Brookings. I am briefly playing the role of mc to say hello beforehand it over to our moderator. Tom is a distinguished and accomplished npr reporter. Really thrilled he would join us. He spent a lot of time in the field in afghanistan, embedded with u. S. Combat units in other parts of the broader effort there that is now approaching the end of its second decade pretty soon. , my copanelist, acting laura miller. She has been at the Rand Corporation subsequently, where she recently completed a 200 page study on in afghanistan Peace Agreement, written as a simulated or model agreement that parties themselves could consider because even though we are aware that america is not gonna write the ultimate peace deal, the parties could benefit from some provocation. Weve been talking about having a peace negotiation for a long time but its not clear how specific people have gotten in there overall concepts about how that would be. She is now with the International Crisis group. A remarkable organization that does Field Research around the world. Speaking of remarkable, my intrepid Field Researcher extraordinaire, who has written a book on afghanistan several years ago and also studied Transnational Criminal Networks and insurgencies around the world, currently working on a book on mexico, and also has recently studied in nigeria, where she is back from Field Research, and indonesia, and many other parts of the world. I am a huge fan of her bravery and brilliance as she studies this kind of phenomenon. Tom, thank you for joining us. Over to you. Thank you to everyone for coming out. Is back inbank the news things to the Washington Post and the afghan papers. I hope you have many questions because we will start calling on you quickly. I want to start by asking michael how he sees things right , andith the peace talks also talk a little bit about your proposal to have 5000 troops in afghanistan for the next five years. As some of you may know, there is talk about reducing the forces in afghanistan, now currently about 13,000, down to about 8600. That could happen sometime this week. Tor plan says to go lower, 5000 for five years. Why that number . On the peace talks, i will say that the others no more, i hopefully will wait your appetite whet your appetite. Me, what they have done is the essence of what we have seen so far in substantive discussion of powersharing compromises, taliban, andthe forces that have no interest in working together right now, they are bitter enemies in the field. I think peace is a long way off, that is the bottom line. I hope i am wrong. I think we need a concept that americans can discuss, debate, and hopefully settle on to some extent for the new presidency. Thisst decided to write 5000 troops for five years concept when President Trump was talking about pulling out of syria completely, and may be turning his gaze next to afghanistan, and when democrats were criticizing trump for his fecklessness and recklessness in talking about foreign commitments, i sensed that the democrats also did not want to commit to a longlasting afghanistan presence either, everyone hopes we pull something out of the hat and go home without defeat but i dont think that is likely. The 5000 for five years concept is a way to take drama out of afghanistan policy and say lets have about the same size presence in afghanistan that we have in iraq and gradually go down to that number. Not suggesting we do it the first week of the new president ial term, whether it is a democrat or be elected President Trump, that could be a conceptual framework that would allow us to keep two or three and at least initially, one or two in the east. That would create kind of major footprint that allows us to do intelligence gathering, airpower strengths airpower strikes, which we still do a lot, i think its the most since 2012 or so. This would allow us to sustain the Afghan Forces with the help they need most, but continue to leave most of the fighting to them, as we have already been doing, frankly, for the better part of half a decade. That is the basic logic of the concept. It there is a suggestion that we glide down to the floor the next couple of years and then stop having annual reviews in washington that takes so much time and energy from senior policymakers, and dramatize and elevate afghanistan almost too much in our National Security discourse. Thats the basic concept. Laurel, you came out with a report, a peace plan. Talk a little bit about that, and also, do you think peace is a long way off . Maybe the peace deal could come soon, but actual peace is a long way off . I think peace is a long ways off but that doesnt mean that the Peace Process has to be a long way off. That doesnt mean it is not worth doing. Worth staying, for militarily and diplomatically engaged in afghanistan for some period of time, to give it a real shot. Where my analysis differs from michaels is that i dont think that, given that we have all seemed to digest the idea that the u. S. Is not going to win the war, the secondbest satisfactory option is to keep it going for an indefinite period of time, or specify a number of years. I dont think that is truly sustainable politically in the u. S. , i dont think it is sustainable even operationally for an indefinite period of time. It certainly doesnt do anything for the Afghan People who are greatly desirous of peace. In my report, i tried to paint a picture of what the substance of an outcome of peace negotiation might look like. It is a set of ideas and options arealternatives that intended to fill in some of the gaps in thinking and analysis of what the substance of peace could look like. I think when you look at it, you see the process will take a while and why it is difficult to do, because these are issues that will be very contentious. But you also see that afghanistan, although complicated, is not so much more complicated than a lot of other places around the world that have had Peace Processes, some of which have actually produced results. The kinds of issues and the kind of possible solutions are ones that have been explored in other Peace Processes, and occasionally succeeded in bringing down levels of violence. The taliban have repeatedly said they want all International Troops out of afghanistan. Your plan calls for some sort of a residual force that would be going after terrorists, isis and so forth. Talk a little bit about how you envision that kind of a force. I have included the idea of potentially having some kind of militaryinternational element that would Counter Terrorism efforts, working with afghans. Whether that could be led by americans i think is somewhat questionable. By no means, am i certain that you could get taliban agreement to such a residual force, certainly not at the outset of a negotiation. I dont think you could enter into a negotiation assuming you could get that as an outcome. But i think its something that you could try to get as an outcome of a peace negotiation. But i do think theres a hard question for u. S. Policymakers as to whether thats a musthave element of a Peace Process or a great if we can get it element of a Peace Process. Because i dont think its certain that you could get that through a Peace Process. The pentagon has repeatedly said they would like some sort of residual force to remain in the country. What about that . Youve been recently in afghanistan, talking to the taliban. Would they accept some sort of a residual force, do you think . Well, so, first of all, i that of many of the members of taliban and to the extent that i was able to speak with individuals, its not at all clear how close they are. So its also very important to understand that the taliban is talking to tremendous amount of people, in fact, to just about all the power brokers except members of the president and government. They tend to tell to people what they want to hear. So same individuals or same factions will tailor messages very much on the basis of what they expect the audience to hear. That said, with this preface, and the need to understand that we are very much, we, the International Community, is very much operating in a very opaque environment where preferences are not clear and not stated, there have been some consistencies. One of the most significant, most striking dimensions from the conversations i had was that the taliban members were systematically expressing that a disastrous outcome would be for the United States to withdraw without a deal with them. So, they still very much want that the u. S. Strikes a deal and they very much like the deal that the ambassador achieved by the end of august and then President Trump cancelled for canceled. For them thats still the , starting point of my further talk and more or less the end of what they envision, the talk. They are, however, very unhappy about the possibility of u. S. Withdrawing its forces without a deal with them, fearing this greatly augments a chance for civil war in afghanistan that they very much want to avoid. Now, some of the military people i talk with over in afghanistan say that the u. S. Leverage is the money to keep the country going. That if all u. S. Troops leave, the money leaves with them. Talk about the taliban. Do they talk about that . Oh, absolutely. Oh, absolutely. And thats another issue that they are very focused on with, really, quite consistent messaging across large numbers of interlocutors that it would be disastrous for the United States to liquidate its socioeconomic accomplishments in afghanistan and eliminate aid once they are in power. And they definitely believe that they will be in power, although they will make the argument that they will share power in some form with someone. And the in some form is really the crux of all the difficulties in the negotiations that will be the really, the hardest part. But nonetheless, they assume that they will be in power, that to some extent, in some form, they will share power and theyre also rather clear that they do not want to repeat the 1990s, including the economic, socioeconomic collapse in the country. And so, they message very clearly by pointing examples to saudi arabia and say, look, United States, you have such a great relationship with saudi arabia. We perfectly want a regime like saudi arabia. We would be very happy with a regime like this, so we and you could be friends after you made the deal with us and your forces leave. And you should keep the money flowing. And indeed, in my view, the really, the longterm or not even longterm, the grappling that the United States needs to , and the International Community needs to deal with is not just how do we get to a peace deal, how do we get to significant reduction of conflict, but how do we then shape the behavior of power brokers, one of which will be the taliban, quite likely in power in some form. What kind of leverage will we have so that we do not see really catastrophic loss of human rights and freedoms so that there is some accountability in the country and some respect for human rights and i very specifically say some because under the current situation, its problematic and its likely to see significant deterioration after peace deal. I wish that the peace deal could be the way the Afghan Government envisions it, essentially a replica of the colombian deal in which the taliban gets minimal penalties and just agrees to demobilize and have five seats in the afghan parliament. The Afghan Government still puts that forth as the model they want. They bring in colombian advisors constantly to explain the colombian process. I think its completely unrealistic. This is just not the way the deal will look like. Talk a little bit about the taliban. If all u. S. Troops leave, or even if theres a residual force, do you think the taliban have enough power to actually take over the country again . I would say they dont and they are well aware of it and thats why they are so leery of us leaving without having a deal with them, a deal that positions them well to have significant power in a Transitional Government and more than Transitional Government. So, they are well aware that they the security is the worst its been from many dimensions, the level of taliban influence is very significant. You can go to liberated districts in 20 miles out or 20 kilometers out of the liberated district, the taliban is there and government officials will not go there. In free districts, government officials might be absolutely hunkered down to just the office and have 40 body guards and not dare to step out of the office because of the level of taliban presence. But that said, the taliban is well aware they cannot just take the country. And that they will face a civil war that will be very fragmented civil war or that could erupt in the south. There are important southern power brokers who can become significant military obstacle and they will have capacities in the north. Its not going to be the line moving more and more north past the shomali plain, so they want to avoid that. The war is stalled but its stalled in the way that gives gradual, small accretion of power to the taliban. Ok. I would just add, i mean, i largely agree with that. Theres no question that if the United States left tomorrow, that the taliban would seek to take advantage of that. But there would be very strong opposition to the taliban. So likely a civil war . Likely an intensified and more multisided civil war than you see now. Its also why i find it quite worrisome that some on the Afghan Government side seem to be thinking theyd be better off with an american departure and no peace deal compromising with the taliban if thats a choice they had to make than going ahead and compromising with the taliban. I agree 100 but just to build on that point, i mentioned earlier, we all know that the United States has used more ordinance in afghanistan this last year or two than all through the 2010 decade except the very beginning of it. Thats extraordinary and it shows that the afghan army still needs a lot of help, even though theyre doing most of the fighting and dying and we only have, you know, at this point, 15 the number of people we had at peak, they are not ready to hold on. On the other hand, they do have all the major cities, 60plus percent of the population lives under Government Protection of one type or another, however imperfect. The u. S. Government stopped providing these kinds of statistics and the statistics are probably, you know, a lot more uncertain than i just made them sound anyway, but at present, the taliban is so far away from winning this away that winning this war that im really glad that laurel and vanda emphasized the point, they would not be the automatic and immediate victors if we pulled out, especially if we kept some of the Security Assistance flowing. So i think the most likely thing is either a hodgepodge of different smaller cities gradually falling into taliban control in different parts of the south and the north and the west, but the Government Holding on to other parts, or ultimately, you could imagine more of a ethnicallybased breakdown, pashtun versus tajiq with a lot of ethnic cleansing to each side help consolidate their own territories. I hope it never cops to that, of course, but you could imagine that as well. Those are the kind of outcomes as opposed to a complete taliban takeover. Now i would like you to each address this question ive been asking people really for the last several years, senior people, military people, civilian, how would you do it differently . Lets say the towers come down, the 9 11 attacks happened, military goes to afghanistan, overthrows the taliban, each of you is in charge of this effort. Tell me what your plan is. I go first . Yes. So, ill start with the early chronology. I think that and im not really being too harsh on the Bush Administration when i say this because everybody says they were distracted by iraq, they didnt care about afghanistan, but frankly, nobody cared about afghanistan. Once we got rid of the taliban, there was a hue and cry from any part of the american debate or europe that we should go in and do sort a medium footprint strategy and try to build up afghan institutions in what proved to be sort of a golden window of 02 to 06 when the taliban was not really fighting. That was the missed opportunity, above all others, in my judgment , because if you had built reasonably Competent Army and police in that period of time and tried to reach out, perhaps, to some more taliban elements and be more inclusive and more inclined towards amnesty for some of them, i think you could have built a society that sort of functioned and didnt create the huge opportunity for a taliban resurgence by 07, 08, 09. Thats the fundamental thing that the fundamental opportunity i think we missed , and again, im not really trying to be overly harsh on the Bush Administration because i wasnt advocating it myself at that time. I was distracted by iraq and by Homeland Security and by all the other things. So, its not accusatory but as i look back, that was the number one missed opportunity. Laurel . Youre in charge. I dont think that it would have been realistic to build up the Afghan Security forces or governance capacity, really, much more quickly or more effectively than was done, i just think there are natural limits on