Moscow utilizes Digital Technologies to target us and our democratic allies from within. It includes election meddling and influenced operations directed by the highest levels of the russian government the very heart of the western world. We provided significant foreign assistance in europe and eurasia, almost all of which supports building resilience to an increasing pressure on russian malign influence in accordance with the fine. The department has increased his support for the Global Engagement center through additional funding and tapping. We have degraded prudence costs. By imposing the administration a section 321 russiarelated individuals and entities in january 2017. These sanctions and related action serve as a warning to the russian government that we will not tolerate inactivity aimed at undermining or manipulating our 2020 election. I confronted Deputy Foreign minister on russian interference in our elections in july and have raise the matter with Russian Ambassador several times. We likewise have taken firm action against russias diplomatic presence. We closed four russian facilities when russia attacked u. K. Citizen with a military grade nerve agent, we closed russian facilities in seattle and expelled 48 russian intelligence officials from the russian embassy. Our diplomats and other regions including the middle east south america, africa were russias actions exacerbate instability and undermine u. S. Interest. In syria, Russian Military support to the assad regime has exacerbated the humanitarian crisis. In venezuela, were pressing russia to withdraw its diplomatic and military and economic support the former maduro regime. In africa, we have called out russias destabilizing policies including support for mercenaries. Russias serial disregard for its International Security and arms controlled commitment represents another significant challenge for our policy. The president has charged us to pursue a new era of arms control agreements. We know congress has a Critical Role to play providing the tools and resources to implement a russian strategy and we are committed to working with you in this regard. Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me today. I look forward to the questions of the committee. Thank you, ambassador. We have now have christopher ford. He has been delegated the authoritys and functions of the undersecretary for arms control and International Security. Dr. Ford previously served as senior director for weapons of mass destruction and cut proliferation at the National Security council. He began his Public Service in 1996 as assistant counsel for the intelligence Oversight Board and insert on several staffs and served as Principal Deputy assistant secretary the state Departments Bureau verification and compliance and u. S. Special representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation from 2008 to 2013 he was a senior fellow at the hudson institute. He is the author of three books and all the doctorate and a law degree. Dr. Ford, welcome. The floor is yours. Thank you. Remarks, undersecretary hale has summarized the broad sweep of our strategy to approach the challenge that russia presents us with today. In my own testimony i would like to address these questions from am. R respective where i i will abbreviate my remarks for oral delivery and request the full version be entered into the record. Thank you, sir. From the perspective of arms control and the ongoing challenges of managing our relationship and strategic sense with moscow, i think it is important to remember we come to all of these tasks out of a long background not just of tensions and problems, but also notable successes over time. The changes in the strategic environment that were occasions by the whining and end of the cold war made possible strategic arms reduction that has seen both countries their arsenals come down to small fractions of what they once were. I mention this because i think it is important to remember this background. It reminds us it is possible to make progress in reducing Nuclear Tensions in our standoff with moscow when the circumstances of the security environment are conducive to such movement. We hope to get back to such an environment. Our policies are designed to help make this possible as well as protect the security of the American People and that of our allies until that point. For now, however, the security environment is challenging. Russia is developing extraordinary new Nuclear Delivery systems for which there are no u. S. Counterparts and most of which seem likely to fall outside existing arms control frameworks. Russia also has a large arsenal of nonstrategic arsenal weapons. It is projected to expand this number of weapons considerably over the next decade. Most observers will be familiar with the Russian Ground launched postproduction and deployment of that system placed russia in material breach of the inf treaty in russia unwillingness to change course in that regard forced us into the unhappy position of having to withdraw from the treaty in the wake of those russian violations. But that missile is only one a broad range new Russian Ground, sea, and air based nuclear or dual capable systems. These systems have longer ranges and lower yields than before and theyre coming online in support of a Russian Nuclear doctrine and strategy that emphasizes and demonstrates periodically boat coercive and military uses of nuclear weaponry. We assess russia does remain in compliance with the new start obligations but its behavior in connection with most other armscontrol agreements and not merely the ear faded in a has nothing short of appalling. As nothingd inf short of appalling. There is also the problem of chemical weapons or russia condones and seeks to ensure impunity for continued violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention by its syrian client staples of further alarming russia has itself used chemical weapons in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention by developing and using a socalled military grade nerve agent on the territory as the chairman indicated of a nato ally, the united kingdom, in 2018. Moscow is up to no good in new and emerging domains of actual or potential future conflict such as cyberspace and outer space. It has been developing capabilities in these respects and even as it is been trying to promote hollow and disingenuous proposals that went on address the challenges russia itself is working hard to create. This track record is a miserable one. I would are free to buy written statement for some of the details of how our responses are being directed. I would stress we are working to address these challenges on multiple fronts. They are robust and they are extensive. These efforts in the department of state are being approached increasingly and systematically is recording them into an integrated strategy for pushing back against russian mischief. The u. S. National Security Strategy makes clear it is our duty to take great competition seriously and we are doing so. If this resolution and focus in the face of National Security threats i think we very much need and can be our ticket to getting through this phase of geopolitical competition. We need to stay on course, maintaining our deterrent strategy, completing our own military modernization and reassure our allies not just of our capacity, but our enduring willingness to side with them against intimidation and aggression and keeping these initiatives on track while still seeking good faith negotiation to advanced shared interests where it is possible. I think we can stabilize and turn things around and that is what our policy is devoted to. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Im going to ask a question to start with and we will do a five minute round. Mr. Ford, give me your thoughts, if you would, i was one of the strong opponents of new start. Start has been in place as long as it has an we cant talk about in the setting the absolute compliance by the russians, but from a general standpoint, i think we can say theyre substantially more in compliance with the new start, the major weapons, than they ever were with the more intermediate weapons that were covered by the inf. Why the disparity . Why were they so far out of whack on inf and totally would ignore us as far as the pressing we did to get them to comply . Why the difference between the two treaties and the two agreements and the difference in the weaponry systems . Chairman, i would hesitate to get into mr. Putins head, but they clearly made a decision they felt they wanted to have the capabilities that the i never treaty did not allow them to have. They seem to have assumed we would remain compliant with the treaty even if we found out they were right in that regard. They were correct. We were scrupulously compliant for the entirety of our period in the treating. Something wey is are now working to try to address the challenge of meeting those russian threats with the development of new conventionally armed intermediate range systems such as the ground loans Chris Mitchell ground launched cruise missile. They assumed we would remain in compliance and they were correct for a while that they would be able to get away with not just testing by developing and deploying a treaty prohibited system and the hope we would not respond to it. Why they did not do Something Like that with new start is something i would not be in a position to hazard a guess about, but they dont seem to have decided they needed to. I would point out that russia is developing today and openly brags about the development of new strategic Delivery Systems, most of which it is difficult to imagine would ever be brought within the new start armscontrol framework. We have seen president putin rag about his developing of a new super heavy icbm, a development of a nuclear power, Nuclear Armed underwater drone. We are now all familiar with this sort of flying for noble disaster chernobyl disaster of their christmas all that had in the whiteality sea area just last august. There developing a whole range of systems including an air launch ballistic missile. Most of these are not likely to fall within new start and things russians are working very hard today. That is leaving aside the issue of the development of nonstrategic weapons. They already have a large arsenal and it is projected to grow dramatically over the next decade or so as well. These are things russia is already deciding to do and moving out upon outside the framework of current armscontrol, and that is something we need to make sure our policy is in a position to address. Thank you, dr. Ford. Hale, did russia interfere in the 2016 election in favor of donald trump . Could you put your microphone on, please . The Intelligence Community assessed Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 and our president ial election. Was the kremlin interference a hoax . No. Are you aware of any evidence ukraine interfered in the 2016 u. S. Election . I am not. Appreciate dr. Fiona hills , whomony before the house say that theory is a fictional narrative that is being perpetrated and propagated by the Russian Security services themselves. Do you have any reason to disagree with dr. Hill . I do not. In february 2017, at a press conference with the Hungarian Prime Minister orban, president putin himself suggested ukraine interfered and the 2016 u. S. Election. Did he not . I dont recall it, but i dont doubt it. He said as we all know during the president ial campaign in the United States, the Ukrainian Government adopted a unilateral position in favor of one candidate. More than that, certain oligarchs with the approval of the Political Leadership funded this candidate or female candidate to be more precise. Has this been a regular russian propaganda point since then . That ite not followed has been a regular point, but i dont follow that on a daytoday basis. Would it be in putins interest to push such a narrative . Possibly. Possibly. Well, let me ask you, youre the undersecretary here, how is it that on something as critical as russia visavis the United States and our National Security interest, you would think it would only possibly be in foods interest to push a narrative. What would be the other possibilities . I will say yes to your question. Close to president putin make this point to President Trump when they met in helsinki last year in any other conversations . I dont know. That is a problem. Neither do we. It is a problem with the president needs along with putin even confiscates the notes of his interpreter. But it is curious ukrainian interference in the 2016 election does not appear to be in the position of senior diplomats like yourself or any intelligence official, yet this line makes it somehow into the president s talking points. Is our National Security made stronger or weaker when members of the administration or members of congress insist on repeating debunked russian lies . That does not serve our interest. Let me turn to sanctions. Does the administration have authority under section 232 to impose sanctions against russian pipelines . Thatdont know we have exact authority. Im not an expert when it comes to pipelines. Let me offer to you, the answer is yes. As one of the authors, the administration has the authority under section 232 have cats or to impose sanctions against, among other things, russian pipelines. Why does the administration not imposed sanctions on worst dream to . The president talked about this pipeline but the administration has lifted has not lifted a finger to prevent the construction. This committee passed northation to require stream to sanctions, likely included in the ndaa of a senator shaking, senator cruz, but every day that takes by is one more where another pipe is laid. You could act today. Have any idea why youve not acted in this regard . I will say we are opposed to the north stream to pipeline and we have made you oppose it . You have the power to do something. Our policy reason why you have not actively pursue this sanctionable authority you have under the law to be able to stop what the administration imposes . So far weve been trying to use other tools to stop the north stream to pipeline from Going Forward but working with our allies in the eu in particular in that regard. The most powerful opportunity would be to create a huge problem for the Companies Involved that would lay the pipeline knowing it would be sanctioned and that would be the most powerful tool. You have it and you have not used it. Then he asked the secretary ford, are ctsa sanctions mandatory . Pins on which section youre referring to, but i think if youre talking about 231, senator, that is a yes. What is the trigger for 231 sanctions . It is a determination by the secretary of state that a significant transaction has therred with someone on list of specified persons relating to the russian did turkey begin to take to deliver the s 400 system on july 12, 2019 . That sounds correct. They took possession. I believe so. Did turkey pay for the system . To my knowledge. Upks public reports anywhere to 2. 5 billion. Transaction took place, russia deliver the system and turkey paid for it. I believe that is correct. Does the presence have an impact on u. S. Acute interest . Cooks we believe it does. That is why we have been unwinding turkey from the participation doesnt challenge nato . That is why the secretaries have made clear the f35 and s 400 cannot coexist. You have sanctioned china for purchasing the s 400 from russia, which i applied, but you sanctioned china for the very exact system that is clearly a significant transaction but turkey, 100 and four days later, with delivery, payment, and just recently, tested it against an f16, which im sure major negotiations a helluva lot better to try to get to the conclusion you want and we still have not sanctioned them. So you send a global message that in fact we are not serious about uniformly enforcing the sanctions the Congress Passed 982 and are mandatory. And that is a challenge because other countries closely, well, turkey got a pass, why cant i . And the consequences of that undermine the very essence of one of the major sanctions against russia which is to undermine its military procurement sales throughout the world. This needs to be i appreciate the chairman soon having a markup to try to move forward, but when you dont ultimately pursue mandatory sanctions, then the discretion that you seek and other ministrations have sought, but the discretion you seek is very tough for some of us to accept because if you dont do it when you are mandatory to, how are we going to believe when you have discretionary wont consistently use the discretion . This is a problem. Thank you. You are quite right regarding the issue with turkey, nato ally, by law, but youre going to have the opportunity and we will all have the opportunity to speak this next week and help out the administration in that regard. We do intend to a markup next week on the turkey bill. With that, senator johnson . Let me follow up on that and give you the opportunity, what is the reluctance to impose a mandatory sanctions on a nato ally . Secretary pompeo has made clear he will comply or we will law. Y with the caatsa this is a process still underway. Ranking mender inking member menendez, we did sanctioned china. They took possession in january 2018 and it was approximately eight months late