Get started. Thank you for joining us despite the rain. I know it was difficult for many of you. Welcome to u. S. Ip usip. Are not familiar, we are a nonpartisan, independent institute dedicated to the proposition that peace is possible. We are funded by congress and we are focused on preventing, mitigating and resolving conflict. Thatf the global hotspots has eluded peace for many years is the korean peninsula. Canident trump and chairman met at the border with south korea, which has weakened the prospect of returning to measure returning to negotiations. In the coming weeks, they will try to make progress on denuclearization and peace. One of the sticking points has been north korea asking for sanctions relief. In order for the kim regime to survive and thrive, it needs to generate hard currency, and develop its economy, and sanctions have impeded these goals. The Trump Administration has stated consistently that it will not provide sanctions relief until north korea denuclearize denuclearizes or take significant steps toward denuclearization. How do we offer sanctions relief to incentivize diplomacy and denuclearization, but at the same time not minimize our leverage to quickly . Quickly . We have assembled this fantastic panel of speakers. One of them is running a few minutes late, so we will have him join when he arrives. I have asked them as a group to help explain the scope of the sanctions regime against north korea, including multilateral and u. S. Sanctions, the process for providing partial and complete sanctions relief, some potential practical paths for providing relief, taking into account the constraints in opportunities, and any lessons from sanctions regimes on other countries that can be applied to the north korean case. Let me introduce the panelists in the order they will be speaking. Is not here, so we will have him speak second or third. And is the Program Manager at the National Committee on north researchere he manages and publications. He is also the lead researcher and editor for north korea and websited, interactive which explores north koreas diplomatic relations. To my left, we have josh stanton, a d c lawyer who played a significant role in drafting sanctions laws, including the north korean sanctions and policy enhancement act and the korean interdiction and modernization of sanctions act. Josh also served as a u. S. Army judge advocate general in south korea, and runs the website one free korea. Is onnie klein albright the panel of experts established pursuant to you and security to a u. N. St Security Council request. She provides her conditions to the Security Council on implement a sanctions. She has had a long career as a u. N. Official, as a director of the northeast asia program room at the program at the crisis group, and was a usip alum. We have liz rosenberg, director of the Security Program at a center for new american security. She focuses on the National Security and Foreign Policy implications of the use of sanctions and economic statecraft, as well as shifts in the energy market. Previously, she was a Senior Adviser at the Treasury Department, overseeing the development and tightening of global sanctions on iran, libya, and syria, as well as the modification of sanctions on verma in the context of diplomatic normalization. I have asked each of them to speak for about eight minutes or so. I will ask a couple of questions to get the discussion going, and then we can open the remaining time for q and a. I was going to have can dan start, but josh can also provide a great overview. I am going toents make this morning are my personal views. They dont represent the opinions of any government agency. Or a member of Congress Committee of congress. Unlike the other panelists here, my job has nothing to do with north korea. I am here on my own time. Was my greatgo, it honor to be asked to come to the House Foreign Affairs committee and draft the north korean sanctions policy enhancement act. It passed the vote by 4183 and the senate by 96 to zero. That may give you a sense of the congresss impatience with the have conducted north korean policy. They looked back on years of bad , and mendacity by the north korean government, and a president s who pursued the diplomacy of instant gratification, often prematurely throwing away the nonviolent, peaceful leverage of sanctions, which is really the only avenue we have left to disarm north korea without war. What we have learned through our experiences since 2005 is that north korea is surprisingly dependent on access to our Financial System. The dollar is the worlds reserve currency, and most of northney that sustains korea runs through banks in new york. That gives the treasury and Justice Department jurisdiction block, and, prosecute people behind those transactions. North korea has no sovereign right to access to our Financial System. As long as it is against our core interests, we should deny that right. Legislation is nothing more than restraining access to the Financial System they are atime as peace with us. The president s authority to lift sanctions is constitutional. T is an enumerated Power Congress has the authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations. Aat congress expects from north korea that has repeatedly reneged on its agreements had said it must regain our trust by accepting basic and fundamental transparency. So while i believe it is never too early to begin thinking about the conditions for the suspension and lifting of sanctions, i suspect we are having the conversation about two years too early, because it is going to take so much political pressure on the cohesion of the north korean regime that kim jongun is presented with the choice between disarming or perhaps seeing the cohesion of his regime undermined, at which point he will have a diplomatic incentives to reach an agreement that meets our fundamental security interest, and is irreversible disarmament. Why do we insist on this . We are dealing with a government reactor,t a nuclear that has helped the side use chemical weapons against innocent civilians in syria, that sold portable surfacetoair missiles to terrorists, that has sent assassins to kill dissidents in exile and to murder kim jonguns halfbrother in a crowded airport terminal with a nerve agent. That Cyber AttacksUnited States and threatens the bedrock of our political system, our freedom of expression, that stole 81 million and the Bangladesh Bank. Except the transparency necessary to verify its disarmament, or coexistence will not be possible. That korea is a regime lives on a small amount of cash overhead, and even a small relaxation of financial pressure will give it the option to continue its status. That is not an option that will be acceptable to congress, which has imposed strict conditions on the lifting of sanctions. 104a sets out 15 categories of conduct, including proliferation,g the facilitation of human rights abuses that require mandatory sanctions. Section 208 is a bypass around the sanctions for humanitarian assistance, or for those cases where imposing mandatory sanctions would harm our own National Security. In other words, we should not require the president to collapse the chinese Financial System when there are other enforcement options. And 402 allow the ultimate lifting of sanctions once north korea accepts transparency and allows for us to verify its disarmament. To those who say that north korea cannot possibly accept nuclear disarmament, i would answer that this argument is a historical. Ahistorical. North korea can survive without Nuclear Weapons. The threat is internal. It is the misappropriation of its wealth. It is fundamentally a kleptocracy problem. If donald trump were to attempt to unilaterally lift sanctions now, i suspect the response would be Something Like it was in 1986, when Congress Passed the comprehensive antiapartheid act over president reagans veto. We already see several bills in congress, including the asia ,eassurance act, the brink act the north korea policy oversight act, cosponsored by senator ,enendez and eliot engel Foreign Policy heavyweights in the Democratic Party in congress, and we have the lead act, by senators gartner and markey. Direction in congress is for more strict conditions on the lifting of sanctions, not less, and all this legislation affirms that our goal is complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of north korea. Missed, i think, the root of all evil in north korea, which is money. The goal of sanctions must not simply be to put temporary pressure on kim jongun until he. Omes back for another photo op it has to be to disarm the country, but also to force kim jongun to make better choices for his people. At this time, the only form of sanctions relief that is appropriate is sanctions released in the form of humanitarian aid that is ensurely monitored to that it feeds the hungry, and regardless of what kim jongun does, whether he behaves well or badly, because the north Korean People are in no way responsible for his decisions. Until then, we need an long game for sanctions, and the long game financialition diplomacy, in concert with u. S. Wish to ensure that only those Financial Transactions involving north korea that directly benefit the north Korean People can clear the Financial System. Thank you. Frank thank you. We have dan arriving right now. We will have him settle in. We can go to stephanie. So my comment today does not bind or represent the United Nations, United NationsSecurity Council, the 1718 committee, or the panel of experts. The goal of the sanctions regime, according to the United Nations, so we are speaking about u. N. And not any of the bilateral or national regimes, like that under treasury and other u. S. Agencies which might be the subject here today the goals are to persuade the dprk to dismantle its Nuclear Programs and to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The goal is to reach Diplomatic Solutions for negotiation and dialogue, and that is something that was articulated specifically following resolution 2270, when the sanctions were described as not the final objective. To goal of sanctions is catalyze effective dialogue. Initially that was seen as a Six Party Talks process, and now the Six Party Talks are long gone, so we are looking at other forms of dialogue. Finally, the goal of the sections regime is to limit the impact of sanctions on the economy and the civilian population of the country. Governedions regime is that falls under the Security Council. It was established by resolution 1718. That was set up deliberately for the execution of the sanctions regime on north korea. There are over a dozen other sanctions regimes that have their own committees. This committee has the same composition of the Security Council, so 15 members, of which five are permanent members. The committee is set up to implement the resolutions on the dprk, which is to say since 2006 are over 10 10 . 11 . Can only. 10 only. The last three were in 2017, and we will talk about that. Underneath the 1718 Committee Sits the panel of experts, of which i am a member in my capacity. There are eight members and they represent the five permanent members they are not representing because of independent experts. We come from the five permanent members, and in addition to that, we have members from the republic of korea, singapore, and japan. They bring expertise in different areas. My expertise is in finance and economics, and we also have nonproliferation, customs and export control, maritime, air transport, and the like. The panel is mandated to assist the committee in carrying out its mandated function. The alleged file asian of sanctions as articulated in the resolutions of the Security Council that means gathering, examining, and analyzing byormation provided to us various different sources, whether it is Member States, experts, organizations, u. N. Bodies, and other interested parties. We make representations to the council, and to Member States, to improve implementation, and then we report. Function our reports are public. Our last report was dated march 6. You can find it online. They are very extensive, with lots of annexes. Panelsa summary of the investigations for the period. We report twice a year, so for the six months prior. We investigate through onsite inspections. We visit Member States at their invitation. We interview. We ask questions. We write letters to companies and Member States, and we do our own research. 2017, there is the last spate of resolutions, and we will focus on the last two. What you have seen in the dprk sanctions regime is a move away from a narrow, targeted focus wmd to auclear and broader lets say a broader regime encapsulating a huge amount of the former north korean economy, looking at sanctions, a regime that prohibits a whole cloth of activities in the maritime space, vessels and otherwise. It has become a rather comprehensive regime. What the panel has found in its reports is that the expansion of the regime has not been matched by the requisite political will of Member States to actually implement the regime. It has not been matched by the requisite international coordination, prioritization, and research allocation to actually drive effective implementation. The resolutions resolution to 375, adopted in response to dprks largest ever nuclear test in 2017, and the resolution adopted in response to the icbm launch, introduced sweeping sanctions, including a ban on work authorizations. Ont comes into full force december 22. All north korean individuals working in other countries can repatriate. You see have brought the regime has become. It happens all joint ventures with dprk individuals, strengthens measures regarding supply and sale of all petroleum product, introduces a crude oil on all dprk exports of textiles, food, and agricultural products, and a ban on the transfer of all industrial machinery, transport vehicles, iron, steel, and other materials, with the exception of spare parts to maintain commercial civilian operations. The panel has found that not only have Member States insufficiently implemented this regime, but that invasion tactics by north korean entities and individuals have effectively undermined implementation as and the networks behind in Illicit Activity consists of a core of very skilled agents who are highly experienced, and they can cross borders, can mobilize money, can mobilize people and goods, can engage in sales and trafficking of armsrelated materials. They can conceal financial activity by using complicit foreign nationals, front companies, and other methods to fuscate thee obg flow of funds. They have full access to the global Financial System right now, despite all the efforts put others. By ofac and the business by these networks is generating significant revenue. One of the recent areas of investigation to the panel is into actors, north korean actors, activities in cyberspace. That includes a tax on cryptocurrency exchange, laundering of proceeds from a the from attacks through currency exchanges, and even mining of currency, which has been done through taking illegal control of companies to literally create money, is what is happening. The panel has determined that these types of activities are in invasion of financial sanctions, because like going to Bangladesh Bank and stealing money from a bank the asset freeze provision is rendered meaningless, because the bank never has an opportunity to freeze those assets, because they are being stolen from under the watch of the bank. It is the view of many Member States that this kind of activity, given that the pie has sort of the way in which north korea is able to gain foreign currency is shrinking, obviously, given the white have been ranging sanctions on a swath of areas of economic importance. And yet this activity in cyberspace is taking on a larger and larger proportionate a larger and larger proportion of the ability of dprk to generate revenue, which under the resolutions, that revenue is applied to prohibited programs, and is by virtue illegal. With that, i will turn it over. Frank just to clarify, the sectoral sanctions cover the prohibition on north korean exports, on coal and textiles that. Afood, all of that is pretty much 95 plus of north koreas export economy right now. Thanks for inviting me to speak today and my apologies for coming in late. There were a few road closures in heavy rain, as folks might have noticed. Bynk asked me to start off giving me the purpose of the sanctions regime. I think this is an important firstorder question. I think it is useful to view must sanctions regimes, certainly the north korean regime, as having implicitly a threefold purpose signaling, constraining, and forcing. Signaling in the north korean context is that action such as