Madam secretary, could you please announce our agenda for this morning . Thank you, mr. Chairman. Good morning to you and good morning, commissioners. You will hear six items for your consideration and one presentation. First, you will receive a preliminary report from the Public Safety and Homeland Security bureau on its investigation into the false Emergency Alert that occurred in hawaii on january 13, 2018. Second, you will consider a second report and order and second order on recon to enhance the effectiveness of emergency wireless alerts, including improving the geographic accuracy of these alerts. Third, an order addressing the remaining issues raised challenging the commissions order implementing the connect america option 903 in which Service Providers will compete to receive support up to 1. 98 billion to offer voice and Broadband Service in unserved, High Cost Service areas. Fourth, you will consider a Public Notice establishing procedures for the connect america funds phase two auction, which will award up to 1. 98 billion over 10 years to Service Providers that commit to offer voice and Broadband Services to fixed locations in unserved, high cost areas. Fifth, you will consider an order to accomplish an office of economics and analytics. Six, you will consider a notice of proposed rulemaking proposing to eliminate the requirement that broadcast licensees and permitees who routinely submit paper copy of contracts and other documents to the f. C. C. As specified in section seven 7 3. 6 of the commissions rules. And seventh, you will consider an enforcement action. This is your agenda for today. Please note item seven on the agenda, as listed in the january 23, 2018 sunshine notice, 54,tle amendment of hearts 73, 74, and 76 of the commissions rules to delete rules made obsolete by the Digital Transition was adopted by the commission and was deleted from todays agenda. First on your agenda today is a preliminary report presented by the Public Safety and Homeland Security bureau, and lisa fowlkes, chief of the bureau will give the introduction. If you are ready, the floor is yours. Good morning, mr. Chairman, commissioners. Earlier this month, on the morning of january 13, people throughout hawaii were alerted on their televisions, radios, and wireless phones of an imminent Ballistic Missile attack. The warning unleashed widespread panic and fear. The alert was issued by the state of hawaii through the Emergency Alert system and the wireless Emergency Alert system. But the warning was a false alert. Compounding this problem, it took 38 minutes for the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency to issue a corrected alert. As chairman pai stated, this false alert was unacceptable. He immediately directed the Public Safety and Homeland Security bureau to investigate the incident with the goal of understanding how it happened and how to help prevent such an incident from happening again. Americas Emergency Alert system s provide timely and lifesaving information to the public, and we must ensure that these systems remain effective. This includes maintaining the public confidence, so that when an Emergency Alert is issued, the public heeds its call. Today, the bureau presents a preliminary report on its investigation. Joining me here today are nicky mcguinness, Deputy Bureau chief and Homeland Security bureau, james wiley, an attorney adviser in the Communications Deputy chief of the bureaus Emergency Management division. These talented folks, along with the bureaus alerting team, has excellent work on this investigation, the wireless Emergency Alert that will be considered shortly, and my recent testimony before the Senate Commerce committee. All within a very, very, very short time frame. To nicky, james, and the rest of the alerting team, as well as the bureau who have helped on these projects in recent weeks, thank you. You have my pride and appreciation, and im grateful that you are a part of the Public Safety and Homeland Security bureau family. I would also like to recognize ryan hagihara, field agent with the enforcement bureau, who assisted james and justin when they were on the ground in hawaii as part of this investigation. James will present the report. Thank you, chief fowlkes. Good morning, chairman and commissioners. As the chief said, on january 13, the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency initiated a false Ballistic Missile alert using the wireless Emergency Alert system, which delivers alerts through television and radio. Investing the false alert, the has interviewed officials in person in honolulu and received a demonstration of how its alert Origination Software initiates alerts and tests. In addition, we have interviewed representatives of wireless providers that offer service to hawaii, the president of the hawaii Broadcasters Association and the hawaii state Emergency Communications committee, vendors, including the vendor other state and local emergency state Emergency Managers. So far, we have been pleased with the level of cooperation we have received, including from the leadership from the hawaii Emergency Management association. Unfortunately the individual who , transmitted the false alert refused to speak with us. Last week, the agency provided us with information from a written statement made by this individual shortly after the incident which helped to improve our understanding of the events that led to the false alert. By way of background and to provide context to what happened on january 13, hawaii has been actively testing its alert warning capabilities over the past year. The Hawaii Emergency Management Agencys Ballistic Missile defense drill aims to simulate a real event. It begins with a mock call from an officer who simulates a call and ends with the transmission of a text message to fema. Under the Hawaii Emergency Management Agencys established drill procedures, the text message should be sent to fema. It should never be transmitted to consumer phones, radios, or televisions. By november 27 of last year, Hawaii Emergency Management Agency had a check list of procedures for initiating and conducting the Ballistic Missile defense drill. It had been refined through practice and feedback on Lessons Learned. And the agency was regularly running the Ballistic Missile defense drill as a nonotice drill, meaning it was commencing the drill without prior warning to the officers who issue the alert in order to better simulate actual conditions. The final version of the check list provided to the agency through its Ballistic Missile defense drill on january 13 was created on january 5. I will walk you through a time line of the events as we understand them that led to the issuing of the false alert. In the Early Morning hours of january 13, the Hawaii Emergency Management Agencys midnight shift conducted Ballistic Missile defense drill without incident. The supervisor of the midnight shift decided to run a nonotice of the drill during the transition to the day shift. The midnight shift supervisor specifically decided to drill at shift change in order to help train the day shift warning officers for a Ballistic Missile defense scenario at a time when it would be challenging to properly respond. At 8 00 a. M. , hawaii standard time, the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency conducted its regularly scheduled shift change. When the supervisor of the day shift entered the agency, the supervisor of the midnight shift orally communicated the intention to conduct the Ballistic Missile preparedness drill. But there was a miscommunication. The incoming day shift supervisor thought that the midnight shift supervisor intended to conduct the jewel for the midnight warning shift officers only, those that were ending their shift, not for the day shift officers, those beginning their shift. As a result, the day shift supervisor was not in the proper location to supervise the day shift warning officers when the Ballistic Missile defense drill was initiated. 8 05 a. M. , the midnight shift supervisor initiative the drill by placing a call to the day shift warning officers, pretending to be u. S. Pacific command. The supervisor played a recorded message over the phone. The recording began by saying, exercise, exercise, exercise. Language that is consistent with the beginning of the script for the drill. After that, however, the recording did not follow the Hawaii Emergency Management Agencys Standard Operating Procedures for this drill. Instead, the recording included language scripted for use in an Emergency Alert system message for an actual, live Ballistic Missile alert and included the sentence, this is not a drill. The recording then ended by saying, exercise, exercise, exercise. Three onduty warning officers received this message simulating a call from u. S. Pacific command on speakerphone. According to a written statement from the day shift warning officer who initiated the alert, as relate to the bureau by the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency, the day shift warning officer heard, this is not a drill, but did not hear, exercise, exercise, exercise. According to the written statement, the day shift warning officer therefore believed that the missile threat was real. At 8 07 a. M. , this officer responded by transmitting a live incoming Ballistic Missile alert to the state of hawaii. The day shift warning officer used software to send the alert. Specifically, they selected the template for a live alert from a dropdown menu containing various live and test alert templates. Software then prompted the officer to confirm if they wanted to send the message. The prompt read are you sure you want to send this alert . Theofficers who heard wasage new the call supposed to indicate an exercise. Specifically, they heard the words exercise, exercise, exercise. The day shift warning officer seated at the alert of termination alert termination terminal however, reported after , the event their belief that this was a real emergency. So they clicked yes to transmit the alert. Because weve not been able to interview the day shift warning officer who transmitted the false alert, were not in the position to fully evaluate the credibility of their assertion that they believed there was an actual missile threat and intentionally sent to live alert as opposed to believing it was a drill and accidentally sending out the drill. But it is worth noting that they actually are called, that the announcement did say, this is not a drill. At a zero 8 a. M. , their mobile device of the officer who transmitted the alert sounded the warning signal, distinct audible tones that announce an a wireless Emergency Alert, providing the first indication to the watch center that an actual alert had been transmitted to the public. At 8 09 a. M. , the director of the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency notified Hawaii Governor that the david ige agency transmitted a false alert. At 8 10 a. M. , the director of the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency communicated to United StatesPacific Command that there was no missile launch, confirming what Pacific Command already knew. The Hawaii Emergency Management Agency also notified the Honolulu Police department there was no missile launch. Hawaii a. M. , the Emergency Management agency used its Emergency Alert system to issue a cancellation. The cancellation is an instruction to downstream Emergency Alert system and wireless Emergency Alert systems equipment to cease retransmission. Notably, a cancellation message does not generate an allclear message. It also does not recall messages that have already been transmitted and displayed on televisions and mobile phones. From 8 13 a. M. To 8 26 a. M. , the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency conducted outreach to hawaiis county Emergency Management agencies and radio and tv stations to inform them that the alarm was false. But the agencys phone lines also became congested with incoming calls from the public asking about the nature of the alert that they just received. Some calls to the agency did not get through. The agency also notified its staff of the false alert, so that they could help respond to community inquiries. At 8 20 a. M. , the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency posted on its facebook and twitter accounts that there was no missile threat to hawaii. At 8 24 a. M. , Hawaii Governor david ige retweeted the agencys notice that there was no missile threat. The governor has stated he was unable to do this earlier because he did not know his twitter password. At 8 27 a. M. , the agency staff met to discuss options for sending a corrective second message using the Emergency Alert system and the wireless Emergency Alert system. The agency determined that a correction of this false alert best met the criteria of a Civil Emergency message, which is one of the event codes used to initiate alerts over the Emergency Alert system. At 8 30 a. M. , the agency called fema, and on its second attempt to reach fema, reached a fema ipods Program Management office employee. Ipause Program Management office employee. After 45 seconds, all on the call agreed the correction met the criteria for use of the Civil Emergency message event code. At 8 31 a. M. , the deputy chief of the Hawaii Emergency Management Agencys Telecommunications Branch logged into the agencys alert Origination Software and created correction messages for the Emergency Alert and wireless Emergency Alert systems. At 8 45 a. M. , 38 minutes after the false alert, the Agency Issued a correction over the two alerting systems. Based on our investigation to date, the bureau believes that a combination of human error and inadequate safeguards contributed to this false alert. With respect to human error, due to a miscommunication between the midnight shift supervisor and day shift supervisor, the drill was run without sufficient supervision. In speaking with the bureau, other Emergency Management agencies stressed the importance of proper drill supervision and conducting a drill without supervision would not be tolerate. Further, the midnight shift supervisor initiated the drill by playing a recording that deviated from the script of the agencys established drill procedure that included the phrase, this is not a drill. Finally, the warning officer at the alert origination terminal apparently failed to recognize that this was an exercise, even though the other warning officers on duty understood this was not a real emergency. With respect to inadequate safeguards, most importantly, there were no