Secretary for affairs. This is 45 minutes. Defense cooperation from the United States japan and south korea. Our speaker this morning is randall shcriver. He is the assistant secretary of defense for indo pacific since early security affairs. He previously served in various u. S. Administrations as the Deputy Assistant secretary of state for east asia and Pacific Affairs and prior to his civilian service he was an activeduty Naval Intelligence officer including a deployment in support of Operation Desert Storm and desert shield. He has won numerous military and civilian awards. He is an old friend and one of the best minds that we have today in washington, d. C. And in the country, on indo Pacific Affairs. Without further ado, let me introduce assistant secretary shriver. [applause] thank you, victor. And thank you, csis. It is always good to return here and be here, but particularly, when speaking of these subjects, because csis has done so much quality work on the Alliance Relationships with south korea and japan and the trilateral relationship, as well. Thank you for hosting me and providing this venue and giving me the opportunity to have this discussion. We are all aware that this event takes place against the backdrop of rising tensions between japan and south korea. Today, i would like to do a few things. Talk about the progress that we have made in our trilateral Security Partnerships and talk about the future possibilities and what we can accomplish to regain a spirit of trilateral cooperation. Then, we also need to be frank about the downsides and the risk should tensions continue or escalate. I will start by talking about the importance and the resilience of our bilateral alliances with japan and south korea, respectively. In our National Defense strategy, we identify our network of allies and partners as a crucial and durable asymmetric advantage in longterm competition with russia and china. Our alliances are unique and more than force multipliers. They give us an opportunity to train and improve our capability and also give us opportunities to share burden alongside our partners and contribute to collective security. In this context, japan and south korea are two of our most important allies. We say japan is a cornerstone of security in the indopacific, and our relationship with korea is the linchpin. Im sure we are guilty of using these as mantras and not reflecting on the meaning, but these are carefully chosen words, and they are meaningful and they are reflective of how we view these very important relationships. Since 1953, the republic of korea has gone from a net security recipient to a Regional Security provider. As we look beyond the northeast asia to challenges of the future, we expect south korea to be a major source of stability. 28,500 u. S. Military personnel and their families live and work in south korea. Together with korean allies, we have opened the u. S. Army garrison humphreys, americas Largest Overseas military facility. The Defense Department has agreed with the republic of korea allies to accelerate the transition of wartime operational control so the rok can lead the defense. Its defense. We continue to always go together. Turning to japan, our Largest Overseas host of u. S. Forces in the world. 55,000 u. S. Servicemembers and their families call it home. With enhanced capabilities we are reshaping the u. S. Japan alliance especially as japan has evolved into a trusted partner and Security Partner for numerous countries in south and Southeast Asia. The bilateral alliance with both of these countries is important to us, and the important trilateral cooperation has allowed our countries to take on the most challenging National Security issues since world war ii. From the challenges presented by the soviet union during the cold war, to the threat posed by north korea, to the emerging challenges that china presents as a global competitor. To speak a bit about the rok and japan relationship, if you just looked at a map, you would certainly understand the current security environment should make japan and south korea natural partners. They have shared values and are committed to a free and open border in the indo pacific based on a rulesbased international order. Both countries understand the longterm risks of a rising china, and a china that is by violating International Norms on cyber, stealing intellectual property aggressively, and modernizing their military while trying to change their geopolitical status quo. Both understand an insurgent russia has its sights on returning to the far east and pacific theaters. Both understand the stability has enabled the region to thrive and achieve remarkable results. And both are concerned by the action taken by authoritarian states like china and russia that undermine the rulesbased order. These areas of common understanding have been evident in the trilateral defense engagements we have had recently. The 11th defense trilateral talks, which i had the opportunity to cochair last may, and was joined by Deputy Director general and the deputy minister. Even at the ministerial level on the margins of the shangrila dialogue this year in late may, early june, acting secretary former acting secretary shanahan had meetings in singapore. These venues are examples of enhanced coordination among the u. S. , the republic of korea, and japan and our defense professionals. They allow us to talk about common challenges and threats in the region as well as our response. It is remarkable how quickly political disputes can push aside discussion of our cooperation and our future progress that our countries seek to accomplish. My colleague, mark napper, said recently korea and japan suffered consequences when their bilateral ties worsen and each bears responsibility for improving them. Historical disputes and animosity should be kept separate from shared vital military Security Cooperation. We hope to see our security relationship insulated from political disputes and disagreements. The United States strongly believes the integrity of our mutual defense and security ties must persist. The United States has expressed strong concern and disappointment that the Moon Administration has withheld its renewal of the general security and information agreement. The u. S. Has repeatedly made clear to the Moon Administration that this decision would have a negative affect not only on the bilateral relationship with japan, but on u. S. Security interests and those of other allies. The only winners when japan and korea feud are our competitors. We only have to look at the recent joint patrol by russian and chinese aircraft as a direct challenge to our three countries and an attempt to take advantage of the current frictions in relationships. The decision reflects the frustration with efforts to resolve trade and economic disputes with japan. We are concerned it may reflect serious misapprehension on the part of the Moon Administration regarding the security challenges we face in this area. In northeast asia. It is critical to ensure there are strong relationships between and among the three countries. The challenges posed by the dprk, china. And russia. We cannot overstate. There is too much at stake. We have endured similar challenges before and have always been able to move forward towards common goals to meet the shared regional and global challenges. This time is no different. To that end, we seek to promote a forwardlooking rok and japan relationship and will continue to pursue bilateral and trilateral Security Cooperation where possible with japan and the republic of korea. So, what are we doing . I want to focus on a few things that we are doing shoulder to shoulder with our partners including in trilateral work. I was recently able to accompany our new secretary esper on his first overseas trip as secretary of defense. We visited the republic of korea and japan as well as mongolia, australia, and new zealand. His predecessor, secretary mattis, also made his first overseas trip to the indo pacific. This is our priority theater, and it is reflected in actions of our senior leadership. Secretary esper is committed to ensuring the United States and its allies and partners are prepared to safeguard the rules and norms that we all enjoy in the indo pacific region. The secretary is aware of the important roles korea and japan play in maintaining regional stability, which is why he chose to visit south korea and japan. We are all committed to the final, fully verified denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as agreed to by chairman kim. Together, we offer north korea a brighter path and a bright Economic Future for his country and his people should he make that decision to implement his previous commitments. Japan hosts the enforcement coordination cell at the command center, which includes the republic of korea, japan, france and our five eyes partners. We are committed to enforcing Un Security Council resolutions that prohibit the north korean ability to unlawfully export and export coal and import Refined Petroleum in the maritime domain. This instrumental effort that we call partnerships with a purpose is a daily reminder that the International Community takes its obligations seriously and that sanctions will continue until north korea comes into compliance with International Obligations and the agreement made in singapore. All parties want a stable and Permanent Peace on the Korean Peninsula. We are committed to getting there. It is critical that this cooperation continue between japan and south korea. We demonstrated our commitment through a series of transparent bilateral training events, and in addition, we conduct trilateral training with japan and south korea. We recently held trilateral chiefs of defense meetings as well as trilateral conversations on a broad range of intelligence matters. The most recent trilateral meeting occurred in 2018. Our trilateral relationship is wellpositioned to deepen cooperation on global Security Issues. If there is a willingness by all parties to do so. For instance, japan and south korea are both active participants in the proliferation security initiative, and are leaders of psis asiapacific exercise rotation, which seeks to enhance capability across the indo pacific to stop weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems, and related materials. Furthermore, both participated in the eastern endeavor exercise in july, and japan hosted the 2018 asiapacific exercise event. Both japan and korea continue to pledge significant support and actively cooperate with us to Counter Terrorism and extremism. Both work to prevent piracy in the indian ocean and build security in Southeast Asia and africa through Global Health security initiatives. Security agendas. Both worked to promote human rights and both contribute to Economic Development around the world and both assist the victims of conflict and natural disasters. The United States has made a commitment to both countries and will honor those commitments. We have a long way ahead, but i believe we can and will surpass these challenging times. We have made substantial effort and engagement at very senior levels. We dont always talk about that publicly, what we do behind the scenes. But now is the time for the action on the part of both parties. As secretary napper said, we will bear the costs and the responsibilities to improve the relations. In the immediate nearterm we do immediate nearterm, we do call on the republic of korea to recommit and renew that agreement. We also call on both sides to participate in meaningful dialogue to address their differences. Meaningful dialogue means coming to the table with a mindset of problem solving, not a mindset of airing grievances further. In northeast asia, in the indo the indo pacific region, and the world, will be safer when the United States, japan, and south korea worth together in solidarity. We are resilient and share Common Security objectives and our trilateral defense cooperation has withstood the test of time to meet our security challenges and will do so in the future should we all commit to it. With that, i look forward to your questions, comments, criticisms, and thank you again for the time, and i look forward to the q and a. Thanks. [applause] dr. Cha thank you so much for those great comments. As you can imagine, there has been a lot of talk in washington over what has happened in the last week or so. I thought i might ask a bunch of questions and we might open it up to the audience for some broader discussions. The first thing i wanted to ask you is, in your remarks you repeated what the state department has said which is this phrase of strong concern and disappointment at the decision to terminate the agreement. To what extent was the u. S. Government consulted on this and did you know about it . I am just curious. Mr. Schriver it was certainly a point of discussion including during the secretarys visit. I would say those discussions would constitute consultation but in terms of the actual decision to not renew we were not forewarned. That decision itself i dont believe we had a forewarning of. Dr. Cha ok. I think maybe for the benefit of the audience and everyone who is watching at home, we know of this as an information sharing intelligence sharing agreement. Maybe you can enlighten us on technically what is considered to be so useful and valued about that for the United States. If north korea does something what is it that gsomia enables the u. S. To do that it would not be able to do without gsomia . Mr. Schriver it is valuable and helpful to the u. S. But it is mainly valuable and helpful to korea and japan themselves. Gsomia is an agreement through which they can share information directly and do so in a timely way as fast as technology can move information. In the complex security environment we are in often times, time is of the essence. When you are looking at potential missile launches or other activity you dont want any cumbersome unwieldy process of information sharing which is had before with us in the middle passing information back and forth. I say it is important to japan and the republic of korea beyond our own interest because there may even be situations where we are not directly impacted but they are operating in the same environment and they would benefit from sharing information. Thenter pirate Counter Piracy operations, should the information be a threat to a japan aircraft . They dont need us in the middle if they are sharing information when time is of the essence. And in vice versa when japan has information that is of interest to the r. O. K. Dr. Cha there was a previous agreement in 2014 . What was it . The trilateral information sharing agreement . What is the difference between that and the gsomia . Agreement. Mr. Schriver the previous agreement has us in the middle. It did provide a mechanism for sharing information and intelligence. Only through us. If the republic of korea provided us with information we could share it with japan and vice versa but not directly. Dr. Cha some commentary on this has been, without gsomia we have another agreement that serves the same purpose but that is not true. There is a substantive difference in terms of the way we in rang arrange these things. It is more cumbersome and unwieldy in the security environment we are operating in. There is added risk without gsomia. Dr. Cha going to the security environment, in your remarks you said was misapprehension of security threats. There has been a lot of activity lately, foremost of which has been the seven missile test by north korea. The first question is, what do you think they are doing . Is this a political statement or are they actually trying to improve certain capabilities through testing . On your point about misapprehension, do you see in asymmetry in the way our allies are looking at the security reasons but particularly those seven sets of shortrange missiles . Mr. Schriver i would probably benefit from hearing your thoughts on north korea more than my own. It seems that these are not mutually exclusive. These tests can be for the purpose of political maneuvering but it can also be critical steps in modernization and development of the systems. Perhaps they are trying to gain leverage before another round of talks. Chairman kim did commit to restarting working level talks so there could be a variety of explanations. The bottom line is from a defense perspective they are improving. The security environment is getting more challenging. I would say among defense professionals and in our discussions with military representatives we have great alignment on our security environment and the growing threat for north korea. I cant speak to how political leaders might do things but it does appear that this decision is a place of prominent elastic politics ahead of the security environment that we feel we are aligned with with defense officials and representatives. Dr. Cha not just on north korea but more broadly in the region when you look at our allies, you mentioned china and south china seas, do you see alignment there between our allies . Are there some gaps . Mr. Schriver i see more alignment than gaps. Obviously there will be nuanced differences on certain issues. On the big strategic q