I will post some questions to the group. We will say the last part of our we will save the last part of our time in the session for questions from the audience save the last part of our time in the session for questions from the audience. Let me quickly introduce our group. We have the Principal Assistant deputy administrator at nsa, where he runs the defense program. Anita is the acting system secretary of state from the bureau arms and control. I am very pleased that we could gather this group here and we are looking forward to this discussion. We will start with entered option and go with the following order we are going to start with greg, then we will go to phil, anita. Greg, over to you. Greg what i thought i would do in my brief remarks is give you a little more insight into the approach that 3 departments took in conducting the Nuclear Posture review over the last year. It will emphasize what general hyten said. Which is consistent with the National Defense strategy. This is a threatbased and strategy based review. I will talk more about the approach that we took and how we did that. Van i want to focus my brief then time on giving you a then i want to focus my brief time on giving you a little more understanding of the rationale behind what i guess is the most controversial recommendation of the Nuclear Posture review, which is our recommendation to acquire 2 additional capabilities that expand the range of low yield Nuclear Options in the u. S. Arsenal. Let me start by walking you through how we did this review. When we were tasked by the president , the department was tasked with doing this review, it said nothing about what the answer should be come other than to ensure that the United States would end up having a Nuclear Deterrent that was effective in the 21st century, and against 21st century threats. We started out by doing a very extensive intelligence deep dive. Band reaching out to other experts. What does the 21st century security environment look like from the perspective of Nuclear Issues . I would argue that this Nuclear Posture review took a longerterm view of the International Security environment than any previous one. That is because this is the first posture review that has ever been contacted right at the front end of a comprehensive modernization of the entire u. S. Nuclear force. That force and that infrastructure has to be able to last and be effective for decades into the future. We cannot afford to modernize the entire force every 10 years. We needed to understand what the security environment looked like that far out. In this review we start by saying what has changed in the security environment since the 2010 Nuclear Posture review . General hyten gave a very good explanation of the obverse observations that we made. We then asked the Intelligence Community how far into the future do you have some confidence and been able to in being able to project the environment . Im not going to tell you what they said but i will tell you it was not far enough for our purpose. We had to look beyond that time frame. What is the nature of the and of the uncertainty . How can we hedge that . As we develop strategy and capability. Once we did that deep dive of the environment, we then did a comprehensive review of the roles of Nuclear Weapons in our National Security strategy now and into the future. I think you will notice that they are very explicitly laid out in a list in the Nuclear Posture review. I wont go into what they are, you have already come but we were determined to be explicit already, but we were determined to be explicit about the roles. The next step in the review was once we determined what the , roles of Nuclear Weapons needed to be, we needed to decide what our strategy was to enable Nuclear Weapons to fulfill those roles. We did a comprehensive strategy review. We looked both sort of across the entire world, and out into the future, but we also took a very tailored approach when looking at strategy. We looked at each adversary including iran as a future nuclear adversary. We developed a very tailored strategies. Only then, which was around three quarters of the way through the review, did we turn to capabilities. We literally did not want to look at what capabilities we would require until we got through those three steps. We were pretty disciplined about that. One we got into the capabilities, we turned back when we got into the capabilities we turned back and said ok, is the program of record for modernization that is on the books sufficient to support the strategies that we have laid out to fulfill the roles . We concluded for the most part that it was. That a comprehensive modernization of our existing force was sufficient to address to fill that strategy and address those roles. One area where we were not confident that the program of record was sufficient was as a result of our deep dive look into russian strategy, russian doctrine, and russian Nonstrategic Nuclear capabilities. Let me tell you why we made the recommendations to add a low yield capability to a limited, small number of warheads as a nearterm solution, and then a recommendation to once again field nuclear arms sealaunch missiles in the future. It is a growing disparity in Nonstrategic Nuclear capabilities between russia, the United States, and nato. Russia is not only replacing its capabilities, it is expanding them. In both numbers and types. We concluded that there are that there were row indications there were real indications that our current strategy was inadequate. The first is initiating limited nuclear strikes and the second is to make wider use of Nuclear Weapons to defeat nato conventional forces if there ever to coerce us through limited use. In looking at this we also , concluded that given the stresses on russias National Defense investment, they would not be expending their limited resources to modernize and expand their Nonstrategic Nuclear forces in in support of their strategy and doctrine if they had little or no confidence in that strategy or doctrine. We saw no reason why they would throw good money after bad. Why invest in a strategy they have no confidence in . Let me say before i talk about why we recommended what we did that nobody can objectively determine precisely what capabilities are required. Anybody that tells you they can do that through some model or quantitatively is an amateur. That is just not the nature of deterrence. Theres too much uncertainty associated with it, because it is ultimately about adversary perceptions. It does not really matter whether we think our current capabilities should be sufficient to deter that the series that adversary. We need to look for indications that that is not the case. We were uncomfortable with our look at that question, that that was the answer the russians were coming to. Given the difference between what they say and what they are doing. We also think that it has proven to air on the side of having more rather than less capability if you have a significant amount of uncertainty, as long as we do not create new counterproductive to perceptions in the discounter perceptive threat perceptions in the adversaries. We do not believe that the 2 capabilities that we recommended do that. They do not increase u. S. For strike capabilities beyond first what it is today. They do not threaten the Russian StrategicNuclear Deterrent in some way that it is not already threatened. We concluded that the recommendation that we made was a sound and a prudent one. Let me go a little farther into that rationale. What we were trying to do with these capabilities is to reduce russian confidence in the course of escalation strategy in their coercive escalation strategy. We needed to take additional action. The low range the low yield involving russian modernization and expansion of their Nonstrategic Nuclear forces is increasing that disparity, and thus potentially increasing the risk of deterrence failure. Let me make this really clear. Reducing russian confidence in their strategy does not require that nato match russian Nonstrategic Nuclear capabilities either in quantity or diversity. Nato no longer compensates for conventional or perceived conventional inferiority by reliance on Nuclear Weapons to deter. And so nato requires a wider range of credible low yield Nuclear Response options to convince the russians that this that if they in initiate limited nuclear use our , objectives will deny what they seek. Additional low yield capabilities recommended in the npr paired with the rest of the Modernization Program are designed to do just that. The are designed to reduce confidence in moscow in this strategy and doctrine. That we do emphasize not see these additional capabilities as lowering the u. S. Nuclear threshold. That has been out there in the media. These capabilities will make a u. S. Nuclear response to russian limited use more credible. And raise the Russian Nuclear threshold and not lower the hours. Purpose of these capabilities is to make a u. S. Response more credible. It is for a response to russian first use. That does not lower our threshold for first use, it raises theres, at least that is our intent. Let me talk very briefly about the specific capabilities we recommended, and why. General heighten touched on some of this. The recommendation to rapidly field a number of low yield submarine warheads is to provide an inexpensive augmentation of our ability to credibly strike any target. Thats in response to russian limited nuclear use. These would be survivable, prompt, and is able to strike targets that are heavily defended against air delivery. All of our current low yield capability is aging. Its air delivered. Again, fielding this capability will not increase the number of Nuclear Weapons deployed on our Ballistic Missile submarines. It wont take us over the start limits. In essence it is actually , reducing the aggregate mega tonnage that is on the submarine. Our recommendation to pursue a nuclear arms sealaunch missile is designed to provide a response to russias increased expansion of Nuclear Forces. It will further enhance deterrence in the future. It is also inherently survivable. It would provide a future u. S. President with options to respond to russian first use. The npr makes very clear that if fresh a were to agree to address that if russia were to agree to address return to arms measures, the u. S. Might be able to agree to limit or four grow forgo the nuclear sealaunch missile capability. We can talk more about that. Finally, a nuclear sea launch Cruise Missile, depending on its concept of operation, could provide a regional presence with out requiring allies to supply further Nuclear Weapons on enhancing assurance of the allies in europe and asia. That is kind of a summary of the rationale that we had, and how we got to that conclusion. I will turn it over to anita. Actually we will have phil next. Just hold it and talk into it. Phil thanks. Good morning, everyone. I am pleased to be here and please to have the opportunity to talk about the npr from the perspective of the department of Energy Nuclear administration. Nuclear security administration. The main point i wonder i want to underscore is that the 2018 npr does not represent a significant departure from the work that we were doing. You have heard that from greg, i think you will hear from rob. It really is a document that reflects a lot of continuity with their work over the past three to five years with a couple of adjustments in capabilities in response to threat environment. That continuity applies to the Weapons Program but also Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Terrorism. Before i speak about the npr, i wanted to highlight a little bit about nsas role in the National Security architecture. I want to provide context for my subsequent remarks. For those that are not familiar, there are three main missions. The largest one is the weapons activities. The nonproliferation Nuclear Counterterrorism mission, and the role there is to prevent terror and to respond to terror. The third is to provide the u. S. Navy with nuclear propulsion. The weapons piece of the nsa budget is about 40 of the department of energys budget. Thatll give it an idea of the size of it. As paul said i am part of the organization that is responsible for the safety, security of the stockpile. I have been there in three separate areas. First we maintain the current stockpile through routine maintenance. The second one is that we prepare for the future deterrence through lifetime Extension Programs of the stockpile. The third area is that we ensure that we possess the capability, i mean strategic material, infrastructure, science tools, and perhaps most importantly people so that we are prepared , to support future stock pile requirements and needs, including those we dont envision right now all of this is. All this is meant to highlight the critical part that we play as part of the deterrent. And why we are part of the npr process. What does the npr mean for us . It reinforces the need for the current work. That is in terms of lifetime Extension Programs and in terms of infrastructure. The general mentioned that infrastructure piece. Ill talk more about that in a minute. First, on the weapons inside. It will not alter the efforts already underway. That workload is significant. It is our largest workload we have had on her plate on our plate. Since the cold war and the npr does nothing to change that. Over the next 10 years, will be looking we will be working on several programs. I will get you some other air force systems in just a second. It will also supplement the workload in response to the everchanging environment. There are four areas i will mention. The first is to replace the w78 icbm warhead. We had a program on the books , it was in started it was intended to start in fy 20 them removed it up next year to reduce the risk and make sure we intend alignment with the air force programs. The second item is we will retain the be 63 gravity bomb b63 gravity bomb longer. Then we previously planned. The u. S. Will modify a number of existing warheads to provide a low yield option. Finally, nsa will work with dod to pursue a nuclear sealaunch Cruise Missile. There has been a lot of focus on the last 2. I want to emphasize that a lot of the npr reinforces the need that we need to get the Current Program of record right. The other side of the coin it is coin is the infrastructure. The npr realize the need to capitalize and to modernize infrastructure. This is not a 510 year undertaking, these are programs that will be around for many years capabilities that will be around for many years. Much of the infrastructure and capability that was the best in the world and its time, has in its time has atrophied since the cold war. A large portion of our facilities date back to the manhattan project. Greg mentioned that this npr was done at a time where we are taking a fresh look at not only the nnsa piece, but the Delivery Systems and other things. Its critical we get these programs started and completed because they will be with us for decades. There is no margin for further delay. We need to get it right and we need to get it done quickly. There has been some items in the media about Nuclear Explosive testing. I want to be clear about the u. S. Policy on Nuclear Explosive testing. Despite some of that media coverage, there is no change to the policy. Although the u. S. Will not seek to ratify the conference of comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban treaty, we will continue to observe the Nuclear Test Moratorium that began in 1992. The annual assessment of the stockpile provided to the present by the Laboratory Directors certifies the safety and liability of the u. S. Stockpile and that effort will continue. Taken it a step further, there has been some other media commentary about the nuclear test rate and its posture. There is also no change to the test rate and its posture. It remains as it was largely since 1992, with some mike judge minor changes. This npr does not reflect any change from that posture. The continuity is also evident in the nprs strong support for nnsa counter proliferation programs. These are not mutually exclusive with the weapon sight of an nsa side of nnsa. They are complementary. Much of the expertise we took to use in those areas is linked directly to the capability we have that was originally established. An effective deterrent that assures allies, reduces the likelihood that others will seek weapons. A robust nonproliferation effort will. Restrict the flow of capability. A strong counter risen Counterterrorism Program is essential. It is integral to protect the homeland. As you heard several times today, the prev