Thank you very much. I wanted to see how long you can stand at attention. Thank you. Introduceleasure to the vice admiral. He is the 16th president of the National Defense. Thank you, john. Distinguished guests, latest german, good morning and welcome to the National Defense university. It is my great pleasure to welcome you to this policy seminar. Proud that wend are able to help facilitate discussion and debate. As a career officer and former commander of Strategic Forces, it is particularly satisfying for me to be able to contribute to a discussion so fundamental to the nations security. It is a vital part of our mission to support the development of national policy, american out of the great work our Research Staff does it support of key initiatives. Ensuresearch also helps that we can bring the most topical content and deepest insights to our classrooms. That israel where we are helping to prepare the next generation of National Security leaders. To build security for an increasingly dynamic world. I would like to thank the dedicated professionals. For correlating a Great Program for you this morning. Will be hearing from Key Stakeholders in department of defense and across the government. I have no doubt you will all leave here with a better understanding of these complex issues and of the implications for National Security. To you all welcome and best wishes for a successful seminar. [applause] thank you, my name is john, and i made Deputy Director for the center of studies of weapons of mass destruction. Like to add my welcome. The center is very pleased to host this event. It is about the foundation of u. S. National security. As admiral mentioned, you would hear today from those who played key roles in the development. I too will play key roles in its implementation. Commentary from highly respected experts within and outside of government. We will provide a policy overview. Will provide the command perspective. We will answer questions following prepared remarks. We invite you to review bios which are in the handout. Will moderate a discussion with senior officials. We will conclude the event moderating a discussion of experts within outside of the government. Please note and hed the following administrative remarks. Be sure to silence your phone or any other electronic devices, and please take a moment to do so if you have not had an opportunity to do so yet. This is an unclassified event. Most of this event will be on the record. The final panel, however, will not. What does this mean . From now until the end of the , you may quote or otherwise attribute any statements made to the speaker who made them. They also may be filmed or recorded. But for the final panel, you may not achieve it any statements to the speaker who made them. You may not film or make audio recordings during that panel. You certainly can report that was said during that panel. We will reiterate this prior to that final panel. There will be two breaks during the event. The first break, there will be refreshments available in the south hvm of this building. The same place where refreshments were available this morning. Willecond and final break follow the first panel. It will be a shorter break, and there will not be refreshments available. So i recommend you stay close to the auditorium. Restrooms can be found right outside of the auditorium. There are additional restrooms off of the south atrium. We are on a tight schedule this morning and want to get a lot accomplished in the time we have, so please return from the brakes on time. Letting youa gong know the break is about to end. No beverages are allowed into the auditorium. So if you brought them in, hide them. [laughter] at oral is to adjourn close to 12 30. We recognize some of you may be hungry after the event, so the cafe will remain open until 1 30. I would now like to introduce david trachtenberg, deputy undersecretary. Has more than 35 years of Public Policy experience in the private sector, and the executive and legislative branches of government. [applause] [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2016] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] ense university. I would like to thank president roti is the entire ndu team for the invitation to speak today, along with general heightam about the Nuclear Posture review. And thinking about how to structure my remarks, i was reminded about the old story about the gentleman who considered to be inexpert in a certain subject matter, he was told he would be a luncheon speaker who could speak for 15 minutes. He got very incredulous and upset and angry, thinking he was the worlds preeminent expert on the topic. How do youhis host, expect me to tell his audience everything i know about this topic and 15 minutes . To which his host responded, well, sir, i advise you to speak slowly. [laughter] with that in mind, i will try to speak slowly. Let me begin by noting that president trumps first president ial memorandum, issued one week into the new administration, directed the department of defense to undertake the fourth review of u. S. Nuclear policy, posture, and programs since the end of the cold war. That armitage offense, with significant input the department of defense, with significant input, conducted this review along with the department of state and energy, in consultation with allies and experts from inside and outside the government. The resulting 2018 Nuclear Posture review is consistent with prior reviews in its definition of u. S. Nuclear roles and strategy. In fact, in many respects, the review reaffirms longstanding, bipartisan principles of u. S. Nuclear policy, while at the same time recognizing the reality that a much more challenging Nuclear Threat environment has emerged since the previous 2010 Nuclear Posture review. 2010 nprrs ago, the made several assumptions about the nature of the strategic that served as a foundation for its vision of achieving the global elimination of Nuclear Weapons. Unfortunately, none of those assumptions proved out. That served as a foundationfor example, first thr argued that u. S. Relations with russia and china had changed fundamentally since the days of the cold war, and it assumed that the prospects for military confrontations had declined dramatically. Second, it asserted that engagement could result in greater russian and chinese restraint in their Nuclear Programs and postures, which would reassure and stabilize the region. Third it stated that if the United States reduced the number weapons, that the rest of the world would move in the same direction, reducing the salience of Nuclear Weapons in international affairs. Fourth, it held that while the reassurance mission of u. S. Nuclear weapons remains, the deterrence challenge was fundamentally different. A Nuclear Arsenal built for stable deterrence of other powers had in the 2010 nprs words, little relevance to the challenge of preventing Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Terrorism. Powers had in thethe world is s much different today than it was then. What we have seen over the past decade is the return of Great Power Competition, not necessarily a return to the cold war, but the emergence of a new, complex, and threatening security environment. In 2010, russia altered its military doctrine to state that nato was its top threat, a position it reiterated in 2014. That same year, russia invaded ukraine, supported a bloody secessionist civil war, and used military force to attempt to change longestablished borders in europe. Rather than reducing the salience of Nuclear Weapons, russian leadership made explicit Nuclear Threats, brandishing their Nuclear Weapons and away we have not seen a generation. Like russia, and is attempting territorial revisionism against its neighbors through the threat of the use of force. In 2011, china began its creeping militarization of the islands in the south china sea. China has also threatened u. S. Allies and partners in the region, and disputes over territorial boundaries and claims to contested island territory. At the same time, rogue states like north korea have repeatedly made explicit Nuclear Threats to the United States and our allies in the region. North korea is working aggressively to hold our homeland at risk. While Irans Nuclear future remains uncertain, its maligned activities and hegemonic aspirations in the middle east are not. Further, it is clear that our attempts to lead by example in reducing the number in salience of Nuclear Weapons in the world have not been reciprocated. Since the 2010 npr, russia, china, and north korea have increased the numbers, capabilities and salience, of their Nuclear Weapons, a topic which i suspect the general they discuss in greater detail. Restraintational reflected in u. S. Nuclear policies did not result in the rest of the world following the same path. Conclusion a unique of the 2018 Nuclear Posture review, but it is shared by our allies with whom we consulted extensively during this review, and by senior figures in the previous administration. Contrast to the actions of potential adversaries, the United States has dealt no new types of Nuclear Weapons or Delivery Systems other than the f35 for the past two decades. In fact, the members of Nuclear Weapons in the u. S. Arsenal has declined by more than 85 since its cold war height. We have instead sustained our Nuclear Deterrent with life extension programs, keeping systems and platforms literally decades beyond their designed service life. Former secretary of defense Ashton Carter rightly observed that if there is an arms race underway, the United States is clearly not a participant. Review0 Nuclear Posture prioritized preventing Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Terrorism over the goal of deterring other Nuclear Powers. However, in this increasingly challenging threat environment, some potential adversaries may now have the mistaken belief that limited Nuclear First use threats or escalation could provide them with a military or political advantage. Responds not by changing longstanding tenants of Nuclear Policy that have bipartisan support, but by emphasizing those capabilities needed to correct adversary miscalculations, and thereby effectively deter the use of Nuclear Weapons. Regard, i would like to address three of the corresponding outcomes of the 2018 Nuclear Posture review. The reprioritization of nuclear roles, the clarification of our Nuclear Policy, and the recommendations for deterrence capabilities, each of which has been subject considerable mischaracterization in much of the public commentary today. Npr returns018 deterrence of Nuclear Attack against us, our allies, and partners to the top priority of u. S. Nuclear policy. Given the changes in the security environment, this, we believe, is a prudent, realistic, and necessary change. Review8 Nuclear Posture makes clear that our new your posture must contribute our Nuclear Posture must contribute to deterring nuclear and nonnuclear strategic attack, assuring u. S. Allies and partners, achieving our objectives should deterrence fail, and hedging against the risks of an uncertain future. The npr also emphasizes that u. S. Nuclear policy will continue to contribute to u. S. Nuclear nonproliferation goals by maintaining support for the Nuclear Nonproliferation treaty and by sustaining the extended deterrent for allies. Extended deterrence, the socalled nuclear umbrella, promotes nonproliferation by reducing the need or incentive for allies to acquire their own Nuclear Arsenals. Second, to strengthen deterrence, the 20 and teen npr the 2018 npr notes that the u. S. Will only consider the use of Nuclear Weapons in response to extreme circumstances that threaten our vital interests. The npr clarifies what nonnuclear scenarios might fall into this category while maintaining a measure, a prudent measure of strategic ambiguity, intended to bolster deterrence. Contrary to some commentary, the Nuclear Posture review does not go beyond the 2010 npr in expanding the traditional role of Nuclear Weapons. What is important is not the means of attack that a potential adversary chooses, it is the extreme circumstances and strategic effect of the attack that will govern our choice of responses. As adversary nonNuclear Capabilities continue to advance, u. S. Policy must make it clear that nonnuclear strategic attacks that would have catastrophic effects on the American People and our allies must also be deterred. This clarification is not only consistent with the 2010 npr, which acknowledged the role for Nuclear Weapons in deterring butct nonNuclear Attacks, is broadly consistent with the policy of every administration from president truman forward. The intent is to enhance determinants by reducing potential for adversary miscalculation. Third, the 2018 Nuclear Posture review recommends to Nuclear Programs to strengthen u. S. Capabilities, to determine attack, and to ensure allies. First is the modification of a small number of existing submarine launched Ballistic Missiles to include a low yield option. Pursuit of a nuclear sea launched cruise missile. That is something the general may discuss in greater detail, but the point i would like to emphasize here is that neither of these capabilities outlined in the 2018 npr is new or lowers the threshold for nuclear use, which remains extremely high. These specific abilities are recommended to strengthen the deterrence of war and the assurance of allies, thereby helping to ensure that Nuclear Weapons are not employed or proliferated. Effective deterrence is about detailing our capabilities to a potential adversarys calculations regarding the use of Nuclear Force to ensure that it can never appear to be a useful option. Capabilitiess our relative to the doctor and, exercise statements, threat, and behavior of potential adversaries. The capabilities recommended arva 2018 npr are tailored to raise the threshold for nuclear use, and to do so with minimal changes to u. S. Nuclear posture. Me be clear, here the goal is to deter a war, not to fight one. If Nuclear Weapons are employed in conflict, it is because deterrence failed, and the goal of the 2018 npr is to make sure that deterrence will not fail. Modernization of the u. S. Nuclear deterrent, adoption of tailored to turned strategies with flexible capabilities, and clarifications of the roles of Nuclear Weapons ill send a strong deterrence message to potential adversaries while also reassuring our allies. Npr helpshe 2018 ensure that our diplomats speak from a position of strength. Russia has little incentive to negotiate seriously about Nuclear Reductions without a robust and ongoing u. S. Modernization program. In fact, the 2018 npr calls for the modernization of all three legs of our Strategic Nuclear triad. Russian leaders have essentially said as much, that they have little incentive to negotiate seriously about further Nuclear Reductions. Secretary mattis recently testified, russia is unlikely to give up something to gain nothing. Critics who favor eliminating u. S. Nuclear systems in the face of what is clearly an expensive Russian Nuclear modernization effort, i believe, are undermining americas greatest bargaining leverage in the prospects for future arms agreements. Review8 Nuclear Posture is one of several important, reinforcing u. S. National security documents meant to guide u. S. Policy in an increasingly complex and challenging world. Much as we might prefer otherwise, Nuclear Weapons are a regrettable necessity in the real world, as colin gray has said. After the slaughter of two world wars, they have prevented large power