Thank you very much, john. I appreciate the kind words of introduction. I want to thank the center for strategic and International Studies and joongang ilbo, the host of todays forum, for their invitation to speak. I think this is the 9th or 10th such forum, and its a great opportunity, very timely, to discuss a lot of critical issues. I also want to congratulate csis and john and victor cha for the this is also the 10th anniversary of the korea chair of csis. So it marks a decade of contributions that the chairs nonpartisan, objective research has made to the Public Policy debate on korean issues that are so important to the American People and to the korean people. It has been a significant accomplishment for victor and john and all of csis. I am delighted to be here today. Im also assured the leadership of north korea is elated that delighted that im here today in a private capacity. [laughter] at least thats what ive read. Perhaps they will be a little less delighted now that i can speak in unvarnished terms about the grave and growing threat that the north Korea NuclearWeapons Program poses to International Peace and security. Lets start with a couple of what i think the main precepts of dealing with the north Korean Nuclear threat are. First, it remains unacceptable for north korea to have deliverable Nuclear Weapons. Now, by the word unacceptable, i dont mean rhetorical flourish by a politician. I mean that our policy should be that we do not accept it, we will not accept it. Second, it seems to me clear that the dprk has not made a strategic decision to give up its Nuclear Weapons. In fact, i think the contrary is true. I think the strategic decision that kim jongun is operating through is that he will do whatever he can to keep a deliverable Nuclear Weapons capability and to develop and enhance it further. He may try to get relief from international sanctions, he may make some concessions, but under current circumstances he will never give up the Nuclear Weapons voluntarily. Now, this is, if you will permit a personal observation, this question of whether there is a strategic decision to give up Nuclear Weapons is what the libya model of 2003 and 2004 properly understood actually means. At that period, we saw Moammar Gadhafi make an unambiguous decision that he and libya would be better off without developing Nuclear Weapons. He came to that decision for a variety of reasons because of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein by a u. S. Led coalition, the subsequent capture of Saddam Hussein, and the seizure of the ship the bbc china and its delivery of Nuclear Components uranium enrichment components manufactured by the a. Q. Khan proliferation network that told him that we knew what he was up to. At that point, he made the clear decision that he was going to give up Nuclear Weapons. We have seen not only nothing like that from north korea, as i say, we have seen the opposite. And i think its important to understand that the current north korean moratorium on testing of Nuclear Weapons and testing of icbms, intercontinentalrange Ballistic Missiles, tells us nothing about either north koreas intention or its strategy as its playing out. One reason one very good, very troubling reason why theres no more testing of Nuclear Weapons for the moment or of longrange missiles is that north korea has, in its judgement, for well or ill, finished testing and can produce Nuclear Warheads and longrange Ballistic Missiles. Thats not an encouraging sign. Thats a sign to be worried about. Moreover, the testing of shorterrange Ballistic Missiles that weve seen in recent months doesnt give us any reason to think that those are not threatening, because the capabilities, the technology, things like maneuverability of closerange or shortrange Ballistic Missiles, by definition, can be adopted to longerrange Ballistic Missiles, so that indeed the testing thats going on now is not unthreatening unless, of course, you happen to be in south korea within range of these missiles, but bodes poorly for the defensive capabilities of japan and even the United States when you get to the intercontinental range. Now, in the past we had been very clear what our expectations were of north korea, both with respect to Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile testing. If you look back to u. N. Security Council Resolution 1695, adopted on july the 25th, 2006, and security Council Resolution 1718, adopted on october the 14th, 2006, after in the first instance, 1695, after north korea broke its moratorium on launched testing of Ballistic Missiles from the korean peninsula, and for 1718 after a Nuclear Weapons test. The United States and the Security Council were very clear in their response. I know this because i helped write both of those resolutions. 1695 dealt only with missiles. 1718 dealt with both. And ill quote from 1718 just to remind everybody how clear it was. In operative paragraph two, the unanimous Security Council said, and i quote, demands that the dprk not conduct any further nuclear test or launch of a Ballistic Missile. And in operative paragraph five, the council said that it decides that the dprk shall suspend all activities related to its Ballistic Missile program and, in this context, reestablish its preexisting commitments to a moratorium on missile launching. North korea today, as we speak, is violating those resolutions. Now, i say this not because of a theological commitment to u. N. Security Council Resolutions. I say it because when the United States, having led the fight to get those resolutions, says, we really dont care, other countries can draw the conclusion that they dont really care about the sanctions contained in those and other resolutions. So when you ask for consistent behavior from others, you have to demonstrate it yourself. And when fail to do that, we open ourselves and our policy to failure. Now, remember also what it is that caused the concern in 2006 when north korea broke this moratorium. In 1998 north korea for the first time launched a Ballistic Missile that landed in the Pacific Ocean east of japan, which needless to say got the attention of people in that country. And the moratorium was intended to signify that north korea was behaving in a more responsible fashion. And yet, the only thing they really gave up was launched testing. Static testing continued, a very important part of missile development. And all of the evidence we have in the Public Domain is that north korea simply shifted its emphasis on launch testing to cooperation with iran, which was also developing scudbased Missile Technology to create Delivery Systems for Nuclear Weapons. So that the 1998 taepodong launch by north korea and the subsequent enhancement of cooperation with iran was actually a clear demonstration not of responsible behavior but of the continued aspiration to have deliverable Nuclear Weapons. So i think right now we are in a classic standoff with north korea. They want a piece of something that we should not be prepared to give them. People will say, but, what can be hurt . What can be lost by negotiation . What about partial agreements . Why not have some progress, look for some indication of something that north korea can do that can allow us to alleviate the sanctions . There are several points, i think, that are important to understand here. If you believe and you may not if you believe it is unacceptable for north korea to have Nuclear Weapons, first, for the wouldbe proliferator, a partial lifting of sanctions is far more important than it is to the opponent of proliferation to have a partial cessation of a Nuclear Weapons program. The history, whether its with respect to north korea or iran, is very clear that the economic kick to the proliferator of getting economic benefits and relief from sanctions is far more beneficial than a marginal reduction in the Nuclear Weapons effort. So from the perspective of the proliferant country, action for action, as the North Koreans call it, is a way to sustain their authoritarian political system, keep their economy going, and yet still have the benefit of the bulk of their Ballistic Missile and nuclear programs. And theres a world out there thats ready to fall sucker to that kind of argument. Even now we see governments, particularly south korea, watching north korea test kn23 and kn25 missiles, but providing them food aid because the North Koreans say their harvests have been bad and Economic Conditions are difficult. Not so difficult they cant launch Ballistic Missiles, but too difficult to buy food for their people. And as i say, there are people who succumb to that line of argument. Now, this is, i think, something that we can apply, this lesson, both to iran and north korea because theres a second Common Element as well, and that is the element of time. Time for a wouldbe Nuclear Weapons state is not a neutral factor. In fact, the more time that goes by almost inevitably benefits the proliferant because it takes time to overcome the complex scientific and technological difficulties inherent in a Nuclear Weapons program. So when we say, well, were in no rush for negotiations, were in no rush for a resolution of this, were saying to north korea and iran, take your time. Keep going. Youve got more time to plan, to test, to produce, to deploy these capabilities. Time works against those who oppose Nuclear Proliferation, and a relaxed attitude to time is a benefit to the likes of north korea and iran. And then, finally, and this applies specifically to the circumstances on the korean peninsula, for about a year and a half, the United States and south korea have not had what some called wargames we have not had largescale military training exercises. Now, ill leave it to the pentagon to describe exactly what we have been doing, but i think youre all familiar with what im talking about. It is inevitable that when exercises are not taking place, readiness can come into question. And a failure to be militarily prepared results in a weakening of structures of deterrence. Now, im not going to make any assertions here today about the level of american and south korean readiness on the peninsula, but someday, whether from the department of defense or from congressional investigation, we are going to hear judgments on what military readiness is. And i think that this is something that should be a priority, both for americans and for South Koreans. Now, there are other issues here that i dont think are currently adequately addressed in the public debate. Not only should we be concerned with north koreas own weapons technology, but to the ongoing danger that north korea will sell Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile technology, or actual weapons and missiles themselves, to other aspiring proliferant states. That is a risk of a nuclearcapable north korea, whether north korea itself is a threat in its immediate region. Now, i also believe that there is only one country in the world that can stop Nuclear Proliferation, and were in it. We can use help, thats for sure, but if the United States fails in this mission, there is no other state or combination of states and no International Organization that can be a substitute. If we fail, Nuclear Proliferation succeeds. Now, let me just read to you a quotation from winston churchill. Its a very pessimistic statement that he made to parliament in 1935, but i think it applies to american policy over Something Like 30 years when it comes to north korea. Churchill said, describing germany, of course he said, when the situation was manageable, it was neglected. And now that it is thoroughly out of hand, we apply too late the remedies which then might have affected a cure. There is nothing new in this story. It is as old as the sibylline books. It falls into that long, dismal catalogue of the fruitlessness of experience and the confirmed unteachability of mankind. Want of foresight, unwillingness to act when action would be simple and effective, lack of clear thinking, confusion of counsel until emergency comes, until selfpreservation strikes its jarring gong. These are the features which constitute the endless repetition of history. Now, lets hope that churchills pessimism is not borne out in the case of north korea. There are things we should look to and have serious discussions about. One is the possibility, limited though it may be, of regime change in north korea. Second, we should look at and discuss with china and we should have done it long ago aiming toward the reunification of the peninsula under a freelyelected government like that in south korea. And third, if you believe and you may not that it is unacceptable for north korea to have Nuclear Weapons, at some point, military force has to be an option. Now, this is, obviously, the most controversial subject, and many people say its just unimaginable, unimaginable that you would use military force. So let me quote to you the words of general joe dunford, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, on his last day, i might say, as chairman. Hes done an outstanding job. He said this to the Aspen Institute seminar in the summer of 2018 on this question of whats unimaginable. General dunford said, but as ive told my counterparts, both friend and foe, it is not unimaginable to have military options to respond to north Koreas Nuclear capability. What is unimaginable to me is allowing the capability to allow Nuclear Weapons to land in denver, colorado. My job will be to develop military options to make sure that doesnt happen. I think general dunford was completely correct. Now, if you dont like those options, there are others, too, that ensue when north korea keeps Nuclear Weapons. The dprk could become the new a. Q. Khan, the walmart or the amazon of deliverable Nuclear Weapons. Or you could have more Nuclear Weapons states in asia, like japan, like south korea. So these are questions that need to focus our attention, not can we get another summit with kim jongun or what the state of stafflevel negotiations are to achieve a commitment from north korea it will never honor. Before i close, i want to take one minute on the subject of u. S. Japansouth korean relations. This is also not a happy subject for discussion of the moment. Its well below the radar screen here in the United States, which is a big mistake for our country in not paying more attention to it. I am almost without words to describe how distressed i am that these tensions between south korea and japan have grown to the point where they currently are. I believe that over the past period of time that american passivity on this point has been a mistake. Im not saying that the United States should engage in public mediation between the two countries. I think, in fact, that Public Participation would be a mistake. And im not underestimating how serious the issues between south korea and japan are. Ive heard at length from both sides, and i think i understand well both their logic and their emotions. But i think if the United States does not operate here, we face a very serious deterioration of Alliance Capabilities at precisely the wrong time. We see at this point that the hubandspoke system of alliances that weve had in the asiapacific region is in need of modification toward a richer, deeper clust