I am jane harman, president and ceo of the Wilson Center and i am delighted to be here. It is august, which means that congress and the president are on vacation. But todays topic is not on vacation and will not be, at least through the 2020 election. So the Wilson Center is not putting off of the conversation. That being said, disinformation is hardly any problem. A new problem. In the midst of the cold war, the u. S. And the soviet union both tried to influence narratives on other parts of the globe. For example, a new article published by the Wilson Centers history and Public Policy program look at translated russian documents related to operation denver. A campaign in the 1980s not to spread the lie that h. I. V. Was created as a result of the pentagons biological weapons research. So, disinformation was not invented in 2016 and is sadly unlikely to be buried in 2020, but today, we delve into the context. And we have the right moderator and speakers to do that. Our first panel, which starts right now, is on historical patterns. Moderating is the very talented kate baldwin, the anchor of cnns morning show at this formallyd the coanchor of new day and the situation room with wolf blitzer. Kate and her colleagues have done critical work on the topic. Earlier this year, cnn created an interactive website that shows the danger of deep fakes, doctored but realistic videos that show public figures saying and doing things they never did. Since 2016, the pentagon has spent at least 68 million on technology to detect deep fakes, but the issue is unlikely to go away before 2020. Were also joined by our very own nina jankowicz, global fellow with the Canon Institute who is writing the book on russian how much do i get for this plug [laughter] on russian disinformation information coming out next summer called how to lose the information more, based on her on the ground experience in ukraine. We welcome jessica buyer, a lecturer and Research Scientist at the university of washingtons Jackson School of international studies, Whose Research has focused on International Cyber security and nonstate actors, as well as online political activism. And finally, our last guest, ginny badanes, is the director of strategic projects, Cyber Security and diplomacy, and Cyber Security and democracy at microsoft, drawing on years of experience in Political Campaigns. She worked on microsofts partnership with the Iowa Caucuses in 2016 to create a Smartphone App for caucus organizers to report the results of the vote more quickly and accurately than before. So, in conclusion, in todays complex world, it is more important than ever to provide real facts and trustworthy information. Everyone in every place is being tested, including the Wilson Center. We are doing our best and we really need our friends on this panel, including the fourth estate, the media, to do its part. So i look forward to todays panels, two panels. Kate, over to you. Kate thank you so much. Surprisingly,not lays out the challenge, the issue, the topic today really well. Before you look forward, you must look back, and i think that is why we should start with history. The patterns of the trends we are seeing when it comes to disinformation. Maybe it started with operation denver, as ginny talked about as jane was talking about, but nina, i wonder, disinformation is not new and how far back do you look to where you would say the first real Disinformation Campaign youve been researching, where do you put it up . Nina i think a lot of people want to go back to the soviet period and compare what we were seeing then with what were seeing now. But there is an important difference. While the tactics are the same , the tools have changed. Social media allows the information getting put out there and its not all fake. We have to say, it is all usually grounded in a kernel of truth or real feelings, real discontent that is weaponized by bad actors, including russia and other foreign actors. The social media allows those bad actors to spread those messages much more quickly, to travel at lightning speed and also allow those messages to be targeted to the very people who will find them most appealing and that is what makes what were seeing today so much more difficult to counter. Looking at the modern era, at disinformation 2. 0 as you might call it, my book started in 2007 in estonia with the crisis when a lot of false stories about how ethnic russians in democratic estonia were being treated in this new era were spread among the population there. It led to riots and led to some real social discord that the estonian government that had to then had to counter. They did that not by trying to stamp out the voices of the press or counter narratives that were grounded in truth about how the russian population was feeling, but they did that by bringing those ethnic russians back into the fold, by focusing on integration and education which is something we will come back to later today. Kate i can promise that, for sure. Jessica, we all know, at this point, especially everyone in this room, we all know what disinformation means generally and broadly. But define the term for us, this is what i am most interested in. You say it is not always what it seems. What is the difference between disinformation and propaganda . Jessica there is nothing like academic loves more than being asked to define something. [laughter] most people talk about disinformation as information that is false with an intent to deceive attached to it. Academics talk about misinformation as Bad Information that is spread unwittingly. The difference between disinformation and propaganda, there are people who also divide that out. Propaganda is an organized effort to spread disinformation or information that isnt necessarily entirely untrue or maybe it is the way it is talked about, that is another tactic. You focus on disorder rather than a narrative of people protesting for their rights. So there are different ways you can look at different events and stress certain things over others. One of the things that academics are starting to point out is that we have this conversation about disinformation or misinformation, and we think disinformation is something that a bad actor is doing, and misinformation is my aunt whos sharing a story on facebook that is not true. But there are scholars, people who say we need to look at the social context that people are a part of. So people share information, not just because they think its true, but also because it resonates with them or signals their place in a group, shows that they are part of some Overall Group rather than other ones. And also, if you are looking at say disinformation in places that are vulnerable to violence, people are also, maybe they are sharing misinformation and they dont know the thing they are sharing about someone coming to kidnap children isnt true, but that information is often grounded in existing societal hatred so, the idea that it is the purveyors of disinformation that are the malicious ones, is not exactly true because even misinformation can be dangerous as well. Kate what are the tech takes, jenny, how have the tactics changed . Im interested from your perspective. Were talking about how the information spreads, but how have the tactics changed . Jenny we are talking about going from how things used to be and how they are now, and have never changed. Espionage is a thing that existed and that is not new but what is new is weaponization of the information you get. Its not new that even Political Campaigns are hacked. That is something that has happened in previous cycles in the u. S. And in recent history. What is new is the tactics the enemy uses when they get a hold of that information. One thing we think about is anticipation, it is important to have Historical Context in order to anticipate and handle it, but also important not to solve yesterdays problems entirely and to be thinking about what might come next. Thats why the conversation around deep fakes. I dont know how much everyone knows about the concept but it sounds like some might be more expert on it, but it is the idea that videos looking like someone saying what that individual did not say. There may not be a rise in it yet, but it is anticipating that it is what is coming next. That is how we are focused on the issues right now, thinking about what is next, how will the playbook from the enemy change, and made new in the next cycle . You are also hitting on Something Interesting when it comes to the goal of disinformation. Is it always the same, nina . Is it always to change hurts and hearts and minds or force a segment to do what you want them to do, or sometimes is it more insidious than that . Is the goal from estonia to today of disinformation the same . Nina i think what is interesting about what we are seeing from the kremlin is that it is not to change hearts and minds. That is how i would draw the line between propaganda and disinformation. Propaganda is agitating on behalf of a certain cause, whether it is government or a political movement, et cetera. Disinformation particularly russian disinformation is aiming to create as much chaos and disorder as possible. That is a theme that goes from estonia right through to georgia, poland, czech republic, ukraine, especially ukraine, as fact. It is trying to inspire a sense of distrust in the democratic system so that people dont go out and invest in that budding new democracy. Certainly since 2016, i think we are seeing more distrust building in our democratic system as well whether thats in the media or in our election infrastructure, or whether that is in campaigns and political structures themselves. In that regard the Disinformation Campaign we saw in 2016 that continues today has been successful in that regard. Kate to that point, is there a pattern you would think if there was a pattern, people would be wiser to it already. Is there a pattern to Disinformation Campaigns . Is the russian disinformation distinct from the Disinformation Campaign put out by iran, or how what happened in ukraine, is that different from what happened essentially in the United States . Is there a Common Element that you find in these things . Nina i think the Common Element, and this is what makes it so difficult to counter, is the fissures in our societies whether economic, or racial or political, especially political polarization, those are the things that all these campaigns weaponize to their advantage. That means it is not as simple as just playing whack patrol. I dont know about that. A simple as just deleting fake accounts. These are societal issues that take Good Governance and investment from our politicians and Civil Servants and folks like you in the fourth estate. Kate that is really interesting. Who are the worst offenders, jessica . Jessica i just want to add, i would agree that we are talking about exploitation of these deep issues. There has been some research that has found patterns. There are more internal Disinformation Campaigns than external ones, for example where we have a nationstate acting a against a country, you are more likely to see internal. People seeking political power are acting for some personal gain using disinformation. Kate within their own country . Jessica yes. And also people doing it to make money. Ad money spreading out stories. There are stories about that happening after 2016 where you see that happening as well. Research out of Oxford Institute has found that democracies and nondemocracies, campaignssinformation inside both. It gets tricky trying to define what is disinformation when the government controls the media, but there have been some efforts to try to look for patterns across countries. This is a question of, i guess the worst offenders would have to be the worst offender, Foreign Government trying to influence outside its borders. Who would be the worst offender than that . Russia . Jessica absolutely. Also, any actor attempting to use or create a situation in which violence is likely to further their political goals, they would be the worst offenders generally across everywhere in the world. Kate what is it about russia . Nina so a lot of times i get a question about why is what russia did in 2016 any different than the type of things the United States does all around the world . And i am talking overt operations, not what our intelligence agencies do. The answer that i give is very much grounded in my background, having worked at the National Democratic institute and supporting prodemocracy activists around the world. Whenever we did those programs, they were out in the open, anybody could come, anybody from any Political Party and learn how to run a Petition Campaign or learn how to run a Political Campaign. And what russia did in 2016 was much more Surreptitious Campaign that didnt get anyone to right . Nes consent, we didnt know we were being byhods test messaged tob the russian government. That is what i find so objectionable about that, also illegal, clearly. This is not something anybody bought into. And we are seeing other nationstates mimicking the russian playbook. You mentioned iran, we have seen some saudi accounts, certainly china is doing that within its own borders. It is that lack of openness that goes against our very democratic being that i find to make russia most objectionable in this case. Here is where i think it is good news. Know some of the playbook and methods, and now, it is all about education. And it not to move into the territory of the next panel, but it is solution focused. Being able to educate the public about what the operations look like. D. H. S. Put out a great info graphic a couple weeks ago about the war on pineapple and essentially took an issue that is divisive but not political which is whether or not pineapple belongs on pizza. I am antipineapple on pizza kate this is going to get very real because i am very propineapple. [laughter] ginny they took this topic in five easy steps to using this info graphic to show what the adversaries are doing with the topic to your point that is already divisive. We have something we disagree on, so how do they take that thing and drive a wedge . And what is the methods that they use. Im encouraged because i see our government doing things, there is Civil Society organizations doing things to educate the public around that, and the awareness is so through the roof. Not saying that we fixed it, but it is encouraging to see that progress has been made. Kate it sounds like theyre really havent been effective defenses against disinformation, maybe not many examples historically, but have you seen effective defenses . Are there any . Other than where we are in this moment . Ginny not to be a broken record, but i think the biggest defense is educating the people on how to discern what theyre reading, understanding the techniques and being able to filter it better. A lot of is also about weve been talking about disinformation versus misinformation and how do you define different terms. If we can get on a similar page about what is happening kate that might be the hardest thing. Ginny but people are working hard on it. Nina i would agree that education is important and i call it a citizen space solution, not just looking at children when we talk about education but voting age people. Helping them navigate the flow of information online. Something that does give me pause, from what i have seen recently in ukraine during their president ial election is that bad actors are now adapting their tactics to the kind of obstacles that some of the social media platforms have put up also kate post russia 20 . nina yeah. I am talking this year, 2019. Rather than being stopped by the walls put up, they are burrowing under or going around in different sorts of ways. Kate im interested in that. What are the borough, described to us, how are they burrowing . What did they take from the russia playbook that they have now grown or built upon . Nina so there was a lot of discussion about political advertisements in the 2016 election. Facebook has now put a lot of transparency measures in place so you can search ads that are being bought, there are records rules that outside actors and foreign actors cant purchase these ads. It was a helpful tool for researchers and journalists like myself to look through the ad library. Anticipating this, russia, according to the Ukrainian SecurityService Based on activity i saw when i was getting ads and looking through all that information in ukrainian and russian, russia is trying to rent peoplesFacebook Accounts in order to use them as ad mules. They pay them about 100 a month or so, which in ukrainian terms, is one third of an average ukrainian salary, in order to use their accounts to get around those ad restrictions. The Security Service found this out, alerted facebook, i do not think that will necessarily stop russia. It is against their terms of service, certainly, but this is something that worries me. People who might not have any Strong Political preferences and may want to get extra cash, or someone in a third world country is going to be happy to rent out that facebook account. Kate seems like a hacker for hire. Nina thats a scary thing and a lot of manipulation going on in gr