providers that offer service to hawaii, the president of the hawaii Broadcasters Association and the hawaii state Emergency Communications committee, vendors, including the vendor supplies Vendor Software and other state and local emergency state Emergency Managers. So far we have been pleased with the level of cooperation we have received including from the leadership from the hawaii Emergency Management association. The individual who transmitted the false alert refused to speak with us. Last week, the agency provided us with information from a written statement made by this individual shortly after the incident which helped to improve our understanding of the events that led to the false alert. By way of background and to provide context to what happened on january 13, hawaii has been actively testing its alert warning capabilities over the past year. The Hawaii Emergency Management Agencys Ballistic Missile defense drill aims to simulate a real event. It begins with a mock call from an officer who similar you lates a call and ends with the transmission of a text message to fema. Under the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency drill procedures, the text message should be sent to fema. It should never be transmitted to consumer phones, televisions. By november 27 of last year, Hawaii Emergency Management Agency had a check list of procedures for initiating and conducting the Ballistic Missile defense drill and refined through practice and feedback on Lessons Learned. And the agency was regularly running the Ballistic Missile defense drill as a nonotice drill meaning it was commencing in order tothout no simulate conditions. The final version of the check list that depided the agency through its Ballistic Missile defense drill on january 13 was created on january 5. I will walk you through a time line of the events as we understand them. In the Early Morning hours of january 13, the Hawaii Emergency Management Agencys midnight shift conduct add Ballistic Missile defense drill without incident. The supervisor of the midnight shift decided to run a nonotice of the drill in addition to the day shift. The mid knit shift supervisor specifically decided to drill at shift change in order to help train the day shift warning officers for a Ballistic Missile defense scenario at a time when it would be challenging to properly respond. At 8 00 a. M. , hawaii standard time, the agency conducted its regularly scheduled shift change. When the supervisor of the day shift entered the agency, the supervisor of the midnight shift communicated the intention to conduct the preparedness drill. But there was a miscommunication. The incoming day shift supervisor thought the midnight shift supervisor intended to conduct it for those ending their shift not for those beginning their shift. As a result, the day shift supervisor was not in the proper location to supervise the officers when the drill was initiated. 8 05 a. M. , the midnight shift supervise sore placed a call to the day shift warning officers pretending to be u. S. Pacific command. The supervisor played a recorded message over the phone. The recording began by saying, exercise, exercise, exercise. Language that is consistent with the beginning of the script tore the drill. After that, however, the recording did not follow the Hawaii Emergency Management Agencys Standard Operating Procedures for this drill. Instead, the recording included language scripted for use in an emergency for an actual live Ballistic Missile alert and included the sentence, this is not a drill. The recorded ended by saying, exercise, exercise, exercise. Three on duty warning officers received this message simulating a call on speaker phone. According to a written statement from the day shift warning officer who initiated the alert as relayed to the bureau, the day shift warning officer heard, this is not a drill, but did not hear, exercise, exercise, exercise. The day shift warning officer therefore believed the missile threat was real. At 8 07 a. M. The responded by transmitting a live incoming Ballistic Missile alert to the state of hawaii. They used software to send this they selected the template for a live alert from a drop down menu containing various live alert templates. It had the officer confirm if ou want to send the message. Do you want to send this alert. The officers knew the call they heard was not a threat. Specifically, they heard the words exercise, exercise, exercise. Officer, ft warning however, reported after the event their belief that this was a real emergency. So they clicked yes to transmit the alert. Because weve not been able to interview the day shift warning officer who transmitted the false alert, were not in position to fully evaluate the credibility of their assertion that they believed it was an actual missile threat as opposed to believing it was a drill and accidently sending out the drill. But it is worth noting that they recalled the announcement did say, this is not a drill. At 08 a. M. , the mobile twice of the officer who transmitted the alert sounded the warning signal, distinct audible tones that announce an Emergency Alert, providing the first alert to those in the watch center that an actual alert had been transmitted to the public. At 8 09 a. M. , the director of the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency notified the Hawaii Governor that the agency transmitted a false alert. At 8 10 a. M. , the director of the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency communicated to United StatesPacific Command there was no missile launch, confirming what Pacific Command already knew. The Hawaii Emergency Management Agency also notified the Honolulu Police department there was no launch. At 8 12 a. M. , the group used its Emergency Alert system to issue a cancellation. The cans sleighs an instruction to downstream wireless Emergency Alert systems to cease retransmission. Notably a cancellation message does not generate an allclear message and does in the recall messages that have been transmitted and displayed on televisions and mobile phones. From 8 13 a. M. To 8 26 a. M. , the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency conducted outreach to hawaiis county Emergency Management agencies and radio and television stations to inform them the alrm was false. But the agencys phone lines also became congested with incoming calls from the public asking about the nature of the alert they received. Some calls to the agency did not get through. The agency also note fid its staff of the false alert so they could help respend to community inquiries. At 8 20 a. M. , the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency posted on its facebook and twitter accounts there was no missile threat to hawaii. At 8 24 a. M. , Hawaii Governor tweeted the agencys notice there was no missile threat. The governor has stated he was unable to do this earlier because he did not know his twitter password. At 8 27 a. M. , the agency staff met to discuss options for sending a corrective second message using the Emergency Alert system and the wireless Emergency Alert system. The agency determined that a correction of this false alert best met the criteria of a Civil Emergency message which is one of the event codes used to initiate alerts over the Emergency Alert system. At 8 30 a. M. , the agency called fema and on its second attempt to reach fema reached a fema Program Management office employee. After 45 seconds, all on the call agreed the correction met the criteria for use of the Civil Emergency message event code. At 8 31 a. M. , the deputy chief of the Hawaii Emergency Management Agencys Telecommunications Branch logged into the agencys alert Origination Software and created correction messages for the Emergency Alert and wireless Emergency Alert systems. At 8 45 a. M. , 38 minutes after the false alert, the Agency Issued a correction over the two alerting systems. Based on our investigation to date, the bureau believes that a combination of human error and inadequate safe forwards contributed to this false alert. With respect to human error, due to a miscommunication between the midnight shift supervisor and day shift supervisor, the drill was run without sufficient supervision. In speaking with the bureau, other Emergency Management agencies stressed the importance of proper drill supervision and the conducting a drill without supervision would not be tolerate. Further, the midnight shift supervisor initiated the drill by playing a recording that deviated from the script of the agencys establish drill procedure that included the phrase, this is not a drill. Finally, the warning officer at the alert origination terminal apparently failed to recognize that this was an exercise, even though the other warning officers on duty understood this was not a real emergency. With respect to inadequate safeguards, most importantly there were no procedures in place to prevent a Single Person from mistakenly sending a missile alert to the state of hawaii. While such an alert addressed the matter of the utmost gravity, there was no requirement in place for a warning officer to double check with a colleague or get sign off from a supervisor before sending such an alert. Additionally, the state of hawaii appears to have been conducting an atypical number of nonotice drills which heightened the potential for an error to occur. The bureaus information so far revealed that while other Emergency Management agencies use no notice trills under special circumstances, the common practice is to schedule drills in advance for a set date and time. It is also troubling that hawaiis alert Origination Software did not differentiate between the testing and the live production environment. Hawaiis alert Origination Software allowed users to send both live alerts and test alerts using the same interface and the same login credentials after clicking a button that confirmed, are you sure you want to send this alert . In other words, the confirmation prompt contained the same language, irrespective of whether the message was a test or an actual alert. The confirmation prompt also did not offer the officer another opportunity to review the text that was about to be sent. Further, hawaiis reliance on prepared templates stored